LEGAL ETHICS
privilege clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his
LEGAL ETHICS
The embodiment of all principles of morality and refinement that should govern the conduct
of every member of the bar. (Justice Moran’s Foreword to Malcolm’s Legal and Judicial Ethics
as cited in Agpalo 2009, p. 2)
That branch of moral science of which treats of the duties which an attorney owes to the
court, to his client, to his colleagues in the profession and to the public. (Malcolm, Legal and
Judicial Ethics as cited in Agpalo 2009, p. 2)
A. PRACTICE OF LAW
PRACTICE OF LAW
Means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training, and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service which, device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill. (Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991)
It is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counseling, and
the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, which
may or may not be
ESSENTIAL CRITERIA DETERMINATIVE OF ENGAGING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (Taken from
Justice Padilla’s dissent in Cayetano vs. Monsod)
Code: H-A-C-A
(1) Habituality. The term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding himself
out to the public as a lawyer. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise.
(2) Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience.
(3) Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active practice and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation,
as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
(4) Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of
lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession as a
lawyer.
PRACTICE OF LAW AS A PRIVILEGE
The practice of law is not a natural, property or constitutional right but a mere privilege, a
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation. (In the
Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1, A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978)
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to a certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. These standards are neither dispensed with nor
lowered after admission. (In re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez,
A.M. No. L-363, July 31, 1962)
But while the practice of law is a privilege, a lawyer cannot be prevented from practicing law
except for valid reasons, the practice of law not being a matter of state’s grace or favor. (Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall (U.S.) 328, 18 L. ed 366)
PRACTICE OF LAW AS A PROFESSION, NOT A BUSINESS
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from a business
(a) A duty of public service, of which emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain
the highest eminence without making much money.
(b) A relation as officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
(c) A relation to client in the highest degree fiduciary.
(d) A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to
resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients. (Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name
“Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, G.R. No. X92-1, July 30, 1979)
A partnership in the practice of law is a mere relationship or association for such particular
purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on a trade or business or
of holding property. (Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name “Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, G.R. No. X92-1, July 30, 1979)
WHO MAY PRACTICE LAW, GENERALLY.
Any person who has been duly licensed as a member of the bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
(Rule 138, Sec. 1, Rules of Court.)
Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent INTELLECTUALLY, ACADEMICALLY, and equally important, MORALLY.
(Soriano vs. Dizon, A.C. No. 792, January 25, 2006)
Persons entitled to practice law, generally:
(1) Those admitted to the bar.
This requirement involves various phases consisting of:
(a) Furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualification.(Rule 138, Secs.
2, 5 and 6, Rules of Court)
(b) Passing the bar examinations. (Rule 138, Secs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14)
(c) Taking the lawyer’s oath before the Supreme Court itself. (Rule 138, Sec. 17, Rules of
Court)
(d) Signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of the Supreme Court a
certificate of the license to practice. (Rule 138, Secs. 18 and 19, Rules of Court)
(2) Those who remain in good and regular standing. (Continuing requirement for the practice
of law)
(a) Remain a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
(b) Regularly pay all IBP membership dues and other lawful assessments as well as the annual
professional tax receipt.
(c) Faithfully observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession.
(d) Be continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.
Qualifications for admission to the practice of law
Every applicant for admission to the practice of law must be:
Code: C-R-A-G-M-E
(a) A citizen of the Philippines.
(b) A resident of the Philippines.
(c) At least 21 years of age.
(d) A person of good moral character.
(e) Must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in
court.
(f) Possess the required educational qualifications.
(Rule 138, Sec. 2, Rules of Court)
Note: An applicant must have pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and
recognized university, college or school
A four-year high school course
A course of study prescribed for a bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences
A four-year bachelor’s degree in law with completed courses in civil law, commercial law,
remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social
legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, and legal ethics.
An applicant who has not completed his pre-legal education or completed the same only
after he began his study of law will not be qualified to take the bar examinations, and if by
concealment of that fact he is able to take and pass the bar examinations and thereafter is
admitted to the bar, his passing the bar examinations will not validate his admission to
practice, taking the prescribed course of legal study in the regular manner being as essential
as the other requirements for membership in the bar. (In the Matter of the Petition for
Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Martinez, A.C. No. 244, March 29, 1963)
(g) Pass the bar examinations.
Note: On September 3, 2013 the Supreme Court lifted the so-called “five-strike rule” for bar
examinees. The five-strike rule was first implemented in 2005 through Bar Matter No. 1161, a
resolution which disqualifies bar examinees who fail the bar five times from taking the exams
again.
Note: The Supreme Court, in the exercise of its power to admit applicants to the bar, may
likewise prescribe such other qualifications or requirements as it may deem necessary to
elevate the standards of the legal profession. The additional qualifications may be apart from
whatever qualifications the legislature may provide in the exercise of its legislative power. (In
the matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953; Albino Cunanan, et. al G.R. No. L-6784. March 12, 1954)
APPEARANCE OF NON LAWYERS
GENERAL RULE: Any person who has been duly licensed as a member of the bar in
accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is
entitled to practice law. (Rule 138, Sec. 1, Rules of Court.)
EXCEPTIONS:
Non-lawyers who can practice law.
(1) A law student who has successfully completed third year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school’s clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court. (Rule 138-A, Sec. 1, Rules of Court)
Note: Such law student may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent
clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. (Rule 138-A, Sec. 1, Rules of Court)
Note: The appearance of the law student shall be under the DIRECT supervision and control
of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. (Rule 138-A, Sec.2, Rules of Court)
The phrase “direct supervision and control” requires no less than the physical presence of the
supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale
behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit:
(a) To ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or
inexperience of law students, who not having as yet passed the test of professional
competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act as counsels on their own;
(b) To provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect
itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law
students; and
(c) To ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to
practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as
required
by law. (In re: Need that Law Student Practicing Under Rule 138-A Be Actually Supervised
During Trial, Bar Matter No. 730, June 13, 1997)
Note: Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be
signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. (Rule 138-A, Sec. 2,
Rules of Court)
(2) A party to a litigation in person OR through the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose in cases which the MTC has jurisdiction. (Rule 138, Sec. 34, Rules of Court)
(3) A party to the litigation before any other court. (Rule 138, Sec. 34, Rules of Court)
Note: In numbers 2 and 3 a law student before an inferior court may appear as an agent or
friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar. (In re: Need that Law
Student Practicing Under Rule 138-A Be Actually Supervised During Trial, Bar Matter No. 730,
June 13, 1997)
(4) In criminal cases before the MTC and a duly licensed member of the Bar is not available,
the court may appoint any person of good repute for probity and ability in the province to
defend the accused. (Rule 116, Sec. 7, Rules of Court)
(5) Non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter only:
If they represent themselves; or
If they represent their organization or members thereof.
(Art. 222, Labor Code of the Philippines, P.D. 442)
(6) Under the Cadastral Act, any person can represent himself or a claimant before the
Cadastral Court. (The Cadastral Act, Act 2259, Sec. 9)
(7) Any person appointed to appear for the Government of the Philippines in accordance
with law (Rule 138, Sec. 33, Rules of Court)
Note: Three limitations should be observed in order that the appearance of a layman on
behalf of another as authorized by law may be reconciled with the rule that admission to the
practice is a judicial function and that the practice of law is a lawful activity for members of
the bar only.
The following are the limitations:
(a) A layman should confine his work to non adversary contentions. He should not undertake
purely legal work such as the examination or cross-examination of witnesses or the
presentation of evidence. (Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Binalbagan Isabela
Sugar Co., G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971)
(b) The services should not be habitually rendered, habituality being one of the
characteristics of the practice of law.
(c) A layman should not charge or collect attorneys’ fees, one of the requisites for payment
thereof being the relation of attorney and client which cannot exist between a layman and a
person in whose favor representation is made. (Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971)
Note: A non-lawyer litigant allowed to appear by himself and conduct his own litigation is
bound by the same rules of procedure and evidence as those applicable to a party appearing
through counsel. Moreover, he may not be heard to complain later that he has been
deprived of the right to the assistance of counsel. (Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2009 p.
45)
Note: The prohibition against the practice of law by a layman is not in conflict with the right
of an individual to defend or prosecute a cause in which he is a party. An individual has long
been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend his own action, but his representation is
not considered to be practice of law. (Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2009 p. 45)
Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing
(1) In all katarungan pambarangay proceedings. (R.A. 7160, Sec. 415)
(2) Small Claims Cases (Rules of Procedure of Small Claims Cases)
Sanctions for practice or appearance without authority
Code: C-E-C-A-D-S
(1) A disbarred attorney until his re-admission or a suspended lawyer during his is prohibited
from engaging in the practice of law; and any such person who assumes to be an attorney is
liable for contempt of court (punishable by fine or imprisonment or both in the discretion of
the court.
(2) If the unauthorized practice on the part of a person who assumes to be an attorney
causes damage to a party is liable for estafa.
(3) A government official forbidden to practice law may be held criminally liable for violating
Secs. 7(b) and 11 of Republic Act 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel,
broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed
by their office unless expressly allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or
pending official transaction with their office.
Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he
holds office or employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity,
committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the
equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal
depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body
or agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be
prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five
thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent
jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient
cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal
prosecution is instituted against him. (c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as
co-principals, accomplices or accessories, with public officials or employees, in violation of
this Act, shall be subject to the same penal liabilities as the public officials or employees and
shall be tried jointly with them. (d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action
against any person who obtains or uses a report for any purpose prohibited by Section 8 (D)
of this Act. The Court in which such action is brought may assess against such person a
penalty in any amount not to exceed twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000). If another
sanction hereunder or under any other law is heavier, the latter shall apply.
(4) An officer or employee of the civil service, who as a lawyer, engages in the practice of law
without a written permit from the department head concerned may be held administratively
liable.
(5) Disbarment.
(6) Suspension.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PRACTICE OF LAW
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
Includes elective or appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in
the career or non-career service, including military and police personnel, whether or not they
receive compensation, regardless of amount. (Sec. 3(b), R.A. No. 6713, Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
General Rule: The appointment or election of an attorney to a government office disqualifies
him from engaging in the private practice of law.
Reason: A public office is a public trust, and a public officer or employee is obliged not only to
perform his duties with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
but also with EXCLUSIVE FIDELITY.
The disqualification is intended to:
Preserve public trust in a public office
Avoid conflict of interests or a possibility thereof
Assure the people of impartiality in the performance of public functions and thereby
promote the public welfare.
Public Officials who cannot practice law (Absolute Prohibition)
(1) Judges and other officials and employees of the courts (Rule 138, Sec. 5, Rules of Court)
(2) Officials or employees of the Solicitor General (Rule 138, Sec. 5, Rules of Court)
(3) Government Prosecutors (People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-19450, May 27, 1965)
(4) President, Vice-President, and members of the cabinet and their deputies and assistants
(Art. VII, Sec. 13, 1987 Constitution)
(5) Members of Constitutional Commissions (Art. IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution)
(6) Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. IX, Sec. 8 (2), 1987 Constitution)
(7) Civil Service Officers or employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their
entire time be at the disposal of the government (Ramos vs. Rada, A.M. No. 202, July 22,
1975)
(8) All governors, city and municipal mayors. (Sec. 90(a), R.A. No. 7160, Local Government
Code)
(9) Those prohibited by special law.
Exceptions:
Public Officials who can practice law but with restrictions (Relative Prohibition)
(1) A lawyer member of the Legislature is prohibited from appearing as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. (Art. VI, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution)
Note: What is prohibited is to “personally appear” in court and other bodies. The word
“appearance” includes not only arguing a case before any such body but also filing a pleading
on behalf of a client as “by simply filing a formal motion, plea, or answer.”
(2) Members of the sanggunian may engage in the practice of law except in the following:
(a) They shall not appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the adverse
party.
(b) They shall not appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of
the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.
(c) They shall not collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving
the local government of which he is an official
(d) They shall not use the property and personnel of the Government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the government. (Sec. 90(b), R.A.
No. 7160, Local Government Code of the Philippines)
(3) A civil service officer or employee whose duty or responsibility does not require his entire
time to be at the disposal of the Government may engage in the private practice of law
provided he can secure a written permit from the head of the department concerned. (Sec.
12, Rule XVIII, Revised Civil Service Rules; Ramos vs. Rada, A.M. No. 202, July 22, 1975)
(4) Retired judge or justice receiving pension from the Government, cannot act as counsel in
a civil case in which the Government or any of its subdivision or agencies is the adverse party
or in a criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is the accused of an
offense in relation to his office. (Sec. 1, R.A. No. 910)
(5) A former government attorney cannot, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in the said service. (Rule 6.03, Code of Professional Responsibility)
Note: Certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their
profession or to engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong
barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusion
alterius. (Catu vs. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, 19 February 2008)
Lawyers authorized to represent the government
The following are authorized to represent the government:
(1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines,
its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents
in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When
authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent
government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. (Sec. 35, Administrative Code of 1987)
(2) Deputized provincial or city fiscal. (Sec. 35, Administrative Code of 1987)
(3) Deputized legal officers of the government departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices to
assist the Solicitor General in cases involving their respective offices. (Sec. 35, Administrative
Code of 1987
(4) Any person appointed to appear for the Government of the Philippines in accordance
with law (Rule 138, Sec. 33, Rules of Court)
Lawyer’s oath
I,________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or
give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Note: The lawyer’s oath is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. It is a
condensed code of legal ethics. The significance of the oath is that it not only impresses upon
the attorney his responsibilities but it also stamps him as an officer of the court with rights,
powers and duties. It is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action. (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Agpalo 2009, p. 68)
B. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
TO SOCIETY
Respect for law and legal processes (Canon 1)
Efficient and convenient legal services (Canon 2)
True, honest, fair, dignified and objective information on legal services (Canon 3)
Participation in the improvement and reforms in the legal system (Canon 4)
Participation in the legal education program (Canon 5)
 Lawyers in Government Service (Canon 6) (1) Abandonment of wife and cohabiting with another woman. (Obusan vs. Obusan, A.M.
1392, April 2, 1984)
CANON 1
(2) A lawyer who had carnal knowledge with a woman through a promise of marriage which
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND he did not fulfill. (Quingwa vs. Puno, A.C. No. 389, February 28, 1987)
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
(3) Seduction of a woman who is the niece of a married woman with whom the respondent
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. lawyer had adulterous relations. (Royong vs. Oblena, G.R. No. 376, April 30, 1963)
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at (4) Delivering bribe money to a judge on request of the clients. (Lee vs. Abastillas, A.M. No.
lessening confidence in the legal system. RTJ-92-863 and AC. No. 3815, July 11, 1994)
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or Rule 1.02 - Duty not to counsel illegal activities
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
The ethics of the legal profession imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to promote respect for law and legal
admit of a fair settlement.

Rule 1.01 - Duty not to engage in unlawful conduct

Unlawful conduct

Is an act or omission which is against the law. (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Agpalo 2009, p. 72)

An immoral or deceitful conduct is one that involves moral turpitude. (Legal and Judicial
Ethics, Agpalo 2009, p. 72)

Immoral conduct

Connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community. For such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. (Ui vs.
Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000)

That conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. (Arciga vs. Maniwang,
A.M. No. 1608, August 14, 1981)

Not confined to sexual conduct, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness. (Advincula vs. Macabata,
A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007)

Moral Turpitude

Means anything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals, or to
any act of vileness, baseness or depravity in the private and social duties that a man owes his
fellowmen or to society, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and
man. (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Agpalo 2009, p. 106)

Instances of gross immorality:

Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be
a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating
an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice
of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past
work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor –
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does
In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
PP VS VILLANUEVA
ACTS:On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva
with crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality.
Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte.
The complainant in the same case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo
City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of
the the Secretary of Justice.
Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private
prosecutor in this case, “this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised
Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
ISSUE: Whether of not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised
Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
RULING:
The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. The word private practiceof law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration
of his said services. It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA
Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified
to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction
and is in violation of the law for requiring such examination as condition precedent before
members of the bar may be allowed to represent applicants in the preparation and
prosecution of applications for patents. Undaunted, Agrava argued that that the prosecution
of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law and that the Rules of
Court do not prohibit the Patent Office from requiring further condition or qualification from
those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office.
ISSUE: Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law
HELD:
Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. Although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and
application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be
rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. All these things involve
the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal
knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
As stated in 5 Am. Jur, “The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation
in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions.”
The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, since much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other
laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part
of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals
from his orders and decisions are, taken to the Supreme Court.
Cui v Cui
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don
Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids,
and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act
No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case
of their incapacity or death, to “such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the
order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of
Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960,
the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant
to a “convenio” entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial document.
Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of his brother’s
assumption of the position. Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his
brother Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was
not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and under
equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However,
before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the
legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado),
should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses,
should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.Jesus Ma. Cui
holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although
disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the
position of administrator of the Hospicio. The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere
possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due
admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone,
conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not
entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as
evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
“successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
approved by the Secretary of Education.The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer,
first of all, because in all of the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working
knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.Under
this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of
administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for
immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated
before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral
rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first
place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
Khan vs. Simbillo, A.C No. 5299, August 19, 2003 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378

FACTS: FACTS:

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:“Annulment Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
of Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those
4-6mos provided thecase will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
appears that similar advertisements were also published.An administrative complaint was
filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved Annex A
to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not SECRET MARRIAGE?
appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he
should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against P560.00 for a valid marriage.
advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any wayby the prohibition.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ISSUE: Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
HELD:
Please call: 521-0767,
Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is
public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to LEGAL5217232, 5222041
public service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
their primary interest.Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he
erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.Solicitation of
business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the Annex B
dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears must
GUAM DIVORCE
be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily
paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of DON PARKINSON
which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.

Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.

Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign

Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy

CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

 clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to
court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtueof the
of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
sought in his petition as herein before quoted. assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
supposedly in the light of the caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
reportedly decidedby the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977. the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
Issue: Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised normal by-product of effective service which is rightand proper. A good and reputable lawyer
by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
subject of the advertisements herein complained of. difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute
practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, as defined:Black defines "practice of law" as:"The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with thelaw." The contention of
respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered
nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer
systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent
IN RE: EDILLON (AC 1928 12/19/1980)
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name
of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership
fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the
IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of
as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of
the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of
Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote
in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the
regulatory program – the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary.
Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment,
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions
and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their
annual dues.
In the matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez
FACTS:
DIAO was admitted to the Bar. 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications.
Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from the roll of
attorneys i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:
1. Did not complete his high school training
2. Never attended Quisumbing College
3. Never obtained a diploma.
DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third year,
he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein,
which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma
Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is
clearly meritorious: i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his
application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate. ii. Now, asserting he had
obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949 1. He said erroneously
certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
ISSUE: WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not
completing pre-law requirements? NO.
HELD:
STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS
LAWYER’S DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS. Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.
Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies
(2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. He
would not have been permitted to take the bar tests: i. Bar applicant must affirm under
oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education (A.A.). ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations iii. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and
is hereby revoked.
Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking
the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
In Re Petition of Arthur Cuevas
Facts
Prior to the Bar Examinations, together with the others, petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., was
convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide due to his participation in the
initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the San Beda College. The
initiation rites resulted to the death of Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte.
Fortunately, petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, JR., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations.
However his oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court’s resolution dated August
27, 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that
should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending
approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. He was discharged from
probation and his case considered closed and terminated.
In the petition received by the Supreme Court, petitioner prays that he be allowed to take his
lawyer’s oath attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation. Along with this, he presented
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character issued by the
authorities therein. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner’s application,
resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I.
Camaligan, to comment thereon. In the comment, Atty. Gilbert said that he has forgiven the
accused and he is not right now in a position to say whether petitioner, since then, has
become morally fit to the noble profession of the law and politely submits this matter to the
sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. has the moral fitness to take his lawyer’s oath and sign
the Roll of Attorneys.
Ruling
Petitioner is allowed to tale the Lawyer’s Oath and Roll of Attorneys.
The Court shares the same sentiment of Atty. Camaligan and condoles with the untimely
death of his son who is expected to become a lawyer and succeed his father. In his comment
submitted to the Court, Atty. Camaligan submits that the petitioner has been morally fit to be
admitted to the membership to the Philippine Bar, tot the sound discretion of the Court. The
deliberate participation of Cuevas in the initiation rites indicated that petitioner does not
possess the moral fitness required for the admission to the Bar. However, petitioner was
discharged from probation without any infraction thereafter of the conditions of the
probation and the various certifications attesting to his righteous character.
The Court then decided to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it allowed Al
Argosino, petitioner’s to take the lawyer’s oath.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER.
(CASE DIGEST)
FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the
Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He
then realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance
of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.
He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not
as important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number
for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was
unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts
as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for
petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner
could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the
imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law. Not allowing
Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate
penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this
case, said action is not warranted. The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good
faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years; that he has
shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and
that he appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at different firms and companies.
However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction. A mistake of law
cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law
and its consequences.
Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that
what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was just an attendance
record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as
it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this
knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent
the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court
imposed upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of
P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the
practice of law.
In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)
FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan
stemmed from the affliction of severe physical injuries uponhim in course of "hazing"
conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the
accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr.
Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2) years,
counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise
him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed
and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.On April 15,
1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to
the practice of law. He averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted
that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.
ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to
the practice of law
HELD: Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as
complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those who are
seeking admission to the bar. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for
the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. In short, he mustshow evidence that he is a different person now, that
he has become morally fitfor admission to the profession of law.He is already directed to
inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names of the parents or
brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice. NOTES:
The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of goodmoral character,
with special education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public
and proper administration of justice is concerned.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar.
Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who wouldseek admission to
the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from
members of the general public.
Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was possessed of good moral character.
Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at the
time of the application for permission to take the barexaminations and more importantly at
the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Magdalena T. Arciga vs. Segundino D. Maniwang
Facts:
· Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October 1970 in Cebu City.
Magdalena was a medical technology student while Segundino was a law student.
· On March 1971, Magdalena and Segundino had sexual congress. Thereafter, they had
repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and
Magdalena were secretly married.
· In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his
studies to Dava City.
· Magdalena discovered in January 1973 that she was pregnant. The two went to her
hometown, Ivisan, Capiz to apprise Magdalena’s parents that they were married although
they were not. The respondent convinced Magdalena’s father to have the church wedding
deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations where he secured his birth
certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
· Segundino reassured Magdalena that he would marry once he passed the bar
examinations. The latter gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973.
· Segundino passed the bar examinations that was released April 25, 1975. After the
oathtaking, Segundino stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Magdalena went to Davao to
contat Segundino. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money.
· In December 1975 Magdalena followed Segundino in Bukidnon only to find out that
their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang.
· Segundino followed Magdalena in Davao and inflicted physical injuries upon her
because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang.
· Magdalena Arciga then filed a disbarment case on the ground of grossly immoral
conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her.
Issue:
· Whether or not Segundino Maniwang should be disbarred on the ground of grossly
immoral conduct.
Ruling No, Segundino Maniwang shouldn’t be disbarred. The Supreme Court found that
respondent’s refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to
warrant disbarment. The complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby
dismissed.
Ui vs. Bonifacio
Facts:
Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out an illicit
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children. Hence, a
complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant against respondent before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s
husband. It is respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit
because they were married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered
Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos
Ui never lived with her.
Issue:
Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to
be barred from the practice of law.
Held:
The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged
immorality, was dismissed.
All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship
with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot
be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the
moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly
immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.