PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 1
PROBLEMS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
Atty: Jose Glenn C. Capanas
EH 406 3rd year 2nd sem S.Y. 2020-2021
Module 1 – Introduction and Orientation
Module 2
Practice of Law (Part 1)
Definition
Practice of Law means any activity, in our out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill. (Cayetano v. Monsod)
What constitutes practice of law
Cayetano v. Monsod
Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Corazon Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years. Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law office of his
father (1960-1963); an operations officer with the World Bank
Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment
bank (1970-1986); legal or economic consultant on various
companies (1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986);
member of Constitutional Commission (1986-1987); National
Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and member of the quasi-
judicial Davide Commission (1990).
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and void.
Issue:
WON Monsod possesses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
Held:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court.
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava,
stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
"practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s
past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least 10 years.
Criteria
According to Justice Padilla, in his dissent in Cayetano,
the following factors are considered in determining
whether there is practice of law:
1. Habituality
• To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter,
means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
• The term 'practice of law' implies customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer
such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of
law, or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer
before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law
in all courts in the country. (People v. Villanueva)
2. Compensation
Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill
is within the term 'practice of law', and, one who renders
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (People
v. Villanueva).
3. Application of law, legal principles, practice or
procedure, which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience.
4. Attorney-client relationship
Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a

lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge
of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as
teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be
said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer.
Note: The test is the activity, NOT who/what he or she is.
Rule:
Even without authority, a person is practicing law, if
he/she represents another.
Exception:
Unless he represents himself.
Meaning and extent of practice of law
1. Giving out legal information (Ulep vs Legal Clinic, 23
SCRA 378);
2. Offering of free paralegal advice and making parties
execute Special Power of Attorney that would make him
an agent of the litigants and allow him to file suits,
pleadings and motions with himself as one of the plaintiffs
[Ciocon-Reer vs Lubao, AM OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ
(2012)];
3. Preparation of an extrajudicial settlement of estate
[Adrienda vs Monilla, AM No. P-11-2980(2013)];
4. Motions filed before an administrative body (BSP OSI)
and regular court (Extension and notice of change of
address); said lawyer furnished with orders issued by
legal officer of BSP OSI [Villatuya vs Tabalingcos, AC
No. 6622 (2014);]
5. A trained mind is what clients were relying upon
execution of Special Power of Attorney in favour of
suspended lawyer [Bonifacio vs Era, AC No. 11754
(2017)]; and
6. Appearance before the Election Canvassers and filed
various pleadings; called himself “counsel” [Aguirre vs
Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036, (2003)].
Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Legal support services constitute practice of law.
SYLLABUS
1. PRACTICE OF LAW, MEANING AND EXTENT OF. —
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or
skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal
rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be
pending in a court.
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law
generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity:
(1) Legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them
of their rights and obligations,
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 2
(2) Preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and
(3) Appearance for clients before public tribunals which
possess power and authority to determine rights of life,
liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in
proper interpretation and enforcement of law.
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself
as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes
the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after
the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another
and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that
extent, practicing law.
2. LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES CONSTITUTE PRACTICE
OF LAW. — The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide
range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the
perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law." The contention of respondent that
it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been
offering, to wit: . . . While some of the services being offered
by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical know-how, such as the installation of computer
systems and programs for the efficient management of law
offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoptation, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for
the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as
if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said
law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice
of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court
since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal
research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
Ciocon-Reer v. Lubao
Issue:
Whether or not Karaan is engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law and therefore liable for indirect contempt
Ruling:
Yes. Karaan is engaged in the practice of law and thus liable
for indirect contempt.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Here, the
OCA was able to establish the pattern in Karaan's

unauthorized practice of law. He would require the parties
to execute a special power of attorney in his favor to
allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as their
attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary
complaint and other pleadings "acting for and in his own
behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative" of the
parties. The fact that Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings
that he was a member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorney's Roll,
or MCLE Compliance Number does not detract from the fact
that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the practice
of law.
Under Section 3 (e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a person "assuming to be an attorney or an officer
of a court, and acting as such without authority," is liable for
indirect contempt of court.
Arienda v. Monilla
The preparation of an extrajudicial settlement of estate
constitutes practice of law.
Not being a lawyer, respondent had no authority to prepare
and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of estate. Worse,
respondent also admitted receiving money from complainant
for her services. Being a court employee, respondent ought
to have known that it was improper for her to prepare and
finalize the extrajudicial settlement of estate, a service only a
lawyer is authorized to perform, and to receive money
therefor.
It is true that respondent prepared and finalized the
extrajudicial settlement of estate pursuant to a private
agreement between her and complainant. However,
respondent is an employee of the court whose conduct must
always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility as to let her be free from any
suspicion that may taint the judiciary. She is expected to
exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in
the performance of her official duties but also in her personal
and private dealings with other people to preserve the court's
good name and standing.
Respondent's behavior and conduct, which led other people
to believe that she had the authority and capability to prepare
and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of estate even when
she is not a lawyer, clearly fall short of the exacting standards
of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees.
Villatuya v. Tabalingcos
The motions filed by Mr. Tabalingcos before an
administrative body exercising quasi-judicial function
and before a regular court clearly constituted practice of
law. When he asked for an extension of time to file reply, he
clearly represented himself as counsel for complainant
Uniwide Holdings, Inc. This misrepresentation is easily
discerned from the opening sentence of the motion and from
his signature therein, together with his PTR and IBP numbers,
his roll number, and his MCLE Compliance number.
The misrepresentation by Mr. Tabalingcos is further
established by the fact that the Office of Special Investigation
of the BSP furnished him copies of numerous Orders issued
in OSI Adm. Case No. 2012-027 from September 2012 until
November 2013. These Orders indicate that he is the counsel
for complainant Uniwide Holdings, Inc.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 3
We can easily conclude from these facts that despite having
been disbarred on 10 July 2012, Mr. Tabalingcos continued
to engage in the practice of law, even if he has yet to be re-
admitted to the Bar.
In San Luis v. Pineda, we have warned lawyers who have
been disbarred not to engage in the practice of law without
first being reinstated to the bar. To do so would constitute
contempt of court.
Remedies to suppress the unauthorized practice of law
include a petition for injunction, declaratory relief and
contempt of court, among others. The proceedings may
be initiated by an aggrieved or interested party or by a
bar association.
Bonifacio v. Era
Atty. Era's acts constituted "practice of law because a
trained mind is what clients were relying upon execution
of Special Power of Attorney in favour of suspended
lawyer”
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the
following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning clients
in the public auction of the condemned properties; (2)
tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the
certificate of sale and presented the said document to the
corporation's officers and employees present in the premises
at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new
owners of the subject properties, hence, should be allowed
entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the
properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his
law office as regards the payment of the judgment award with
interest instead of pulling out the properties.
It is true that being present in an auction sale and
negotiating matters relating to the same may not be
exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating
Commissioner. However, in this case, as aptly put by the
Board in its Resolution, Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the
determination by a trained legal mind of the legal effects and
consequences of each course of action in the satisfaction of
the judgment award. Precisely, this is why his clients chose
Atty. Era to represent them in the public auction and in any
negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising from the
labor case as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era.
Such trained legal mind is what his clients were relying upon
in seeking redress for their claims. This is evident from the
fact that they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement
without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter being
their lawyer. It could readily be seen that the said SPA was
executed by reason of Atty. Era being their legal counsel.
Thus, We are one with the Board's submission that the said
SPA cannot be invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he
was not engaged in the practice of law in performing the acts
above-cited as such SPA cunningly undermines the
suspension ordered by this Court against Atty. Era, which We
cannot countenance.
Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law
during his suspension.
As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of
law for a period of two years in this Court's Decision dated
July 16, 2013. He performed the above-cited acts on the
same year, specifically November to December 2013.

Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized law
practice.
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful
order of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is
found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's lawful order
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas
is likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) month, effective
immediately from receipt of this Decision. Also, both Attys.
Era and Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar offense, or a commission of another offense will
warrant a more severe penalty.
Remedies to Suppress Unauthorized Practice of Law
1. Petition for Injunction
2. Petition for Declaratory Relief
3. Contempt of Court (Rule 71 – specifically, Indirect
Contempt)
Atty: But this list is not exclusive.
Who can avail of these remedies?
The 3 persons who can avail are:
1. Aggrieved Party
2. Interested Party
3. Bar Associations
So not any person can avail of these remedies. It must be
of the three as provided by the Supreme Court. (Villatuya
v. Tabalingcos)
Private Practice
People v. Villanueva
Assistant city attorney handling case for relative with
permission of superior not in prohibited private practice.
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW EMPLOYED IN THE
GOVERNMENT; PROHIBITION TO ENGAGE IN PRIVATE
PRACTICE; MEANING. — Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice
of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within
the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer
and demanding payment for such services. The appearance
as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
The word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice
of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
2. ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY HANDLING CASE FOR
RELATIVE WITH PERMISSION OF SUPERIOR NOT IN
PROHIBITED PRIVATE PRACTICE. — The isolated
appearance as a private prosecutor, previously authorized by
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 4
his superior, of an assistant city attorney in a criminal case for
malicious mischief before a justice of the peace court where
the offended party is his relative, does not violate Section 32,
Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court,
which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap Inc.,
Isolated assistance in entering into a compromise
agreement does not constitute a prohibited “private
practice” of law by a public official.
ISOLATED ASSISTANCE BY A PUBLIC OFFICIAL DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE PROHIBITED "PRIVATE PRACTICE"
OF LAW; CASE AT BAR. — Finally, we find no merit in
petitioner's contention that the compromise agreement
should be annulled because Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who
assisted him in entering into such agreement, was then an
employee of the Quezon City government, and is thus
prohibited from engaging in the private practice of his
profession. Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance
provided by Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering into a
compromise agreement does not constitute a prohibited
"private practice" of law by a public official. "Private practice"
of a profession, specifically the law profession does not
pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a
lawyer. Such was never established in the instant case.
Tan-Yap v. Patricio
Assisting a wife in preparing a motion to intervene does
not constitute private practice of law.
With respect to respondent judge's act of assisting his wife in
preparing a motion to intervene and affixing his signature
thereon, the Court agrees with respondent judge that the
same does not constitute private practice of law. In Office
of the Court Administrator v. Judge Floro, Jr., we held:
x x x What is envisioned by 'private practice' is more than an
isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent
customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a
lawyer. In herein case, save for the 'Motion for Entry of
Judgment,' it does not appear from the records that Judge
Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court
proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe
to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floro's act of filing the
motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does
not in any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover,
we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is obviously not
lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the
petitioner.
Atty: Was the case of Cayetano v. Monsod, insofar as
the definition of practice of law overturned by the
cases of Borja and Tan-Yap?
No.
In the cases of Borja and Tan-Yap, it was centered on the
private practice of law (public officials) and not on the
general definition of practice of law.

When we talk about the general concept of practice of law,
we apply Cayetano v. Monsod.
When the question is about unauthorized practice of law,
then we can rely in the case of Cayetano v. Monsod. It is
not only the common or lay person who can be guilty of
unauthorized practice of law. Even judges and lawyers
can be guilty.
How come?
Example a judge or a lawyer who has been suspended by
the SC and despite the suspension, such lawyer or judge
still engaged in an activity that requires the application of
legal knowledge.
On the other side, we look at the cases of Villanueva,
Borja, and Tan-Yap. That there are public officials who are
engaged in the application of legal knowledge.
But the context there is that the issue is if they are
considered in the private practice of law.
Practice of law is a PRIVILEGE
Aguirre v. Rana
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional
right but is a privilege.
1. RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW IS NOT A NATURAL OR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BUT IS A PRIVILEGE. — The
right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer
of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.
2. ADMISSION TO THE BAR; REQUISITES THEREOF. —
Respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and
took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The
fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to
be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered
by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant charged respondent for unauthorized practice of
law, violation of law, grave misconduct and grave
misrepresentation. The Court referred the case to the Office
of the Bar Confidant ("OBC").
The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 5
appeared in the proceedings before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers and filed various pleadings without
license to do so. Respondent called himself "counsel,"
knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no
authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral
unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. The Court
however, ruled, that the two other charges of violation of law
and grave misconduct were not supported by evidence.
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must
possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in
the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of
greater importance than possession of legal learning.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the
morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot
practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
MCLE (Mandatory Continuing Legal Education)
Establishing the MCLE
SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 113-
03
SECTION 2. Functions. — The MCLE Office shall carry out
the objectives of mandatory continuing legal education as
stated in Rule 1 of the MCLE Rules.
*Rule 1 of Bar Matter No. 850
RULE 1
Purpose
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. — Continuing legal
education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they
keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics
of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice
of law.
Exempt lawyers aged 75 years and above who are not
engaged in active law practice, public and private,
after complying with the requirements
MCLE Resolution No. 01-2007, June 1, 2007
WHEREFORE, aware of the plight of lawyer-retirees who
refuse to give up their IBP membership, the MCLE Governing
Board finds it logical, compassionate, and reasonable to
exempt lawyers who are seventy-five years old and above,
from compliance with MCLE requirements and allow them to
perform notarial work only for a living;
WHEREFORE, pursuant to section 2 (a), Rule 7 of Bar Matter
No. 850, the MCLE Governing Board resolved to exempt
lawyers aged 75 years and above who are not engaged in
active law practice, public and private, after complying
with the foregoing requirements subject to the following
conditions:
a. The applicant shall file a verified application for
exemption attaching thereto a duly authenticated certificate
of live birth from the National Statistics Office or any
acceptable proof of age;
 PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 6

b. An undertaking that he/she will not be engaged in the

practice of law other than notarial work;

c. Pay the MCLE exemption fee of P1,000.00 under Section

15 (c) of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
lmplementing Regulations; and

d. Pay IBP dues and other fees required by the IBP

Governing Board.

This resolution shall take effect immediately. 26 April

2007.

Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the

Counsel’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption

Bar Matter No. 1922, as amended by SC

Resolution dated January 14, 2014

Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal

Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed
with the Courts the Counsel’s MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption.

The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008,

of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura,
Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education and Bar
Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing interest of the
members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the

Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE
practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings
filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number
and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the
immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to
disclose the required information would subject the
counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action.

Rules for non-disclosure of current MCLE

compliance/exemption number in the pleadings

(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine:

• Php 2,000.00 - first offense
• Php 3,000.00 - second offense
• Php 4,000.00 - third offense

(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a

delinquent member of the Bar pursuant to section 2, Rule
13 of Bar Matter No. 850 and its implementing rules and
regulations; (delinquent member – will be stripped of all the
benefits of being a member)

(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged from the

case and the client/s shall be allowed to secure the
services of a new counsel with the concomitant right to
demand the return of fees already paid to the noncompliant
lawyer.
 PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 7

Module 3 (e) Supervising Lawyer refers to a member of the Philippine

Practice of Law (Part 2) Bar in good standing who is authorized by the law school to
supervise the law student practitioner under this Rule.
When non-lawyers may practice law
SECTION 3. Eligibility Requirements of Law Student
General Rule:
Practitioners. — No law student shall be permitted to
Only those who are members of the bar are entitled to engage in any of the activities under the Clinical Legal
practice law. Education Program of a law school unless the law student
has applied for and secured the following certifications:
Exceptions:
1. Law students (Revised Law Student Practice Rule); (a) Level 1 certification, for law students who have
2. By an agent/friend (Rule 138, Section 34); successfully completed their first-year law courses; and/or
3. By the litigant himself; and
4. Non-Lawyers in Administrative Tribunals (b) Level 2 certification, for law students currently enrolled
for the second semester of their third-year law courses:
a. NLRC or any Labor Arbiter
Provided however, where a student fails to complete all their
b. National Commission on Indigenous Peoples third-year law courses, the Level 2 certification shall be
c. PhilHealth (National Health Insurance Act) deemed automatically revoked.
d. Cadastral Court
e. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication The certification issued shall be valid until the student has
Board (DARAB) completed the required number of courses in the clinical legal
education program to complete the law degree, unless
(1) Law Students sooner revoked for grounds stated herein.

SECTION 4. Practice Areas of Law Student Practitioners.

Rule 138-A: Law Student Practice, A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC,
[June 25, 2019] — Subject to the supervision and approval of a supervising
lawyer, a certified law student practitioner may:
SECTION 1. Coverage. — This rule shall cover the limited
For Level 1 Certification
practice of law by students certified herein. The limited
practice of law covers appearances, drafting and submission
(1) Interview prospective clients;
of pleadings and documents before trial and appellate courts
and quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, assistance in
(2) Give legal advice to the client;
mediation and other alternative modes of dispute resolution,
legal counselling and advice, and such other activities that
(3) Negotiate for and on behalf of the client;
may be covered by the Clinical Legal Education Program of
the law school as herein provided.
(4) Draft legal documents such as affidavits, compromise
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — agreements, contracts, demand letter, position papers, and
the like;
(a) Clinical Legal Education Program is an experiential,
(5) Represent eligible parties before quasi-judicial or
interactive and reflective credit-earning teaching course with
administrative bodies;
the objectives of providing law students with practical
knowledge, skills and values necessary for the application of
(6) Provide public legal orientation; and
the law, delivery of legal services and promotion of social
justice and public interest, especially to the marginalized,
(7) Assist in public interest advocacies for policy formulation
while inculcating in the students the values of ethical
and implementation.
lawyering and public service. It consists of learning activities
covered by this Rule undertaken in either a 1) law clinic or an
For Level 2 Certification
2) externship, which shall incorporate the teaching of legal
theory and doctrines, practical skills, as well as legal ethics.
(1) Perform all activities under Level 1 Certification;
(b) Externship is part of the clinical legal educational program
(2) Assist in the taking of depositions and/or preparing judicial
if: (a) it allows students to engage in legal work for the
affidavits of witnesses;
marginalized sectors or for the promotion of social justice and
public interest, and (b) it is undertaken with any of the
(3) Appear on behalf of the client at any stage of the
following: (i) the courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
proceedings or trial, before any court, quasi-judicial or
(IBP), government offices; and (ii) law school-recognized
administrative body;
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
(4) In criminal cases, subject to the provisions of Section 5,
(c) Law Clinic refers to an office or center which is a
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to appear on behalf of a
component of the law school's clinical legal education
government agency in the prosecution of criminal actions;
program that renders legal assistance and services as herein
and
provided to eligible persons, groups, and/or communities.
(5) In appealed cases, to prepare the pleadings required in
(d) Law Student Practitioner is a law student certified under
the case.
Section 3 of this Rule.

SECTION 5. Certification Application Requirements. —
The law student must submit a duly-accomplished application
form under oath in three (3) copies, accompanied by proof of
payment of the necessary legal and filing fees.
The law school, through the dean or the authorized
representative, shall submit to the Office of the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) having jurisdiction
over the territory where the law school is located, the duly-
accomplished application form together with an endorsement
under oath.
Level 1 Certification
The Executive Judge of the RTC shall evaluate, approve, and
issue the certification within ten (10) days from receipt of the
application.
The Level 1 certification issued under this provision shall be
valid before all courts, quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies within the judicial region where the law school is
located.
Level 2 Certification
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the application, the
Executive Judge of the RTC shall (a) evaluate the application
together with its attachments, and (b) recommend to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the approval and
issuance of the certification. If the Executive Judge finds the
application to be incomplete, the law school shall be notified
and required to comply with the requirements within five (5)
days from receipt of notice.
The Level 2 certification issued under this provision shall be
valid before all courts, quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies.
SECTION 6. Duties of Law Student Practitioners. —
Acting under a certification, the law student practitioner shall:
(a) Observe the provisions of Section 24 (b), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court;
(b) Be prohibited from using information acquired in one's
capacity as a law student practitioner for personal or
commercial gain;
(c) Perform the duties and responsibilities to the best of one's
abilities as a law student practitioner; and
(d) Strictly observe the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
SECTION 13. Sanctions. — (a) Without prejudice to existing
laws, rules, regulations, and circulars, the following shall be
considered as unauthorized practice of law by a certified law
student practitioner —
i. Engaging in any of the acts provided in Section 4 of this
Rule without the necessary certification or without the
consent and supervision of the supervising lawyer;
ii. Making false representations in the application for
certification;
iii. Using an expired certification to engage in the limited
practice of law under this Rule;
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 8
iv. Rendering legal services outside the scope of the practice
areas allowed under Section 4 of this Rule;
v. Asking for or receiving payment or compensation for
services rendered under the Clinical Legal Education
Program as provided in this Rule; and
vi. Such other analogous circumstances.
Unauthorized practice of law shall be a ground for revocation
of the law student practitioner's certification and/or
disqualification for a law student from taking the bar
examination for a period to be determined by the Supreme
Court.
(b) The above provisions notwithstanding, any act
constituting a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility shall subject the supervising lawyer, Clinical
Legal Education Program Head, and/or law school dean to
disciplinary action, as the circumstances may warrant.
SECTION 14. Effectivity. — This rule shall take effect at the
start of Academic Year 2020-2021 following its publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation. The requirements
under second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 138 as amended
by A.M. No. 18-03-24-SC dated June 25, 2019 shall apply to
bar examination applicants commencing the 2023 bar
examinations.
(Eligibility
• Completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum.
• Enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court
Coverage and Conditions
• May appear without compensation in any civil, criminal
or administrative case before any trial court to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school.
• Shall be under the direct supervision and control of a
member of the IBP duly accredited by the law school.
• Any pleadings and papers to be filed must be signed by
the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal
clinic.
• Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision
of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action.
– old revised law student practice rules
Sec. 34, Rule 138, allows appearance before the inferior
courts by a non-lawyer, irrespective of whether or not he
is a law student. Thus, a law student may appear under
the circumstances of Sec. 38, as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, without complying with the requirements of
Rule 138-A, e.g., supervision of a lawyer [Cruz vs. Mina,
G.R. 154207 (2007) p. 29 Pineda 2009 Ed].
(2) By an agent/friend
• In cases before the MTC: A party may conduct his own
case or litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose (Sec. 34, Rule
138, RRC).

• Before any other court: A party may conduct his
litigation personally. But if he gets someone to aid him,
that someone must be authorized member of the Bar
(Rule 138, ibid). He is bound by the same rules in
conducting the trial of his case. He cannot, after judgment,
claim he was not properly represented by counsel.
• In a criminal case before the MTC in a locality where
a duly licensed member of the Bar is not available:
The judge may appoint a non-lawyer who is a:
a. Resident of the province; and
b. Of good repute for probity and ability to aid the
accused in his defense (Sec. 7, Rule 116 RRC). If there
are available members of the bar, the judge cannot
appoint a non-lawyer as defense counsel for the accused.
(3) By the litigant himself
In civil cases
An individual litigant has the right to conduct his litigation
personally.
In criminal cases
In grave and less grave offenses, an accused who is a
layman must always appear by counsel; he cannot
conduct his own defense without violating his right to due
process of law.
Exception
Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend
himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court
that he can properly protect his rights without the
assistance of counsel. (Rule 115 (c) ROC)
A non-lawyer conducting his own litigation is bound by the
same rules in conducting the trial case. He cannot after
judgment, claim that he was not properly represented.
An attorney who is otherwise disqualified to practice law,
or has been disbarred or suspended from practice, can
validly prosecute or defend his own litigation, he having
as much right as that of a layman [Danforth vs. Egan, 119
N.W. 1021 (1909)].
(4) Non-lawyers in Administrative Tribunals
Art. 228 (222) of the Labor Code, as amended
Art. 228. Appearances and Fees.
a. Non-lawyers may appear before the Commission or any
Labor Arbiter only:
1. If they represent themselves; or
2. If they represent their organization or members
thereof; or
3. If they are duly accredited members of any legal
aid office duly recognized by the Department of
Justice, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in
cases referred to by the latter
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 9
b. No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of
any kind arising from any collective bargaining
agreement shall be imposed on any individual member
of the contracting union: Provided, However, that
attorney’s fees may be charged against union funds in
an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any
contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the
contrary shall be null and void. (As amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1691, May 1, 1980)
Sec. 6, Rule III, NLRC Rules of Procedure
Section 6. Appearances. – (a) A lawyer appearing for a
party is presumed to be properly authorized for that purpose.
In every case, he/she shall indicate in his/her pleadings and
motions his/her Attorney’s Roll Number, as well as his/her
PTR and IBP numbers for the current year and MCLE
compliance.
(b) A non-lawyer may appear in any of the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter or Commission only under the
following conditions:
1) he/she represents himself/herself as party to the case;
2) he/she represents a legitimate labor organization, as
defined under Article 212 (now 219) and 242 (now 251)
of the Labor Code, as amended, which is a party to the
case: Provided that, he/she presents to the Commission
or Labor Arbiter during the mandatory conference or
initial hearing:
i. a certification from the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR) or Regional Office of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) attesting that the
organization he/she represents is duly registered
and listed in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations;
ii. a verified certification issued by the secretary and
attested to by the president of the said organization
stating that he/she is authorized to represent the
said organization in the said case; and
iii. a copy of the resolution of the board of directors of
the said organization granting him such authority;
3) he/she represents a member or members of a
legitimate labor organization that is existing within the
employer’s establishment, who are parties to the case:
Provided that, he/she presents:
i. a verified certification attesting that he/she is
authorized by such member or members to
represent them in the case; and
ii. a verified certification issued by the secretary and
attested to by the president of the said organization
stating that the person or persons he/she is
representing are members of their organization
which is existing in the employer’s establishment;
and,
4) he/she is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid
office recognized by the Department of Justice or
Integrated Bar of the Philippines: Provided that, he/she:
i. presents proof of his/her accreditation; and
ii. represents a party to the case;
(c) Appearances of a non-lawyer in contravention of this
Section shall not be recognized in any proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter or the Commission.
Art. 228, Labor Code in rel. to Sec. 6 Rule III of the NLRC
Rules before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter under the
following conditions:

a. Represents as party to the case
b. Represents Legitimate Labor Org (LLO).
c. Represents LLOs member/s
d. Duly-accredited member of any legal aid
office recognized by the DOJ or IBP, or
e. Is the President or owner of the corporation or
establishment party to the case [Note: He is not,
however, entitled to attorney’s fees under Article
222 of the Labor Code for not being a lawyer.
(Five J. Taxi vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 111474,
August 22, 1994)]
Strict Application of the Requirements for
Appearances of Lawyers or Non-Lawyers
NLRC Memorandum Circular No. 2-01-04 (I can’t find a
copy of this circular anywhere online)
Recovery of attorney’s fees by non-lawyers
PAFLU v. Binalbangan Isabela Sugar Co.,
Sharing of attorney’s fees with non-lawyers is unethical
and immoral.
Reason: The law will not assist a person reap the fruits
or benefit of an unlawful act or an act done in violation of
law.
Issue: May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal
services rendered? NO.
1. ATTORNEY'S FEES; SHARING THEREOF WITH NON-
LAWYERS, UNETHICAL AND IMMORAL. — Applicable to
the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated
Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, that an agreement providing
for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union
president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is
condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and
cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is
no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the
present case.
2. NON-LAWYER REPRESENTING A PARTY IN LABOR
CASES, NOT ENTITLED THERETO. — The provision in
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that — "In the
proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the
parties shall not be required to be represented by legal
counsel . . ." is no justification for a ruling that the person
representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's
fees: for the same section adds that — "it shall be the duty
and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and
cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist
in the orderly presentation of evidence," thus making it clear
that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to
duly qualified members of the bar.
3. RECOVERY THEREOF IMPORTS EXISTENCE OF
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. — The permission
for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend
in the said court on behalf of the party-litigant does not by
itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court, providing — "Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys;
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 10
agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services..." imports the existence of
an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the
recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot
exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer.
Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an
attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenazas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal
work in representation of parties litigant should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications
and who are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of
the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the
public.
REASONS FOR DISALLOWING NON-LAWYERS TO
RECOVERY THEREOF, CITED. — The reasons are that the
ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that
acting as an attorney without authority constitutes contempt
of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,
and the law will not assist a person reap the fruits or
benefit of an unlawful act or an act done in violation of
law; and that if fees were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it
would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to
consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a
chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures. "And the general rule
above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by
non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services
were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an 'agent' and not
as an attorney."
Labor Discussion:
Legitimate labor organization may appeal award of attorney's
fees which are deductible from backpay of its members
because such union or labor organization is permitted to
institute an action in the industrial court, on behalf of its
members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of
the employees' moral, social and economic well-being";
hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the
union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under
Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides: "Sec 6. Unfair
Labor Practice Cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved
by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court
of the Philippines . . .," since more often than not the individual
unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
litigations.
Practice of Law: ISSUES CAN NOT BE RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the
habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial
Relations, and many others like him who are not licensed to
practice, registering their appearances as "representatives"
and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a
serious situation demanding corrective action that
respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by
position action to that purpose. But since this matter was not
brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken
up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper
action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in
the practice of law.
Five J Taxi v. National Labor Relations Commission

The existence of an attorney-client relationship is a
condition for the recovery of attorney’s fees.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or services fees for private
respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the
NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent
themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the
members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia
was the authorized representative of private respondents, he
was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing
categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable
compensation for his services necessarily imports the
existence of an attorney-client relationship as a
condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is
a lawyer.
Non-lawyers before the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples
Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure
Before the NCIP (NCIP Admin. Circular No. 1-03)
Section 10. Indigenous System of Settlement. The
following rules shall apply in disputes involving ICCs/IPs:
(c) As a general rule, lawyers are prohibited to appear
for any party as counsel, except when such lawyer is
appearing in his/her capacity as a member of the council of
elders or due to his/her obligation as member of the IP
community or for the purpose of defending or prosecuting
his/her case.
Section 30. Appearances. Lawyers and NCIP legal officers
within their respective assigned jurisdictions may appear
before the Commission or the RHO as counsel for any of the
parties.
A non-lawyer may appear in any proceedings before
the Commission or the RHO provided that:
a. He/she appears as a party to the case;
b. He/she represents an organization or its members
conditioned upon presentment of a written authority showing
proper representation;
c. He/she is a duly accredited member of any legal aid office;
d. He/she is an NCIP accredited paralegal aide or member of
an accredited Indigenous Peoples Organization (IPO) subject
to the presentation of a written authority to represent the IPO;
Section 31. Appearance of a Non-lawyer may be Denied.
When in the opinion or assessment of the Commission or the
RHO that the rights and interests of a party litigant may not
be best served or be compromised due to lack of skill and
experience of a non-lawyer appearing as counsel in a case,
the appearance of a non-lawyer may be denied. But where
the party litigant cannot afford the services of a lawyer, the
RHO or the Commission shall appoint a counsel for said
party.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 11
Non-lawyers in National Health Insurance Act (before
the PhilHealth)
Quasi-Judicial Provisions of the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. 10606, IRR of RA 10606,
[December 5, 2016]
SECTION 113. Legal Representation. —
Legal representation may be allowed a Respondent or any
Party to the case upon formal entry of appearance filed before
the Arbitration Office. Legal representation or appearance by
a non-lawyer may also be allowed upon presentation of a
verified Certification attested to by the Respondent or a copy
of the Resolution of the Board of Directors or Secretary's
Certificate of the Respondent's Organization granting such
authority.
Non-lawyers before the Cadastral Court
Cadastral Act, Act No. 2259, [February 11, 1913])
SECTION 9. Any person claiming any interest in any part of
the lands, whether named in the notice or not, shall appear
before the court by himself, or by some person in his behalf
and shall file an answer on or before the return day or within
such further time as may be allowed by the court.
Under the Cadastral Act, a claimant may appear by
himself, or by some person in his behalf, before the
Cadastral Court. (So this includes a non-lawyer)
Non-lawyers before the DARAB
Amending RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) Re:
Extending the Acquisition and Distribution of Agricultural
Lands, Republic Act No. 9700, [August 7, 2009]
Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent
themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organizations in any
proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there
are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the
representatives should choose only one among themselves to
represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings.
Limited Practice by non-lawyers
a. Confine his work to non-adversary contentions.
b. Should not undertake purely legal work (i.e.,
examination of witness, presentation of evidence);
c. Should not be habitually rendered.
d. Should not charge or collect attorney’s fees.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO CANNOT PRACTICE LAW
IN THE PHILIPPINES
The following public officials are prohibited to engage in
the private practice of law: (Absolute Prohibition)
1. Judges and other officials or employees of the
superior court (Rule 138, Section 35, RRC):
2. Officials and employees of the Office of the Solicitor
General (Ibid):
3. Government prosecutors (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109: Aquino vs. Blanco, 79 Phil. 647);
4. President, Vice President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants (Art. VII, Section 13.
1987 Constitution):
5. Members of Constitutional Commissions (Art. IX A.
Section 2, 1987 Constitution).
6. Members of the Judicial Bar Council;

7. Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. IX, Section 8
[2nd par.], 1987 Constitution).
8. All governors, city and municipal mayors (R.A. No.
7160. Section 90):
9. Those who by special law are prohibited from
engaging in the practice of their legal profession.
General Prohibition
Sec. 7, RA 6713
"Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees."
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to
acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official or employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto. – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions;
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of
one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation
from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b)
(2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he
used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall
likewise apply.
General Rule:
Public officials are prohibited to engage in the private
practice of their profession.
Exception:
If allowed by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice is not in conflict with official functions.
ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION
1. Judges and other officials or employees of the
superior court.
2. Officials and employees of the Office of the
Solicitor General
Rule 138, Rules of Court
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge
or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice
to clients.
-Relate with People v. Villanueva (No Practice of Law
because it was not customary in nature, there was no
succession of acts)
-Relate with Memo. Circular No. 17 (Only applies to
employees of the Executive Department) allowing
employees to engage in private business, vocation or
profession outside office hours vis-a-vis SC Admin.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 12
Circular No. 5 prohibiting officials or employees of courts
from engaging in private business, vocation, or
profession. So this official or employees of the courts are
not covered by Memorandum No. Circular 17 because it
applies only to executive department.
But there is an SC Circular that allows employees of the
court to teach for not more than 10 hours a week.
In relation to this absolute prohibition, please note that you
have first-level court judges, while they may be authorized
to act as notaries public ex-oficio, there are conditions that
must be met there. Because as a general rule, judges are
prohibited from the engagement of are prohibited from the
engagement in the private practice of law.
Q: Can an incumbent judge act as a notary public?
Answer: Yes. For as long as there is no other notary public
within the area and the document to be notarized is not in
relation the judge’s function, the incumbent judge may act
as one. (So exception to the absolute prohibition)
3. All governors, city, and municipal mayors
RA 7160, Local Government Code
Sec. 90 Practice of Profession. – (a) All governors, city and
municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
EXC: Sec. 90(b) Sanggunian Members – relative
prohibition
4. President, Vice President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted
by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
5. Members of Constitutional Commissions
Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution
Section 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall,
during his tenure, hold any other office or employment.
Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or
in the active management or control of any business which in
any way be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he
be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract
with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the
Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
6. Ombudsman and his deputies

Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their
appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity
and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and
must not have been candidates for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have
for ten years or more been a judge or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same
disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in
Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.
7. Government Prosecutors
People v. Villanueva
Assistant city attorney handling case for relative with
permission of superior not in prohibited private practice.
ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY HANDLING CASE FOR
RELATIVE WITH PERMISSION OF SUPERIOR NOT IN
PROHIBITED PRIVATE PRACTICE. — The isolated
appearance as a private prosecutor, previously authorized by
his superior, of an assistant city attorney in a criminal case for
malicious mischief before a justice of the peace court where
the offended party is his relative, does not violate Section 32,
Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court,
which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
Aquino v. Blanco
When an attorney had been appointed to the position of
Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in
private law practice
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; EFFECT OF APPOINTMENT OF
ATTORNEY AS PROVINCIAL FISCAL; INEFFICACY OF
NOTICE TO ATTORNEY AFTER APPOINTMENT; CASE AT
BAR. — When Attorney S was appointed to the position of
assistant provincial fiscal and therein qualified, by operation
of law he ceased to engage in private law practice, and as
a consequence he became simultaneously disqualified to
continue representing his former client, the herein
respondent. So that in contemplation of law the notice of the
decision upon him on February 11, 1947, was not a notice
upon said respondent, and the period for perfecting an appeal
on the part of the latter in reality did not then commence to
run but only, if at all, when she acquired knowledge of said
decision upon the service on her of the writ of execution on
March 26, 1947.
Unauthorized private practice/filing petitions for
commission as a notary public while employed as a
court attorney
Muring, Jr. v. Gatcho
Atty. Gatcho filed petitions for commission
as notary public while employed as court attorney
In the course of the hearings, complainant presented copies
of petitions filed by Atty. Gatcho for commission as notary
public in the cities of Mandaluyong and Makati, dated 3 April
2000 and 7 February 2003, respectively. Atty. Gatcho asserts
that he filed the petitions only because he was "planning to
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 13
engage in private practice" upon separation from government
service. These petitions do not form part of the records.
Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Executive Department
permits employees of government offices to "engage directly
in any private business, vocation or profession . . . outside
office hours." However, we declared in an En Banc resolution
dated 1 October 1987 that —
. . . [the memorandum circular] . . . is not applicable to
officials or employees of the courts considering the express
prohibition in the Rules of Court and the nature of their work
which requires them to serve with the highest degree of
efficiency and responsibility, in order to maintain public
confidence in the Judiciary.
Atty. Gatcho should have known that as a government
lawyer, he was prohibited from engaging in notarial
practice, or in any form of private legal practice for that
matter. Atty. Gatcho cannot now feign ignorance or good
faith, as he did not seek to exculpate himself by providing an
explanation for his error. Atty. Gatcho's filing of the petition
for commission, while not an actual engagement in the
practice of law, appears as a furtive attempt to evade the
prohibition.
Complainant engaged in unauthorized private practice
While complainant must have intended to assume the role of
whistle-blower in filing this case, we cannot disregard
complainant's admission that he appeared in court as counsel
and received P2,000 in appearance fees when he was
employed as court attorney. Appearing in court on behalf
of a party litigant falls within the scope of the phrase
"practice of law." We held in Cayetano v. Monsod that —
To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, engaging in the private practice of profession, when
unauthorized, is classified as a light offense punishable by
reprimand.
Resignation or removal not a bar
to a finding of administrative liability
The fact that complainant and Atty. Gatcho are no longer
employed at the Court of Appeals, and claim to have shifted
to private practice, does not preclude the Court from making
a pronouncement as to their administrative liability for acts
committed by them while in government service. Cessation
from office of a respondent by resignation or retirement
does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative
complaint filed while he or she was still in the service nor
does it render the administrative case moot and
academic. The complaint in this case was filed on 28
February 2003, before Atty. Gatcho resigned. The jurisdiction
that the Court acquired at the time of the filing of the complaint
is retained until the case is finally resolved. However, while
they deserve a more severe penalty, like suspension from
office, they can only now be admonished since they are no
longer in the service.

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Edna S. Paña guilty of gross
misconduct and accordingly SUSPEND her from the practice
of law for three (3) months effective upon finality of this
Decision. For engaging in the unauthorized private practice
of law, we ADMONISH Atty. Victoriano S. Muring, Jr., Court
Attorney IV. For filing a petition for commission as notary
public while employed in the Judiciary, we also
ADMONISH Atty. Manuel T. Gatcho, Court Attorney V. They
are STERNLY WARNED that repetition of the same or similar
act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.
On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private
Practice of Law
In re: Silverio-Buffe
The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the
prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and
employees. Subsection (b) (2) prohibits them from engaging
in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee
can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the
following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by
the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will
not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period
of one year after the public official or employee's
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office,
except for the private practice of profession under
subsection (b) (2), which can already be undertaken even
within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to
this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with
respect to any matter before the office the public officer or
employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that
public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any
impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government
transactions between a former government official or
employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or
superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and
the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office
hours to serve the public.
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7
(b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to contend
with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel also applies. The latter provision provides the
definitive rule on the "outside employment" that an incumbent
court official or court employee may undertake in addition to
his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office
provided it complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that
practices law before the courts or conducts business with the
Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of
normal working hours and is not incompatible with the
performance of the court personnel's duties and
responsibilities;
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 14
(c) That outside employment does not require the
practice of law; Provided, however, that court personnel
may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource
person in law schools, review or continuing education centers
or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the
court personnel to disclose confidential information acquired
while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative
or executive branch of government, unless specifically
authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to
exist, or where the outside employment reflects adversely on
the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not
accept outside employment.
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the
quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is covered; the practice
of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically
mentions any outside employment requiring the practice of
law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law
as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill. Under both provisions,
a common objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on
the part of the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly
use confidential information acquired from his
employment, or use his or her familiarity with court
personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel ceases to apply as it
applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its
subsection (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the
extent discussed above. Atty. Buffe's situation falls under
Section 7.
Atty. Buffe's Situation
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty.
Buffe's admission that she immediately engaged in private
practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated
in Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. We find it noteworthy,
too, that she is aware of this provision and only objects to its
application to her situation; she perceives it to be unfair that
she cannot practice before her old office — Branch 81 — for
a year immediately after resignation, as she believes that her
only limitation is in matters where a conflict of interest exists
between her appearance as counsel and her former duties as
Clerk of Court. She believes that Section 7 (b) (2) gives
preferential treatment to incumbent public officials and
employees as against those already separated from
government employment.
Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT
aptly stated, she interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket
authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. We
reiterate what we have explained above, that the general rule
under Section 7 (b) (2) is to bar public officials and employees
from the practice of their professions; it is unlawful under this
general rule for clerks of court to practice their profession. By

way of exception, they can practice their profession if the
Constitution or the law allows them, but no conflict of interest
must exist between their current duties and the practice of
their profession. As we also mentioned above, no chance
exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their profession,
as they are in fact expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon
3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel from doing so.
Under both the general rule and the exceptions,
therefore, Atty. Buffe's basic premise is misplaced.
As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage
in the practice of law immediately after her separation from
the service and without any period limitation that applies to
other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The
clerk of court's limitation is that she cannot practice her
profession within one year before the office where he or
she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned,
retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand,
and an incumbent official or employee, on the other, the
former has the advantage because the limitation is only with
respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for
a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all,
save only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and
the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists.
This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffe's basic premises.
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe's approach to Section 7 (b)
(2) is her awareness of the law and her readiness to risk its
violation because of the unfairness she perceives in the law.
We find it disturbing that she first violated the law before
making any inquiry. She also justifies her position by referring
to the practice of other government lawyers known to her
who, after separation from their judicial employment,
immediately engaged in the private practice of law and
appeared as private counsels before the RTC branches
where they were previously employed. Again we find this a
cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffe's part and, to our mind, only
emphasizes her own willful or intentional disregard of Section
7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as
"unlawful", Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As indicated by the use of the mandatory word "shall", this
provision must be strictly complied with. Atty. Buffe failed to
do this, perhaps not with an evil intent, considering the
misgivings she had about Section 7 (b) (2)'s unfairness.
Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does
not necessarily require the element of criminality, although
the Rule is broad enough to include it. Likewise, the presence
of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential to bring
his or her act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01, when
it specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful
conduct. Thus, we find Atty. Buffe liable under this quoted
Rule.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 15
We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her
lawyer's oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully
practised law within the prohibited period by appearing before
the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed
the footsteps of the models she cited and wanted to replicate
— the former court officials who immediately waded into
practice in the very same court they came from. She, like
they, disgraced the dignity of the legal profession by openly
disobeying and disrespecting the law. By her irresponsible
conduct, she also eroded public confidence in the law and in
lawyers. Her offense is not in any way mitigated by her
transparent attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing
the Court a letter-query, which she followed up with
unmeritorious petitions for declaratory relief, all of them
dealing with the same Section 7 (b) (2) issue, in the hope
perhaps that at some point she would find a ruling favorable
to her cause. These are acts whose implications do not
promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.
Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a
penalty of fine of P10,000.00, together with a stern warning
to deter her from repeating her transgression and committing
other acts of professional misconduct. This penalty reflects
as well the Court's sentiments on how seriously the retired,
resigned or separated officers and employees of the Judiciary
should regard and observe the prohibition against the
practice of law with the office that they used to work with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M.
Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional misconduct for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the
commission of other acts of professional misconduct shall be
dealt with more severely.
Private practice of law after separation from public
office
Olazo v. Tinga
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized
practice of law after his separation from the government
service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the
document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent
legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence
fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law as any
activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the

profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be
correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions
on government lawyers to engage in private practice after
their separation from the service.
Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts
and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in
the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. — Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; . . .
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year
after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except
in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-
year prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in
the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer can
engage in the practice of his or her profession under the
following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized
by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official
functions. The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an
exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from
the government service who are covered under
subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-
year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with
any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes
this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the
government service, to accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we
previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has
the power to influence the proceedings. Otherwise stated, to
fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted
engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his
public office, he had previously exercised power to influence
the outcome of the proceedings.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the
respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuel's land when the former was
still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the
respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face
value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 16
limited only in the preparation of a single document. In
Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., we specifically described private
practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts
of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self
to the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondent's act fell within
the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of
evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation
was made before the Committee on Awards, or that the
Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are
matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider
any uncertainty in this regard against the respondent's favor.
Lingan v. Calubaquib
When this court orders a lawyer suspended from the
practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing
all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge
within the period of suspension. This includes desisting
from holding a position in government requiring the
authority to practice law.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Baliga's (Regional Director of CHR) motion to
lift order of suspension should be granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of
suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further from the
practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience." It includes "performing acts which
are characteristics of the legal profession" or "rendering any
kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill."
Work in government that requires the use of legal
knowledge is considered practice of law. In Cayetano v.
Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by
lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "the use of legal
knowledge or legal talent" is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office
created under the Constitution with power to investigate "all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights." It is divided into regional offices with each office
having primary responsibility to investigate human rights
violations in its territorial jurisdiction. Each regional office is
headed by the Regional Director who is given the position of
Attorney VI.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission
on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of
law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney — a
member of the bar in good standing and authorized to
practice law. When the Regional Director loses this authority,
such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary
qualification to the position he or she is holding. The
disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding
the position of Regional Director.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for
one year on June 15, 2006, "effective immediately." From the
time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of

suspension on July 5, 2006, he has been without
authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary
qualification to his position as Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director/Attorney VI.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director constituted practice of law. Atty.
Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as
Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a
ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is
a "privilege burdened with conditions." To enjoy the privileges
of practicing law, lawyers must "adhere to the rigid standards
of mental fitness, maintain the highest degree of morality, and
faithfully comply with the rules of the legal profession."
WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga
from the practice of law for six (6) months. Atty. Baliga shall
serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension
from the practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga
of a copy of this resolution.
Fajardo v. Alvarez
Even if permitted, there was still conflict of interest.
Facts:
-Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the
Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired
respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to defend
her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office of
the Ombudsman.
-Atty. Alvarez was then working as Legal Officer III of the
National Center for Mental Health, DOH.
-Teresita claims that Atty. Alvarez asked for P1.4 million as
acceptance fee. However, he did not enter his appearance
before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.
-Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected
with the Office of the Ombudsman who could help with
dismissing her case for a certain fee.
-Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to pay the amount of
P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances working at the
Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against Teresita
dismissed.
-However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez
talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution and
decision recommending the filing of a criminal complaint
against Teresita, and her dismissal from service,
respectively.
-Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a
portion of the amount she gave. Atty. Alvarez promised to
return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to fulfill this
promise.
-Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he
failed to heed.
Issue:
Whether a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National
Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health is
authorized to privately practice law. NO
Held:
We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice
of his profession.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 17
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any
pleading. In the context of this case, his surreptitious
actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized
practice, his acts also show badges of offering to peddle
influence in the Office of the Ombudsman.
By preparing the pleadings of and giving legal advice to
complainant, respondent practiced law.
Under Section 7 (b) (2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular
No. 17, series of 1986, government officials or employees are
prohibited from engaging in private practice of their
profession unless authorized by their department heads.
More importantly, if authorized, the practice of profession
must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the official functions
of the government official or employee.
In Abella v. Cruzabra, the respondent was a Deputy Register
of Deeds of General Santos City. While serving as an
incumbent government employee, the respondent "filed a
petition for commission as a notary public and was
commissioned ...without obtaining prior authority from the
Secretary of the Department of Justice." According to the
complainant, the respondent had notarized around 3,000
documents. This Court found the respondent guilty of
engaging in notarial practice without written authority
from the Secretary of Justice. Thus:
It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a
notary public, she did not obtain a written permission from the
Secretary of the Department of J[ustice. Respondent's superior,
the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because
he is not the head of the Department. And even assuming that the
Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any
proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance
or good faith because respondent filed her petition for commission as
a notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in
1986.
In this case, respondent was given written permission by the
Head of the National Center for Mental Health, whose
authority was designated under Department of Health
Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999. 58
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a
suit against the Ombudsman and against government in
general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict
of interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and
impliedly conditioned on the requirement that his practice will
not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and the
Philippine government as a whole."
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public
officer, an employee of government. The Office of the
Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against the
Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the
same employer he swore to serve.
In addition, the government has a serious interest in the
prosecution of erring employees and their corrupt acts. Under
the Constitution, "public office is a public trust." The Office of
the Ombudsman, as "protectors of the People," is mandated
to "investigate and prosecute ...any act or omission of any

public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."
Thus, a conflict of interest exists when an incumbent
government employee represents another government
employee or public officer in a case pending before the Office
of the Ombudsman. The incumbent officer ultimately goes
against government's mandate under the Constitution to
prosecute public officers or employees who have committed
acts or omissions that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper,
or inefficient. Furthermore, this is consistent with the
constitutional directive that "public officers and employees
must, at all times, be accountable to the People, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."
RELATIVE PROHIBITION
Some public officials are not absolutely disqualified to
practice law. They are merely subject to certain
restrictions.
Q: Who are not absolutely prohibited?
1) Members of Legislature (Constitution)
2) Members of Sanggunian (RA 7160)
3) Civil Service officer or employee (Pp v. Villanueva)
- Provided it is with consent of the head
1. Senators or Members of the House of
Representatives (Legislature Members)
Article VI, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
Note: The word “appearance” includes not only arguing a
case before any such body, but also filing a pleading on
behalf of a client. (Ramos v. Manalac)
Since the practice of law covers a wide range of legal
activities, the Senator or Congressman is allowed to
engage in the other aspects of the law practice such as
the giving of legal advice to clients, negotiating contracts
in behalf of clients which necessitates legal knowledge,
preparation of documents of conveyancing and similar
others.
If a lawyer is a Senator, and is also a member of a law
firm that represents the party, then the law firm is also
included in the prohibition. Even if the Senator did not
personally appear, or even if he did not sign the pleadings,
the fact that he is a member of the law firm that
represented a certain party, then the prohibition still
applies.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 18
2. Sanggunian Members
Local Government Code
Sec. 90 (b). Sanggunian members may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian
members who are also members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case
wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer
or employee of the national or local government is accused
of an offense committed in relation to his office.
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he
is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the government except
when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest of the government.
However even if they are allowed, please relate this with
Revised Civil Service Rules, Rule XVIII, Sec. 12. In this
Rule, there must be permission or authority coming
from the head of the department.
The head of the Department here does not only refer to
the mayor or the presiding officer of the Sanggunian
council concerned. It refers to the Department of Interior
and Local Government Secretary.
Relate this again to the case of Pp. Villanueva. “xxx
appearance on one occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the practice of law.
Q: Are vice-mayors allowed to engage in the private
practice of their profession?
A: Yes. Because they are Sanggunian Members.
Q: How about Punong Barangay and members of
Sangguniang Pambarangay?
A: They are not covered by the prohibitions covering
governors and mayors. So they are also allowed to
engage in the private practice. However, they must be
covered by the same condition under the Civil Service
Rules. They must get consent authority from the head of
the department. So from the Secretary of the DILG.
Q: Is an incumbent councilor of Cebu City who is a
lawyer allowed to engage in the practice of law?
A: Yes. An incumbent councilor of Cebu City who is a
lawyer is allowed to engage in the practice of law because
councilors, as Sanggunian members are not absolutely
prohibited from practice of law and are only relatively
prohibited as provided by Sec. 90 of the Local
Government Code. As provided by the aforementioned
provision, Sanggunian members may practice their
profession for as long as an LGU, or any government
agency or instrumentality is NOT the adverse party for
civil cases. And in criminal cases, for as long as the
accused is not an officer or an employee of the
government in relation to his office.

An example of this is when the councilor, a lawyer files a
case against his neighbor for invasion of privacy or for
nuisance or when his private car was stolen at home.
These situations are not directly or indirectly related to the
government and are personal to the councilor. The
councilor can also engage in other aspects of law practice
such as the giving of legal advice or preparation of
documents for as long as it is not in conflict with his duties.
3. Retired Justice
RA 910
Sec. 1, RA 910. No retiring Justice during the time that he
is receiving said pension shall appear as counsel before any
court in any civil case wherein the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse
party, or in any criminal case wherein and officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office, or collect any fee for his
appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain
an interest adverse to the Government, insular, provincial
or municipal, or to any of its legally constituted officers.
These are conditions for a retiring justice to receive
pension. Purpose is to avoid conflict of interest.
Private Practice of Law Without Authority
Lawyers without authority
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court, corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so is a ground for disbarment or
suspension.
Non-lawyers without authority
A non-lawyer who practices law is guilty of illegal
practice of law (Zeta vs. Malinao, Adm. Case No. P-
220, 1978). In addition, he may be liable for indirect
contempt for assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a
court, and acting as such without authority (Rule 71,
Section 3[4] ROC). He can also be criminally prosecuted
for such false representation (Saladaga vs. Astorga).
Sanctions for unauthorized practice of law
1. Petition for Injunction: Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic,
B.M. No. 553, 1993; for both lawyers and nonlawyers
2. Declaratory Relief: Que v. Revilla Jr., AC. No
7054, 2009; for lawyers
3. Contempt of Court: Rule 71, Section 3(e), ROC; for
both lawyers and non-lawyers
4. Disqualification and complaints for disbarment:
Rule 138, Section 27, ROC; for lawyers
5. Criminal complaint for estafa against the person who
falsely represented himself as a lawyer to the damage of
another: Saladaga vs. Astorga, A. C. No. 4697, 2014; for
both lawyers and non-lawyers
6. Administrative complaint against the erring lawyer or
government official (for lawyers)
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules (Memorandum Circular No. 17)
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 19
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute
in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal
of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time
so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief
of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally,
That no permission is necessary in the case of investments,
made by an officer or employee, which do not involve any real
or apparent conflict between his private interests and public
duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer or member of the board of
directors.
Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage
in private practice, a written request and approval
thereof, with a duly approved leave of absence for that
matter are indispensable [Yumol v. Ferrer, A.C. No.
6585, 2005; See Rule XVIII, Section 12, Revised Civil
Service Rules, cf. Memorandum Circular No. 17, s.
1986 and Special Rules governing members of the
judiciary. See Rule 138, Sec. 35, ROC vis- a-vis RA
6713, Sec. 7 (b) (2)].
Requisites for officer or employee of the Executive
departments to engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession
1. One’s duties and responsibilities do not require him/her
to render his entire time to the government;
2. A written permission was issued by the head of the
Department; and
3. Such private practice is done outside the department’s
office hours.
Yumol, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr.,
Private practice of law by CHR lawyers is not a matter of
right.
Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage in
private practice, a written request and approval thereof,
with a duly approved leave of absence for that matter are
indispensable. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any
such written request or duly approved leave of absence. No
written authority nor approval of the practice and approved
leave of absence by the CHR was ever presented by
respondent. Thus, he cannot engage in private practice.
As to respondent's act of notarizing documents, records show
that he applied for commission as notary public on 14
November 2000, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by
RTC Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., on 01 December
2000. However, the CHR authorized respondent to act as
notary public only on 29 October 2001. Considering that acts
of notarization are within the ambit of the "term practice
of law," for which a prior written request and approval by
the CHR to engage into it are required, the crucial period

to be considered is the approval of the CHR on 29 October
2001 and not the approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000.
Practice of law has a settled meaning. It refers to any activity,
in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage
in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainants, the
belated authority granted to respondent cannot be made to
retroact to the notarized documents dated prior thereto.
To our mind, respondent's acts of issuing the subject orders,
engaging in private practice without prior written request and
authority of the CHR and duly approved leave of absence,
notarizing documents even before being so authorized by the
CHR and falsifying his DTRs, constitute gross misconduct for
which he may be suspended, per the dictates of Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Busilac Builders, Inc. v. Judge Aguilar
Complainants averred that the respondent's act of appearing
as his own counsel in Civil Case No. 12635 is a form of private
practice of law which is expressly prohibited by the Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Court.
The Court agrees with the observation of the CA Investigating
Justice that the respondent judge did not engage in the
practice of law when he twice appeared as his own
counsel in Civil Case No. 12635. As correctly ratiocinated by
the Investigating Justice:
However, it should be clarified that prohibited private practice
of a profession is more than an isolated court appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.
In the instant case, Respondent Judge Aguilar's appearances
as counsel for himself in the previous hearings or in the two
(2) hearings in Civil Case No. 12635 as stated by
Complainants per their Manifestation dated 06 October 2003,
constitutes an isolated court appearance. It must be noted
that Respondent Judge also appeared in that case as one of
the defendants therein, and that another counsel prepared
and represented him in the pleadings. Respondent Judge's
act of asking permission from the Supreme Court to appear
as counsel for himself, although made after his appearances
in court shows no trace of malice and bad faith on his part.
The respondent judge's appearance on two occasions in
Civil Case No. 12635 is not conclusive and determinative
of engagement in the private practice of law. Essentially,
the term "private practice of law" implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a
source of his livelihood or in consideration of said services.
Clearly, then, the isolated instances when the respondent
judge appeared as counsel for himself in Civil Case No.
12635 do not constitute the "private practice" of the legal
profession as contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while the respondent's isolated court
appearances did not amount to private practice of law, he
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 20
failed to obtain a written permission from this Court prior
to his court appearances, in violation of Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which states:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of the Department: Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that
their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be
fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an
officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way
influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part
in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the
board of directors. (Emphasis ours)
Judge Aguilar entered his appearance and attended court
proceedings in Civil Case No. 12635 on September 23 and
29, 2003 as borne out by his own admission, without securing
a prior written permission from this Court. It was only after
such appearances when he sought permission which this
Court denied. Further, the public expects him to devote full
time to his judicial work. Well-taken, therefore, is the OCA
recommendation that the respondent judge merits
reprimand.
Cabalida v. Lobrido, Jr.,
Atty. Pondevilla was engaged in the practice of law while
also employed as a City Legal Officer. This can be
gathered from Atty. Pondevilla's statement in his position
paper dated July 23, 2009, to wit:
The court records will clearly show that the address of the
undersigned [Pondevilla] when he filed his Answer with Counterclaim
is Basiao, Bolivar Law Office having been connected with that
Law Office at that time and also concurrently holding office at
City Legal Services Offices of Talisay City, Negros Occidental,
being a City Legal Officer of the City from 2004 to 2007. In fact
when he filed his motion to withdraw, counsel was using that address
until he resigned from the office.
There is no doubt that Atty. Pondevilla acted as counsel for
Alpiere and Salili in Civil Case No. 30337, by preparing their
pleadings, appearing in court in their behalf, and negotiating
for them with the opposing party. In addition, his submission
of Motion to Withdraw affirms his standing as counsel of
Alpiere and Salili.
Atty. Pondevilla was also a named partner in a law office
during his tenure as a City Legal Officer, which shows his
active engagement in the practice of law.
Atty. Pondevilla thus engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law, in violation of Section 7 (b) (2) of Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, in relation to
Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 1986, which prohibits
government officials or employees from engaging in the
private practice of their profession unless:
1) they are authorized by their department heads, and
2) that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions.

Atty. Pondevilla's engagement in the unlawful practice of law,
through disregard and apparent ignorance of Sec. 7 (b) (2) of
Republic Act No. 6713, is a contravention of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law.
Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and
promote respect for it.
The Court holds Atty. Pondevilla administratively liable, even
in the absence of further investigation, by reason of his
admissions of facts on record. This here is an application of
the principle of res ipsa loquitur. In several instances, the
Court has sanctioned lawyers for their blatant misconduct
even in the absence of a formal charge and investigation
because their admissions are sufficient bases for the
determination of their administrative liabilities.
Right to resume practice of law
In re Muneses, B.M. No. 2112, [July 24, 2012]
Facts:
Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) filed a petition with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
He lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen
of the USA but he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath
of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA. He intends to
retire in the Philippines and resume the practice of law
Issue:
May petitioner resume practice of law?
Ruling:
Yes, the Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss
thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in
the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law
Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic.
Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship
remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. The right,
however, is not automatic.
R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice
his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the
Court for the practice of law, the OBC required petitioner to
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 21
submit the original or certified true copies of the documents
required.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his
compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his
practice of law.
Petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses was GRANTED,
subject to the condition that he re-take the Lawyer's Oath on
a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of
appropriate fees.
The OBC Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary
guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the
practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.
Petition For Leave To Resume Practice Of Law,
Benjamin M. Dacanay, Petitioner, B.M. No. 1678,
December 17, 2007
Facts:
Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.
He practiced law in the Philippines until his migration to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention to his
ailments. Later, in May 2004, he became a Canadian citizen.
On July 14, 2006, he acquired Philippine citizenship pursuant
to RA No. 9225. On same day, he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General
in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and
intends to practice law. Hence, this Petition.
Issues:
(1) Has Dacanay ceased to become a member of the
Philippine Bar after he lost his Filipino citizenship following
his naturalization in Canada? YES
(2) May he be allowed to resume his privilege to practice law
in the Philippines after reacquiring Philippine citizenship?
YES
(3) Assuming he qualifies to resume the privilege to practice
law, is it automatic? NO
Held:
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No as a
general rule.
(1) The Constitution provides that the practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of
law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.
(2) The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA No. 9225. This
is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA No. 9225).
 PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 22

Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of

another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA No. 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

(3) Under RA No. 9225, if a person intends to practice the

legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his
Filipino citizenship pursuant to its pro visions "(he) shall
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice. Stated otherwise, before a
lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to
RA No. 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first
secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual

membership dues in the IBP:

(b) the payment of professional tax:

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory

continuing legal education, this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner's knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind
him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Module 4
Duties of a Lawyer (Part 1)
CONCEPTS
Ambulance Chasing
-It is the lawyer’s act of chasing (figuratively speaking) an
ambulance carrying the victim of an accident for the
purpose of talking to the said victim or relatives and
offering his legal services for the filing of a case against
the person who cause the accident
-It is an unethical practice of inducing personal injury
victims to bring suits. The practice of lawyers in
frequenting hospitals and homes of the injured to
convince them to go to Court (Lex Pareto, 2014).
-Refers to solicitation of almost any kind of legal business
by laymen employed by an attorney for the purpose or by
the attorney himself (Agpalo)
-It supports perjury, the defrauding of innocent persons by
judgments, upon manufactured causes of actions and the
defrauding of injured persons having proper causes of
action but ignorant of legal rights and court procedure.
-A lawyer’s conduct of vindictiveness is a decidedly
undesirable trait especially when one resorts to using the
court not to secure justice but merely to exact revenge
warrants his dismissal from the judiciary (Saburnido vs.
Madrono, A.C. No. No. 4497, 2001).
Sec. 20, Rule 138
Duty of lawyer…
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the
continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any
man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
Rule 1.03
A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s
cause.
Application: It does not refer only to prospective cases,
but also, continuance or commencement of the action. It
is prevalent in Metro Manila, patients who were
hospitalized with their engagements as seafarers
(Linsangan vs. Tolentino). The client is to execute SPA in
favor of the lawyer. Outside Metro Manila, this applies
through expropriation case.
For ambulance chasing has spawned recognized evils,
such as the: (FSMD)
a. Fomenting of litigation with resulting burdens
on the courts and the public,
b. Subornation of perjury,
c. Mulcting of innocent persons by judgments,
upon manufactured causes of actions, and
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 23
d. Defrauding of injured persons having proper
causes of action but ignorant of legal rights and
court procedure by means of contracts which
retain exorbitant percentages of recovery and
illegal charges for court costs and expenses and
by settlement made for quick returns of fees and
against the just rights of the injured persons.
Barratry or “Maintenance”
-It is the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up
quarrels and suits.
-Barratry is the act of fomenting suits among individuals
and offering his legal service to one of them for monetary
motives or purpose
Note: Barratry is not a crime under the Philippine laws.
However, it is proscribed by the Rules of Legal Ethics.
(CPR Annotated, PhilJA)
Question: What is a crime of maintenance?
Answer: A lawyer owes to society and to the court the duty
not to stir up litigation.
Rule 1.03 — Duty not to encourage lawsuits, duty
not to delay any man’s cause
The lawyer owes it to the society and to the court the duty
not to stir up litigation
The reason for the rule: to prevent BARRATRY and
AMBULANCE CHASING
Ambulance Chasing Barratry
It refers to personal injury. It refers to any action.
It refers to cases brought It refers to cases brought
before judicial bodies. before judicial and non-
judicial bodies.
Champertous Contract
• In this case, the lawyer agrees to spend for ALL the
litigation expenses, and hence, the client does not pay a
single cent, in consideration of a bigger percentage of
fees on the property subject of litigation.
• The lawyer undertakes to pay the expenses of
proceedings to enforce the client’s rights in exchange for
some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute.
• It is void for being against public policy.
Q: How about in Pro Bono Cases?
Atty GCC: The lawyer does not pay for all the costs
because the client still shoulders the mailing, transcript
fees, and the like.
Q: How about if the lawyer pays for the client’s
expenses but is subject to a refund? Is it
Champertous?
No. These are considered advances already.
Forum Shopping
There is forum shopping when as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another or when he

institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition. The most
important factor in determining the existence of forum
shopping is the "vexation caused the courts and parties-
litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the
same or related causes or grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs. (Benguet Electric Cooperative. Inc.
vs. Atty. Ernesto R Flores, AC No. 4058, March 12,
1998).
Rule 12.02 – A lawyer shall not file multiple actions
arising from the same cause.
2 concepts of forum-shopping
1) Splitting of a cause of action
2) Filing of multiple suits involving same parties, same
cause of action, and where the elements of litis
pendentia or res judicata can actually apply.
Prevention And Sanctions Against Forum Shopping.–
To prevent forum shopping by party-litigants and their
lawyers, the Supreme Court, in several Circulars it has
issued, required the attachment to all initiatory pleadings
a sworn certification, that:
2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC (Resolution), [October
15, 2019])
SECTION 5. Certification against Forum Shopping. —
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he or she has not theretofore commenced any action
or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall
report that fact within five (5) calendar days therefrom to the
court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party,
whether in the form of a secretary's certificate or a special
power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not
be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his or her counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 24
Effect of Forum Shopping.
Forum shopping is condemnable and the punishment
therefor is the dismissal of all actions pending in the
different courts without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate actions against the counsel or party
concerned (Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34).
Forum Shopping Inapplicable To Disbarment
Proceedings.-
Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or
proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings (Maronilla
VS. Jorda, 482 SCRA 256: Gonzales vs. Alcaraz, 503
SCRA 355. See also: Tomlin II vs. Moya II, 483 SCRA
154; Ron quillo vs. Cezar, 491 SCRA 1).
Client and Not Counsel Should Sign the Certification
Against Forum Shopping.
If signed only by the counsel, it is equivalent to non-
compliance with the requirement of the Rules and
constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.
Essential Element of Forum Shopping.
–A lawyer could be charged with engaging in forum
shopping only when two (or more) cases are pending
involving the same parties, causes of action and reliefs
prayed for (Carlet vs. CA, 275 SCRA 110).
If one case had already been litigated before (the decision
therein having become final and executory) and it is refiled
by the same party, the defense of the defendant should
be res judicata and not forum shopping (Employees
Compensation Commission vs. CA, 257 SCRA 723:
First Philippine International Bank vs. CA, 252 SCRA
259 (1996|).
Attorney’s fees
Two Kinds Of Attorney's Fees; Bases.
There are two concepts of attorney's fees.
(a) Ordinary and
(b) Extraordinary.
In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer for the legal
services he has rendered to a client. The basis of this
compensation is the fact of employment by the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an
indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by
the losing party to the prevailing party in a litigation. The
basis of this is any of the cases authorized by law and is
payable not to the lawyer but to the client-unless they
have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part thereof.
Even if the award is for the winning litigant, but there is an
internal agreement between the lawyer and the winning
litigant, and if it is agreed upon that the lawyer will be able

to have those attorney’s fees. Then those fees can
ultimately be given by the winning litigant to the lawyer.
Proper time of fixing attorney’s fees
At the commencement of the lawyer-client relationship.
Attorney’s fees to be justified, its reason must be
mentioned in the text of the decision
If the attorney’s fee granted by the Court is mentioned
only in the dispositive portion, it will be disallowed on
appeal. The reason for this is that the award of attorney’s
fee to a winning party is not the general rule but only the
exception. Hence, there must be findings of facts and law
to justify its grant.
Attorney’s Fee, Not Included in the General Prayer
Attorney’s fee must be specifically prayed for and proven
and justified in the decision itself.
Legal interest cannot be imposed on attorney’s fees
because legal services “stand upon an entirely different
footing from contracts for the payment of compensation
for any other services” (Bach v. Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit
& Acorda Law Offices)
Bach v. Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit & Acorda Law Offices,
G.R. No. 160334, [September 11, 2006], 533 PHIL 69-87)
Issues:
1) Whether or not under the concept of quantum
meruit, the amount of P750,000.00 as fees for
services rendered with interest pegged at 2% a
month from date of demand until fully paid is
reasonable (Partly modified to P500,000, interest
removed)
2) Whether or not there is legal basis to award
P50,000.00 as and for litigation expenses and costs
of suit. YES
Held:
I.
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary
sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its
extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by
the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing
party to the prevailing party.
The issue in this case concerns attorney's fees in the ordinary
concept. Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that
stipulated in the retainer agreement which is conclusive as to
the amount of the lawyer's compensation. In the absence
thereof, the amount of attorney's fees is fixed on the basis of
quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney's
services. Courts may ascertain also if the attorney's fees are
found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the
circumstances. In no case, however, must a lawyer be
allowed to recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's fees; agreement as to fees. —
An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 25
to the importance of the subject — matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as
expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard
such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional
knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable. (Underscoring supplied.)
We have identified the circumstances to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorney's fees
as follows: (1) the amount and character of the service
rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature
and importance of the litigation or business in which the
services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5)
the amount of money or the value of the property affected by
the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill
and experience called for in the performance of the services;
(7) the professional character and social standing of the
attorney; (8) the results secured; and (9) whether the fee is
absolute or contingent, it being recognized that an attorney
may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent
than when it is not.
Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enumerates the following factors which should guide a lawyer in
determining his fees:
(a) the time spent and extent of services rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) the importance of the subject matter;
(d) the skill demanded;
(e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of the
acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of
fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting
to the client from the service;
(h) the contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
(j) the professional standing of the lawyer.
In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to respondent as
compensation for their services on quantum meruit, based on
the factors abovequoted, it is proper to consider all the facts
and circumstances obtaining in this case.
It is undisputed that respondent firm had rendered services
as counsel for the petitioners in Civil Case No. 95-244.
In sum, the services rendered by the respondent as
enumerated above and as admitted by Atty. Mario Ongkiko
during the ex parte hearing, consist of annotating notice of lis
pendens on the conjugal properties of petitioner and his wife;
filing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage;
preparing and filing various pleadings and documents
relevant to the case; obtaining a freeze order of petitioner's
funds in the UCPB; attending hearings in Civil Case No. 05-
224, and sending notices to petitioner updating the latter of
the status of the case. Nothing in Civil Case No. 95-224 so
far appears complicated and no extra ordinary skill was
needed for lawyers of respondent Law Firm to

accomplish what they had done in the case before they
withdrew their appearance. We do not find herein a
situation so intricate that demands more than a careful
scrutiny of the legal matters involved. These are simply the
normal duties of a lawyer that he is bound by law to render to
his clients with utmost fidelity for which his client must not be
burdened to pay an extra price. It bears stressing that at the
time respondent firm withdrew their appearance due to policy
differences with petitioner, the case was still in its initial stage.
Guided by the above yardstick and so much of the pertinent
data as are extant in the records of this case and in the
exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the amount
of P500,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for
the legal services rendered by respondent to the
petitioner.
The imposition of legal interest on the amount payable to
private respondent as attorney's fees is unwarranted. Even
as we agree that parties can freely stipulate on the terms of
payment, still the imposition of interest in the payment of
attorney's fees is not justified. In the case of Cortes v. Court
of Appeals, we ruled that Article 2209 of the Civil Code does
not even justify the imposition of legal interest on the payment
of attorney's fees as it is a provision of law governing ordinary
obligations and contracts. It deleted the 6% interest imposed
by the appellate court on the payment of attorney's fees. It
ratiocinated by citing Mambulao Lumber Co. v. Philippine
National Bank, thus:
Contracts for attorney's services in this jurisdiction stands
upon an entirely different footing from contracts for the payment
of compensation for any other services. . . . [A]n attorney is not
entitled in the absence of express contract to recover more than a
reasonable compensation for his services; and even when an
express contract is made, the court can ignore it and limit the
recovery to reasonable compensation if the amount of the stipulated
fee is found by the court to be unreasonable. This is a very different
rule from that announced in section 1091 of the Civil Code with
reference to the obligation of contracts in general, where it is said that
such obligation has the force of law between the contracting parties.
Had the plaintiff herein made an express contract to pay his attorney
an uncontingent fee of P2,115.25 for the services to be rendered in
reducing the note here in suit to judgment, it would not have been
enforced against him had he seen fit to oppose it, as such a fee is
obviously far greater than is necessary to remunerate the attorney for
the work involved and is therefore unreasonable. In order to enable
the court to ignore an express contract for attorney's fees, it is
necessary to show, as in other contracts, that it is contrary to
morality or public policy (Art. 1255, Civil Code). It is enough that
it is unreasonable or unconscionable. (Emphases supplied.)
We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture
and lawyers are not merchants. Law advocacy, it has been
stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births
are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a
calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater
deal of freedom from governmental interference, is
impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State
regulation.
II.
Though we reduced the award of attorney's fees and
disallowed the imposition of interest thereon, the fact that an
attorney plays a vital role in the administration of justice
underscores the need to secure to him his honorarium
lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and
respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much
entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition of
fraud on the part of his client as the client against abuse on
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 26
the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to
see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also
its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his
capital consisting only of his brains and with his skill acquired
at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of
time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial
tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape
payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after
putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client, he
himself would not get his due.
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
expenses of litigation.
ATTORNEY’S LIENS
A lawyer cannot unilaterally appropriate the client’s
money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes
him attorney’s fees. What he can do is to exercise his
right of lien, if proper.
It can either be a charging lien or a retaining lien.
Charging Lien
It is an equitable right of a lawyer to have the fees due him
for services in a suit secured by the judgment or recovery
in such suit.
It is the right of a lawyer upon all judgments for the
payment of money.
NOTE: When we talk about charging lien, we talk about a
judgment for a payment of money.
Requisites:
1. Attorney-client relationship;
2. The attorney has rendered services;
3. Favorable money judgment secured by the
counsel for his client, and
4. The attorney has a claim for attorney’s fees or
advances, and
5. A statement of his claim has been recorded in the
case with notice served upon the client and
adverse party.
Note: A charging lien, to be enforceable as a security for
the payment of attorney’s fees, requires as a condition
sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in
pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action
by the attorney in favor of his client.
Question: How to enforce?
1) File a Motion
2) File collection suit
Question: How to reflect the Notice in your Motion?
1) Furnish your client of the copy of Motion.
Retaining Lien
It is a passive lien and may not be actively enforced.

It amounts to a mere right to retain the papers and
documents as against the client until the lawyer is fully
paid.
It is the right to retain the funds, documents, and papers
of the client.
Requisites: (ALU)
1) Attorney-client relationship,
2) Lawful possession by the lawyer of the client’s
funds, documents and papers in his professional
capacity; and
3) Unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees or
disbursements
Retaining Lien Charging Lien
Nature
A passive lien. It is a general An active lien. It is a special
lien. It cannot be actively lien. It can be enforced by
enforced. execution.
Basis
Lawful possession of funds, Securing of favorable
papers, documents and judgment for client.
property belonging to client
Coverage
Covers only funds, papers, Covers all judgments for the
documents and property in payment of money and
the lawful possession of the executions issued in
attorney by reason of his pursuance of such judgment
professional employment. (final and executory).
Effectivity
As soon as the lawyer gets As soon as the claim for
possession of the funds, attorney’s fees had been
papers, documents and entered into the records of
property. the case.
Applicability
May be exercised before Generally, it is exercisable
judgment or execution, or only when the attorney had
regardless thereof. already secured a favorable
judgment for his client.
Notice
The client need not be The client and adverse party
notified to make it effective need to be notified to make it
effective.
NOTE:
In this two kinds of lien, it takes effect only if there is notice
of that lien that has been entered in the record. And
there is a service of a notice on the adverse party.
Atty GCC: “Hi everyone. A clarification was made on my
recorded lecture where I mentioned that the
implementation of both types of attorney's liens require
that the lien be entered into the records with notice to the
client. When I mentioned that, I was referring to the case
of Menzi & Co. v. Bastida, G.R. No. 42278, March 25,
1936, decided by the Supreme Court en banc. SC did not
make such distinction in the said case on the kind of
attorney's lien. My opinion? With due respect to SC, that
opinion should only apply to charging lien, not
retaining lien, as, based on the facts, the lien was
about the claim for attorney's fees which was
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 27
withdrawn. Thank you.” –so charging lien ra ang needed
ug service of notice to adverse party
Implementation of Attorney’s Retaining or Charging
Lien
A lawyer shall have a lien over the client’s funds and may
apply so much thereof to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements but must give prompt notice to his client
for the latter’s advisement.
Rule 16.03 (CPR) gives the lawyer a lien over the client's
funds and allows him to apply the same to satisfy his
lawful fees and disbursements but giving notice promptly
to the client (Report of IBP Committee, p. 89).
For the further protection of the lawyer, he shall also have
a lien to the extent of his attorney's fees and legal
disbursements on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules (Rule
138, Sec. 37. Revised Rules of Court). This lien refers
to charging liens. To enforce a charging lien, it is
necessary that the lawyer shall have caused a statement
of such lien to be entered upon the records of the
court which rendered the favorable judgment with
written notice to the client and to the adverse party.
The Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure of
enforcing attorney's liens
"SEC. 37. Attorney's liens. -An attorney shall have a lien
upon the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession and may
retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent upon all judgments for the payment of money,
and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments,
which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and
after the time when he shall have caused a statement of
his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of
the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof
to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party:
and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have to
enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees
and disbursements.
Attorney's Retaining Lien Does Not Apply to Public
Documents And Exhibits Introduced In Court.
The attorney's retaining lien does not apply to public
documents introduced in court as exhibits. These
documents are subject to the court's custody. To hold
otherwise would be to curtail unduly the inherent power of
a judicial tribunal in the conduct of the proceedings before
it.
When Documents are Subject of Lien, Adequate
Security May Be Required.
When documents in the possession of a lawyer are the
subject of attorney's lien, he cannot be compelled to
surrender the same without prior proof that his fees

have been fully satisfied. If the fees have not been paid,
and there is a genuine need for the court to gain
possession of the documents, it must first require the
claimant to file an adequate security for the lawyer's fees
before it can require the surrender thereof.
Lawyers cannot be deprived of his attorney’s fees
through the client’s maneuvers.
Lawyer’s Charging Lien May be assigned.
Because it is a property right.
Charging Lien survives the death of the client.
A lawyer is not deprived of his attorney’s fees by the death
of his client although the client-lawyer relationship is
terminated.
Effect of Enforcement of Charging Lien
When a lawyer enforces a charging lien against his client,
the client-lawyer relationship is terminated.
Contingent Contract
A contingent fee contract is one which stipulates that the
lawyer will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or
litigation ends favorably to the client.
• It must be in writing otherwise it is unenforceable.
• To be payable, a final judgment is required.
Contingent fee is not per se prohibited by law. Its validity
depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of
the amount fixed as contingent fee under the
circumstances of the case.
NOTE:
A contingent fee contract is generally valid and binding.
But there must be an express contract or a stipulation that
is reduced in writing. And for the amount of attorney’s
fees, it is always subject to the supervision of the court
insofar as the reasonableness of the amount is
concerned.
In case of doubt, that provision would have to be resolved
against the person who caused the obscurity. Usually, it
is the lawyer.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 28
Quantum Meruit
Quantum meruit is a legal mechanism in legal ethics
which prevents an unscrupulous client from running away
with the fruits of the legal services of a counsel without
paying therefor. It is in line with the fundamental principle
against unjust enrichment at the expense of another.
Full-blown Trial Is Needed In "Quantum Meruit".- In the
determination of the reasonableness of a lawyer's
attorney's fees anchored on the factors enumerated in the
Rule, full-blown trial is necessarily needed because the
factors must be established by evidence (See
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs Court of Appeals,
181 SCRA 367; Bach vs. Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit &
Accorda Law Offices, 501 SCRA 258).
Guides in Determining Attorney’s Fees on “Quantum
Meruit” Basis
a) Time Spent and Extent of the Services Rendered
or Required.
b) Novelty and Difficulty of Questions Involved
c) Importance of Subject Matter
d) Skill Demanded of the Lawyer
e) Probability of Losing Other Employment
f) Customary Charges for Similar Services and
Schedule of Fees of IBP
g) Amount Involved in the Controversy and benefits
Resulting to the Client from the Service
h) Contingency or Certainty of Compensation
None of the factors is controlling but are guides only.
The mere fact that an agreement had been reached
between the attorney and the client fixing the amount of
the attorney’s fees does not insulate such agreement from
review and modification by the Court where the fees
clearly appear to be excessive or unreasonable.
Additional Notes:
Article 111 of the Labor Code; it involves extraordinary kind
of attorney’s fees in favor of the client, and a contingency fee
basis with a cap up to 10%:
“(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept,
in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery
of wages, attorney’s fees which exceed ten percent of the
amount of the average wage…”
Whether that particular amount stated in the contract is
reasonable or not would depend on the circumstances of
the case.
-The contract does not allow the lawyer to subrogate for
the client.
-Not covered by prohibition in Article 1491 (5) of the NCC
(acquiring); Article 1646 (leasing); Article 1492 (sales in
legal redemption, compromises and renunciation).

Module 5
Duties of a Lawyer (Part 2)
DUTIES
Sec. 20, Rule 138 Rules of Court
SECTION 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an
attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the
Philippines;
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only
as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth
and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial
officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business except
from him or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance
no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which
he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the
continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself,
the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and
honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the
guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or
liberty, but by due process of law.
The Four-fold Duties of a Lawyer
According to the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
conduct of the lawyers should be guided by their four-fold
duties – to the clients, the courts, their colleagues and the
community.
Clients Courts Colleagues Community
CANONS
CANON 1
Duty to Uphold the Constitution and the Laws
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 29
RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
RULE 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's
cause.
RULE 1.04 A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end
or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
Vitriolo v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984
To extort money from persons with applications or
requests pending before her office were violative of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or
participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts
Complainants filed a disbarment case against Atty. Felina S.
Dasig for gross misconduct in violation of the Attorney's Oath.
They claimed, among others, that during her term as Officer-
In-Charge of the Legal Affairs Services of the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED), Atty. Dasig made unlawful
demands or attempted to extort money from certain
individuals who had pending applications/requests before her
office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on said
requests/applications. Despite due notice, Atty. Dasig failed
to file her comment or answer. Accordingly, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that she be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years.
The Court ruled that respondent's attempts to extort money
from persons with applications or requests pending before
her office were violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits members of
the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful,
dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts
constituted a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars
lawyers in government service from promoting their private
interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected
by the functions of his office. Respondent's conduct in office
fell short of the integrity and good moral character required
from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public
office. Thus, respondent Atty. Felina S. Dasig was found
liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the
Attorney's Oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility and was ordered disbarred.
1. Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. However, if said misconduct as a government
official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar.
2. The Attorney's Oath is the source of the obligations and
duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground
for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The
Attorney's Oath imposes upon every member of the bar
the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty

is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent's demands for sums of money to
facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests
before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath
she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run
contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
3. Extortion. We find that respondent's misconduct as a
lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her
qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she
ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal
for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the
approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her
office.
4. Code of Professional Responsibility; governs the
conduct of all lawyers including those in government
service. — A member of the Bar who assumes public office
does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code
of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21,
1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said
Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe
utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be
more sensitive in the performance of their professional
obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant
scrutiny of the public.
-DISBARRED.
Dizon v. Lambino
By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected
students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Issues:
1. Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over
the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes
violation of Code of Professional Responsibility. NO.
2. Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the
student-suspects constitutes violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. YES.
Held:
1. That the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of
the students "cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No.
1829, Sec. 1 (c) without rendering it unconstitutional," they
having "a right to prevent the arrest of the students at the time
because their attempted arrest was illegal."
Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against
the turnover of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, there being no
basis for him to effect a warrantless arrest.
2. In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic
Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers the NBI "to
undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses against
the laws of the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as
public interest may require" and to make arrests. The
invocation does not impress. Said section does not grant
the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The NBI
Charter clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be "in
accordance with existing laws and rules."
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 30
Members of the investigation
staff of the Bureau of Investigation shall
be peace officers, and as such have the
following powers:
(a) To make arrests, searches
and seizures in accordance with
existing laws and rules.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected
students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
(Emphasis supplied).
-Atty Dizon REPRIMANDED and WARNED
Sison v. Camacho
For entering into a compromise agreement without client’s
authority and for failing to account for the money of the client,
he violated Canon 1.01 and Canon 16 of the CPR,
respectively.
- DISBARRED
Lehnert v. Diño
This Court continues to state that the issuance of worthless
checks constitutes gross misconduct and violates Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates
all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law." Issuance of worthless checks also
violates Rule 1.01 of the Code, which mandates that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.".
-SUSPENDED and WARNED
Navarro v. Gonzales-Diego
Atty. Maria Victoria M. Gonzales-Diego is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, 1 Canon 7, 2 and Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for her unethical
actions in connection with her personally serving copies of
a "Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy" to complainant Amelita S. Navarro
on November 4, 2015, during the occasion of the
complainants' 50th wedding anniversary celebration,
lacking in proper demeanor as a lawyer, thereby causing
distress and humiliation upon complainants.
-REPRIMANDED
Agustin v. Laeno
Atty. Laeno's acts of (i) executing two deeds of sale that
covered one single property, (ii) indicating an undervalued
consideration contrary to what was agreed on by the
contracting parties, and (iii) offering one of these bogus
deeds as evidence before the Court is exactly what is

proscribed under the following Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith
to the court.
Next, Atty. Laeno's resort to several suits against Marcelina
and Perpetua to avoid eviction or cause the delay in the
execution of an unfavorable judgment in an ejectment suit is
likewise contrary to Canon 12.
Canon 12 — A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
Certainly, he had a duty as an officer of the court to abide by
the judgment rendered even if it was unfavorable to him.
Therefore, a five (5)-year suspension is appropriate to
penalize his reprehensible transgressions.
-SUSPENDED
CANON 2
Duty to be an Efficient Lawyer
CANON 2 — A lawyer shall make his legal services
available in an efficient and convenient manner
compatible with the independence, integrity and
effectiveness of the profession.
RULE 2.01 A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons,
the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
RULE 2.02 In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept
a case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the
person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard
the latter's rights.
RULE 2.03 A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
RULE 2.04 A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those
customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
Villatuya v. Tabalingcos
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used
the business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients
and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be
specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the
facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of
profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other
lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the
business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 31
as to be inconsistent with the lawyer's duties as a member of
the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one
that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional
employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for
indirect solicitation on the lawyer's behalf; or is of a nature
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice
of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by
complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which
purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a
vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure
professional employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases. Annex "C" of the Complaint is a
letterhead of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which proposed
an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter
clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the
proposed fees, respondent would render legal services
related to the former's loan obligation with a bank. This
circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the
Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as
President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as
partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is
mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as
a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those
occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that
certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client
relationship may be operative in one and not in the other. In
this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether
respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the
degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, we affirm
the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating
Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy
twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate this allegation,
complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different
women. The latter objected to the introduction of these
documents, claiming that they were submitted after the
administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus
giving him no opportunity to controvert them. We are not
persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case
is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a
lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the
procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we
explained in Garrido v. Garrido:
Laws dealing with double
jeopardy or with procedure — such as
the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of
affidavits of desistance by the
complainant — do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer's qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar.
We have so ruled in the past and we see
no reason to depart from this
ruling. First, admission to the practice of

law is a component of the administration
of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to
the public. The admission qualifications
are also qualifications for the continued
enjoyment of the privilege to practice
law. Second, lack of qualifications or the
violation of the standards for the practice
of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of
public concern that the State may inquire
into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant. For the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established
by convincing and satisfactory proof. In this case,
complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove
that respondent entered into two marriages while the latter's
first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied
entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted
to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He
did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but
denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He
submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately
with the RTC of Laguna — one in Biñan and the other in
Calamba — to declare the second and the third Marriage
Contracts null and void.
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the
Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered
by respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or
impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the
Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the
former's marriages to two other women aside from his wife.
For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage
Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent
and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy,
which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar.
The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official
repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth,
marriage and death of a person. Having been issued by a
government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of
regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any
competent evidence to rebut those documents.
-REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and
solicitation, but DISBARRED for engaging in Bigamy, a
grossly immoral conduct.
CANON 3
Duty of Honest and Dignified Pronouncement of
Legal Service
CANON 3 — A lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statements of facts.
RULE 3.01 A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
RULE 3.02 In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading
or assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the
name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 32
firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is
deceased.
RULE 3.03 Where a partner accepts public office, he shall
withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from
the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law
concurrently.
RULE 3.04 A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value
to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business.
Khan, Jr. v. Simbillo
For advertising himself in several leading newspapers as an
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo
was charged for improper advertising and solicitation of
his legal services. Respondent admitted the act imputed to
him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts.
The practice of law is not a business but a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Although solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed, to be proper, it must be compatible
with the dignity of the legal profession, made in a modest and
decorous manner that would bring no injury to the lawyer and
the bar. Here, for advertising himself as an annulment of
marriage specialist, Atty. Simbillo undermined not only the
stability but also the sanctity of marriage. Thus, for violation
of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 2.03. — A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any
act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. —
A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.
PRACTICE OF LAW AS A PROFESSION, NOT A
BUSINESS;. — It has been repeatedly stressed that the
practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should
be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and
to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The
following elements distinguish the legal profession from
a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-
product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration
of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their
practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
-SUSPENDED and REPRIMANDED
Allowed Solicitation/Advertisement of Legal
Business (Khan v. Simbillo)

1) Use of simple signs stating the name or names of
lawyers, the office and residence address and fields
of practice,
2) Advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the
same brief data, are permissible.
3) Use of calling cards.
4) Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by
the canon, of brief biographical and informative data.
Best advertisement: well-merited reputation and
fidelity to trust based on character and conduct
Linsangan v. Tolentino
Any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for
the exercise of the Court's disciplinary powers. Violation of
anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining employment. Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to
the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including
violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the
sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a
wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence
by petitioner. A lawyer's best advertisement is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust based on his character and conduct. For this
reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of
simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the
following details:
(a) lawyer's name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with financial
assistance". The phrase was clearly used to entice clients
(who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was
dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers,
thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded
the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence
to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that
respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labiano's calling cards.
-SUSPENDED for 1 year and is STERNLY WARNED
CANON 4
Duty to Support the Improvement of the Legal
System
CANON 4 — A lawyer shall participate in the
development of the legal system by initiating or
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 33
supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement
of the administration of justice.
Re: Request of National Committee on Legal Aid, A.M.
No. 08-11-7-SC (Resolution), [August 28, 2009], 614
PHIL 1-23)
Facts:
On September 23, 2008, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated
Resolution No. 24, series of 2008. The resolution requested
the IBP's National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for
the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other
fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP
chapters.
Issue:
Whether or not indigent litigants be exempted from paying
filing, docket, and other fees. YES.
Held:
Access to justice by all, especially by the poor,
is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is
essential in a democracy and in the rule of law. As such,
it is guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law:
Sec. 11. Free access to the
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any person by reason of
poverty. (emphasis supplied)
||Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right,
there must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be
effective and efficient, but also readily accessible. For a
remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at all.
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the
poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal
assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA
and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide
addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance.
Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid
offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts
by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed
in connection with the filing of a complaint or action in
court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of
Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and
access to justice is increased by bridging a significant
gap and removing a major roadblock.
WHEREFORE, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
hereby COMMENDED for helping increase the access to
justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental
Chapter for the exemption from the payment of filing,
docket and other fees of the clients of the legal aid offices
of the various IBP chapters is GRANTED. The Rule on
the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the
Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA)
and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) (which shall be
assigned the docket number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR]
provided in this resolution is hereby APPROVED. In this
connection, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the
publication of the said rule in a newspaper of general

circulation within five days from the promulgation of this
resolution.
CANON 5
Duty to Keep Abreast of Legal Developments
CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in
law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.
Cerilla v. Lezama
Respondent entered into the Compromise Agreement on the
basis of the SPA granted to him by complainant. The SPA
authorized respondent to represent complainant in filing the
ejectment case and "to appear on [complainant's] behalf
during the preliminary conference in said ejectment case and
to make stipulations of fact, admissions and other matters for
the early resolution of the case, including amicable settlement
of the case if necessary." Nowhere is it expressly stated in
the SPA that respondent is authorized to compromise on
the sale of the property or to sell the property of
complainant.
The records show that respondent admitted that he entered
into the compromise agreement with the defendant in the
unlawful detainer case and stated that the plaintiff, who is the
complainant herein, was willing to sell the property to the
defendant in the amount of P350,000.00 even if the
complainant did not instruct or authorize him to sell the
property, and he merely acted upon his own belief. As the
SPA granted to him by the complainant did not contain
the power to sell the property, respondent clearly acted
beyond the scope of his authority in entering into the
compromise agreement wherein the property was sold to
the defendant Carmelita S. Garlito.
Respondent, in his Answer and Motion for Reconsideration of
Resolution No. XXI-2014-386, stated that his action was
based on an honest belief that he was serving both the
interest of his client and the policy of the law to settle cases
amicably. However, his justification does not persuade,
because his alleged honest belief prejudiced his client,
since the property she was not willing to sell was sold at
a price decided upon by respondent on his own, which
caused his client and her co-owners to file further cases
to recover their property that was sold due to
respondent's mistake. He overlooked the fact that he was
not authorized by his client to sell the property.
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states:
CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law
schools as well as in the practical training of law students and
assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon
5 duty have been reiterated in Hernandez v. Atty. Padilla,
thus:
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 34
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in
the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty
carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing
laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge
competently and diligently their obligations as members of
the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.
As found by the IBP Board of Governors, respondent also
violated Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Responsibility:
CANON 15
—
A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.
CANON 17
—
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
- SUSPENDED for 2 years
CANON 6
The Canons that Apply to Lawyers in Government
Service
CANON 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.
RULE 6.01 The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done.
The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses
capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
RULE 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promote or advance his private interests
nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
RULE 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving a government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
Bautista v. Ferrer
First of all, it was clearly established, and in fact admitted by
Ferrer, that she uttered the derogatory remarks "putang ina
mo Arlene, ang kapal ng mukha mo. Ayusin mo muna ako
bago mo makuha ang mga gamit mo" in the confines of her
own office. This fact, standing alone, already violates Rule
8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which prohibits a lawyer from using language which is
abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper. It is not amiss to
add, moreover, that Ferrer was even thrusting a pair of
scissors making a move to throw it in anger. To the Court,
Ferrer's excuse that she did not point the same in the
direction of Bautista and that it is simply her mannerism to
hold things with her hands does not absolve her from
administrative liability. The fact that she angrily hurled
offensive words at Bautista while holding a pair of scissors

was enough to threaten and intimidate the latter. As the
Investigating Commissioner held, these words surely have no
place in the mouth of a lawyer in a high government office
such as Ferrer, an Assistant Regional State Prosecutor no
less.
Moreover, whether the dispute between the parties is a
private matter is of no moment. In Gonzalez v. Atty. Alcaraz,
We held that "whether in their professional or in their
private capacity, lawyers may be disbarred or suspended
for misconduct. This penalty is a consequence of acts
showing their unworthiness as officers of the courts, as well
as their lack of moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor. When the misconduct committed outside of their
professional dealings is so gross as to show them to be
morally unfit for the office and the privileges conferred upon
them by their license and the law, they may be suspended or
disbarred."
Accordingly, We ruled in Olazo v. Justice Tinga that "since
public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded
upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than
the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the
government service are subject to constant public scrutiny
under norms of public accountability. They also bear the
heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in
favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should
not interfere with the discharge of their official functions."
Thus, while Ferrer had every right to demand the return of her
investments, the appropriate course of action should have
been to file a collection case against Bautista. But instead,
she chose to put the law into her own hands by personally
questioning Bautista, bringing her to the police station, and
confiscating her personal belongings. To the Court, Ferrer's
acts evinces a certain vindictiveness, an undesirable trait in
any individual, and as extensively discussed above, these
actuations violated multiple provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, Ferrer may have been in
the government service for many years, but such fact may not
extinguish her administrative liability.
Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a lawyer in government from
using his/her public position or influence to promote or
advance his/her private interests. On this score, let Us not
forget that Ferrer was the Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, at the time of the
incident and that Bautista was well aware of such fact. Let Us
also not forget that Bautista was questioned at the police
station from 2:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., or almost 5 hours. But
despite this, Ferrer did not file any complaint against Bautista,
insisting that she merely wanted to talk to Bautista in front of
the police authorities. These police authorities searched
Bautista's belongings looking for any clue as to the
whereabouts of Ferrer's money as well as the debtors who
borrowed the same. Thus, even assuming that Ferrer did not
really kick, punch, or repeatedly slap Bautista's head, the fact
that Bautista surrendered her cellphone and allowed herself
to be brought by Ferrer from one place to another, from early
morning until the evening, shows how Ferrer succeeded in
using her high and powerful position in the government
to intimidate Bautista, a mere manicurist and lessee of
her property.
-SUSPENDED
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 35
CANON 7
Duty to Uphold the Dignity of the Legal Profession
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the integrated bar.
RULE 7.01 A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppressing a material fact, in
connection with his application for admission to the bar.
RULE 7.02 A lawyer shall not support the application for
admission to the bar of any person known by him to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other
relevant attribute.
RULE 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Samala v. Palaña
In this case, respondent assured complainant that by
investing his dollar savings with FIRI, his investment was in a
stable company, even if, as it was later discovered, the by-
laws of FIRI prohibited it from engaging in investment or
foreign exchange business and its primary purpose is "to act
as consultant in providing professional expertise and reliable
data analysis related to partnership and so on."
When complainant decided to withdraw his investment from
FIRI, the first check given to him in the amount of his total
investment bounced. Thereafter, respondent, as legal officer
of FIRI, gave complainant P250,000 in cash and a check for
P329,045.09. Respondent assured complainant that the
second check was a "good check" and that it was signed by
Paul Desiderio, the alleged president of FIRI. However, the
said check bounced because it was drawn against insufficient
funds, and the drawer of the check, Paul Desiderio, could not
be located when sought to be served a warrant of arrest since
his identity was unknown and his residential address was
found to be non-existent.
Hence, it is clear that the representations of respondent as
legal officer of FIRI caused material damage to complainant.
In so doing, respondent failed to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and lessened the confidence of
the public in the honesty and integrity of the same.
Respondent was found to have violated Rule 7.03 of Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
-SUSPENDED for 3 yrs
Assurance by a lawyer that by investing his dollar savings
with a corporation, his investment was in a stable
company, even if, as it was later discovered, the by-laws
of said corporation prohibited it from engaging in
investment or foreign exchange business and its primary
purpose is "to act as consultant in providing professional
expertise and reliable data analysis related to partnership
and so on"

-such misrepresentation lessened the confidence of the
public in the honesty and integrity of the legal profession
Navarro v. Gonzales-Diego
Atty. Maria Victoria M. Gonzales-Diego is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, 1 Canon 7, 2 and Canon 8
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for her unethical
actions in connection with her personally serving copies of
a "Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy" to complainant Amelita S. Navarro
on November 4, 2015, during the occasion of the
complainants' 50th wedding anniversary celebration,
lacking in proper demeanor as a lawyer, thereby causing
distress and humiliation upon complainants.
-REPRIMANDED
CANON 8
Duty of Professional Courtesy
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
RULE 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
RULE 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to
give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Dimaculangan v. Jurado
Membership in the bar imposes upon lawyers certain
obligations to one another. These include observance of
honorable, candid and courteous dealings with other lawyers,
as provided in Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
From the facts, Sta. Ana's remarks against Dimaculangan in
front of other lawyers exhibit unprofessional conduct. While
he may be frustrated of Dimaculangan's actuations, this does
not excuse him from not treating his opposing counsel with
courtesy, dignity and civility. Aside from scolding
Dimaculangan, Sta. Ana also publicly berated the former by
saying that she erroneously filed a motion in the main case
despite pendency of a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. This criticism was uncalled for considering that
Dimaculangan was only performing her legal duty of
protecting the interest of a client. Sta. Ana's fault-finding
remarks betray lack of understanding of the lawyer's duties to
the client.
For emphasis, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 8 — A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF
WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS
HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 36
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Sta. Ana's foregoing actions do not measure up to this
Canon. A cordial and collaborative atmosphere among
lawyers is expected in the practice of law. Sta. Ana could
have privately aired his exasperation with Dimaculangan.
Dimaculangan even exercised efforts to maintain
camaraderie amongst her fellow members of the bar by
writing an apology letter immediately after the confrontation
at the postponed hearing. Despite this letter, however, Sta.
Ana let his "emotional attitude" get the better of him. To Our
mind, such unprofessional behavior must be reproached.
-REPRIMANDED with STERN WARNING
Navarro v. Gonzales-Diego
-supra
CANON 9
Duty Not to Assist in the Unauthorized Practice of
Law
CANON 9 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
RULE 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only
be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
RULE 9.02 A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a
fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice
law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or
associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall be paid
over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons
specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal
business of a deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees
in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in
part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.
Tapay v. Bancolo
Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his
signature to a pleading
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. YES.
Held:
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former
client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his
name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a
violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9

A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by
a member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v.
Cristal-Tenorio, where we held:
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon
a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and
ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, we held
that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute
legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty.
Bancolo's authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal
to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel's signature serves
as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the
best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good
ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.
Thus, by affixing one's signature to a pleading, it is counsel
alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters
and give legal effect to the document.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that
because of some minor lapses, the communications and
pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his
secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty.
Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation is an act of falsehood which is a
ground for disciplinary action.
-SUSPENDED for 1 year
Bonifacio v. Era
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his
unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must likewise be
reproved.
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty.
Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet, she
allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized
practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not
to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 37
founded upon public interest and policy, which requires that
law practice be limited only to individuals found duly qualified
in education and character.
As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to
know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice
could be performed only by a member of the Bar in good
standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she
should have not participated to such transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to
circumvent the suspension order. The factual circumstances
of the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to
replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's
clients during the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely
assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly was the one actively
performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was
handling.
-SUSPENDED for 1 month and WARNED
CANON 10
Duty of Candor, Fairness and Good faith to the
Courts.
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court.
RULE 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
RULE 10.02 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.
RULE 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Magdaluyo v. Nace
Facts:
Respondent Nace was accused of acts amounting to deceit
and gross misconduct. Complaint Magdaluyo alleged that he
is the registered owner of parcels of land situated in Rizal and
he offered to relocate the squatters living on his land. The
squatters, however, refused and filed a case before the
DARAB, claiming that they are tenants on complainant's land.
Almost three months later, the squatters, including Nace, also
filed a case before the RTC for the annulment of
complainant's land titles claiming that they are the owners of
the land under the old Spanish title. Both agrarian and civil
cases were later dismissed and Magdaluyo filed this
complaint against Nace inasmuch as he was a party to both
the agrarian and civil suits. Magdaluyo accused Nace of
having deliberately committed a falsehood and of forum-
shopping.
Issue:
Did Atty. Nace violate Canon 10? YES.
Held:
Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of
Professional Responsibility against engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. He was, indeed, less

than sincere in asserting two conflicting rights over a portion
of land that, in all probability, he knew not to be his. What
made matters worse was his participation in bringing such
claims to court, knowing them to be contradictory and
therefore cannot both be true, though both could be totally
false. In this he is guilty of consenting to if not actual
commission of a falsehood before a court, again in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Canon 10, Rule
10.1).
-REPRIMANDED
Apolinar-Petilo v. Maramot
Pertinent in this case are Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1; and
Rule 10.1 of Canon 10, which provide:
CANON 1 — x x x
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 — x x x
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.
The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At the time of
his preparation of the document, he actually knew that
Princess Anne was a minor; hence, his claim of having then
advised that her parents should represent her in the
execution of the document. Mommayda was likewise a minor.
His awareness of the latter's minority at the time was not
disputed because he was also representing Mommayda in
the latter's adoption proceedings aside from being
Mommayda's neighbor. Nonetheless, he still indicated in
the deed of donation that the donees were of legal age.
His doing so, being undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his
oath as a lawyer not to utter a falsehood. He thereby
consciously engaged in an unlawful and dishonest conduct,
defying the law and contributing to the erosion of confidence
in the Law Profession.
The respondent's explanation that it was only Margarita who
actually acknowledged that the deed of donation was her own
free act and deed does not extricate him from responsibility.
The deed of donation, whether or not acknowledged by the
donees, should not bear any false statement upon a material
fact. The ages of the donees were material because they bore
on their capacities to render the donation efficacious. That
neither Princess Anne nor Mommayda acknowledged the
deed of donation did not cure the defect.
The respondent justifies himself by stating that the
persistence of the donor Margarita prevailed upon him to
prepare the deed of donation as he had done; and adverts to
the donor's assurance that she would herself procure the
signatures of the parents of Princess Anne on the document.
He also submits that the execution of the deed had
redounded to the advantage of the minors; and that there was
no law that prohibited the donation in favor of minors.
The respondent cannot be relieved by his justifications and
submissions. As a lawyer, he should not invoke good faith
and good intentions as sufficient to excuse him from
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 38
discharging his obligation to be truthful and honest in his
professional actions. His duty and responsibility in that
regard were clear and unambiguous. In Young v. Batuegas,
this Court reminded that truthfulness and honesty had the
highest value for attorneys, thus:
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to
the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any
in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the
best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer
of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the
law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving
at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his
client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in
defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the
expense of truth.
The respondent posits that a donation could be made in favor
of a minor. Such position was not a factor, however, because
whether or not a minor could benefit from the donation
did not determine the merits of the complaint for his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Neither was his claim that the filing of the petition for judicial
partition amounted to the ratification of the deed of donation
a factor to be considered in his favor. The decisive
consideration is whether or not he committed a
falsehood in his preparation of the deed of donation.
Sadly for him, the answer is in the affirmative.
-SUSPENDED for 6 months and REVOCATION of notarial
commission for 2 years
CANON 11
Duty to Give Respect to the Courts
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.01 A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
RULE 11.02 A lawyer shall punctually appear at court
hearings.
RULE 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
RULE 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives
not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a
Judge to the proper authorities only.
Spouses Asuncion v. Bassig
Atty. Bassig filed a complaint that was false in a critically
material aspect — the status of the plaintiff (Plaintiff was
alreadydeceased for 2 years). The mere act of filing such a
complaint, alongside the proven deceased status of its
purported plaintiff, shows either Atty. Bassig's ill intent on the
one hand, or appalling incompetence on the other, neither of
which are excusable under the circumstances.
Atty. Bassig's defense, as raised in his motion for
reconsideration, does not convince Us. His bare denial of
prior knowledge of Cabangon's status during the preparation

and filing of the complaint, on the pretext that he only met
Cabangon's agent further aggravates his stance. His
defensive claims, notwithstanding their lack of proof, indicate
respondent's gross negligence in relying on a representation
of agency by a client without so much as the requirement of
a written letter of authority or a similar document that would
verify the identity of the client. That the supposed agent of
Cabangon remains unnamed even in his raising of defenses
may even reasonably hint at the complete falsity of the
defense itself. And even if We consider Atty. Bassig's defense
that he merely relied on the representation of the supposed
agent of Cabangon, there is nothing on record to show that
Atty. Bassig addressed this mistake in court after Sps.
Asuncion manifested that Cabangon already died prior to the
filing of the complaint.
In addition, We note that Atty. Bassig did not file an answer,
mandatory conference brief and position paper despite
repeated orders of Commissioner Mamon. This attitude of
Atty. Bassig is inexcusable considering that he has been
previously sanctioned for his refusal to obey the orders of
the IBP, in violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG
guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 10, and
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the lawyer's oath. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW for a period of TWO
YEARS from finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
CANON 12
Duty to Assist in the Speedy and Efficient
Administration of Justice
CANON 12 — A lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
RULE 12.01 A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has
adequately prepared himself on the law and the facts of his
case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its
profference. He should also be ready with the original
documents for comparison with the copies.
RULE 12.02 A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising
from the same cause.
RULE 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period
lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation
for his failure to do so.
RULE 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede
the execution of a Judgment or misuse Court processes.
RULE 12.05 A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness
during a break or recess in the trial, while the witness is still
under examination.
RULE 12.06 A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to
misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.
RULE 12.07 A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a
witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 39
RULE 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his
client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or
custody of an instrument, and the like: or
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is
essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during
his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.
Nuñez v. Ricafort
Synopsis
This is an administrative complaint filed by Soledad Nuñez, a
septuagenarian represented by her attorney-in-fact Ananias
B. Co, seeking the disbarment of respondent. It appeared that
the complainant authorized the respondent to sell her two
parcels of land for a commission. However, after selling the
lots he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale despite
complainant's repeated demands. This forced the
complainant to file an action for a sum of money against the
respondent and his wife. Thereafter, the court ordered
respondent to pay his obligation to the complainant. The
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which was
dismissed for non-payment of docket fee. In the satisfaction
of the writ of execution issued by the court, the respondent
issued four postdated checks, which were later dishonored
because the account had been closed. Again, because
respondent ignored the repeated demands of the
complainant to make good the checks, four criminal
complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against him
and his wife. Because of the failure of the respondent to
comment on the complaint against him, the Supreme Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP
investigating commissioner concluded that the respondent
had no intention to honor the money judgment against him
and recommended that respondent be declared guilty of
misconduct and be suspended from the practice of law for at
least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to
the complainant.
The Supreme Court concurred with the findings of the IBP
that the respondent was guilty of misconduct in his dealings
with complainant. By violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished
public confidence in the law and lawyers. The penalty of
suspension imposed by the IBP was inadequate. For his
deliberate violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 12.03
and 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, coupled with his palpable bad faith and
dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant, respondent
deserved a graver penalty. The graver penalty is indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
Syllabus
Respondent gravely abused the confidence that
complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty
when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her
property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the
complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of
the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and
energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer
the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default,
he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals.
Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay
the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent
wanted to prolong the travails and energy and agony of the

complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs
to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and
unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to
satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant
of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly
malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been
validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him,
respondent closed the account against which the checks
were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had
the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact that
despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did
not pay the obligation. All the foregoing constitute.
Lawyers are required to avoid any action that would
unduly delay a case, impede execution of judgment or
misuse court processes.
Respondent's act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the
alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the
trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice.
His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his
continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an
officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold. To
further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and
judicial processes, respondent even had the temerity of
making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his
three motions for extension of time to file his comment on the
complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the
comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such
failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having
waived the filing of the comment. To the Highest Court of the
land, respondent openly showed a high degree of
irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful
orders. Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated
Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide
that lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do
so.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty.
Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED
from the practice of law.
CANON 13
Duty to Refrain from Acts Giving Appearance of
Influencing the Court
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the
Court.
RULE 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention
or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity
with Judges.
RULE 13.02 A lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 40
RULE 13.03 A lawyer shall not brook nor invite interference
by another branch or agency of the government in the normal
course of judicial proceedings.
Fajardo v. Alvarez
Facts of the case on page 17, Module 3
Respondent is guilty of influence peddling.
In relation, Canon 13 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon
the merits of his or her cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and
receive a favorable outcome for his or her client violates
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This act
of influence peddling is highly immoral and has no place in
the legal profession:
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching
a judge — or a judge evincing a willingness — to discuss,
in private, a matter related to a case pending in that
judge's sala cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that
Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes,
initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to
conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the
judge to rule in his client's favor. This conduct is not
acceptable in the legal profession.
In Jimenez v. Verano, Jr., we disciplined the respondent for
preparing a release order for his clients using the letterhead
of the Department of Justice and the stationery of the
Secretary.
Similar to the present case, in Bueno v. Rañeses, we
disbarred a lawyer who solicited bribe money from his client
in violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant was
"forced to give ...Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00
because of the words of Respondent that he had friends in
the Office of the Ombudsman who could help with a fee." It is
because of respondent's assurances to complainant that she
sent him money over the course of several months.
As found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown
by the records, we rule that there is enough proof to hold
respondent guilty of influence peddling.
We find respondent's acts of influence peddling, coupled with
unauthorized practice of law, merit the penalty of suspension
of one (1) year from the practice of law. To be so bold as to
peddle influence before the very institution that is tasked to
prosecute corruption speaks much about respondent's
character and his attitude towards the courts and the bar.
Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or
relationships with regulators, investigators, judges, or
Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and
debase themselves even as they claim to be members of a
noble profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to
one's ability to have illicit access. Rather, it should be about
making an honest appraisal of the client's situation as seen
through the evidence fairly and fully gathered. It should be
about making a discerning and diligent reading of the
applicable law. It is foremost about attaining justice in a fair

manner. Law exists to temper, with its own power, illicit power
and unfair advantage. It should not be conceded as a tool
only for those who cheat by unduly influencing people or
public officials.
It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to even imply
to a client that a lawyer knows who will make a decision is an
act worthy of the utmost condemnation. If we are to preserve
the nobility of this profession, its members must live within its
ethical parameters. There is never an excuse for influence
peddling.
While this Court is not a collection agency for faltering
debtors, this Court has ordered restitution of amounts to
complainants due to the erroneous actions of lawyers.
Respondent is, therefore, required to return to complainant
the amount of P500,000.00 — the amount that respondent
allegedly gave his friends connected with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
-SUSPENDED for 1 year
Vantage Lighting Philippines, Inc. v. Diño, Jr.
By representing to his clients that he can secure the
issuance of a TRO by bribing the judge P150,000.00, Atty.
Diño violated Canon 13
We find Atty. Diño guilty of gross misconduct and violation of
the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides the
grounds for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer, thus:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds thereof. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied.)
Gross misconduct is defined as any inexcusable, shameful or
flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned
with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to
the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the
cause. Generally, such conduct is motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.
We agree with and find as persuasive the finding of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Diño tainted the
image of the Judiciary by claiming that the P150,000.00
to be collected from Vantage will be used to facilitate the
issuance of the TRO. Although Atty. Diño now denies bribing
the judge to secure the issuance of the TRO, explaining that
the amount of P150,000.00 was for the payment of the
additional fees, expenses and costs of litigation which he
euphemistically called "mobilization expenses" and, for
alleged professional fees for collaborating lawyers who
devoted laborious man-hours in personally monitoring the
progress of the complaint, we find his explanation not worthy
of credence.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 41
First, Atty. Diño himself admitted in his complaint-affidavit for
estafa that the P150,000.00 which he described as
mobilization and representation expenses was for the
purpose of securing the TRO. This statement negates his
assertion in the verified complaint that the P150,000.00 was
for other expenses. Atty. Diño did not even explain in the
Billing Statement what he needed to mobilize. Second, the
Retainer's Agreement and the Billing Statement did not
authorize the hiring of collaborating lawyers. Third, the
reimbursement of incidental expenses such as sheriff's and
process server's fees were billed under Item No. 5, i.e.,
"Reimbursement of incidental expenses" in the Billing
Statement. This is different from Item No. 2, i.e.,
"Reimbursement of Mobilization and Representation
Expenses" of the same Billing Statement. Plainly, and
contrary to Atty. Diño's claim, the P130,000.00 could not have
included the sheriff's and process server's fees.
By representing to his clients that he can secure the
issuance of a TRO by bribing the judge P150,000.00, Atty.
Diño violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Canon 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court.
In Dongga-as v. Cruz-Angeles, we suspended respondents-
lawyers from the practice of law for three years because they
represented to their client that they could find a "friendly"
court, judge, and public prosecutor to ensure a favorable
ruling in the client's annulment case. Their representation
undermined and/or denigrated the integrity of the national
prosecution service and the courts, in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
As an officer of the Court, Atty. Diño has a paramount duty to
protect the court's integrity and assist it in the administration
of justice according to law. He should not espouse a belief
that the judicial system can be bought, much less contribute
to the perpetuation of such belief. Unfortunately, instead of
relying on the merits of his clients' cause, Atty. Diño
represented to his clients that the judicial system can be
bribed. This inexcusable, shameful and unlawful act of Atty.
Diño, by itself, constitutes gross misconduct. In fact, we find
that it is conduct so condemnable that it merits the harshest
of penalties.
Worse, after failing to get the reimbursement/payment for his
fees and other amounts he advanced for such illegal
purposes, Atty. Diño threatened complainants that they would
not like the succeeding events if they fail to pay him. Indeed,
he made true to his threats to institute retaliatory acts against
complainants and the Reals as he in fact filed five actions
against Vantage and its officers within a span of two months.
Atty. Diño claims that he was merely trying to collect his
professional fees and other advances that he made in
complainants' behalf. Under Rule 16.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, however, a claim for attorney's
fees may be asserted either in the very action in which a
lawyer rendered his services or in a separate action, to wit:
Rule 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over
the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent

on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client
as provided for in the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
The existence of this appropriate recourse notwithstanding,
Atty. Diño still opted to file criminal and civil complaints
against his former clients. This supports the view that his acts
were ill-intentioned, and in violation of: (1) the Lawyer's Oath,
which provides that he shall not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit; and (2) Rule
20.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
imposes upon him the duty to avoid unnecessary lawsuits
against his client to collect his fees and to resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
We also find that Atty. Diño violated Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he filed a disbarment case
to harass the Reals, his former clients' new counsel. By
resorting to such harassment tactics against the opposing
counsel, he failed to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor towards his professional colleagues.
In Reyes v. Chiong, we suspended a lawyer from the practice
of law for two years for failing to treat his opposing counsel
and other lawyer with courtesy, dignity and civility, and for
wittingly and willingly promoting a groundless suit. There, the
respondent lawyer impleaded his opposing counsel and the
prosecutor handling the estafa case of his client as parties-
respondents in a civil complaint for the collection of sum of
money. We found that respondent lawyer misused the legal
processes when he unjustly impleaded the two lawyers
despite knowing that they had no participation in the civil
complaint.
In view of Atty. Diño's above-enumerated acts of professional
malpractice and gross misconduct, and considering further
the gravity of his acts, we find that Atty. Diño's conduct
warrants disbarment from the practice of law. Atty. Diño
is clearly unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the
Court; hence, he deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
-DISBARRED
CANON 14
Duty Not to Refuse Services to the Needy
CANON 14 — A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the
needy.
RULE 14.01 A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person
solely on account of the latter's race, sex, creed or status of
life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said
person.
RULE 14.02 A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and
sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel de oficio or as
amicus curiae or a request from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
RULE 14.03 A lawyer may not refuse to accept
representation of an indigent client unless:
a) he is in no position to carry out the work effectively or
competently; or
b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the
prospective client, or between a present client and the
prospective client.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 42
RULE 14.04 A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person
unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same
standard of conduct governing his relations with paying
clients.
In re Lahesa, G.R. No. 452
Jose Robles Lahesa, a lawyer practicing before this court, as
duly appointed counsel for the appellants in the case of the
United States vs. Julian Tulagan et al. on February 5, 1904,
and on February 12, 1905, the Solicitor-General gave notice
of motion to dismiss the appeal in said case on the ground of
abandonment and failure to prosecute the same. The said
Lahesa was also appointed counsel for the appellant in the
case of the United States vs. Julio Liuag, on the 12th of
August, 1904, and on February 11, 1905, this court, on its
own motion, issued a rule to the said Lahesa to show cause
of why the appeal in that case should not be dismissed on
like grounds, and further, to show cause, if any he had, why
this court should not impose disciplinary punishment for
grave neglect in the performance of his duty as a lawyer
and officer of this court.
Said motion and rule on for hearing Monday, February 20,
1905, when Jose Maria Marcaida appeared on behalf of said
Lahesa, and said he had been instructed by said Lahesa to
inform the court that he could not appear personally in
response to its rule, because he found it necessary to go
elsewhere on the day and at the hour fixed for the
hearing, that he had no ground on which to oppose the
dismissal of the appeals in said cases, and further, that he
had taken no action in the said cases because, in his opinion,
"there was no defense to be made on behalf of any of the
defendants for whom he had been assigned as counsel."
An examination of the record in the case of the United States
vs. Julian Tulagan et al. shows that the appellants were
sentenced in the trial court to long terms of imprisonment for
the crime of robo en cuadrilla, from which sentence they
appealed, and it appearing that they were too poor to
employ a lawyer, this court, in accordance with the law
provided in such cases, assigned the said Lahesa as counsel
de oficio, yet the said Lahesa has utterly failed to take any
action whatever in behalf of the defendants in said case,
though more than a year has elapsed since the date of said
assignment. An examination of the record in the case of the
United States vs. Julio Liuag shows that the defendant was
sentenced to seventeen years and four months imprisonment
for the crime of homicide, from which sentence he appealed,
and it appearing that he was too poor to employ a lawyer, this
court assigned the said Lahesa as counsel de oficio, yet the
said Lahesa has utterly failed to take any action whatever
on behalf of the defendant in that case, though more than
six months have elapsed since the date of his assignment.
Upon this statement of facts it cannot be doubted that the said
Jose Robles Lahesa has been guilty of grave negligence
in the performance of his duties as counsel, and as an
officer of the court.
This court should exact from its officers and subordinates the
most scrupulous performance of their official duties,
especially when negligence in the performance of those
duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of
criminal cases and the detention of accused persons pending
appeal. We are of opinion, therefore, that a fine of 200 pesos,
Philippine currency, should be imposed upon the said Jose

Robles Lahesa, said fine to be paid to the clerk of this court
within ten days of receipt of notice of this order. So ordered.
CANON 15
Duty to Observe Candor, Fairness, and Loyalty in all
Dealings and Transactions with Client
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
client.
RULE 15.01 A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client,
shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter
would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest,
and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
RULE 15.02 A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege
communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a
prospective client.
RULE 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
RULE 15.04 A lawyer may, with the written consent of all
concerned, act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling
disputes.
RULE 15.05 A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a
candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results
of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the
prospects of the case.
RULE 15.06 A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able
to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
RULE 15.07 A lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.
RULE 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession
or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make
clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity.
Rollon v. Naraval
Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or
as advocates of any person who may wish to become their
client. They may decline employment and refuse to accept
representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out
effectively or competently. But once they agree to handle a
case, attorneys are required by the Canons of
Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with
zeal, care and utmost devotion.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client's cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of
importance. The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly
states:
CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 43
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's
request for information.
Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as
they can efficiently handle. Otherwise, their clients would be
prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should
undertake the task with dedication and care. If they do any
less, then they fail their lawyer's oath.
The circumstances of this case indubitably show that
after receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing and partial
service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service
in relation to the case of complainant. His continuous
inaction despite repeated follow-ups from her reveals his
cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his client's
cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only
that. Despite her repeated demands, he also unjustifiably
failed to return to her the files of the case that had been
entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had
likewise entrusted to him.
Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent
should have given her a candid, honest opinion on the merits
and the status of the case. Apparently, the civil suit between
Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided against
the latter. In fact, the judgment had long become final and
executory. But he withheld such vital information from
complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as "filing and
service fee" and thereby gave her hope that her case would
be acted upon.
Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires that lawyers give their candid and best opinion to
their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither
overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof.
Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of
success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the
part of lawyers. If they find that their client's cause is
defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the
latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the
incontrovertible. The failure of respondent to fulfill this
basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to
"observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his clients."
Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently
refused to return the money of complainant despite her
repeated demands. His conduct was clearly indicative of lack
of integrity and moral soundness; he was clinging to
something that did not belong to him, and that he absolutely
had no right to keep or use.
Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client's money and
property that may come into their possession. As respondent
obviously did nothing on the case of complainant, the amount
she had given — as evidenced by the receipt issued by his
law office — was never applied to the filing fee. His failure to
return her money upon demand gave rise to the
presumption that he had converted it to his own use and
thereby betrayed the trust she had reposed in him. His
failure to do so constituted a gross violation of professional
ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.

The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law,
legal processes and the courts, but also mandates the utmost
degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys
entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.
Respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him
as a member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his
duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but
also to this Court, to the legal profession, and to the general
public. Given the crucial importance of his role in the
administration of justice, his misconduct diminished the
confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the
profession.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is
ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within thirty (30) days from
notice of this Decision, complainant's eight thousand pesos
(P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six percent per
annum, from October 18, 2000, until fully paid.
CANON 16
Duty to be a Trustee of Client’s Money and Property
CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
RULE 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
RULE 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by
him.
RULE 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have
a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
RULE 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client's interests are fully protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer
lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.
Sison, Jr. v. Camacho
For entering into a compromise agreement without
client’s authority and for failing to account for the money
of the client, he violated Canon 1.01 and Canon 16 of the
CPR, respectively.
Failing to account for
the money of the client
Atty. Camacho was also charged with violation of Rule 16.01
of the CPR, which provides for a lawyer's duty to "account for
all money or property collected or received for or from the
client."
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 44
Here, Atty. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Atty. Camacho
the amount of P1,288,260.00 as payment of additional docket
fees but the latter failed to apply the same for its intended
purpose. In contrast, Atty. Camacho invoked the July 6, 2012
Order of the RTC which declared the MDAHI allegation as
unsubstantiated, and claimed that the said amount formed
part of his attorney's fees. The Board, on the other hand,
opined that it was still premature to decide such issue
because there was a pending estafa case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 13-1688, filed by MDAHI against Atty.
Camacho involving the same amount of P1,288,260.00.
The Court is of the view that it is not premature to rule on the
charge against Atty. Camacho for his failure to account for
the money of his client. The pending case against him is
criminal in nature. The issue therein is whether he is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of misappropriating the amount of
P1,288,260.00 entrusted to him by his client. The present
case, however, is administrative in character, requiring
only substantial evidence. It only entails a determination of
whether Atty. Camacho violated his solemn oath by failing to
account for the money of his client. Evidently, the adjudication
of such issue in this administrative case shall not, in any way,
affect the separate criminal proceeding.
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only
concern of the Court is the determination of the respondent's
administrative liability. The findings in this case will have no
material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may
choose to file against each other. While a lawyer's wrongful
actuations may give rise at the same time to criminal, civil,
and administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the
appropriate case; and every case must be resolved in
accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the
quantum of proof required in each.
Delving into the substance of the allegation, the Court rules
that Atty. Camacho indeed violated Rule 16.01 of the
CPR. When Atty. Camacho personally requested MDAHI for
additional docket fees, the latter obediently granted the
amount of P1,288,260.00 to the former. Certainly, it was
understood that such amount was necessary for the payment
of supposed additional docket fees in Civil Case No. 05-655.
Yet, when Atty. Sison confronted Atty. Camacho regarding
the said amount, the latter replied that he simply gave it to the
clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed. Whether the
said amount was pocketed by him or improperly given to the
clerk of court as a form of bribery, it was unmistakably clear
that Atty. Camacho did not apply the amount given to him by
his client for its intended legal purpose.
Atty. Camacho did not even deny making that request to
MDAHI for additional docket fees and receiving such amount
from his client. Rather, he set up a defense that the said
amount formed part of his attorney's fees. Such defense,
however, is grossly contradictory to the established purpose
of the P1,288,260.00. In its Payment Request/Order Form, it
is plainly indicated therein that MDAHI released the said
amount only to be applied as payment for additional docket
fees, and not for any other purposes. Consequently, the lame
excuse of Atty. Camacho is bereft of merit because it
constitutes a mere afterthought and a manifest disrespect to
the legal profession. Atty. Camacho is treading on a perilous
path where the payment of his attorney's fees is more
important than his fiduciary and faithful duty of accounting the

money of his client. Well-settled is the rule that lawyers are
not entitled to unilaterally appropriate their clients' money for
themselves by the mere fact that the clients owe them
attorney's fees.
Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to
MDAHI from the moment he received the said amount. In
Tarog v. Ricafort, the Court held that ethical and practical
considerations made it both natural and imperative for a
lawyer to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep
copies of the receipts for his own records. Pursuant to Rule
16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is
accountable for the money entrusted to him by the
clients, and that his only means of ensuring
accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.
Worse, on May 26, 2011, the RTC already rendered its
decision in Civil Case No. 05-655, adjudging MDAHI entitled
to an insurance claim in the amount of approximately
P65,000,000.00. From that date on, there was no more need
for additional docket fees. Apparently, still unaware of the
judgment, MDAHI subsequently released the money for
additional docket fees to Atty. Dimaano, who handed it to
Atty. Camacho on May 27, 2011. Despite a decision having
been rendered, Atty. Camacho did not reject the said amount
or return it to his client upon receipt. Instead, he unilaterally
withheld the said amount by capriciously invoking the
payment of his attorney's fees.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the
counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received
for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be
immediately returned. A lawyer's failure, to return upon
demand, the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed
in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
-DISBARRED
CANON 17
Duty of Fidelity to the Cause of the Client
CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
CANON 18
Duty to Serve with Competence and Diligence
CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
RULE 18.01 A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service
which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to
render. However, he may render such service if, with the
consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel
a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
RULE 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 45
RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client's request for information.
Ramiscal v. Orro
Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar,
solemnly takes the Lawyer's Oath, by which he vows, among
others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients." If he should violate the vow, he
contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
Canon 18, viz.:
CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's
request for information.
It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the
lawyer and the client becomes imbued with trust and
confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client
relationship commences, with the lawyer being bound to
serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their
cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion. To accord
with this highly fiduciary relationship, the client expects the
lawyer to be always mindful of the former's cause and to be
diligent in handling the former's legal affairs. As an essential
part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled
to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the
developments of the case. The lawyer who neglects to
perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the
respondent had the foregoing professional and ethical
burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to
the best of his knowledge and discretion and with all good
fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up their cause, he
gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their
interest therein. Even if he could not thereby guarantee to
them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he reneged
on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file
the motion for reconsideration in their behalf despite
receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for
that purpose. He further neglected to regularly update
them on the status of the case, particularly on the
adverse result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the
proceedings that were gradually turning against their
interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their
substantial prejudice by enabling them to engage another
competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his

neglect in that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies
were then available. His various omissions manifested his
utter lack of professionalism towards them.
His unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by
the IBP to comment and to appear in the administrative
investigation of his misconduct revealed his
irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and
its proceedings. He thereby exposed a character flaw that
should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession. He
should always bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded
that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral and
professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others.
He should never forget that his duty to serve his clients with
unwavering loyalty and diligence carried with it the
corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to the Bar,
and to the public in general.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES
respondent ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO guilty of violating
Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for a period of two TWO YEARS EFFECTIVE
UPON NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar
infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Soliman v. Lerios-Amboy
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the
parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court affirms
the penalty imposed by the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and that he
should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
(Canon 17) A lawyer is mandated to serve his client with
competence and diligence; to never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him; and to keep his client informed of the status
of his case and respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information. (Canon 18)
The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy,
after receiving PhP25,000.00 as payment for her professional
services, failed to submit material documents relative to the
issuance of separate certificates of title to the individual
owners of the property. It was her negligence which caused
the delay in the issuance of the certificates of title.
To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted the commission
of an illegal act when she asked from Soliman the amount of
PhP50,000.00 to be paid to her "contact" inside the office of
the RD in order to facilitate the release of the said certificates
of title. Further, notwithstanding the payment of
PhP50,000.00, Atty. Amboy still failed to obtain issuance of
the said certificates of title. Instead of procuring the release
of the certificates of title as she promised, Atty. Amboy asked
for an additional PhP10,000.00 from Soliman.
Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence and
incompetence by a counsel in dealing with a client. Atty.
Amboy's acts undermined the legal processes, which she
swore to uphold and defend. In swearing to the oath, Atty.
Amboy bound herself to respect the law and legal processes.
The Court further finds improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to
return the amount of PhP50,000.00 which she paid in order
to facilitate the release of the certificates of title. To reiterate,
upon inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the Deputy RD of Manila,
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 46
denied having received any amount from Atty. Amboy. In not
returning the money to Soliman after a demand therefor was
made following her failure to procure the issuance of the
certificates of title, Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03
thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds
and property of his client upon demand. It is settled that the
unjustified withholding of money belonging to a client
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
"A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held
by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well
as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment."
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 16.03, Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years
CANON 19
Duty to Serve only within the Bounds of Law
CANON 19 — A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law.
RULE 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage
in any case or proceeding.
RULE 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetuated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate
the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules
of Court.
RULE 19.03 A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case.
Espina v. Chavez
The complaint is anchored on the alleged violation by Atty.
Chavez of Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, viz.:
Canon 19: A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of law.
Rule 19.01: A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case
or proceeding. (Underscoring supplied.)
Atty. Espina contends that Atty. Chavez violated the above-
quoted provisions when he indispensably participated in the
filing of the falsification complaint against him, his wife and
his parents. The falsification case was filed, according to Atty.
Espina, solely for the purpose of gaining an improper
advantage and leverage in the ejectment case.

Atty. Espina further argues that Atty. Chavez participated in
the filing of the baseless criminal complaint by (i) goading
Enguio to file the criminal complaint and (ii) ensuring that the
criminal complaint was acted upon by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor by sending the transmittal letter to the
said office under Atty. Chavez's signature.
We find Atty. Espina's position unmeritorious and
without basis.
What Rule 19.01 prohibits is the filing or the threat of
filing patently frivolous and meritless appeals or clearly
groundless actions for the purpose of gaining improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.
Two elements are indispensable before a lawyer can be
deemed to have violated this rule: (i) the filing or threat of
filing a patently frivolous and meritless action or appeal
and (ii) the filing or threat of filing the action is intended
to gain improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Rule 19.01 is violated only when the criminal complaint filed
or threatened to be filed is patently frivolous, meritless and
clearly groundless and is aimed solely at gaining the sole
purpose of improper advantage.
In Pena v. Atty. Aparicio, the demand letter was explicit and
blatant in its threat of filing several actions (which included tax
evasion, a matter totally unrelated to the pending labor case)
if the employer failed to accede to the demand for payment
of separation pay allegedly due to the employee. It was
clearly and obviously done to compel the employer to grant
the demand for separation pay.
Similarly, in Ong v. Atty. Unto, the letter contained threats of
criminal prosecution if the complainant did not accede to the
lawyer's demand. The lawyer subsequently filed totally
unrelated and irrelevant criminal and administrative cases
against the complainant when the latter failed to comply with
the demand letter. Without doubt, these cases were filed to
force the complainant to give in to the lawyer's demands.
Finally, in Atty. Briones v. Atty. Gimenez, the criminal
complaint was filed after the complainant did not comply with
the demand letter. There was also an available remedy in the
civil action which could have given effect to Atty. Gimenez's
demand without having to file the criminal complaint.
The facts of the present case differed from the above-cited
cases. We note that Atty. Espina did not only fail to
substantiate his allegation that Atty. Chavez
masterminded the filing of the criminal complaint for
falsification; he also failed to show that the criminal
complaint was patently frivolous, meritless and
groundless, and that it was filed to gain improper
advantage in favor of his client.
First, the fact that Atty. Chavez endorsed the criminal
complaint to the Provincial Prosecutor was, in itself, not
contrary to Rule 19.01.
We point out that Atty. Chavez was then a PAO lawyer. In this
capacity, he had the duty to assist clients who could not afford
the services of a private lawyer. His assessment on the merit
of the criminal complaint might have been erroneous but the
act of endorsing the affidavit-complaint to the Provincial
Prosecutor did not per se violate Rule 19.01.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 47
Moreover, the affidavit-complaint for Falsification was signed
and executed by Enguio and not by Atty. Chavez. Atty.
Chavez merely transmitted the affidavit-complaint to the
Provincial Prosecutor for the latter's consideration. We
cannot conclude, solely given these facts and Atty. Espina's
bare assertions, that Enguio was goaded into filing the
criminal complaint.
Second, the criminal complaint was not patently frivolous and
groundless. It was not unreasonable for Atty. Chavez to
conclude (albeit incorrectly according to the assessment of
the Provincial Prosecutor) that there was a case for violation
of Article 172 of the RPC.
As the IBP Commissioner correctly observed, the criminal
complaint was not exactly unfounded or wanting in basis.
That it was later dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor for
lack of probable cause is of no consequence. We cannot
expect and require Atty. Chavez (or any lawyer for that
matter) to be infallible in his judgment on the merit of every
criminal charge he endorses to the prosecutor. It is only
required that the complaint is not patently frivolous and filed
solely to ensure improper advantage.
It is also unwise to characterize every criminal complaint
that arose from or is connected with a separate case or
proceeding to be within the coverage of Rule 19.01. The
better policy is to balance the prohibition under Rule 19.01
with the equally important right of the State to prosecute
criminal offenses. We stress that the key test is whether
the criminal complaint is patently meritless and clearly
filed to gain improper advantage.
Unless the criminal complaint is patently frivolous and
obviously meant to secure an improper advantage, a lawyer
who files such criminal complaint should not be automatically
deemed to have violated Rule 19.01. Otherwise, lawyers who
have a valid cause for filing a criminal action may be
compelled not to proceed because of fear of administrative
sanctions.
Finally, unlike in the cases cited above, there is no clear and
concrete proof that the falsification complaint was filed to
ensure improper advantage to Enguio.
Other than the fact that the falsification complaint arose from
the narration of facts in the ejectment complaint, Atty. Espina
failed to show that the falsification complaint was meant to
ensure improper advantage to Enguio. Atty. Espina merely
made this conclusion by inference but his basic premises
were not supported by evidence. We cannot presume that
Enguio gained or stood to gain improper advantage to the
detriment of Atty. Espina's parents by the mere filing of the
falsification complaint. After all, both the ejectment and
falsification complaints were eventually dismissed.
As a final point, we note with concern the excessive
antagonism between Atty. Espina and Atty. Chavez. It
appears that this case is no longer about the alleged violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility but a protracted
and bitter fight between brothers in the legal profession. Both
claim that the other party is arrogant and ignorant of the law.
The pleadings contained serious attacks on the professional
competence and personal integrity of one another. These are
acts that this Court should not allow to pass without
comments.

We take this occasion to remind lawyers of their duties to their
professional colleagues. Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is clear: a lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
While the fervor shown by Atty. Espina and Atty. Chavez in
defending their clients' respective claims has been admirable,
we find it unfortunate that they allowed their personal
animosity and bruised egos to affect their handling of these
cases.
Although we dismiss the present complaint because of lack
of merit, we strongly warn both counsels that any future
infraction of the Code of Professional Responsibility may
warrant actual penalty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM the
recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
DISMISS the Disbarment/Suspension complaint against
ATTY. JESUS G. CHAVEZ
Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.
In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade
responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims
that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the
case. He further claims that he would be violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility by handling a case without
adequate preparation. This is preposterous.
Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the
accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument, respondent
accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in
Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases
against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal
services to complainant.
Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified
documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be
sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First,
Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who
perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding.
Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule
19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides:
Rule 19.02 — A lawyer who has received information that his clients
has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify
the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship
with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule.
Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant
and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If
complainant refuses, then he should terminate his
relationship with her.
Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited
Rule. This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did
not render legal service to complainant because she falsified
the documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044.
Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant,
respondent was motivated by vindictiveness.
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 48
WHEREFORE, we DENY respondent's motion for
reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 (finding
him guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct for violating
Canons 17, 18, Rule 18.03 and 20 of the CPR, suspending
him for 6 months) is immediately executory. Respondent is
directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar
Confidant his compliance with our Decision.
CANON 20
Duty to Charge only Fair and Reasonable Fees
CANON 20 — A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees:
RULE 20.01 A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors
in determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or
required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
RULE 20.02 A lawyer shall, in cases of referral, with the
consent of the client, be entitled to a division of fees in
proportion to the work performed and responsibility assumed.
RULE 20.03 A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge
and consent of the client, accept any fee, reward, costs,
commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other
compensation whatsoever related to his professional
employment from anyone other than the client.
RULE 20.04 A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients
concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Q: Did the lawyer violate the CPR when he filed a
criminal case against a client to be able to collect the
balance of a notarial fee? YES
Cueto v. Jimenez, Jr.,
Complainant's claim that respondent's P50,000 notarial fee
was exorbitant is debatable. As confirmed by the IBP, it is a
recognized legal practice in real estate transactions and
construction projects to base the amount of notarial fees on
the contract price. Based on the amount demanded by
respondent, the fee represented only 1% of the contract price
of P5,000,000. It cannot be said therefore that respondent

notary demanded more than a reasonable recompense for
his service.
We are also convinced that the two contracting parties
implicitly agreed on the cost of Jimenez's notarial service. It
was Cueto's responsibility to first inquire how much he was
going to be charged for notarization. And once informed, he
was free to accept or reject it, or negotiate for a lower amount.
In this case, complainant's concern that the other party to the
construction agreement was the son of respondent notary
and that his non-availment of respondent's service might
jeopardize the agreement, was purely speculative. There was
no compulsion to avail of respondent's service. Moreover, his
failure to negotiate the amount of the fee was an implicit
acquiescence to the terms of the notarial service. His
subsequent act of paying in cash and in check all the more
proved it.
However, we agree with the IBP that respondent's
conduct in filing a criminal case for violation of BP 22
against complainant (when the check representing the
P20,000 balance was dishonored for insufficient funds)
was highly improper.
Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his compensation
and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud." Likewise, in Canon 14 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics it states that, "controversies
with clients concerning compensation are to be avoided by
the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his self-respect
and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his
service; and lawsuits with the clients should be resorted to
only to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud."
There was clearly no imposition, injustice or fraud obtaining
in this case to justify the legal action taken by respondent. As
borne out by the records, complainant Cueto had already
paid more than half of respondent's fee. To resort to a suit to
recover the balance reveals a certain kind of shameful
conduct and inconsiderate behavior that clearly undermines
the tenet embodied in Canon 15 that "A lawyer should
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client." And what can we say about the
failure of respondent's son Jose III to pay his own obligation
to complainant Cueto? It in all probability explains why Cueto
ran short of funds. Respondent therefore should have been
more tolerant of the delay incurred by complainant Cueto.
We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. He should always remind himself
that the legal profession is imbued with public service.
Remuneration is a mere incident.
Although we acknowledge that every lawyer must be
paid what is due to him, he must never resort to judicial
action to recover his fees, in a manner that detracts from
the dignity of the profession.
-SEVERELY REPRIMANDED
Pineda v. De Jesus
Issues:
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 49
(1) Whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over
the claim for additional legal fees YES and
(2) Whether respondents were entitled to additional legal fees
NO.
Ruling:
First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the
necessary petition as an incident of the main action in which
his services were rendered or in an independent suit against
his client. The former is preferable to avoid multiplicity of
suits.
The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the
declaration of nullity of marriage was filed, had jurisdiction
over the motion for the payment of legal fees. Respondents
sought to collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of
the value of the properties awarded to petitioner in that case.
Clearly, what respondents were demanding was additional
payment for legal services rendered in the same case.
Second, the professional engagement between petitioner
and respondents was governed by the principle of quantum
meruit which means "as much as the lawyer deserves."
The recovery of attorney's fees on this basis is permitted, as
in this case, where there is no express agreement for the
payment of attorney's fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism
which prevents an unscrupulous client from running away
with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying
for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the part
of the lawyer himself.
Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients
concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect
fees should be avoided and should be filed only when
circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.
In the case at bar, respondents' motion for payment of
their lawyers' fees was not meant to collect what was
justly due them; the fact was, they had already been
adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and
perks already given to them was an act of unconscionable
greed which is shocking to this Court.
As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are
members of an honorable profession, the primary vision of
which is justice. It is respondents' despicable behavior which
gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some people. The
vernacular has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of
law is a decent profession and not a money-making trade.
Compensation should be but a mere incident.
Respondents' claim for additional legal fees was not justified.
They could not charge petitioner a fee based on percentage,
absent an express agreement to that effect. The payments to
them in cash, checks, free products and services from
petitioner's business — all of which were not denied by
respondents — more than sufficed for the work they did. The
"full payment for settlement" should have discharged
petitioner's obligation to them.
The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award
of attorneys' fees cannot be denied. Lawyers are officers of
the Court and they participate in the fundamental function of

administering justice. When they took their oath, they
submitted themselves to the authority of the Court and
subjected their professional fees to judicial control.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
30, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68080 is hereby MODIFIED. The
award of additional attorney's fees in favor of respondents is
hereby DELETED.
Cortez v. Cortes
Facts:
Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of Atty.
Cortes as his counsel in an illegal dismissal case against
Philippine Explosives Corporation (PEC). He further alleged
that he and Atty. Cortes had a handshake agreement on a
12% contingency fee as and by way of attorney's fees.
Atty. Cortes, in his Answer, admitted that his services were
engaged by complainant to pursue the labor claims. He,
however, denied that they agreed on a 12% contingency fee
by way of attorney's fees.
Atty. Cortes claimed that complainant is a relative of his, but
considering that the case was to be filed in Pampanga and
he resided in Las Piñas, he would only accept the case on a
50-50 sharing arrangement.
Issue:
WON the acts of Atty. Constitue misconduct. YES.
Ruling:
We have held that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in
this jurisdiction. It is generally recognized as valid and
binding, but must be laid down in an express contract.
In this case, We note that the parties did not have an express
contract as regards the payment of fees. Complainant alleges
that the contingency fee was fixed at 12% via a handshake
agreement, while Atty. Cortes counters that the agreement
was 50%.
The IBP Commission on Discipline pointed out that since
what respondent handled was merely a labor case, his
attorney's fees should not exceed 10%, the rate allowed
under Article 111 of the Labor Code.
Although we agree that the 50% contingency fee was
excessive, We do not agree that the 10% limitation as
provided in Article 111 is automatically applicable.
It would then appear that the contingency fees that Atty.
Cortes required is in the ordinary sense as it represents
reasonable compensation for legal services he rendered for
complainant. Necessarily, the 10% limitation of the Labor
Code would not be applicable. Beyond the limit fixed by
Article 111, such as between the lawyer and the client, the
attorney's fees may exceed 10% on the basis of quantum
meruit. We, however, are hard-pressed to accept the
justification of the 50% contingency fee that Atty. Cortes is
insisting on for being exorbitant.
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that "A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees."
Rule 20.01 of the same canon enumerates the following
factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 50
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or
required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of
fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting
to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Here, as set out by Atty. Cortes himself, the complainant's
case was merely grounded on complainant's alleged absence
without leave for the second time and challenging the plant
manager, the complainant's immediate superior, to a fist fight.
He also claimed that the travel from his home in Las Piñas
City to San Fernando, Pampanga was costly and was an
ordeal. We likewise note that Atty. Cortes admitted that
complainant was a close kin of his, and that complainant
appealed to his services because, since his separation from
work, he had no visible means of income and had so many
mouths to feed. These circumstances cited by Atty. Cortes to
justify the fees, to Our mind, does not exculpate Atty. Cortes,
but in fact, makes Us question all the more, the
reasonableness of it.
We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here
claimed by Atty. Cortes was, under the facts obtaining in
this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. The
issues involved could hardly be said to be novel and Atty.
Cortes in fact already knew that complainant was already
hard up. We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking
venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law advocacy, it has
been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it
births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered.
It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a
greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is
impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State
regulation.
-SUSPENDED for 3 months
CANON 21
Duty to Preserve the Client’s Confidence and
Secrets
CANON 21 — A lawyer shall preserve the confidences or
secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation
is terminated.
RULE 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or
secrets of his client except:
a) when authorized by the client after acquainting him of the
consequences of the disclosure;
b) when required by law;
c) when necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his
employees or associates or by judicial action.
RULE 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his
client, use information acquired in the course of employment,
nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a

third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.
RULE 21.03 A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of
his client, give information from his files to an outside agency
seeking such information for auditing, statistical,
bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any similar
purpose.
RULE 21.04 A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of
the firm to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by
the client.
RULE 21.05 A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be
required to prevent those whose services are utilized by him,
from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the client.
RULE 21.06 A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation
about a client's affairs even with members of his family.
RULE 21.07 A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been
consulted about a particular case except to avoid possible
conflict of interest.
Suntay v. Suntay
A complaint for disbarment was filed by the complainant
against his nephew, Atty. Rafael G. Suntay. Complainant
alleged that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and
confidant who was privy to all his legal, financial, and political
affairs from 1956 to 1964. However, since they parted ways
because of politics, respondent had been filing complaints
and cases against complainant, making use of confidential
information gained while their attorney-client relationship
existed. Thereafter, this case was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation. After almost four years in 1982, the OSG
submitted its report and recommendation finding respondent
guilty as charged. Resolution of this case was delayed due to
several motions filed by the respondent. In 1988, the case
was forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Finally in 2001 the IBP recommended that respondent Suntay
be suspended from the practice of law for two years for
immoral conduct. The investigating commissioner adopted in
toto the report and recommendation of the OSG. In view of
the penalty involved, the case was referred to the Court en
banc for final action.
For violating the confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship
and for unethical conduct, respondent Suntay was
suspended by the Supreme Court from the practice of law for
two years. After review of the records of this case, the Court
found the IBP recommendation to be well taken. As found by
both the OSG and the IBP investigating commissioner,
respondent acted as counsel for clients in cases involving
subject matter regarding which he had either been previously
consulted by complainant or which he had previously helped
complainant to administer as the latter's counsel and
confidant from 1956 to 1964.
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATION; CONSTRUED. — A lawyer shall preserve the
confidences and secrets of his clients even after
termination of the attorney-client relation. As his defense,
respondent averred that complainant failed to specify the
alleged confidential information used against him. Such
defense is unavailing. As succinctly explained in Hilado v.
David—Communications between attorney and client are, in
PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 51
a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting
of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known
facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the
dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the
nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of
the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of
other unsalutary results. To make the passing of confidential
communication a condition precedent, i.e., to make the
employment conditioned on the scope and character of the
knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to
change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants,
which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers
upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The
condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what
information the attorney has received and in what way it is or
it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in
consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an
unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held,
the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of
the facts that came to him . . . Hence, the necessity of setting
down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of
interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent
the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice . . . It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste . . . [T]he
question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but
as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional
standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys,
like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
-SUSPENDED for 2 years
•Use of information gained while the lawyer represented
a client and part administrator of fishpond
•Preservation of confidences extend even after
termination of relation
•Defense: failure to specify the alleged confidential
information used?
Hilado v. David: doctrine: “… mere relation of attorney
and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting
the opposite party’s retainer in the same litigation
regardless of what information was received by him from
his first client (citing American cases in CJS)
CANON 22
Duty to Withdraw only for Good Cause and Upon
Notice
CANON 22 — A lawyer shall withdraw his services only
for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances.
RULE 22.01 A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the
following cases:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of
conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of these canons and rules;
 PALE Midterm Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 52

c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote
the best interest of the client;
d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer
renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;
e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the
services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office;
and
will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be
decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, would accomplish the end desired. In the
present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.
Withdrawal of services is valid when the client deliberately
fails to pay the fees for services.
But in the case of Montano v. IBP, there was no
deliberate failure to pay as there where honest efforts
exerted.

g) Other similar cases.

RULE 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall,

subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate
with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter,
including all information necessary for the proper handling of
the matter.

Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines

There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainant's

willingness to pay the attorney's fees. As agreed upon,
complainant paid half of the fees in the amount of P7,500.00
upon acceptance of the case. And while the remaining
balance was not yet due as it was agreed to be paid only upon
the completion and submission of the brief, complainant
nonetheless delivered to respondent lawyer P4,000.00 as the
latter demanded. This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca
withdrew his appearance simply because of complainant's
failure to pay the remaining balance of P3,500.00, which does
not appear to be deliberate. The situation was aggravated by
respondent counsel's note to complainant withdrawing as
counsel which was couched in impolite and insulting
language.

Given the above circumstances, was Atty. Dealca's conduct

just and proper?

We find Atty. Dealca's conduct unbecoming of a member of

the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his
services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may
withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay
the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the
present case, Atty. Dealca's withdrawal was unjustified as
complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney's
fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his
obligation. Respondent's contemptuous conduct does not
speak well of a member of the bar considering that the
amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of Canon
20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with
clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to
judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant,
respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the
demands of the Code.

The Court, however, does not agree with complainant's

contention that the maximum penalty of disbarment should
be imposed on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must
be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar