Cabarlesv Maceda

11/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 516
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 303

Cabarles vs. Maceda
*
G.R. No. 161330. February 20, 2007.
RENE CABARLES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE BONIFACIO

SANZ MACEDA AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Motion to Reopen Case; Requisites; A motion to

reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was
nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and
acceptance from long, established usage, which deficiency was remedied by
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on 1 December
2000.—A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the
old rules but it was nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse, deriving
validity and acceptance from long, established usage. This lack of a specific
provision covering motions to reopen was remedied by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. The April 1,
2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following
requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the
finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on
his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing
is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
(5) the presentation of
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
304
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cabarles vs. Maceda
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016e3be81233f86d832d003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/20
additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days

from the issuance of the order.
Same; Same; Due Process; The court, for good reasons, in the
furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and
its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of
discretion appears, and the only controlling guideline governing a motion to
reopen is the paramount interest of justice; While a judge is allowed to
reopen a case before judgment is rendered, a hearing must first be had, and
where the judge does so without notice and hearing and without giving the
prosecution and the accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the
matter, the same constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against the
due process clause of the Constitution.—Generally, after the parties have
produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of
justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will
not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears.
A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both
parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment
is rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment and
the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the
paramount interest of justice. This remedy of reopening a case was meant to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. However, while Judge Maceda is allowed
to reopen the case before judgment is rendered, Section 24 requires that a
hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003
Order without notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution and
accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter. This failure,
to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due
process clause of the Constitution which requires notice and opportunity to
be heard. The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is
contrary to the express language of Section 24, Rule 119.
Same; Same; Same; Waiver; Participation by the defense counsel in
cross-examining the witness for the prosecution and in the proceedings after
the case was reopened by the judge without prior hearing does not amount
to a waiver of the accused’s objection to the order reopening the case—to be
effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal.—Although the defense
counsel had cross-examined
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Cabarles vs. Maceda
Pedrosa and had participated in the proceedings after the case was reopened
by Judge Maceda, the same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarles’s
objection to the April 1, 2003 Order. To be effective, a waiver must be
certain and unequivocal. Here, Cabarles filed the present petition seeking for
a writ of certiorari against Judge Maceda before Pedrosa was cross-
examined. Also, when asked to comment on the prosecution’s formal offer
of evidence taken after the case was reopened, Cabarles objected to its
admission on the ground that the same was inadmissible having been
received by the court after Judge Maceda issued the questioned order.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Although the matter of reopening a
case for reception of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion on the
part of the trial court judge, this judicial action must not, however, be done
whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably; The presence of prosecution
witnesses in court is the responsibility of the public prosecutor and it is
incumbent upon him to take the initiative of ensuring the attendance of his
witnesses at the trial.— Although the matter of reopening a case for
reception of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion on the part of
the trial court judge, this judicial action must not, however, be done
whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably. In this particular case, the
prosecution was given ample opportunity to present all its witnesses but it
failed to do so. The failure of the prosecution to take full advantage of the
opportunities given does not change the fact that it was accorded such
opportunities. Contrary to the justification stated in the April 1, 2003 Order,
the prosecution was not deprived of its day in court. While it may be true
that due to some confusion with the trial court’s calendar, some of the trial
dates assigned to the prosecution did not push through and some of the
subpoenas issued to Pedrosa and/or Dr. Salen pertained to hearing dates
which were different from those assigned for reception of prosecution’s
evidence, still the prosecution had a total of four hearing dates when it was
given the chance to prove its case: May 23, June 20 and 27, and August 1,
2001. The presence of prosecution witnesses in court is the responsibility of
the public prosecutor and it is incumbent upon him to take the initiative of
ensuring the attendance of his witnesses at the trial.
Same; Same; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Nowhere is the guaranty of
right to speedy disposition of cases more significant and
306
Cabarles vs. Maceda
meaningful than in criminal cases where not only the fortune, but the life
and liberty of the accused as well, are at stake; The right to a speedy
disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.—On Cabarles’s
right to a speedy disposition of his case, we agree that under the
Constitution, all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases. Nowhere is this guaranty more significant and meaningful than in
criminal cases where not only the fortune, but the life and liberty of the
accused as well, are at stake. Although a discussion on the right to speedy
disposition of the case is mooted by our nullification of Judge Maceda’s
April 1, 2003 Order as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion,
we are constrained to reiterate that the concept of speedy disposition is
relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is
not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the
right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The Supreme Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition; A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.—
It is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper
for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the hierarchy of
courts. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the Court of Appeals and with the regional trial courts in
proper cases within their respective regions. However, this concurrence of
jurisdiction does not grant a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the
absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court
is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfac-
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Cabarles vs. Maceda
torily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and

immemorial tradition. The hierarchy of courts determines the appropriate
forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance of such
extraordinary writs against a regional trial court should be filed with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is the established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon this Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further overcrowding of its docket.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court has full discretionary power to take
cognizance of a petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues raised.—Under the present
circumstances however, we are willing to take cognizance of this case as an
exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Cabarles invokes the
jurisdiction of this Court in the interest of speedy justice since the
information against him was filed way back in June 1999, and almost eight
years thereafter, no judgment has yet been rendered. Any further delay in
the resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the
Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the
issues raised. Since Section 24 is a new provision, and considering the
irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003 Order, it is necessary to
resolve the issues raised in this petition.
Same; Remand of Cases; Due Process; To order the remand of a
criminal case to the court a quo to enable the prosecution to present
additional evidence would violate the constitutional right of the accused to
due process, and to speedy determination of his case.—As a final word, we
find the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the case of People v. Monje,
390 SCRA 160 (2002), instructive: A proposal has been expressed for the
remand of this case to the trial court for further proceedings, apparently to
enable the prosecution to prove again what it failed to prove in the first
instance. We cannot agree because it will set a dangerous precedent. Aside
from its being unprocedural, it would open the floodgates to endless
litigations because whenever an accused is on the brink of acquittal after
trial,
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Cabarles vs. Maceda
and realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be allowed to

augment its evidence which should have been presented much earlier. This
is a criminal prosecution, and to order the remand of this case to the court a
quo to enable the prosecution to present additional evidence would violate
the constitutional right of the accused to due process, and to speedy
determination of his case. The lamentable failure of the prosecution to fill
the vital gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial to the State and the private
offended party, should not be treated by this Court with indulgence, to the
extent of affording the prosecution a fresh opportunity to refurbish its
evidence.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
In an original action filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

1
Procedure, petitioner Rene Cabarles seeks to annul the Order issued
by respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda in Criminal Case No.
99-0878, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rene “Nonoy”
Cabarles y Adizas, for murder, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Las Piñas City, Branch 275. The questioned Order dated April 1,
2003 cancelled the scheduled promulgation of judgment and
reopened the case for reception of evidence from two prosecution
witnesses who were not presented during trial.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 18, 1999, Cabarles was charged with murder under the
following information:
“The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses RENE “NONOY” CABARLES Y

ADIZAS of the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 14-15.
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Cabarles vs. Maceda
That on or about the 25th day of April, 1999, in the City of Las Piñas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without justifiable motive with intent to kill and by means
of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with a deadly weapon
(fan knife) one Antonio Callosa, which directly caused his death.
2
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Cabarles pleaded not guilty. The trial court scheduled the case for
hearing on the following dates, to wit: pre-trial on November 22,
2000; presentation of prosecution’s evidence on April 18, May 4, 11,
18, and 23, 2001; and presentation of defense
3
evidence on June 20
and 27, July 4 and 18, and August 1, 2001.
The prosecution had subpoenas issued to its witnesses: Flocerfina
Callosa, the mother of the deceased; Imelda Pedrosa, the alleged
eyewitness; Carlos Callosa, brother of the deceased; and Dr. Romeo
T. Salen, Police Senior Inspector of the Southern Police District
(SPD) Crime Laboratory to testify on the contents of the death
certificate of Antonio Callosa.
Through no fault of its own, the prosecution was unable to
present its evidence on the first four hearing dates. Instead, trial on
the merits began only on May 23, 2001 when the prosecution called
Carlos Callosa to the witness stand. Since defense counsel agreed to
stipulate that Carlos would testify on matters in his May 13, 1999
Sinumpaang Salaysay, his testimony was dispensed with.
The second prosecution witness, Police Inspector Prudencio
Parejos, was presented in court during the June 20, 2001 hearing.
His testimony was likewise dispensed with after defense counsel
agreed to stipulate that Police Inspector Parejos would testify on
what was in the spot report of the stab-
_______________
2 Id., at p. 13.
3 Records, p. 37.
310

Cabarles vs. Maceda
bing incident. In the June 20, 2001 hearing, the prosecution said it
would offer its evidence and rest its case should
4
the People fail to
present a witness at the next scheduled hearing.
When the case was called on June 27, 2001, the prosecution
failed to present a witness. Neither Pedrosa nor Dr. Salen appeared
during the said hearing. Records show that four subpoenas were
issued to Pedrosa informing her that she had to appear on November
5 6 7 8
22, 2000, April 11 and 18, May 11 and June 20, and August 1,
9
9
2001. The first subpoena was personally received by her; the second
subpoena by her husband, Salvador Pedrosa; and the third and fourth
subpoenas had no proofs of service. Meanwhile, the three subpoenas
10 11
issued to Dr. Salen requiring his attendance on May 11 and 23,
12 13
June 20, and August 1, 2001, were all returned with the notation
“addressee moved.” There was no evidence, however, that
subpoenas were issued to these two witnesses requiring their
attendance for the June 27, 2001 hearing, which would explain why
they were absent. Taking into consideration the absence of a
subpoena issued to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen and notwithstanding the
vehement objection registered by Cabarles, Judge Maceda gave the
prosecution a last chance but warned:
“… It is however understood whether the subpoena is actually issued and

served or not upon the prosecution witnesses and service of such subpoena
or notice will not relieved (sic) the prosecution to make a
_______________
4 Id., at p. 66.
5 Id., at p. 41.
6 Id., at p. 47.
7 Supra note 5.
8 Id., at p. 55.
9 Id., at p. 72.
10 Id., at p. 52.
11 Id., at p. 59.
12 Supra note 10.
13 Id., at p. 70.
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Cabarles vs. Maceda
formal offer of evidence should the prosecution failed (sic) to present any
14
witness in the next scheduled hearing.”
With no witness for the August 1, 2001 hearing, 15

the prosecution
rested its case and formally offered its evidence.
Thereafter, Cabarles, with leave of court, filed a demurrer to
16
evidence but it was denied by Judge Maceda. Two witnesses were
called for the defense, accused Cabarles and Luisito Javier, a
fisherman.
A day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on April 2,
2003, Judge Maceda motu proprio issued the questioned order
reopening the case. In it, he observed that the prosecution may not
have been given its day in court resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
He explained that because there was a mix-up in the dates specified
in the subpoena and the hearing dates of when the case was actually
heard, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the first
four of the five hearing dates: April 18, May 4, 11 and 18, 2001
assigned to it. Judge Maceda found that there was no hearing
conducted on April 18, 2001. Thereafter, the subpoena issued to
Pedrosa required her to appear on April 11, 2001, which was not a
date assigned for the prosecution but May 11, 2001. Also, Judge
Maceda noted that another subpoena was issued to Pedrosa and Dr.
Salen requiring them to appear on May 11 and June 20, 2001. But,
the May 11, 2001 hearing was reset to May 25, 2001 because the
judge was indisposed, and insofar as the June 20, 2001 setting was
concerned, it was not one of the days set by the court for the
prosecution. Judge Maceda further observed that the May 18, 2001
hearing was never scheduled and May 25, 2001 was likewise not a
hearing date set by the court. According to Judge Maceda, since the
prosecution was not able to present its evidence on the first four
hearing dates and there was
_______________
14 Id., at p. 68.
15 Id., at p. 74.
16 Id., at p. 91.
312

Cabarles vs. Maceda
either no return on the subpoenas subsequently issued or there was

no subpoena issued at all to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen, the prosecution
should have been given a last chance to present the alleged
eyewitness and the doctor. His order in part read:
“… As a consequence[,] the promulgation set tomorrow, April 2, is

canceled. Set the reception of the testimony of the eye witness and the
doctor on May 1, 2003 at 2:00 [p.]m. to enable the prosecution to avail [of]
the last chance granted by this Court.
Issue the corresponding subpoena to Imelda Pedrosa and Dr. Romeo T.
Salen directing them to appear on the aforesaid date and time, to be served
by the Branch Sheriff who is required to make a prompt return thereof.
17
SO ORDERED.”
Judge Maceda denied Cabarles’s motion for reconsideration in an

Order dated April 25, 2003 and set the case for hearing on May 8,
2003 to hear the testimonies of Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. The subpoena
18
issued to Pedrosa for that hearing was duly served, but service
upon Dr. Salen failed since the doctor was no longer assigned to the
SPD Crime Laboratory. Notwithstanding the service upon Pedrosa,
the prosecution still failed to present a witness during the May 8,
2003 hearing. Nonetheless, Judge Maceda, upon motion, again
decided to extend to the prosecution another chance, giving 19
the
People June 19 and July 3, 2003 as additional hearing dates.
Finally, on June 19, 2003, Pedrosa took the witness stand and
completed her direct examination. A few days thereafter, Cabarles
filed the present petition questioning Judge Maceda’s order, alleging
that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Since trial in the
lower court continued, on July 3, 2003, the Public Attorney’s Office
conducted its crossexamination of Pedrosa.
_______________
17 Rollo, p. 15.
18 Records, pp. 133-134.
19 Id., at p. 136.
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Cabarles vs. Maceda
On July 24, 2003, the defense counsel agreed on the facts contained
in the death certificate of the victim, so the testimony of Dr. Salen
was dispensed with. Thereafter, Judge Maceda set the date for the
reception of evidence on the civil aspect of the criminal case on
August 14, 2003, when 20
Carlos, the deceased’s brother, was recalled
to the witness stand.
Cabarles was then given a chance to adduce further evidence on
his behalf.
On August 9, 2004, Judge Maceda deferred the promulgation of
judgment and ordered the case archived pending this Court’s
21
resolution of the case.
In his petition, Cabarles raises as issues the following:
[1] WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE

GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE
ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDER DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION.
[2] WHETHER PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

AND SPEEDY
22
DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS
VIOLATED.
Did Judge Maceda act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing motu
proprio the April 1, 2003 Order reopening the case, before judgment
was rendered, to receive the testimonies of two prosecution
witnesses after both parties had rested their case? Did the said order
violate Cabarles’s right to due process and speedy disposition of his
case?
On the first issue, Cabarles insists that Judge Maceda gravely
abused his discretion when he ordered the reopening of the case
before promulgation of judgment although both parties had already
rested their case. Cabarles argues that a case may only be reopened
after a judgment of conviction has
_______________
20 Id., at p. 172.
21 Id., at p. 223.
22 Rollo, p. 85.
314

Cabarles vs. Maceda
23
been made but before its finality, as provided in Section 24, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Cabarles insists
that the reopening of a case under Section 24 presupposes that
judgment has already been promulgated, which is not the case here.
According to petitioner, the cases cited by the People are not at all
applicable in this case since they were tried and decided before the
introduction of Section 24 under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
For Judge Maceda, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that Section 24 is a new provision which merely
formalized the long accepted practice of judges of reopening a case
to avoid a miscarriage of justice. This being the case, jurisprudence
providing that a judge has the discretion to reopen a case even
before promulgation of judgment still holds.
After a thorough consideration of the submissions by the parties,
we find that the petition is meritorious.
A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the
old rules but it was nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse,
24
deriving validity and acceptance from long, established usage. This
lack of a specific provision covering motions to reopen was

remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took
effect on December 1, 2000.
The April 1, 2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence
stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the
reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;
(2) the order is issued by the judge
_______________
23 SEC. 24. Reopening.—At any time before finality of the judgment of

conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case,
reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be
terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.
24 Alegre v. Reyes, No. L-56923, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 226, 231.
315
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Cabarles vs. Maceda
on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only
after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or
further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the
issuance of the order.
Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct
proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. However,
the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may allow
new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be
disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion
25
appears. A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only
after either or both parties had formally offered26
and closed their
evidence, but before judgment is rendered, 27and even after
promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only
controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount
28
interest of justice. This remedy of reopening a case was meant to
29
prevent a miscarriage of justice.
However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case
before judgment is rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing must
first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order
without notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution and
accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter. This
failure, to our mind, constitutes
_______________
25 Gacayan v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483 (OCA-I.P.I. No. 98-578-RTJ),

September 17, 1999, 314 SCRA 682, 694; People v. Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No.
45037, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 38, 42.
26 Alegre v. Reyes, supra note 24; II F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 551
(10th ed., 2004), citing People v. Concepcion, 84 Phil. 787, 788 (1949).
27 REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 119, Sec. 24; II F.
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra.
28 People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 419, 444.
29 II F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra.
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Cabarles vs. Maceda
grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due process clause of
30
the Constitution which requires notice and opportunity to be heard.
The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is
contrary to the express language of Section 24, Rule 119.
Although the defense counsel had cross-examined Pedrosa and
had participated in the proceedings after the case was reopened by
Judge Maceda, the same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarles’s
objection to the April 1, 2003 Order. To be effective, a waiver must
31
be certain and unequivocal. Here, Cabarles filed the present
petition seeking for a writ of certiorari against Judge Maceda before
Pedrosa was crossexamined. Also, when asked to comment on the
prosecution’s formal offer of evidence taken after the case was
reopened, Cabarles objected to its admission on the ground that the
same was inadmissible having been received by the court after Judge
Maceda issued the questioned order.
On the second issue, Cabarles maintains that contrary to Judge
Maceda’s observation, the prosecution was given ample opportunity
to present its case as seen by the issuance of several subpoenas to
Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. Cabarles argues that he is presumed innocent
until proven guilty and should not be made to wait indefinitely for
prosecution witnesses to testify. To do so would violate his
constitutional right to due process and a speedy disposition of his
case. According to Cabarles, the reopening of the case is clearly
detrimental to him since it meant another day in prison.
The OSG counters that the reopening of the case was made in
accordance with Section 24 since the prosecution is entitled to the
reopening of the case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Furthermore, Cabarles’s right to a speedy trial had not
_______________
30 See Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286, March 18, 2004, 426 SCRA 29, 40.
31 Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998, 287 SCRA
581, 591.
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Cabarles vs. Maceda
been violated since delays caused by the absence of a prosecution

witness are excluded when computing
32
the time within which trial
should start under Section 3, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
_______________
32 SEC. 3. Exclusions.—The following periods of delay shall be excluded in

computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused,
including but not limited to the following:
(1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the
accused;
(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the
accused;
(3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;
(4) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided, that the delay does not exceed
thirty (30) days;
(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue
of cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) Delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a prejudicial question; and
(7) Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during
which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential
witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent when his
whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. He shall
be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial
cannot be obtained by due diligence.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability of
the accused to stand trial.
318

Cabarles vs. Maceda
Although the matter of reopening a case for reception of further

evidence is largely a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court
judge, this judicial action must not, however, be done whimsically,
33
capriciously and/or unreasonably. In this particular case, the
prosecution was given ample opportunity to present all its witnesses
but it failed to do so. The failure of the prosecution to take full
advantage of the opportunities given does not change the fact that it
was accorded such opportunities. Contrary to the justification stated
in the April 1, 2003 Order, the prosecution was not deprived of its
day in court. While it may be true that due to some confusion with
the trial court’s calendar, some of the trial dates assigned to the
prosecution did not push through and some of the subpoenas issued
to Pedrosa and/or Dr. Salen pertained to hearing dates which were
different from those assigned for reception of prosecution’s
evidence, still the prosecution had a total of four hearing dates when
it was given the chance to prove its case: May 23, June 20 and 27,
and August 1, 2001. The presence of prosecution witnesses in court
is the respon-
_______________
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter
a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay
from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would
commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous
charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-
accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom
the time for trial has not run and no motion for separate trial has been
granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu
proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution,
if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the
order that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
33 Gacayan v. Pamintuan, supra note 25, at p. 695.
319
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 319

Cabarles vs. Maceda
sibility of the public prosecutor and it is incumbent upon him to take 34

the initiative of ensuring the attendance of his witnesses at the trial.
Since Judge Maceda issued the questioned order without
complying with the third requirement of Section 24, that there be a
hearing conducted before the order to reopen is issued, then the
assailed order must be annulled and set aside for having been issued
35
contrary to law and consequently with grave abuse of discretion.
On Cabarles’s right to a speedy disposition of his case, we agree
that under the Constitution, all persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases. Nowhere is this guaranty more
significant and meaningful than in criminal cases where not only the
36
fortune, but the life and liberty of the accused as well, are at stake.
Although a discussion on the right to speedy disposition of the
case is mooted by our nullification of Judge Maceda’s April 1, 2003
Order as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, we are
constrained to reiterate that the concept of speedy disposition is
relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts
37
and circumstances peculiar to each case. The right to a speedy
disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial
_______________
34 People v. Monje, G.R. No. 146689, September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA 160, 174.
35 See Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 141, 148.
36 Clave v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 102502 and Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 103143, June 19, 2001, p. 5 (Unsigned Resolution).
37 Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 478,
485.
320

Cabarles vs. Maceda
are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable

motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
38
having his case tried.
With regard to the OSG’s allegation in its Comment and

Memorandum, that Cabarles failed to observe the rule on hierarchy
of courts since the petition for certiorari was filed directly with the
Supreme Court, Cabarles insists that he is a detention prisoner
needing immediate resolution of his case. He also argues that this
case not only involves grave abuse of discretion but also a pure
question of law involving the application of Section 24, which is a
39
new provision.
It is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is
highly improper for it violates the established policy of strict
observance of the hierarchy of courts. This Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the Court
of Appeals and with the regional trial courts in proper cases within
their respective regions. However, this concurrence of jurisdiction
does not grant a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the
absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice.
This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution
and immemorial tradition. The hierarchy of courts determines the
appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance
of such extraordinary writs against a regional trial court should be
filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is the established policy. It is
a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
_______________
38 Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116945, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA
499, 504, citing Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991, 199
SCRA 298, 307.
39 Rollo, pp. 51-52, 100-102.
321
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 321

Cabarles vs. Maceda
within its exclusive

40
jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding
of its docket.
Under the present circumstances however, we are willing to take
cognizance of this case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy
of courts. Cabarles invokes the jurisdiction of this Court in the
interest of speedy justice since the information against him was filed
41
41
way back in June 1999, and almost eight years thereafter, no
judgment has yet been rendered. Any further delay in the resolution
of the instant petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the Court
has full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of
42
the issues raised. Since Section 24 is a new provision, and
considering the irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003
Order, it is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this petition.
As a final word, we find the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in
the case of People v. Monje instructive:
“A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the trial court
for further proceedings, apparently to enable the prosecution to prove again
what it failed to prove in the first instance. We cannot agree because it will
set a dangerous precedent. Aside from its being unprocedural, it would open
the floodgates to endless litigations because whenever an accused is on the
brink of acquittal after trial, and realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution
would insist to be allowed to augment its evidence which should have been
presented much earlier. This is a criminal prosecution, and to order the
remand of this case to the court a quo to enable the prosecution to present
additional evidence would violate the constitutional right of the accused to
due process, and to speedy determination of his case. The lamentable failure
of the prosecution to fill
_______________
40 Page-Tenorio v. Tenorio, G.R. No. 138490, November 24, 2004, 443 SCRA
560, 567-568.
41 Records, p. 1; Rollo, p. 13.
42 Ark Travel Express, Inc v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010, August 29, 2003, 410
SCRA 148, 157.
322

Cabarles vs. Maceda
the vital gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial to the State and the private
offended party, should not be treated by this Court with indulgence, to the
extent of affording the prosecution a fresh opportunity to refurbish its
evidence.
In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but
justice must be dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much we
want to punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice to the
victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is
bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color,
creed, gender or political persuasion—whether privileged or less privileged

—to be invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused deserves no less
than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what the
43
prosecution has not proved.”
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. We hold that the

assailed Order dated April 1, 2003 was issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Said Order is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, any evidence received and offered in this case as a
result of the April 1, 2003 Order is hereby stricken off the record.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED immediately to the trial
court concerned for its appropriate action without further delay. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition granted, assailed order annulled and set aside. Records

remanded to trial court.
Notes.—Where the trial court judge was well aware of the nature
of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that have so far been
presented, and that the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient
to convict, he, motu proprio,
_______________
43 Supra note 34, at pp. 179-180.
323
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 21, 2007 323

Small vs. Banares
should have called additional witnesses for the prosecution for the
purpose of questioning them himself in order to satisfy his mind
with reference to particular facts or issues involved in the case.
(Merciales vs. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 345 [2002])
A trial court is not in error if it opts to reopen the proceedings of
a case, even after both sides had rested and the case submitted for
decision, by the calling of additional witnesses or recalling of
witnesses so as to satisfy the judge’s mind with reference to
particular facts involved in the case—a judge cannot be faulted
should he require a material witness to complete his testimony.
(People vs. Tee, 395 SCRA 419 [2003])
——o0o——
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11/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 516

VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 303

RENE CABARLES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE BONIFACIO

Criminal Procedure; Motion to Reopen Case; Requisites; A motion to

304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cabarles vs. Maceda

additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days

VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 305

Cabarles vs. Maceda

306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cabarles vs. Maceda

VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 307

Cabarles vs. Maceda

torily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and

308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cabarles vs. Maceda

and realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be allowed to

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

In an original action ﬁled under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

“The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses RENE “NONOY” CABARLES Y

1 Rollo, pp. 14-15.

VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 309

of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,

310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“… It is however understood whether the subpoena is actually issued and

VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 311

With no witness for the August 1, 2001 hearing, 15

312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

either no return on the subpoenas subsequently issued or there was

“… As a consequence[,] the promulgation set tomorrow, April 2, is

Judge Maceda denied Cabarles’s motion for reconsideration in an

VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 313

[1] WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE

[2] WHETHER PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

lack of a speciﬁc provision covering motions to reopen was

23 SEC. 24. Reopening.—At any time before ﬁnality of the judgment of

VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 315

25 Gacayan v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483 (OCA-I.P.I. No. 98-578-RTJ),

316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 317

been violated since delays caused by the absence of a prosecution

32 SEC. 3. Exclusions.—The following periods of delay shall be excluded in

318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Although the matter of reopening a case for reception of further

33 Gacayan v. Pamintuan, supra note 25, at p. 695.

VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 319

sibility of the public prosecutor and it is incumbent upon him to take 34

320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justiﬁable

With regard to the OSG’s allegation in its Comment and

VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 321

within its exclusive

322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

creed, gender or political persuasion—whether privileged or less privileged

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. We hold that the

Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petition granted, assailed order annulled and set aside. Records

43 Supra note 34, at pp. 179-180.

VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 21, 2007 323

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