FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000.]

ARTHUR TE , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA ,

respondents.

Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. for petitioner.

Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit & Acorda Law Office for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner, an engineer, was charged with bigamy by Liliana, herein private respondent, for
contracting a second marriage with Julieta Santella while his marriage to her was still
subsisting. Private respondent also filed an administrative case against petitioner with the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) for immorality and falsification by stating in
his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single. Prior to the filing of the bigamy
charge, petitioner has filed an action for the annulment of his marriage with Liliana.
Petitioner in the criminal and administrative cases moved to suspend the proceedings
claiming that the pendency of an annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question to the
resolution of the cases. The trial court and the PRC denied the motion. Resort to the Court
of Appeals failed to produce any positive result. Hence, these two petitions for certiorari
with this Court which were consolidated.
A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused and
for it to suspend the criminal action.
The pendency of the civil action for annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question to a
bigamy case for the outcome of the annulment case had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner's innocence or guilt in bigamy because all that is necessary is
that the first marriage is subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Furthermore, under the law, a marriage even one which is void or voidable is deemed valid
until declared otherwise. Also, there is no prejudicial question where one case is
administrative and the other is civil.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; DEFINITION. — A prejudicial question has been

defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.
2. ID.; ID.; PENDENCY OF ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, NOT A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
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 TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR BIGAMY. — The Court of Appeals did not err when it
ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner
against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate
that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated. The
outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to private respondent had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner's innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner's
argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in
the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that
their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability is
untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab
initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code,
which was already in effect at the time of petitioner's marriage to private respondent in
September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
not be invoked for purposes of marriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Thus, under the law a marriage even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. It is clear from the
foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to
private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was under the law still valid and
subsisting.
3. ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, NOT A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. — Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment
necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As
discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case.
We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is
administrative and the other is civil. Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly
provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended
notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent
involving the same facts as the administrative case. It must also be noted that the
allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the
issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is
also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as
husband to private respondent and as father to their child. and for cohabiting with Santella
without the benefit of marriage. The existence of these other charges justified the
continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE; GRANT OR DENIAL
THEREOF, LEFT TO SOUND DISCRETION OF COURT. — The grant or denial of a demurrer to
evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall
not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. In this case, the Court
of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which
based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima
facie case for bigamy against the petitioner and second, petitioner's allegations in the
demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the
appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution's
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 evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the trial court's finding that a prima
facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his
defense.
5. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO INHIBIT JUDGE; CHARGE OF BIAS AND PREJUDICE. MUST BE
PROVED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. — We agree with the appellate court
that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that
the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. In People of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid
reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137 the rudimentary
rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear
and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRETIONARY ON COURT WHERE GROUND ALLEGED IS NOT
INCLUDED IN THOSE MENTIONED IN SECTION 1, RULE 137 OF REVISED RULES OF
COURT. — Furthermore since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are
not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. AaEcDS

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DENIAL OF MOTION DID NOT DEPRIVE PARTY OF FAIR AND. IMPARTIAL
TRIAL; CASE AT BAR. — The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion
is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial. The instances when Judge
Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel
did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge
of petitioner's motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence
are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the
requirement that petitioner's counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that
he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was
evidently imposed upon petitioner's counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was
not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge's duty to
disposing of the court's business promptly.

DECISION

KAPUNAN , J : p

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the
Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 1 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 26178 2 and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in Civil rites on
September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would
meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21,
1989, petitioner stopped visiting her. 3
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner
contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella). 4
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 On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990,
when she learned about petitioner's marriage to Santella, an information charging
petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on
August 9, 1990. 5 This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409. 6
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the
annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to
marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at
the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations. 7
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the
revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts
of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their
knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private
respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act
of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single. 8
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a
demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for
showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner's counsel during the hearings of
said case. cCaIET

The trial court denied petitioner's demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28,
1990 which stated that the same could not be granted because the prosecution had
sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused. 9 The RTC also denied
petitioner's motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis. 1 0
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting
antagonism and animosity towards petitioner's counsel; (2) violating the requirements of
due process by denying petitioner's [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence
even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the
appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in
a criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971. 1 1
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the
administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to
suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98,
respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. 1 2 When the Board denied the said motion in its
Order dated July 16, 1991, 1 3 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for
certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that
the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative
case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the
administrative case could render nugatory petitioner's right against self-incrimination in
this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping
interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and
Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding
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 before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings
against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals.
This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178. 1 4
The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of
facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in
the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC's denial of the motion to
inhibit due to petitioner's failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge
exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner's
motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord
with law. 1 5 The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC's denial of the demurrer to
evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the
same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the
existence of the elements of bigamy. 1 6
Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board's
Order denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on
the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question
existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other
action involved is a civil case. 1 7
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals but the same was denied. 1 8
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO
SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN
ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF. 1 9

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner's marriage to
private respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal
case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for
revocation of petitioner's engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic,
the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and
controlling precepts and rules. 2 0
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from
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 the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 2 1 The rationale behind
the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. 2 2
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a
prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be
suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to private respondent
had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner's innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that
the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 2 3
Petitioner's argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be
resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a
declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from
criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza 2 4 and People vs. Aragon 2 5
cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article
40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner's marriage to
private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one
which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. 2 6 In Landicho vs. Relova, 2 7 we held that: IcTEaC

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when
the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. 2 8

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
petitioner's marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which
warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the
time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid
and subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of
prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there
is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. 2 9
Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and
Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative
proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal
and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative
case:

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 The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an
administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered
professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be
filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter
case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case
and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the
courts or quasi-judicial body.aIcSED

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC
Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by
petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued
failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their
child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. 3 0 The existence of
these other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board. ATcEDS

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's
denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the
prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second marriages
beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract
between him and private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not
properly identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were
complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract between
him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was
adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage
ceremony participated in by him ever took place. 3 1
We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the
absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. 3 2 In this case, the Court of Appeals did not
find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of
the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for
bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioner's allegations in the demurrer were
insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will
not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution's evidence and decide in
advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. 3 3 In view of the trial court's finding that a prima facie case against
petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense. 3 4
The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner's misimpression that by denying his
demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial
court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not
an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary
to resolve the case. 3 5 The RTC's observation that there was a prima facie case against
petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its
proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner
presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion. 3 6 Said declaration by
the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner's guilt. It was precisely
because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner
may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the
evidence adduced by both parties.
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 Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-
90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against
him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the
judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for
reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner's counsel manifested that
he had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for trial, the judge
commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said counsel to
produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested
that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the same as
dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge's
hostile attitude towards petitioner's counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified
the grant of his motion to inhibit. CIDaTc

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge
Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case.
3 7 In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 3 8 this Court held that while bias and
prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge
under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is
partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of
bias and partiality. 3 9
Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among
those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision
of law states:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit
in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the
case.
This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying
petitioner's motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said
motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial. 4 0 The instances when
Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his
counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by
the judge of petitioner's motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to
evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything
unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner's counsel submit a medical certificate to
support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial.
Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner's counsel to ensure that the
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 resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping
with the judge's duty to disposing of the court's business promptly. 4 1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Arthur Te, Petitioner vs. Hon. Cesar C. Peralejo as Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98
and People of the Philippines, Respondents.
2. Arthur Te, Petitioner vs. Board of Civil Engineering, Professional Regulation Commission
and Liliana Choa Te, Respondents.
3. Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994, Rollo, p. 29.
4. Ibid.
5. Id., at 29-30.
6. Records, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p. 1.

7. Rollo, pp. 29-30.

8. Id., at 30.
9. Records, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p. 37.
10. Id., at 33.
11. Id., at 6-10.
12. These cases were: (1) Arthur Te, vs. Liliana Choa-Te, Civil Case No. 90-6265 for
Annulment of Marriage, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106; and (2) People
of the Philippines vs. Arthur Te, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 for Bigamy, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 98.
13. Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, p. 15.
14. Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 6-10.
15. Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 33-34, 36.

16. Id., at 35.

17. Id., at 36.
18. Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 18, 1996, Id., at 103.
19. Petition, Id., at 18-24.
20. Salonga vs. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438, 463 (1985).
21. Librado vs. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303, 309-310 (1982).
22. Carlos vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25, 33 (1997) citing Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan,
249 SCRA 342 (1995).
23. The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) the offender has been legally
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 married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved; (3) the offender contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. (REYES, LUIS B. THE REVISED PENAL CODE
ANNOTATED , VOL. 2, Thirteenth Edition, p. 828.)
24. 95 Phil. 843 (1954).
25. 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).

26. Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000; Bobis vs. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509,
July 31, 2000; Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy , 143 SCRA 499, 501 (1986).

27. 22 SCRA 731 (1968).

28. Id., at 734, Citing 3 VIADA, PENAL CODE 275.
29. Ocampo vs. Buenaventura, 55 SCRA 267, 271 (1974).
30. Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 18-19.

31. Petition, Rollo, pp. 21-23.

32. People vs. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453, 459 (1988).
33. People vs. Cruz, 144 SCRA 677, 681 (1986).
34. Section 15, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court.
35. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178,
Rollo, pp. 35-36.
36. People vs. Nuque, 58 O.G. 8445; Salonga vs. Cruz Pano, supra note 20 at 450.
37. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178,
Rollo, p. 33.
38. 309 SCRA 705 (1999).
39. Id., at 709-710.
40. Associacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88
SCRA 294.
41. Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.

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