CASE DIGESTS

Submitted By: Marie Vera Christine Leung

[NATRES] NATURAL RESOURCES and ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Class 2 Section C – Set 3
Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada
October 9, 2019

Mining Laws

(1) APEX Mining Co. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp

G.R. Nos 152613 & 152628 (November 20, 2009)
(2) Benguet Corporation vs DENR - Mine Adjudication Board & J.G Realty
G.R. No 163101 (February 13, 2008)
(3) Armando vs Sulu Resources G.R. No 148267
(4) Celestial Nickel Mining vs Macroasia Corp G.R. 169080
(5) Blue Ridge vs Hon. Angelo Reyes G.R. 172936
(6) Lepanto Mining vs WMC Resources G.R. 162331
(7) John Eric vs People of the Phil G.R. 152644
(8) PICP Resources vs Vase Metals Mineral G.R. 163509
(9) Marcopper Mining vs Alberto Bumlo G.R. 139548
(10) Santo Rosa Mining vs Minister of Natural Resources G.R. L-49109
(11) Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining vs Balite Portal Mining G.R. 135190
(12) Ungay Malobago Mines vs CA/Director or Lands G.R No 69997
(13) Pyro Copper Mining vs MAB G.R. No 179674

Brown Laws
(14) Chavez vs. NHA G.R. No. 164527 August 15, 2007
(15) GMMSWM vs. JANCOM G.R. No. 163663 June 30, 2006
(16) Henares vs. LTFRB and LTO G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
(17) Salalima vs. ECC and SSS G.R. No. 146360 May 20, 2004
(18) SJS vs. Atienza G.R. No. 156052 February 13, 2008

Clean Water Act

(19) LLDA v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 110120
(20) Hizon vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119619 December 3, 1996
(21) Navarro vs. IAC G.R. No. 681166 December 12, 1997
(22) People of the Philippines vs. Vergara, G.R. No. 110286 April 2, 1997
(23) MMDA Vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
 (1) APEX Mining Co. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp
G.R. Nos 152613 & 152628 (November 20, 2009)

FACTS:

A motion for reconsideration was filed by SEM. The Assailed Decision held
that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one
of the conditions stipulated in the permit. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133
violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a
mining right be made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decision
pointed out that EP 133expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before or
after its expiration. It likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297 absent
any question against its validity.

In view of this, and considering that under Section 5 of Republic Act No.
7942, otherwise known as the “Mining Act of 1995,” mining operations in mineral
reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the
Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal
GoldRush Area as having been overtaken by the said proclamation. Thus, it was
held in the assailed decision that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive
Department to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to
award the operations to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite,
subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided that these private
entities are qualified.

Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision,
praying that the Court elucidate on the Decision’s pronouncement that “mining
operations, are now, therefore within thefull control of the State through the
executive branch.” Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the Mines and
Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration permit.
Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the State
of the mining industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private sector. In
addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its application for an
exploration permit. Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them. In the
Resolution, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the instant cases.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to

SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions set forth
in Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.

2. Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over the
disputed area, which constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution.
3.Whether the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in this
case is contrary to and overturns the earlier Decision of this Court in Apex v.
Garcia (G.R. No. 92605, 16 July1991, 199 SCRA 278).

4. Whether the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 declaring the disputed area as
mineral reservation outweighs the claims of SEM, Apex Mining Co. Inc. and
Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.

5. Whether the issue of the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 was

belatedly raised.

HELD:

1. The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in Apex
Mining Co., Inc. v.Garcia. The former was decided on facts and issues that were
not attendant in the latter, such as the expiration of EP 133, the violation of the
condition embodied in EP 133 prohibiting its assignment, and the unauthorized and
invalid assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since this assignment was effected
without the approval of the Secretary of DENR;

2. SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because it’s supposed
right was extinguished by the expiration of its exploration permit and by its
violation of the condition prohibiting the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM.
In addition, even assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, such is a mere
license that can be withdrawn by the State. In fact, the same has been withdrawn
by the issuance of Proclamation No. 297, which places the disputed area under the
full control of the State through the Executive Department;

3. The approval requirement under Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463

applies to the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since the exploration permit
is an interest in a mining lease contract;

4. The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No. 297 was
raised belatedly, as SEM questions the same for the first time in its Motion for
Reconsideration. Even if the issue were to be entertained, the said proclamation is
found to be in harmony with the Constitution and other existing statutes;

5. The motion for reconsideration of Camilo Banad, et al. cannot be passed upon
because they are not parties to the instant cases;6. The prayers of Apex and Balite
asking the Court to direct the MGB to accept their applications for exploration
permits cannot be granted, since it is the Executive Department that has the
prerogative to accept such applications, if ever it decides to award the mining
operations in the disputed area to a private entity
 (2) Benguet Corporation vs DENR - Mine Adjudication Board & J.G
Realty G.R. No 163101 (February 13, 2008)

FACTS:

Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with

Option to Purchase (RAWOP), wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the
owner of four mining claims with a total area of 288.8656 hectares. The parties
also executed a Supplemental Agreement.The mining claims were covered by
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) Application No. APSA-V-0009
jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claim-owner and Benguet as operator.

After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N.

Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the
mining claims. However, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then
sent a letter to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating
the RAWOP. The latter alleged that petitioner violated some of the provisions of
the RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of royalties and non-fulfillment of
obligations stipulated therein.

J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of

the RAWOP. POA issued a Decision, cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental
Agreement. BENGUET was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA
Application over the mineral claims. Subsequent MR was denied. Said decision
was upheld by DENR-MAB.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is
proper

HELD:

No. the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to

an improper Remedy.

The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the
“Philippine Mining Act of 1995” states, “A petition for review by certiorari and
question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB].”

The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a

uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from
their judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a
verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an
organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this
definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated
under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91––
“among these agencies are”––indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or
conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which,
though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.

The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that

direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained,
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals,
or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.

Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43,

the decision of the MAB has become final and executory. On this ground alone,
the instant petition must be denied.
 (3) Armando vs Sulu Resources G.R. No 148267

FACTS:

A petition filed by respondent for Mines Production Sharing

Agreement(MPSA) No. MPSA-IV-131, covering certain areas in Antipolo,
Rizal. Petitioner filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging that his
landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondent’s
claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right to explore and extract the quarry
resources on his properties. The Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-
Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding petitioner’s
opposition/adverse claim.

Respondent appealed. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to

dismiss appeal on the ground of respondent’s failure to comply with the
requirements of the New Mining Act’s Implementing Rules and Regulations.

On June 20, 1997, the Mines Adjudication Board rendered the

assailed Order dismissing petitioner’s opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order which was denied by the
Board. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43, seeking a reversal of
the MAB Decision was filed. Citing Section 79 of Chapter XIII of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), the CA ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction to review the Decision of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB).
The adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely administrative in
nature. Under Section 79 of RA 7942, “the findings of fact by the MAB as well
as its decision or order shall be final and executory.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines
Adjudication Board should be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended by
the respondent and the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the Court
of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.

HELD:

The petition is granted. Factual controversies are usually involved in

administrative actions; and the CA is prepared to handle such issues because,
unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. In Metro
Construction, we observed that not only did the CA have appellate jurisdiction
over CIAC decisions and orders, but the review of such decisions included
questions of fact and law. At the very least when factual findings of the MAB are
challenged or alleged to have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the
present case, the CA may review them, consistent with the constitutional duty of
the judiciary.

To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of

the MAB Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that “[n]o law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and consent.” On the other hand, Section 79 of RA
No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court on a
“petition for review by certiorari.” This provision is obviously an expansion of the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not consented.
Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court would unnecessarily burden it.

Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making

power, transfers to the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial
body’s decisions, such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair
the substantive and vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved party’s right to
appeal is preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which the appeal is
to be made or decided. The parties still have a remedy and a competent tribunal to
grant this remedy.

Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide

a uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals
from their judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on
a verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as
an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights
of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this
definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated
under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 --
“among these agencies are” -- indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or
conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which,
though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.

Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as
amended by RA No. 7902, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions
of quasi-judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions
of fact, has more elbow room to resolve them. By including questions of fact
among the issues that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to
the CA, Section 3 of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of
Rule 43 explicitly expanded the list of such issues.

According to Section 3 of Rule 43, “[a]n appeal under this Rule may be
taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law.” Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies even only on questions of
law may be brought to the CA.

Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that
direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained,
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals,
or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

In brief, appeals from decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CA

through petitions for review in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
 (4) Celestial Nickel Mining vs Macroasia Corp G.R. 169080

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral and
Industrial Corporation (Infanta) and with new name of Macroasia entered into a
Mining Lease Contract

Peitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts and
other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease
Contract before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences
Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.

Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas

contiguous to Macroasia mining lode claims. Celestial sought the cancellation of
Macroasia’s lease contracts. Macroasia refuted the grounds for cancellation
invoked by Celestial.

Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of the field
investigations, the POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the Mining
Lease Contracts of Macroasia; and found the claims of the others indubitably
meritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential right to Macroasia’s mining areas. It
upheld Blue Ridge’s petition, but only as against the Mining Lease Contract areas
of Lebach, and the said leased areas were declared automatically abandoned. It
gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid Lebach’s areas/mining claims. Blue
Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the MAB.

Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of
appeal; thus, with respect to Lebach, the above resolution became final and
executory.

The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel the
Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia.

However, the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution vacating its previous

decision, holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke a
mineral agreement duly entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further
held that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively
lodged with the DENR Secretary.

The CA affirmed the MAB Resolution which upheld the exclusive authority
of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The
CA also denied Celestial’s Motion for Reconsideration.

While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridge’s petition; reversed
and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and treated the cancellation of a mining
lease agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA
under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the power to resolve mining disputes,
which is the greater power, necessarily includes the lesser power to cancel mining
agreements.
ISSUE:

Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction
to cancel mining contracts and privileges?

HELD:

YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel
mining contracts and privileges.

After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its
implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and case law, we rule that
the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral
lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the following reasons:

The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates

from his administrative authority, supervision, management, and control over
mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987.

It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and

regulates the use and development of all mineral resources of the country. It has
exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public domain, which
covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands. It has the power to oversee,
supervise, and police our natural resources which include mineral resources.
Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary under
the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements and
necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.

Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR

Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights
clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the
cancellation of mineral agreements.

The DENR Secretary’s power to cancel mining rights or agreements through

the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on
cancellation, revocation, and termination of a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.
 (5) Blue Ridge vs Hon. Angelo Reyes G.R. 172936

FACTS:

Blue Ridge Mineral Corporation (Blue Ridge) seeks to annul and set aside
the action of then Secretary Michael T. Defensor, in his capacity as DENR
Secretary, approving and signing two Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSAs) in favor of Macroasia Corporation (Macroasia).

The CA reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB, and reinstated
the October 24, 2000 Decision in MAB, granting Blue Ridge the prior and
preferential right to file its application over the mining claims of Macroasia. These
petitions likewise seek to set aside.

Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to

seek cancellation of mining lease contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia
and another entity, Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in
Brooke's Point.

The MAB found that it was Blue Ridge that had prior and preferential rights
over the mining claims of Macroasia, and not Celestial.

In case Blue Ridge defaults, Celestial could exercise the secondary priority
and preferential rights, and subsequently, in case Celestial also defaults, other
qualified applicants could file.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has the prior and preferential rights to files its
mining application?

HELD:

Petitioner Blue Ridge has the prior and preferential right to file its mining
application over the mining claims covered by the subject MPSAs, pursuant to
the Decision dated 24 October 2000 of the Board.

The government represented by the then Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources (now the DENR Secretary) has the power to cancel the lease
contracts for violations of existing laws, rules and regulations and the terms and
conditions of the contracts. Celestial and Blue Ridge are now estopped from
challenging the power and authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral
agreements.

There is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Hon. Court of Appeals
in its appreciation of the facts, the evidence and the law thereby leading it to make
the erroneous conclusion that Blue Ridge, not Celestial, is entitled to the Award of
prior/preferential rights over the mining areas declared as abandoned by
Macroasia;
 (6) Lepanto Mining vs WMC Resources G.R. 162331

FACTS:

Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned

subsidiary of WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed
a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement, denominated as the Columbio
FTAA No. 02-95-XI (Columbio FTAA) for the purpose of large scale exploration,
development, and commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in an
initial contract area of 99,387 hectares located in the provinces of South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in accordance with Executive
Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.

The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under
various Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining
Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
(collectively called the Tampakan Companies), in accordance with the Tampakan
Option Agreement entered into by WMC Philippines and the Tampakan
Companies on 25 April 1991, as amended by Amendatory Agreement dated 15
July 1994, for purposes of exploration of the mining claims in Tampakan, South
Cotabato. The Option Agreement, among other things, provides for the grant of
the right of first refusal to the Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines
desires to dispose of its rights and interests in the mining claims covering the area
subject of the agreement.

WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the
ColumbioFTAA, and on 12 July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement
with petitioner Lepanto over its entire shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject
to the exercise of the Tampakan Companies’ exercise of their right of first refusal
to purchase the subject shares. On 28 August 2000, petitioner sought the approval
of the 12 July 2000 Agreement from the DENR Secretary.

In the interim, on 10 January 2001, contending that the 12 July Agreement

between petitioner and WMC Philippines had expired due to failure to meet the
necessary preconditions for its validity, WMC Resources and the Tampakan
Companies executed another Sale and Purchase Agreement, where Sagittarius
Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and corporate vehicle which would acquire
the shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA activities. On 15 January
2001, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. increased its authorized capitalization to P250
million. Subsequently, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale of Shares of Stocks on 23 January 2001.

After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technical

qualifications of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the transfer
of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. in the
assailed Order. According to said Order, pursuant to Section 66 of Department
Administrative Order No. 96-40, as amended, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. meets the
qualification requirements as Contractor-Transferee of FTAA No. 02-95-XI, and
that the application for transfer of said FTAA went thru the procedure and other
requirements set forth under the law.
 Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius
Mines, Inc., petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR
Secretary with the Office of the President. Petitioner assails the validity of the 18
December 2001 Order of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) approving the application for and the consequent
registration of FTAA No. 02-95-XI from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines,
Inc.on the ground that: 1) it violates the constitutional right of Lepanto to due
process; 2) it preempts the resolution of very crucial legal issues pending with the
regular courts; and 3) it blatantly violates Section 40 of the Mining Act.

In a Decision dated 23 July 2002, the Office of the President dismissed the
petition

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly

Section 40 thereof requiring the approval of the President of the assignment or
transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements should have a retroactive
application to the Columbio FTAA.

HELD:

NO. Applying the above-cited law retroactively would contradict the

established legal doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the contrary is expressly stated or necessarily implied
from the language used in the law.

In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an

implication in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law
shall be made to apply retroactively, therefore, any section of said law must be
made to apply only prospectively, in view of the rule that a statute ought not to
receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so
clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or
unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied.
 (7) John Eric vs People of the Phil G.R. 152644

FACTS:

Petitioners are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager,
and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corporation, a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings1 from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the
tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In
a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the
Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in

the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines, the National Pollution
Control Decree of 1976 (“PD 984”), the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (“RA
7942”), and Article 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property.

The MTC is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are
concerned, only the Information for violation of Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942)
should be maintained and the Information for violation of Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial
because the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic]
damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes not the
negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation of
Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for reckless imprudence
resulting to [sic] damage to property.

Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984.

RTC granted public respondent’s appeal but denied petitioners’ petition.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion and contends that they should only be prosecuted for
violation of Article 365 of the RPC.

Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s ruling. The appellate court held:

The doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to
the case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for
violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in character.
 This Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence
that would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal
Trial Court’s quashal of the Informations against the petitioners for violation of
P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial court’s
denial of the petitioner’s motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.2

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied

their motion.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the decision of the CA contravenes People v. Relova.

HELD:

The Filing of Several Charges will prosper. The contention has no merit.

Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their

prosecution contravenes this Court’s ruling in People v. Relova. In particular,
petitioners cite the Court’s statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent
harassment of the accused by “multiple prosecutions for offenses which though
different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or
overlapping sets of technical elements.”

The issue in Relovais whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in
charging one Manuel Opulencia with theft of electric power under the RPC, after
the latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated Opulencia’s right against
double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those
two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished
by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against
multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. We held:

Thus, Relovais no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple

prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of double
jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as theCourt of Appeals held,
petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national
statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever,
fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple
prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from
the same incident.
 (8) PICOP Resources vs Vase Metals Mineral G.R. 163509

FACTS:

Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a

Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation
whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration,
development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCI’s eighteen (18)
mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement,
Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining
claims with the Bureau of Mines.

The Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it

to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon
its expiration, the temporary permit was subsequently renewed thrice by the
Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991. Since a portion of Banahaw
Mining’s mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP’s logging concession in
Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each other’s right
to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right
of way to its mining claims. Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to
applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements.

While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996,
decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims
in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation. The
transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim
owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI.
On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals’ amended MPSA applications
were published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act of 1995.

On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-
Sciences Bureau (MGB), an adverse claim and/or opposition to private respondent
Base Metals’ application. After the submission of their respective position paper,
the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order disapproving private respondent Base Metals’
MPSA on the reasons that adverse claim was filed on time, that the granting of the
MPSA application on area subject of an IFMA or PTLA which is covered by a
Presidential Warranty, the panel believes it cannot, unless the grantee consents
thereto, without the grantee’s consent, the area is considered closed to mining and
that the mining location in forest or timberland is allowed only if such forest or
timberland is not leased by the government to a qualified person or entity and if it
is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in addition to the area clearance to
be issued by the agency concerned before it is subjected to mining operation.
Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off tangent to
mining. Both are extremes. They cannot exist at the same time. The other must
necessarily stop before the other operates. Private respondent Base Metals filed a
Notice of Appeal with public respondent MAB, the latter rendered the assailed
decision setting aside the Panel Arbitrator’s order. The Court of Appeals upheld
the decision of the MAB.

ISSUE:

(a) Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals’ MPSA is, by law, closed to
mining activities and

(b) Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract protected by the non-
impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

The Court ruled that the area covered by Base Metals’ MPSA is, by
law, not closed to mining activities. RA 7942 does not disallow mining
applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed aswatershed
forest reserves. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by
Base Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. Even
granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-
Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not necessarily signify that the area is
absolutely closed to mining activities.

Contrary to PICOP’s obvious misreading of our decision in Apex Mi

ning Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral agreements are not
allowed in the forest reserve established under Proclamation369, the Court
in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385,
one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-
Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to prospect
with the Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for a permit to
explore with the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences. Moreover, Sec. 18 RA
7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestry subject to existing rights
and reservations. Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in
forest lands which include the public forest, the permanent forest or forest
reserves, and forest reservations.

The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a

contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and
enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the
complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power
to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the
natural resources in the area. The warranty covers only the right to cut,
collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the
utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the
concession.

The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct

from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. It is merely a collateral undertaking
which cannot amplify PICOP’s rights under its timber license. Since timber
licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
 (9) Marcopper Mining vs Alberto Bumlo G.R. 139548

FACTS:

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims in

Pao, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from February 02,1982 to October
12, 1982. Private respondents Alberto G. Bumolo and others registered their
mining claims in the same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988, which
claims were subsequently converted into Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA).

On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the
mining. Under the Agreements, petitioner was granted the exclusive and
irrevocable right to explore the mining claims for three (3) years with provision for
extension.

On December 23, 1982 and March 26, 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting
Permit Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on the
alleged ground that a portion of the area covered by the mining claims was within
the Magat River Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June 26, 1969 and with
DAR on account of alleged coverage of the other portion within the Nueva
Vizcaya-Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11 September 1975.

On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected petitioner’s

Prospecting Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of July
08, 1991 endorsed by the Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed that the
area covered was outside government reservation; that the prospect claim was in
conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been extensively explored in
the early 1980's.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive Director Samuel

Paragas recommended to the DENR Secretary that petitioner's request for
reconsideration be denied; that the existing rights of mining claim holders be
respected; and, that the prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement applicants over subject area be recognized.

As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was
issued a clearance to prospect for six (6) months from December 11, 1995.

On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines Adjudication

Board (MAB). Petitioner maintained that subject area was within the Magat River
Forest Reservation. On June 11, 1998 the rejection of the PPA was affirmed
whereas the mining claims of respondents Alberto G. Bumolo et al. that had
been converted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAO No.
96-40, were given due course.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Respondent MAB denied petitioner’s
motion.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the PPA
was outside the Magat River Forest Reservation.

HELD:

Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional Executive

Director Paragas in denying petitioner's PPA.

The disapproval of Marcopper’s PPA moreover, did not emanate from a

single recommendation of the RTD for Mines. Records would show that as
early as May 31, 1989 x xx the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims which
Marcopper has eventually surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of
claims x xxx was confirmed by the Forest Engineering Section of the region to
be outside proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks and existing
government reforestation projects x xxx

In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is
outside the Magat River Forest Reservation has been adequately established by the
following evidence: (a) confirmation as early as 31 May 1989 by the Forest
Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991 Memorandum
Report of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provided by the
National Mapping and Resources Information Authority per its 2 June 1995
indorsement of the maps to the office of the Regional Executive Director.
Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within the Magat
River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical error
committed by somebody in the Engineering Section of the DENR." Aside from the
fact that the allegation does not have anything to support it, the aforementioned
documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in denying the PPA
had already settled the issue.

Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for the rejection of
petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the Lands Management Sector of DENR Region 2
contained in the sketch plan of 11 November 1996 and as shown in the Land Use
map of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Dupax,
Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered under the PPA is indeed outside any government
reservation.
 (10) Santo Rosa Mining vs Minister of Natural Resources G.R. L-49109

FACTS:

Petitioner is a mining corporation, it alleges that it is the holder of fifty valid

mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the
Philippine Bill of 1902.P.D. No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of subsisting
and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one year from the approval of
the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease application, but "under
protest", with a reservation annotated on the back of its application that it is not
waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of Presidential Decree
No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court.

Three days before filing the disputed mining lease application, petitioner
filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to protect its
rights (except by said petition). Petitioner assails Presidential Decree No. 1214 as
unconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of property without due process
of law. Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declared
as its own private and exclusive property in final judgments rendered by the CFI
CamarTinhes Norte.

The cases cited by petitioner recognize the right of a locator of a mining

claim as a property right. This right is not absolute. It is merely a possesory right,
more so, in this case, where petitioner's claims are still unpatented. They can be
lost through abandonment or forfeiture or they may be revoked for valid legal
grounds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional

RULING:

Even assuming that petitioner was not bound to exhaust administrative

remedies on the question of whether or not its mining claims are still subsisting
before challenging the constitutionality of said Decree. It is a valid exercise of the
sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which
petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of
which mineral deposits are a valuable asset.

It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all
mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over
which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may
still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Dec. No.
463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.Mere location does not
mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It merely
segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-
be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals
found therein.
To rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire
and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or
sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator
should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work
and improvements in the located mining claim. Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in
accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution which states:"All lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State.

With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and

resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated,
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation,
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant".
 (11) Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining vs Balite Portal Mining G.R. 135190

FACTS:

On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was
enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel
of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03
which provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option
of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.

The petition prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum

Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused therein
would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the
memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain
studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the
DENR. The assailed memorandum did not conclusively adopt “direct state
utilization” as official government policy on the matter, but was simply a
manifestation of the DENR’s intent to consider it as one of its options, after
determining its feasibility through studies. MO 97-03 was only the initial step in
the ladder of administrative process and did not, as yet, fix any obligation, legal
relationship or right.

ISSUE:

WON CA erred when it concluded that the assailed memorandum order did
not adopt the “direct state utilization scheme” in resolving the Diwalwal Conflict.

HELD:

No, since the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt “direct state
utilization” as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the
memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed there under was merely a
study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, it did not
grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners
or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned
to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. It must likewise be pointed out that
under no circumstances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as
total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely
evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or
rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the
exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources
are matters impressed with great public interest. The DENR Secretary acted within
his authority when he ordered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken
consistently in accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above.
Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of
the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities
generated by the gold rush. As implied earlier, the State need be guided only by the
demands of public interest in settling for this option, as well as its material and
logistic feasibility. In this regard, petitioner’s imputation of bad faith on the part of
the DENR Secretary when the latter issued MO 97-03 is not well-taken. Hence
petition denied.
(12) Ungay Malobago Mines vs CA/Director or Lands G.R No 69997

FACTS:

On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted the following
mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu Albay.
Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned
their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner.

The assignment of rights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder
of Albay on December 2, 1959. The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance
on July 20, 1962, were all recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay
on August 28, 1962 and transcribed on September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book
of the Registry of Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay
issued the respective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act
No. 496 in the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.
Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, the following free patents were granted by the
respondent Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titles
were issued by the Register of Deeds of Albay.

The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents

against the private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in
their favor for properties over which original certificates of title had already been
issued in its favor be declared null and void. On January 25, 1980, the trial court
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. It ruled that since the disputed
properties form part of disposable land of the public domain, the action for
reversion should be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines and that, therefore, the petitioner lacks personality to institute the
annulment proceedings. The petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court.

On April 5, 1984, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
It ruled that the titles issued to the petitioner cover mineral lands which belong to
the public domain and that these cannot be the subject of private ownership.
According to the Court, under Section 101 of the Public Land Law, only the
Solicitor General r the officer acting in his stead has the authority to institute an
action on behalf of the Republic for the cancellation of the respondents' titles and
for reversion of their homesteads to the Government.

ISSUE:

a) Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when it ruled
that the lands in question belong to the public domain; and b) whether or
not the appellate court erred in discussing the complaint on the ground that
the petitioner had no personality to institute the same.

HELD:

Nowhere in the records of this petition is there any mention of a date

before November 15, 1935 as to when essential acts regarding its mining
claims were executed. It is silent as to when the land was entered,
measured, and plotted; when the legal posts and notices were put up; when
the claim was registered with the mining recorder; whether or not the
annual amount of labor or development, and other requirements under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 were followed. These may have been complied with
but not necessarily before 1935. A mere mention in the Torrens title that the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 were followed is not sufficient.
The Philippine Bill provides the procedures for the perfection of mining
claims but not the dates when such procedures were undertaken by any
prospector or claimant.

The same procedures would have to be followed even after the Jones
Law of 1916 and the Constitution of 1935 were promulgated, but subject to
the restrictions of the fundamental law. Petitioner has not established by
clear and convincing evidence that the locations of its mining claims were
perfected prior to November 15,1935 when the Government of
Commonwealth was inaugurated. Applying provision to the case at bar, we
conclude that the issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the
President of the Philippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it
only the right to extract or utilize the minerals which may be found on or
under the surface of the land. On the other hand, the issuance of the free
patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of the private
respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to use the land for
agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to
extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 (13) Pyro Copper Mining vs MAB G.R. No 179674

FACTS:

Petitioner prays for the setting aside or reversal of the Decision dated 28
December 2006 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)-Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) which affirmed the Orders dated 14
September 2005 and 27 December 2005 of the DENR-Panel of Arbitrators, Region
1, San Fernando City, La Union (Panel of Arbitrators), in Case No. 2005-00012-I,
dismissing the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for
Exploration Permit of private respondent Montague Resources Philippines
Corporation. Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws engaged in the business of mining.

On 31 March 2000, petitioner’s Application for Mineral Production Sharing

Agreement (MPSA), for the exploration, development and commercial utilization
of certain pyrite ore and other mineral deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol,
Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor.
Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines and engaged in the business of mining. Private respondent filed an
Application for Exploration Permit with MGB covering the same properties
covered by and during the subsistence of APSA-SF-000089 and MPSA No. 153-
2000-1 of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to the
Application for Exploration Permit of the private respondent. It was allegedly filed
with the Panel of Arbitrators on August 30, 2005 and was received by the latter on
September 5, 2005. Prior, however, to petitioner’s filing of its Verified
rotest/Opposition to the private respondent’s Application for Exploration Permit,
petitioner’s MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was cancelled, a Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied. The MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent. Panel
of Arbitrators dismissed motu proprio the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner.
Petitioner elevated by appeal to the MAB which was also dismissed. The case was
elevated to the Court of appeals but judgment was rendered against the petitioner.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or

revoke EP No. 05-001issued by MGB to private respondent.

HELD:

The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP

No. 05-001issued by MGB to private respondent Section 77 of Republic Act No.
7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, thus: Sec. 77. Panel of
Arbitrators.– x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the
case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following: 1. Disputes involving rights to
mining areas; 2. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits; 3. Disputes
involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and 4.
Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the
effectivity of this Act. The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse
claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral
rights, but not over cancellation of mineral rights already granted and existing. As
to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration permit, Section 28 of
DAO NO. 96-40explicitly provides: Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration
Permit . – The Director/concerned Regional Director may cancel the Exploration
Permit for failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the requirements and for
violation(s) of the terms and conditions under which the Permit is issued. For
renewed Exploration Permits, the Secretary upon the recommendation of the
Director shall cause the cancellation of the same.

According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96- 40, “Director” means the Director
of the MGB Central Office, while “Regional Director” means the Regional
Director of any MGB Regional Office. As the authority to issue an Exploration
Permit is vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily includes the corollary
power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. Indisputably, the authority to deny,
revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-001 of private respondent is already lodged with the
MGB, and not with the Panel of Arbitrators.
 (14) Chavez vs. NHA G.R. No. 164527 August 15, 2007 - EN BANC

FACTS:

On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant

petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing
Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.

On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No.

(MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and
Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time,
Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of
many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.

As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite

into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-
Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private sectors
as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415
applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also established
EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan,
respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).

Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were
published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the
bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint
Venture Agreement with RBI.

Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual
development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI
is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40
hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the
commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as
enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government
through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate
RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return
not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of
such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by
both parties.

To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the
project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary
housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II
involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of
the garbage at the dumpsite.

Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA
was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and
additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original
3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as
enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was
supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The
revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase
II of the project.

Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the
establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey
Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later
reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements.
During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21
permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.

ISSUES:

Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to
reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as
claimed by petitioner

Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR
to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands

Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands
considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man

Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no
declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use

Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands

Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding

Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire

lands of public domain

Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the

SMDRP

Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position

HELD:

Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf
of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all.
The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the
President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA
(which were seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and
undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National
Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim
lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have
granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is
one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project.
ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of
its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the
abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted
that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine
President.

The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued
by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no
longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be
“disposed to qualified beneficiaries.” Furthermore, these lands have already been
necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.
Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights
and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem
appropriate.

There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to
become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted that
notices were published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by
the Bids and Awards Committee on May 18, 1992.
RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid “a
portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional
requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino
equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the lands were transferred to the
NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the
power to sell the same to any qualified person.
This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on
matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7
of the 1987 Constitution.
When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue
of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in question after the
passage of around 10 years from the start of the project’s implementation cannot be
disturbed or questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time
SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but
did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.
 (15) GMMSWM vs. JANCOM G.R. No. 163663 June 30, 2006

FACTS:

President Fidel Ramos issued Presidential Memorandum Order no. 202

creating an Executive Committee (EC) to oversee and develop waste-to-energy
projects for the waste disposal sites in Rizal and Carmona under the Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. Respondent Jancom International Development
Projects Pty. Limited of Australia was one of the bidders for the Rizal Site which
subsequently entered into a partnership with its co-respondent Asea Brown Boveri
under the firm name Jancom Environmental Corporation (JANCOM).
Consequently, EC declared JANCOM as the sole complying bidder of the Rizal
Waste Disposal Site hence a Contract for the BOT implementation of the Solid
Waste Management Project for the Rizal Site was entered between Greater
Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee (GMMSWMC) and
Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and JANCOM.

The contract was submitted for approval to President Ramos who

subsequently endorsed it to then incoming President Joseph E. Estrada. Owing to
the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the closure
of the San Mateo landfill. GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to
pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as reasons therefore the passage of
Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999, the non-
availability of the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees. JANCOM filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City to declare the
GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of MMDA calling for the bids for and
authorizing the forging of a new contract for the Metro Manila waste management
as illegal, unconstitutional and void, and to enjoin them from implementing the
Resolution and making another award. The trial court ruled in favor of JANCOM
which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court
declared the contract valid and perfected, albeit ineffective pending the approval
by the President. JANCOM and MMDA later entered into negotiations to modify
certain provisions of the contract which were embodied in a draft Amended
Agreement which bore no signature of the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not contract is ineffective and not implementable until and

unless it is approved by the President

HELD:

The only question before the Court is whether or not there is a valid and
perfected contract between the parties. As to necessity, expediency, and wisdom of
the contract, these are outside the realm of judicial adjudication. These
considerations are primarily and exclusively a matter for the President to decide.\

While the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is a matter of grave
public concern, it can only declare that the contract in question is a valid and
perfected one between the parties, but the same is still ineffective until and unless
it is approved by the President, the contract itself providing that such approval by
the President is necessary for its effectivity.

(16) Henares vs. LTFRB and LTO G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding

respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public
utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the petitioners have legal personality to bring the petition

(2) Whether the mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use
CNG as alternative fuel?

RULING:

(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their
case before this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this
Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's
discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush
aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance
to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e.,
a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is
unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically
enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus
will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for
the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific
statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein
petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
 (17) Salalima vs. ECC and SSS G.R. No. 146360 May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner’s husband, Juancho Salalima, was employed as a route helper and

subsequently as route salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca-Cola Bottlers
Phils., Inc. In 1989, Juancho was diagnosed with minimal pulmonary tuberculosis.
In February 1995, he was found to be suffering from pneumonia. After he died, a
claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626 as amended was filed by his
surviving wife, Azucena, petitioner herein, with the SSS. The claim was denied on
the ground that cancer of the lungs had no causal relationship with Juancho’s job
as a route salesman. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The ECC
affirmed the decision of the SSS. The ECC argued that lung cancer is not an
occupational disease nor is the risk of contracting lung cancer increased by
Juancho’s working conditions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s claim should be allowed

HELD:

Yes. Under the present law, Adenocarcinoma of the lungs which was the
immediate cause of Juancho’s death as stated in his death certificate, while listed
as an occupational disease, is compensable only among vinyl chloride workers and
plastic workers. This, however, would not automatically bar petitioner’s claim for
as long as she could prove that Juancho’s risk of contracting the disease was
increased by the latter’s working conditions. The degree of proof required under
P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means, “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” What the
law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.
Juancho’s job required long hours on the streets as well as his carrying of cases of
soft drinks during sales calls.

The combination of fatigue and the pollutants that abound in his work
environment verily contributed to the worsening of his already weak respiratory
system. His continuous exposure to these factors may have led to the development
of his cancer of the lungs.
(18) SJS vs. Atienza G.R. No. 156052 February 13, 2008 - First Division

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila

reclassified the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among
the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil
companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered
into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they
agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to remove 28
tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of
safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange,
the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate
within the limited area resulting from joint operations and the scale down program.
The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.

Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to

enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of
the oil companies.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

HELD:

Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 because the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as
city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by
the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform

their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to
be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional.
 (19) Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through

Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the
said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fish pens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The

municipalities in the Laguna flake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the
newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or
the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA
prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a
special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction
that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed
to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police

power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as
opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to
issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over
the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
 (20) Hizon vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119619 December 3, 1996

FACTS:

In September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime

Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan received reports of illegal fishing
operations in the coastal waters of the city. In response to these reports, the city
mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection and
apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing.

On September 30, 1992, the Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP
Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by "muro
ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police,
headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members of the Task Force Bantay Dagat,
headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the area and found
several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B
Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city.

They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the
acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their inspection,
the police saw two foreigners in the captain's deck. SP03 Enriquez examined their
passports and found them to be mere photocopies. The police also discovered a
large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one
ton at the bottom of the boat. They checked the license of the boat and its
fishermen and found them to be in order.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners were guilty of illegal fishing and the use of
poisonous substances as defined under section 33 of the Republic Act 704.

HELD:

The petitioners were acquitted. We cannot overlook the fact that the
apprehending officers found in the boat assorted hooks and lines for catching
fish. For this obvious reason, the Inspection/Apprehension Report prepared by the
apprehending officers immediately after the search did not charge petitioners with
illegal fishing, much less illegal fishing with the use of poison or any obnoxious
substance.

The only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of
the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. Under the circumstances of
the case, however, this finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the
fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with the
use of sodium cyanide.
The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of
illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It
was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious
circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of
poisonous substances.

(21) Navarro vs. IAC G.R. No. 681166 December 12, 1997

FACTS:

Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land registration case. The story
begins on 1946 upon his desire to register land on the northern section of his
existing property. His current registered property is bounded on the east by Talisay
River, on the West by Bulacan River and on the North by the Manila bay. Both
rivers flow towards the Manila Bay. Because of constantly flowing water, extra
land of about 17hectares (that’s about the size of Disney Park!) formed in the
northern most section of the property. It is this property he sought to register.

The RTC denied the registration claiming this to be foreshore land and part
of public domain (remember, accretion formedby the sea is public dominion). His
Motion for Reconsideration likewise burned. In 1960, he attempted registry again,
claiming that the Talisay and Bulacan rivers deposited more silt resulting on
accretion. He claimed this land as riprarian owner. The Director of Lands, Director
of Forestry and the Fiscal opposed.

Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into the fray
opposing the same application, stating the he leased part of the property sought to
be registered. He sought to protect his fishpond that rested on the same property.
Sinforoso was not amused and filed ejectment against Mr. Navarro, claiming that
Navarro used stealth force and strategy to occupy a portion of his land. Pascual lost
the case against Navarro so he appealed. During the appeal, his original land
registration case was consolidated and tried jointly. (alas Pascual died) The heirs of
Pascual took over the case.

On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore land and
therefore part of public domain. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pascual for
ejectment against Navarro and also denied his land registration request. Pascual’s
heirs appealed and the RTC was reversed by the IAC. The Apellate court granted
petition for registration! The reason? The accretion was caused by the two rivers,
not manila bay. Hence it wasn’t foreshore land. (BUT the confusion lies in the fact
that the accretion formed adjacent to Manila Bay… which is sea!) Aggrieved, the
Director of Forestry moved for reconsideration (Government insists it is foreshore
and hence, public domain). The Apellate court denied all motions of the Director
and the Government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accretion taking place on property adjacent to the sea can
be registered under the Torrens system
HELD:

It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed ownership

under Article 457 of the Civil Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an
accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers Art 457:
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and
(3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.

Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is

misplaced. If there’s any land to be claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to the
rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the
river bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of land on the
property adjacent to Manila Bay.

Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land and
the applicable law is not Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
This law, while old, holds that accretion along sea shore cannot be registered as it
remains public domain unless abandoned by government for public use and
declared as private property capable of alienation.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action
of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the
waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government
shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto
and as increment thereof.

The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set aside. Registration
cannot be allowed.
 (22) People of the Philippines vs. Vergara, G.R. No. 110286 April 2, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner in this case was charge for the violation of section 68 of PD 705 as
amended by EO No. 277. Accordingly, petitioners had in their possession and
custody of 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board
on two passenger jeeps with a value of 14,000 pesos.

The petitioner questioned the charge of illegal possession of lumber and that
it is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of timber as defined in section
68 of PD 705 as amended to warrant the quashing of information charging the
former offenses on a non-existence crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner violated PD 705

HELD:

The petitioner is devoid of merit. A law should not be so construed as to

allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law nor so interpreted as to afford
an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create inconsistency or
contravene the plain words of the law. The phrase forest products are broad enough
to encompass lumber which is manufactured timber.
 (23) MMDA Vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

FACTS:

The Supreme Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering

petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different
capacities.

The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate
the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in
accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase.

In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended

that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the recommendation by the Committee is an encroachment

over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of
the Philippines

HELD:

The petition is denied due to lack of merit in reference to Constitutional Law

on Adjudicative function.

The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of

judicial power of the constitution because the execution of the Decision is but an
integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court.

While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of

plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the
execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.