CASE DIGESTS

Submitted By: Marie Vera Christine Leung

[NATRES] NATURAL RESOURCES and ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Class 2 Section C
Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada

(1) Filinvest vs. IAC GR. No. 65935

(2) LLDA vs. CA G.R. No 110120
(3) Magabanua vs. IAC G.R. Nos. 66870-72
(4) Oposa vs. Factoran G.R. No. 101083
(5) Rodriguez s. IAC G.R. No 74816
(6) Technology Developers, Inc. vs CA G.R. No. 94759
(7) Hernandez vs. NPC G.R. No 145328
(8) Legaspi vs CSC G.R. No 72119
 (1) FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT AND NESTOR B. SUÑGA, JR GR. No. 65935

Facts of the Case:

Nestor Sunga is the owner of the NBS Machinersis Marketing and the NAP-
NAP transit who alleged purchased a Mazda minibus in Pangasinan on March 21,
1978.

On October 21, 1978 the minibus was seized by Filinvest Credit Corporation
under the order of their branch manager Gaspar De los Santos for unpaid balance
for the past due on the mortgage. The minibus was return when Nestor settled the
payment.

Sunga filed a case for damages on the case at hand and RTC gave moral
damages to Sunga amounting to Php30,000. The Filinvest Corporation appealed
but Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and increased the moral
damages to Php50,000.

The Filinvest Credit Corporation submitted a civil action for certiorari to

declare the nullity of the decision and resolution on September and December 1983
of the Court of Appeals which the respondents said the it was allegedly issued with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or in excess of
jurisdiction, and that the court denied due of process of law.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion and the Court of
Appeals has the power to increase moral damages

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that there was a grave abuse of power since it
increased the award for moral damages and that the courts involved lack
jurisdiction in the increase of the moral damages.

The court granted the petition of Filinvest Corporation and reduced the
damages to Php10,000 and eliminated the litigation expenses.
 (2) LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, PRESIDING JUDGE G.R.
No 110120

Facts of the Case:

The Laguna Lake Development (LLD) submitted an order of cease and

desists to stop the operation of a 8.6 hectares open garbage dumpsite in Caloocan
City due to its harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the residents and
possible pollution in the waters.

The LLD was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy
towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces and towns.

Issue:

Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to order cease and desist of the
operation and whether they are quasi-judicial agency

Held:

Under RA 4850, The LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue

permits for the use of all surface water for any projects and activities affecting the
region. While under RA 7160 granted the municipalities the exclusive authority to
grant privileges on municipal waters. Supreme Court ruled that the provisions of
RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the law creating the LLDA and granting the
latter wafer rights over the Laguna De Bay.

When there is a conflict between the genera law and special statue, the latter
should prevail since its legislative intent is clearer than the general status (RA
7160).

The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-

judicial body in respect to pollutioncases with authority to issue a “cease and desist
order” and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fish pens, fish cages and other
aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.

The Supreme Court held that the LLDA has the authority to order cease and
desist of the open garbage operation.
 (3) AGAPITO MAGBANUA, INENIAS MARTIZANO, CARLITO
HERRERA, SR., PAQUITO LOPEZ, AND FRANCISCO HERRERA
vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. Nos. 66870-72

Facts of the Case:

The farmers had filed a petition indicating that they are shared tenants of the
private respondents owners of the land divert the flow of water from their farm lots
which caused the drying up of their landholdings and asked to vacate their areas
for they could not plant their rice fields or ‘palay’ due to lack of water.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor to the petitioners and ordered the
defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages. The defendants appealed to the
IAC which they affirmed the appeal by deleting the award of moral and exemplary
damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon the reinstatement of the IAC, the
trial court did not agree to the appellate court in its decision because the former
believe that as shared tenants, they are entitled to be maintained as agricultural
lessees in peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings.

Issue:

Whether or not the tenants of defendants were entitled to moral and

exemplary damages

Held:

The petition was granted and the decision under review is modified and each
of the plaintiffs is entitled to receive award of moral and exemplary damages by
the defendants.

Under the law, the landowners have an obligation to keep the tenant in the
peaceful and continuous cultivation of his landholding. In this case, it shows that
the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make
them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiff’s rights and
caused prejudiced to the latter by the diversion of water. Under Article 2219 (10),
the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article
21 of the same Code which provides, Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The defendants acted in an
oppressive manner which is contrary to the morals of the petitioners and therefore,
they are liable for the compensation to the latter.
 (4) OPOSA vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR
G.R. No. 101083

Facts of the Case:

Juan Antonio Oposa and other filed a class suit representing their generation
represented by their parents against the Secretary of DENR, Factoran. They plead
to cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country and
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising
new TLAs

The minors alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology. They also claim that the act of the defendant in
allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

In their defense, the minors have no cause of action against him and the
issue raised is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action in their case to prevent
impairment of Philippine rainforests?

Held:

The Supreme Court granted the petition and ruled that the petitioners and
other in their generations including the succeeding generations has the authority to
file a class suit.

The Supreme Court also discussed the principle of intergenerational

responsibility in connection to the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology. Every generation has the responsibility to the next generation to preserve
the natural resources and preserve the rhythm and harmony of the environment.
Their obligation is to ensure the protection of the rights of the generation to come.
 (5) ERNESTO R. RODRIGUEZ, JR., ERNESTO LL. RODRIGUEZ III,
SACHA DEL ROSARIO, JOSE P. GENITO, ZENAIDA Z.
RODRIGUEZ, AND ENECERIO MONDIA VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT AND DAYTONA CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No 74816

Facts of the Case:

The petitioners filed on December 16, 1980, an action for abatement of a

public nuisance with damages against Daytona Construction & Development
Corporation. After being granted four (4) extensions of time to file an answer,
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on February 27, 1981 upon the ground
that the lower court has no jurisdiction to hear the instant case and for lack of cause
of action. However, the motion was denied by the court on April 3, 1981, a copy
of which decision was received by the defendant on April 23, 1981. On May 5,
1981 defendant filed a motion for reconsideration which motion was denied on
July 7, 1981.

The court ordered the operation of the cement batching plant of the
defendant corporation as a nuisance and ordering its permanent closure and pay
nominal damages.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals denying the motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration is valid

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the decision and resolution on the Court of
Appeals and rendered that all nominal damages be eliminated. It is clear therefore
that petitioners' motion was based on good cause and was filed opportunely
making the act of respondent Court unwarranted in denying petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file its motion for reconsideration.
 (6) TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA AS PRESIDING JUDGE G.R. No.
94759

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner Technology Developer, Inc. sought to annul the Mayor’s order in

closing the petitioner’s Plant, assailing the latter’s power in denying the former a
mayor’s permit on the basis of environment violation.

Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request to produce the

required documents. It sought to secure the Region III-Pollution of Environment
and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit although prior to the operation of
theplant, a Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation was issued to it.
Petitioners also sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure a
mayor’s permit but were not entertained.

Issue:

Whether or not the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the
stoppage of Technology Developers

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mayor had a legal ground. The lower
courts were right in upholding the mayor’s order, reasoning that although the
NPCC of the Ministry of human Settlements (now Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) has the task to
determine the existence of pollution and violations of environmental laws, the
mayor by virtue of his police power has as much responsibility to protect its
constituents from the same and regulate the operation of establishments which pose
relative threat to the community.

The Court, in considering the evidence presented, upheld the respondent,

stressing the importance of the general welfare of the community over and above
the potential economic return of investment but is detrimental to many.
 (7) HERNANDEZ vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION G.R. No
145328

Facts of the Case:

NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or

towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high tension cables in
connection with its Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes...
through the Sergio Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of
Fort Bonifacio, and Dasmariñas Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where
petitioners' homes are.
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the
internet on the possible adverse effects that such a structure could cause to their
health and well-being. Petitioners got hold of published articles and studies linking
the incidence of a fecund of... illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields.
These illnesses range from cancer to leukemia.
Issue:

Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the towers being
built by the NAPOCOR

Held:

Supreme Court held that the court does not have authority to issue a
temporary restraining order. Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16
January 1981, prohibiting judges from issuing restraining orders against
government infrastructure projects. In part, the decree says, "No court in the
Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary...
injunction or preliminary order, preliminary mandatory injunction in any case,
dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project." Realizing the
importance of this decree, this Tribunal had issued different circulars to implement
this particular law.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions
against government infrastructure projects. Presidential Decree No. 1818 was also
held to prohibit courts from issuing an injunction against any infrastructure project
in order not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential government projects or
frustrate the economic development effort of the nation.
 (8) VALENTIN L. LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No 72119

Facts of the Case:

The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedlyrepresented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and

Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said
information.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner has legal ground to bring the suit

Held:

The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public
right. It has been held in a case that when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people
are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation
the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws.

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the

assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the
mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public
which possesses the right.

The Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for
the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas for said position in the Health Department
of Cebu City.