Ty v. CA, GR 127406, Nov.

27, 2000
ISSUE WON the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly.
FACTS
Edgardo M. Reyes had a previous wedding to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva which was declared null and void ab
initio for lack of a valid marriage license on on August 4, 1980.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty on
April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church
wedding in Makati, Metro Manila. Ty and Reyes had children during this marriage.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying
that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got
married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria.
Ofelia P. Ty pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted
their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued a Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exhs. 11, 12 and 12-A. Ty claimed that
People v. Mendoza and People v. Aragon are applicable in this case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void
from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity.However, the appellate court said these
cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code amended by E.O. No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is
now needed as provided by Article 40 of the family code.
RULINGS Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage— Art. 40. The absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Article 256 of the same code also provides that the code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the civil code or other laws.
The two marriages contracted by Edgardo Reyes was solemnized before the Family code. The Civil Code which was
operational during the celebration of their marriage contains no provision as to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage is necessary.
The provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice
the vested rights of Ofelia Ty and of her children.
Hence, the second marraige to Ofelia Ty is valid.
DOCTRINE Husband and Wife; Bigamy; Where the second marriage of a person was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel v. Sempio
Diy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986), during which time the prevailing rule was found in Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977),
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954) and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957), there was no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before such person may contract a second marriage A
recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife
charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage
was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first
marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children
thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time. Similarly, in the present
case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule
was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case,
therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied where to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of a party and of her children.—We find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As
held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights.

Marriage Licenses; That a marriage license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from
the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for the latter rites served not only to
ratify but also to fortify the first.—In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s finding that despite private
respondent’s “deceit and perfidy“ in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the issue.
Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the
marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly.
Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage
license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in
both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner
contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage
on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such
failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the
interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In
our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage,
including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the
celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same
parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court
might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the
defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by
her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the
wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls “his own deceit and perfidy.”
Villanueva v. CA, GR 84464, June 21, 1991
ISSUE Whether or not the marriage contract is a valid proof that Catalina Sanchez is the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez to
merit her to validly file the complaint for the recovery of her late husband’s property.
FACTS Catalina Sanchez, claiming to be the widow of Roberto Sanchez, averred that her husband was the owner of a 275 sq.
meter parcel of land located at Rosario, Cavite, which was registered without her knowledge in the name of the herein
petitioners on the strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their favor by her late husband on February 7, 1968.

Catalina Sanchez submitted her marriage license dated September 21, 1964.

On the other hand, the Torrens certificate issued to Roberto Sanchez over the subject land on August 25, 1965, described
his civil status as “single.”

Spouses Villanueva questioned the personality of the private respondent to file the complaint, contending that the late
Roberto Sanchez was never married but had a commonlaw wife by whom he had two children.
RULINGS The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. A marriage contract renders
unnecessary the presumption that “a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage”
Catalina Sanchez has proved her status as the widow of Roberto Sanchez with her submission of the marriage
contract denominated as Exhibit “A.” That evidence rendered unnecessary the presumption that “a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage” and may also explain why
Roberto Sanchez could not marry the woman by whom he supposedly had two illegitimate children, assuming these
persons did exist. It is strange that the trial court should reject Exhibit “A” in favor of the Transfer Certificate of Title
describing Roberto Sanchez as “single,” disregarding the elementary principle that the best documentary evidence of a
marriage is the marriage contract itself. A Torrens certificate is the best evidence of ownership of registered land, not of the
civil status of the owner.
Hence, Catalina has proved that she is the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez and she could validly file the
complaint for the recovery of her late husband’s property, without prejudice to the successional rights of his other heirs.

DOCTRINE Civil Law; Evidence; Marriage Contract; Presumption; A marriage contract renders unnecessary the presumption that “a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage”; The best
documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself.––The Court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez
has proved her status as the widow of Roberto Sanchez with her submission of the marriage contract denominated as
Exhibit “A.” That evidence rendered unnecessary the presumption that “a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage” and may also explain why Roberto Sanchez could not
marry the woman by whom he supposedly had two illegitimate children, assuming these persons did exist. It is strange that
the trial court should reject Exhibit “A” in favor of the Transfer Certificate of Title describing Roberto Sanchez as “single,”
disregarding the elementary principle that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. A
Torrens certificate is the best evidence of ownership of registered land, not of the civil status of the owner.

Private respondent could validly file the complaint for the recovery of her late husband’s property without prejudice to the
successional rights of his other heirs.––As the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez, the private respondent could validly
file the complaint for the recovery of her late husband’s property, without prejudice to the successional rights of his other
heirs. Parenthetically, (and curiously), although the supposed common-law wife and her illegitimate children were never
presented at the trial, their existence was readily accepted by the trial court on the basis alone of the petitioner’s
unsupported statements.
Vda. De Jacob v. CA, GR 135216, Aug. 19, 1999
ISSUE WON the marriage license is required for the validity of the marriage between Tomasa and Dr. Jacob.
WON the fact of marriage may be proved by secondary evidence other than the marriage contract
FACTS Tomasa Vda De Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed
Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself
and the deceased.
The marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila
sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original
document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa
presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
Pedro Pilapil claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo Jacob. He contends that the marriage between Dr.
Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.

Tomasa on the other hand has established that prior to their marriage, she and Doctor Jacob have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit of this effect was executed by the contracting Parties.
She was also able to present the following secondary evidence in addition to the reconstructed marriage license;
(1) testimonies of Tomasa, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana
(2) photographs of the wedding ceremony; documentary evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that
he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had
not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the
subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop–through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino
ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of
Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.

RULINGS It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses.– Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its
contents. the execution of a document may beproven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who
saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof. The Court has also held that “[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or
by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument
[has] indeed [been] lost.
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and
the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner’s own declaration in court. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by
the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
 Failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does no invalidate the marriage. In the second
place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to th civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell
upon the solemnizing officer.

DOCTRINE
Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage. (n)

Best and Secondary Evidence; Authentication and Proof of Evidence; Public and Private Documents; If the original
writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or recital of itscontents in some authentic document, or by recollection
of witnesses.–“It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof
of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses.– Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its
contents.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have
previously narrated the execution thereof.– Truly, the execution of a document may beproven by the parties themselves, by
the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the
parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that “[t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination
in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody
the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy
the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.–

Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the
evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.–In
the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage
ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the
affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner’s own declaration in court. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by
the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificates; Failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not
invalidate the marriage.–Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the
Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO). He finds it
quite “bizarre– for petitioner to have waited three years before registering their marriage. On both counts, he proceeds
from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does no
invalidate the marriage. In the second place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to th
civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.
Republic v. CA, GR 103047, Sept. 2, 1994
ISSUE WON the certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar sufficiently proves the absence of a
marriage license
FACTS On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents.
Edwin Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no.
3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple had a child but eventually parted ways. Angelina wanted to to put in order her marital status before
leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her
marriage. Through her lawyer’s efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.

As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
“February 20, 1987
“TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly
married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license no. 3196182
allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not
appear from our records. Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer”

RULINGS
DOCTRINE Absence of a marriage license renders the marriage void ab initio.—At the time the subject marriage was solemnized
on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.

Same; Evidence; Civil Registrars; The certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar
enjoys probative value and sufficiently proves that his office did not issue a particular marriage license.—The above Rule
authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his
office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter
all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data. The certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of “due search and inability to find” sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to
the contracting parties.
Villanueva v. CA, GR 84464, June 21, 1991
ISSUE
FACTS
RULINGS
DOCTRINE