G.R. No.
164007 August 10, 2006 The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO,
LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO,
LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT.
NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS.
ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT.
JONNEL SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and B. GEN.
MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the
Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate
General’s Office (JAGO), Respondents.
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for
a temporary restraining order) filed by the above-named
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein
petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge
Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received
intelligence reports that some members of the AFP, with
high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places
of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government.
The President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily
armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP – mostly from
the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s
Special Warfare Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood
Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They
disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices
around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported
red armbands emblazoned with the emblem of
the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then,
through broadcast media, announced their grievances against
the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such
as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of
arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and the
bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military
assistance from the US government. They declared their
withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and
demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They
also called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the
top brass of the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion, followed by
General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all
necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place
in Makati City. She then called the soldiers to surrender their
weapons at five o’clock in the afternoon of that same day.
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent
negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. The aim was to
persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After
several hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded
in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the
explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood
Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered
to the authorities.
incident and recommended that the military personnel involved
be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article
134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003,
the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
recommended the filing of the corresponding Information
against them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the
Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP
Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers
involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to
conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Makati City an Information for coup d’etat 2against those
soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually
raffled off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F.
Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case was consolidated with Criminal
Case No. 03-2678, involving the other accused, pending before
Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B.
Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a
reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order
No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to
determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal
charges for violations of the Articles of War under
Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended, against the same
military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of
Article 63 for disrespect toward the President, the Secretary of
National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for disrespect
toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or
sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for
conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only
243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch
148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume
jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal.
They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5
On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge
Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the
suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have
resolved their motion to assume jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel
submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff
recommending that the military personnel involved in the
Oakwood incident be charged before a general court martial
with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles
of War.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a
reinvestigation, found probable cause against only 31
(petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No.
03-2784. Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an
Amended Information. 6
In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the
Amended Information and dropped the charge of coup
d’etat against the 290 accused.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation
Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the
"doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d’etatbefore
the RTCshould not be charged before the military tribunal for
violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an
Order 8 stating that "all charges before the court martial against
the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but
rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup
d’etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners’
applications for bail.
In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as
officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the
Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the
officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners,
be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of
Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of
the Articles of War.
On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was
approved by the AFP top brass. The AFP Judge Advocate
General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the
charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the
instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be
ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96
of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 9
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a
determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense
for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but
is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the military tribunal
cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters
that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which offenses covered by the
Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of
Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that
violations of these Articles are properly cognizable by the court
martial. As the charge against petitioners is violation of Article
96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected offense,
then it falls under the jurisdiction of the court martial.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental
Petition raising the additional issue that the offense charged
before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners
alleged therein that during the pendency of their original
petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation
for purposes of charging them with violation of Article 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then
referred the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two
years since the Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only
petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and this was
done under questionable circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing
of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of
the case on the ground that they were not arraigned within the
prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the
commission of the alleged offense, in violation of Article 38 of
the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on
July 25, 2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial ruled, however,
that "the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight of
July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was
approaching and it was becoming apparent that the accused
could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its
position and asserted that 23 of the accused have already been
arraigned;" 14 and that petitioners moved for a reconsideration
but it was denied by the general court martial in its Order dated
September 14, 2005. 15
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the
Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of merit. He alleges
that "contrary to petitioners’ pretensions, all the accused were
duly arraigned on July 13 and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show
that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused were
present" and, "(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen
Ong Jags read the Charges and Specifications from the Charge
Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners
are entitled to the writ of prohibition.
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP,
are subject to military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as
the Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to refer to a
commissioned officer." Article 2 provides:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. – The following persons
are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included
in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons
subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine
Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates
of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all
trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons
lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training
in the said service, from the dates they are required by the
terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
other persons subject to military law, including members of the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes
or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other
special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless
of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended
parties, which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried
by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as
determined before arraignment by the civil court, is
service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by
court-martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines
may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses
shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72
to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the
court-martial may take into consideration the penalty
prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special
laws, or local government ordinances.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and
unambiguous. First, it lays down the general rule that members
of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who
commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal
Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it
provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil
court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be
service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a
court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the
exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the
interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such
crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies
the "service-connected crimes or offenses" as "limited to
those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these
specified Articles are triable by court martial. This delineates
the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court martial
over crimes or offenses committed by military personnel.
Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to
preserve the peculiar nature of military justice system over
military personnel charged with service-connected offenses.
The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at
achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the
highest degree of military efficiency. 18 Military law is
established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but
also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time
of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public
peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military
body. 19 The administration of military justice has been
universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in
almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military
law and its administration as the most effective means of
enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has
become invariably an indispensable part of any organized
armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing
discipline both in peace and in war. 20
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War
before the court martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003
at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro Manila, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as
officers to defend the Constitution, the law and the
duly-constituted authorities and abused their
constitutional duty to protect the people and the
State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent
duly-elected and legitimate President by force and violence,
seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people and
the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby causing
dishonor and disrespect to the military profession,
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in
violation of AW 96 of the Articles of War.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)
Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any
officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or
probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed
from the service. (Underscoring ours)
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles
of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in
Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears
stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the
alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to
defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge
has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as
military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected"
nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same
– dismissal from the service – imposable only by the
military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character,
evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits
and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they
can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation
of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been
declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not
service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of
the alleged crime of coup d’etat," hence, triable by said court
(RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically
amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the
jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What
the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only
the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the
court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature
of an action which can do so. 22 And it is only through a
constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act
can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is
merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to
be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and is, therefore, void.
24
In Navales v. Abaya., this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration
made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its
Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the
court-martial against the accused were not service-connected,
but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat,
cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made
without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.
The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly specifies what are
considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, also known as the
Articles of War, to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned
Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Articles 72 to 92:
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.–Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military
courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not
divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving
violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95
to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered
"service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates
that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T.
Carpio during the deliberation of this case is worth quoting,
thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by
holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged
crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of
crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to
crimes punished by the same statute, 25unlike here where
different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies
only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here,
Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over
service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles
of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not
applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184
[1975]), applicable only to military personnel because the
military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of
discipline separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry
high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to
civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military
organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected
to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed
civilians or unarmed government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by
his superior may question his reassignment by asking a
temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court.
However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a
restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him
to another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military
discipline will collapse.
xxx
This Court has recognized that courts-martial are
instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and
discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil.
875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, 2nd
edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the
disciplinary system that ensures the President’s control, and
thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this
disciplinary system is the President who exercises review
powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the
Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted).
xxx
While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or
similar proceedings, it did so sparingly and only to release a
military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons,
80 Phil. 401 [1948] or to correct objectionable procedures
(Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never
suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground that the
offense charged ‘is absorbed and in furtherance of’ another
criminal charge pending with the civil courts. The Court may
now do so only if the offense charged is not one of the
service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055.
Such is not the situation in the present case.
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in
their Supplemental Petition, suffice it to say that we cannot
entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads
as to (a) who among the petitioners were actually arraigned,
and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are matters
involving questions of fact, not within our power of review, as
we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as
the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the
tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis
of the undisputed facts. 26
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office
of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise
of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27 Stated
differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts,
corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by
law. 28
In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the
authority in convening a court martial and in charging
petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE
VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason
on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty
to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to
counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence
only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he
did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant
was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and
was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements
do not coincide on any single detail. Juanito Albano, the first
witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other
Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American
aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a
sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked
behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster
than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai
headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to
the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one
day in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an American
and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions.
The last witness stated that the American was walking as well
as his captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see
Juanito Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a drink
of tuba together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The
two witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the
whole overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off.
Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of treason complexed by murder
and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances
mentioned above." Apparently, the court has regarded the
murders and physical injuries charged in the information, not
only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the decision
except as to technical designation of the crime. In his opinion,
the offense committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of
treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a
member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as
undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of
giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese
soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for
the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and locating their
hideouts; that said accused and his companions did
apprehended Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind him and give
him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the
accused and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu,
where he was severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his
shoulders, legs and back and from there he was sent back to
the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7
days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as
an informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police, with the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy, did, the, and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a group of Filipino
undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and
guerrilla suspects; that the herein accused and his companions
did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce from
their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the
hands of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their
backs, giving them first blows on the face and in other parts of
the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai
Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following
day while his brother was detained and thereafter nothing more
was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the
Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, for the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy and her military forces, said accused acting as an
enemy undercover did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a
patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio
Pakna-an, municipality of Mandaue for the purpose of
apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol
did in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and
Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and
detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and
Santiago Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home
and the accused did bayonet them to death;
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy
with the enemy and other Filipinos undercovers, said accused
did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco
for guerrilla activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in
these counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are
not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine
treason law and under the United States constitution defining
treason, after which the former was patterned, there must
concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and
comfort. One without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only
be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature
partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental
operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under
another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is
charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the
latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase
the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.
Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot
be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a
prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force
and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder
as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense
where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient
of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude the
punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the
government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for
those crimes instead on relying on them as an element of
treason. it is where murder or physical injuries are charged as
overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded separately
under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries
were carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance.
Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims
instead of the usual and less painful method of execution will be
taken into account to increase the penalty under the provision
of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since
they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended
parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal
objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true that the
accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has
not be substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.
In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the
judgment because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another
attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation
of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial)
that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons."
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in
favor of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the
trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not
denied the right to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.)
It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has been
observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary.
(U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney
appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense
expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the
present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the
defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this
presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below
did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to
protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the
present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin
did his best, although it was not the best of a willing worker."
We do not discern in the record any indication that the former
counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. if
Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as
the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments
did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not
imperil the rights of the appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and
guilty of treason as charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being
an aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed
is reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be
modified in this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the
same will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this
instance against the appellant.
CRAMER v. UNITED STATES 325 U.S. 1 (1945)
On the night of June 12, 1942, several specially trained
saboteurs were put ashore from a German submarine near
Amagansett, New York, with orders to disperse throughout
the United States and to sabotage the American war effort.
Anthony Cramer, a naturalized American citizen of German
background, befriended two of the saboteurs, met with them,
and was suspected of assisting them in their mission. However,
the only overt acts to which two witnesses could testify were
two meetings between Cramer and one of the saboteurs, who
was an old friend of Cramer's. The prosecution was unable to
produce the testimony of two witnesses concerning what took
place at the meetings or to establish that Cramer gave
information, encouragement, shelter, or supplies to the
saboteurs. Cramer was tried for and convicted of treason, and
he appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court.
The Cramer case marked the first time that the Supreme Court
passed on the meaning of the treason clause of Article III,
section 2, of the Constitution. Justice robert h. jackson, for a 5–
4 Court, held that the overt acts testified to by two witnesses
must be sufficient, in their setting, to sustain a finding that
actual aid and comfort was given to an enemy of the United
States. Although there was other evidence of Cramer's Nazi
sympathies and of his assistance to the saboteur, the overt
acts—the meetings—were not in themselves treasonable, and
the conviction could not stand.
G.R. No. L-456 March 29, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CUCUFATE ADLAWAN, defendant-appellant.
C. de la Victoria & Ramon Duterte and Sotto & Sotto for
appellant.
First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B.L. Reyes and Solicitor
Jose B. Jimenez for appellee.
REYES, J.:
We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death
and a fine of P20,000 imposed by the People's Court upon the
appellants who was charged with treason but convicted of what
the said court terms "complex crime of crime of treason with
murder robbery and rape."
The convicted is based on defendants plea of guilty to a
complaint which as amended contains the following counts:
1. That on or about and during the period comprised between
March 1943 and May 3, 1945 in the city of Cebu. Philippines and
within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate
Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its
Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he
did give aid and comfort to said enemy did then and there
wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join and become
a member of the so-called Philippines Constabulary, an
enemy-sponsored military organization knowing fully well that
the aims and purposes of said organization are among other to
extend every aid and cooperation with said enemy in the
prosecution of her war efforts against the United States of
America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines and during
the period aforesaid as a member of said enemy-sponsored
Philippines Constabulary the said accused further adhering to
the enemy with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and
comfort to them did go out on numerous patrol in company with
Japanese soldier in search of guerrilla and other elements and
other elements resisting said enemy in the Philippines.
2. That on our about and during the period comprised between
December 1, 1943 and May 3, 1945, and the City of Cebu
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan
and the Imperial Forces with treasonable to give as he did give
aid and comfort to said enemy in violation of his allegiance and
fidelity to the United States of America and the Commonwealth
of the Philippines did then and there willfully unlawfully
feloniously and treasonably join the Japanese Military Police
otherwise known as the Kempei-tai under the command of a T.
Yushida, performing the function and duties of an informer spy
and chief undercover man of the Cebu district of said military
police and did during the period aforesaid in various places in
the Province of Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Court in furtherance of his adherence to said enemy with
treasonable intent to give as he did give and comfort aid and
comfort to them did in company with other member of the
Japanese Military Police go out on patrols to apprehend guerrilla
as they did apprehend capture and torture guerrillas loot
civilians and otherwise commit acts of atrocities in furtherance
of the hostile design of the enemy and to weaken the cause of
the United States of America in the Philippines.
3. That sometime in June 1944 in various places in the Province
of Bohol Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the
accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of
Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent
to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in his
capacity as a member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary
attached to the Japanese Military Police and a guide of the
Japanese Army Jointly and in cooperation with soldier of the
Japanese Imperial Army did then and there wilfully unlawfully
feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a so-called
mopping up operation for the purpose of suppressing guerrillas
and other element engaged in resistance against said enemy
and as a result thereof ten guerrillas were killed.
4. That on or about during the period comprised between
September 1944 and November 1944 in the City of Cebu
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan
and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to
give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy did then and
there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably help in the
a construction of air raid shelters for the protection of Japanese
soldier against allied air raids and did help in the acquisition of
as he did acquire food supplies for the enemy in preparation
against the expected landing of America forces.
5. That on or about August 18, 1944 in the municipality of
Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines the accused Cucufate
Adlawan adhering the enemy the Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he
did aid and comfort to the said enemy in company with
Japanese Military soldier of the Japanese Military Police and
other Filipino enemy spies did then and there wilfully unlawfully
feloniously and treasonably arrest maltreat and otherwise
torture Primitivo Cansancio in an effort to force the latter to
disclose the whereabouts of Lt. Antonio Karedo a guerrilla
officer to cause said Primitivo Cansancio to confess his guerrilla
activities.
6. That on or about December 7, 1944 in the municipality of
Minglanilla Province of Cebu Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court Empire of Japan and the Imperial
Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give
aid and comfort to said enemy in company with a patrol of
Japanese soldier s of the Japanese Military Police and other
enemy spices and informers did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest
Francisco Larrobia and did kick said Francisco Larrobia strike
him on the face and head with a pistol and subsequently
bayoneting and killing said Francisco Larrobia on the suspicion
that he was a guerrilla.
7. That on or about September 6, 1944 in the municipality of
Talisay province of Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction
of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the
enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces
with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to
the said enemy in his capacity as chief undercover man for the
Japanese Military Police Cebu District in company with Japanese
soldier and Santiago Bernaba another Japanese spy did then
and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest
Numariano Bellesa on suspicion of being a guerrilla thereafter
taking said Numeriano Bellesa to Inayawan Cebu City and
thereat herein accused did investigate said Numeriano Bellesa
about the latter's firearms in order to help said enemy in
gathering up arms in gathering up arms in furtherance of their
hostile design and did strike said Numeriano Bellesa on the face
and body and otherwise maltreat him in the course of said
investigation.
8. That on or about August 18, 1944 in Sitio Tubod municipality
of Minglanilla Province of Cebu Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering
to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its imperial Forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover
man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu
District and in company with Japanese soldier of the Japanese
Military Police did then and there wilfully, feloniously and
treasonably apprehend and arrest Cipriano Trazona and did
investigate the latter as to the whereabouts of guerrillas
especially Nicolas Adlawan food procurement officer of the
guerrilla and upon his denial of knowledge of said whereabouts
herein accused did torture said Cipriano Trazona by hanging the
latter by the arms so that his body dangled down striking his
stomach and with an empty bottle inflicting wounds on his head
and finally striking his mouth with a flashlight splitting said
Cipriano Trazona's lower lips.
9. That on or about October 2, 1944 in the municipality of
Talisay Province of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction
of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the
enemy the Imperial Japanese Government and her armed
forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover
man informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military
Police Cebu District in company with other informers said
Military Police, did then and there apprehend and arrest Albina
Alpez and accused herein did wilfully and treasonably
investigate said Albina Alpez as to the whereabouts of her
husband Ponciano Alpez, a guerrilla, attached to the 2nd
Division Cebu Area Command and when said Albina Alpez
denied knowledge of her aforesaid husband's whereabouts
herein accused did slap kick and throw her to the ground hang
her by the arms strike her on the breast with his revolver
threaten her with a dagger pointed at her throat and otherwise
maltreat and torture said Albina Alpez.
10. That on or about December 25, 1944 in the municipality of
Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court the accused. Cucufate Adlawan
adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial of
Japan its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to
give as he did give aid and comfort said enemy in company with
five Japanese soldier and fourteen agent of the Japanese
Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-Tai and his
capacity Military Police for the Cebu District did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and
arrest Victoriano Primacio and one Juan Unadia on suspicion of
being guerrillas and said accused did box, beat slap and strike
said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia with his rifle several
times and did turn over said Victoriano Primacio and Juan
Unadia to the Japanese Military Police on the ground that said
person were guerrilla and as a result of which said Victoriano
Primacio and Juan Unadia have not been heard of ever since
then.
11. That on or about January 27, 1944 at sitio Tacba, Cebu City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan
and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give
as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy of the
Japanese Military Police Cebu District, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Lt.
Miguel Dacallos, a USAFFE officer, in furtherance of the hostile
designs of said enemy.
12. That on or about September 6, 1944, at sitio San Isidro,
municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
furtherance of his adherence to the enemy, the Empire of Japan
and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the
Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and inn company with
Japanese soldier, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest one Jose Murillo on suspicion
that the latter was a guerrilla.
13. That on or about November 13, 1944 in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused,
Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan
and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did and comfort to said enemy, did then and there,
wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest
Basilia Arong and did take the latter to headquarters of the
Japanese Military Police and thereat herein accused did
question and investigate said Basilia Arong as to the
whereabouts by the enemy of guerrilla activities, and when said
Basilia Arong denied knowledge of their whereabouts, herein
accused did said Basilia Arong by her arms, strip her of her
clothing, severely beat her and otherwise torture her, finally
forcing said Basilia Arong to sign a letter addressed to her
aforesaid husband, Pedro Arong asking the latter to report top
the Japanese Kempei-Tai headquarters and when said Pedro C.
Arong did report to said headquarters in compliance of said
letter, he not been seen ever since.
14. That on or about August 10, 1944, at Sitio Gapas, Gaps
Island, in the Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan,
adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable to give as he did give aid
comfort to, said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief
undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military
Police of Cebu District and in company with Japanese
Kempei-Tai informers and spies, did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Pedro
Cabanada and did question the latter as the whereabouts of
Alejandrino Ciriaco, a guerrilla Intelligence operative, and, in
the course of said investigation, the accused did hang said
Pedro Cabanada by his arms, strike him with clubs and an iron
pipe thereby inflicting several wounds on his head for the
latter's refusal to divulge said guerrilla whereabouts.
15. That on or about June 2, 1944, in sitio Basac, Mambaling, in
the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this
court the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy,
the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid comfort to said
enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer
and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police of the
Cebu District, in company with two Japanese soldiers and three
other Japanese informers and spies, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest
Marciano Alejandro, Carlos Numera and Jose Rada, killing said
Marciano Alejandro, and Carlos Numera, and wounding said
Jose Rada on the charge that said person had contact with
guerrillas.
16. That on or about October 8, 1943, in the municipality of Tisa,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy,
the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said
enemy, acting in his capacity as an informer and spy of said
enemy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably shoot and kill Bernardo Laborte, a guerrilla soldier
for the latter's guerrilla activities and resistance to said enemy.
17. That sometime in the month of April, 1944, in different
place in the Province of Cebu, Philippines, particularly in the
area comprised between Tubano and Minglanilla, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan,
adhering to the enemy, thee Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give
aid and comfort to said enemy, as member of the
enemy-sponsored constabulary and as informer and spy of the
Japanese Army, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonable join and take part in the general
mopping up operation conducted by the Japanese Army under
the command of Sergeant T. Yushida, particularly in the area of
Tubonok to Minglanilla for the Purpose of apprehending
guerrillas and other elements engaged in resisting said enemy.
18. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the municipality of
Cordoba, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan,
adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give
aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief
informer and spy under the employ of the Japanese Military
Police, Cebu District, in company with the member of said
Japanese Military Police under the command of Sergeant T.
Yushida of the Japanese Army, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest, maltreat and
torture Martin Francisco and did expose the latter's wife and
some Filipino girls naked, raping them, and, did steal and carry
away the following articles belonging to said Martin Francisco:
2 diamond rings, a ring and one wrist watch
P500 in Cebu Emergency and Currency Notes
P1,858 in Japanese Military Notes
3 pairs white pants
2 out shirts
2 pairs shoes
1 buntal hat
1 wedding ring
on suspicion that said Martin Francisco was a guerrilla.
19. That sometime in 1944, at sitio Cabadiangan, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the
accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire
of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces, with treasonable
intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy,
acting as an informer to the enemy and in company with
soldiers of the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a
raid for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and as a result
of which, Governor Hilario Abellana of Cebu then in hiding from
said enemy, was captured.
20. That on or about February 12, 1944, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused,
Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan
and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent give,
as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the
Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably beat and strike
Vicente Padilla with a baseball bat, hang said Vicente Padilla by
the arms, and otherwise torture him in an effort to extract
confession of the latter's connection with guerrillas.
21. That on or about July 19, 1944 at Cebu, City Philippines and
within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate
Adlawan, adhering to the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give
aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as chief informer and spy
of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, in company
with Japanese soldier and other agent of the Japanese Military
Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest
Bartolome Rosal, Antonio de la Serna, and Braulio Padilla and
did tie up the hands of said persons, severely inflicting wounds
on them, on suspicion of being guerrillas and as consequence of
said maltreatment and torture, Braulio Padilla died a few days
thereafter.
22. That on or about December 20, 1944, in the city of Cebu,
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused,
Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and
its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as
did give and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as
chief informer, spy and undercover man of the Japanese
Military Police of the Cebu District, did and there wilfully
unlawfully, feloniously arrest at the point of his gun, Paulita
Delgado and "John Doe" her husband, on suspicion that said
persons were cooperating and helping the guerrillas and did
thereafter bring said Paulita Delgado and her husband to the
Kempei-Tai headquarters and once thereat herein accused did
torture them by hanging them by their arms did otherwise
maltreat them.
23. That sometime in September, 1944, at Pasil Market, Cebu
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the
accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire
of Japan and Imperial Japanese Army, with treasonable intent
to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in
his capacity as member of the enemy-sponsored Philippines
Constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably kill
Dionisio Abatol, a guerrilla, for his activities and resistance to
the said enemy.
By his plea of guilty appellant admit having committed the
treasonous acts alleged in the information. But he now pleads
for modification of the sentence, contending that the lower
court erred:
1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating circumstances,
the following facts:(1) voluntary surrender; (2) the facts that
the accused has been and is being utilized as witness by the CIC
in cases against Japanese soldiers under trial by the military
commission; on and (3) the facts that the accused helped and
saved the lives of many civilian and from death in the hands of
the Japanese;
2. In making as a matter of set-off the plea of guilty entered by
the defendant-appellant on the strength of the assurance that
no death penalty would be imposed upon him;
3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances, treachery,
abuse of superiority and unnecessary cruelty;
4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused is a
complex crime of treason with murder, rape and robbery;
5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine of
P20,000.
Taking up first the fourth alleged error, we find merit in the
contention that appellant should not have been convicted of the
so-called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and
rape." The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the
information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as
mere elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is
being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the
general charge, they can not be used in combination with
treason to increase the penalty under article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,1 L-399, January 29, 1948.)
Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason only.
Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender has not been
satisfactorily proved. On the other hand, his admission that he
was "taken" from the house of his mother by an agent of the
CIC, is proof that he was in fact arrested. Where there has been
actual arrest the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
cannot be invoked (People vs. Conwi,2 40 Off. Gaz. [14th
Supp.], No. 23, p. 166; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil., 307.)
The meritorious acts which appellant claims to have performed
in aid of the CIC and his countrymen have not been established
by satisfactory proof and may not in any event be considered as
mitigating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.
There is nothing to the claim that appellant entered a plea guilty
on the assurance that he would not be sentenced to death. The
claim is not supported by proof. On the other hand, it is denied
by both the prosecution and the trial court, the latter stating in
its order denying appellant' motions for reconsideration that
"No responsible judge can or would advance his opinion in
connection with the decision to be rendered in any case before
he has properly deliberated on the merit of the same."
There is, however, merit in the contention that the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength
should not have been considered. These circumstances are "by
their nature, inherent in the offense of treason and may not be
taken to aggravate the penalty." (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil.,
623) But the facts alleged in the information show that
appellant in committing the crime of treason, deliberately
augmented the wrong by being unnecessarily cruel to captured
guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to barbarous forms of
torture and finally putting them to death, and as appears in
count No. 18, he also chose to add ignominy to his treasonous
act in arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect by stripping
his wife of her clothes and then abusing her together with other
Filipino girls. Clearly shown as they are by the allegations of the
complaint and deemed admitted by appellant's plea of guilty,
these two aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty
and ignominy may be appreciated against him. As this said in
the case of People vs. Racaza, supra.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to
commit acts unnecessary to the commission of treason. There is
no incompatibility between treason and decent, human
treatment of prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal
grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and their
perpetration will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of
ignominy will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of
ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to
the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of
article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above
mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty, fall
within the term of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of
superior strength are adsorbed in treason characterized by
killings, the killings themselves and other and other
accompanying crimes should be taken in to consideration for
measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility
irrespective of the manner in which they were committed. Were
not this the rule treason, the highest crime known to law, would
confer on its perpetrators advantages that are denied simple
murderers. To avoid such incongruity and injustice, the penalty
in treason will be adapted, within the range provided in the
Revised Penal Code, to the danger and harm to which the
culprit has exposed his exposed his country and his people and
to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deed. The
letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code just
penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and
carried the crime into execution. Where the system of
graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable,
as in the case of homicides connected with treason, the method
of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the
offense may be summoned to the service of justice and
consistency and in furtherance of the law's aims.
The penalty prescribed for the crime of treason is reclusion
temporal to death and a fine of not to exceed P20,00 Giving the
appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary confession of guilty, but appreciating against him the
aggravating circumstances of ignominy and unnecessary cruel,
the said penalty should be imposed in its maximum. But since
five member of this court are opposed to the imposition of the
death penalty in this case, the appellant can only be sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.
Wherefore, the judgment below is modified in the sense that
the appellant is declared guilty of treason and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000, with costs in
this instance de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones,
Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
G. R. No. 154130 - October 1, 2003
BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001,1 as well as its
Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.
On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
following Information against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram,
Samar, as well as a number of his men for Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for
sometime subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Daram,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer,
being the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving,
confederating and mutually helping with unidentified persons,
who are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES,
who were armed with firearms of different calibers, with
deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo
Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR
Employees, at the Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them
to leave the place, without any legal and valid grounds thereby
restraining and depriving them of their personal liberty for nine
(9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2cräläwvirtualibräry
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group
(RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a team to
the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence
gathering and forest protection operations in line with the
governments campaign against illegal logging. The team was
composed of Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo
Maniscan, Forest Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree Marker
Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest
Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team leader. The
team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo
Capoquian.3cräläwvirtualibräry
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at
2:00 p.m., where they saw two yacht-like boats being
constructed. After consulting with the local barangay officials,
the team learned that the boats belonged to a certain Michael
Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not around at the time,
the team left Brgy. Bagacay.4cräläwvirtualibräry
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted
two more boats being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy.
Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m.,
prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and
Militante disembarked from the DENRs service pump boat and
proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they met
Mayor Astorga. After conversing with the mayor, Militante
returned to their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the
request of Mayor Astorga.5cräläwvirtualibräry
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1
Capoquian, approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain the
purpose of their mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard
twice on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who exclaimed,
"Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di
ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo
makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha misencounter." (I
can make you swim back to Tacloban. Dont you know that I can
box? I can box. Dont you know that I can declare this a
misencounter?)6 Mayor Astorga then ordered someone to fetch
"reinforcements," and forty-five (45) minutes later, or between
5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of
them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were armed with
M-16 and M14 rifles, and they promptly surrounded the team,
guns pointed at the team members.7 At this, Simon tried to
explain to Astorga the purpose of his teams mission.8 He then
took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was going to
contact his people at the DENR in Catbalogan to inform them of
the teams whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly
grabbed Simons radio, saying, "Maupay nga waray kamo radio
bis diri somabut an iyo opisina kon hain kamo, bis diri kamo
maka aro hin bulig." (Its better if you have no radio so that your
office would not know your whereabouts and so that you cannot
ask for help).9 Mayor Astorga again slapped the right shoulder
of Simon, adding, "Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a
dinhi ha Samar kay diri kamo puwede ha akon." (If you are
tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will not
tolerate it here.)10 Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to allow the
team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted that they
would not be allowed to go home and that they would instead
be brought to Daram.11 Mayor Astorga then addressed the team,
saying, "Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga dagko.
Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha
Bagacay puwede ko liwat ipadakop an akon." (If you really want
to confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. If you
confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will
surrender mine.)12 Simon then tried to reiterate his request for
permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor
Astorga, who angrily said, "Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on
ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro istorya." (You
cannot go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will
have many things to discuss there.)13cräläwvirtualibräry
The team was brought to a house where they were told that
they would be served dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor
Astorga and several others at a long table, and the meal lasted
between 7:00-8:00 p.m.14 After dinner, Militante, Maniscan and
SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house, but
not to leave the barangay.15 On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and
the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was
finally allowed to leave.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention
against Mayor Astorga and his men, which led to the filing of the
above-quoted Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000,
wherein he pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.17 At the
trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1
Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint
Affidavit.18 However, the presentation of Simons testimony was
not completed, and none of his fellow team members came
forward to testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by
the DENR RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance.19cräläwvirtualibräry
On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision,
disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused BENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT
guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum
to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correctional as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.20cräläwvirtualibräry
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11,
200121 which was denied by the Sandiganabayan in a
Resolution dated September 28, 2001.22 A Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 24, 200123 was also filed, and
this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10,
2002.24cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a
sole error for review:
5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty
of Arbitrary Detention as defined and penalized under Article
124 of the Revised Penal Code, based on mere speculations,
surmises and conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding the
Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining
witnesses wherein the latter categorically declared petitioners
innocence of the crime charged.25cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the
required quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused,26 especially in light of the fact that the private
complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance.27 Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the records of
the case is there any competent evidence that could sufficiently
establish the fact that restraint was employed upon the persons
of the team members.28Furthermore, he claims that the mere
presence of armed men at the scene does not qualify as
competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the
minds of the team members, to the extent that they would feel
compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.29cräläwvirtualibräry
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or
employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person. 30 The
elements of the crime are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or
employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal
grounds.31
That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed
herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar is not disputed. Hence,
the first element of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a
public officer or employee, is undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of
petitioner that his acts were spurred by some legal purpose. On
the contrary, he admitted that his acts were motivated by his
"instinct for self-preservation" and the feeling that he was being
"singled out."32 The detention was thus without legal grounds,
thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.
What remains is the determination of whether or not the team
was actually detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta,33 which involved the illegal
detention of a child, we found the accused-appellant therein
guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show that
any physical restraint was employed upon the victim. However,
because the victim was a boy of tender age and he was warned
not to leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had
returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that he could
not leave because of his fear to violate such
instruction.34cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case of People v. Cortez,35 we held that, in establishing
the intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary
that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict
her freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the
offended party in said case was found outside talking to the
owner of the house where she had been taken. She explained
that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the
kidnappers would make good their threats to kill her should she
do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the
kidnappers knew where she resided and they had earlier
announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to
kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known
to render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an
individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are
equivalent to the use of actual force or
violence.36cräläwvirtualibräry
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention
is that the curtailment of the victims liberty need not involve any
physical restraint upon the victims person. If the acts and
actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of
the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the
victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in
accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is,
for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident.
Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants were
not allowed by petitioner to go home.37 This refusal was quickly
followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen
"reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the
complainants and the witnesses.38 Given such circumstances,
we give credence to SPO1 Capoquians statement that it was not
"safe" to refuse Mayor Astorgas orders.39 It was not just the
presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these
gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear
was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the
extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.
The intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and
witnesses against their will is thus clear.
Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the
private complainants, suffice it to say that the principles
governing the use of such instruments in the adjudication of
other crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v. Ballabare, it
was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional
ground to buttress the defenses of the accused, not the sole
consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other
circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given
by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge. Here,
there are no such circumstances.40 Indeed, the belated claims
made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations
that the incident was the result of a misunderstanding and that
the team acceded to Mayor Astorgas orders "out of respect,"
are belied by petitioners own admissions to the contrary.41 The
Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private complainants is
evidently not a clear repudiation of the material points alleged
in the information and proven at the trial, but a mere expression
of the lack of interest of private complainants to pursue the case.
This conclusion is supported by one of its latter paragraphs,
which reads:
11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our
sincerity and improving DENR relations with the local Chiefs
Executive and other official of Daram, Islands so that DENR
programs and project can be effectively implemented through
the support of the local officials for the betterment of the
residence living conditions who are facing difficulties and are
much dependent on government support.42cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the
evidence, pointing out that the Sandiganbayans reliance on the
testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason that
SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants in the
case.43 He also makes much of the fact that prosecution witness
SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly "not exactly privy to, and
knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired between herein
accused and the DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, from
their alleged confrontation, until they left Barangay
Lucob-Lucob in the early morning of 2 September
1997."44cräläwvirtualibräry
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial courts factual findings
are conclusive and binding upon appellate courts unless some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.45 Nothing in
the case at bar prompts us to deviate from this doctrine. Indeed,
the fact that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private
complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor the
rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusively
supplied by the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary
Detention. Furthermore, Mayor Astorgas claim that SPO1
Capoquian was "not exactly privy" to what transpired between
Simon and himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian
testified that he accompanied Simon when the latter went to
talk to petitioner.46 He heard all of Mayor Astorgas threatening
remarks.47 He was with Simon when they were encircled by the
men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14 rifles.48 In
sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the circumstances which
led to the Arbitrary Detention of the team at the hands of Mayor
Astorga.
Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in
fact prevented from leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether they
had simply decided to "while away the time" and take
advantage of the purported hospitality of the accused.49 On the
contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied that they
were simply "whiling away the time" between their dinner with
Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following
morning.50SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that
they did not use the time between their dinner with Mayor
Astorga and their departure early the following morning to
"enjoy the place" and that, given a choice, they would have
gone home.51cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold neutrality of an
impartial judge", because the ponente of the assailed decision
acted both as magistrate and advocate when he propounded
"very extensive clarificatory questions" on the witnesses. Surely,
the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle arbiter during
a trial. It can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in
order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the court cannot
be assailed on the ground that clarificatory questions were
asked during the trial.52cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention.
Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that, where
the detention has not exceeded three days, the penalty shall be
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, which has a range of four (4) months and
one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to a
minimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4)
months. Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of
Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion in Lino v. Fugoso,
wherein he decried the impunity enjoyed by public officials in
committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and called for the
intensification of efforts towards bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention
committed by government officers form part of our statute
books even before the advent of American sovereignty in our
country. Those provisions were already in effect during the
Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American rule; DIDM, the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and the
continued in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), Respondents.
Japanese regime they were not repealed. The same provisions
continue in the statute books of the free and sovereign Republic x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
of the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints
often heard of violations of said provisions, it is very seldom that
G.R. No. 175013 June 1, 2007
prosecutions under them have been instituted due to the fact
that the erring individuals happened to belong to the same
CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Petitioner,
government to which the prosecuting officers belong. It is high
vs.
time that every one must do his duty, without fear or favor, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY RAUL M.
that prosecuting officers should not answer with cold shrugging
GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of Justice
of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or
and overall superior of the Public Prosecutors,
illegal detention.
HONORABLE ENCARNACION JAJA G. MOYA, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of
Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124
Makati City, Branch 146, and HONORABLE ELMO M.
and 125 of the Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce
ALAMEDA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
to its minimum such wanton trampling of personal freedom as
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
depicted in this case. The responsible officials should be
150,Respondents.
prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees right to the
indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustified
The Case
violation of their fundamental rights.53cräläwvirtualibräry

These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO
ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO,
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, and REY CLARO C.
CASAMBRE,Petitioners,
vs.
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO,
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JOSELITA C. MENDOZA,
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S.
GUTIERREZ, STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA,
and STATE PROSECUTOR MERBA A. WAGA, in their
capacity as members of the Department of Justice
panel of prosecutors investigating I.S. Nos. 2006-225,
2006-226 and 2006-234, JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO,
in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police,
P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT.
YOLANDA G. TANIGUE, Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 172074-76 June 1, 2007
LIZA L. MAZA, JOEL G. VIRADOR, SATURNINO C.
OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIÑO, CRISPIN B. BELTRAN,
and RAFAEL V. MARIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, in his
capacity as Chief State Prosecutor, the Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors composed of EMMANUEL Y.
VELASCO, JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, AILEEN MARIE S.
GUTIERREZ, IRWIN A. MARAYA and MERBA A. WAGA
(Panel), RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, in his capacity as
Acting Deputy Director, Directorate for Investigation
and Detective Management (DIDM), YOLANDA G.
TANIGUE, in her capacity as Acting Executive Officer of
certiorari to enjoin petitioners’ prosecution for Rebellion and to
set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the
investigation and prosecution of petitioners’ cases.
The Facts
Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, Liza L. Maza (Maza), Joel G.
Virador (Virador), Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo), Teodoro A.
Casiño (Casiño), and Rafael V. Mariano (Mariano),1 are
members of the House of Representatives representing various
party-list groups.2Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 are private
individuals. Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under
Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in
two criminal cases pending with the RTC Makati.
G.R. No. 175013 (The Beltran Petition)
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006
declaring a "State of National Emergency," police
officers3 arrested Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en
route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame,
Quezon City. Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the
arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which
he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an
inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition
under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech
Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24
February 2006, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the
EDSA Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of
Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been present at
the rally. The inquest prosecutor4indicted Beltran and filed the
corresponding Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (MeTC).5
The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where, on
27 February 2006, he was subjected to a second inquest, with
1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for Rebellion. A
panel of State prosecutors6 from the DOJ conducted this second
inquest. The inquest was based on two letters, both dated 27
February 2006, of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo
Mendoza (Mendoza). Tanigue is the Acting Executive Officer of
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG),
Philippine National Police (PNP), while Mendoza is the Acting
Deputy Director of the CIDG. The letters referred to the DOJ for
appropriate action the results of the CIDG’s investigation
implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, San
Juan, and several others as "leaders and promoters" of an
alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The
plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang
Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a "tactical
alliance."
On 27 February 2006, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a
Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan
as "leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. The panel then filed an
Information with the RTC Makati. The Information alleged that
Beltran, San Juan, and other individuals "conspiring and
confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously form a tactical alliance between the
CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP)
and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan
(KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and
thereby rise publicly and take up arms against the duly
constituted government, x x x."7 The Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-452, was raffled to Branch 137 under
Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (Judge
Delorino).
Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of
probable cause against him.8 Before the motion could be
resolved, Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which
was re-raffled to Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion
Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya).
In its Order dated 31 May 2006, Branch 146 sustained the
finding of probable cause against Beltran.9 Beltran sought
reconsideration but Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the
case without resolving Beltran’s motion. Judge Elmo M.
Alameda of Branch 150, to whom the case was re-raffled,
issued an Order on 29 August 2006 denying Beltran’s motion.
Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 175013 to set aside the Orders
dated 31 May 2006 and 29 August 2006 and to enjoin Beltran’s
prosecution.
In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that
Beltran’s inquest for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC
Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such
felony.
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The Maza and Ladlad
Petitions)
Based on Tanigue and Mendoza’s letters, the DOJ sent
subpoenas to petitioners on 6 March 2006 requiring them to
appear at the DOJ Office on 13 March 2006 "to get copies of the
complaint and its attachment." Prior to their receipt of the
subpoenas, petitioners had quartered themselves inside the
House of Representatives building for fear of being subjected to
warrantless arrest.
During the preliminary investigation on 13 March 2006, the
counsel for the CIDG presented a masked man, later identified
as Jaime Fuentes (Fuentes), who claimed to be an eyewitness
against petitioners. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before
respondent prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco who then gave
copies of the affidavit to media members present during the
proceedings. The panel of prosecutors10 gave petitioners 10
days within which to file their counter-affidavits. Petitioners
were furnished the complete copies of documents supporting
the CIDG’s letters only on 17 March 2006.
Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the
prosecution panel for lack of impartiality and independence,
considering the political milieu under which petitioners were
investigated, the statements that the President and the
Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners’
case,11 and the manner in which the prosecution panel
conducted the preliminary investigation. The DOJ panel of
prosecutors denied petitioners’ motion on 22 March 2006.
Petitioners sought reconsideration and additionally prayed for
the dismissal of the cases. However, the panel of prosecutors
denied petitioners’ motions on 4 April 2006.
Petitioners now seek the nullification of the DOJ Orders of 22
March 2006 and 4 April 2006.
Acting on petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of an injunctive
writ, the Court issued a status quo order on 5 June 2006. Prior
to this, however, the panel of prosecutors, on 21 April 2006,
issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioners
and 46 others with Rebellion. The prosecutors filed the
corresponding Information with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 (later consolidated with
Criminal Case No. 06-452 in Branch 146), charging petitioners
and their co-accused as "principals, masterminds, [or] heads" of
a Rebellion.12Consequently, the petitioners in G.R. Nos.
172070-72 filed a supplemental petition to enjoin the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.
In his separate Comment to the Maza petition, the Solicitor
General submits that the preliminary investigation of petitioners
was not tainted with irregularities. The Solicitor General also
claims that the filing of Criminal Case No. 06-944 has mooted
the Maza petition.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. In G.R. No. 175013, (a) whether the inquest proceeding
against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b) whether there is
probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion; and
2. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, whether respondent
prosecutors should be enjoined from continuing with the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.13
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petitions meritorious. On the Beltran Petition
The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.
Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has
been lawfully arrested without warrant.14 Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances
when such warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful.— A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
xxxx
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the
officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,16 for Inciting to
Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor
could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for
Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another
group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority
rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting
officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion,
sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had
committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in
their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an
allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.17
Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993,
the initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine if the arrest
of the detained person was made "in accordance with the
provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113."18 If
the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest officer should
proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides:
Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.— Should the Inquest
Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with the
Rules, he shall:
a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b) note down the disposition on the referral document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the
action taken; and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to
the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
Where the recommendation for the release of the detained
person is approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the
evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary
investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer
having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said officer
to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of
preliminary investigation, together with the copies of the charge
sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements of the
complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
For the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to
comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in relation to Section 5, Rule
113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltran’s inquest
void.19 Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary
investigation had he not asked the trial court to make a judicial
determination of probable cause, which effectively took the
place of such proceeding.
There is No Probable Cause to Indict
Beltran for Rebellion.
Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted."20 To accord respect to the discretion granted to
the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a
rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of
probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with
petitions to review the prosecutor’s findings in such
investigations.21 However, in the few exceptional cases where
the prosecutor abused his discretion by ignoring a clear
insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause,
thus denying the accused his right to substantive and
procedural due process, we have not hesitated to intervene and
exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the
prosecutor’s findings.22 This exception holds true here.
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed –
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or
other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms
against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its
laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.23
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or
multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a
political end.24
The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted
the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits
and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have
gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s
contention that the same are insufficient to show probable
cause to indict him for Rebellion. The bulk of the documents
consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn before a notary
public, executed by members of the military and some civilians.
Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala
(Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,26 and Raul Cachuela
(Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006,27 none of the affidavits
mentions Beltran.28 In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the
afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran, Ocampo,
Casiño, Maza, Mariano, Virador, and other individuals on board
a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia,
Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met
by another individual who looked like San Juan. For his part,
Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP and
that (1) he attended the CPP’s "10thPlenum" in 1992 where he
saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the
arms he and the other CPP members used were purchased
partly from contributions by Congressional members, like
Beltran, who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed
to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising
against the government. What these documents prove, at best,
is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20
February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present during
the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran
committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a
rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006.
None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a
rebellion. Beltran’s alleged presence during the 1992 CPP
Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.
In fact, Cachuela’s affidavit stated that Beltran attended the
1992 CPP Plenum as "Chairman, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)."
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran
does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not
constitute rebellion.29 As for the alleged funding of the CPP’s
military equipment from Beltran’s congressional funds,
Cachuela’s affidavit merely contained a general conclusion
without any specific act showing such funding. Cachuela merely
alleged that "ang mga ibang mga pondo namin ay galing sa
mga party list na naihalal sa Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN MUNA –
pimumunuan nila SATUR OCAMPO at CRISPIN BELTRAN, x x
x."30Such a general conclusion does not establish probable
cause.
In his Comment to Beltran’s petition, the Solicitor General points
to Fuentes’ affidavit, dated 25 February 2006,31 as basis for the
finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided
details in his statement regarding meetings Beltran and the
other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to
overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly
discussed, among others.
The claim is untenable. Fuentes’ affidavit was not part of the
attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ on 27 February 2006.
Thus, the panel of inquest prosecutors did not have Fuentes’
affidavit in their possession when they conducted the Rebellion
inquest against Beltran on that day. Indeed, although this
affidavit is dated 25 February 2006, the CIDG first presented it
only during the preliminary investigation of the other petitioners
on 13 March 2006 during which Fuentes subscribed to his
statement before respondent prosecutor Velasco.
Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect
by motu proprio submitting to Branch 137 of the RTC Makati
Fuentes’ affidavit as part of their Comment to Beltran’s motion
for judicial determination of probable cause. Such belated
submission, a tacit admission of the dearth of evidence against
Beltran during the inquest, does not improve the prosecution’s
case. Assuming them to be true, what the allegations in
Fuentes’ affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal
Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings
to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is
a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting
Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution
acknowledged this, since the felony charged in the Information
against Beltran and San Juan in Criminal Case No. 06-452 is
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. The
Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others
conspired to form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus,
the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable
cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before
it.
The minutes32 of the 20 February 2006 alleged meeting in
Batangas between members of MKP and CPP, including Beltran,
also do not detract from our finding.1a\^/phi1.net Nowhere in
the minutes was Beltran implicated. While the minutes state
that a certain "Cris" attended the alleged meeting, there is no
other evidence on record indicating that "Cris" is Beltran. San
Juan, from whom the "flash drive" containing the so-called
minutes was allegedly taken, denies knowing Beltran.
To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is
promoting, maintaining, or heading a Rebellion. The
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452 itself does not make
such allegation. Thus, even assuming that the Information
validly charges Beltran for taking part in a Rebellion, he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is no allegation in
the Information that he is a leader or promoter of the
Rebellion.33 However, the Information in fact merely charges
Beltran for "conspiring and confederating" with others in
forming a "tactical alliance" to commit rebellion. As worded, the
Information does not charge Beltran with Rebellion but with
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, a bailable offense.34
On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions
The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted
With Irregularities.
As in the determination of probable cause, this Court is similarly
loath to enjoin the prosecution of offenses, a practice rooted on
public interest as the speedy closure of criminal investigations
fosters public safety.35 However, such relief in equity may be
granted if, among others, the same is necessary (a) to prevent
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner36 or (b) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights.37The case of the petitioners in G.R. Nos.
172070-72 and 172074-76 falls under these exceptions.
The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses
punishable by at least four years, two months and one day is
outlined in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, thus:
Procedure.—The preliminary investigation shall be conducted
in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and
shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and
his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the
official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to
before any prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the
investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground
to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the
respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its
supporting affidavits and documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been
furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is
voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those
which he intends to present against the respondent, and these
shall be made available for examination or copying by the
respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be
made available for examination, copying, or photographing at
the expense of the requesting party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the
respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his
witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his
defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn
to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with
copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The
respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in
lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed,
does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day
period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint
based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts
and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties
can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine
or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the
investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party
or witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission
of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the
expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be
terminated within five (5) days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating
officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground
to hold the respondent for trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this
Court had mandated in an earlier ruling, "so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be
protected from any material damage,"38 respondent
prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent
prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112
which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment,
must be of such number as there are respondents) be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Respondent
prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and
Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints39 and accepted the
affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them
were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a
prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as
required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.
Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor,
after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are
grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he
shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to
the respondents." Here, after receiving the CIDG letters,
respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to
petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13
March 2006 "to secure copies of the complaints and its
attachments." During the investigation, respondent prosecutors
allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed
to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco
proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to
petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who
covered the proceedings. Respondent prosecutors then
required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days.
It was only four days later, on 17 March 2006, that petitioners
received the complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG
letters.1a\^/phi1.net
These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors’
statement in the Order of 22 March 2006 that the preliminary
investigation "was done in accordance with the Revised Rules
o[f] Criminal Procedure."40 Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the
subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainant’s antics
during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’
affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have
not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them,
respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but
also lent credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire
proceeding was a sham.
A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal
justice system which spells for an individual the difference
between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail
term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the
other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a
preliminary investigation as not "a mere formal or technical
right" but a "substantive" one, forming part of due process in
criminal justice.41 This especially holds true here where the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may
be non-bailable for those accused as principals.
Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, respondent
prosecutors’ filing of the Information against petitioners on 21
April 2006 with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati does not moot the
petitions in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76. Our power to
enjoin prosecutions cannot be frustrated by the simple filing of
the Information with the trial court.1a\^/phi1.net
On Respondent Prosecutors’ Lack of Impartiality
We find merit in petitioners’ doubt on respondent prosecutors’
impartiality. Respondent Secretary of Justice, who exercises
supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors, stated in
an interview on 13 March 2006, the day of the preliminary
investigation, that, "We [the DOJ] will just declare probable
cause, then it’s up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x."42 Petitioners
raised this issue in their petition,43 but respondents never
disputed the veracity of this statement. This clearly shows
pre-judgment, a determination to file the Information even in
the absence of probable cause.
A Final Word
The obvious involvement of political considerations in the
actuations of respondent Secretary of Justice and respondent
prosecutors brings to mind an observation we made in another
equally politically charged case. We reiterate what we stated
then, if only to emphasize the importance of maintaining the
integrity of criminal prosecutions in general and preliminary
investigations in particular, thus:
[W]e cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should
not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their
noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly,
for political ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of,
the basic and fundamental objective of observing the interest of
justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all
litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless
or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established
procedure may be public’s perception of the impartiality of the
prosecutor be enhanced.44 1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. In G.R. No. 175013, we
SET ASIDE the Order dated 31 May 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, Branch 146 and the Order dated 29 August
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150. In
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, we SET ASIDE the Orders
dated 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006 issued by respondent
prosecutors. We ORDER the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
Branch 150 to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-944.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159085 February 3, 2004
SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP.
RENATO MAGTUBO petitioners,
vs
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES,
GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES
EBDANE, respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 159103 February 3, 2004
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS
namely, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S.
ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL and
RODOLFO D. MAPILE, petitioners,
vs
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG,
HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO
REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA,
JR., respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 159185 February 3, 2004
REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP.
CELSO L. LOBREGAT, REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP.
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, REP. EMMYLOU J.
TALINO-SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU R.
YUMUL-HERMIDA, petitioners,
vs
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 159196 February 3, 2004
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the
Senate, petitioner,
vs
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, AS
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GENERAL
NARCISO ABAYA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED
FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et al., respondents.
They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered
ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati
City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption
in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the
resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the
Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).1
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued
later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
both declaring "a state of rebellion" and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion. Proclamation No. 427 reads in
full:
PROCLAMATION NO. 427
DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, armed with
high-powered firearms and explosives, acting
upon the instigation and command and
direction of known and unknown leaders,
have seized a building in Makati City, put
bombs in the area, publicly declared
withdrawal of support for, and took arms
against the duly constituted Government,
and continue to rise publicly and show open
hostility, for the purpose of removing
allegiance to the Government certain bodies
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police, and depriving
the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers
and prerogatives which constitute the crime
of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines are being
supported, abetted and aided by known and
unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in
the government service and outside the
government;
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of
the present Constitution, whenever it
becomes necessary, the President, as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, may call out such Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, hereby confirm
the existence of an actual and on-going
rebellion, compelling me to declare a state of
rebellion.
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General
Order No. 4 in accordance with Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, calling out the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to immediately
carry out the necessary actions and measures
to suppress and quell the rebellion with due
regard to constitutional rights.
General Order No. 4 is similarly worded:
GENERAL ORDER NO. 4
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS
REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, armed with
high-powered firearms and explosives, acting
upon the instigation and command and
direction of known and unknown leaders,
have seized a building in Makati City, put
bombs in the area, publicly declared
withdrawal of support for, and took arms
against the duly constituted Government,
and continue to rise publicly and show open
hostility, for the purpose of removing
allegiance to the Government certain bodies
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police, and depriving
the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers
and prerogatives which constitute the crime
of rebellion punishable under Article 134 et
seq. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines are being
supported, abetted and aided by known and
unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in
the government service and outside the
government;
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of
the present Constitution, whenever it
becomes necessary, the President, as the
Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of
the Philippines, may call out such Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution as
President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of all the armed
forces of the Philippines and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, do
hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police
to suppress and quell the rebellion.
I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Chief of the
Philippine National Police and the officers and
men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police to
immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and quell the rebellion with due
regard to constitutional rights.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the
Oakwood occupation had ended. After
hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed
to return to barracks. The President, however,
did not immediately lift the declaration of a
state of rebellion and did so only on August 1,
2003, through Proclamation No. 435:
DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF
REBELLION HAS CEASED TO EXIST
WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 427
dated July 27, 2003, a state of rebellion was
declared;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 4
dated July 27, 2003, which was issued on the
basis of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27,
2003, and pursuant to Article VII, Section 18
of the Constitution, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police
were directed to suppress and quell the
rebellion;
WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police
have effectively suppressed and quelled the
rebellion.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by law, hereby declare that the state of
rebellion has ceased to exist.
In the interim, several petitions were filed
before this Court challenging the validity of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.
4.
In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et
al.),2 party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng
Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of
rebellion to call out the armed forces.3 They further submit that,
because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there
exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the
President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.4
Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al.) are officers/members of the Social
Justice Society (SJS), "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law
professors and bar reviewers."5 Like Sanlakas and PM, they
claim that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not
authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion.6 They contend
that the declaration is a "constitutional anomaly" that "confuses,
confounds and misleads" because "[o]verzealous public officers,
acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are
liable to violate the constitutional right of private
citizens."7 Petitioners also submit that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a
report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law.8 Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency
powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the
President.9
In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo), petitioners
brought suit as citizens and as Members of the House of
Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were
allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of
rebellion.10 Petitioners do not challenge the power of the
President to call out the Armed Forces.11 They argue, however,
that the declaration of a state of rebellion is a "superfluity," and
is actually an exercise of emergency powers.12 Such exercise, it
is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress
granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.13
In G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.), petitioner
Senator assails the subject presidential issuances as "an
unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power
that has no basis under the Constitution."14 In the main,
petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion
"opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of
warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.15
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the
petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the
declaration.16 In addition, the Solicitor General questions the
standing of the petitioners to bring suit.17
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of
Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has
ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts
do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to
the determination of "actual controversies."18 Nevertheless,
courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of
repetition yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such
case.
Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of
rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the
rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1.
On that occasion, "'an angry and violent mob armed with
explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other
deadly weapons' assaulted and attempted to break into
Malacañang."20 Petitions were filed before this Court assailing
the validity of the President's declaration. Five days after such
declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The
mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying
cases21 precluded this Court from addressing the
constitutionality of the declaration.
To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this
opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of
a state of rebellion in the exercise of the President's calling out
power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding.
Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as
Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject
issuances. In Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,22 this Court recognized that:
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which
can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case,
any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a
state of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an exercise
of Congress' emergency powers, thus impairing the lawmakers'
legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration
is a subterfuge to avoid congressional scrutiny into the
President's exercise of martial law powers.
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have
no legal standing or locus standi to bring suit. "Legal standing"
or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged…. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."23
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:
2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important
plank in their programs, petitioners are committed to assert,
defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and
welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized
classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are
committed to defend and assert human rights, including
political and civil rights, of the citizens.
3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass
actions and mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional
rights to peaceably assemble and their freedom of speech and
of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances
and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to
support the same.24 [Emphasis in the original.]
Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, whose standing this Court
rejected in Lacson v. Perez:
… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which
would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical
person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be
threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its
leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with
warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion.
Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose
legal rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right
is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for
declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it[']s right to freedom
of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the
declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is
invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief
affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having
jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5
[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction
of the court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.25
Even assuming that petitioners are "people's organizations,"
this status would not vest them with the requisite personality to
question the validity of the presidential issuances, as this Court
made clear in Kilosbayan v. Morato:26
The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role
of independent people's organizations to enable the people to
pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their
legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through
peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and
economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII,
§§15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that
only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case
may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this
Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited
by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This
requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is
what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from
decisionmaking in the political departments of the government
and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.27
That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens
does not necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer
may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.28 No
such illegal disbursement is alleged.
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a
constitutional question only when he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result
of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action.29Again, no such injury is
alleged in this case.
Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground
that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, the
petitions must fail.
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power
the Constitution does not require the President to make a
declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII
provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, Section 1. 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President
he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the of the United States of America . . . .
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours ....
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
Section 2. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
Army and Navy of the United States. . . .
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
....
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or Section 3. … he shall take care that the laws be faithfully
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the executed…. [Article II – Executive Power]
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
Recalling in historical vignettes the use by the U.S. President of
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours the above-quoted provisions, as juxtaposed against the
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in corresponding action of the U.S. Supreme Court, is instructive.
accordance with its rules without need of a call. Clad with the prerogatives of the office and endowed with
sovereign powers, which are drawn chiefly from the Executive
Power and Commander-in-Chief provisions, as well as the
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
presidential oath of office, the President serves as Chief of State
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
or Chief of Government, Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Foreign
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
Relations and Chief of Public Opinion.33
the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
First to find definitive new piers for the authority of the Chief of
State, as the protector of the people, was President Andrew
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Jackson. Coming to office by virtue of a political revolution,
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
Jackson, as President not only kept faith with the people by
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the
driving the patricians from power. Old Hickory, as he was fondly
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
called, was the first President to champion the indissolubility of
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
the Union by defeating South Carolina's nullification effort.34
privilege of the writ.

The Federal Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 that Congress enacted
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
did not pacify the hotspurs from South Carolina. Its State
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
Legislature ordered an election for a convention, whose
or directly connected with invasion.
members quickly passed an Ordinance of Nullification. The
Ordinance declared the Tariff Acts unconstitutional, prohibited
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
South Carolina citizens from obeying them after a certain date
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three
in 1833, and threatened secession if the Federal Government
days, otherwise he shall be released. [Emphasis supplied.]
sought to oppose the tariff laws. The Legislature then
implemented the Ordinance with bristling punitive laws aimed
The above provision grants the President, as at any who sought to pay or collect customs duties.35
Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated
power[s]."30 From the most to the least benign, these are: the
Jackson bided his time. His task of enforcement would not be
calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
easy. Technically, the President might send troops into a State
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the
only if the Governor called for help to suppress an insurrection,
exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the
which would not occur in the instance. The President could also
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or
send troops to see to it that the laws enacted by Congress were
rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such
faithfully executed. But these laws were aimed at individual
power.31 However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the
citizens, and provided no enforcement machinery against
Philippines v. Zamora,32 "[t]hese conditions are not required in violation by a State. Jackson prepared to ask Congress for a
the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that
force bill.36
'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the
armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
In a letter to a friend, the President gave the essence of his
or rebellion.'"
position. He wrote: ". . . when a faction in a State attempts to
nullify a constitutional law of Congress, or to destroy the Union,
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII
the balance of the people composing this Union have a perfect
does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state
right to coerce them to obedience." Then in a Proclamation he
of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not
issued on December 10, 1832, he called upon South Carolinians
only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost,
to realize that there could be no peaceable interference with the
with Executive powers.
execution of the laws, and dared them, "disunion by armed
force is treason. Are you ready to incur its guilt?"37
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states:
"The executive power shall be vested in the President…." As if
The Proclamation frightened nullifiers, non-nullifiers and
by exposition, Section 17 of the same Article provides: "He shall tight-rope walkers. Soon, State Legislatures began to adopt
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." The provisions
resolutions of agreement, and the President announced that the
trace their history to the Constitution of the United States.
national voice from Maine on the north to Louisiana on the
south had declared nullification and accession "confined to
The specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution granting the U.S. contempt and infamy."38
President executive and commander-in-chief powers have
remained in their original simple form since the Philadelphia
Constitution of 1776, Article II of which states in part:
No other President entered office faced with problems so
formidable, and enfeebled by personal and political handicaps
so daunting, as Abraham Lincoln.
Lincoln believed the President's power broad and that of
Congress explicit and restricted, and sought some source of
executive power not failed by misuse or wrecked by sabotage.
He seized upon the President's designation by the Constitution
as Commander-in-Chief, coupled it to the executive power
provision — and joined them as "the war power" which
authorized him to do many things beyond the competence of
Congress.39
Lincoln embraced the Jackson concept of the President's
independent power and duty under his oath directly to
represent and protect the people. In his Message of July 4, 1861,
Lincoln declared that "the Executive found the duty of
employing the war power in defense of the government forced
upon him. He could not but perform the duty or surrender the
existence of the Government . . . ." This concept began as a
transition device, to be validated by Congress when it
assembled. In less than two-years, it grew into an independent
power under which he felt authorized to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, issue the Emancipation
Proclamation, and restore reoccupied States.40
Lincoln's Proclamation of April 15, 1861, called for 75,000
troops. Their first service, according to the proclamation, would
be to recapture forts, places and property, taking care "to avoid
any devastation, any destruction of or interference with
property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens."41
Early in 1863, the U.S. Supreme Court approved President
Lincoln's report to use the war powers without the benefit of
Congress. The decision was handed in the celebrated Prize
Cases42 which involved suits attacking the President's right to
legally institute a blockade. Although his Proclamation was
subsequently validated by Congress, the claimants contended
that under international law, a blockade could be instituted only
as a measure of war under the sovereign power of the State.
Since under the Constitution only Congress is exclusively
empowered to declare war, it is only that body that could
impose a blockade and all prizes seized before the legislative
declaration were illegal. By a 5 to 4 vote, the Supreme Court
upheld Lincoln's right to act as he had.43
In the course of time, the U.S. President's power to call out
armed forces and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus without prior legislative approval, in case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion came to be recognized and accepted.
The United States introduced the expanded presidential powers
in the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1902.44 The use
of the power was put to judicial test and this Court held that the
case raised a political question and said that it is beyond its
province to inquire into the exercise of the power.45 Later, the
grant of the power was incorporated in the 1935 Constitution.46
Elected in 1884, Grover Cleveland took his ascent to the
presidency to mean that it made him the trustee of all the
people. Guided by the maxim that "Public office is a public
trust," which he practiced during his incumbency, Cleveland
sent federal troops to Illinois to quell striking railway workers
who defied a court injunction. The injunction banned all
picketing and distribution of handbills. For leading the strikes
and violating the injunction, Debs, who was the union president,
was convicted of contempt of court. Brought to the Supreme
Court, the principal issue was by what authority of the
Constitution or statute had the President to send troops without
the request of the Governor of the State.47
In In Re: Eugene Debs, et al,48 the Supreme Court upheld the
contempt conviction. It ruled that it is not the government's
province to mix in merely individual present controversies. Still,
so it went on, "whenever wrongs complained of are such as
affect the public at large, and are in respect of matters which by
the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation and
concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all citizens of
securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that
the Government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is
not sufficient to exclude it from the Courts, or prevent it from
taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional
duties."49 Thus, Cleveland's course had the Court's attest.
Taking off from President Cleveland, President Theodore
Roosevelt launched what political scientists dub the
"stewardship theory." Calling himself "the steward of the
people," he felt that the executive power "was limited only by
the specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the
Constitution, or impleaded by Congress under its constitutional
powers."50
The most far-reaching extension of presidential power "T.R."
ever undertook to employ was his plan to occupy and operate
Pennsylvania's coal mines under his authority as
Commander-in-Chief. In the issue, he found means other than
force to end the 1902 hard-coal strike, but he had made
detailed plans to use his power as Commander-in-Chief to wrest
the mines from the stubborn operators, so that coal production
would begin again.51
Eventually, the power of the State to intervene in and even take
over the operation of vital utilities in the public interest was
accepted. In the Philippines, this led to the incorporation of
Section 6,52 Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, which was
later carried over with modifications in Section 7,53 Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution, and thereafter in Section 18,54 Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.
The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is
that the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is
and become more so when taken together with the provision on
executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the
plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant
with the means to address exigencies or threats which
undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of
the State.
In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the
late Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the Philippine
President was vested with residual power and that this is even
greater than that of the U.S. President. She attributed this
distinction to the "unitary and highly centralized" nature of the
Philippine government. She noted that, "There is no counterpart
of the several states of the American union which have reserved
powers under the United States constitution." Elaborating on
the constitutional basis for her argument, she wrote:
…. The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three
departments of the government in this manner: "The legislative
power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." "The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." The judicial powers shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as may be provided by law."
These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by
actual division but also confer plenary legislative, executive, and
judicial powers. For as the Supreme Court of the Philippines
pointed out in Ocampo v. Cabangis, "a grant of legislative
power means a grant of all the legislative power; and a grant of
the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which
may be exercised under the government." If this is true of the
legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a
combined membership [at that time] of more than 120 and of
the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can
equally if not more appropriately apply to the executive power
which is vested in one official – the president. He personifies the
executive branch. There is a unity in the executive branch
absent from the two other branches of government. The
president is not the chief of many executives. He is the
executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more
immediate and direct than the United States president because
he is given by express provision of the constitution control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices.55
The esteemed Justice conducted her study against the
backdrop of the 1935 Constitution, the framers of which, early
on, arrived at a general opinion in favor of a strong Executive in
the Philippines."56 Since then, reeling from the aftermath of
martial law, our most recent Charter has restricted the
President's powers as Commander-in-Chief. The same, however,
cannot be said of the President's powers as Chief Executive.
In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her
thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin,
upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled
predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on
the President's
… unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of
executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with
her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President
are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article
on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of
the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit
the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under
the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of
specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to
the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power.57 [Underscoring supplied.
Italics in the original.]
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at
the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out,
statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in
Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the
President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which
states:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an
executive order. [Emphasis supplied.]
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the
armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter
superfluity.58 At most, it only gives notice to the nation that
such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to
prevent or suppress it.59 Perhaps the declaration may wreak
emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State,
even on the entire nation. But this Court's mandate is to probe
only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court
finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance.
For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
Should there be any "confusion" generated by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that,
as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate
constitutionally protected rights.60 Indeed, if a state of martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus,61 then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of
a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. 62 At
any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the
suppression of the rebellion "with due regard to constitutional
rights."
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and
police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise
unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court
held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the
authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances so warrant. The
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on
the declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'"64 In other words, a
person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of
rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of
rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest
are present.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power
to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for
the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine
whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or
in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis.65
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion
amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a
circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic.
There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil
courts in the "theater of war" or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of civil government. There is no
allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and
legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the
President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial
law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration
constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which
exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) ….
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President
has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers
as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces,
was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and
18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Puno, J., in the result.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., joins J. Panganiban's Opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the result.
Callejo, Sr., J., concurs in the separate opinion of J. Panganiban.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the "state of
rebellion" declared by the President through Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 in the wake of the so-called
"Oakwood Incident." The questioned issuances, however, were
subsequently lifted by her on August 1, 2003, when she issued
Proclamation No. 435. Hence, as of today, there is no more
extant proclamation or order that can be declared valid or void.
For this reason, I believe that the Petitions should be dismissed
on the ground of mootness.
The judicial power to declare a law or an executive order
unconstitutional, according to Justice Jose P. Laurel, is "limited
to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented."1 Following this long-held principle, the Court
has thus always been guided by these fourfold requisites in
deciding constitutional law issues: 1) there must be an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of
judicial determination; 2) the constitutional question must be
raised by a proper party; 3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and 4) adjudication of the
constitutional question must be indispensable to the resolution
of the case.2
Unquestionably, the first and the forth requirements are absent
in the present case.
Absence of Case and Controversy
The first requirement, the existence of a live case or
controversy, means that an existing litigation is ripe for
resolution and susceptible of judicial determination; as opposed
to one that is conjectural or anticipatory,3hypothetical or
feigned.4 A justiciable controversy involves a definite and
concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests.5 Hence, it admits of specific
relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, in
contrast to an opinion which only advises what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.6
As a rule, courts have no authority to pass upon issues through
advisory opinions or friendly suits between parties without real
adverse interests.7 Neither do courts sit to adjudicate academic
questions –– no matter how intellectually challenging8 ––
because without a justiciable controversy, an adjudication
would be of no practical use or value.9
While the Petitions herein have previously embodied a live case
or controversy, they now have been rendered extinct by the
lifting of the questioned issuances. Thus, nothing is gained by
breathing life into a dead issue.
Moreover, without a justiciable controversy, the Petitions10 have
become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme
Court has no original jurisdiction. Be it remembered that they
were filed directly with this Court and thus invoked its original
jurisdiction.11
On the theory that the "state of rebellion" issue is "capable of
repetition yet evading review," I respectfully submit that the
question may indeed still be resolved even after the lifting of the
Proclamation and Order, provided the party raising it in a
proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced
or damaged as a direct result of their issuance.
In the present case, petitioners have not shown that they have
been or continue to be directly and pecuniarily prejudiced or
damaged by the Proclamation and Order. Neither have they
shown that this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief. I would venture to say that, perhaps, if this
controversy had emanated from an appealed judgment from a
lower tribunal, then this Court may still pass upon the issue on
the theory that it is "capable of repetition yet evading review,"
and the case would not be an original action for declaratory
relief.
In short, the theory of "capable of repetition yet evading
review" may be invoked only when this Court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter. It cannot be used in the present
controversy for declaratory relief, over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction.
The Resolution of the Case on Other Grounds
The fourth requisite, which relates to the absolute necessity of
deciding the constitutional issue, means that the Court has no
other way of resolving the case except by tackling an
unavoidable constitutional question. It is a well-settled doctrine
that courts will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it
is the lis mota of the case, or if the case can be disposed on
some other grounds.12
With due respect, I submit that the mootness of the Petitions
has swept aside the necessity of ruling on the validity of
Proclamation No. 427 and General order No. 4. In the wake of
its mootness, the constitutionality issue has ceased to be the lis
mota of the case or to be an unavoidable question in the
resolution thereof. Hence, the dismissal of the Petitions for
mootness is justified.13
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petitions. On the
constitutionality of a "state of rebellion," I reserve my judgment
at the proper time and in the proper case.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The fundamental issue in the petitions is the legality of
Proclamation No. 427 issued by the President on July 27, 2003
declaring a "state of rebellion".
The majority affirmed the declaration is legal because the
President was only exercising a wedding of the "Chief
Executive" and "Commander-in-Chief" powers. U.S.
jurisprudence and commentators are cited discussing the
awesome powers exercised by the U.S. President during
moments of crisis1 and that these powers are also available to
the Philippine President.2 Although the limits cannot be
precisely defined, the majority concluded that there are enough
"residual powers" to serve as the basis to support the
Presidential declaration of a "state of rebellion".3 The majority,
however, emphasized that the declaration cannot diminish or
violate constitutionally protected rights.4 They affirmed the
legality of warrantless arrests of persons who participated in the
rebellion, if circumstances so warrant5 with this clarification:
"[i]n other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless
arrests for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President
has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a
valid warrantless arrest are present."6
If the requisites for a warrantless arrests must still be present
for an arrest to be made, then the declaration is a superfluity. I
therefore shudder when a blanket affirmation is given to the
President to issue declarations of a "state of rebellion" which in
fact may not be the truth or which may be in affect even after
the rebellion has ended.
Proclamation No. 427 was issued at 1:00 p.m. on July 27, 2003,
at the height of the occupation of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City, by 323 junior officers
and enlisted men (Oakwood Incident),7which began in the early
morning of July 27, 2003.8 Shortly after, the President issued
General Order No. 4, ordering the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to use reasonable
force, and pay due regard to constitutional rights, in putting
down the rebellion.9 The Oakwood incident ended peacefully
that same evening when the militant soldiers surrendered after
negotiations.
From July 27 to August 1, 2003, "search and recovery"
operations were conducted. Throughout the Oakwood Incident,
searches were conducted in the non-occupied areas,10 and,
with the recovery of evidence, staging points for the Oakwood
Incident were found in Cavite, Makati and Mandaluyong.11 After
the soldiers left at around 11:00 in the evening of July 27, a
search was conducted around the Oakwood premises.12 These
searches expanded in scope on the basis of recovered
evidence.13
Ramon Cardenas, Assistant Executive Secretary in the previous
administration, was arrested, presented to the media in
handcuffs and brought for inquest proceedings before the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") in the morning of July 28.14 He
was initially detained at the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime
Division of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
("CIDG"), and brought to the DOJ in the afternoon of July
28.15 Cardenas was later charged with the crime of
rebellion,16 but as of this writing has been allowed bail.
On July 31, 2003, 4 days after the militant group had
surrendered peacefully, an official spokesperson from the DOJ
declared that the President's "indefinite" imposition of the "state
of rebellion" would make "warrantless arrests" a valid exercise
of executive power.
The Court can take judicial notice that the police authorities
were releasing to media "evidence found" purporting to link
personalities in the political opposition, the most prominent of
whom was Senator Gringo Honasan. Even Senator Loi Ejercito
and Mayor JV Ejercito's names were being linked to the
attempted uprising.
On August 1, 2003, the President issued Proclamation No. 435,
declaring that the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police had effectively suppressed and
quelled the rebellion, and, accordingly, that the "state of
rebellion" had ceased on that date.
The majority discussed only the abstract nature of the powers
exercised by the Chief Executive, without considering if there
was sufficient factual basis for the President's declaration of a
"state of rebellion" and when it ended. In taking this position,
the majority is returning, if not expanding, the doctrine
enunciated in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,17which overturned the
landmark doctrine in Lansang v. Garcia.18 In Lansang, the
Supreme Court upheld its authority to inquire into the factual
bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and held that this inquiry raises a judicial rather than a
political question. In Garcia-Padilla, on the other hand, the
ponencia held that Lansang was no longer authoritative, and
that the President's decision to suspend the privilege is final and
conclusive upon the courts and all other persons.
These two cases were decided prior to the 1987 Constitution,
which requires this Court not only to settle actualcontroversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.19 This provision in the 1987 Constitution was
precisely meant to check abuses of executive power. Martial
Law was still fresh in the minds of the delegates in
1987!lawphi1.nêt
The majority ignored the fact that the "state of rebellion"
declared by the President was in effect five days after the
peaceful surrender of the militant group.
The President's proclamation cites Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution as the basis for the declaration of the "state of
rebellion.".
Section 18 authorizes the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to
call out the Armed Forces, in order to suppress one of three
conditions: (1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion or (3)
invasion.20 In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or invasion, the
President may, when public safety requires, also (1) suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or (2) place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
The majority made it clear that exercise of the President's
Commander-in-Chief powers does not require the declaration of
a "state of rebellion" or a declaration of a "state of lawless
violence" or a "state of invasion". When any of these conditions
exist, the President may call out the armed forces to suppress
the danger.
Thus, the declaration of a "state of rebellion" does not have any
legal meaning or consequence. This declaration does not give
the President any extra powers. It does not have any good
purpose.
If the declaration is used to justify warrantless arrests even
after the rebellion has ended, as in the case of Cardenas, such
declaration or, at the least, the warrantless arrests, must be
struck down.
Clearly defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is
the crime of rebellion or insurrection, to wit:
ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection – How committed. – The
crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly
and taking up arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the Chief Executive or the legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
On the other hand, a coup d' etat is defined as follows:
ART. 134-A. Coup d' etat. – How committed. – The crime of
coup d' etat is a swift attack accompanied by violence,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against the
duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or
any military camp or installation, communications networks,
public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and
continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried
out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or persons,
belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or
employment, with or without civilian support or participation,
for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power.
Under these provisions, the crime of rebellion or insurrection is
committed only by "rising publicly or taking up arms against the
Government". A coup d' etat, on the other hand, takes
place only when there is a "swift attack accompanied by
violence." Once the act of "rising publicly and taking up arms
against the Government" ceases, the commission of the crime
of rebellion ceases. Similarly, when the "swift attack" ceases,
the crime of coup d' etat is no longer being committed.
Rebellion has been held to be a continuing crime,21 and the
authorities may resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court.22 However, this doctrine should be applied
to its proper context – i.e., relating to subversive armed
organizations, such as the New People's Army, the avowed
purpose of which is the armed overthrow of the organized and
established government. Only in such instance should rebellion
be considered a continuing crime.
When the soldiers surrendered peacefully in the evening of July
27, the rebellion or the coup d' etat ended. The President,
however, did not lift the declaration of the "state of rebellion"
until 5 days later, on August 1, 2003.
After the peaceful surrender, no person suspected of having
conspired with the soldiers or participated in the Oakwood
incident could be arrested without a warrant of arrest. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, which governs arrest
without warrant, provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
xxxxxxxxx
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Rule 113, Section 5, pars. (a) and (b) of the Rules of Court
are exceptions to the due process clause in the Constitution.
Section 5, par. (a) relates to a situation where a crime is
committed or attempted in the presence of the arresting officer.
Section 5, par. (b), on the other hand, presents the requirement
of "personal knowledge", on the part of the arresting officer, of
facts indicating that an offense had "just been committed", and
that the person to be arrested had committed that offense.
After the peaceful surrender of the soldiers on July 27, 2003,
there was no crime that was being "attempted", "being
committed", or "had just been committed." There should,
therefore, be no occasion to effect a valid warrantless arrest in
connection with the Oakwood Incident.
The purpose of the declaration and its duration as far as the
overeager authorities were concerned was only to give legal
cover to effect warrantless arrests even if the "state of
rebellion" or the instances stated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules are absent or no longer exist.
Our history had shown the dangers when too much power is
concentrated in the hands of one person. Unless specifically
defined, it is risky to concede and acknowledge the "residual
powers" to justify the validity of the presidential issuances. This
can serve as a blank check for other issuances and open the
door to abuses. The majority cite the exercise of strong
executive powers by U.S. President Andrew Jackson. Was it not
President Jackson who is said to have cynically defied the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling (under Chief Justice Marshall) against
the forcible removal of the American Indians from the tribal
lands by saying: "The Chief Justice has issued his Decision, now
let him try to enforce it?" Others quote Madison as having gone
further with: "With what army will the Chief Justice enforce his
Decision?"
WHEREFORE, I vote for Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, issued on July 27, 2003 by Respondent President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, to be declared NULL and VOID for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. All other orders issued and action taken
based on those issuances, especially after the Oakwood incident
ended in the evening of July 27, 2003, e.g., warrantless arrests,
should also be declared null and void.
G.R. No. 138553 June 30, 2005
ENRIQUE "TOTOY" RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review
on certiorari are the October 16, 1998 decision1 and April 5,
1999 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
17284, which respectively affirmed in toto an earlier decision
of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet convicting
herein petitioner Enrique "Totoy" Rivera of the crime of direct
assault, and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad,
Benguet an information3 for direct assault was filed against
petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan,
Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously resist one Lt.
EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then
and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter
grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus
injuring him in the process while the latter was actually engaged
in the performance of his official duties.
Contrary to law.
On arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "Not Guilty."
Thereafter, trial ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented in evidence the
testimonies of the victim himself, Lt. Edward Leygo, and the two
alleged eyewitnesses to the incident, SPO1 Jose Bangcado and
Brenda Dup-et. For its part, the defense presented the
petitioner himself and one Alfredo Castro.
As summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of
Appeals in the decision herein assailed, the People’s version4 is,
as follows:
On March 20, 1993 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Police
Inspector Edward M. Leygo, Deputy Chief of Police for
Operation and Patrol of the La Trinidad Police Station, La
Trinidad, Benguet and SPO1 Joseph Basquial were conducting
routinary patrol on board a police car somewhere in Shilan, La
Trinidad, Benguet when they came upon a truck unloading
sacks of chicken dung at the stall of accused Enrique "Totoy"
Rivera which was located along the Halsema Highway at Shilan,
La Trinidad, Benguet. Inspector Leygo advised the driver to
stop unloading the manure as it violates La Trinidad Municipal
Ordinance No. I-91 (Exhibit "C") which prohibits, among others,
the loading and unloading of chicken manure along the
sidewalks or road shoulders or within 15 meters from the center
of the Halsema Highway located at La Trinidad, Benguet. The
driver complied with the police directive. The policemen then
escorted the truck back to Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet and
proceeded to the police headquarters.
Not long after, SPOI Jose Bangcado and SPOI Rivera Dayap,
members of the La Trinidad Police under Inspector Leygo were
conducting patrol aboard a police car somewhere at Km. 6, La
Trinidad, Benguet when they observed a truck loaded with
chicken dung proceeding towards Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Having in mind the instructions of La Trinidad Mayor Edna C.
Tabanda and their Commanding Officer Inspector Leygo to
Implement Ordinance No. I-91, the two policemen followed and
stopped the truck at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet. Immediately
they called Inspector Leygo on the radio and informed him that
they stopped a truck carrying chicken dung. Inspector Leygo
ordered them to restrain the truck, as he would be proceeding
to the area.
Knowing that the truck being restrained by the two policemen
was the same truck which they had escorted earlier from Shilan,
La Trinidad, Benguet, Inspector Leygo felt ignored and insulted.
He immediately called SPO4 Justino Tiwtiwa, SPO1 Baldwin
Ngolab and SPO1 Joseph Basquial and the group sped to Cruz,
La Trinidad, Benguet.
Meanwhile, back at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, the accused
arrived before the group of Inspector Leygo did and ordered the
driver not to obey the policemen but instead obey him, as he
(accused) was the boss. The truck driver followed the accused’s
order and drove the truck towards Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet
with the accused following closely behind in his vehicle.
Inspector Leygo and his group arrived in time to see the truck
pulling away and so they gave chase. The police were able to
overtake and stop the truck at Dengsi, Tomay, La Trinidad,
Benguet. Inspector Leygo confronted the truck driver and asked
him why he still insisted on proceeding to Shilan to unload
chicken manure despite the fact that he was ordered to go back
earlier in the evening. The truck driver stated that he was just
following the orders of the accused. Immediately, Inspector
Leygo turned around to see the accused who had at that time
alighted from his vehicle behind the truck. Inspector Leygo
asked the accused why he insisted on defying the ban on the
unloading and loading of chicken manure. Instead of answering
however, the accused pointed a finger on the policeman and
uttered words like "Babalian kita ng buto" (I’ll break your bones).
"Ilalampaso kita" (I’ll scrub you). "Pulis lang kayo" (you are only
policemen) and other unsavory and insulting words. Inspector
Leygo who was a little bit angry warned the accused to stop
uttering further insulting words and cautioned him to take it
easy and then informed him that he was being arrested for
violation of the chicken dung ordinance. The accused removed
his jacket, placed it inside the vehicle, assumed a fighting
stance and challenged the policeman. Inspector Leygo then
approached the accused and warned him anew that he was
being arrested. The accused responded by punching Inspector
Leygo on his face, particularly on his lip. The two then grappled
as Inspector Leygo tried to hold the accused. Finally, with the
help of Policemen Dayap and Bongcado, the accused was
subdued. The accused was then pushed into one of the police
cars but he resisted until Alfredo Castro, one of the chicken
dung dealers in the area, boarded the police car to accompany
him.
The accused was brought to the police headquarters where
Inspector Leygo immediately called Mayor Tabanda who arrived
at about 10:00 o’clock that same evening. She confronted the
two protagonists and at the same time admonished the accused
for violating Ordinance No. I-91. Mayor Tabanda then
accompanied the accused and Inspector Leygo to the Benguet
General Hospital where both were examined by Dr. Antonio T.
Carino. In the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "A") of Inspector
Leygo, his injury described as "contusion with 0.5 laceration,
upper lip, left side" with healing period from 5 to 7 days.
Subsequently, this present case was filed against the accused.
Reproduced from the same decision of the appellate court, the
defense’s version5 runs:
At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of March 20, 1993, while
the accused was at the Trading Post at Km. 5, La Trinidad,
Benguet, the driver reported to him that he was prevented by
the police from unloading chicken manure at Shilan, La Trinidad,
Benguet. The accused reminded the driver that he should have
brought the chicken manure to Acop, Tublay, Benguet where
dealers sell it when prevented from unloading within the
municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. As it would be more
expensive to return the chicken dung to Batangas where it
came from, the accused told the driver to bring the chicken
dung to Acop, Tublay, Benguet. The driver expressed his fear
that the police might stop him along the way and so the
accused ordered the driver to proceed and gave him the
assurance that he (accused) would follow later.
The truck then proceeded as instructed and the accused
following after a short while. Arriving at Cruz, La Trinidad,
Benguet, the accused noticed that the truck was stopped at the
side of the road while a police vehicle and three policemen were
across the road. Thinking that the policemen were there trying
to extort money from the driver, the accused told the truck
driver to proceed. The truck driver complied and the accused
tailed along.
When the truck and the accused reached Dengsi, Tomay, La
Trinidad, Benguet, he heard a police siren from behind.
Immediately, a police vehicle overtook the truck, another police
vehicle was running along side the accused’s vehicle and a third
police vehicle was right behind them. Thus, the truck and the
accused had no recourse but to stop.
Inspector Leygo alighted from one of the police vehicles and
angrily uttered so many words at the accused. The policeman
then held the collar of accused’s jacket and forced the latter to
get out of his vehicle while shouting "Ang tigas ng ulo mo. Sige,
bumunot ka." (You are very stubborn. Go ahead, draw your
gun.) The accused explained that he had no gun to draw while
removing his jacket and raising his hands to show that there
was no gun on his body. Inspector Leygo then held the left
hand of the accused and tried to put handcuffs on him. The
accused tried to resist, pleading that he had no fault and at the
same time asking what infraction of law he committed.
Inspector Leygo answered by uttering insulting words and
pointing his left forefinger on the accused’s face while his right
hand was poking a gun on the accused. The accused noticed
that the policeman smelled of liquor.
A crowd started to gather around the scene. Sensing that the
onlookers were on his side, the accused stated that he was
going to get his camera inside his vehicle. As he was opening
the door, Inspector Leygo suddenly slapped and boxed him in
the stomach causing the accused to feel dizzy. This assault
weakened him and so he did not resist when the police pushed
him inside the police vehicle. Inspector Leygo then ordered his
men to bring the accused to the police headquarters. The
accused recognized Alfredo Castro among the onlookers and
because he (accused) knew him to be one of the chicken dung
dealers, asked him (Castro) to accompany him to the police
headquarters for fear that something might happen.
At the police station, the accused suggested that Inspector
Leygo should undergo medical examination to determine if the
policeman was positive of alcoholic breath. The accused,
however, was examined ahead and was issued a medical
certificate (Exhibit "4") which described his injury as "erythema,
lip left side face" and "contusion-midepigastric area". The
healing period is from 3 to 5 days. With him sustaining this
injury, the accused now wonders why this charge was filed
against him.
After weighing the parties’ respective versions of the incident,
the trial court found that of the People more credible.
Accordingly, in its decision of April 22, 1994,6 it convicted
petitioner of the crime of direct assault and sentenced him,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby renders judgment
finding the accused Enrique "Totoy" Rivera GUILTY and
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day of arresto mayor as MINIMUM to One
(1) Year, One (1) Month and Eleven (11) Days of prision
correccional as MAXIMUM. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine
of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
trial court, petitioner then went on appeal to the Court of
Appeals whereat his recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
17284.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its
decision7 of October 16, 1998, affirmed in toto that of the trial
court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the decision appealed from
is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED,
and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its
resolution of April 5, 1999.8
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, submitting for our
consideration the principal issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered
by the trial court.
We AFFIRM.
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed
in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the
crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or
any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance.9
Unquestionably, petitioner’s case falls under the second mode,
which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated
when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when
the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the
offender lays hand upon a person in authority.10
In this recourse, petitioner argues that the appellate court, like
the trial court, erred in finding the testimony of complainant Lt.
Leygo as clear and convincing. In an attempt to impugn the
latter’s credibility, petitioner contends that Lt. Leygo was
mumbling while giving his testimony, adding that the latter
failed to identify which of his (petitioner) hands was used and
the precise distance between them when he punched the police
lieutenant.
Admittedly, the record shows that the trial judge had to call Lt.
Leygo’s attention for testifying in such a low voice while on the
witness box. Evidently, however, this did not prevent the trial
court into believing his testimony and from according it full faith
and credit. As it is, the witness was able to narrate and
communicate the events that transpired. Both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals found the witness to have clearly and
adequately recounted how the incident happened, and we find
no valid reason to discredit the truth and veracity of his
narration. We quote:
Q Now, you said that Mr. Rivera faced you, when he faced you
after he removed his jacket what did you do?
A He positioned himself in a fighting stance, sir.
Q What do you mean "in the fighting stance"?
A He raised his fist. (Witness raised his hands with his clenched
fist in front of him).
Q How about you, what did you do when Mr. Rivera did that?
A I informed him that I am arresting him.
Q How far were you when he faced you at first?
A At first before I went near him is about 6 feet, sir.
Q Now, you said you approached him, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do when you approached him?
A I told him that I am arresting him, sir.
Q And what was his response?
A He punched me at my face, sir.
Q You said he punched you, with what hand did Mr. Rivera
punch you?
A I think it is his left hand, sir.11
Nor is Lt. Leygo’s credibility any less diminished by the
circumstance that he failed to categorically identify which of
petitioner’s hands was used in punching him, and the exact
distance between them at that time. In all likelihood, this police
officer was not expecting a physical attack by the petitioner as
he was just confronting the latter about the prohibited
unloading of chicken dung when petitioner laid hand on him.
Under this scenario, any person, like Lt. Leygo, cannot be
expected to remember every single detail of the incident with
perfect recall.12 For sure, far from adversely affecting Lt.
Leygo’s credibility, his failure to recall every minute detail of
what transpired even fortifies it. We have thus held that the
failure of a witness to recall each and every detail of an
occurrence may even serve to strengthen rather than weaken
his credibility because it erases any suspicion of a coached or
rehearsed testimony.13 What is vital in Lt. Leygo’s testimony is
the fact that petitioner punched him on his face, about which he
was steadfast and unflinching.
In any event, this Court has said time and again that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
is best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has
the opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its
findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness
or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance,
are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be
disturbed on appeal.14
Petitioner also asserts that the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses SPO1 Jose Bangcado and Brenda Dup-et did not
corroborate Lt. Leygo’s testimony. For, while SPO1 Bangcado
merely testified during direct examination that petitioner
punched Lt. Leygo, this witness failed to reiterate said
testimony during cross-examination. As regards prosecution
witness Brenda Dup-et, petitioner alleged that this witness
never testified that petitioner boxed Lt. Leygo.
The imputed shortcomings in the testimonies of said two (2)
prosecution witnesses are not of their own making. A witness is
supposed to confine his answers only to questions propounded
of him. Here, the defense counsel focused his line of
questioning on what the two protagonists were doing
immediately prior to the punching incident, and the answer
correctly received by counsel was that both petitioner and
Leygo were pushing each other. There is no showing that
counsel asked the witness as to what happened after the
pushing incident, as what the public prosecutor did of SPO1
Bangcado during the latter’s direct examination, to wit:
PROS. BOTENGAN:
Q And what happened when they faced each other?
A Totoy Rivera was shouting at Lt. Leygo, sir.
Q What was he shouting?
A "Bakit ninyo ako tinutugis, hindi ako criminal. Magbabayad
kayo rito. Hindi ninyo ako kaya, pulis lang kayo." And some
other words but I cannot remember them all, sir.
Q What else, if any, did he say?
COURT:
He said he cannot remember the other words.
WITNESS:
There is one thing more, sir. "Ilalampaso kita. Babalian kita ng
buto." And others, sir.
PROS. BOTENGAN:
Q To whom was Mr. Rivera saying this?
A To Lt. Leygo, sir.
Q What was Mr. Rivera doing when he said these?
A He was pointing to the face of Lt. Leygo and they are
becoming closer and closer with each other, sir.
Q At that time, what was Lt. Leygo doing?
A What I saw was they were pushing to one another and after
that Totoy Rivera boxed Lt. Leygo, sir.
Q You said they were pushing one another, what part of their
body were they holding?
A At the breast, sir.
Q So each one was holding each other’s breast, is that what you
mean?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long did they push each other?
A Seven to ten seconds, sir.
Q And was Lt. Leygo saying anything?
A He was trying to arrest Totoy Rivera, sir.
Q You said that he was trying to arrest Totoy Rivera, did you
hear him if he says anything?
A He was convincing Totoy Rivera to go to the Municipal Hall,
sir.
Q You said Totoy Rivera boxed Lt. Leygo, what part of the body
of Lt. Leygo was hit?
A His face, sir.
Q What part of his face?
A Here, sir. (Witness referring to his lower lip. Witness is holding
his lower lip).
Q What happened when Lt. Leygo was hit?
A He ordered us to arrest Totoy Rivera, so were able to subdue
Totoy Rivera and placed him in the car, sir.15
But even assuming, in gratia argumente, that Lt. Leygo’s
testimony was not corroborated by the two (2) other
prosecution witnesses during their cross-examinations, still the
day cannot be saved for the petitioner. Well-settled is the rule in
this jurisdiction that the testimony of a single witness, if
straightforward and categorical, is sufficient to convict. After all,
witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and evidence are
assessed in terms of quality, not quantity. It is not uncommon,
then, to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony
of a lone witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary
only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the
witness falsified the truth or that his observations had been
inaccurate.16 Unfortunately for the petitioner, the trial court
found nothing to indicate that Lt. Leygo falsified the truth or
that his observations had been inaccurate.
Petitioner theorizes that he could not have hit Lt. Leygo, what
with the circumstance that his co-policemen were present at the
scene of the incident, and he finds it unusual that none of them
retaliated if he really hit Lt. Leygo.
We are not persuaded. The evidence on record clearly bears out That Dr. Antonio T. Carino did not testify on the medical
that it was Lt. Leygo who was attacked by petitioner, not the certificate he issued is of no moment. If ever, the medical
other way around, as petitioner would want us to believe. Both certificate is only corroborative in character and is not an
the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense are one in indispensable element of the crime of direct assault filed against
saying that it was only petitioner who was in confrontation with petitioner. The unequivocal piece of evidence against petitioner
Lt. Leygo. Evidently, petitioner’s anger started to burst when is no less Lt. Leygo’s credible and consistent testimony that he
the truck driver reported to him that Lt. Leygo prohibited the was punched on his face by the petitioner.
unloading of the chicken dung and ordered him to return, such
that when the same delivery truck was again intercepted by Lt. Lastly, petitioner puts the Court of Appeals to task for sustaining
Leygo’s group, petitioner’s anger was too much for him to the trial court’s observation that he exuded an aura of
contain. We quote with approval what the trial court has said in arrogance and defiance of authorities.
its decision:
We have consistently ruled that the trial court judge is in the
The accused, however, denies that he ever laid hands on the best of position to see and observe the demeanor, actuation
cop. But the bigger question is, how then did the policeman and countenance of a witness, matters which are not normally
sustain his injuries? It is highly improbable, if not absurd, for the expressed in the transcripts of his testimony. We see no reason,
policeman to inflict it on himself. It is also very unlikely that his therefore, to disturb the following observations of the trial court
co-policemen would punch him just to make it appear that the in its decision:
accused did it. The accused admits of being at the place. He
admits having been confronted by the policeman but he denies
The demeanor of the accused on the witness stand also shows
that he ever lifted a finger against the policeman. Yet all the
that he is the kind who is impatient with authority. His manner
witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense are in
of answering questions bespeaks of one who has trouble
accord in saying that it was only the accused who was in
abiding with authority. He portrayed a very aggressive manner
confrontation with the policeman. The only logical conclusion
and his answers were always on the defensive as if he had
that can be derived from this is that it is indeed the accused
every right in this world to do and say whatever he wanted to.
who punched the policeman. Evidence to be believed must not
Over all, he exuded an aura of arrogance and defiance of
only proceed from the mouth of the credible witness but it must
authority.
be credible in itself. No better test has yet been found to
measure the value of the testimony of a witness than its
In closing, let it be noted that the attention of this Court has not
conformity to the knowledge and common experience of
been called to of any ulterior or improper motive on the part of
mankind (People vs. Maspil, Jr., 186 SCRA 751).1awphi1.zw+
the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against petitioner.
Absence such a motive, the presumption is that they were not
That the other police officers did not retaliate is no basis for us
so moved, and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and
to share petitioner’s submission that Lt. Leygo was the
credit.17
aggressor. In the nature of things, they naturally reacted the
way they should, i.e. placed petitioner under arrest when
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
ordered by Lt. Leygo.
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in
toto.
Petitioner next contends that Lt. Leygo was not in the
performance of his official duties as a police officer and as
Deputy Chief of Police for Operation and Patrol at the time he
was attacked.

Again, We disagree.

It is a matter of record that at the time of the assault, Lt. Leygo

was engaged in the actual performance of his official duties. He
was wearing the designated police uniform and was on board a
police car conducting a routinary patrol when he first came
upon the truck unloading chicken manure. Because the
unloading of chicken dung was a violation of La Trinidad
Municipal Ordinance No. 1-91, the lieutenant ordered the truck
driver to return from where he came, but petitioner, in defiance
of such lawful order, commanded the truck driver to return to
Shilan, the place where the truck was first intercepted, and on
being informed that the same truck had returned, the lieutenant
had every reason to assume it did return for the purpose of
unloading its cargo of chicken dung, thus stopped it from doing
so.

Under the circumstances, it simply defies reason to argue that

Lt. Leygo was not in the performance of his lawful duties as a
police officer when the assault upon him was perpetrated by the
petitioner.

Nor are we impressed by petitioner’s submission that the

prosecution’s failure to present the doctor, who examined Lt.
Leygo, proved disastrous to the People’s case, arguing that the
alleged injury of Lt. Leygo cannot be proved without the
testimony of the attending physician.