PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
COMPILATION OF ATTY GCC’S
DISCUSSIONS ONLINE
Representation of Conflicting Interests
Quiambao v. Bamba:
Lawyer was counsel of a plaintiff in an ejectment
case where the latter was the President of a
corporation. After said plaintiff resigned from the
corporation and while said ejectment case is
pending, a replevin case was filed against her by the
same corporation, represented by the same lawyer,
for recovery of a car assigned to her as a service
vehicle;
Defenses:
a) made to believe that part of function as counsel
for corporation is to handle personal cases of its
officers;
b) ejectment case and replevin cases are unrelated
cases, fraught with different issues, parties and
subject matters
SC:
a) Good faith or honest intention “does not make the
prohibition inoperative”; lawyers are not obliged to
act either as adviser or advocate for every person
and they have the right to decline such employment
subject to Canon 14 of the CPR
b) Representation of opposing clients in two cases,
though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interest, or,
at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing; it is
enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of
whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the
nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective
retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both
clients
c) There is also conflict of interests when a lawyer
who has financial interest in a security agency, a
President at that, engaged in a business competing
with his existing client, one cannot help entertaining a
doubt on his loyalty to his existing client; applies (a)
with respect to the same general matter however
slight the adverse interest may be, and (b) even if the
conflict pertains to the lawyer’s private activity or in
the performance of function in a non-professional
capacity; criterion is probability, not certainty, of
conflict
GCC :
The second test was applied by SC in both
circumstances of conflict of interests: “whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
of that duty”.
San Jose Homeowners Assn. v. Romanillos
Lawyer represented an association before the HSRC
(now HLURB) against a developer for violation of PD
957 alleging that a lot designated as school site was
sold to third parties without disclosing it as a school
site. While still counsel of association, lawyer
represented third parties in requesting the
association’s conformity to construct a school
building. When the said request was denied, lawyer
applied for clearance before HLURB in behalf of said
third parties. Lawyer also acted as counsel for a third
party who substituted for the developer in a civil case
filed by the association against the developer before
the RTC. Lawyer was admonished by SC but he
continued to represent the said third party before CA
and SC and even moved for execution of decision.
Defense:
Association never questioned the propriety of the
continued representation of a third party
SC:
It is inconsequential that the association never
questioned the propriety of the continued
representation; the lack of opposition does not mean
tacit consent; as long as the lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing clients,
he is guilty of violating his oath; written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts is
necessary
GCC:
a) There are 2 disbarment cases mentioned in the
case
b) Good faith as a defense was found in the report of
the Investigating Commissioner in the first disbarment
case
c) The issue in the present case (second disbarment
case) is – notwithstanding the admonition, the lawyer
continued to represent the third party
Northwestern University, Inc. v. Arquillo
In a labor case, lawyer appeared as counsel for both
complainants (8 of 18 complainants) and respondent
(1 of 10 respondents); said respondent, represented
by the lawyer, submitted a Motion to Dismiss and
sixteen days later, the said complainants filed their
Position Paper, represented by the same lawyer
Defense:
The parties were on the same side theorizing that the
decision of the LA absolved the respondent of
personal liability for illegal dismissal.
SC:
There is an obvious conflict of interests because the
dismissed employees were complainants in the same
cases in which the respondent was one of the
respondents, regardless of the lawyer’s alleged belief
that they were all on the same side
Paz v. Sanchez
Lawyer was engaged by complainant in buying
properties from tenant-farmers
2 cases are involved, DARAB and RTC:
1) in DARAB case, lawyer filed a case against his
1
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
former client (complainant) for annulment of TCT of
property, one of properties purchased by
complainant with the lawyer’s assistance;
2) in RTC case, lawyer filed the case against his
former client (complainant) for annulment of title
Defense:
The lawyer felt that it was his “duty and responsibility”
to file the case because he felt responsible for the
cancellation of the title and its subsequent transfer in
complainant’s name; he “will be forever bothered by
his conscience” if he did not file the case
SC:
Good faith and honest intentions do not excuse the
violation of the prohibition
GCC note:
SC noted that respondent did not specifically deny
representing conflicting interests. So there is a need
to specifically deny an allegation in an administrative
case against a lawyer, otherwise, it could be
considered as an admission against the said lawyer.
Lim, Jr. v. Vilarosa
Lawyer represented clients in a civil case for recovery
of possession of property involving a hotel owned by
a corporation; in the criminal case, lawyer was
counsel of respondents in a criminal case for BP 22
issued by the said corporation for the construction of
the hotel; in another criminal case, the lawyer
positioned himself against the corporation’s interests;
in another collection case against the corporation,
the lawyer appeared as counsel of the contractor
SC:
a) Even if the corporation is not specifically named as
party-litigant, the prohibition, citing the book of
Pineda, stands even if the adverse interest is very
slight;
b) Citing the book of Pineda, even respondent’s
alleged effort to settle existing controversy among
family members was improper as a lawyer who acts
as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of
the parties to it
Capinpin, Jr. v. Cesa, Jr.
Complainant executed a Real Estate Mortgage on
his lot in favor of a corporation as security for a loan.
Due to complainant’s default in payment, the
corporation initiated foreclosure proceedings against
the lot. Complainant availed of several legal
remedies to stop the said foreclosure proceedings
and the corporation was represented by the
respondent, a lawyer, in the said proceedings. The
same lawyer extended help to the complainant by
negotiating with the corporation for the reduction of
the loan payment and cessation of the foreclosure
proceedings. For this, the lawyer received money
from the complainant.
Defense: the negotiation was with the knowledge of
client (corporation)
SC:
a) there is substantial evidence to hold the lawyer
liable; there is conflict of interests – that of the
corporation (to be able to foreclose and obtain best
amount it could get to cover the loan obligation)
and that of complainant (to forestall the foreclosure
and settle the loan obligation for a lesser amount);
b) knowledge of client will not exonerate because
there is no record of any written consent from any of
the parties, especially from the corporation
GCC note:
Written consent is required from all concerned, not
“from any of the parties” (with due respect)
Now, on the second question of the group exercise -
how can the same lawyer validly represent such
conflicting interests?
Ocampo-Ingcoco v. Yrreverre, Jr.
Lawyer acted as counsel for Billones Spouses,
defendants in a civil case, while acting as counsel for
a defendant-intervenor in the same case
SC:
There is no violation as written conformity was
obtained after full disclosure of the facts of case;
Billones Spouses even submitted a verified written
manifestation of conformity
Here is a follow-up question in relation to this topic
which you may wish to answer:
Are the following defense/s valid?
a) Not enough lawyers to serve the exploding
population
b) Good faith or honest intention
c) The lawyer felt that it was his “duty and
responsibility” to file the case because he felt
responsible for the cancellation of the title and its
subsequent transfer in complainant’s name; he “will
be forever bothered by his conscience” if he did not
file the case
d) With the knowledge of one client
e) With the knowledge of all clients
➢ ALL ARE NOT VALID DEFENSES.
What is the effect of termination of relation insofar as
the proscription against representation of conflicting
interests is concerned? (Agpalo)
➢ None, except with written consent of all
concerned after full disclosure of the facts.
Reason: Client’s confidence, once reposed, cannot
be divested by the expiration of professional
engagement.
2
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
Does the prohibition against representation of
conflicting interests apply even if the lawyer has not
acquired confidential information from a former
client?
➢ Yes.
a) A bare attorney-client relationship will
suffice.
b) If the prohibition is made to depend on
whether the attorney has acquired
confidential information, it will of necessity
call for investigation of that question and will
lead only to the revelation in advance of trial
of matters that may further prejudice the
former client. In addition, the inquiry will
violate the confidential relation (Hilado v.
David, cited in Agpalo).
Q: Can we safely say therefore, Atty., that the
exempting circumstance under Rule 15.03 of Canon
15 is exclusive?
It is exclusive in the sense that it is only when there is
a written consent of all concerned after full
disclosure of the facts that a lawyer would not be
liable administratively notwithstanding the existence
of conflicting interests.
Q: Can we safely say that representing conflicting
interest is like that prohibition on confidential
information as to its paramenters? That even if the
case is already terminated, you can no longer file
any case against your former client?
Yes because both are founded on the same
principle of public policy as the lawyer-client
relationship is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. In Quiambao v. Bamba, SC said
that "(i)t behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
important in the administration of justice."
Does the rule apply to a law firm?
a. Rules: the employment of one member of a
law firm is considered as an employment of
the law firm; the employment of a law firm is
equivalent to a retainer of the members
thereof (A.B.A. Opinions, cited in Agpalo)
b. The rules apply even if a lawyer who is a
member of a law firm uses an address
different from the law firm (Agpalo)
c. The rules still apply even if free practice is
given to a member of a law firm.
When is the rule inapplicable?
1. When there is written consent of all concerned
after full disclosure of the facts
2. Where no conflict of interests exists:
a. Where the clients represented have similar
duties and asserting no interest adverse to
that of the other parties (i.e., lawyer
representing an administrator of estate of
deceased wife and subsequently the
administrator of the deceased husband –
Magno v. Gellada, cited in Agpalo)
b. Where complainant desisted from further
prosecution in a criminal action, counsel for
accused may properly prepare, upon
request of complainant, a motion to dismiss
the action and intervene on the latter’s
behalf during the hearing of the motion
(Nombrado v. Hernandez, cited in Agpalo)
3. Where there is no attorney-client relationship:
a. Where none of the parties is a former client
b. A public prosecutor may ethically sustain an
information against an accused who is the
complainant in another information filed by
the same prosecutor because the latter
represents not the private complainant but
the people of the Philippines as the real
offended party (People v. Mediavilla, cited in
Agpalo)
4. When the conflict of interests has ceased
(Agpalo)
Lawyer – Client Relationship
True or False:
The penalty imposable against an erring lawyer for
violation of Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility depends on
the amount of the money involved.
➢ FALSE.
Explanation:
a) In Isalos v. Cristal, SC, on the proper penalty
to be meted, cited cases imposing suspension
for 2 years against erring lawyers who failed to
return the amount;
b) In Isalos case, SC imposed suspension for 1
year as the respondent-lawyer returned the full
amount;
c) There is nothing in Isalos case that the
imposable penalty depends on the amount of
money involved.
Here are my personal notes however:
1) Palencia v. Linsangan: SC said penalty for
violation of Canon 16 of the CPR may result to
disbarment depending on the amount
involved and the severity of the lawyer’s
misconduct. So will note that in that opinion of
the SC, there is an additional requirement aside
from the amount involved, and that is, the
severity of the misconduct.
2) I am not aware of an SC case where the
penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the CPR
depends on the amount.
3
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
True or False:
Business transactions between an attorney and his
client are not allowed.
➢ FALSE.
Explanation:
(a) Canon 16.04 of the CPR states that a lawyer
shall not borrow money from his client unless
the client’s interest are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice.
(b) In HDI v. Cruz, SC said:
1) As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing
with his client but the business transaction must
be characterized with utmost honesty and
good faith.
2) Business transactions between an attorney
and his client are disfavored and discouraged
by the policy of the law.
PROBLEM:
A lawyer received money from a client for the
processing of transfer of land title but it was not used
for the purpose. The money however was returned by
the lawyer to the client when asked to do so. May the
said lawyer be sanctioned for such conduct? Explain
your answer.
You may be surprised last week why I sent a private
message to a group asking about which conduct
was referred to in the answer. Although there were
answers which I did not anymore bother to clarify
because the contexts of the answer to such conduct
are in the subsequent paragraphs.
➢ 2 conducts/misconducts are covered in the
problem. So it is not only one.
1) First is – not using the client’s money for the
purpose.
Basis? Money of client not used for the
purpose is held in trust and under Rule 16.01
of the CPR, a lawyer should account
(Gonoto v. Adaza, cited in Agpalo)
2) Second is – returning to the client the
money only when asked to do so
Basis? In Isalos v. Cristal, HDI Holdings v. Cruz,
Mariano v. Laki, and Huang v. Zambrano, SC
said that money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose but not used for the purpose
should be immediately returned; Note that
SC used the word “immediately”.
Q: To clarify, sir, at what point would the
presumption that the lawyer misappropriated his
client's fund, arise?
The presumption arises upon the failure to return.
Q: what is contemplated by the CPR when it says
"upon demand," if the presumption already arises
upon the lawyer's failure to return, regardless if there
was any demand or not?
The fact that the money was not used will not
always be presumed that it was due to the fault of
the lawyer. Other causes can be the reasons for not
using it. Then, even if not demanded, the lawyer
has to return immediately the money that was not
used for the purpose intended. "Upon demand" can
cover several scenarios like when the lawyer is the
administrator of a client's property and the renters
are paying the rents to the lawyer and based on
agreement, the lawyer is supposed to deliver to the
client such collected rents but failed. So the client
demanded for the delivery of such rents.
On the duty of the lawyer to account:
1. Note the words of the CPR - account for all
money COLLECTED or RECEIVED FOR or FROM
the client – so this may include rent collected by
a lawyer from a tenant, filing fees for filing of an
initiatory pleading in Court.
2. SC calls this Rule 16 of the CPR as the “rule on the
accounting of monies and properties received
by lawyers from clients as well as their return upon
demand” (referring to Canon 16, Rules 16.01,
16.02 and 16.03 of the CPR) [Mariano v. Laki;
Yoshimura v. Panagsagan)
3. Note Capinpin v. Cesa - the fees paid by the
adverse party were considered client’s money
and so the lawyer has the duty to account
4. Note also that receipt by the lawyer of the
downpayment for the property and applied it as
his share in the property violates Canon 16 of the
CPR (Heirs of Carlos v. Linsangan)
5. Note further that money received by a lawyer on
behalf of his client should be accounted for
(Huang v. Zambrano)
Q: Clarification on the matter relating to “rents”
above, this will only happen if the lawyer is given an
authority to collect on behalf of the client? Will this
happen for example the lawyer collected rents
because the client failed to pay his professional
fees?
I submit that in order for the lawyer to be able to
apply the rent collected to his unpaid fees, he must
have the consent of the client. Otherwise, the
lawyer has no authority to apply his client’s money
(rent collected) for his fees, and he should in
instead return the money to his client, without
prejudice to his filing a case to recover his
unsatisfied fees.
GCC:
consent of the client may be obtained after the
lawyer has properly notified the client on the
exercise of his lien.
When should a lawyer account?
➢ The word used by SC is “promptly” (HDI
Holdings).
Where should a lawyer put the client’s funds?
4
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020

1. Not in personal safe deposit vault (Palencia

v. Linsangan) On this duty to serve, please note then the following:

2. The funds should be deposited in a separate GENERAL RULE:

trust account in a bank or trust company of Negligence of counsel binds the client
good repute for safekeeping (Palencia v.
Linsangan) EXCEPTION:

Gross Negligence
On the duty to serve client with competence and
diligence: In re: Abellana v. Paredes, G.R. No. 232006, [July 10,
2019], SC said:
1. Please note that a lawyer is bound to serve the
client with competence and diligence whether “In sum, the negligence and mistakes of
the acceptance is FOR A FEE or FOR FREE (Sps. the counsel are binding on the client, unless
Vargas v. Oriño) the counsel has committed gross negligence. For a
claim of a counsel's gross negligence to prosper,
2. The decision to withdraw from the case due to a nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's
view that the case is unmeritorious IS NOT AN cause must be shown. As well, the
EXCUSE because no formal withdrawal of gross negligence should not be accompanied by
counsel was made (Sps. Vargas v. Oriño) the client's own negligence or malice.”

Q: On #2 sir, so if the withdrawal followed the ATTY GCC:

procedure and a hearing was made with the client, Note that in that case of Abellana v. Paredes, SC
such reason can be cited as a valid ground? declared that gross negligence should not be
accompanied with the client's negligence. So the
the case is unmeritorious is not a valid ground for client must be faultless so it will not be bound by the
withdrawal. In the first place, the lawyer should not counsel's negligence.
have accepted the case.
Consider this case:
Q: But, sir, is it not a violation of his oath if he
continues with an "unmeritorious" case? In Systems and Plan Integrator and Development
Corp. v. Municipal Government of Murcia, G.R. No.
If you based it in Sps. Vargas, that the case is 217121 (Resolution), [March 16, 2016]), SC said:
unmeritorious, as alleged by the lawyer, should have
been considered as a mere afterthought (although “It appears from the records that SPIDC's complaint
SC did not say so). Anyway, when I said that the was dismissed on account of the law
lawyer should not have accepted the case, I based office's negligence. Philhouse Development instructs
it on the principle that once a case is accepted that as a general rule, the dereliction of duty by
and a pleading is filed in court, you will remember the counsel affects the client. As an exception
that the lawyer signed the said pleading and such thereto, the client may be excused from the counsel's
signature of the lawyer signified that there is a good failure only if the former can prove to have been
ground for it. Also, I believe that an "unmeritorious entirely faultless.”
case" is not a valid ground to withdraw.
ATTY GCC:
Q: Hypothetically, assuming that the lawyer is
already estopped, having accepted the case and
My personal note to the client: DO NOT LEAVE THE
having filed appropriate pleadings (since an
FATE OF THE CASE TO THE LAWYER.
"unmeritorious case" is not a valid ground to
withdraw, he has to continue the case), but the
case/suit, in itself, is patently unmeritorious, can the Representation
opposing party file a disciplinary action against the GROUP EXERCISE:
said lawyer for violating his oath through filing a
patently unmeritorious case? To recall, these are the questions asked:

If the answer is in the affirmative, would it not be 1. What are the legal effects of the fact that a non-
unfair for the lawyer, as he belatedly realizes that lawyer represented a party to a case during a trial?
the case is patently unmeritorious, but he can no
longer withdraw form the same, and he risks I purposely sent a reply because I noticed
exposing himself to administrative sanction by the that there were those who assumed that the case
Court? referred to is a civil case.

The answer is in the affirmative. And it is not unfair To reiterate, I asked about "the legal effects
because: of the fact that a non-lawyer represented a party to
a) he has the opportunity, in the first place, to a CASE during a trial". I did not refer specifically to a
accept or decline a case; civil case nor to a criminal case.

(b) he must be very careful with his defenses in the So what are the answers to this question?
admin case where he may have used that defense
of "unmeritorious case" as it may be have You must distinguish or qualify.
repercussions against him.

5
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
➢ My answers to the first question:
a. Sec. 34 of Rule 138, ROC provides:
SECTION 34. By whom litigation conducted.
— In the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court,
a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by
a duly authorized member of the bar.
The said provision was applied by SC in a
civil case, special proceedings or cadastral
case in Santos v. Lacurom. In Cruz v.
Mijares, it was a civil case before the RTC.
b. In a criminal case, an accused shall be
entitled to be present and to defend
himself in person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings, citing Rule 115 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. So
a denial of due process can be
successfully invoked if a non-lawyer
represents the accused during trial. This is
subject however to waiver, citing Art. 6,
Civil Code and Art. III of the Constitution
(during custodial investigation) (People v.
Tulin)
But note in Cruz v. Mijares, citing People v.
Holgado, that the right to counsel during a
trial cannot be waived. In Holgado, the
accused, unaided by counsel, entered a
qualified plea to kidnapping and serious
illegal detention and the judge did not
comply with 4 important duties when an
accused appears without an attorney:
1. Inform the accused that it is his right
to have an attorney before being
arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the
court must ask him if he desires the aid
of an attorney;
3. If he desires and is unable to employ
attorney, the court must assign
attorney de oficio; and
4. If the court desires to procure an
attorney of his own, the court must
grant him a reasonable time therefor) –
this is denial of fair hearing in violation
of due process clause in the
Constitution.
2. May a disbarred lawyer appear in court to defend
himself or herself in a case? Explain your answer.
Again, you will note in the question that I did not
specify the kind of case. So you must again
distinguish or qualify.
➢ My answers? The same as in number 1.
3. Is the appearance by a Clerk of Court for herself
and on behalf of her co-plaintiff in a civil case
proper? Explain your answer.
In this case, you will note that I have specified the
kind of case involved - a civil case. And I know that
you immediately remembered the case of
Maderada v. Mediodea.
So the answers are:
➢ In respect to herself, it was proper pursuant to
Sec. 34 of Rule 138, ROC.
In respect to the co-plaintiff, it was improper
because the COC did not have any
authority from SC, citing the case of
Maderada of course.
Q: Is it correct to say that for clerks of court who are
not members of the BAR, but are law graduates,
they can only represent themselves, but they are
absolutely prohibited from representing a co-
plaintiff?
My answer is not necessarily because they can still
represent others under Sec. 34 of Rule 138 provided
they have obtained authority from SC.
On the appearance of the COC before the Court
where he or she works as COC, I believe there is
conflict of interests there as it may invite suspicion
of double-dealing.
Q: what if she was authorized but then the case
was filed in the court where she works as Clerk of
Court, will she be allowed to represent her co-
plaintiff?
I am not really sure the extent of the permission
granted by SC to COC in the engagement of
private practice of law. What I am sure of is that
there should a provision that the permission should
not impair the efficiency of the COC. Just like
judges and justices, they may teach provided after
office hours and that it will not impair efficiency. So
going back to the COC, I believe the COC cannot
be present in his or her office and at the same time
appear before a Court.
4. Discuss the extent of the authority of a lawyer to
appear for and bind a party in a case both at the trial
court and the appellate court.
Sec. 21 of Rule 138 provides for a
presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of
his client and while a lawyer is not required to present
proof of his representation, when a court requires that
he show such authorization, it is imperative that he
show his authority to act. Also, an attorney-client
relationship terminates upon death of either client or
the lawyer. (Villahermosa, Sr. v. Caracol)
The same Rule also provides the presumption
of representation of a client on appeal:
SECTION 22. Attorney who appears in lower court
presumed to represent client on appeal. — An
attorney who appears de parte in a case before a
lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a
formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the
appellate court.
On Self-Representation:
6
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
1. This kind of representation is also known as “in
propria persona” (Maderada v. Mediodea). You
mentioned this kind of representation in your
answers as "pro se" representation or practice
which is also correct;
2. Based on Santos v. Lacurom and Cruz v. Mijares,
Sec. 34 of Rule 138 applies in the RTC. Besides,
said Rule provides that in “… any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar.” Note the word “or” used under the
rule;
3. Note, according to SC (Cruz v. Mijares), the said
rule applies in a civil case and not in a criminal
case, citing People v. Holgado, which speaks of
the constitutional right of an accused to be
heard by HIMSELF and OF COUNSEL [Constitution,
Art. III, Sec. 14 (2)] and during the trial, the right to
counsel cannot be waived (Flores v. Ruiz). This
case of Flores was a footnote in the case of Cruz
v. Mijares;
Here are my observations in the case of Cruz v.
Mijares:
a) Note the word “and” used in Art. III of the
Constitution.
b) Note also that in the Flores case (Flores v. Ruiz),
a contempt charge partakes of the nature of a
criminal prosecution, and the case of People v.
Holgado was the basis of SC for emphasizing the
constitutional right of an accused to be heard
where even the most intelligent or educated
man, without counsel, may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.
c) SC also said in Flores that the practice has
always been for the trial court to provide the
accused with a counsel de oficio, if he has no
counsel of his own choice, or cannot afford one.
4. According to SC, during the course of
proceedings, a party should not be allowed to
shift from one form of representation to another
(Santos v. Lacurom). Hope you remember these
forms of representation;
5. “lead counsel” is the lawyer on either side of a
litigated action who is charged with the principal
management and direction of the party’s case,
compared to “collaborating counsel or
subordinate” (Santos v. Lacurom);
Here, you should remember the duty of a lead
counsel (as cited in Lacurom).
We will discuss about collaborating counsel and
the legal effects of decisions, orders and notices
served to a party having two or more counsels in
our Legal Forms class.
Here are my personal notes on self-representation
which are not covered by the cases assigned:
1. Estoesta v. CA 9GR 92349, Nov. 9, 1990 – MTC and
RTC, petitioner was represented by counsel; when
elevated to CA, she chose to handle her case
personally; SC said that it is always better for a party
to be represented by counsel in a litigation.
Nevertheless, it is the right of such party to appear in
his or her own behalf to prosecute or defend a cause
in court (SC cited Sec. 34 of Rule 138). If in the
process, petitioner suffered reverses, she has only
herself to blame. She is bound by the consequences
of her own voluntary act.
2. In another criminal case, Delgado v. CA L-46392,
Nov. 10, 1986, SC said there was denial of due
process when her lawyer, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is
not a lawyer reasoning that there is great danger
that any defense presented in her behalf will be
inadequate considering the legal requisites and skills
needed in the court proceedings.
3. In a new case, Inacay v. People, GR 223506, Nov
28, 2016, right to counsel is absolute, citing Delgado
v. CA:
a) Inacay case is an estafa case before the RTC
where Inacay was represented by Manila who,
based on the certification from OBC, was not a
lawyer. Manila is the family name, not a place;
b) Inacay was convicted by RTC and affirmed by CA;
c) Before SC, Inacay claimed he was denied due
process since he was not represented by a lawyer
and SC granted the petition and remanded the case
to the RTC for new trial.
On representation by non-lawyer.
People v. Tulin:
It was contended by Tulin, et al. that the trial erred in
allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken
during the time they were represented by Mr.
Posadas, a non-lawyer, in a Manifestation (Exhibit 20),
thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to
procedural due process.
SC held:
a) That an accused shall be entitled to defend
himself in person and by counsel at every stage
of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of judgment (citing Rule 115 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
b) That under the same Rule 115, upon motion, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in
person when it sufficiently appears to the court
that he can properly protect his rights without the
assistance of counsel. In this case, the rights of
the accused were sufficiently protected by the
appearance of Mr. Posadas because he new the
technical rules of procedure
c) That the said right of the accused can be
waived (citing Art. 6 of the Civil Code of the
Phils.)
d) In this case, there was a waiver of the right to
sufficient representation during the trial because
the Manifestation by said accused were made
with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. The
said Manifestation stated the following:
7
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
1. That the accused were apprised of the nature
and legal consequences of the subject
manifestation;
2. That the accused voluntarily and intelligently
executed the same; and
3. That the accused affirmed the truthfulness of its
contents when asked in open court (per TSN)
Here are my personal notes on representation by
non-lawyer not covered by the cases in the Syllabus:
1) US v. Escalante (GR 12442, Aug. 10, 1917 En Banc) –
right to counsel is a renounceable right; it is waived
when the defendant voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court and proceeds with the
defense; also when the accused fails to raise a
question of his right and only did so for the first time
before SC;
2) Sayson v. People (GR 51745, Oct. 28, 1988) – there
is nothing in the Constitution nor in any law prohibiting
waiver of a right to counsel; so denial of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver
of rights has been made; 7 postponements of the
accused were considered dilatory and there being
no meritorious case, so the accused was considered
to have waived his rights;
3) People v. Serzo, Jr. (GR 118435, June 20, 1997 ) – it
is the right to counsel de parte that may be waived;
thus the court may restrict the accused’s option to
retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an
attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is
not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to
represent for a valid reason;
4) People v. Sesbreño (GR 121764, Sept. 9, 1999) – the
accused is a practicing lawyer of long standing,
initially, he was assisted by counsel of his choice but
he later terminated due to disagreements and took
full control of his defense; despite admonitions of the
trial court, the accused persisted in his decision to try
his own case; the accused also brushed aside the
court’s offer of assistance by PAO and declared that
there is no need therefor;
5) People v. Bodoso (GR 149382-83, March 5, 2003) –
case was remanded by SC to ascertain appellant’s
volition to the waiver.
On appearance.
1. No written authority is required; in actual
practice, it is always prudent to file a written
appearance in Court to avoid any complications
in the future and as there are Courts which
require a written appearance first before
recognizing a lawyer
2. Remember: General Appearance v. Special
Appearance
When you physically appear in court by way of
special appearance, make sure to use the word
“special”; special appearance is also the term
used when challenging jurisdiction of a court by
way of pleading or motion
3. Unauthorized appearances were held in the
following:
a. Que v. Revilla:
Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by
respondent-lawyer on behalf of 49
individuals: 31 gave their consent while the
other 15 did not; belief that majority of the
litigants who signed the certification of non-
forum shopping already gave the lawyer the
necessary authority to sign for the others was
considered highly improbable considering
that respondent was a seasoned lawyer;
Complaint for Annulment of Title impleading
the Republic as plaintiff and signed the
amended complaint on behalf of his clients
and the Republic: respondent knew that only
the OSG can legally represent the Republic
in actions for reversion of land.
b. Villahermosa, Sr. v. Caracol – while a lawyer is
presumed to have authority when he
appeared before DARAB, an attorney-client
relationship terminates upon death of either
client or the lawyer.
Responsible & Professional Behavior; Duty to a
Colleague, IBP
Group Exercise
1) How should a lawyer conduct himself in his
dealings with the opposing litigant in a case and the
latter’s counsel?
➢ There should be two answers, first - on the
opposing litigant, second - on the opposing
litigant's counsel.
On the opposing litigant.
We have the case of Buenviaje v. Magdamo.
In Buenviaje, a lawyer (Magdamo) who sent a letter
(Notice of Death of Depositor) to BPI referring to
Buenviaje (the respondent in the bigamy case filed
by the lawyer’s clients who were siblings of Fe, the
wife of Buenviaje) as a “swindler”, “fugitive from
justice as he has been hiding from the criminal
charge”, and referring the marriage documents of
Buenviaje and Fe as “spurious” and that “Fe never
had a husband or child in her entire life”.
SC held that the lawyer’s actuations are
IRRESPONSIBLE AND UNPROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR.
Let us look at the following justifications of SC:
▪ On “swindler”, that such imputation was with
pure malice for he had no evidence that
Buenviaje is committing swindling activities
and this was aggravated by the fact that
such imputation was made in a forum which
is not a party to the legal dispute between
Fe’s siblings and Buenviaje; that even if he
was suspicious of Buenviaje, he should have
refrained from name-calling for a mere filing
of a complaint does not guarantee a finding
8
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
of guilt and that an accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty;
▪ On marriage documents as “spurious”,
without the court’s pronouncement, the
lawyer is in no position to draw conclusions
and pass judgment as to the existence and
validity or nullity of the marriage as that is not
his job;
▪ On “fugitive from justice”, this is incredulous
according to SC as the case number 7H-
103365 is the same bigamy case before the
prosecutor’s office where there was no
resolution yet from said office and there is no
evidence that Buenviaje had any intent to
flee prosecution; a mere charge does not
suffice, there must be sufficient evidence to
support the charge;
▪ The statements were not only improper but it
also tended to mislead BPI into thinking that
Buenviaje is a swindler and a fugitive as it
was made without hesitation notwithstanding
the absence of any evidentiary support;
▪ Though a lawyer’s language may be
forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity
of the legal profession;
▪ In support of the cause of their clients,
lawyers have the duty to present every
remedy or defense within the authority of the
law.
On the opposing litigant's counsel.
There are three (3) answers which I would like you to
consider. These are the following:
a. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), Canon 8, it is stated that “(a) lawyer
shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues,
and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.”
Note that this should be your answer if you are
asked of the principal obligation of a lawyer to
his professional colleagues under the CPR.
b. Roque v. Balbin, a complaint for unprofessional
conduct against respondent who allegedly
made various calls and send text messages
and e-mails to complainant, his friends and
clients threatening to file disbarment and
criminal suits against the complainant and to
publicize suits to besmirch his name and
reputation.
The Supreme Court said in Roque:
▪ Lawyers should treat their opposing
counsels and other lawyers with
courtesy, dignity and civility; treat one
another with trust and respect; any
undue ill feeling between clients
should not influence counsels in their
conduct and demeanor toward each
other; mutual bickering, unjustified
recriminations and offensive behavior
among lawyers not only detract from
the dignity of the legal profession but
also constitute HIGHLY
UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT subject to
disciplinary action.(emphasis mine)
▪ Resort to personal attacks
(respondent’s acts of repeatedly
intimidating, harassing and
blackmailing complainant with
purported administrative and criminal
cases and prejudicial media
exposures) violates Canon 8 of the
CPR; such acts were tools to return the
inconvenience suffered by his client;
such actions demonstrated a misuse of
legal processes as the aim of a suit is to
render justice, not to harass parties;
they show lack of respect and
despicable behavior towards a
colleague; a violation of Canon 19
that a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or
baseless criminal case or cases against
the adversaries of his client designed
to secure a leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield or withdraw their
own cases against the lawyer’s client.
c. Under the Code of Professional Ethics (CPE):
You may refer to the following Canons: Canon
7 (shall not encroach upon the business of
another lawyer), Canon 9 (deal only with
counsel when party is so represented), Canon
22 (frank and fair), Canon 24 (not to enforce
the opposite lawyer to trial under certain
circumstances), Canon 25 (not to take
technical advantage of opposite counsel),
Canon 41 (promptly inform injured party or his
counsel upon discovery that some fraud or
deception has been practiced).
Q: let's assume that there is a pending high-profile
civil case, there is no gag order, and the lawyer of
one of the parties was interviewed by media about
a matter relating to the case.The lawyer,
responding to the questions raised by media,
referred to the adverse party as a thief and an
immoral man (the adverse party having been
previously administratively sanctioned for an
offense involving a misappropriation of money, and
the adverse party having been previously
convicted for entering into a bigamous marriage).
Would it also be a violation of Canon 8 even if it is
of public record that the adverse party, indeed,
been previously sanctioned for misappropriation
and convicted for bigamy? Also, considering that,
although true, the statements of the lawyer "was
made in a forum which is
not a party to the legal dispute" between his client
and the adverse party?
ATTY GCC:
I believe Carlo that there is a violation. My reasons
are: 1) the reference to "thief" and "immoral man" is
9
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
not accurate, it may be argued that a man
convicted of misappropriation may not be
considered a "thief" and that one convicted of
bigamy may not be considered "immoral"; 2) the
name-calling may not be relevant to the civil case,
even if the questions were raised by media; 3) the
media is not the proper forum.
Q: Would it violate the CPR if, over the course of
negotiations regarding an amicable settlement
between parties, the lawyer of the plaintiff (A) uses
something that he has over the lawyer of the
adverse party (B) as leverage in getting the
adverse party to agree to the terms of the plaintiff?
Specifically, what if there was a previous altercation
between A and B where B punched and injured A,
and A threatens B that if he does not convince his
client to agree to the terms of the settlement, he
would file a criminal case of serious physical injuries
against B?
ATTY GCC:
There would be a violation of the CPR Carlo. I
believe that falls under Canon 8. And that was
what happened in the case of Roque where SC
applied Canon 8. Note though that the above-
cited Canons of the CPE can also apply.
Follow up Q:
But, what if, in the course of negotiations, the
lawyer of the plaintiff leverages the exercise/non-
exercise of a right that he has over the adverse
party or the lawyer of the adverse party, in ensuring
that the adverse party would agree to their
proposed terms?
For example, sir, lawyer for A (plaintiff) is a creditor
of B (adverse party). B asked A's lawyer for an
extension in paying his debt, and A said that he
would only agree if B considers the terms of their
proposed compromise settlement in a civil case. In
using his being a creditor of the adverse party as
leverage in the negotiation process, can that be
considered as a violation of Canon 8? Specifically,
does that fall under "harassing tactics" as
mentioned in Canon 8? Or is the lawyer of A
justified in using his being a creditor of the adverse
party as a leverage in the negotiation process?
Note that the lawyer of A did not really threaten
the adverse party (B). He merely said that he would
agree to extending the payment period if B agrees
to the compromise settlement.
So, if B does not agree with the proposed
settlement, then A's lawyer can rightfully exercise
his right to demand payment from B upon the
debt's maturity.
Atty Gcc:
I believe that will not fall under Canon 8 because
this Canon is towards colleagues but in your
problem, the lawyer of A was communicating to an
adverse party. This situation however fall under the
CPE, check Canon 9, which states that a lawyer
must avoid everything that may tend to mislead a
party. If there is nothing that tends to mislead the
party, then there is no violation.
2) Do postponements of the hearings of a civil case
merit an administrative penalty against a lawyer?
Explain your answer.
The answer to this questions needs a qualification.
➢ In Chua v. De Castro, an administrative liability
and sanction depend on whether the
postponements showed abuse or whether there
is proof that the delay is due to malice,
dishonesty, or deceit or grave misconduct.
The operative phrase, according to the Supreme
Court (SC), for causing delay in any suit or
proceeding under Rule 1.03 is “for any corrupt
motive or interest”.
In the case of Chua, please note the following:
▪ SC said that the complainant has the
burden to prove deliberate intention to
do wrong or cause damage to him and
his business;
▪ The postponements were mostly
sanctioned by the court which negated
or foreclosed malice, or dishonesty, or
deceit or grave misconduct;
▪ The following grounds relied upon are
not flimsy excuses: possibility of amicable
settlement, trips abroad for emergency
medical treatment and attend son’s
graduation;
➢ Even if the lawyer was not held guilty
of causing delay for corrupt motive or
interest, the lawyer was admonished
because it is the duty of a lawyer to assist
in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice; citing Miwa v.
Medina, SC said that members of the
Bard are exhorted to handle only as
many cases as they can efficiently
handle, qualification to handle is not
enough as a lawyer is required to
prepare adequately and give
appropriate attention to his legal work.
Q: On the last point of the case(Chua) on which
the lawyer was admonished sir, what would be our
gauge if our postponements now violates such
case? How many postponements would be okay
sir? With a premise that the reason is valid
Atty GCC:
On the admonition, there is no gauge as the duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice is very broad. It can happen to just one
case or two cases or more handled by a lawyer. It
can also happen to just one unmeritorious
postponement. In practice, though, the judge
would normally count how many postponements
have already been filed by the lawyer in a case but
there is no standard, it could be 2, 3 or more
postponements.
Follow up Q:
But would the judge, who approve the
postponements should be equally liable?
ATTY GCC:
Judges have the discretion. For as long as there is
NO corrupt motive or interest and there is no
10
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
violation of the rules prescribed by SC, the judge
cannot be held liable.
3) You are a lawyer and a prospective client
approached you for assistance in the recovery of
ownership and possession involving a parcel of land
consisting of 1,000 square meters. It was verbally
agreed that a portion of the said parcel of land would
constitute your attorney’s fees to the extent only of
200 square meters. You have to prepare a written
agreement between you and your prospective client
and thereafter have the same agreement signed.
(a) How would you indicate in the said agreement
the following matters?
1. Professional services to be rendered by you;
2. Your attorney’s fees - a portion of the lot to the
extent of 200 square meters only; and
3. Effectivity of agreement.
➢ In Sps. Jacinto v. Bangot, SC taught us how a
lawyer should draw up terms of a professional
engagement – he or she SHOULD NOT PRACTICE
DECEIT and that clients are entitled to RESCIND
the written agreement on the professional fees if
the terms thereof contravened the true
agreement of the parties.
In that case, SC said that respondent did not
observe candor and fairness in his dealings with
his clients because of the following:
▪ Respondent had evinced an instinctive
interest in the property of complainants;
▪ Respondent had the MOA executed at
the same time he filed a Manifestation
for Information before the Court that was
hearing the LRC case;
▪ Respondent’s proposal to have the MOA
executed was meant to impress that his
supposed attorney’s fees would be paid
on contingent basis however the MOA
indicates that the payment of the fees is
being made immediately effective upon
execution of the agreement.
➢ According to SC, the deceit was shown by the
following:
▪ Changing the property ostensibly agreed
upon with the bigger lot as payment for legal
services;
▪ Enforcing the MOA against the clients
through an action for specific performance.
So what should we watch out in crafting an
agreement with a client based on the Sps.
Jacinto case?
• Specify the property that would serve as
payment of attorney’s fees;
• Proportion between the amount of
attorney’s fees and the effort or service
already performed or still to be performed;
• SC cited the factors in Rule 20.1 of the CPR –
so the filing of a 2-paged Manifestation for
Information was disproportionate with the
300 square meters in area as attorney’s fees;
the reasons given by SC: the Manifestation
was not even a precursor of the promised
petition for certiorari; nothing was done after
the filing of the said Manifestation; property
was of substantial value; lawyer was bent on
obtaining the property and refused the offer
of cash;
• The agreement must show the contingent
fee agreement (subject to the stipulation
that counsel will be paid for his legal services
only if the suit prospers).
(b) How will you ensure that the said Agreement is
freely entered into and in good faith?
In the same case of Sps. Jacinto v. Bangot, the
lessons that can be drawn are the following:
• Ensure that the clients have read and understood
the contents of the agreement;
• The MOA must be completely signed by the parties
and witnesses;
• The terms of the MOA must reflect the true
intentions of the parties (i.e., area agreed must be
the one reflected and the lawyer shall not change
any of the terms of the MOA without the conformity
of the clients).
I. Irresponsible and/or Unprofessional behavior:
1. Pasok v. Zapatos – a retired judge who took on
a case that he had intervened in during his
incumbency as a judge.
Please note the following in Pasok:
(a) Rule 6.03 of the CPR which prohibits a
lawyer not to accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service;
(b) The restriction in Rule 6.03 of the CPR would
last beyond the tenure of the retired judge.
2. Cabiles v. Cedo – a lawyer who did not
diligently and fully attend to the cases he
accepted although he had been fully
compensated for them: 1) already paid in
advance an appearance fee of P2,000 for a
scheduled hearing but failed to appear; 2)
already received the sum of P45,000 to file an
unjust vexation case but failed to promptly file
and the crime prescribed.
3. Palencia v. Palangan – where lawyers, with
paralegals, went to a hospital several times to
convince a patient to hire their services and
failed to give accurate accounting of amounts
due to the client and to return the money due
to the client upon demand.
Please note the following in Palencia:
(a) Malpractice – ambulance chasing;
(b) Gross misconduct – failure to handle client’s
11
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020

money with great degree of fidelity and lack of
good faith.
4. Mariano v. Laki – a lawyer failed to perform his
duty to account the money of the client
(failure to file a petition for annulment of
marriage despite receipt of acceptance fee
and failed to account it) and the deceitful
assurances of being able to secure a favorable
decision without the client’s personal
appearance because of a “friendly judge”
who is receptive of annulment cases.
respect) cannot apply because this rule is a
prohibition against professional competition or
“stealing another’s client” and there is nothing in
Cabalida case about this; Canon 8 applies
though because it is very encompassing; Canon
8 reads – a lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel;
2) I agree on the application of CPE, citing
Camacho.

5. Lopez v. Cristobal – a lawyer failed to render

any legal service (failed to file the required ON IBP
position paper per court’s order) after
receiving an acceptance fee and to properly
withdraw from the case. 1. IBP – composed of all persons whose names now
appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll
6. Fuji v. Dela Cruz – a BI Special Prosecutor who of Attorneys of SC (Rule 139, Sec. 1); 9 Regions
failed to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing (we belong to Eastern Visayas) (Rule 139-A, Sec.
the immigration records of an alien which 3); a Chapter shall be organized in every
resulted to the alien’s wrongful detention (the province and every city shall be considered as
records revealed that the alien was not part of the province except as provided in Sec. 4
overstaying as there was a change of status (where Cebu City is expressly stated that a
from 9A to 9G and the lawyer would have separate chapter shall be organized); House of
found this out upon careful review of the Delegates of not more than 120 members who
records). shall be apportioned among all chapters as
nearly as may be according to the number of
ON DUTY TO A COLLEAGUE their respective members, each chapter shall
have at least one Delegate (Rule 139-A, Sec. 5)
1) In Camacho v. Pangulayan, lawyers were found
liable for violation of Canon 9 of the CPE as they 2. Integrated Bar v. Bar Associations Differences?
negotiated with the students and their parents
without communicating the matter to their lawyer a. Compulsory v. voluntary
b. Membership is sine qua non for practicing v.
Please note that under the CPE, mere it is not sine qua non
communication is a violation (see Canon 9 of the c. Violation of rules on membership is sufficient
CPE). cause for disbarment or suspension of a
lawyer from practice v. it is not a sufficient
cause
Is a mere notice/information to adverse counsel
sufficient compliance to Canon 9 of the CPE? 3. Non-political Bar
➢ In Cabalida v. Lobrido, Jr., SC said: a. Note: Rule 139-A, Sec. 13:
“… No lawyer holding an elective, judicial,
Atty. Pondevilla “SHOULD HAVE, AT THE VERY quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the
LEAST, GIVEN NOTICE to Atty. Lobrido prior to Government or any political subdivision or
the submission of the Memorandum of instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for
Agreement to court”. (Emphasis made) election or appointment in the Integrated
Bar or any Chapter thereof. A delegate,
In Cabalida, SC cited Binay-an v. Addog Governor, Officer or employee of the
saying “…six months suspension on a lawyer Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of
who issued an affidavit of desistance with any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso
opposing parties BUT WITHOUT INFORMING facto resigned from his position as of the
THEIR COUNSEL.” (Emphasis made) moment he files his certificate of candidacy
for any elective public office or accepts
Please note the following in Cabalida appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any
2 justifications of SC: political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof.”
1) Canon 8.02 of the CPR – when Atty.
Pondevilla negotiated with Cabalida without b. Sec. 4 of By-Laws allows only private
consulting Atty. Lobrido; practitioners to occupy any position (cited in
Tabuzo v. Gomos)
2) CPE, citing Camacho v. Pangulayan.
4. May a member be sanctioned for not paying the
ATTY GCC (with due respect to SC): annual IBP dues?

1) Rule 8.02 (instead of Canon 8.02, with due Default in payment for 6 months shall warrant
suspension of membership and default to make

12
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020

such payment for 1 year shall be a ground for

removal of the delinquent member (In re Edillon, 2) In the immediately preceding number, do you
84 SCRA 554 cited in BM 1370; see Rule 139-A, agree with the said ruling? Explain and justify your
Sec. 10). answer.

5. IBP Commissioners may be held administratively
liable only in relation to their functions as IBP
officers (Tabuzo v. Gomos); they cannot be
disciplined like public officers as they are not
public officers; they are under the administrative
supervision of SC and governed by the rules
promulgated by SC relative to the IBP and to the
practice of law (my note: SC did not specify
what those rules are, with due respect)
Your answers here vary - based of course on your
answer in the immediately preceding question.
Here are your answers to this second question:
(a) “fair requirement” (referring to preponderance of
evidence) as it is not burdensome as proof beyond
reasonable doubt, citing the presumption of
innocence in favor of lawyer;

a. Is a lawyer who is a senior citizen exempt (b) akin to "administrative proceedings” which
from the payment of IBP dues? require substantial evidence;
No, as the law (RA 7432, as amended)
only grants tax exemptions, not (c) “less onerous for a complainant” (referring to
exemption from payment of IBP dues. substantial evidence);

b. Is a lawyer who was inactive in the (d) "in line with the basic principles of law … to fulfill
practice of law exempt from payment of the end goal of justice – penalty and correction of
dues? behavior" (referring to preponderant evidence;

No (BM 1370 – Letter of Atty. Arevalo); SC
– payment of dues is a necessary
consequence of membership and no
one is exempt, regardless of lack of
practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
(e) “(i)t is settled that for administrative proceedings,
the quantum of proof … is substantial evidence …”
And I find nothing objectionable of your answers.
3) Section 18 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
enunciates the confidentiality rule in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers. When does this rule
apply?

GROUP EXERCISE
1) What is the quantum of proof required in 1. In Tan v. IBP CBD, it was found that petitioners
disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer? Justify cited most of the amendatory averments in
your answer by jurisprudence. respondent’s Verified Answer in the
administrative case as the core of their Amended
Complaint in the civil case.
➢ You were correct when you answered this
question with any of the following: SC held that there was violation of the
confidential nature of the disbarment
(a) substantial evidence proceedings against respondent lawyer
(b) preponderance of evidence because:
(c) clear and convincing evidence.
(a) “(p)etitioners had in effect announced to the
There are decided cases to support any of world the pending disbarment case against
the said quantum of proof. respondent lawyer”;

(b) petitioners did not only disclose the

I will discuss more on this later but here are just ONGOING proceedings;
examples of the said cases:
(c) petitioners DIVULGED most, if not all of the
a. In Arienda v. Aguila, it is preponderance. contents of respondent lawyer’s Verified Answer.
b. In Concerned citizen v. Divina, it is substantial
evidence. 2. In Roque, Jr. v. Catapang, respondents were
c. In Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, it is convincing sued by petitioner for publicly announcing in a
evidence. conference at Camp Aguinaldo that a
d. In Chan v. Go, it is clear, convincing and disbarment complaint had been filed against
satisfactory evidence. petitioner and for distributing a press statement
about the filing of such disbarment complaint.
It is good that you did not answer proof
beyond reasonable doubt. SC held that the confidentiality in disciplinary
actions for lawyers is not absolute and is not to
I am not aware though of a jurisprudence that be applied under any circumstances to all
the proof beyond reasonable doubt was disclosures of any nature. So this rule was not
applied as quantum of proof to disciplinary applied by SC here as:
proceedings.
• The matter had involved public interest;

13
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
• Due to the personalities involved; and
• The announcement that a complaint had been
filed does not violate the confidentiality rule
considering that it did not discuss the disbarment
complaint itself. SC also said that the
confidentiality rules does not extend to mere
existence or pendency of disciplinary actions;
• The press statement does not divulge any acts
or character traits on the part of petitioner that
would damage his personal and professional
reputation, no particulars were given about the
content of the complaint or the actual charges
filed;
• It is unlikely that respondent’s reputation could
be damaged by the factual report that a
complaint had been filed because even before
any case against petitioner had been filed,
media reported that petitioners tweeted publicly
that he looked forward to answering the
complaint before the AFP.
In Roque, Jr., SC said that where there are yet no
proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to
keep private and confidential.
Please note the following cases cited in Roque, Jr.
and their application to the confidentiality rule:
(a) Palad v. Solis – the disciplinary proceeding against
petitioner became a matter of public concern
considering that it arose from his representation of his
client on the issue of video voyeurism on the internet;
(b) Fortun v. Quinsayas – the dissemination of copies
of the disbarment complaint against petitioner to
members of media constitutes contempt of court;
(c) Relativo v. De Leon – premature disclosure by
publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment
proceedings is a violation of confidentiality rule.
4) In a petition for Probate of Last Will and Testament
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), you are the
lawyer of petitioner. An opposition was filed to the
petition on the sole ground that the Last Will and
Testament is a forged document. While the said
petition is pending, an administrative case was filed
against you for presenting to the RTC a forged
document.
(a) Will the said administrative case against you
prosper?
➢ In Tan v. IBP CBD, SC decreed that the CBD is
not empowered to resolve matters which are
pending resolution by the regular courts to
which jurisdiction properly pertains as it is
merely tasked to investigate and make
recommendations on complaints for
disbarment, suspension and discipline of
lawyers and as it is not a regular court
endowed with the power to investigate and
resolve judicial matters pending before
regular courts.
(b) Will your answer be the same if the petition was
already granted by the RTC per decision and which
decision was already final and executory before the
filing of the administrative case?
➢ You may give a qualification whether or not
the RTC decision made a pronouncement on
the culpability of the lawyer.
In Arienda v. Aguila, on whether or not the
marriage contract was falsified is a matter
within the appreciation of the trial judge in
the special proceeding case in which the
subject document was adduced in
evidence.
Also, in Arienda, on whether the lawyer
employed deceit, SC said that there was no
proof presented to show that respondent
deliberately applied deceit as it is the burden
of the complaint to establish it by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. Note
the findings of the Commissioner in this case
that the knowledge of the falsity of the
evidence is an indispensable element and
such knowledge must be proven.
1) Remedies of an aggrieved party:
(a) Administrative (SC, IBP Board, IBP
Chapter where the lawyer belongs)
(b) Civil (Damages)
(c) Criminal (Art. 209 RPC; falsification, use
of falsified document, BP 22, etc.)
Should a complaint in disciplinary proceedings
against a lawyer be verified?
➢ It depends. Why? Look at Sec. 1 which you
cited. The verification qualifies only the
complaint of the IBP but not the Supreme
Court. So this means, if it is at SC, it need
not be verified but if it is at IBP, it needs to
be verified.
2) Grounds for disciplinary proceedings against a
lawyer:
a. Violation of Lawyer’s Oath
b. Statutory grounds in Sec. 27, Rule 138 of ROC
which are:
1. Deceit
2. Malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office
3. Grossly immoral conduct
c. Violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR)
d. Violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics
(CPE)
Does the Canons of Professional Ethics (CPE) still
apply in the Philippines?
(a) I check the books of Pineda and Agpalo and
they did not expressly say that the CPE was already
superseded by the CPR; (b) There is also no
jurisprudence saying that the CPE is repealed by
the CPR; (c) There are however cases decided by
SC that continue to apply the CPE, even to date,
against erring lawyers. Examples of these cases are
Camacho v. Pangulayan and Cabalida v. Lobrido
involving Canon 9 of the CPE. These cases are
among those under this topic in our syllabus.
14
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
These are the answers to the question earlier of Nika
(why do you think any of these three are allowed
by the SC? Why not just choose one quantum of
proof as standard? Or it just depends on what
violations are done by the lawyer?) on quantum of
proof.
1. Hierarchy of evidentiary values (Aba v. De
Guzman, Jr.):
1st, proof beyond reasonable doubt as highest
2nd, clear and convincing evidence
3rd, preponderance of evidence
4th, substantial evidence as the last
2. Different decisions of SC:
a. Arienda v. Aguila (2005) – preponderance of
evidence
SC said: “… In this regard, we find that
complainant failed to meet the required
standard. Thus, absent a showing of clear
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE to sustain the
charge against respondent, the complaint
must be dismissed.” (emphasis mine)
b. Tabang v. Gacott (2004) – preponderance of
evidence
SC said: “In this case, complainants have
shown by a preponderance of evidence that
respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01
of the CPR.” “Given the glaring disparity
between the evidence adduced by
complainants and the sheer lack of evidence
adduced by respondent, this Court is led to no
other reasonable conclusion than that
respondent committed the acts of which he is
accused …”
c. Aba v. De Guzman (2011) – preponderance of
evidence
SC said: “The evidence required in suspension
or disbarment proceedings is preponderance
of evidence.”
d. Concerned citizen v. Divina (2011) – substantial
evidence
SC said: “In administrative proceedings, the
quantum of proof necessary for a finding of
guilt is substantial evidence or such evidence
as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”
e. Goopio v. Maglalang (2018) – substantial
evidence
SC said: “However, in consideration of the
gravity of the consequences of the disbarment
or suspension of a member of the bar, we have
consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to
satisfactorily prove the allegations in his
complaint through substantial evidence.”
f. Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio (2004) –
convincing evidence
SC said: “In disbarment proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving his
case by convincing evidence.” (citing Adarne
v. Aldaba)
g. Chan v. Go (2009) – clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence
SC said: “In disbarment proceedings, the
burden of proof is upon the complainant and
this Court will exercise its disciplinary power only
if the complainant establishes his case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence.” (citing
Aquino v. Villamar-Mangaoang which talks
about convincing evidence or preponderance
of evidence)
So what is the prevailing proper evidentiary threshold
in disciplinary proceedings given those conflicting
decisions of SC?
➢ It is SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. SC has settled
this.
Note the following:
a) Cases - Billanes v. Latido AC 12066, August 28,
2018 (citing Reyes v. Nieva – 2016); Salazar v.
Quiambao AC 12401, March 12, 2019
b) Reasons of SC: “… is more in keeping with the
primordial purpose of and essential
considerations attending to these types of cases”
as disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
sui generis, neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit,
but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers.
On the privacy and confidentiality of disciplinary
proceedings.
1. Please note the following 3-fold purpose (Sec. 18,
Rule 193-B of ROC):
a) To enable the court and the investigator to
make the investigation free from any extraneous
influence or interference;
b) To protect the personal and professional
reputation of attorneys from baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible persons
or clients by prohibiting the publication of such
charges pending their resolution; and
c) To deter the press from publishing the charges
or proceedings based thereon.
2. ATTY GCC: when confronted in the future of a
question about confidentiality and there is no
jurisprudence yet on the matter that can be
applied, please consider its 3-fold purpose (court
and investigator – freedom from any extraneous
influence or interference; attorney – protection
from baseless charges; press – prevention from
publication) in resolving it.
Q: What threshold should we apply in determing
the presence of a public interest aspect in
disciplinary proceedings, if any, sir?
15
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
Atty GCC:
There is no threshold applied by SC on disciplinary
proceedings. What we have are cases where such
public interest was applied - Roque, Jr. and Palad
v. Solis. Note though that SC did not state the
guidelines on how a matter could be considered as
public interest.
GROUP EXERCISE
1. Does the failure of a lawyer to answer a complaint
in a disciplinary proceedings merit a sanction against
him or her? Explain your answer.
➢ It depends on the peculiar circumstances of a
case.
In A-1 Financial Services v. Valerio, it is the
wanton disregard of IBP’s and Court orders in the
course of proceedings that would merit a
sanction. Note that in this case, SC noted that in
Lao v. Medel (deliberate failure to pay just debts
and issuance of worthless checks constituting
gross misconduct) and Rangwani v. Dino (gross
misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of
a piece of property), a lawyer was sanctioned of
1 year suspension, 2-year suspension was
considered reasonable for issuing worthless
checks and failing to pay debts and for wanton
disregard of IBP’s and Court orders in the course
of proceedings.
➢ I believe also that a mere failure to answer a
complaint does not immediately warrant a
sanction from the SC because in most cases, SC
considered other factors. So in A-1 Financial
Services, note the following factors considered by
SC:
1. respondent failed to answer the complaint;
2. despite due notice, she failed to attend the
disciplinary hearings set by IBP;
3. she also ignored the proceedings before the
court – failed to answer the complaint against
her and appear during the arraignment despite
orders and notices form the court;
4. the court considered the justification of the
respondent’s mother as unmeritorious that her
daughter is suffering from a health condition as
the mother failed to prove the contents of the
certificate or present the physician who issued it.
ADDITIONAL INPUTS:
a) Aggravating circumstance:
In my opinion, I believe that the deliberate failure to
answer a complaint in disciplinary proceedings is an
aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the
appropriate sanction against a lawyer. Note that in
A-1 Financial Services, SC emphasized that such
conduct of the lawyer runs counter to the precepts
of the CPR as well as the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the CPR and violates
the lawyer’s oath which imposes upon every member
of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. I believe also that this is aside from the nature
of the offense itself.
b) Indirect contempt:
Further, please note though that a willful failure or
refusal to obey a lawful order issued by an
Investigator of the IBP handling the disciplinary
proceeding constitutes indirect contempt (see Sec. 8
in relation to Sec. 5 of Rule 139-B of the ROC) subject
to compliance with the rules provided.
c) Fine as penalty:
Note further, that in Sps. Regulto v. Teoxon (AC 10301,
April 3, 2019), SC adopted the BOG’s
recommendation to impose a fine of P5,000 for failure
to comply with CBD’s directive to file a comment to
the disbarment complaint.
2. Is a motion for reconsideration a requirement
before the SC can act upon the report of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
(IBP BOG) suspending a lawyer from the practice of
law?
➢ No, because in Gerona v. Datingaling, SC
emphasized that Sec. 12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the
ROC does not mention of an MR of the IBP BOG’s
resolution. SC however said that if an MR is filed
after the records of the case has been
forwarded to SC, SC may decide to treat the
motion as a petition for review within the
contemplation of Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b).
Q: What is the basis of SC in treating the MR as a
petition for review within the contemplation of Rule
139-B, Section 12 (b)?
Classmate: I submit that it could be expediency,
Attorney. The MR would have afforded the IBP an
opportunity to correct any error or misapprehension
of facts it may have committed, but since the case
has already been forwarded to the Supreme Court,
it would appear that the MR is in effect a petition
for review.
Q: What is the proper remedy from the decision of
the BOG after the MR was denied by it?
Classmate: f the respondent is meted disciplinary
sanction by the BOG, the proper remedy is a
petition for review ti the Supreme Court within the
contemplation of Rule 139-B, Section 12 (b).
Atty GCC:
Sec. 12 (b) does not expressly mention of a petition
but transmittal. Sec. 12 (c) expressly mentions of a
petition but did not expressly state of a "petition for
review"
If the sanction of BOG is suspension or disbarment,
Sec. 12 (c) does not obviously apply.
1) In cases on disciplinary proceedings decided by
SC, while there is no issue on the proper remedy
concerned from BOG to SC, the party who
appealed to SC used Rule 45 as the remedy of
appeal (see this case: Lucente v. Evangelista, Jr.
[AC 5957, Feb. 4, 2003]; 2) These are the cases
where the petition filed is called a Petition for
Review or SC mentioned of a Petition for Review
but no mention about what RULE: Bernardo v. Mejia
(AC 2984, Aug. 31, 2007), Serrano v. Magpantay
(AC 8015, Sept. 14, 2015), Reyes-Abastilla v. Salva
[AC 12043, June 11, 2018], Sumera v. Salvatierra
[AC 12142, June 18, 2018], Valino v. Villarin (AC
9201, Sept. 19, 2018), Guanzon v. Dojillo, AC 9850,
16
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
Aug. 6, 2018); 3) Can you invoke Rule 45 of the
ROC? I believe so. This was the rule availed of in
Lucente v. Evangelista, Jr.;
While Sec. 1 of Rule 45 states that it is this rule that
applies to judgment or final order or resolution of
CA, Sandiganbayan, RTC or other courts whenever
authorized by law, Sec. 4 of Rule 56 says that the
procedure in Rule 45 applies in an appeal to SC by
petition for review on certiorari; I do not believe
that a petition for review under Rule 45 availed of
by a person can simply be denied by SC for being
a wrong remedy and for the following reasons: (a)
that Rule 45 cannot apply to disciplinary
proceedings decided by BOG and (b) that
disciplinary proceedings are sui generis. In Lucente
v. Evangelista, Jr., where the petition filed by
complainants was a petition for review under Rule
45 and a comment was filed thereto by the lawyer
on technicalities (that the petition failed to comply
with Sec. 4 of Rule 45 as the petition did not
indicate the correct date of receipt of the BOG’s
Resolution, failure to attach the certified true copy
of the Resolution, and the certification against
forum-shopping was executed only by one of the
petitioners), SC adopted a liberal attitude and held
as follows: “In A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we held:Litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice and thereby
defeat their very aims. As has been the constant
ruling of this Court, every party litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.The Rules must be so
interpreted and applied as to achieve, not defeat,
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
Procedural rules should be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding.
Where the rigid application of the rules would
frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of
a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in
exempting a particular case from the operation of
the rules.” 4) I also believe that Rule 56 of the ROC
should better apply because it is encompassing
that will cover disciplinary proceedings. Rule 56
says: “Section 3. Mode of appeal. – An appeal to
the Supreme Court may be taken only by a petition
for review on certiorari, except in criminal cases
where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.” 5) The procedure to
follow under Rule 56? Same as in Rule 45, etc. (see
Sec. 4, Rule 56).
3. Kara filed a complaint against her estranged
husband, Atty. Seb, on the ground of immorality and
use of illegal drugs which both happened five years
ago. When sought for comment, Atty. Seb denied the
allegations of the complaint and set up the defense
of prescription citing the 2-year prescriptive period of
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (CBD-IBP). After Kara’s presentation of
her evidence before the Investigating Commissioner
of the IBP, she filed an Affidavit of Desistance and a
motion to dismiss the complaint as she and Atty. Seb
have already reconciled. You are the investigating
Commissioner of the IBP.
(a) Would you find merit in the complaint of Kara?
Explain your answer.
➢ Under Sec. 5 of Rule 139-B, no investigation shall
be interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.
So based on the said provision, the affidavit of
desistance and the motion to dismiss can simply
be noted and the complaint will have to be
resolved on the basis of the evidence presented.
Besides, the affidavit of desistance and the
motion to dismiss are based on reconciliation
between the complainant and respondent.
Since there are two charges against the lawyer,
the said affidavit and motion are only relevant to
the charge on immorality and not on the second
charge.
Be that as it may, the resolution of the two cases,
as stated, will still be based on the evidences
presented.
(b) Is the defense of prescription tenable? Explain
your answer.
➢ No as the said Rule invoked was void for being
ultra vires and thus null and void as held in Heirs
of Alilano v. Examen, citing Frias v. Atty. Bautista-
Lozada. So in that case, SC said that there is no
prescription in bar discipline cases.
ATTY GCC:
Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD is no
longer found in the 2012 CBD Rules.
Q: why is it that in the Isenhardt case the SC still
used Section 1, Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure in
deciding the case since such rule is now void as
enunciated in the earlier case of Frias?
Atty GCC:
Just my observation, with due respect to SC: it was
the argument used by respondent before the CBD,
that is, 2 years from date of professional
misconduct, so he claimed that since the
notarization happened in 2000 and the complaint
was filed in 2004, so he argued that the complaint
has prescribed. SC should have added that these
proceedings do not prescribe.
1. How disciplinary proceedings are instituted (Rule
139-B, Sec. 1):
a. By SC;
b. By IBP upon verified complaint of any person;
c. By IBP Board of Governors, motu proprio or
upon referral by SC or by a Chapter Board of
Officers or at the instance of any person
17
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
2. Upon initiation by IBP (Rule 139-B, Sec. 1):
a. Against erring attorneys including those in the
government service
b. All charges against Justices of CA,
Sandiganbayan, CTA and lower courts even if
lawyers are jointly charged with them shall be
filed with SC
c. Charges filed against Justices and Judges
before the IBP including those filed prior to their
appointment in the Judiciary shall immediately
be forwarded to SC for disposition and
adjudication
d. Agpalo (8th Ed., p. 569): IBP has no power or
jurisdiction over such Justices or Judges for
misconduct in connection with the discharge
of their judicial functions even if such justice or
judge has already retired or been separated
from the Judiciary.
e. Agpalo (8th Ed., p. 569): complaints for
disbarment may not lie against impeachable
officers of the government during their tenure
because they may only be removed from
office by impeachment for and conviction of
certain offenses.
3. Direct filing with SC and its authority:
a. SC may summarily dismiss a complaint for utter
lack of merit without referring it to IBP;
b. If found prima facie meritorious, SC may refer
the complaint to IBP BOG for appropriate
action
c. Referral to IBP by SC is not mandatory; SC may
refer to Solicitor General, any officer of the
Court or judge of a lower court
d. What does the word “noted” mean? It means
that the Court has merely taken cognizance of
the existence of an act or declaration, without
exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering
a decision on the matter (Sebastian v. Bajar)
e. Can SC take cognizance of disbarment
complaints against lawyers in the government
service? Fuji v. Dela Cruz - In holding a special
prosecutor of the Bureau of Immigration liable
for negligence (simple neglect), violating Rule
18.03 of the CPR, SC held: “Generally, a lawyer
who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of her duties as a
government official. However, if said
misconduct as a government official also
constitutes a violation of her oath as a lawyer
and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
then she may be subject to disciplinary action
by this Court.”
Note that in Fuji, SC exercised discretion on
appropriate sanction for SIMPLE NEGLECT,
imposed 3 months suspension, taking into
consideration the Civil Services Rules (1-6
months for simple neglect of duty) and the
penalties imposed in previous cases (3-6
months);
Atty GCC:
My personal notes on the sanction imposed by SC in
Fuji - some cases cited are not appropriate, with due
respect, as the offense found is not simple neglect
unlike in Fuji: in Penilla v. Alcid, the offense is Gross
Misconduct (for errors committed with respect to the
nature of the remedy adopted in the criminal
complaint and the forum selected in the civil
complaint); in Baldado v. Mejica, the offense is Gross
Negligence, Gross Incompetence and Gross
Ignorance (for failing to appeal decision); In Vda. De
Enriquez v. San Jose, the offense is Inexcusable
Negligence (for failure to file a pleading after sending
a demand letter).
4. On deciding the appropriate sanction to be
imposed, SC considers the following: (Advincula
v. Macabata)
a. number of factors (citing Agpalo, Legal Ethics, p.
445)
b. primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings
c. SC has discretion to impose a particular sanction
that it may deem proper against an erring
lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and
despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice but should be controlled by the
imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity
and independence of the bar and exact from
the law strict compliance with his duties to the
court, to the client, to his brethren in the
profession and to the public;
d. The power to disbar or suspend ought always to
be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only
for the most weighty reasons and only on clear
cases of misconduct which seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the Bar;
e. Only those acts which cause loss of moral
character should merit disbarment or suspension
while those acts which neither affect nor erode
the moral character of the lawyer should only
justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such
nature and to such extent as to clearly show the
lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of
law;
f. The dubious character of the act charged as well
as the motivation which induced the lawyer to
commit it must be clearly demonstrated before
suspension of disbarment is meted out;
g. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
attended the commission of the offense should
also be considered.
In Advincula, the charge is gross immorality;
Investigating Commissioner recommended 1
month suspension while the IBP BOG
recommended 3 months suspension; SC found
that the acts of respondent in turning the head of
complainant towards him and kissing her on the
lips are distasteful but cannot be considered as
grossly immoral; it is an isolated act of
misconduct of a lesser nature.
In Advincula, based on circumstances of case
and considering that this is respondent’s first
offense, SC imposed reprimand.
5. On Decision of IBP BOG:
a. Every case heard by an Investigator shall be
reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors xxx. The
decision of the Board upon such review shall be
in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the
18
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020

facts and the reasons on which it is based. Florendo)

xxx.(Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 [a]);
Note - Quiambao v. Bamba: reduction from
suspension of 1 year to a stern warning was found
by SC to be without basis as no facts and reasons
were clearly and distinctly stated upon which the
reduction is based;
Agpalo (8th Ed., p. 581) – executive pardon
by President operates to wipe out the
conviction as well as the offense itself, the
grant thereof in favor of a lawyer is a bar to a
proceeding.
However, the same does not apply to:

Atty GCC: 1. Does not automatically entitle the

disbarred lawyer to reinstatement
My personal note: if it is an increase of penalty or
adoption of Investigator’s recommendation, the 2. Disciplinary action that is based not solely
decision of the BOG needs to state the facts and on the lawyer’s commission of the offense
reasons as required but on a transaction involved or related
therein which culminated in his conviction
b. Note the role of IBP in disciplinary proceedings:
c. Pendency of a criminal case: pending criminal
power to recommend so cannot impose penalty;
cases against a lawyer is not an obstacle to
c. IBP BOG can only be held liable for damages if
an administrative proceeding citing
they acted maliciously or upon illicit
Gatchalian where a finding of guilt in
consideration; if the rule were otherwise, a great
criminal case will not necessarily result in
number of lower court justices and judges whose
finding of liability in admin case and that
acts the appellate courts have annulled on
conversely the acquittal does not necessarily
ground of grave abuse of discretion would be
exculpate him administratively (Bayonla v.
open targets for damage suits (Cadiz v. Presiding
Reyes)
Judge of RTC-48);
d. MR is not prohibited as Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 is silent
d. Prescription:
about the filing of an MR and it is in fact
1. 2-year prescription under Rule VIII of CBD
encouraged before resort to SC as a matter of
Rules in Isenhardt v. Real is no longer found
exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford
under 2012 CBD Rules)
the agency rendering the judgment an
2. Bar discipline cases do not prescribe (Heirs
opportunity to correct any error it may have
of Alilano v. Examen)
committed through a misapprehension of facts
or misappreciation of the evidence (Gerona v.
Datingaling).
JUDICIAL CONDUCT
6. Failure to answer a complaint (we have
Let us begin with the New Code of Judicial Conduct
discussed this under A-1 Financial Services);
for the Philippine Judiciary.
a) note HDI Holdings v. Cruz: SC – “The natural
a) This is the Bangalore Draft, intended to the
instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded
Universal declaration of Judicial Standards
claim or imputation and defend himself. It is
applicable in all Judiciaries, was approved at the
totally against our human nature to just remain
Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices at the Peace
reticent and say nothing in the face of false
Palace, the Hague on 25-26 November 2002 (see 1st
accusations. Silence in such cases is almost
and 2nd whereas clauses)
always construed as implied admission of the
truth thereof. Consequently, we are left with no
b) Reasons for adoption: 1) update and correlate the
choice but to deduce his implicit admission of
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of
the charges levelled against him. Qui tacet
Judicial Ethics; 2) stress the Philippines’ solidarity with
consentive videtur. Silence gives consent.”;
the universal clamor for a universal code of judicial
ethics (see 4th whereas clause)
7. Defenses:
c) There is an express provision therein that this Code
supersedes the Canon of Judicial Ethics and the
Code of Judicial Conduct to the extent that the
a. Desistance in criminal case – reliance on
provisions or concepts therein are embodied in this
Affidavit of Desistance to secure exoneration
Code
is misplaced because:
d) Promulgated on 27 April 2004 but effective1 June
1) the Affidavit, while filed with the trial court,
2004
was not filed in the administrative case;
e) My note: Judicial Integrity Board is created; how
2) Court has consistently frowned upon the
proceedings for the discipline of Justices of CA,
desistance because of legal (Rule 139-B, Sec.
Sandiganbayan, CTA and judges and court
5) and jurisprudential injunction (Rangwani v.
personnel of lower courts including Sharia’ Courts
Dino, citing Bolivar v. Simbol) (Wilkie v. Limos)
and the officials and employees of the Office of the
Jurisconsult, Court Administrator, Deputy Court
b. Pardon by the legal spouse on the charge of
Administrator, Assistant Court Administrator and their
gross immorality (akin to an affidavit of
personnel may be instituted (AM 18-01-05-SC)
desistance) cannot abate disciplinary
proceedings against a lawyer (Tiong v.

19
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
When you want to refer to or cite the New Code,
what is the correct way of calling it?
In my opinion, it should be called "New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary". Yes,
SC calls it that way. Another basis is the Code itself.
See second to the last paragraph of the Code
which says "(t)his Code, which shall hereafter be
referred to as the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary, xxx."
Notwithstanding the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
the following continue to be sources of Judicial
Ethics:
1. Rules of Court (Rules 135, 137, and 140);
2. Laws by Congress (Art. 1491 of the NCC, Arts. 204,
205 and 206 of the RPC, RA 3019, and RA 6713);
3. SC Circulars and Decisions.
Let us proceed to the Canons found in the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Here are the Canons:
Canon 1. Independence
Canon 2. Integrity
Canon 3. Impartiality
Canon 4. Propriety
Canon 5. Equality
Canon 6. Competence and Diligence
Please note the definition of “Judge’s family”
(includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law,
daughter-in-law, and any other relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree,
or person who is a companion or employee of the
judge and who lives in the judge’s household) vis-à-
vis Canon 3 (Sec. 5), Canon 4 (Secs. 4, 7, 8, 13).
Q: How about a live-in partner? Is s/he part of a
judge's family?
ATTY GCC:
Yes provided he or she is a companion of the judge
who lives in the judge's household. I am just trying to
be accurate though I know that a live-in partner
lives together with the judge.
Canon 1 (Independence)
• Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the
rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a
fair trial (Canon 1)
• Free from extraneous influence, inducement,
pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason (Sec. 1)
• Independence from colleagues (Sec. 2)
• Refrain from influencing outcome of litigation
(Sec. 3)
• Not to allow family, social, or other relationships
to influence judicial conduct or judgment (Sec.
4)
• Free from inappropriate connections with
executive and legislative branches of
government (Sec. 5)
• Independence in relation to society and to
particular parties to a dispute (Sec. 6)
• Encourage and uphold safeguards for the
discharge of judicial duties (Sec. 7)
• Exhibit and promote high standards of judicial
conduct (Sec. 8)
a. Receipt of allowance from LGUs (allowed under
RA 7160) see Leynes v. COA, GR 143596, Dec. 11,
2003
b. Sub judice rule (Republic v. Sereno)
• Violations of sub judice rule may be dealt
with in 2 ways:
o Contempt proceedings
o Administrative actions
• Sub judice rule restricts comments and
disclosures pertaining to pending judicial
proceedings;
• Subject utterances by respondent in: forum
in UP Diliman on May 5, 2018, IBP Central
Luzon Regional Convention and MCLE on
May 2, 2018, Forum in Ateneo Law School
on April 25, 2018, Speech at
Commencement Exercises of College of
Law of University of San Agustin on April 20,
2018, Fellowship of Phil. Bar Association on
April 11, 2018, 30th Anniversary and 23rd
National Convention of Phil. Women Judges
Association on March 8, 2018, CNN
Philippines on March 9, 2018, Speech at
Panpacific University North Philippines on
March 9, 2018, Speech held at UP on May 5,
2018, and Speech in Ateneo Law School on
April 25, 2018.
>The public utterances of respondent did
not only tend to arouse public opinion on
the matter but tend to tarnish SC’s integrity
and unfairly attributed false motives against
its members
• Respondent insinuated the following:
o That the grant of quo warranto
petition will result to dictatorship
o In filing the quo warranto petition,
the livelihood and safety of others
are in danger
That the people could no longer rely
on SC’s impartiality
o That she could not expect fairness
from SC in resolving the quo
warranto petition against her.
Canon 2 (Integrity)
• Conduct above reproach and perceived to be
so (Sec. 1)
• Behavior and conduct must reaffirm people’s
faith (Sec. 2)
• Take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against lawyers (Sec. 3)
a) Public confidence in the judicial system:
• Rule banning the employment of spouses
of Justices in the SC, CA, Sandiganbayan,
and CTA as coterminous employees (AM
07-3-02-CA)
20
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
b) Prohibition against gambling
• All judges and court personnel are
prohibited from playing or being present
in gambling casinos [OCA Circular 231-15
reminding all judges and court personnel
of the prohibition against gambling or
being seen in casinos, citing Section 14 (4)
(a) of PD 1869, SC Circular No. 4, and Sec.
1, Canon 4 of the NCJCPJ
c) Re: Normandie Pizarro:
• Playing in casino was supported by
photographs attached to the anonymous
complaint and admitted by the Justice
also that he played in a casino in 2009
This is a violation of Canons 2 and 4
according to SC
d) Anonymous v. Buyucan:
• Canon 2 requires that the conduct of
judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in
the integrity of the judiciary and that
their conduct must, at the least, be
perceived to be above reproach in the
view of a reasonable observer;
Respondent’s continued illegal
settlement of a land erodes the public’s
confidence in its agents of justice
e) Antiporda v. Ante, Jr.
• Respondent’s behavior towards
complainant amounted to serious
misconduct; apart from a display of
arrogance, respondent’s demeanor and
actuations which resulted in physical
injuries to complainant, are in direct
contravention of the virtues of patience,
sobriety, and self-restraint espoused by SC
• SC affirmed the following findings of EJ
Balloguing who investigated it:
-That complainant had sustained physical
injuries inflicted by respondent;
-Respondent had a grudge against
complainant because he reported the
illegal renovation of her house to the
authorities and that he could have
instead advised her to secure the
necessary building permit;
-Respondent could have exercised
maximum tolerance towards complainant
• Note that SC also considered the said
offense as violation of Canon 4.
f) Taking the law into his hands (Tan-Yap v.
Patricio)
• A judge took the law into his own hands
when he stopped the implementation of
the writ of execution using threats and
intimidation (note that the judge
admitted preventing the fencing of the
properties because he believed that the
sketch plan was erroneous and possible
encroachment on his property may result)
• The threats uttered by the judge (that
something untoward might happen if the
writ of execution were out), even if no
force was employed, effectively
prevented or stopped the carrying of the
writ of execution
• Note: SC considered the said offense as
violation also of Canon 4.
Canon 3 (Impartiality).
• Perform judicial duties without favor, bias or
prejudice (Sec. 1)
• Conduct, both in and out of court, maintains
and enhances public confidence (Sec. 2)
• Conduct as to minimize occasions to be
disqualified from hearing or deciding cases
(Sec. 3)
• Not to make any comment that might affect
fair trial (Sec. 4)
• Disqualify when unable to decide a matter
impartially (Sec. 5)
• Disclose on the records the basis for
disqualification (Sec. 6)
A. Serious Misconduct
a. OCA v. Salise:
• Bases for the offense: He never refuted the
findings of the judicial audit and admitted in fact
the following:
1. Granted bail to some accused with
capital offense where no bail was
recommended without conduct the
mandatory hearing and merely
mentioned excuses;
2. The interpreter drafted the decision in a
civil case (for nullity of marriage)
3. Proceeding to hear a civil case (nullity of
marriage) when the return states that it is
unserved;
4. Proceeded to hear a civil case (nullity of
marriage) despite the question on the
court’s jurisdiction;
5. Failed to issue an order directing the
public prosecutor to conduct a
background check in civil cases (nullity
of marriage) due to mere oversight and
without malice;
6. Allowed plea-bargaining in drugs cases
with the consent of the prosecution to
decongest jails.
• Rendering a premature decision in a
declaration for nullity of marriage granting
the petition without first ruling on the pending
motions;
• Dismissed criminal cases on fabricated
grounds:
o Issued an order for illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition dismissing
it n the ground that the case has not
been moving when in reality it was
already dismissed less than 2 months
after it was filed;
o Dismissed a case of acts of
lasciviousness motu proprio as
21
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
complainant has not been
appearing when the records
revealed that after the filing of the
Information, there were only 4
settings and 3 of which were
cancelled due to absence of
defense counsel and as there was
no showing that private complainant
was notified;
• Irregularities in disposing or dismissing criminal
cases:
1. Supposedly to “decongest the jail”, he
allowed plea-bargaining as early as 2012
which was still prohibited under Sec. 23, Art. II
of RA 9165;
2. Possession of dangerous drugs under Sec.
11 with imposable penalty of 12 years to life
imprisonment and fine of P300,000 to
P500,000, he allowed an accused to plead
guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia
and sentenced to a straight penalty of 1 year
imprisonment and fine of P10,000 (or P5,000
fine together with 1 year imprisonment in
another case);
3. Allowed an accused (charged with Sec. 5)
to plead guilty to a lesser offense of use of
shabu and sentenced to straight penalty of 6
months and fine of P10,000;
• Dismissing criminal cases under highly
questionable circumstances and without due
regard to the applicable procedural rules
(i.e., violations of Secs. 5 and 11 of RA 9165
were ordered dismissed for “lack of probable
cause” when he had earlier issued an order
finding probable cause against the accused;
ordering motu proprio the dismissal of a
criminal case for violation of RA 9165 on the
ground that “the arresting officer dipped into
the left pocket of the accused and allegedly
found shabu worth P1,000 which is illegal and
inadmissible in evidence” even if the
accused had already been arraigned and
the pre-trial had been terminated))
• Defense of good faith? SC said no: the
number of cases involved and the manner
by which the judge disposed of the cases
clearly show a pattern of misdeeds and a
propensity to violate the law and established
procedural rules
b. Anonymous complaint v. Dagala:
>The judge was brandishing an M-16 armalite rifle
in front of the police and other civilians and per
PNP Firearms and Explosives Office, he is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind
and caliber
c. OCA v. Dumayas
>Failure to cite in the Decision the factual and
legal bases for his finding is a violation and
oversight or good faith is not an excuse
Unfamiliarity with the rules is a sign of
incompetence and betrays the confidence of
the public in courts
ATTY GCC:
While SC said that this is a violation of canon of
Judicial Conduct, I believe that this violation falls
under Canon 3, that is why I placed it there.
Canon 4 (Propriety).
• Avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities (Sec. 1)
• Accept personal restrictions and conduct oneself
consistent with dignity of judicial office (Sec. 2)
• Avoid situations that may give rise to suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality (Sec. 3)
• Not to participate in a case where any member
of family represents a litigant or is associated with
the case (Sec. 4)
• Not to allow the use of residence to receive
clients of lawyers (Sec. 5)
• Entitled to freedom of expression but must
preserve the dignity of judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of judiciary (Sec.
6)
• To be informed of personal fiduciary financial
interests and of members of family (Sec. 7)
• Not to use or lend the prestige of judicial office
for private interests or those of family members or
anyone else (Sec. 8)
• Not to use or disclose confidential information
(Sec. 9)
• Allowed activities (Sec. 10)
• Not to practice law (Sec. 11)
• May form or join associations of judges (Sec. 12)
• Not to ask or accept any gift, bequest, loan or
favor (Sec. 13)
• Not to knowingly permit court staff or others to
ask or accept any gift, bequest, loan or favor
(Sec. 14)
• May receive token gift, award or benefit as
appropriate to the occasion (Sec. 15)
a. Judges and court personnel who participate in
social media are enjoined to be cautious and
circumspect in posting photographs, liking posts
and making comments in public on social
networking sites (OCA Circular No. 173-17)
b. Not to notarize as a rule (see Fuentes v. Buno and
Tupal v. Rojo in Legal Forms Syllabus); relate this
with Rule 138, Sec. 35 (judge not to engage in
private practice)
c. Attempting to bribe:
Maddella III v. Pamintuan – attempt to bribe an
Executive Judge with 100k to influence the
outcome of a criminal case to the benefit of the
respondent-judge’s best friends, children of
private complaint is, according to SC, a plainly
unlawful behavior, motivated by corrupt intent
and constitutes gross misconduct
d. Engaging in conflict of interests:
Maddela III v. Pamintuan: judge did the
organization of the Freddie Aguilar concert and
the solicitation of donations therefor, celebration
of 60th birthday of his wife at a venue owned by
a person with a pending case before the RTC of
Olongapo City, and the organization of a
shooting event in his name and the solicitation of
donations therefor; while not directly related to
22
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020
his judicial functions, the judge’s participation
constitutes a violation of the NCJCPJ as judges
are mandated to avoid the appearance of
impropriety in their activities (Canon 1, Sec. 4)
and that judges shall not allow others to convey
the impression that they are in a special position
to influence him
e. “Gimmicks” (Reyes v. Reyes)
• SC considered the following as violation
of Canon 4, Secs. 1 and 2)
• Presence in comedy bars and night
“gimmicks” impairs the respect due to a
judge
• Act of bringing some of her staff to
weekday “gimmicks” that causes them
to be absent or late for work disrupts the
speedy administration of service
f. Siring a child outside of wedlock (Anonymous
complaint v. Dalaga)
• Immorality is a recognized ground for
discipline (Sec. 1, Canon 4 of NCJCPJ)
• Note the doctrine of no dichotomy of
morality (a public official is also judged
by his private morals)
• The judge admits the paternity to his son
and does not dispute the entry in the
certificate of live birth attesting to his
paternity
Q: is a judge allowed to have a common-law
relationship or partnership without marriage?
ATTY GCC: I do not see any ethical violation in that
for as long as no law is violated by the said judge.
Canon 5 (Equality).
• Aware of diversity in society and differences
arising from various sources (Sec. 1)
• Not to manifest bias or prejudice towards any
person or group (Sec. 2)
• Carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons (Sec. 3)
• Not to knowingly permit court staff or others
subject to his or her influence, direction or
control (Sec. 4)
• Require lawyers to refrain from manifesting
bias or prejudice (Sec. 5)
a. Failing to show compassion, patience, courtesy
and civility to lawyers (Cahanap v. Quiñones)
▪ Displaying antagonistic behavior towards
lawyers who appeared before her
▪ Humiliating a prosecutor in open court
▪ Shouting at court staff in her chamber
while correcting the court staff’s draft
orders dictated in open court and called
the court staff, “bogo ba nimo” (you are
dumb or stupid)
▪ Berating a court staff by repeatedly
pointing her mistakes (respondent
corrected the court staff’s 11 draft
orders) in an elevated voice in the
presence of a friend of respondent judge
who happened to be a party in a civil
case; when the court staff went out of
chambers and told her co-workers that
she would no longer held in drafting
orders in bail bond, respondent judge
found court staff’s reaction so the judge
followed her and scolded her in front of
other staff; respondent judge called the
court staff “punyeta ka, buwisit ka” in
front of other staff in an emergency staff
meeting.
Canon 6 (Competence and Diligence)
• Judicial duties takes precedence (Sec. 1)
• Devote professional activity to judicial duties
(Sec. 2)
• Maintain and enhance knowledge, skills and
personal qualities (Sec. 3)
• Keep informed about relevant development
of international law, international
conventions and human rights norms (Sec. 4)
• Perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness (Sec. 5)
• Maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings and be patient, dignified and
courteous (Sec. 6)
• Not to engage in conduct incompatible with
diligent discharge of judicial duties (Sec. 7)
a. Performing judicial duties efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness
• A judge is tasked to resolve motions filed
and is expected to act on a
communication sent by a party inquiring
about the status of a case; the failure to
decide a case or to resolve a motion within
the reglementary period amounted to gross
inefficiency; failure to explain the delay
despite directive of the Court Administrator
was construed as lack of suitable and
acceptable explanations for the inaction
and his silence was an admission of the
charge of negligence (Puyo v. Go)
• ATTY GCC: take note of the different
reglementary periods especially now with
the 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure (AM 19-10-20-SC)
(i.e., 30 calendar days to resolve affirmative
defenses from termination of summary
hearing (R. 8, S. 12]; 5 calendar days from
receipt to resolve non-litigious motions [R.
15, S. 4]; 15 calendar days from receipt of
opposition or upon expiration of period to
file opposition [R. 15, S. 4]; 10 calendar days
to issue pre-trial order [R. 18, S. 7]; 90
calendar days to render judgment when
appropriate for summary judgment or
judgment on the pleadings [R. 18, S. 10]; 90
calendar cays to decide from submission of
case for resolution [R. 30, S. 1]
b. Decision-making (including conduct of hearings)
is the primordial duty of a judge
• Habit of watching telenovelas during office
hours and lawyers and litigants were made
to wait until the judge finished watching:
violate Canon 6 which requires judges “not
to engage in conduct incompatible with
the diligent discharge of judicial duties”
• Delegation of mediation to court personnel
and delegation to process server the
23
 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS I ATTY GCC
EH 403 I 2019-2020

performance of functions and duties • Lack of collusion report in declaration of

pertaining to the clerk-in-charge of criminal nullity and annulment of marriage cases
cases was considered by SC as serious • ATTY GCC: These violations were also
misconduct (GCC note: I believe that this considered by SC as violation of Canon 2.
offense falls under Canon 6)
Last inputs on Judicial Conduct.
c. Temperate in language and refrain from
inflammatory rhetoric (Reyes v. Reyes) a) Institution of complaints and imposition of
penalties:
• The following remarks were considered by
SC as failure to exercise judicial 3 ways in instituting complaints against judges
temperament at all times and maintain and justices: (Anonymous complaint v. Dagala)
composure and equanimity:
1. “Ano kaya kung mag-hearing ako ng 1. By SC motu proprio
hubo’t hubad tapos naka-robe lang, 2. Through a verified complaint
pwede kaya?” 3. Through an anonymous complaint
2. “Hayaan mo, Farah, pag natikman ko na
siya, ipapasa ko sa iyo, ha ha ha!” b) Anonymous complaints must be supported
3. “Alam mo na ang dami intriga dito; by public records of indubitable integrity (Re:
nireport ba naman na nakatira ako dito, Normandie Pizarro)
ano kaya masama dun” Alam ko staff ko rin
nagsumbong eh, PUTANG INA NILA, The accusations of selling favorable decisions
PUTANG INA TALAGA NILA!” and having a mistress were not supported by
any evidence or by any public record of
d. Observe prescribed official hours Cahanap v. indubitable integrity;
Quiñones
Bare allegations of corruption and immorality do
• Commencing court sessions between 9:00 not deserve any consideration
a.m. and 10:00 a.m. although the minutes of
the Proceedings reflected the time at 8:30 c) Multiplicity of penalties (Boston Finance and
a.m. according to SC violates the Canons of Investment Corp. v. Gonzales)
Judicial Ethics
>My note: I believe that this is a violation of Rule 140 of ROC shall exclusively govern
Canon 6, so I placed it here. administrative cases involving judges or justices
of lower courts. If the respondent judge or
e. Delays in rendering judgments (OCA v. Guiling) justice is found guilty of multiple offense under
• Reglementary period to decide a case is 90 Rule 140, the Court shall impose separate
days (1987 Const.) penalties for each violation
• udge Guiling incurred delay in rendering
judgment in 23 criminal cases and 40 civil Different rules govern the administrative liability
cases; delay in resolving motions in 17 of court personnel (who are not judges or
criminal cases and 63 civil cases; justices of lower courts)
• Despite given the chance to explain his
side, he did not offer any explanation In the case, the judge was found guilty of issuing
an indefinite cease and desist order (gross
f. Inefficiency (OCA v. Arreza) ignorance) so fine of P30,000 and undue delay
• 23 cases were overdue for decision in rendering an order (failure to expeditiously
• Domestic (marital problems) and health resolve pending incidents in a civil case despite
issues (suffered stroke) are not valid excuses repeated motions for early resolution) so fine of
but can mitigate, at most P11,000.
g. Gross inefficiency (Tamondong v. Pasal)

• MR was resolved 113 days or almost 4

months after it was submitted for resolution
(30 days mandatory period to resolve MR in
a special civil action)
• ATTY GCC: remedy by judge if cannot
resolve within the period: request an
extension from SC

h. Committing irregularities (OCA v. Cabrera-Faller,

et al.)

• Improper venue (some residential addresses

in the province have no house numbers and
most of the court notices were “returned to
sender”
• Grant of petitions at extraordinary speed
(petitions granted in 6 months or less)
• Failing to serve copies of Decisions on
respondents

24