123 149. 54 Phil. 909 (1930). .

SARRA

124 150. 10 Phil. 197(1908). SARRA

125 151.Quirino v. Gorospe, 169 SCRA 702 (1989) SARRA

126 152. Paula v. Ecsay, 97 Phil. 617; SARRA

127 153. Vide De la Cruz v. Camon, 16 SCRA 886,888-889. SARRA

Doctrine: Every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a testate or intestate
succession may make must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a
separate action.

DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT OF PARTITION; SUBSEQUENT ANNULMENT. —

The court that approved the partition and the agreement ratifying the same may annul both in case such
approval was obtained by deceit or fraud; and the petition must be filed in the intestate proceedings, for the
general rule is, that probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured by fraud, not
only while the proceedings in the course of which it was issued are pending, but even during a reasonable
time thereafter.

G.R. No. 33023 September 16, 1930

Intestate estate of Concepcion Gerona. IGNACIO ARROYO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
JACOB GERONA, ET AL., movants-appellants.

Zulueta and Zulueta for appellants.

William E. Greenbaum for appellee.

VILLAMOR, J.:

In the course of the intestate proceedings of the estate of Concepcion Gerona, Ignacio Arroyo filed
an application on September 5, 1928, alleging that Victor, Jacoba, Patricia, Ciriaca, and Clara,
surnamed Gerona, being all of age, executed an agreement of partition and adjudication of the
estate of Concepcion Gerona by virtue of which they assigned to the applicant all the estate of the
late Concepcion Gerona, renouncing whatever rights they had or might have thereafter to said
property in favor of the applicant, in consideration of other property ceded to them by said
agreement. For which reason Ignacio Arroyo prayed the court to declare him to be the sole assignee
or successor and heir of the late Concepcion Gerona.

On October 8, 1928, the court issued an order declaring the following as sole heirs of the late
Concepcion Gerona: Ignacio Arroyo, Victor, Jacoba, Patricia, Ciriaca, and Clara, also surnamed
Gerona; and in view of the agreement of partition and adjudication of the estate, Exhibit A, executed
by said heirs who were all of age, together with the express waiver made in favor of Ignacio Arroyo
with respect to the property assigned thereby, particularly one-half of lot No. 2255 and lot No. 1175,
and, furthermore, in view of the fact that the late Concepcion Gerona left no debts nor claims against
her estate, the court ratified and approved said agreement Exhibit A, in respect to the adjudication
made therein in favor of each of said heirs who signed it, and particularly that of lot No. 1175 and
one-half of lot No. 255 in favor of the heir Ignacio Arroyo, according to the terms therein set forth;
and, lastly, the court declared the proceeding closed and at an end pursuant to section 596 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

On December 1, 1928, Ignacio Arroyo submitted to the court the receipt of the "Inheritance Tax
Returns" together with the communication of the Collector of Internal Revenue, annexes A and B.

On July 6, 1929, the court, considering that Maria Gerona had not signified her acquiescene in the
ratification of the deed of partition of June 13, 1913, stayed the approval of that stipulation pending
the personal acquiescene of said interested party Maria Gerona.

The stipulation referred to by the court reads as follows:

Come now Ignacio Arroyo, in his own behalf, and the heirs of Victor Gerona, through the
undersigned counsel, and to the honorable court respectfully states:

That on October 8, 1928, this court declared the following to be the sole heirs of the late
Concepcion Gerona: Ignacio Arroyo, Victor, Jacoba, Patricia, Ciriaca, and Clara, surnamed
Gerona.

That in accordance with the agreement of partition and adjudication dated June 13, 1913,
Ignacio Arroyo paid Victor Gerona, in addition to certain parcels of land, the sum of one
thousand pesos (P1,000).

That when Victor Gerona died, his children Maria and Blas Gerona inherited his estate.

That in consideration of the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000) paid to them by the
other heir, Ignacio Arroyo, in three installments, to wit:

Four thousand pesos (P4,000) at the time this agreement is signed, three thousand pesos
(P3,000) on the 1st of July, 1930; and the remaining three thousand pesos (P3,000) on July
1st, 1931.

In consideration, them, of ten thousand pesos (P10,000) paid as described in the foregoing
paragraph, and of the amount of money which their late father Victor received of Ignacio
Arroyo, together with some parcels of land in virtue of the agreement of June 13, 1913, Maria
and Blas, surnamed Gerona, do hereby renounce whatever right, title, and interest they have
or might have in the estate of Concepcion Gerona.

That both parties do hereby ratify the deeds executed on June 13, 1913, and on the 27th of
September, 1928.

That both parties accept this agreement as executed and signed by Ignacio Arroyo and the
attorney for the heirs of Victor Gerona.

Iloilo, July 5, 1929.

(Sgd.) IGNACIO ARROYO

(Sgd.) JOSE C. ZULUETA

Attorney for the heirs of Victor Gerona
 We agree:
(Sgd.) BLAS GERONA
(Sgd.) MARIA GERONA
(Sgd.) TORIBIO GARINGALAO

On the 9th of July, 1929, counsel for Jacoba, Ciriaca, Clara, and Patricia, surnamed Gerona,
petitioned the court, for the reasons stated, to annul the deed of June 13, 1913, as being contrary to
the law, and that of September 27, 1928, as having been surreptitiously and fraudulently executed,
thereby rendering nugatory the order issued on October 8, 1928, permitting the summary partition of
the estate of the deceased Maria Concepcion Gerona; and that a judicial administrator be appointed
for said estate of the late Maria Concepcion Gerona, the supplicants proposing Luis Servando, upon
furnishing a bond, the amount of which to be fixed by the court, taking into consideration the fact that
all the estate is in the form of realty, and that Ignacio Arroyo claims an interest therein adverse to the
heirs of the decedent Concepcion Gerona.

Counsel of Ignacio Arroyo objected to the petition upon the grounds set forth in a memorandum filed
on July 19, 1929.

On September 18, 1929, the court ruled itself incompetent to grant petition filed by Ciriaca, Jacoba,
Clara, and Patricia, surnamed Gerona, and dismissed the motion without passing upon the validity of
the agreements entered into on June 13, 1913, and on September 27, 1928, which were left for
decision in an ordinary suit.

On October 12, 1929, counsel for the movants petitioned for the reconsideration of the former ruling,
which the attorney for Ignacio Arroyo opposed on the 17th of October, 1929. On October 29, 1929,
the court denied the motion for reconsideration. Exception was taken to the orders of September 18,
and October 29, 1929, and, upon filing a five-hundred bond, the record on appeal was submitted for
approval.

The only question raised by this appeal is: Can the court that approved the agreement of partition
dated June 13, 1913, annul said agreement and vacate the order approving it on the ground of
fraud?

The court below held that in the course of the intestate proceedings of Concepcion Gerona, it could
not entertain a petition for the annulment of the agreements made on June 13, 1913, and on
September 27, 1928, attached as annexes A and B to the appellee's brief, for the reason that the
question of the nullity of the deed of partition comes within the jurisdiction of the ordinary and not the
probate court.

We are of opinion that the court which possessed jurisdiction to approve said agreement of partition
may disapprove or annul it. An agreement of partition made by heirs who are all of age, certainly
binds all of them, especially when judicially approved. This court so held in Centeno vs. Centeno (52
Phil., 322, 339):

While it is true that the partition agreement was made by all the heirs extrajudicially, in
submitting it to the court for approval, and in being approved by the latter after having
announced the hearing through publication in the newspapers, said extrajudicial agreement
of partition became judicial, and the order of the court approving it and declaring the
respective testamentary proceedings involving the estates of the deceased spouses closed,
became final and absolute, and binding upon all the parties who took part in the said partition
agreement, and acquiesced therein. . . . . (Text of the decision.)
But this does not mean that none of the participants may thereafter ask for the annulment or
rescission of the agreement upon discovering that fund, deceit, mistake, or some other defect has
vitiated the consent given, provided the action is brought within the statutory period. Of course, if the
estate has passed to the heirs by virtue of the agreement of partition, there is nothing to administer
and the intestate proceedings must be deemed terminated. But if the agreement of partition be
successfully impugned, if it be shown that fraud was practiced in the compromise between the
parties, then an administrator may properly be appointed to take charge of the estate with a view to
its just distribution in accordance with the law.

Section 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 598. Liability of Distributes. — But if it appear, at any time within two years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the
proceeding sections of this chapter, that there are debts outstanding against the estate which
have not been paid, or that an heir or other persons has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation in the estate, any creditor, heir, or other such person, may compel the
settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his credit or
lawful participation in the estate shall be paid, with interest. The court shall then appoint an
administrator who may recover the assets of the estate for the purpose of paying such credit
or lawful participation; and the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain charged
with the liability to creditors, heirs or other persons for the full period of two years after such
distribution, notwithstanding any transfer thereof that may have been made. (As amended by
Act No. 2331.)

It should be borne in mind that the appellee was appointed guardian of the person and estate of the
late Concepcion Gerona, and was by law deemed the administrator of said estate, the subject matter
of the agreements in question which, it is alleged, were fraudulently procured. On October 8, 1928,
the court issued an order closing the intestate proceedings of the late Concepcion Gerona, pursuant
to section 596 of the code of Civil Procedure. But the record shows that on the 6th of July, 1929, the
court withheld its approval of the stipulation ratifying the partition agreed upon dated June 13, 1913,
pending the consent of the interested party, Maria Gerona, which was given on the 5th of said month
of July. Up to this date, then, the court had control of the proceedings. Three days later, on July 9,
1929, the instant motion was filed by the appellants, which originated this appeal.

The motion, the, was filed within the statutory period prescribed in section 598 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

Taking up the question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the appellants' motion filed on July 9,
1929, it must be remembered that in Benedicto vs. Javellana (10 Phil., 197), this court held that all
demands and claims filed by any heir, legatee, or party in interest to a testate or intestate
succession, shall be acted upon and decided in the same special proceedings, and not in a separate
action, and the judge who has jurisdiction over the administration of the inheritance, and who, when
the time comes, will be called upon to divide and adjudicate it to the interested parties, shall take
cognizance of all such questions.

In our opinion, the court that approved the partition and the agreement in ratification thereof may
annul both whenever, as it is here alleged, the approval was obtained by deceit or fraud, and the
petition must be filed in the course of the intestate proceedings, for it is generally admitted that
probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured by fraud, not only while he
proceedings in the course of which it was issued are pending, but even, as in this case, within a
reasonable time thereafter.
In 11 Cyc., page 799, we come upon the following:

. . . where equitable powers are possessed in probate matters orders for allowances may be
set aside, after the term, for fraud or mistake (Schlink vs. Maxton, 48 Ill. App., 471). So the
court may pass upon the nullity or rescission of its own decrees or judgments (Darse vs.
Leaumont, 5 Rob. [La.], 248; Harty vs. Harty, 8 Mart., N. S. [La.], 518) and may within a
reasonable time revoke or correct an order of ratification of a sale procured by honest
mistake or by deceit (Montgomery vs. Williamson, 37 Md., 421). so the power exists
independent of the statute to revoke letters testamentary or of administration when issued
without jurisdiction, or irregularly, illegally, or for a special cause which has ceased to exist.
(Morgan vs. Dodge, 44 N. H., 255; 82 Am. Dec., 213.) And the surrogate, in court or out of
court, has power to open, vacate, modify, or set aside, or to enter as of a former time, a
decree or order of his court; or to grant a new trial or a new hearing for fraud, newly
discovered evidence, clerical error, or other sufficient cause.

In the case of Estate of Leavens (65 Wis., 440) the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held:

"The county court, sitting as a probate court, may at any time, in furtherance of justice, revoke an
order which has been irregularly made or procured by fraud." The propriety o that determination by
this court, as limited in the case of Betts vs. Shotton, supra, has never been questioned, and it has
been reiterated in the opinions of this court in the several cases above cited. (See In re Fisher, 15
Wis., 511; Betts vs. Shotton, 27 Wis., 667; Archer vs. Meadows, 33 Wis., 166; Baker vs. Baker, 51
Wis., 538, 548; Brooks vs. Chappell, 34 Wis., 405.) A like rule has been adopted for the probate
courts of New York (see Campbell vs. Thatcher, 54 BArb., 382,386; Pew vs. Hastings, 1 Barb. Ch.,
452; Proctor vs. Wanmaker, 1 Barb. Ch., 302; Sipperly Vs. Baucus, 24 N. Y., 46; Vreedenburgh vs.
Calf, 9 Paige, 128; Skidmore vs. Davies, 10 Paige, 316); also by the courts of Massachusetts (see
Waters vs. Stickney, 12 Allen, 1; Richardson vs. Hazelton, 101 mass., 108). In some courts this
proceeding to set aside an order of the probate court which has been irregularly or fraudulently
made, is treated as a bill of review in such court. (See Mauro vs. Ritchie, 3 Cranch, C. C., 167.)

. . . The court, under the authorities cited, certainly has the power to vacate the order
procured by the fraud of the administrator; and when that is vacated, there would seem to be
no reason why the administrator may not be required to again render his account, and, when
such account is rendered, why another order of distribution may not be made to such
persons as shall appear to be entitled to the same.

Justice Cassoday, concurring, said:

The enlarged jurisdiction given to county courts by our statute, in matters of probate and the
settlement of estates, seems to be sufficient to authorize them to grant relief of the nature
here sought.

Justice Lyon said:

I concur in the judgment of the court on the grounds that the county court has ample power
to grant the petitioner substantial relief, and that his petition shows he is in a position to
attack the validity of the order of distribution, and is entitled to some relief. . . .

In the case of the City of Chicago vs. Nodeck (202 Ill., 257), the Supreme Court of Illinois rule as
follows:
 . . . the rule, that a court has no power to set aside its judgment at a subsequent term, is
subject to several exceptions. . . . Another exception to the rule is that, where a judgment
has been obtained through fraud, such fact constitutes a sufficient reasons for vacating it
after the term at which it was rendered. (17 A. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 827; Walker
vs. Shreve, 87 Ill., 474; Chicago Building Society vs. Haas, 11 id., 176; Ward vs. Durham,
134 id., 195; Mitchell vs. Shaneberg, 149 id., 420; Wright vs. Simpson, 22 id., 56.)

. . . But, even if there are any doubt as to the question whether or not the court had
jurisdiction to enter the judgment, there can be no doubt that the making of the estimate,
which included the paving of these approaches to the viaduct, and the passage of the
ordinance, which required the property owners to pay for such part of the pavement,
amounted to a fraud against the property owners. This element of fraud entered so largely
into the judgment itself, that it justified the court in vacating the judgment at a term
subsequent to the term, at which it was entered.

In Montgomery vs. Williamson (37 Md., 421), the Supreme Court of Maryland stated as follows:

It seems to have been supposed that as there is no express authority to be found in the
statute, the rescinding of the order of ratification would be the exercise of constructive
authority which the court is forbidden to exercise. But his objection is fully answered by the
Court of Appeals, in the case of Raborg vs. Hammond (2 H. & G., 42, 51), in considering the
power of the Orphans' Court to revoke letters of administration, when improvidently granted,
and where to exercise of the power, the same objection was urged as to the jurisdiction in
this case. The court said: "But to this it may be answered that we deem the power of
revocation, under such circumstances, as necessarily inherent in the Orphans' Courts, and a
part and of the essence of the power delegated to them, of granting administration." In
confirmation of which, see 3 Bac. Ab., 50, where speaking of the ecclesiastic tribunals of
England, in reference to this power, it is stated that "it would be absurd to allow a court
jurisdiction herein, and at the same time deprive them of the liberty of vacating and setting
aside an act of their own, which was obtained from them by deceit and imposition."

In view of the foregoing, the orders appealed from are reversed, and let the record be remanded to
the court below with instructions to proceed to try the claims set up by the appellants, and thereafter
let the proper order be issued in accordance with law and the evidence. Without any pronouncement
as to costs. So ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Benedicto vs. Javellana

10 Phil 197 (1908)
Facts:
Maximino Jalandoni, brother of the deceased Maximo Jalandoni, petitioned that the administrator
or executor, Julio Javellana, be directed to pay him the sum of P985 which he held, in lieu of the land
donated to him in his brother’s will. He alleged that one-half of the hacienda “Lantad” had been
bequeathed to him, subject to the payment of certain debts and expenses of the estate; that one-half of
said hacienda was sold, the sum of P985 remaining in the possession of Javellana; that Javellana is no
longer entitled to retain the P985 since, with the value of the portion inherited by the heirs Francisco
Jalandoni and Sofia Jalandoni, there would be more than enough required to pay the other debts and
expenses of the estate.
Javellana alleged that it was not proper to ask, by means of a motion, for the relief that Maximino
Jalandoni claimed, but that a complaint should have been filed and action brought against the other
legatees or rather against all the parties concerned in the estate, not against the administrator alone. The
lower court judge granted the motion.

Issue: Whether Maximino’s claim should be filed in the special proceedings or in a separate action?

Held: In the special proceedings. Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication
thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a testate or intestate
succession may make must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a
separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take
cognizance of the question raised.

However, considering that everyone stated by the will are mere legatees they have no right to receive
their share of the property of the deceased until after his debts have been paid. Contrary to Maximino’s
contention, Francisco and Sofia Jalandoni are not heirs but mere legatees. Thus, since all of them are
legatees, the debts and expenses of the estate must be paid pro rate by the legatees in the manner
provided in the will.

Doctrine: Every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a testate or intestate
succession may make must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a
separate action.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-58797 January 3l,1989

ANTONIO QUIRINO, as Special Administrator, Testate Estate

of Natividad C. Raquiza, and Intestate Estate of Carmen M.
Castellvi, Petitioner, vs. HON. NATHANAEL M. GROSPE, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch VI, Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District, and WILFREDO
M. GOINGCO, Administrator, Testate Estate of Don Alfonso

Juan F. Gomez for and in his own behalf. chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Antonio, Quirino and Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner. chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary

Valentino LL. Quevedo for Raquiza children. chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Engelberto A. Farol for Jasmin Raquiza.

-->

RESOLUTION
 PADILLA, J.:

For resolution are the separate motions for reconsideration of the

decision of this Court, dated 25 April 1988, filed by Juan F. Gomez,
Jesus T. David, Raquiza children and their father Antonio V. Raquiza
(as alleged heirs of Natividad Castellvi), and petitioner Antonio
Quirino; motion for intervention of Carmen Castellvi et al. (as
alleged heirs of Don Juan Castellvi); the motion for clarificatory
order of Juan F. Gomez; and omnibus motion for early resolution
and immediate release of funds, filed by the Raquiza children. The
Court Will resolve the motions separately.

1. Motion for Reconsideration of Juan F. Gomez.

Movant's claims are for attorney's fees equivalent to 12% of one-

third (1/3) of the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi and P30,000.00
representing transportation and representation expenses, for
services admittedly rendered to the heirs of Don Juan Castellvi.
These claims may not be properly charged against the estate of Don
Alfonso Castellvi.
chan roble svi rtualaw lib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

As held in Gabin v. Malleja (84 Phil. 794), the term "claims"

required to be presented against a decedent's estate is generally
construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which
could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime or
liability contracted by the deceased before his death. It is important
to note that movants claims for attorney's fees and transportation
as wen as representation expenses are for services rendered to the
alleged substituted heirs of Don Juan Castellvi and such services did
not inure to the benefit of Don Alfonso Castellvi or his estate. The
court charged with the settlement of the estate of Don Alfonso
Castellvi is bound to protect the estate from any disbursements
based on claims not chargeable to the estate. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

We find no merit in movants contention that he was deprived of due

process, on the ground that he was not impleaded as party
respondent in, and required to answer the petition for certiorari,
subject of this Court's decision dated 25 April 1988. Prior to the
promulgation of said decision, movant had already filed a motion for
intervention, 1and the allegations set forth therein were duly
considered and studied by the Court. Furthermore, even if Gomez
was not impleaded as party respondent in said petition
for certiorari, his act of filing the said motion for intervention as well
as his present motion for reconsideration, indubitably gave him an
adequate opportunity to present his side of the controversy, and
therefore cured any defect of alleged lack of due process. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

Petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the

questioned orders of the court a quo is not fatal. Although as a
general rule, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court has,
through a motion for reconsideration, been given a chance to
correct the errors imputed to it, this rule, however, admits of
exceptions, like: (1) when the issue raised is one purely of law; (2)
where public interest is involved; and (3) in case of urgency. 2 In
the case at bar, the questioned orders of the trial court were
already being executed, hence, there was an urgency which caused
the case to fall under one of the exceptions, thereby allowing
petitioner to file a petition for certiorari without need of first filing a
motion for reconsideration. chanroblesv irtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

2. Motion for Reconsideration of Jesus T. David.

The claim for attorney's fees of intervenor Jesus T. David is for

services rendered for the benefit of Doña Carmen Castellvi, and not
for the benefit of Don Alfonso Castellvi or his estate. As discussed
earlier, only claims which could have been enforced against the
deceased in his lifetime are allowed to be presented against his
estate, with the exception of funeral expenses, expenses for the last
sickness 3 and administration expenses in the ordinary course
thereof. 4 chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary

As to the alleged attachment and levy of Doña Carmen's alleged

administratrix' fees and share in the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi,
the same cannot be given force and effect in the special proceedings
for the settlement of Don Alfonso's estate. It must be stressed that
the subject of settlement in this case is not the estate of Doña
Carmen Castellvi. For intervenor to insist on enforcing in this
proceeding his claim against Doña Carmen's alleged fees as
administratrix and share in the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi,
would be irregular and untenable. It should be borne in mind that
the respondent court is one of limited jurisdiction, and it has no
authority to determine as to who are the heirs of Don Juan Castellvi
and/or decide the claims or demands which may be properly paid
out of the funds of the estate of Doña Carmen Castellvi. Such issues
have to be determined in separate proceedings. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

For this Court to allow in this proceeding which is for the settlement
of the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi the enforcement of the claim
of David against Doña Carmen's alleged share in the estate of Don
Alfonso Castellvi, would amount to summarily declaring Doña
Carmen an heir of Don Alfonso, without giving the other heirs or
claimants to the latter's estate an opportunity to oppose the same.
Moreover, whatever fees Doña Carmen might have earned during
her lifetime as administratrix of the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi
should go to her estate. Hence, whatever claim herein intervenor
has against the deceased Doña Carmen Castellvi, should be
presented before the court with jurisdiction in settling her estate.
Intervenor cannot resort to a short cut and present his claim
directly to this Court to suit his own end and convenience thereby
brushing aside the settled rules of applicable procedure. chanroblesv irtualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

3. Motion for Reconsideration of the Raquiza children chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary

Movants would like to impress upon this Court that the award of
attorney's fees to Atty. Mendoza equivalent to 12% of the gross
value of the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi is not valid on the
ground that they never gave their consent thereto, nor did Doña
Carmen Castellvi, then administratix of the estate of Don Alfonso
Castellvi. However, the record of this case shows that Natividad
Castellvi-Raquiza, the instituted heir to two- third (2/3) of the
estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi, gave her conformity to such award
of attorney's fees in favor of Atty. Mendoza. 5 Moreover, movants,
through their father and general guardian Atty. Antonio V. Raquiza,
had agreed to grant said attorney's fees. In fact, separate
manifestations 6 were filed by Atty. Raquiza and Carmen Castellvi
with the court a quo stating that they were withdrawing their
oppositions to said claim.chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chan robles v irt ual law li bra ry

With regard to Floro's claim for payment for services rendered to

the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi, the rule is that where the
monetary claim against the administrator has a relation to his acts
of administration in the ordinary course thereof, such claims can be
presented for payment with the court where a special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate is pending, although said claims were
not incurred by the deceased during his lifetime and collectible after
his death. This is so, because the administration is under the direct
supervision of the court and the administrator is subject to its
authority. 7chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary

As to the question of whether or not the movants are the heirs of

Natividad Castellvi-Raquiza, thus, entitled to her share in the estate
of Don Alfonso, determination of said issue is again not within the
jurisdiction of the court a quo charged only with the settlement of
the estate of Don Alfonso. chanroblesv irtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

4. Motion for Reconsideration of Antonio Quirino chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

As discussed earlier, Natividad Castellvi-Raquiza and Doña Carmen

Castellvi (as administratrix of the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi)
had given their conformity to the award of attorney's fees to Atty.
Mendoza. Petitioner who now is acting as special administrator of
the estates of Natividad Castellvi-Raquiza and Carmen Castellvi is
estopped from questioning said award. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Insofar as payment of service fees to Exequiel Floro, the same was

allowed for services rendered by claimant for the benefit of the
estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi and the same falls under the
category of "administration expense" which may be paid out of the
finds of the estate. Moreover, the heirs of Don Alfonso Castellvi had
dropped their opposition to said claim, thus, they are barred from
questioning the same at this stage. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

5. Motion for Intervention of Carmen Castellvi, et al. chanroble s virtual law lib rary

Intervenors (as alleged substituted heirs of Don Juan Castellvi) seek

clarification of the term "instituted heirs' and a modification of the
decision dated 25 April 1988, so that the term "instituted heirs'
would include the substituted heirs of Don Juan Castellvi. They
likewise move for the setting aside of the portion of the decision
which provides for the final settlement and distribution of the estate
of Don Alfonso to the instituted heirs or their respective estates, if it
would mean that delivery of the one third (1/3) share of the estate
of Don Alfonso is to be made only to Don Juan Castellvi or his
estate.chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

They further claim that for this Court to order the delivery of the
residue of the estate of Don Alfonso to the 'estate of Don Juan
Castellvi (to the extent of (1/3 as decreed in Don Alfonso's last will)
instead of his substituted heirs, will result in the latter re-litigating
among themselves and/or with other parties for their respective
shares over the estate of Don Juan Castellvi, when they had already
ventilated the issue of heirship over the same before the court a
quo, and they were declared heirs of Don Juan Castellvi and
substituted heirs to his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of Don
Alfonso Castellvi. 8 chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

We find intervenors contention to be without merit. To allow

intervenors instead of the estate of the instituted heir, Don Juan
Castellvi to receive the residue of the estate of Don Alfonso would
be not only prejudicial to the creditors of Don Juan but also to the
government in the form of non-payment of taxes required by law.
The transfer of the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi to his instituted
heirs (Natividad Castellvi-Raquiza and Don Juan Castellvi) is subject
to payment of estate taxes. Before the estates of Don Juan Castellvi
(and Natividad Castellvi-Raquiza) can be transferred to their heirs,
again, estate taxes must first be paid to the government. To allow
intervenors, as substituted heirs of Don Juan Castellvi, to receive
directly from the estate of Don Alfonso, the share pertaining to Don
Juan, could result in a single transfer of property and a single
payment of estate taxes, in fraud of the government. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

Moreover, the court a quo has no jurisdiction to determine who are

the heirs of Don Juan Castellvi; said issue has to be ventilated in a
separate proceeding. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

6. Motion for Clarificatory Order of Juan F. Gomez chanroble s virtual law l ib rary

Movant seeks clarification of the decision of this Court, dated 25

April 1988, denying his claim for attorney's fees, as to whether or
not it is meant to annul not only the order fixing his fees but also
the contract for services approved in the order issued by the court a
quo, dated 5 October 1981. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Movant's claim is chargeable to the heirs of Don Juan Castellvi, his

clients, and the court a quo has no jurisdiction to fix such fees for
services rendered not to the estate of Don Alfonso, but to the heirs
of Don Juan. It follows that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to
approve a contract of legal services between claimant and the heirs
of Don Juan. The court a quo is of limited jurisdiction, empowered
to settle only the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi: any act done in
excess of such limits may not be given force and effect. chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

7. Omnibus Motion for Early Resolution and Immediate Release for

Funds by the Raquiza Children

In the motion at bar, movants seek approval for the release of the
amount of P300,000.00 to allegedly take care of the burial expenses
incurred upon the death of Natividad Castellvi-Raquiza. Said motion
for release of funds was previously presented before the court a
quo and subsequently denied.

What movants are actually praying of this Court is to reverse the

order of denial of their motion for release of funds. Before a review
can be made of said order of denial, movants should have filed a
proper petition before this Court and not a mere motion. This
incident is not covered by the petition for certiorari resolved in the
decision of 25 April 1988.chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration filed by Juan F.

Gomez, Jesus T. David, Raquiza children, and Antonio Quirino are
hereby DENIED. This denial is FINAL. The motion for intervention of
Carmen Castellvi, et al., the motion for clarificatory order of Juan F.
Gomez, and the omnibus motion for early resolution and release of
funds by the Raquiza children, are also DENIED. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

SO ORDERED,

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado,

JJ., .
 [G.R. No. L-8559. September 28, 1955.]

RUFINA C. DE PAULA, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late VICTOR
GASTON, Petitioner, v. JOSE ESCAY, ET AL., Respondents.

Constantino G. Gulmatico and Eduardo P. Arboleda for Petitioner.

Benedicto Sumbingco & Associates for respondent Jose Escay.

SYLLABUS

1. CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS; DEMANDS AGAINST ADMINISTRATORS MAY BE

PRESENTED IN THE ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. — The practice has been foe demands against
administrators (not by these against third parties) to be presented in the court of first instance where the
special proceeding of administration is pending, if the demand has relation to an act of administration and in
the ordinary course thereof. This is because the administration is under the direct supervision of the court
and the administrator is subject to its authority. When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the
party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court’s jurisdiction, the demand can not be
by mere motion by the administration, but by an independent action against the third person.

DECISION

LABRADOR, J.:

This is a special civil action of certiorari instituted in this Court, seeking to annul an order of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, the Honorable Jose Teodoro, Sr., presiding, approving the claim of
respondent Jose Escay in the amount of P5,418.31 plus legal interest of P2,682.06 and P810.03 as
attorney’s fees and approving its payment by the administratrix out of the funds of the estate. The claim
arose out of a contract of lease between claimant Jose Escay as lessee of Hacienda Puyas No. 1, and the
administratrix as lessor. This contract of lease was executed on May 12, 1937, with the court’s approval,
and amended on April 29, 1942, also with the court’s approval. Under the original contract of lease (Exhibit
A of Annex A), the administratrix was obliged to deliver to Escay ten per cent of the sugar, rice and corn
produced from Hacienda Puyas No. 1 from 1943 until the full sum of P7,000, the estimated cost of property
transferred to the estate, was fully covered. In the subsequent amendment of the contract, the lease was
declared terminated with the close of the 1942-43 harvest, with the right on the part of either party to
demand a liquidation of the accounts in relation to the lease one year after the re-establishment of the
peace.

Pursuant to the above agreement, Jose Escay filed his claim on June 29, 1954, attaching thereto a copy of
the contract of lease and a detailed statement of accounts showing that the administratrix is indebted to him
in the sums of P5,418.31 as principal and P2,682.06 as interest. The administratrix opposed the claim on
the following grounds, namely, (1) that it can not be presented as a claim because the administration
proceedings were commenced since 1932 yet and the claim can not now be presented as one under section
5 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that the court sitting in probate has no jurisdiction to entertain
the claim, especially as the same is being controverted. The lower court held that the claim was properly
filed (under the authority of III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, pp. 393-94 and the case of Escueta
v. Sy Juilliong, 5 Phil., 405). As to the contention that the claim is not chargeable against the estate but
against the administratrix in her personal capacity because there is an over payment of rentals, the trial
court held that as the contract of lease was approved by the court and the claim is an offshoot of said
contract, she may not now repudiate it. As to the claim that the administratrix had not been given
opportunity to contest the correctness of the claim, the court held that the administratrix had not offered to
disprove the items contained in the statement of accounts.

The first legal issue submitted to us for resolution is the supposed lack of authority or jurisdiction on the
part of the court to consider the claim in the administration proceedings. There is no question that the claim
does not fall under the provisions of section 5 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, because the same is not a
debt or money claim incurred by the deceased during his lifetime and collectible after his death. It is an
ordinary demand or claim for the payment of the balance of an account due under a contract of lease
entered into by the administratrix under the court’s approval. There is no express provision of the Rules
governing the method by which the demand for payment may be made. May the claim be enforced by a
simple motion in the administration proceedings, or by an ordinary action?

Under our judicial system, there is only one grade of court of general jurisdiction invested with power to
take cognizance of all kinds of cases, whether civil or criminal, or all kinds of special proceedings, whether
probate, or land registration, or naturalization. In the same grade, we have the Court of Industrial Relations
and the Agrarian Court, but these are courts of limited jurisdiction. We do not have probate courts dedicated
to the trial of probate cases alone; our courts of first instance have jurisdiction of probate proceedings, such
as administration and distribution and guardianship, jointly with the civil or criminal actions, and when
taking cognizance of probate cases they do not hold court or sessions at specified places, or periods, or
terms, and their power over the same is not separate and distinct, as is the case in common law countries
where the same court may at one time sit as a court of common pleas, at another as a probate court, and
still at another as a court of claims. As a result the practice has been for demands against administrators
(not by those against third parties) to be presented in the court of first instance where the special
proceeding of administration is pending, if the demand has relation to an act of administration and in the
ordinary course thereof. This is because the administration is under the direct supervision of the court and
the administrator is subject to its authority. When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party
against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court’s jurisdiction, the demand can not be by
mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action against the third person. For obvious
reasons, the demand can not be made because third persons not under the jurisdiction of the court are
involved.

From the above considerations, it can be seen, in the case at bar, that as the lease contract was entered
into by the administratrix with the approval of the court in the ordinary course of administration and with
the court’s approval in the administration proceedings, to consider the claim in the same administration
proceedings may not be denied for the claim purpose to make the administratrix comply with the obligations
contracted in the course of administration with the court’s consent and approval. There is no question that
the court has jurisdiction of the administrator in so far as the property and the contract are concerned; as to
the movant, he submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction by filing his claim. The claimant is not prohibited
from filing an independent action to recover the claim, but the existence of such a remedy is not a bar to the
remedy that he had pursued in the case at bar.

The objection of the administratrix to the presentation of the claim before the court may have been impelled
by the belief that the amounts she may be compelled to pay by virtue of the demand of Escay may be
charged against the estate, when the same should fall under her personal responsibility. She was entitled to
receive only the amount of the rentals under the lease contract and no more, and Escay should not make
the estate under administration responsible for the amount received by the administratrix in excess of the
rentals actually due. The consideration of the claim in the administration proceedings, however, does not
necessarily mean that the administratrix may not be held personally liable for the excess. The mere fact that
the court in passing upon the claim may order her, the administratrix, to pay the full amount of the demand,
does not mean that the total amount which she is compelled to pay could be chargeable against the said
estate under administration. Certainly, the estate would only be responsible for the amount which she is
legally entitled to receive as rentals; it can not be held responsible for the excess of the amount collected
over and above the rentals due under the lease. For this excess the administratrix will have to be personally
responsible and the court in ordering payment of the said excess would order the administratrix to be
personally responsible therefor. The above circumstances, however, do not deprive the court of power to
consider the claim; and the administratrix for herself is estopped from denying that the amounts received in
excess of the true rentals were received by her In such capacity. One who contracts with another in a
representative capacity cannot claim that amounts received by her in said representative capacity are due
from her in another capacity (Arnold v. International Banking Corporation, 50 Phil., 477; Kellerman v. Miller
[1897] 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 443 and Magee v. Mellon [1852] 23 Miss. 585, cited in 64 A. L. R. 1558-1559; In re
Glover, 29 S. W. 982).

Insofar as the correctness of the amounts stated in the claim or demand, we find that the administratrix
never offered to disprove the amounts stated in the claim. Notwithstanding the fact that the account is
itemized to the last detail, with a description of the methods by which payment were made, only a general
denial was made which is not even under oath. The administratrix should have indicated the items the
truthfulness or correctness of which she wanted to deny. There was in fact, therefore, no valid denial of any
item and all the items were deemed admitted. It must be taken into account that the present action is one
of certiorari, based on lack or excess of jurisdiction and/or abuse of discretion. Under these circumstances,
we are constrained to find that the court did not abuse its discretion in approving the claim, there being no
specific denial of any of the items of the claim or specific offer of proof by her of the incorrectness of any of
the items of the claim.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition should be as it hereby is denied. With costs against the
petitioner.