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Group 6 Macroeconomics Project Readable PDF
Group 6 Macroeconomics Project Readable PDF
Introduction
Egypt is a country with frequent make-overs. From gaining a republic status in 1953 to a civil war and a coup
in 2014, from self-sufficient, closed economy to liberalization in the 1990s, Egypt has gone through it all.
Egypt has always been a focus of attention, be it for its enormous pyramids, or the state of its economy. In the
past couple of decades, the Egyptian economy grew at a respectable rate. According to the data from
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the economy grew at about 8% in 2002-2009, and by 5.7% in the latest
quarter1. This growth has been crucial in improving the living standards of its approximately 100 million-strong
population. However, along with the much-desired economic growth, there has been a growth of some less-
desired (read derided) components, like poverty, inequality, absurd double-digit inflation, and a poor health
of external account amongst others.
A healthy Egyptian economy is important for the entire world. The world expects Egypt to thrive and, by doing
so, contain the beliefs-based extremism that affects the region, for its own good (and the world’s). With a
reputation of growing the fastest in one of the world’s most backward regions (in terms of economic and
geopolitical stability), the Egyptian economy has a big responsibility. To carry its people to prosperity. And in
the process, show light to other embattled countries that surround Egypt.
Sources: IMF, CBE, World Bank, Bloomberg, CEIC, The Economist
By Group-6: Kritika Ahuja (E006), Veeraraghavan D (E016), Siddharth Gupta (E026), Soutik Kumar (E036), Omkar Palsule
(E046), Akash Sharma (E056)
This study, recognizing the importance Egyptian economy holds, aims to look closely at the economic situation
in Egypt, macroeconomic policies that it follows, the changes in these policies, and the impact these policies
have had on the Egyptian economy, along with analyzing the impact of these policies on the people of the
country, by going beyond the economic indicators.
This study is not only limited to these metrics, many of which mostly fail to truly capture the real prosperity of
its people, but also goes beyond to unearth various factors and indicators which reflect the overall well-being
of the people of Egypt in a better sense, like poverty rate, per-capita GDP growth rate, happiness index etc. We,
throughout our analysis, bring the discussion down to the stakeholder at the bottom of the ladder, in order to
assess the quality of life as comprehensively as possible.
Next, the study looks closely at the macroeconomic policies of Egypt, both fiscal and monetary, and
subsequently tries to find the links between various economic indicators and these policies. The study then
maps the impacts of the macroeconomic policies on the quality of life and on the true sense of well-being of
Egyptians.
The study concludes by highlighting the strong points of the Egyptian economy, and the positives associated
with these. The study also gives out recommendations to leverage these strengths through various policies. In
addition, the study underscores the not-so-well points of the economy, and suggests the ways to improve on
these as well, in order to improve the quality of life of the people of Egypt.
In this section, we analyze parameters like GDP growth rate, inflation, government deficit, foreign exchange
rate movement, among others, to get a broader picture of the health of the Egyptian economy. It is important
to note that the country recently underwent an intense period of political crisis, and a consequent civil war.
Hence, only improvement in the economic parameters is not enough to help improve the living standards of
the people of the country. We must dive deeper into the economy, analyzing figures like poverty rate and
happiness level, to arrive at a fair and comprehensive analysis, in the process suggesting a more informed action
plan.
A glance at the historical GDP data shows that Egypt’s GDP has improved only modestly after early 1990s. Till
1992 (from 1980), the economy grew by 4.4% on average, while after 1992 (adjusting for years marred by the
civil war), it grew at a slightly higher 4.7%1. Though the increase is not much, one of the most important
observations is the relative stability in growth rate of Egypt after 1992. The GDP growth rate exhibited a
standard deviation of 1.5 after 1992, though the period was marred by rising protests and growing unrest
amongst the people, accompanied by the Arab Spring. Before 1991, during relatively peaceful times, the
deviation stood at 2.61.
But the growth rate has not been fast enough to accommodate all of the Egyptians together. As population
growth rate continues to remain high for Egypt, its per capita GDP growth rate has come under pressure. Going
by the approximation:
Per capita GDP growth rate = GDP growth rate - population growth rate
The growth figures look less optimistic in this light. In the last three years, for example, while the real GDP
grew by about 5%, the growth in per capita real income was just about 1.7%. With such a small, it will take a
very long time, perhaps forever, for Egypt to witness the prosperity it is in desperate need of.
Continuing high inflation has well-known negative effects on the economy. It imposes welfare costs on society;
hampers efficient resource allocation by causing hinderance in the signaling role of relative price changes; hits
the poor disproportionality because they do not hold financial assets that can be a hedge against inflation; and
reduces long-term economic growth. In the case of growth, studies have shown that double-digit inflation has
serious negative consequences.
However, inflation in Egypt continued to be high till the end of 2017, after which it started falling rapidly. The
latest figures from the Central Bank of Egypt reveal that the core inflation has cooled down to 3.1%, lowest in
almost 9 years, since the Arab Spring brought disruptions to the economy.
Associated very intricately with inflation, is unemployment. Theoretically, both are negatively correlated; as
inflation rises, unemployment falls down, as explained by Phillips’ Curve. However, the case has been
somewhat different in Egypt. Even with high inflation, the unemployment rates have peaked. Since 2011, with
the onset of Arab spring, the related violence and a consequent civil war, the unemployment rate (as reported
by Bloomberg) skyrocketed from 8.9% to almost 12.5% in just about 1 year. This rate continued to stay above
12% for the better part of 2017. Since then, it has started falling. According to the CBE, the unemployment rate
is now down at 7.8% (as on September 2019), second lowest in the history of Egypt (the lowest reported
unemployment rate was on June 2019, at 7.5%)6.
Last year Egypt vowed to halve poverty by 2020 and eliminate it by 2030. It is going in the wrong direction. On
July 29th the national statistics agency released a long-delayed report on household finances. It found that 33%
of Egypt’s 99m people were classified as poor last year, up from 28% in 2015. Even that dismal finding may not
be dismal enough. The government has fixed the official poverty line at just 736 EGP ($45) a month, a figure
that many economists say is too low. The World Bank said in April that 60% of Egyptians were “either poor or
vulnerable”.
The macroeconomic analysis of Egypt over the past decade reveals that while the growth was relatively stable
and fairly well maintained ever since the liberalization policies of 1990s, Egyptian economy had to fight off
other major hurdles like low GDP per capita growth, high inflation and unemployment, growing public unrest
after the Arab Spring, ever increasing government borrowings, an overvalued currency (which had to be
devalued, more on that later) and a poor external account. However, with sustained policy initiatives (which
we discuss about next), the government succeeded in taming down inflation and unemployment rate,
controlling public spending, stabilizing the Egyptian pound and reining in the external account deficit. We
now look at these policy measures, and whether the government reforms have been as good on the ground for
Egyptians, as good they appear on paper.
Fiscal Policy
Even though the GDP growth averaged 4.4% from 1980 8
Egypt Growth Rate
till 1992, deeper analysis shows that in the last 5 years
Growth rate in %
The immediate result was that the average growth rate bounced to about 4.5% in the 5 years prior to
liberalization. In the sixth year, the growth rate touched 7.5%1, as can be seen in the diagram. Trade liberalized
as well, albeit partly and as the Egyptian economy opened up, it started showing a much stable growth, as the
domestic factors were no more the only reason for economic growth, with international economy also playing
an increasing part.
More recently, Egypt has undertaken a slew of reforms overseen by the president, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi. The
country has been facing huge budget deficits, and by the time the civil war came to an end, the budget deficit
In need of monetary assistance from IMF, Mr. Sisi went ahead with a number of economic reforms, backed by
the IMF. These included removal of fuel subsidies, letting the currency depreciate and imposition of a 14%
value-added tax. The reforms paved the way for long-term economic growth. And a $12bn aid from IMF.
But macroeconomic gains came at the expense of Egyptians themselves. Cuts to fuel subsidies have pushed up
transport costs. For an Egyptian on the official poverty line, a short daily trip on Cairo’s metro would now
consume 25% of their monthly income. The price of almost every service, from driving licenses to gun permits,
has gone up. Public-school fees has jumped by 20-50%. For businesses, there is a proposed 0.25% levy on
revenue that would be used to fund a new national healthcare scheme.
Many of these changes are long overdue. (Fuel subsidies were regressive, inefficient and unaffordable; hospitals
need investment.) But the government seems oblivious to their impact on the poor. Subsidies were the heart
of Egypt’s social safety-net. Nothing has adequately replaced them. Ration cards give access to cut-rate staples,
but no one can live on cooking oil and rice alone.
Monetary policy
Arguably, one of the biggest challenges Egypt has to face is inflation. The authority tasked with handling the
monetary policy in Egypt is the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE). CBE, as its tools for effectively managing the
monetary policy in the country, has established two standing facilities, the overnight lending and the overnight
deposit facility. The CBE tinkers with the interest rates on these two standing facilities, the overnight lending
and the overnight deposit rates, to effectively control the liquidity in the economy, and achieve its goal of
desired level of inflation.
With growing government spending, a deteriorating domestic currency, and economic growth, inflation was
at outrageous levels. For three years ending 2018, the average inflation remained above 20.9%. As a result, the
CBE went on with a series of massive interest rate hikes. In 2016 alone, the central bank hiked the interest rate
by 550 bps. In November 2016, on the back of sustained double-digit inflation, the central bank hiked the
deposit and overnight lending rates by 300 bps in one go.
In 2017, there were two more interest rate hikes by the central bank, increasing the deposit rate by 400 bps
from 14.75% to 18.75%, and similarly impacting the overnight lending rate, increasing from 15.75% to 19.75%.
The expected impact would have been a tamed inflation. Instead, immediately after the 300 bps rate hikes,
the inflation rate jumped from 13.5% in October to 19.4% in November 2016. And by the time the central bank
hiked interest rate for the
second time in 2017, the
inflation had touched its peak, at
32.9% as can be seen in the
following diagram4.
We now focus our attention to the time lag between declining inflation rate as a result of higher interest rates.
Theoretically, with interest rate hikes, inflation rate should have declined. Instead, despite a total hike of 950
basis points in 2016 and 2017, inflation continued to grow, almost along with the interest rates. The reason
behind this lies in the exchange rate of the Egyptian Pound (EGP).
The result was that import bill rose significantly, deteriorating the external account balance. Data from IMF
shows that in 2016 itself, external account deficit increased to 6% of the GDP, from 3.7% a year before.
Increasing import bill pushed the inflation. Hence, we see that even after a steep rate hike, the inflation sky-
rocketed, hitting the poorest segment the hardest. This was the impact that trade (liberalized partly after 1991)
had on Egypt. No wonder, the majority of poor people feel that liberalization, apart from benefitting a few
corporates, has barely helped the Egyptian poor.
Once the economy was in a better shape by the end of 2017, with lower level of inflation, the monetary policy
shifted its stance to accommodative and started cutting interest rates. A noticeable fact is that the inflation has
been kept in check throughout, and as of October 2019, it is down to 3.1%4. With EGP priced at its fair value,
exports were bound to take off in medium to long run. It had become cheaper to travel to Egypt, and being the
tourist hotspot that it is, this fact would definitely go on to benefit the country. Consequently, the
unemployment in the country has come down as well, and the engines off the economy have started rolling
too. All of this, after controlling for the interest rate and liberalizing EGP. This is the impact that monetary
policy of any country can have, and this is best shown in the Egyptian case.
However, with all its theories of efficiency, economic equilibrium and the related policies may not always lead
to welfare of all the segments of the society. The policies adopted by the Egyptian authorities have helped the
broader economy to grow, but have also resulted in growing poverty, discontent among its people, and
inequality. The GDP growth often is inefficient in its indication of growing prosperity. Even though the GDP
growth in Egypt has increased over the past year, the jump is mostly due to a boom in oil and gas. Other sectors
look stagnant. Though jobs are being created, many are in low-wage or informal sectors.
We, therefore, now look at the policy suggestions to help Egypt address the shortcomings it faces.
Other references:
The Economist: Used for fiscal policy and monetary policy inputs
• https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/08/08/egypt-is-reforming-its-economy-but-
poverty-is-rising
• https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/04/25/egypts-economy-thrills-investors-but-
locals-are-struggling
For inflation, interest rate hikes and free-floating exchange rate regime:
• https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/publications/the-egp-devaluation-a-new-beginning.html
• https://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-cenbank/update-2-egypts-central-bank-makes-third-straight-cut-to-
interest-rates-idUSL8N27U7LU
• https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/why-inflation-is-so-high-in-egypt/
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-09/egypt-inflation-at-9-year-low-in-boost-for-central-
bank-rate-cut
Sources
• International Monetary Fund, IMF: for GDP growth rate (historical), population growth rate
(historical), government net borrowings as a % of GDP (historical), current account balance as a % of
GDP (historical)
• Central Bank of Egypt, CBE: Inflation data (historical)
• Bloomberg: Unemployment (historical), inflation (historical)
• Other Sources: National Statistics Agency (Egypt), World Bank, The Economist (for policy
information), TradingEconomics (for diagrams, data sourced at CBE)