CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH BIHAR

GAYA-823001

SCHOOL OF LAW & GOVERNANCE

**** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES,
**** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****

PROJECT REPORT

An analysis of Purposive approach to the

interpretation of Constitution of India.

Submitted By- Enrolment-

MUKESH RANJAN CUSB1513125026
B.A. LL.B (Hons.)
7th Semester (2015-2020) Submitted to – DR. AVINASH
KUMAR
Assistant Professor,
School of Law & Governance,
Central University of South
Bihar.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The project work of “INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES” on the topic “ An analysis of

Purposive approach to the interpretation of Constitution of India. .” This project
is given by our honorable subject professor “Dr. Avinash Kumar” and first of all I
would like to thank him for providing me such a nice topic and making me aware
as well providing me a lot of ideas regarding the topic and the methods to
complete the project.

I would like to thank all the Library staffs who helped me to find all the desired
books regarding the topic as the whole project revolves around the doctrinal
methodology of research. I would like to thank to my seniors as well as class
mates who helped me in the completion of this project. I would also like to thanks
to Google and Wikipedia as well as other web sites over web which helped me in
the completion of this project. Last but not the least, thanks to all who directly or
indirectly helped me in completing of this project.

I have made this project with great care and tried to put each and every
necessary information regarding the topic. So at the beginning I hope that if once
you will come inside this project you will be surely glad.

-Mukesh Ranjan

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 Index
S.NO CONTENT PAGE NO.
1. 04
TABLE OF CASES

2 05
INTRODUCTION

3 05
RULE OF PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION

4 09
LEADING CASE

5 12
INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA IN CONTEXT OF PURPOSIVE
APPROACH
6. 19
CONCLUSION

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TABLE OF CASES
1. D. SAIBABA V BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

2. SANJAY DUTT V STATE THROUGH CBI, BOMBAY

3. DIRECTORATE OF ENFBRCEMENT V DEEPAK MAHAJAN

4. A.N ROY V SARAH SHAM SINGH

5. UDAY MOHAN LAL ACHARYA V STATE QF MAHAMSHTRA

6. P. NINNALUSLINGAM V ANNAYA NADER

7. UOI V PRABHAURAM VIIAY KUMAR

8. DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA V HARI PRAKASH

9. HARBANS SINGH V STATE OF UP

10. MC. MEHTA V STATE OF TN

11. TARUN RANJAN MAJUMDAR V SIDDHARTH DATTA

12. DR. M. ISMAIL FAROQQI V UNION OF INDIA

13. REV. STAINISLAUS V STATE OF MP

14. PANACHAND GANDHI V STATE OF BOMBAY

15. RAMESH THAPPAR V STATE OF MADRAS

16. RAMJILAL MODI V STATE OF UP

17. ARUM GHOSHE V STATE OF WB.

18. S.R. CHAUDHURI V STATE OF PUNJAB

19. STATE OF MYSORE V R.V. BIDAP

20. KOPPISETTI SUBHARAO V STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

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INTRODUCTION

The purposive approach sometimes referred to as purposive construction, purposive

interpretation, or the "modern principle in construction" is an approach to statutory and
constitutional interpretation under which common law courts interpret an enactment (that is, a
statute, a part of a statute, or a clause of a constitution) in light of the purpose for which it was
enacted.

The historical source of purposive interpretation is the mischief rule established in Heydon's
Case. Purposive interpretation was introduced as a form of replacement for the mischief rule, the
plain meaning rule and the golden rule to determine cases. Purposive interpretation is exercised
when the courts utilize extraneous materials from the pre-enactment phase of legislation,
including early drafts, committee reports, etc. The purposive interpretation involves a rejection of
the exclusionary rule.

Critics of purposivism argue it fails to recognize the separation of powers between the legislator
and the judiciary. The legislator is responsible for the creating the law, while the judiciary is
responsible for interpreting law. As purposive interpretation goes beyond the words within the
statute, considerable power is bestowed upon the judges as they look to extraneous materials for
aid in interpreting the law.

RULE OF PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION

Purposive construction of a statute is a functional approach adopted by the court to give full
effect to the ‘purpose and object’ or the ‘reason and spirit of the Act so as to arrive at a just
result. The true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the
words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose and object which
comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed.

If the natural meaning of the words used in a statute clearly omits certain cases, the words should
not be so strained as to include these. But if the natural meaning of the words is not able to

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achieve the objects of the statute, extended meaning may be given to them if they are capable of
receiving that meaning.

Where literal construction or plain meaning may cause hardship, futility, absurdity or uncertainty,
the purposive or contextual construction may be preferred to arrive at a more just, reasonable and
sensible result (D. Saibaba v Bar Council of India ).1Purposive construction must be applied to
provisions so as to ensure that true intent of statute is carried on. It is the duty of the courts to
accept a construction Which promotes the object of legislation and also prevents its possible
abuse [Sanjay Dutt v State through CBI, Bombay (II) 2

A bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of the legislative intent devoid of
concept of ‘purpose and object’ will render the legislature to be vain. Because there may be
sometimes certain circumstances in which it may be necessary to go behind the words of an
enactment and take other factors into consideration to give effect to the legislative intention and
to the purpose and spirit of the enactment so that no absurdity or practical inconvenience may
result and the legislative exercise and its scope and object may not become futile [Directorate of
Enfbrcement v Deepak Mahajan 3

When an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the court would attempt to resolve the
ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision having regard to the grave
consequences of the alternative constructions [A.N Roy v Sarah Sham Singh .4 An indefeasible
right of an accused flowing from any legislative provision should not be defeated by a court by
giving a strained interpretation of the provisions of the Act. Only that interpretation should be
preferred which is in consonance with purpose and object of the legislation [Uday Mohan Lal
Acharya v State Qf Mahamshtra 5

Purposeful construction should be adopted by the courts and the construction which advances the
objective, protect the interest of the party and keep the remedy alive should be preferred. If a
decision runs counter to the very intent and purpose for which the enactment was made, the
decisions need to be corrected [P. Ninnaluslingam v Annaya Nader]6.

1
(2003) 6 SCC 186]

2
(1994) 5 SCC 410]

3
(1994) 3 SCC 440].
4
(2006) 5 SCC 745].

5
(2001) 5 SCC.

6
(2001) 9 SCC 673
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In UOI v Prabhauram Viiay Kumar7, the Apd Court while examining the sc0pe of the
expressions ‘untoward accident’ and ‘accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying
passengers, Id chat falling down of a bona fide passenger (Le. a passenger travelling with a valid
ticket or pass) from the train while trying to board it 15 50W by the expressions. Since the
provision for compensation!" Railways Act, 1989, is a beneficial piece of legislation, liberal or
Purposive interpretation be applied and compensation be awarded for death of such a person.

Purposive construction need not be applied where relevant Act has amended from time to time
on the basis of fresh needs and has not remained static. In such situation, literal interpretation has
to be applied. 11m Dentists Act, 1948 has not remained static but has changed with the times
Thus, interpreting the Dentists Act purposive construction cannot be applied because what is not
included by the legislature cannot be undone by the court by adopting the principle of purposive
interpretation ‘ [Dental Council of India v Hari Prakash 8]. But when ‘ amendment is made in
the provision to implement effectively the legislative intention and to prevent the social mischief
against which the provision is directed, a purposive construction is required.

Case Law

Harbans Singh v State of UP. 9In this case, Sec. 59 of Indian Prison Act, 1974 was in question:
whether under-trial prisoners to be fettered or not? The Court held that 8.59 is a beneficial
provision, which cannot be used in its general terms. The purpose of Prison Act is not to put only
the restriction, but also to provide any benefit as and when can be given to prisoners. A
‘categorisation’ of under-trials ought to be made: Under-trials not to be fettered and not to be put
into jail, but sufficient safeguards to be provided. Only in rarest cases, such person can be
fettered (e.g. where there is a criminal record of such person absconding from jail).

7
(2008) 9 SCC 527

8
(2001) 8 SCC 61

9
AIR (1991) SC 531
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MC. Mehta v State of TN. 10 In this case, Children’s Employment Act (T.N.) was in question.
The court held that the word “Employment” in Act do not includes all kinds of jobs. Children
cannot be given a job in manufacturing process (more particularly of match 1mm); but job can be
given for packing etc. Because, the purpose of the Act is to protect the rights of children and to
provide some benefit to them.

Tarun Ranjan Majumdar v Siddharth Datta 11 In this case, the question was how to construe
the word “may” in sec. 25(1) of Guardians and Wards Act, 1878, which deals with the custody of
a child. A guardian was appointed for a Child but child for some reason left that guardian, and
refused the guardianship of that person. But child later said he want the same man as his
guardian. The question was whether the same person Can be appointed as guardian (by court’s
order)? Sec.25(1) provides that “Court may pass such orders” (i.e. orders regarding the
reappointment of that particular person). The court held that the purpose of Act is to protect the
rights of wards It is not necessary to look into the fact why the particular child for sometime left
that guardian.

Dr. M. Ismail Faroqqi v Union of India 12 In this case, the question was how to construe the
term “acquisition” under the Acquisition of Certain Areas Act Ayodhya Act (whether a mosque
can be acquired by government or not?). The court held that the term to be construed liberally
and in the context of the Act. The term “public purpose” is to be used in its widest sense. For all
such terms like “acquisition” as incorporated in this Act, rule of construction should be beneficial
because a construction which promotes a larger, national interest/purpose must be preferred to a
strict literal construction because the latter may lead to factionalism and discord.

10
(AIR 1991 SC 417)

11
(AIR 1991 SC 76)

12
(AIR 1995 SC 605)
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LEADING CASE:

REV. STAINISLAUS v STATE OF MP. 13

[The word ‘propagate’ has been used in Article 25(1) of the Constitution in the sense that, for
what the Article grants is not the right to convert another person to one’s own religion, but to
transmit or spread one’s religion by an exposition of its tenets. The M.P. and Orissa Acts
providing for the prohibition of conversion from one religion to another by use of force or
allurement, or by fraudulent means, relate to ‘Public Order’ (a State subject) and not ‘Regulation
of Religion’ (a Union subject).] In this case, the controversies were related to the M.P. Dharma
Swatantraya Adhiniyam, 1968 and the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967. The provisions of
the two Acts which were in dispute were related to prohibition of forcible conversion and
punishment there for. The appellant Rev. Stainislaus was prosecuted for the commission of
offence under Sec. 3, 4 and 5(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Act.

The common questions which. were raised for the consideration of the Apex Court were as
follows:

(1) Whether the two Acts were in violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article
25(1) of the Constitution, and

(2) Whether the State Legislatures were competent to enact them?

The provision in contention viz. Article 25(1) of the Constitution reads as follows: “Subject to
public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally
entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.”

Counsel for the appellant argued that the right to ‘propagate’ one’s religion means the right to
convert a person to one’s own religion. On that basis, the counsel argued further that the right to
convert a person to one’s own religion is a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 25(1) of the
Constitution.

The court noted that the expression ‘propagate’ has been defined in the Shorter Oxford
Dictionary to mean “to spread from person to person, or from place to place, to disseminate,
diffuse (a statement, belief, practice, etc.).” According to the Century Dictionary (which is an
Encyclopaedic Lexicon of the English Language), Vol. VI, ‘propagate’ means as follows: To

13
[(1977) 1 SCC 677]
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transmit or Spread from person to person or from place to place; carry forward or onward;
diffuse; extend; as to propagate a report; to propagate the Christian religion.

Thus, the learned court held: “We have no doubt that it is In this sense that the word ‘propagate’
has been used in Article 25(1). for what the Article grants is not the right to convert another
person to one’s own religion, but to transmit or spread one’s religion by an exposition of its
tenets. It has to be remembered that Article 25(1) guarantees “freedom of conscience” to every
citizen, and not merely to the followers of one particular religion, and that, in turn postulates that
there is no fundamental right to convert another person to one’s own religion because if a person
purposely undertakes the conversion of another person to his religion, as distinguished from his
effort to transmit or spread the tenets of his religion, that would impinge on the “freedom of
conscience” guaranteed to all the citizens of the country alike.”

In, Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v State of Bombay 14 it was held: ‘Thus, subject to the
restrictions which this Article imposes, every person has a fundamental right under our
Constitution not merely to entertain such religious belief as may be approved of by his judgment
or conscience but to exhibit his belief and ideas in such overt acts as are enjoined or sanctioned
by his religion and further to propagate his religious views for the edification of others.’

Hence, the court observed: “This Court has given the correct meaning of the Article, and we [ind
no justification for the view that it grants a fundamental right to convert persons to one’s own
religion. What is freedom for one, is freedom for the other, in equal measure, and there can
therefore be no such thing as a fundamental right to convert any person to one’s own religion.”

Further, the court noted: “The expression ‘public order’ is of wide connotation. It must have the
connotation which it is meant to provide as the very first Entry in List 11 (State List). It has been
held in Ramesh Thappar v State of Madras 15that ‘public order’ is an expression of wide
connotation and signifies state of tranquility which prevails among the members of a political
society as a result of internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have
established.”

In, Ramjilal Modi v State of UP. 16 held that the right of freedom of religion guaranteed by
Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is expressly made subject to public order, morality and
health, and that it cannot be predicated that freedom of religion can have no bearing whatever on
the maintenance of public order or that a law creating an offence relating to religion cannot under
any circumstances be said to have been enacted in the interests of public order. Again, in Arum
14
(AIR 1954 SC 388)

15
(AIR 1950 SC 124)

16
(AIR 1957 SC 620)
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Ghoshe v State of WB. 17held that if a thing disturbs the current of the life of the community,
and does not merely affect an individual, it would amount to disturbance of the public order.

Therefore, the court observed: “Thus if an attempt is made to raise communal passions e.g. on
the ground that someone has been “forcibly” converted to another religion, it would, in all
probability, give rise to an apprehension of a breach of the public order, affecting the community
at large. The impugned Acts therefore fall within the purview of Entry 1 of List 11 of the Seventh
Schedule as they are meant to avoid disturbances to the public order by prohibiting conversion
from one religion to another in a manner reprehensible to the conscience of the community. The
two Acts do not provide for the regulation of religion and we do not find any justification for the
argument that they fall under Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule.”

Interpretation of constitution of India in context of

Purposive approach:

17
[(1970) 1 SCC 98]
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S.R. CHAUDHURI v STATE OF PUNJAB 18

[It would be subverting the Constitution to permit an individual, who is not a member of the
Legislature, to be appointed a Minister repeatedly for a term of “six consecutive months”,
without him getting himself elected in the meanwhile and the practice would be clearly
derogatory to the constitutional scheme, improper, undemocratic and invalid.

Constitutional provisions are required to be understood and interpreted with an object-oriented

approach. A Constitution must not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense]

In this case, the Respondent 2 without being a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly was
appointed as a Minister in the State on the advice of the Chief Minister. He failed to get himself
elected as a member of the Legislature of the State of Punjab within a period of six months and
submitted his resignation from the Council of Ministers. However, during the term of the same
Legislative Assembly, there was a change in the leadership of the ruling party and a new CM was
appointed. The new CM once again appointed the respondent 2 as one of the Ministers in the
State, even though, the respondent 2 was still un-elected as a member of the Legislative
Assembly. The appellant filed a petition seeking writ of quo warranto against Respondent 2. It
was stated in the petition that appointment of Respondent 2 for a second time during the term of
the same Legislature, without being elected as a member of the Legislature was violative of
constitutional provisions and, therefore, bad.

Further, the court observed: “The absence of the expression “from amongst members of the
Legislature” in Article 164(1) is indicative of the position that whereas under that provision a
non-legislator can be appointed as a Chief Minister or a Minister but that appointment would be
governed by Article 164(4), which places a restriction on such a non-member to continue as a
Minister/Chief Minister, unless he can get himself elected to the Legislature within the period of
six consecutive months from the date of his appointment. Article 164(4) is, therefore not a source
of power or an enabling provision for appointment of a non legislator as a Minister even for a
short duration. It is actually in the nature of a disqualification or restriction for a non-member,
who has been appointed as a Chief Minister/Minister, to continue in office without getting
himself elected within a period of six months.”

Thus, the issue was: Can a non-member; who fails to get elected during the period of six
consecutive months, after he is appointed as a Minister or while a Minister has ceased to be a
18
[(2001) 7 SCC 126]
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legislator, be reappointed as a Minister; without being elected to the Legislature after the expiry
of the period of six consecutive months?

With a view to consider the issue, while considering the Constitutional scheme governing a
democratic parliamentary form 0f government and interpreting Articles 164(1) and 164(4) : “It is
the convention that ministerial office-holders should be members of one or other House of
Parliament. Such membership is essential to the maintenance of ministerial responsibility. When
a Prime Minister appoints to ministerial office someone who is not already In Parliament, a life
peerage is usually conferred on him.” 19

However, the learned court observed: “Constitutional provisions are required to be understood
and interpreted with an object oriented approach. A Constitution must not be construed in a
narrow and pedantic sense. The word used may be general in terms but, their full import and true
meaning, has to be appreciated considering the we contact in which the same are used and the
purpose which they seek to achieve. ”

“The “privilege” of continuing as a Minister for “six months” without being an elected member
is only a one-time slot for the individual concerned during the term of the Legislative Assembly
concerned. It exhausts itself if the individual is unable to get himself elected within the period of
grace of “six consecutive months”. The privilege is personal for the individual concerned. It is he
who must cease to be a Minister, if he does not get elected during the period of six months. The
“privilege” is not of the Chief Minister on whose advice the individual is appointed. Therefore, it
is not permissible for different Chief Ministers, to appoint the same individual as a Minister,
without him getting elected, during the term of the same Assembly. Resignation by the individual
concerned before the expiry of the period of six months, not followed by his election to the
Legislature, would not permit him to be appointed a Minister once again.”

The court further held: “Even a most liberal interpretation of Article 164(4) would be futile. To
construe this provision as permitting repeated appointments of that individual as a Minister,
without getting elected in the meanwhile, would not only make Article 164(4) nugatory but
would also be inconsistent with the basic premise underlying Article 164.”

“We must also bear in mind that no right is conferred on the non-member Minister concerned
even during the period of “six months”, when he is permitted to continue in office, to vote in th e
House. The privilege to vote in the House is conferred only on members of the House of the
Legislature of a State (Article 189). It does not extend to non-elected Ministers. He may address
19
Wade and Bradley: Command and Administrative Law, p. 268
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the House or take part in the proceedings but he cannot vote as an MLA. None of the powers or
privileges of an MLA extend to that individual. All these disabilities also clearly go to suggest
that “six months' clause” in Article [164(4) cannot be permitted to be repeatedly used for the
same individual without his getting elected in the meanwhile."

“Articles 164(1) and 164(4) have therefore, to be so construed that they further the principles of
a representative and responsible government. The legitimacy of the law would be to ensure that
the role of the political sovereign -the people -is not undermined. All Ministers must always owe
their power, directly or indirectly, to them, except for the short duration as envisaged by Article
164(4). The interpretation, therefore, must be such that expectation of the founding fathers and
constitutionalist are fulfilled rather than frustrate .”

STATE OF MYSORE v R.V. BIDAP 20

[A member of a Public Service Commission is eligible for appointment as its Chairman at the
expiration of his six-year term as ordinary member. An ordinary member when elevated to the
higher office of Chairman is not reappointed and does not contravene Article 316(2) or (3) of the
Constitution even if it be on the full course of six years of the office of ordinary member having
run out or even when a member is appointed Chairman midstream.

To re-appoint to an office predicates the previous holding of that identical office. The office of
member is different from that of Chairman and so also the duties attached to each. Thus, While
both are members, they hold different head office.

20
[(1974) 3 scc 337]
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A short issue as to the expiration of the constitutionally guaranteed tenure of office of a Member
of the Public Service Commission, Who, in the middle of his term, reincarnates as its Chairman
and claims a fresh six-year spell, has lent itself to considerable argument at the Bar, because of
apparent incongruity between the Paramount purpose and the expressed language of the
provisions and the slight obscurity of the relevant articles.

In this case, Shri Bidap (the respondent), was appointed Member of the State Public Service
Commission (SPSC) by the Governor of Mysore on March 20, 1967. While his term was still
running, the Governor was pleased to appoint him Chairman of the Commission with effect from
February 15, 1969. The State took the view that the six-years assured to him by Article 316(2)
commenced to run from the date he became Member Simpliciter and did not receive a fresh start,
from the later date when he assumed office as Chairman. On this reckoning the Chairman’s term
would have ended earlier and so, the panicked respondent hastened to the High Court to avert the
peril of premature ouster.

The High Court gave the respondent an interim order and referred the matter to the Apex Court.

The Apex Court put the question: Are Constituent Assembly Debates and objects in the mind of
law-makers put out of the judicial area of vision by the classical ‘Exclusionary Rules’ which are
part of our legal heritage from the British?

The learned court observed: “If the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of meaning,
nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded, and yet, the Rule of Exclusion, which is
generally followed in England, insists that, in interpreting statutes, the proceedings in the
Legislatures, including speeches delivered when the statute was discussed and adopted, cannot
be cited in courts.”

“ The judicial opinion on this point is certainly not quite uniform and there are American
decisions to the $211 that the general history of a statute and the various steps leading up to an
enactment including amendments or modifications of the original bill and reports of Legislative
Committees can be looked at for ascertaining the intention of the legislature where it is in doubt;
but they hold definitely that the legislative history is inadmissible when there is no obbscurity in
the meaning of the statute. ” 21

Thus, the learned court noted that the ‘Rule of Exclusion’ has been criticized by jurists as
artificial. The trend of academic opinion and the practice in the European system suggest that
interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is
logically relevant should be admissible.
21
Crawford on Statutory Construction at p. 388
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Thus, the learned court concluded: “Ofcourse, nobody suggests that such extrinsic materials
should be decisive but they must be admissible. Authorship and interpretation must mutually
illumine and interact. There is authority for the proposition that resort may be had to these
sources with great caution and only when incongruities and ambiguities are to be resolve, Where
it is Plain, the language prevails, but where there is obscurity or lack of harmony with other
provisions and in other special circumstances) it may be legitimate to take external assistance
such as the object of the Provisions, the mischief‘ sought to be remedied, the social canted, the
Words cf the authors and other allied matters.”

KOPPISETTI SUBHARAO v STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 22

In this case, the Apex Court held that the definition of ‘dowry’ under the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961 emphasises that any money, property or valuable security given as a consideration for
marriage ‘before, at or after’ the marriage would be covered by the expression ‘dowry.’ Under
Sec. 4, mere demand of dowry is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Marriage in
this context would include a proposed marriage also more particularly when the non-fulfillment
of the ‘demand of dowry’ leads to the ugly consequence of “the marriage not taking place at all.

The Court further ruled that the word ‘husband’ in Sec498-A, IPC is not limited to cover only
those persons who have entered into legally valid marriage. The thrust of the offence under this
section is subjecting of the woman to cruelty. Likewise, the thrust of the offence under Sec. 304-
B, IPC is also the ‘dowry death.’ Consequently, the evil sought to be curbed are distinct and
separate from the persons committing the offending acts and mere could be no impediment in
law to liberally construe the word/expressions relating to the persons committing the offence so
as to rope in not only the validly married but also anyone who has undergone some or other form
of marriage and thereby assumed for himself the position of ‘husband’ to live, cohabitate and
exercise authority as such husband over another woman.
22
[AIR 2009 SC 2684]
~ 17 ~
The Court observed: The purpose for which Sec. 498-A and 304-B, IPC were introduced cannot
be lost sight of. Legislations enacted with some policy to curb and alleviate some public evil
rampant in society and effectuate a definite public purpose or benefit positively requires to be
interpreted with certain element of realism too and not merely pedantically or hyper-technically.
The obvious objective was to prevent harassment to a woman who enters into a marital
relationship with a person and later on becomes a victim of the greed for money.

Can a person who enters into a marital arrangement be allowed to take a shelter behind a smoke
screen to contend that since there was no valid marriage the question of dowry does not arise?
Such legalistic niceties would destroy the purpose of the provisions. Legislature has taken care of
children born from invalid marriages. Sec. 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 deals with
legitimacy of children of void and voidable manages. Can it be said that the legislature which
was conscious of the social stigma attached to such children closed eyes to the plight of a woman
who unknowingly or unconscious of the legal consequences entered into the marital relationship?
If such restricted meaning is given, it would not further the legislative intent.

The Court, thus, held: It would be appropriate to construe the expression ‘husband’ to cover a
person who enters into a marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned
status of husband subjects the woman concerned to cruelty of coerces her in any manner for any
purposes enumerated in Sec. 304-B and 498-A, IPC. Such an interpretation known and
recognized as purposive construction has to come into play in a case of this nature.

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 CONCLUSION
We have experienced significant changes over the interpretation of statutes. This change from
literal to purposive approaches has had significant effect on our legal system. So much so that the
powers of the legislative and judicial arms are beginning to converge. Parliament has enacted
laws telling the judicial branch how they must interpret legislation, and the judicial arm can read
words into legislation to promote what they believe is the apparent purpose of the legislature,
when, in fact, unrestrained by obedience to the specific words of the statute, they could be
promoting their own policy agenda. In relation to statutory interpretation and the purposive
approach, ‘what is at stake is the separation of powers and respect by the judicial branch of
government for the powers of the legislative branch.’ It is clear that although the purposive
approach may result in some benefits, its application brings with it significant difficulties and
problems.

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