DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY,

LUCKNOW

LAW OF EVIDENCE: FINAL DRAFT

“CASE ANALYSIS: PANNEERSELVAM V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU”

Submitted To: Submitted By:

Mr. Vipul Vinod

Associate Professor

Department of Law Section B

Semester V

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 Acknowledgement

I would like to express my gratitude to all those who helped me to complete this project. I
extend my sincere acknowledgements to Mr. Vipul Vinod Sirwho mentored me in
completing the analysis of the case “Panneerselvam v. State of Tamil Nadu”. I am deeply
indebted to him whose help and stimulating suggestion helped me in choosing this topic.

I would like to thank our Hon’ble Vice Chancellor sir for providing our institute with all the
facilities which are required for the completion of this project.

I further extend my thanks to library staff of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
University who helped me in getting all the materials necessary for the project.
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 Table of Contents

Case Name............................................................................................................4

Citation.................................................................................................................4

Coram...................................................................................................................4

Type of case..........................................................................................................4

Facts of the case....................................................................................................4

Issue involved.......................................................................................................5

Law on point.........................................................................................................5

Ratio Decidendi....................................................................................................5

Judgment...............................................................................................................6

Authors’ Opinion..................................................................................................7

References...........................................................................................................10

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Case Name:Panneerselvam v. State of Tamil Nadu.

Citation: (2008) 17 SCC 190.

Coram: Dr. Arijit Pasayat, P. Sathasivam and Mukundakam Sharma, JJ.

Type of case: Criminal Appeal.

Facts of the case:

The appellants were five in number in all these appeals, arrayed as A-1 to A-5 respectively.
A-1 was the Head Constable, while A-2 was a Constable. A-3 was a Writer, and A-4 was a
Para Constable. All of them were attached to Ammapet Police Station, and they were on duty
on 14.12.1992 and 15.12.1992. A-5 was a native of Udaiyur Kovil Village, to which place
the deceased also belonged to. On 14.12.1992, A-1 and A-2 brought the deceased and P.W.2
at 11.00 P.M. and 11.30 P.M. to the Police Station for the purpose of enquiry.

On coming to know about this, P.W.1 and others came to the Police Station, and they made a
request to A-1 to leave them, so that they may be enquired next morning to which course A-1
was not amenable. Thereafter, P.W.1 and others left the Police Station. A-1 asked P.W.1 to
lie outside, and the deceased was asked to be in the Police Station. At about 1.30 A.M. on
15.12.1992, a distressing cry was heard by P.W.2, who was actually lying outside the Police
Station. He then, got inside along with A-4 who was lying nearby him, to see the deceased
with burn injuries and the fumes and flames also. All of them made attempts to quench the
fire. Thereafter, A-1, the Head Constable registered a case at 2.00 A.M. under Sec.309 of
I.P.C. alleging that it was an attempt of self-immolation by the deceased by pouring petrol.

Then, the victim was taken to the Government Primary Health Hospital, Ammapet, where
P.W.3, the Doctor, was on duty. The deceased made a statement to P.W.3, which was
recorded and, in which he deposed that he had poured petrol on himself and set himself on
fire. From there, he was sent to Thanjavur Medical College Hospital, Thanjavur, where he
was admitted by P.W.4, the Doctor to whom also he made a similar statement. Following the
same, he was examined by P.W.6, another Doctor, to whom also he made a similar statement.
The matter was then brought to the notice of theCollector, pursuant to which directions have
been issued to P.W.14, the Revenue Divisional Officer, to conduct an enquiry in that regard.

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On 16.12.1992 at about 00.10 hours, P.W.14, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kumbakonam,
went to Thanjavur Medical College Hospital, Thanjavur, enquired the deceased between
11.30 A.M. and 1.15 P.M. and recorded his statement. According to the statement, which
was the dying declaration, A-5 only poured petrol on his hip at about 11.30 P.M. and further
at the time of occurrence, but he did not knowwho set fire on him, because of which he
sustained injuries. At thattime, P.W.5, the Doctor, was also present. The Doctor also made
an endorsement, to the effect that he was conscious enough and having mental frame also to
give such dying declaration. Despite treatment, he succumbed to burn injuries on 20.12.1992
at 12.10 A.M. The case was committed to Court of Session, and four charges were framed
against all the five accused. Both the trial Court as well as Hon’ble High Court of Madras
found all the appellants/accused guilty and were awarded punishments accordingly. Hence,
these appeals have arisen in the present case.

Issue involved:

The main issue that was involved in this criminal appeal was that whether the dying
declaration of the accused should be admitted or not and can all of the accused be conviction
on the sole basis of the declaration.

Law on point

 Punishment for murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
 Wrongful confinement to extort confession, or compel restoration of property under
section 348 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
 Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen
offender under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
 Acts done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention under section 34
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Ratio Decidendi:

The dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its
correctness. Where there is more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one
first in point of time must be preferred.

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Judgment:

The judgment of this case was delivered by Justice Arijit Pasayat. This is a case where the
basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person
is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to
accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and
cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides should the dying declaration be excluded it
will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness
in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of
evidence.

Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the
accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth
as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason that the Court also insists that the
dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its
correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a
result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be
further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to
observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true
and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It
cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the
sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely
a rule of prudence.

Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the High Court has erroneously
discarded the statements made by PWs. 3, 4 and 6 to the effect that the deceased
voluntarily told each one of them that he had set himself on fire. As rightly contended by
learned Counsel for the appellant, even though one police official was present when the
statement was made to PWs. 3, 4 and 6, yet large number of relatives of the deceased, more
particularly, PW1 who had taken him to the hospital were present also. Additionally, the
High Court has misconstrued the dying declaration. The deceased had categorically stated
therein that he did not know who set him on fire. The High Court observed, as if, the
deceased had said that either A-1 or A-5 did so. The conclusions have been arrived at by
misreading the evidence.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court therefore, held the impugned judgment of the High Court
unsustainable and hence is liable to be set aside. And also acquitted the appellants of all the
charges in each case thereby, allowing the appeals.

Authors’ Opinion
Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is an exception to the general rule against hearsay.
Sub-section (1) of section 32 makes the statement of the deceased admissible which is
generally described as ‘dying declaration”.1 Dying declarations are statements oral or
documentary made by a person as to the cause his death or as to the circumstances of the
transactions resulting in his death. There are basically two grounds of admission of a dying
declaration. Firstly, necessity, for the victim being generally the only principle eye-witness
to the crime, the exclusion his statement might defeat the ends of justice; and secondly, the
sense of impending death which creates a sanction equal to the obligation of an oath.2

The general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is that they are
declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every of
this world has gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by
the most powerful consideration to speak truth; a situation so solemn and so awful is
considered by law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive
oath administered in a Court of Justice.3

If the truthfulness of a dying declaration is accepted, it can always form the basis of
conviction of the accused,4 and if a dying declaration is acceptable as truthful event in the
absence of corroborative evidence, court may act upon it and convict.5 A truthful, coherent
and consistent dying declaration needs no corroboration and conviction may be based on
it.6 Thus, if the dying declaration passes the test of scrutiny it can be relied on as the sole
basis of conviction.7

1
Ravi Kumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2006 SC 1448: (2006) 9 SCC 240
2
Chief Justice M. Monir, The Law of Evidence, 170 (10th ed. Universal Law Publishing 2015)
3
Id
4
Vithal Somnath More v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 519: (1978) 1 SCC 622
5
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416: (1985) 1 SCC 552
6
Id
7
Raja Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 5 SCC 272

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In Paniben v. State of Gujarat8the Supreme Court on the basis of its own earlier decisions
has summed up certain guidelines to be followed by the courts while dealing with the
dying declarations:

(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be
acted upon without corroboration.9

(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can
base conviction on it, without corroboration.10

(iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that
the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The
deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a
fit state to make the declaration.11

(iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without
corroborative evidence.12

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying
declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected.13

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of
conviction.14

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to the
occurrence, it is not to be rejected.15

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the

contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth.16

8
AIR 1992 SC 1817: (1992) 2 SCC 474
9
Munnu Raja and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1976) 3 SCC 104: AIR 1976 SC 2199
10
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav,AIR 1985 SC 416: (1985) 1 SCC 552
11
K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618: AIR 1976 SC 1994.
12
Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 264: AIR 1974 SC 332
13
Kake Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1981) Supp SCC 25: AIR 1982 SC 1021
14
Ram Manorath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1981) 2 SCC 654
15
State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurty Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617
16
Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1505

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 (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental
condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But
where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to
make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail.17

(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying
declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.18

(xi) Where there is more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one
first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying
declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted.19

The Supreme Court, in the case at hand held that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule
of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of the conviction unless it is
corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.

In the present case the dying declaration furnished by the accused is highly suspicious
because first he told all the three doctors, PWs. 3, 4, and 6, that he had set himself on fire
while in the declaration made to the Revenue Divisional Officer he said that it was A-5
who poured petrol on him. So there is an inconsistency in these declarations and there is a
possibility that one of them might be tutored. Hence, the declaration cannot be a sole basis
of conviction and it has to be corroborated with the evidences, if any.

Also, there was no other eye-witness other than the accused himself, and although P.W.2 was
present at that time he was lying outside the Police Station and only on hearing the distressed
cry of the deceased, he came only to see the fumes and flames, so it cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be said that he is a competent witness.

Merely because the accused was in a fit state of mind the declaration made by him would not
be admitted and it has to pass the basic test of scrutiny and the statement deposed by him was
highly dubious and hence liable to be rejected.

The Supreme Court very rightly opined that even though one police official was present when
the statement was made to PWs. 3, 4 and 6, yet large number of relatives of the deceased,

17
Nanhau Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 912
18
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Madan Mohan, AIR 1989 SC 1519
19
Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700

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more particularly, PW1 who had taken him to the hospital were present also. So the
declaration made was in fact voluntary. Also, the High Court misconstrued the dying
declaration. The deceased had categorically stated therein that he did not know who set him
on fire. The High Court clearly erred in its judgment because it observed, as if, the deceased
had said that either A-1 or A-5 did so.

So in the case at hand I completely agree with the reasoning applied by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court by not admitting the declaration made to the Revenue Divisional Officer and acquitting
all of the accused.

References:

Law Reporters:
(i) Supreme Court Cases
(ii) All India Reporter

Books:
Chief Justice M. Monir, The Law of Evidence, (10th ed. Universal Law Publishing 2015)

Web Sources:

(i) http://www.manupatrafast.in/pers/Personalized.aspx
(ii) http://judis.nic.in/Judis_Chennai/content.asp

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