Efforts for peace in Afghanistan during 1979-84

On February 11, 1981, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim committed to resolve the

Afghan crisis and appointed Under-Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar as his
personal representative to Afghanistan. In July the same year, it was revealed that the
United States was found assisting the resistance with more than $20 million for the
purchase of weapons while Saudi Arabia had claimed that it was committed to
contributing aid which was "equal to or greater than that of the United States", whereas
the Egyptians were providing materials left from the days of Egypt-Soviet relations. The
crisis was beginning to dominate the international arena.
Geneva 1, the first round of negotiations, took place under UN in 1982, but was
conducted indirectly as a compromise to the two parties. Cordovez shuttled between
Afghan and Pakistan representatives sitting in the same building at different times so as
to avoid direct government talks. Although little resulted from the round, it did mark the
opening of an official forum for discussion for a Soviet withdrawal.
The Geneva talks continued through 1983 as the Soviets experienced growing losses in
terms of casualties, material and international prestige. On April 8, Geneva II began
optimistically after Moscow signaled that under the right conditions, it was willing to
withdraw from Afghanistan. Geneva II was suspended on April 22, so that delegates
could consult with their respective governments. At that time, the Soviets told Cordovez
and Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Yaqub Khan, that they were all set to undertake a phased
withdrawal if Pakistan would commit itself to cutting off arms to the resistance.
In June 1983, Geneva II was reconvened with both Afghanistan and Pakistan assuming
hardened positions. Pakistan insisted on reopening issues concerning its obligations under
principles of "non-interference", the repatriation of Afghan refugees and a time frame for
a Soviet withdrawal. Following the death of Andropov, on February 9, 1984, and the
succession of Cherenkov, the Soviet position on Afghanistan hardened and threatened
negotiations. The points of contention for Moscow were the conditions and time-frame
for a Soviet retreat. To placate the Soviets, Cordovez revised the framework for
negotiations and based the new format on four "instruments". These instruments included
"noninterference", international guarantees, the return of Afghan refugees and
"interrelationships". The compromise was based on the elimination of any terminology
referring specifically to a Soviet withdrawal. The issue of a withdrawal was to come
under the fourth instrument of "interrelationships".
Geneva III began on August 24 and ended six days later with little progress. The collapse
of this third round may be attributed to the absence of a Soviet negotiator on the Afghan
side. The Cherenkov government was unwilling to negotiate a settlement of the Afghan
war or to accept a negotiated withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Kremlin still seemed intent
on achieving a military victory. In fact, the talks took place following a major Soviet
offensive in the strategic Panjshar Valley and incursions into Pakistan, prompting
Islamabad to complain of extensive border violations. Despite the setbacks in
negotiations, Cordovez reported that there had been a significant narrowing in the time
span that the two sides proposed for a Soviet withdrawal closing their differences to less
than a year. The fighting forced Afghan refugees to continue fleeing to Pakistan at the
rate of 8,000 a month, involving numerous international aid organizations to help
Islamabad cope with the influx of new settlers. By the middle of 1984 five million
Afghans had fled their country, about three million settling in Pakistan and two million in
Iran.
The war continued to intensify and was carried over into Pakistan and the Soviet Central
Asian Republic of Tajikistan. Pakistani border villages became subject to increased
bombings and rocket fire from across the Afghan border. Islamabad waged protests with
the United Nations citing cases in which entire villages had been destroyed by Afghan
government or Soviet reprisals against suspected rebel strongholds. The war also carried
over into Iran where Afghan Shiite rebels based their operations. For the Soviet Union,
Iran and Pakistan, the war was no longer confined to Afghanistan but had spilled over to
affect border areas, villages and their domestic populations. Pakistan claimed that attacks
on its border villages were an attempt, to intimidate Islamabad and force it to
compromise in the Geneva talks, especially on the issue of supplying the resistance with
weapons.
But in early April and with Pakistan's encouragement, Reagan announced that his
administration would continue to supply material aid to the resistance, and through
Pakistan. The announcement came in the midst of an American congressional debate over
the consequences of introducing advanced weapons into a region where they might make
their way into unfriendly hands.
Reagan linked the Afghan crisis with weapons negotiations, detente and the future of US-
Soviet relations. In August 1984 the third round of Geneva talks convened and ended,
and Washington announced that it was supplying the Afghan resistance at the rate of
$280 million a year. Once again the foreign ministers of the European Community
renewed their appeal to Moscow to resolve the crisis by withdrawing from South Asia.
Europe's role in condemning the Soviet Union put pressure on Moscow to rethink its
Afghan policy at a time when Moscow was pursuing relations with the West. In October
the US Congress approved a resolution declaring "it should be the policy of the United
States to encourage and support the people of Afghanistan to continue their struggle to be
free of foreign domination".
In 1985 Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union following the death of Cherenkov
on March 10. Although it was not immediately evident, Gorbachev's government would
eventually embark on overhauling Soviet foreign policy, including Moscow's Afghan
policy. In many respects the assent of Gorbachev marked the beginning of the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan. A determination to restructure the domestic economy
forced Moscow to rethink expensive and unpopular foreign policy initiatives in the Third
World and Europe. Gorbachev also had to weigh the relative advantages to be gained
from continued involvement in countries like Afghanistan with potential gains to be
derived from normal relations with the West and China, both of which were critical of
Soviet policy in South Asia.
In December 1985, Geneva VI ended without progress due to an impasse over the
negotiating format. Kabul claimed to have a time-table for the withdrawal of Soviet
troops if Islamabad would agree to direct talks. Pakistan stood firm on indirect talks but
sensed a softening in the Afghan and Soviet positions. Without having made any
significant concessions Pakistan forced Afghanistan to reintroduce the concept of
withdrawal into the negotiations. Although this round of talks ended without progress, the
rhetoric of Soviet withdrawal had been introduced into the official debate for the first
time in meaningful terms. Islamabad gained renewed support for its position on
November 13 when for the sixth time the UN General Assembly passed with a vote of
122 to 19 and 12 abstentions a Pakistani resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign
troops from Afghanistan.