Other Full Text

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 94511-13. September 18, 1992.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEJANDRO C. VALENCIA, Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Perfecto R. Bautista for Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; NO STANDARD BEHAVIOR WHEN ONE IS CONFRONTED WITH A SHOCKING
INCIDENT; CASE AT BAR. — Arlyn B. Jimenez testified that as she and her son, Samuel were about to eat, she saw "Ponga" holding
a sumpak a few feet away from her open door. Seized with fear, she immediately closed the door because whenever she sees a
sumpak she feels afraid. Momentarily thereafter, a shot was fired through her door, hitting her children. With her two children in serious
condition Arlyn rushed them to the Philippine General Hospital, and in her state of hysteria and shock, Arlyn was in no position to tell
the police investigator who shot her children, nor recall whether a rumble preceded the shooting or not. All that she could tell the police
at that point in time was that the sumpak pellets passed through her shanty door, which she had just closed. Arlyn’s testimony should
be considered in the light of the fact that there is no standard of behavior when one is confronted with a shocking incident, especially so
when the person whose testimony is elicited is part of that shocking incident.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY ENTITLED ON APPEAL. — Settled is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses are accorded great respect and finality in the appellate court where the same
are supported by the evidence on record.
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; CAN BE FILED WITHOUT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AGAINST AN
ACCUSED ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT. — A person who is lawfully arrested without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b),
Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court should be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7. Under said Section 7, Rule 112, the prosecuting officer can file the Information in court without a preliminary
investigation, which was done in the accused-appellant’s case.
4. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; DEEMED WAIVED WHEN NOT INVOKED. — Since the records do not show whether
the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant
signified his readiness to be arraigned, the Court can only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, when
he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his arraignment.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; CONFESSION ALLEGEDLY OBTAINED BY FORCE, NOT PRESENTED IN CASE AT BAR. —
As to the appellant’s contention in his Brief that he was likewise tortured into confessing that he fired the "sumpak," a careful review of
the records and exhibits does not reveal that the prosecution presented his confession, if any, during the trial. His conviction was not
based on his alleged confession but on the strength of the testimony of the victim’s mother.
6. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; CLAIM OF TORTURE, NOT GIVEN WEIGHT IN THE ABSENCE OF FORMAL
COMPLAINT. — Accused-appellant’s claim of police brutality cannot be given weight as he never formally complained to the police or
to the fiscal nor presented any medical certificate to prove the same.
7. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; INDEMNITY FOR DEATH RAISED TO P50,000.00. — In Criminal Case No. 89-72061 the death indemnity
is increased to FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS in consonance with existing jurisprudence.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
Page 1 of 28
"Where there is smoke, there is a fire!" is an old saying which is applicable in the appeal at bar considering that the accused-appellant
was convicted mainly on circumstantial evidence.
Accused-appellant Alejandro Valencia y Canaria appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, branch 12, in Criminal
Case Nos. 89-72061, and 89-72062 1 convicting him of (1) Homicide with the use of an unlicensed firearm and (2) Less Serious
Physical Injuries, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, ALEJANDRO VALENCIA y CANARIA, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt —
"1. In Criminal Case No. 89-72061 - of the crime of HOMICIDE (with the use of an unlicensed firearm), as defined and penalized in
Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, and accordingly, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment) with the accessory penalties provided for by law; to pay to the heirs of Annabelle Jimenez, herein
represented by her mother, Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez, the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) for medical and
hospitalization and funeral expenses; the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as death indemnification, and the sum
of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as moral damages, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 98-72062 - of the crime of LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES, as defined and penalized under Article
265, Revised Penal Code, which is a lesser offense to that charged in the afore-quoted information and, accordingly, hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties provided for by law: to pay
to the victim, Samuel B. Jimenez, Jr., represented by his mother, Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez, the amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,500.00) for his medical and hospitalization expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"In the service of his sentences, the accused shall be credited with the full time during which he underwent preventive imprisonment,
provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners; otherwise, he shall
be entitled to only four-fifths (4/5) thereof (Article 29, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6127).
"SO ORDERED." 2
The People’s version of the facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez, her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr., aged five and three, respectively, and her mother, are residents
of 2008 F. Muñoz St., Paco, Manila. At about 9:00 p.m. of March 19, 1989, as she was about to eat supper, she noticed appellant
standing five steps away from the open door of her house and holding a sumpak, a homemade shotgun. Seized with fear, she closed
the door. After a few moments, she heard a burst of gunfire. This was followed by cries of pain from her children inside the house.
Seeing her children bloodied, she immediately went outside and shouted for help. As she did so, she saw appellant running away,
carrying the sumpak. Two neighbors assisted Jimenez in bringing the injured children to the Philippine General Hospital (tsn, pp. 2-5, 8,
17, Aug. 7, 1989).
"That same evening, Patrolman Renato Marquez, a homicide investigator, interviewed Jimenez at the hospital about the shooting
incident. Since she was still experiencing shock over the incident Jimenez forgot to mention the name of appellant as the one who shot
her children (tsn, pp. 4, 14, Aug. 21, 1989).
"Acting on the report of a barangay tanod, Patrolmen Roberto Cajiles, Romeo de la Peña and Carlos Castañeda, assigned at the Ong
Detachment, Police Station No. 5, conducted an investigation of the shooting incident in the house of Jimenez. At the time, Jimenez
and her injured children were already in the hospital. Nevertheless, Pat. Cajiles was able to interview the mother of Jimenez, the
barangay captain, a certain Josie, and appellant’s brother, Rolando, who all mentioned appellant as the gunwielder. Moreover, the
policemen discovered the presence of six pellet holes and one big hole with the size of the circumference of a shotgun bullet on the
door of the house of Jimenez. Three pellets were also found at the crime scene (tsn. pp. 3-6; 9, 10, Sept. 4, 1989).chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
Page 2 of 28
"Early next morning, the three policemen were led by Rolando Valencia to the residence of Sonia Castillo, his aunt, where he believed
appellant was sleeping. The police apprehended appellant there and took him to the Ong Detachment for initial investigation (tsn, pp.
70 11-13, Sept. 4, 1989). He was indorsed to the police headquarters for further investigation in the evening of March 22, 1989 (tsn. p.
7, Aug. 21, 1989). At 12:20 a.m. of the following day, one of the injured children, Annabelle, died as a result of the gunshot wounds she
suffered (Exh. H). The other child, Samuel Jr., who was shot in the right forearm, was discharged from the hospital one week after the
incident, but needed two (2) more weeks for healing (tsn. p. 3, Aug. 21. 1989).
"On March 26, 1989, Arlyn Jimenez executed a sworn statement (Exh. B) wherein she identified appellant as the culprit. On March 30,
1989, a certain Ramon Bacnotan executed a sworn statement (Exh. J) and turned over to the police the sumpak (Exh. A) allegedly
used by appellant in the shooting of the two children." 3
Accused-appellant’s version of the case is that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
At about 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. of March 19, 1989, Accused-appellant and his co-workers together with his father were in his house
drinking several bottles of beer since it was a Sunday and they have just received their wages.
At about 9:00 p.m., they separated and he proceeded to his aunt’s house to sleep. Since his uncle died he used to keep her aunt and
her six children company for want of a male companion.
About midnight of March 19, 1989, his Auntie, SONIA CANARIA CASTILLO, woke him up as his brother, ROLANDO VALENCIA,
knocked at their door. As she opened the door, she saw Rolando accompanied by several policeman who handcuffed the accused and
brought him to the ONG DETACHMENT, Paco, Manila, together with his brother ROLANDO. The relatives of the accused together with
his aunt attempted to visit them but they were allegedly refused admittance to their detention cell.
ROLANDO VALENCIA was released on March 22, 1989 while ALEJANDRO VALENCIA who denied any participation in the shooting,
was turned over to the Investigator of the HOMICIDE SECTION, Pat. Renato Marquez, at about 11:30 p.m. of the same date.
ROLANDO VALENCIA when released had a swollen face but was allegedly advised not to tell any one about the maltreatment that he
and his brother, Alejandro had received if he wanted to see his brother alive. So he did nothing for fear that ALEJANDRO VALENCIA
might be salvaged. On one occasion, when he was visited by his parents, Accused-appellant told them of his request to be taken to a
doctor for treatment, but the police refused. 4
On March 30, 1989, two Informations for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide, were filed against the accused-appellant, to
wit:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"1. Criminal Case No. 89-72061 — for the crime of HOMICIDE (with the use of unlicensed firearm), alleged to have been committed as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘That on or about March 19, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with the use of an unlicensed firearm (sumpak),
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one
ANNABELLE JIMENEZ Y BARREDO by then and there shooting the latter with an unlicensed firearm (sumpak) hitting her at the back
and at the right buttock, thereby inflicting upon said Annabelle Jimenez y Barredo gunshot wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of her death.
‘Contrary to law.’
and in
2. Criminal Case No. 89-72062 —for the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, alleged to have been committed as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘That on or about March 19, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with the use of an unlicensed firearm (sumpak),
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one SAMUEL
JIMENEZ, JR. Y BARREDO, by then and there shooting the latter with an unlicensed firearm (sumpak) hitting him at the right forearm,
thereby inflicting upon him mortal wound which is necessarily fatal, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will,
that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Samuel Jimenez, Jr. y Barredo which saved his life.
Page 3 of 28
"Contrary to law." 5
When arraigned, the accused-appellant pleaded "Not Guilty." Trial then proceeded resulting in accused-appellant’s conviction as above
stated.
On appeal, Accused-appellant raised as errors of the trial court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In giving credence to the uncorroborated testimony of Arlyn Barredo Jimenez, mother of the victims, Annabelle Jimenez and Samuel
Jimenez, Jr.;
2. In finding that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the defendant-appellant beyond reasonable doubt in spite of the fact that
there was allegedly no preliminary investigation, and that no sufficient evidence exists proving his guilt; andchanrobles virtual lawlibrary
3. In convicting the defendant-appellant, considering the fact that there exists no evidence that he was the holder of the unlicensed
firearm, and that the prosecution had earlier moved for the dismissal of the case of illegal possession of firearm, Criminal Case No. 89-
72657. 6
I
As to the incredibility of Arlyn B. Jimenez’ testimony due to her flip-flopping allegations, where in one instance, for example, she could
not tell Pat. Marquez the identity of the suspect when queried at the Philippine General Hospital where her two children were taken for
medical attention right after they were shot, 7 but at the witness stand she was able to readily identify the accused-appellant as the
suspect claiming that they are neighbors; 8 (2) that while Arlyn B. Jimenez claimed there was no "rumble" preceding the shooting, 9
Pat. Marquez on the other hand testified that a "rumble" did occur in the area before the shooting incident 10 which was in fact
bannered in the front page of the March 20, 1989 edition of People’s Journal; 11 and (3) Arlyn’s claim that the pellets that hit her
children were fired through the door 12 of their shanty, is rebutted by defense Exhibit "2" 13 which is a photograph of a plywood wall of
Arlyn B. Jimenez’ shanty showing that the pellets were fired through said plywood wall and not through the door.
The alleged incredibility and flip-flopping testimonies do not exist and could be explained.
In this connection, it is worthwhile mentioning the reason why at first no eyewitnesses volunteered to testify in this case and for which
the court may take judicial notice of. The incident occurred in Anak Bayan, Paco, Manila, a place notorious for its high incidence of
criminality even before World War II. With the increase in its population of urban poor after the war and the formation of teenage gangs,
one resided in Anak Bayan either out of sheer desperation or because his forefathers lived there and out of necessity one could not
help but lived with them and take his chances with the environment. One always lived in constant fear of being killed or maimed or
forced to take drugs from the pushers that hang around the place. Ramon Bacnotan, (the person who found the sumpak and gave it to
the police) in his statement to the police, 14 tells Us why this is so:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"09 T Bakit mo naman isinurender itong sumpak sa mga pulis?
S Kasi ho ay nabalitaan ko kanina na may mga pulis na nagtatanong at hinahanap daw iyong sumpak na ginamit sa pagkakabaril ng
mga bata dito sa F. Muñoz, naalala ko na nuong mangyari ang barilang iyon ay habang ako ay naglalakad duon sa malapit sa
pinangyarihan ay narinig ko ang mga bata na nag-uusap na duon daw itinapon ni Ponga ang ginamit na sumpak, kaya nuong malaman
ko na hinahanap ng mga pulis ay pinuntahan ko at nakita ko nga na nanduon pa rin.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
10 T Bakit hindi mo itinuro kaagad sa pulis ang lugar nuong araw na iyon?
S Una po ay takot ako na masangkot at takot din ako kay Ponga. Ngayon po ay nakakulong na siya kaya po naglakas na akong
tumestigo.
x x x.
14 T Kilala mo ba itong si Ponga?
S Hindi po masyado, pero putok po ang pangalan niya duon sa lugar namin at maraming takot sa kanya kung lasing siya sa gamot."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Page 4 of 28
Arlyn B. Jimenez testified that as she and her son, Samuel were about to eat, she saw "Ponga" holding a sumpak a few feet away from
her open door. 15 Seized with fear, she immediately closed the door 16 because whenever she sees a sumpak she feels afraid. 17
Momentarily thereafter, a shot was fired through her door, hitting her children. With her two children in serious condition Arlyn rushed
them to the Philippine General Hospital, and in her state of hysteria and shock, Arlyn was in no position to tell the police investigator
who shot her children, 18 nor recall whether a rumble preceded the shooting or not. All that she could tell the police at that point in time
was that the sumpak pellets passed through her shanty door, which she had just closed. Arlyn’s testimony should be considered in the
light of the fact that there is no standard of behavior when one is confronted with a shocking incident, 19 especially so when the person
whose testimony is elicited is part of that shocking incident.
Contrary to accused-appellant’s assertions, the photograph presented in evidence indeed shows that the bullet holes were on the door
and not on the wall of the shanty. This was corroborated by Pat. Cajiles who testified that the shanty door "happen to have gunshot
damages." 20
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cited by accused-appellant have not been shown to be deliberately
made to distort the truth and cannot, therefore, be regarded as dissolving and destroying the probative value of the witnesses’
testimonies on the identity of the suspect, the presence of the rumble and the entry point of the "sumpak" pellets. 21 Settled is the rule
that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses are accorded great respect and finality in the appellate court where
the same are supported by the evidence on record. 22
II
The accused-appellant decries the fact that he was denied the right of preliminary investigation. This is not true.
A person who is lawfully arrested, without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court 23 should be
delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. 24 Under said Section 7, Rule
112, 25 the prosecuting officer can file the Information in court without a preliminary investigation, which was done in the accused-
appellant’s case. 26
Since the records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the case had been filed in
court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, 27 the Court can only conclude that he waived his right
to have a preliminary investigation, 28 when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his arraignment. 29
Ponga was convicted because all the circumstances pointed to no other person but him — Ponga — as the sumpak-wielder. We quote
with approval the trial court’s analysis on the conflux of circumstantial evidence, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The evidence of the prosecution reveals that it has no eyewitness to the actual commission of the two offenses herein charged or that
it did not present any. Stated otherwise, its case is anchored on circumstantial evidence and such is mostly supplied by the victim’s
mother, Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez. These circumstances are:chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
(1) While she, her mother and her son, Samuel Jimenez, Jr., were taking supper in their shanty at around 8:30-9:00 o’clock in the
evening of March 19, 1989, she saw Ponga, who is accused Alejandro Valencia, standing a few meters outside holding a homemade
shotgun, locally known as ‘sumpak’. Afraid of any untoward incident or of their involvement thereof, she immediately closed the door of
their house.
(2) Not long after she closed the door of their house, there was a gun blast coming from in front of their hovel, from the direction where
she saw Ponga standing. That shot injured her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr., causing the death of the former four days later
and injuring the latter’s forearm causing his hospitalization for one week and another 2 weeks for complete recovery.
(3) Upon seeing her two children wounded, she opened the door of their dwelling to ask for help. At that precise moment, she saw
accused Alejandro Valencia running away and carrying the same homemade shotgun (sumpak).
(4) The several holes (6 of them) of the door (made of plywood) to their house unmistakably show that they were produced by pellets of
a shotgun bullet and one bigger hole shows that it was made by a shotgun bullet because of the size of its circumference. In fact, Pat.
Roberto Cajiles recovered 3 pellets at the door.
Page 5 of 28
(5) A homemade shotgun (sumpak) - now Exhibit "A") was retrieved from a canal/ditch very near the hut of Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez by
Ramon Bacnotan and surrendered to Pat. Edgardo Paterno on March 30, 1989.
(6) That there was a rumble involving 2 rival gangs immediately preceding the shooting incident that night of March 19, 1989
participated in by accused Alejandro Valencia is admitted by the defense in its offer of People’s Tonight issue of March 20, 1989
(Exhibit "1").
Are these circumstances sufficient to support the conviction of the accused, affording as it does the basis for a reasonable inference of
the existence of the fact thereby sought to be proved?" chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
x x x
"In answer thereto, the Court finds the above-enumerated circumstances to be sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. For there is no showing whatsoever by the defense that Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez, victim’s mother, was motivated by
ill-will or evil design to testify against the accused. In the absence, therefore, of any such showing tending to question her motive and
integrity, her testimony should be given full credit in the light of the time-honored pronouncement that the absence of improper or evil
motive for a State witness to make false imputations against the accused strengthens his credibility (People v. Rose, Sr., Et Al., L-
80457, September 29, 1988, 166 SCRA 110; People v. Cabatit, L-62030-31, October 4, 1985, 139 SCRA 94; People v. Beltran, Et Al.,
L-37168-69. September 13, 1985, 138 SCRA 521; People v. Sogales, L-31938, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 520; People v. Vengco,
Et Al., L-31657 & 32264, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 242; People v. Aposago, Et Al., L-32477, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 574,
and other numerous cases).
Thus, Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez testified that while they were taking their supper that night of March 19, 1989, she happened to glance
through the open door of their hut and she saw the accused, outside, standing a few meters away, holding a homemade shotgun
(sumpak). Lest she may get embroiled in any untoward incident, she hurriedly went to close the door. She recognized that person
standing outside due to the light in front of their house and the fluorescent lamp at the back of their neighbor’s house, thus illuminating
the place where the person was standing. Soon after she closed the door, there was a gun blast and then she heard the moanings and
cries of pain of her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr. When she looked at them, she saw them bloodied and writhing in pain.
Immediately, she opened the door of their hovel to ask for help. Once she opened the door, she saw the accused, Alejandro Valencia,
running away and carrying with his right hand the homemade shotgun.
In addition, the telltale bullet marks of the door proved without doubt that they were produced by a shotgun bullet and pellets thereof.
Pat. Renato Marquez testified that he saw those bullet and pellet holes at the door when he went to investigate the place after he
received a report of the incident from Pat. Ramon Cajiles of the Ong Detachment. From his investigation, only one suspect has been
consistently mentioned and that is accused Alejandro Valencia who is identified by those he investigated as Ponga.
All these circumstances are found by the Court to be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused,
Alejandro Valencia, is guilty thereof, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of his guilt. They
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, Alejandro Valencia, to the
exclusion of all others, as the author or the two crimes, a chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other and they
certainly can not be overcome by the very inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by him (Erlanger and Galinger, Inc. v. Exconde,
L-4792 and L-4795, September 20, 1953) as will be pointed out later. Then, too, the facts that no less than the accused’s brother,
Ramon Valencia, brought the policeman to their aunt’s house to arrest the herein accused is another circumstance to show that,
indeed, herein accused is guilty thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
III
The fact that the case of illegal possession of the sumpak, Criminal Case No. 89-72657 was dismissed upon motion of the prosecution
is irrelevant and immaterial as what is material is that Arlyn Jimenez saw Ponga holding the sumpak shotgun before the shooting 30
and saw him again holding the said weapon while running away after the shooting. 31 Said criminal case was dismissed because the
trial court applied Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 to accused-appellant’s case. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Finally, the accused did not adduce any evidence of whatever nature to show that he has the authorization or permit to possess the
homemade shotgun (Exhibit "A"). As a matter of fact, there is no need to discuss further this matter because such kind of firearm can
not be licensed/registered with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, PC, as it is a homemade shotgun. The Court can take judicial notice
Page 6 of 28
that said firearm can fire and cause injury even death, to a person.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearms, the penalty of death shall be imposed. Since death occurred as a consequence of the use of an unlicensed firearm
(homemade shotgun) in Criminal Case No. 89-72061, the penalty so provided therein should be imposed."cralaw virtua1aw library
IV
Assuming that maltreatment or torture was employed by the police in the course of their investigation of the case at bar, which of
course We condemn, the person allegedly tortured or maltreated was the appellant’s brother, Rolando, not the appellant himself, who,
incidentally was released. Rolando Valencia, if he was indeed tortured, has remedies under the law for the vindication of his
rights.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
As to the appellant’s contention in his Brief 32 that he was likewise tortured into confessing that he fired the "sumpak", a careful review
of the records and exhibits does not reveal that the prosecution presented his confession, if any, during the trial. His conviction was not
based on his alleged confession but on the strength of the testimony of the victim’s mother. Furthermore, Accused-appellant’s claim of
police brutality cannot be given weight as he never formally complained to the police or to the fiscal nor presented any medical
certificate to prove the same. 33
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No.
89-72061 the death indemnity is increased to FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS in consonance with existing jurisprudence.
Costs against the Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, JJ., concur.
23. "SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: library
x x x
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
24. "SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:1aw
library
x x x
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7, (6a, 17a)."cralaw virtua1aw library
25. "SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper
officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such
waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days
from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule (15a)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Page 7 of 28
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015
ALVIN COMERCIANTE Y GONZALES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 20, 2011 and the Resolution3 dated February 19, 2013
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813, which affirmed in toto the Judgment4 dated July 28, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales
(Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165,5 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante ofviolation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, to
wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That on or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
(sic) each containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams which was found
positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the
NARCOTICS group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a
friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they
spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla7 (Dasilla) - standing
and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets
may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5) meters, PO3
Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.8redarclaw
Page 8 of 28
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However,
due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to
present his evidence.9redarclaw
In his defense, Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area,
when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police
station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their
release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and
thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.10redarclaw
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment11 dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of
RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years, and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00.12redarclaw
The RTC found that PO3 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which yielded two (2) plastic sachets
containing shabu. In this relation, the RTC opined that there was probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest, considering that PO3
Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend the latter.
Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent that PO3 Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be presumed to
have properly performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante.13redarclaw
Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held that PO3 Calag had probable cause to effect
the warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given that the latter was committing a crime in flagrante delicto; and that he personally saw the
latter exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to the CA, this was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion that those sachets
might be shabu, and thus, PO3 Calag had every reason to inquire on the matter right then and there.15redarclaw
Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration16 which was, however, denied in a Resolution17dated February 19, 2013. Hence,
this petition.18redarclaw
The Issue Before the Court

The core Issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165.
In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that PO3 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him. Consequently, the
evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets containing shabu should be rendered
inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.19redarclaw
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines, maintains that Comerciante's
warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule, especially considering that he was caught in flagrante
delicto in possession of illegal drugs.20redarclaw
The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
Section 2, Article III21 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial
warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a
general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III22 of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible
Page 9 of 28
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.23redarclaw
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions established by
jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest.24 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made the process cannot be reversed.25 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules
on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable
cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.26redarclaw
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.27 On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that
at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the accused had committed it.28redarclaw
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5
(a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.29redarclaw
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on
Comerciante. PO3 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when
he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing
plastic sachets to the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest. PO3 Calag's testimony on direct examination
is revelatory:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Pros. Silao:
Q: Now on July 30, 2003 around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, kindly tell the court where were you?
A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma'am.
xxxx
Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling?
A: Eduardo Radan, Ma'am.
Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan?
A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group, ma'am.
Q: While you were along Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City, what unusual incident that happened if any?
A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet to someone.
xxxx
Q:Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two male persons you already identified?
A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am.
Page 10 of 28
Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that particular act?
A: They were quite facing me then.
Q:What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing this Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City?
A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am.
Q: And who was driving the motorcycle?
A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am.
Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, what did you do?
A: We stopped ma'am.
Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or less?
A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am.
Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was the reaction of these two male persons?
A: They were surprised, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself as police officer?
A: They were surprised.
Q:When yon say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you say that they were surprised?
A: They were stunned.
Q:After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer?
A: I arrested them, ma'am. I invited them.
Court:
Mr. Witness, stop making unnecessary movements, just listen.
Pros. Silao:
Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala?
Witness:
Wala po.
Pros. Silao:
Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?
Court:
You keep touching your eyes. Just relax. Answer the question, ano sinabi mo sa kanila?
Pros. Silao:
Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit?
Witness:
Wala po.
xxxx
Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you recover the plastic sachet?
A: From his hand ma'am.
Q: Left or right hand?
Pros. Silao:
You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo kung hindi mo matandaan, no problem. Kaliwa, kanan or you cannot
recall?30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would
be able to identify with reasonable accuracy especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at
a speed of 30 kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by
Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind
of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around
with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante
Page 11 of 28
and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been
sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.31 That
his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his
trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he
purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu.32redarclaw
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e.,
that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused
had committed it. As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that PO3 Calag had personal
knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does
not obtain in this case.33redarclaw
In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante untenable.
In People v. Cogaed,34 the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk" searches:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should
be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be
undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals
and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves observe - whether an
individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
xxxx
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause.
In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this
court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause
that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere
suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds
that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single suspicious
circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on
only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.35 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter
do not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would
constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search
made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante. As such,
the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since
Page 12 of 28
the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from
all criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 20, 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19,
2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin
Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
RODEL LUZ y ONG, G. R. No. 197788

Petitioner, Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
- versus -
Promulgated: February 29, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,[1]
Respondent.
--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R.
CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011[2] and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case

Page 13 of 28
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a
traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused,
who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle
without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires
all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside
their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while
he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused
to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged
and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2)
to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon
seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a
cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the
container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other
two (2) contained suspected shabu.[3]
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of Not guilty to the charge of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand,
petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs[5] committed on 10
March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then
subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also
found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen
(13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper
disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In
a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed
its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:

Page 14 of 28
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER
CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN
COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE
DOUBT (sic).[7]
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there
was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even
assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and
Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle
drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself
admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he
had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down
and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City
Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he
could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.[8]
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire
case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.[9]
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.[10] It
is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making
the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.[11]
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not
the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant
thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the
Page 15 of 28
driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to
operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt.
The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to
settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation
of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual [12] provides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during
the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general
concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable:
xxx
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR).
Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles
occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest.
There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance
of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found
by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged
down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to
take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a
motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning
does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the freedom of action of the driver
and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a
policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by
respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types
of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic
stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist
pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only
a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be
obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and
registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his
way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation,
which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides
his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Page 16 of 28
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels
completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and
the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some
pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces.
Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop, see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of
this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.
The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant
to such stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
xxxxxxxxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the
safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a degree
associated with formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has
been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for practical
purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.
S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of
the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and
neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner
here be considered under arrest at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while
riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for
such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police
officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this
case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic
violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the
reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. [14] It may also be noted that in this
case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.
Page 17 of 28
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic
violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick
captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting
itself, which work to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those
purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by
questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his
ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the
drugsas he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of
evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search;
and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.[15] None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest,
are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed
inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence.[17] It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction
of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was
merely told to take out the contents of his pocket.[18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State
that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily
given.[19] In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by
several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Page 18 of 28
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious
or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons.[20]
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a
citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein
held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only
conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the search incident to arrest exception: (1) the
need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at
trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the
search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both legitimate and weighty, x x x The threat to
officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In
Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves danger to an officer because of the extended exposure which
follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We
recognized that [t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress,
and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a
relatively brief encounter and is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest. Berkemer
v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (Where there is no formal
arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to
destroy incriminating evidence).
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop. It
plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this
context may justify the minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does
not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the
search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves
from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers,
Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a patdown of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be
armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a Terry patdown of the passenger compartment of
a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon,
Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment,
including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrestthe need to discover and
preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to
prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the
person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest
opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
the illegal warrantless arrest.[22]
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[23] Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
Page 19 of 28
proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government.[24]
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.[25] The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516
affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04201. Said decision affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated August 6 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 41, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which convicted the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes
Page 20 of 28
of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of Section 15 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended,3 which was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34 grams, 51.45 grams, 41.32 grams and 20.14 grams or with a total
weight of TWO HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETY-EIGHT (247.98) grams contained in six (6) transparent plastic sachets of
white crystalline substance known as "Shabu" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug. 4
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose from an alleged violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended,5 which was said to be committed in this manner:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without being authorized by law to possess or use
any regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
1.61 grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10 grams, 0.17 grams, 0.21 grams, 0.24 grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04
grams, [0].51 grams or all with a total weight of four point zero three grams of white crystalline substance contained in twelve (12)
transparent plastic sachets known as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license or prescription thereof.6
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 23. Upon motion7 of the appellant, however, said case
was allowed to be consolidated with Criminal Case No. 98-164174 in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41.8 On arraignment, the appellant
pleaded not guilty to both charges.9 The pre-trial conference of the cases was held on July 27, 1998, but the same was terminated
without the parties entering into any stipulation of facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Jean
Fajardo,11 (2) P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito,12 and (3) Police Officer (PO) 2 Christian Trambulo.13Thereafter, the defense presented in court
the testimonies of: (1) the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan,14 (2) Angelina Arejado,15 and (3) Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecution’s Case
The prosecution’s version of the events was primarily drawn from the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant went to their office and reported that a certain
Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an employee of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the informant, alias Don promised him a good commission if he (the informant) would
present a potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the
commanding officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a team and conduct a possible buy-bust against alias
Don. She formed a team on the same day, which consisted of herself, PO2 Trambulo, PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno,
and PO1 De la Rosa. P/Insp. Fajardo was the team leader. With the help of the informant, she was able to set up a meeting with alias
Don. The meeting was to be held at around 9:00 p.m. on that day at Cindy’s Restaurant located in Welcome Rotonda. She was only
supposed to meet alias Don that night but she decided to bring the team along for security reasons.17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the meeting place with the informant. The members of her team
positioned themselves strategically inside the restaurant. The informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of shabu.
She asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied in the affirmative. They agreed to close the deal wherein
she would buy 250 grams of shabu for ₱250,000.00. They also agreed to meet the following day at Cindy’s Restaurant around 10:00 to
11:00 p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to Cindy’s Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her
outside the establishment when she arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that she had the money with her. She brought
five genuine ₱500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of play money to make it appear that she had ₱250,000.00 with
Page 21 of 28
her. After she showed the money to alias Don, he suggested that they go to a more secure place. They agreed for the sale to take
place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Don’s apartment at 765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The team
proceeded to the Western Police District (WPD) Station along U.N. Avenue for coordination. Afterwards, the team held their final
briefing before they proceeded to the target area. They agreed that the pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair,
which would signify that the deal had been consummated and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene. The team then travelled
to the address given by alias Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the two vehicles they used were parked along the corner of
the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the apartment of alias Don and stood in front of the apartment gate.
Around 1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of the apartment with a male companion. Alias Don demanded to see the money, but P/Insp.
Fajardo told him that she wanted to see the drugs first. Alias Don gave her the big brown envelope he was carrying and she checked
the contents thereof. Inside she found a plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in size, which contained white crystalline substance. After
checking the contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same was indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust money to alias Don
and scratched her hair to signal the rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as a narcotics agent. The
two suspects tried to flee but PO2 Trambulo was able to stop them from doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of the shabu. When
she asked alias Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell shabu, he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials "JSF"
on the genuine ₱500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the arrest of the two suspects, the buy-bust team brought them
to the police station. The suspects’ rights were read to them and they were subsequently booked.20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the appellant Donald Vasquez. She learned of his name when he
brought out his NBI ID while he was being booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also learned that the name of the appellant’s companion was
Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police station. P/Insp. Fajardo explained that after she gave the buy-bust
money to the appellant, the latter handed the same to Siscar who was present the entire time the sale was being consummated. Upon
receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a green plastic bag, Siscar looked at the contents thereof and uttered "okey na to." P/Insp.
Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the same to the Crime Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and
PO1 Agravante. She handed over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante who then turned it over to P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic
chemist on duty. The police officers previously weighed the drug specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at the crime laboratory weighed
the specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her team waited for the results of the laboratory examination.21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-bust operation were actually contained in a self-
sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When the brown envelope was confiscated from the appellant, she put her
initials "JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed that there were markings on the envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y
Sunga" but she did not bother to check out what they were for or who made them. When she interrogated the appellant about the
brown envelope, she found out that the same was submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also learned that the
appellant worked as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs that her
team recovered, which sachets she also initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also stated that after the appellant was arrested, PO2
Trambulo conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant. The
12 sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a white envelope. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the
envelope. As to the 12 sachets, the same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and signed by PO2 Trambulo.22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp. Fajardo’s. PO2 Trambulo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a
confidential informant reported to them about the illegal drug activities of alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay then tasked P/Insp. Fajardo to
form a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to set up a meeting with alias Don at Cindy’s Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon
City. At that meeting, PO2 Trambulo saw P/Insp. Fajardo talk to alias Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the members of the team that she
convinced alias Don that she was a good buyer of shabu and the latter demanded a second meeting to see the money. After the initial
meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo briefed P/Supt. Domantay about what happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo
was furnished with five genuine ₱500.00 bills together with the boodle play money. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials in the genuine
bills below the name "Benigno Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the team left the office. When they arrived at Cindy’s Restaurant past 10:00
p.m., alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed the boodle money to alias Don and after some time, they parted ways.
P/Insp. Fajardo later told the team that alias Don decided that the drug deal would take place in front of alias Don’s rented apartment
on Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. After an hour, the team went to Valdez St. to familiarize themselves with the area. They then
proceeded to the WPD station to coordinate their operation. Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo conducted a final briefing wherein PO2
Trambulo was designated as the immediate back-up arresting officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to
scratch her hair to indicate the consummation of the deal. PO2 Trambulo was to signal the same to the other members of the team.23
Page 22 of 28
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked
towards the direction of alias Don’s apartment, while PO2 Trambulo positioned himself near a parked jeepney about 15 to 20 meters
from the apartment gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at the street perpendicular to Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out
of the gate with another person. PO2 Trambulo saw alias Don gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if asking for something but P/Insp.
Fajardo gestured that she wanted to see something first. Alias Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown envelope, which the latter
opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then handed to alias Don a green plastic bag containing the buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged
signal. When PO2 Trambulo saw this, he immediately summoned the rest of the team and rushed to the suspects. He was able to
recover the buy-bust money from alias Don’s male companion. Upon frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces of plastic
sachets of suspected drugs. The same were placed inside a white envelope that was tucked inside alias Don’s waist. PO2 Trambulo
marked each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers then informed the suspects of their rights and
they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, the latter retained possession thereof. The envelope
contained six pieces of plastic bags of white crystalline substance. When they got back to their office, the team reported the progress of
their operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested suspects were booked and the required documentations were prepared. Among
such documents was the Request for Laboratory Examination of the drug specimens seized. PO2 Trambulo said that he was the one
who brought the said request to the PNP Crime Laboratory, along with the drug specimens.25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results of her examination of the drug specimens seized in this case. She
explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr. initially examined the drug specimens but the latter was already assigned to another office.
The results of the examination of P/Insp. Taduran were laid down in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito first
studied the data contained in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98 and retrieved the same from their office. She entered that fact in
their logbook RD-17-98. She then weighed the drug specimens and examined the white crystalline substance from each of the plastic
sachets. She examined first the specimens marked as "A-1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequito’s examination
revealed that the white crystalline substances were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 She also examined the contents of
12 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that also contained crystalline substances. The 12 plastic sachets were marked "B-1" to "B-
12." The white crystalline powder inside the 12 plastic sachets also tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. P/Insp.
Dequito’s findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-17-98.27
The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and documentary evidence: (1) photocopies of the five original ₱500.00
bills28 used as buy-bust money (Exhibits A-E); (2) Request for Laboratory Examination29 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial
Laboratory Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating that the specimen submitted for examination tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court Order31 dated September 2, 1998 (Exhibit H); (5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-1071-9832 dated
April 3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6) Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-O); (7) Big brown envelope (Exhibit P); (8) Small white envelope
(Exhibit Q); (9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-CC); (10) Physical Sciences Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11) Joint
Affidavit of Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12) Play money (Exhibit FF); (13) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report35 (Exhibit GG); (14) Request for
Medical Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15) Medico Legal Slip37 of Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16) Medico Legal Slip38 of Reynaldo
Siscar (Exhibit JJ).
The Defense’s Case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecution’s version of events. The appellant’s brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a
concise summary of the defense’s counter-statement of facts. According to the defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory Aide II at the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His
duties at the time included being a subpoena clerk, receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from different police agencies to
have their specimens examined by the chemist. He also rendered day and night duties, and during regular office hours and in the
absence of the laboratory technician, he would weigh the specimens. As subpoena clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the trial
courts. When there is no chemist, he would get a Special Order to testify, or bring the drug specimens, to the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial Statistics between 6:00 to 9:00 o’clock p.m. Thereafter, he took a
jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop at Quiapo. From there, he took a tricycle to his house, arriving at 9:45 o’clock that evening,
where he saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the latter a confidential informant of the narcotics agents.
Page 23 of 28
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 o’clock in the morning, Donald’s household help, Anatolia Caredo, who had just arrived from Antipolo that time,
was eating while Donald was asleep. She heard a knock on the door. Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and thereafter two (2) men
entered, poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3) others. The door to Donald’s room was kicked down and they
entered his room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a gun at him. He saw that there were six (6)
policemen searching his room, picking up what they could get. One of them opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donald’s]
possession in relation to his work as a laboratory aide. The drugs came from two (2) cases and marked as DD-93-1303 owned by
Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in the envelope marked as DD-93-
1303 was intended for presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player,
and his wallet containing ₱2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donald’s neighbor, witnessed the policemen entering the apartment and apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from
the apartment terrace.40 (Citations omitted.)
The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition Form41 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn Statement of
Idabel Bernabe Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2); (3) Photocopy of the buy-bust money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List of Hearings44 attended by Donald
Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization Letter45 prepared by Acting Deputy Director Arturo A. Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5);
and (6) List of Evidence46 taken by Donald Vasquez from 1996-1998 (Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s
evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome.
The trial court held that the appellant did not present any evidence that would show that the police officers in this case were impelled by
an evil motive to charge him of very serious crimes and falsely testify against him. Also, the trial court noted that the volume of the
shabu involved in this case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for illegal sale and illegal possession, respectively. To
the mind of the trial court, such fact helped to dispel the possibility that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by the police
officers. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the police officers regarding the illegal drug peddling activities of
the appellant prevailed over the latter’s bare denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely framed up by the police, the trial court pointed out that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper authorities, or asked help from his Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan
from the NBI to testify and identify in Court the xerox copy of the Disposition Form which she issued to the accused and the Affidavit
dated April 17, 1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or from Mr. Arturo A. Figueras, Acting Deputy Director, Technical Services of the
NBI to testify and identify the Letter issued by the said Acting Deputy Director in order to corroborate and strengthen his testimony that
he was indeed authorized to keep in his custody the said shabu to be presented or turned over to the Court as evidence, and he should
have filed the proper charges against those police officers who were responsible for such act. But the accused did not even bother to
do the same. Further, the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit of [Idabel] Pagulayan and Letter dated March 27, 1998 issued
by Acting Deputy Director) presented by the accused in Court could not be given weight and credence considering that the said
persons were not presented in Court to identify the said documents and that the prosecution has no opportunity to cross-examine the
same, thus, it has no probative value.47
The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III in Relation to Sec.
2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
₱5,000,000.00; and 2. In Crim. Case No. 98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, DONALD VASQUEZ
y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III in Relation to Sec. 2 (e-2)
Art. I of R.A. 6425 as Amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of FOUR THOUSAND (₱4,000.00) PESOS.
Page 24 of 28
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk
of Court is hereby directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
upon the finality of this Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The appellate court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently
proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo on the conduct of
the buy-bust operation was found to be clear and categorical. As the appellant failed to adduce any evidence that tended to prove any
ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely charge the appellant, the Court of Appeals held that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties on the part of the police officers had not been controverted in this case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The August 6, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41 of the City of Manila in Criminal Cases No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his conviction on two grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the
search and the ensuing arrest done by the police officers and (2) his supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs seized from
him.51 He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred
despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was
illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti of the crime
was rendered inadmissible, the appellant posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he
was able to prove that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he was an employee of the NBI
Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring drug specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to this case, we resolve to deny this appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that
"[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having
failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning
the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may,
the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-
bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an
arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that
the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures
have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in
hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his
person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
Page 25 of 28
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements should be satisfactorily
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in a prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, "what is material is proof that the accused
peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal possession
of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.58
In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo established that a buy-bust operation was legitimately carried
out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant as the
one who sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big brown envelope for the price of ₱250,000.00. She likewise
identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the markings she placed thereon after the same were seized from the
appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the white crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags tested positive for
shabu. We find that P/Insp. Fajardo’s testimony on the events that transpired during the conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed
and straightforward. She was also consistent and unwavering in her narration even in the face of the opposing counsel’s cross-
examination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of the drug specimens seized and the buy-bust money, P/Insp.
Fajardo further testified as to the recovery from the appellant of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was
arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the appellant. This search resulted to the confiscation
of 12 more plastic sachets, the contents of which also tested positive for shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply
corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the former’s narration of events. Both police officers also identified in
court the twelve plastic sachets of shabu that were confiscated from the appellant.
In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses
especially so when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be
evidence to the contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less satisfactorily prove, any improper motive on the
part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified that, not only did he
not have any misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his arrest, he in fact did not know them at all.60 In the
absence of evidence of such ill motive, none is presumed to exist.61
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the appellant to criminally or administratively charge the
police officers herein for falsely framing him up for selling and possessing illegal drugs. Such a move would not have been a daunting
task for the appellant under the circumstances. Being a regular employee of the NBI, the appellant could have easily sought the help of
his immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his office to extricate him from his predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in
evidence were mere photocopies of documents that supposedly showed that he was authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody.
That the original documents and the testimonies of the signatories thereof were not at all presented in court did nothing to help the
appellant’s case. To the mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the appellant failed to persuade amid the positive and categorical
testimonies of the arresting officers that the appellant was caught red-handed selling and possessing a considerable amount of
prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust operation.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that
it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses
since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual
findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such
findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.62
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes
charged.
The Penalties
Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, state:
Page 26 of 28
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under
this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. SEC. 16.
Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding
license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses
under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous
drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and
promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity. (Emphases supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the appellant was found to have sold to the
poseur-buyer in this case a total of 247.98 grams of shabu, which amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law
for the imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating circumstances, the death penalty.
Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.1âwphi1 Thus, in this case, considering that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the appellant’s violation of
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court’s imposition of
reclusion perpetua. The ₱5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on the appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, the Court of Appeals properly invoked our
ruling in People v. Tira64 in determining the proper imposable penalty. Indeed, we held in Tira that:
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of possession of a regulated drug, less than 200
grams, in this case, shabu, is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the
offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Page 27 of 28
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)
Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the appellant amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable
penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance in this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant should be the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, thus,
falls within the range of the proper imposable penalty. In Criminal Case No. 98-164175, no fine is imposable considering that in
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.65
Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the appellant was a regular employee of the NBI Forensics
Chemistry Division. Such fact, however, cannot be taken into consideration to increase the penalties in this case to the maximum, in
accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.66 Such a special aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that which
arises under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period,67 was not alleged and charged in the
informations. Thus, the same was properly disregarded by the lower courts.
All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEOARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
3Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on
Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other
Purposes), states:
"SEC. 15. Sale Administration Dispensation Delivery Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty therein provided shall be imposed."
4 Records, p. 1.
5 Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides: "SEC. 16.
Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding
license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof."
Page 28 of 28

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 94511-13. September 18, 1992.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEJANDRO C. VALENCIA, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Perfecto R. Bautista for Accused-Appellant.

Accused-appellant’s version of the case is that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"09 T Bakit mo naman isinurender itong sumpak sa mga pulis?

14 T Kilala mo ba itong si Ponga?

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015

ALVIN COMERCIANTE Y GONZALES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The RTC Ruling

Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.

The Issue Before the Court

The Court's Ruling

Republic of the Philippines

RODEL LUZ y ONG, G. R. No. 197788

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:

G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The Prosecution’s Case

The Defense’s Case

The Decision of the RTC

The trial court, thus, decreed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:

The Ruling of the Court

We now rule on the substantive matters.

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or

QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY

TERESITA J. LEOARDO-DE CASTRO

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