Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2013, 58, 278–285

Are archetypes transmitted or emergent? A

response to Christian Roesler

François Martin-Vallas, Le Pin, France

[Translated from the French by Ann Kutek]

Abstract: In this paper the author argues that Jung’s concept of archetype should not be
reduced to an univocal definition. Jung himself proposed many definitions of this concept,
some of them being partially or totally contradictory to others. A univocal and logical way
of thinking can lead us to refute and reject part of those definitions, but a complex way of
thinking, as proposed by Edgar Morin or Roy Bhaskar for example, can allow us to
consider that those apparent contradictions in Jung’s definitions of archetype reflect the
complexity of the psychic reality. The main argument of the author is that Jung was missing
the epistemological concept of emergence (which appeared in science at the time of his
death) and that he tried to express it with the epistemological concepts of his time.

Keywords: Roy Bhaskar, brain structures, concept of archetypes, emergence, Edgar

Morin, neurobiology

Christian Roesler’s article (JAP, April 2012, 57, 2, pp. 223-46) raises many
questions, not least, it seems to me, in its very title, ‘Are archetypes transmitted
more by culture than biology? Questions arising from conceptualizations of the
archetype’. In fact, the title itself appears to circumscribe the debate around
conceptualizations of the archetype as a transmissible psychic structure. While
Jung certainly often writes about this, it is far from the only way he approaches
the subject. Furthermore, Roesler’s title restricts the debate in another way
which purports that there are only two possible means of transmission, either
biological or cultural, one allegedly being sufficiently independent of the other,
so that one beats the other by virtue of its frequency.
This is all the more surprising since his article rests mainly on the work of
Jean Knox and, to a lesser extent, on that of George Hogenson, for whom the
archetype is a phenomenon emerging out of the biological roots of humankind,
which are formed out of their interactions with the environment: clearly in this
approach it cannot be a question of more of this or less of that, since in neither
case would any emergence of the type described be possible. Where Knox and
Hogenson in their different ways carry on from where Jung left off, reworking
Jung’s conceptualizations in a scientifically empirical fashion in the light of

0021-8774/2013/5802/278 © 2013, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12010
Are archetypes transmitted or emergent? A response to Christian Roesler 279

recent advances in developmental psychology on one hand, and in epistemology

on the other, Roesler’s question appears to me to reduce the debate to an over
simple alternative which is miles away from an adequate account of the
complexity of the concept under discussion as well as of the scientific advances
in developmental studies and in neurobiology.
Christian Roesler begins his paper by questioning at some length Jung’s idea
that archetypes might be transmitted through the genes. Unfortunately no
reference to this assertion is given: where in his writings does Jung state that
the transmission of archetypes is of a genetic nature? In my search through
the index to the Collected Works, I can find only two entries for the word ‘gene’,
one in 1937 (para. 512) and one in 1939 (para. 48), in two texts both originally
in English, and both talking about the anima. In these texts he considers the
anima (and conversely the animus) to be the result of the presence of female
genes in the man, his gender being determined, according to Jung, by the genes
of one sex outnumbering those of the other. An assertion of this type is today
clearly very debatable, but can two sentences in the entirety of Jung’s work be
deemed to suffice to nail down his position on the archetype, to the extent of
devoting to it a major part of an article on this topic?
Actually, Roesler answers this question at the start of his article by
assimilating a hypothesized genetic transmission of the archetype to its
biological nature:

It is not clear why we should find every one of these archetypes in every human
being given that they cannot be transmitted genetically [. . .] It will then become
clear that we have to depart from Jung’s assumption that it is a biological
phenomenon.

Such an assimilation is all the more surprising given that he goes on to insist on
the importance of the difference between the genotype and the phenotype, a differ-
ence resting on epigenesis, as it is now understood from recent biological studies.
Putting it another way, no one can any longer seriously uphold the view that
genetic transmission can be the only (or a necessary and sufficient) condition for
the biological organization of humankind. Yet does that make the organization
any the less biological for all that? When Christian Roesler states that the structure
of the brain differs from one individual to the next as a function of the baby’s
interaction with his environment, does that mean those structures lose their
biological constitution? Obviously not, any more than Jung’s assertion about
the archetype’s biological nature could be undermined by variations of the kind
just mentioned.
Since Christian Roesler proposes a comparison of brain structures, why not
look into this more closely? Another fact is that all human beings share the same
brain structure and that what is different among them is not the general organiza-
tion of these structures, but their differing development and their ways of (inter-)
relating. For my part, I have not come across anything in Jung’s writings which
would object to our regarding archetypes, along with their interrelations and their
280 François Martin-Vallas

dynamics, as being similar in such a manner; yet my conclusion is exactly opposite

to Roesler’s one. Moreover, it seems to me that a hypothesis concerning the
biological origin of the archetype is today reinforced by recent research in genetics
and in neurobiology.
On the other hand, can a debate about the nature of the archetype be reduced to
a debate about its biological origin? That would only be possible if Jung had not
formulated other hypotheses about it, which of course is not the case. While it is
true that he often talks about the archetype in terms of a biological structure, it
is no less true that, just as often, he describes it as a pure structure, without any
particular attributes. He refers, for instance, to the structure of a crystal to
illustrate this notion. And we know that a crystal is the result of physical rather
than biological properties. One can therefore–and this is my standpoint–argue
from such comparisons that Jung introduces (obviously without using the
terminology) the idea of emergence, when indeed such a concept did not yet exist
in science during his lifetime. More to the point, such a comparison could show
that Jung intuited the importance of the environment for the emergence of
archetypes, even if he did not himself delve deeper into this line of thinking. I
am making this assertion based not only on his comparison with the crystal, but
also with the instinct which leads each bird to construct a nest proper to its species.
In the case of the crystal, this does indeed require for its formation very
specific environmental conditions (temperature and pressure), without which
it would never occur. This example chosen by Jung should therefore lead us
to consider the environment as an essential condition for the emergence of
archetypes and not, as Christian Roesler seems to assert, that in Jung’s view
archetypes are independent of the environment. The example of the bird
confirms my position: to build his nest, the bird is reliant on favourable condi-
tions without which he would be unable to find either the place or the mate-
rials essential for the construction, nor possibly the stimuli which will trigger
his instinctual project. I think I am entitled to say that most of the criticisms
levelled by Christian Roesler at Jung’s theory of the archetypes arise from a partic-
ular way of thinking about and applying this theory in clinical practice and do
not address what Jung actually wrote about it in the course of his oeuvre. Here,
as is the case with the genesis of archetypes, Christian Roesler’s reading of Jung
is too restrictive, which allows him to be overly critical of these ideas: he is
attacking a straw man.
This is not, however, where I wish to end my criticism of the article. Indeed
Christian Roesler seems to detach the idea of emergence from an essential
condition in the field of physics where it originates: I refer to complex systems,
systems which have been the subject of much discussion over the last twenty
years, especially under the heading of deterministic chaos (i.e. systems with
unpredictable outcomes despite deterministic initial conditions). The attribute
of emergence which, incidentally, Christian Roesler defines very well, is in fact
an essential quality of these systems, one based on the fact that, depending on
the conditions of observation, they are characterized by dynamics which can
Are archetypes transmitted or emergent? A response to Christian Roesler 281

be linear or chaotic. It is precisely on the boundary of linear and chaotic dynamics

that emergence phenomena are most commonly found, as Joe Cambray (2011)
has observed.
Talking of complex systems implies opening up the discussion into the sphere of
epistemology. Such an opening is necessary since there are two peculiarities of
complex systems which evade classical epistemology in science. I am referring here
to the scientific epistemology developed by Karl Popper (1935) which, to this day,
remains the definition favoured by most researchers. The two peculiarities are
linked to their sensitivity to initial conditions: 1) they are unpredictable, although
obeying the laws of causality; 2) they cannot be reproduced. Hence Popper’s
axioms no longer apply, which necessitates a new epistemology to account for
them. There are numerous attempts to solve this question and I shall instance only
Theodore Adorno (in Popper & Adorno 1979) who suggests replacing the
criterion of refutability by that of criticality, Edgar Morin (1977, 1990) who
proposes the necessity of erecting an epistemological system for variable
complexity and Roy Bhaskar (1978) who sees the ontology of the world
in terms of strata, each stratum resulting from the emergence of a higher level of
complexity in the preceding stratum, which would imply that each stratum in
this conceptualization is governed by separate laws, such that the whole is
of an entirely heterogeneous nature. (See also Anderson 1972 and Harvey &
Reed 1996).
The relevance of this epistemological research for all those working in the life
sciences is obvious, the more so when subjectivity comes into play, in which case
Popper’s linearity clearly no longer applies. For us Jungians, however, there is in
this research a different major interest: we quickly ascertain that what Jung was
about in his researches was precisely such a new epistemology that was still
absent in his day. From his early affinity with the vitalist movement (Addison
2009)–an affinity which signals a rejection of pure Cartesian dualism with
its division of the world into matter and psyche and which haunts him the
length of his career–right up to his final definition of the psychoid with its
simultaneous roots in matter and the psyche, or the very heterogeneity of his
concept of the archetype, there is constant evidence of true complexity–in
the current meaning of the term–in all his endeavours to elaborate theory.
With the concept of psychoid Jung both accepts AND rejects Cartesian dualism,
which contributes to the complexity of his thought.
This is how we can easily gain the impression that Jung is ill at ease or cannot
settle on one or other definition he gives of the archetype. This may appear true
even if one is mindful of the distinction he occasionally makes between the
archetype as a representational structure, or a priori1 and archetypal represen-
tations, in other words the actualizations of such structures instanced in images

1
These representational or a priori structures are, for Jung, transcendent in the sense that Kant uses
the term and not, as Christian Roesler seems to think, some kind of link with a metaphysical reality.
282 François Martin-Vallas

accessible/conceivable to the conscious mind. Often the disparate definitions

can appear so different as to make them irreconcilable. Yet is this not the
outcome of our over familiarity with a linear epistemology where a concept
has to be defined within the logical schema of the excluded third? In a complex
system, this is not the case. One aspect of such a system, say a concept, can
never be comprehended in a univocal way, so it is not in the least surprising that,
in such a system, an univocal definition of one of its parts should be impossible,
entailing the necessity of as many definitions as necessary to cover all its character-
istics, all the diverse possible emergences, each of them depending of the position
of the observer.
Mathematics is at the service of modelling complexity in physics and one of its
leading exponents, the mathematician Henri Poincaré (1905), in an effort to
overcome this impossibility, proposed sectioning the phase space2 representing
the system. These days such sections are called in his honour ‘Poincaré sections’3.
It is thanks to them that we can, for example, deduce the existence of strange
attractors in the chaotic dynamics of complex systems.
It appears to me that in so far as Jung offered numbers of contradictory
definitions of the archetype, he was doing much the same as a physicist might
do in creating mathematical models of a complex system, producing many
Poincaré sections to capture the dynamics of the system, in order to retain those
pertinent to his area of study, the objective being to discern something
organized at the heart of an otherwise stochastic chaos. It is the equivalent of
what I believe Jung was doing in his various searches around his notion
of the archetype.
Clearly, it may be seen as regrettable that Jung did not have access to the
theoretical and epistemological models to which I refer, but one can admire
all the same how he tenaciously arrived at a genuinely complex theory of the
archetype without the benefit of all the tools we have at our disposal. It is
obviously down to us to reactivate his search in light of the new data at our
disposal but, if at all possible, without getting rid of its attribute as a complex
system which bestows upon it interest as much as pertinence.
I conclude by returning to the issue of a connection between culture and the
biological instinct which Christian Roesler placed in opposition in his title. By
placing culture in an adversarial position to biology, that is to say nature, it seems
to me Christian Roesler reduces the debate to its simplest expression. I have
already alluded to the views of Jean Laplanche (1987) in an earlier paper
(Martin-Vallas 2005) linking them to the notion of the archetype, and advocating
an attitude to the connection between nature (instinct) and culture (sexuality as
defined by Laplanche) that should substitute complexity for opposition; in this

2
The phase space is a mathematical space where each dimension represents a variable in the
system, in such a way that all states of the system can be represented by any point in it.
3
The Poincaré section differs from a classical section in that the ‘plane’ of the section is not static,
but dynamic. I give en example in Martin-Vallas 2013.
Are archetypes transmitted or emergent? A response to Christian Roesler 283

paper I am proposing that the archetype is an emergent structure, a by-product of

the encounter between culture and instinct, in other words, a higher level of
complexity. I refer the interested reader to this earlier article, as I do to my later
article (2009) where I elaborate the same idea somewhat differently. In a last paper,
to be published soon (2013), I develop further many of the points I raise here.
To close this critique, I would nevertheless like to say that despite my severe
criticisms, Christian Roesler’s paper has the merit of throwing down the gauntlet
for the necessity of a new definition of the archetype. It is simply that I regret his
initiative not only failed to contribute to the enlargement of the different dimen-
sions of complexity latent in Jung’s notion, (unlike the efforts of Jean Knox,
George Hogenson or myself, each in her/his specific way), but also, owing to his
reductionist approach, put at risk its very pertinence.

TRANSLATIONS OF ABSTRACT

Dans cet article, l’auteur soutient que le concept d’archétype de Jung ne devrait pas être
réduit à une définition univoque. Jung lui-même a proposé de nombreuses définitions de
ce concept, certaines étant partiellement ou complètement en contradiction les unes avec
les autres. Une manière de penser univoque et logique peut nous conduire à réfuter et
rejeter une partie de ces définitions, alors qu’une manière de penser complexe, telle que
celle proposée par Edgar Morin ou Roy Bhashkar par exemple, peut nous permettre
de considérer ces apparentes contradictions dans les définitions de l’archétype par Jung
comme reflétant la complexité de la réalité psychique. Le principal argument de l’auteur
est qu’il manquait à Jung le concept épistémologique d’émergence (qui est apparu dans
les sciences à l’époque de sa mort) et qu’il a essayé de l’exprimer avec les concepts
épistémologiques de son temps.

In diesem Beitrag argumentiert der Autor dafür, daß Jungs Archetypenkonzept nicht auf
eine eindeutige Auslegung reduziert werden sollte. Jung selbst schlug viele Definitionen
dieses Konzeptes vor, einige davon in teilweisem oder völligem gegenseitigen Widerspruch.
Eine auf Eindeutigkeit und Logik angelegte Denkweise könnte uns zu Widerlegungen und
Zurückweisungen von Teilen dieser Definitionen führen, während eine komplexe Art des
Denkens, wie sie z.B. von Edgar Morin oder Roy Bhaskar vorgeschlagen wird, es uns
ermöglicht zu sehen, daß jene offensichtlichen Widersprüche in Jungs Definitionen des
Archetypischen die Komplexität der psychischen Realität reflektieren. Das Hauptargument
des Autors richtet sich auf den Umstand des Fehlens eines epistemologischen Konzeptes der
Emergenz bei Jung (welches in der Wissenschaft zur Zeit seines Todes auftauchte) und daß
er versucht habe, dieses mit den epistemologischen Mitteln seiner Zeit zu formulieren.

Gli archetipi vengono trasmessi o sono emergenti? Una risposta a Christian Roesler.In
questo articolo l’autore sostiene che il concetto junghiano di archetipo non dovrebbe essere
ridotto a una definizione univoca. Lo stesso Jung ha proposto molte definizione di tale
concetto, alcune delle quali parzialmente o totalmente in contraddizione con altre. Un
284 François Martin-Vallas

modo di pensare univoco e logico può portarci a rifiutare e rigettare parte di queste
definizioni, ma un pensiero complesso, come proposto per esempio da Edgard Morin o
Roy Bhaskar può permetterci di considerare che quelle apparenti contraddizioni nelle
definizioni di Jung di archetipo riflettono la complessità della realtà psichica. L’argomento
principale dell’autore è che Jung non prese in considerazione il concetto di emergente ( che
comparve nella ricerca scientifica al tempo della sua morte) e che cercò di esprimerlo con i
concetti epistemologici del suo tempo.

В этой статье автор доказывает, что концепцию Юнга об архетипах не стоит

сводить к однозначному определению последних. Сам Юнг предлагал
множество определений, причем некоторые из них частично или даже
полностью противоречили другим. Логическое мышление может привести
нас к опровержению и отвержению некоторых из этих определений, тогда
как комплексное мышление, предлагаемое, к примеру, Эдгаром Мартином
или Роем Бхаскаром, может позволить нам учесть, что видимые противоречия
юнговских определений архетипа отражают сложность психической
реальности. Основной аргумент автора заключается в том, что Юнгу не
хватало эпистемологической концепции появления (эмерджентности) (воз-
никшей в науке только ко времени смерти Юнга), и что он пытался описать
это явление, используя эпистемологические концепции своего времени.

En este trabajo el autor argumenta que el concepto junguiano de arquetipo no debe ser
reducido a una definición unívoca, El propio Jung propuso muchas definiciones para este
concepto, algunas de ellas parcial o totalmente contradictorias a otras. Una forma de
unilateral o lógica de pensar nos puede conducir a rechazar o refutar parte de estas
definiciones, sin embargo un pensamiento complejo como el propuesto por Edgar Morin
o Roy Bhaskar por ejemplo, nos podría permitir considerar esas aparentes contradic-
ciones del concepto junguiano de arquetipo como reflejos de la complejidad de la
realidad psíquica. El argumento más importante del autor se refiere a que Jung no había
tomado en cuenta el concepto epistemológico de la emergencia (el cual surgió al
momento de su muerte) y que el intentó expresarse con los conceptos epistemológicos
de su tiempo.

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[MS first received September 2012; final version November 2012]