VII.
Paternity and Filiations; 152-162 from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de
A. Legitimate Children; 163-174, 43(1); arts. 363, 369
NCC; A.M. No. 06-11-5 SC; art. 351 RPC; sec 3(dd), Rule 131
ROC
a) Presumption of legitimacy
1. Liyao vs Tanhoti-Liyao, GR No. 138961, 3/7/2002
It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by
the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
2) Facts: - UST Compilations
William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon, filed
an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate
(spurious) child of the late William Liyao against herein
respondents before the RTC. Petitioner Liyao, jr. insisted that
his mother, Corazon, had been living separately for ten (10)
years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she
cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically
impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo
when petitioner was conceived and born.
Respondents, on the other hand, stated that their parents,
William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally
married and that Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon
Yulo and was not legally separated from her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to
be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father,
William Liyao.
Ruling:
No. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal
right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the
simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces
and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs
are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these
cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that
would amount to an insult to his memory.
It is therefore clear that the present petition initiated by
Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor,
herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of
petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late
William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born
within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow
petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the
clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage.
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation.
2. De Jesus vs Estate of Dizon, GR#142877, 10/2/2001
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more
firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate.
2) Facts: - UST Compilations
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married and
it was during this marriage that Jacqueline de Jesus and
Jinkie Christie de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born. In a
notarized document, a certain Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. When Juan G. Dizon
died intestate, petitioners Filed a complaint for Partition with
Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the RTC.
Respondents sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that
the complaint would call for altering the status of petitioners
Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus is Juan G.
Dizon’s own illegitimate children.
Ruling:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners
were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as
being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law
more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and
more convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical
incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not
possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably,
upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and
in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took
effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and
the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child
born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate
action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only
when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
3. Concepcion vs CA, GR No. 123450, 31 Aug 2005
The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
2) Facts: - UST Compilations
Gerardo Concepcion filed a petition to have his marriage to
Ma. Theresa Almonte annulled on the ground of bigamy. He
alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa, she
had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. The RTC annulled Ma. Theresa’s marriage to
Gerardo for being bigamous and as a result declared Jose
Gerardo as an illegitimate child. The custody of the child was
awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted
visitation rights. Ma. Theresa argued that there was nothing
in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative
father of an illegitimate child. She further maintained that
Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed from
Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule
that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname.
When brought to the appellate court, it held that Jose
Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by
Mario during her first marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Gerardo was the son of Mario during
Ma. Theresa’s first marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is
conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect
his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code
provides: “The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.”
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be
made in favor of legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy
does not only Mow out of a declaration in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right
of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very
beginning; he never became her husband and thus never
acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence
sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by
him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence
here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose
Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa
and Mario, stands. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall
have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the
Civil Code on surnames. A persons surname or family name
identities the family to which he belongs and is passed on
from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his
surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not
related to him in any way.
4. Angeles vs Maglaya, GR No. 153798, 2Sep 2005
Facts: - compiled case digest/Action to impugn legitimacy
Francisco M. Angeles died intestate on January 21,
1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind four parcels of land
and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent
Aleli claims that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased
and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S.
Angeles, decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are
the surviving heirs of the decedent. For this matter, respondent
prays that she be made administratrix of Francisco’s estate.
Petitioner Belen opposed respondent’s claim, alleging that the
respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for,
although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter,
the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Belen
petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of
being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva
Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her
supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to
prove such union.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Aleli could validly claim
that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco Angeles.
Ruling:
No, respondent’s legitimacy was impugned, and for
failing to establish the presumption of her legitimacy, she could
not validly claim that she is the legitimate child of the deceased.
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family
Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual
basis- that the child’s parents were legally married and that
his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of
that marriage. In the case at bar, respondent failed to prove
such legal marriage of her parents, for she failed to show any
marriage certificate or marriage contract. She failed to present
any priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority to the
witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage
between her parents. Clearly, therefore, respondent could not
be vested with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as
above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between
Francisco and Genevova.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the
legitimate filiation of a child can be established by any of the
modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the
marriage of his/her supposed parents. But respondent failed to
prove her legitimacy even in this aspect. Respondent presented,
in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth
Certificate dated November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil
Registrar of the City of Manila. But such birth certificate was
not signed by her putative father. Jurisprudence teaches that a
birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of
paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed
by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the
father refuses.
5. Babiera vs Catotal, GR No. 138493, 15 June 2000
The present action involves the cancellation of Babiera's
Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. The
specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the
evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negates the
presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate.
1) Facts: - UST Compilations
Presentacion Catotal questioned the authenticity of the entry
of birth of Teofista Babiera. She asserted that the birth
certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth,
the signature of informant forged, and contained false
entries. Catotal ask the court to declare Babiera's certificate
of birth void and ineffective, and to order the City Civil
Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the hereditary rights
of Catotal who inherited the estate. Babiera countered that
she and Catotal are full-blooded sisters, as showed therein
her certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School
Report Card.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Catotal has legal capacity to file the
special proceedings pursuant to Art. 171.
(2) Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and
barred by the statute of limitation.
(3) Whether or not the public record of Babiera's birth is
superior to the oral testimony of Catotal.
Ruling:
(1) No. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171
of the Family Code shows that it applies to instances which
the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The
provision, however, presupposes that the child was the
undisputed child of the mother. Present case alleges and
shows that the alleged mother, Hermogena, did not give birth
to Babiera. The present action does not impugn Babiera's
Filiation to Eugenio and Hermogena, be there is no blood
relation to impugn in the first place. The reason why Catotal
took interest on Babiera's status is to protect the former's
successional rights.
(2) No. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision
provides a prescriptive period for action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the
cancellation of Babiera's Birth Certificate, it does not impugn
her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does
not prescribe because it was allegedly declared void ab initio.
(3) No. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the
totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently
negates the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth
certificate. First, the birth certificate was not signed by the
local civil registrar, and the mother's signature was different
from other signatures. Second, no medical records or
doctor's prescription that provide as evidence of
Hermogena's pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have
given birth at 54 years of age. Third, the disposition of
Hermogena which states that she did not give birth to
Teofista and that the latter was not hers of Eugenio.
6. Lee vs CA, GR No. 118387, 11 Oct 2001
Facts: - fr: Compiled Case Digest CORRECTION of ENTRIES
On 15 November 1985, a complainant for sum of
money was filed by the International Corporate Bank, Inc.
against Sacoba Manufacturing Corp., Pablo Gonzales Jr., and
Tomas Gonzales who, in turn, filed a third party complaint
against Alfa Integrated Textile Mills (ALFA), Ramon C. Lee
(ALFA's president) and Antonio DM. Lacdao (ALFA's vice
president) on 17 March 1986. On 17 September 1987, Lee and
Lacdao filed a motion to dismiss the third party complaint
which the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 denied in
an Order dated 27 June 1988. On 18 July 1988, Lee and Lacdao
filed their answer to the third party complaint. Meanwhile, on
12 July 1988, the trial issued an order requiring the issuance of
an alias summons upon ALFA through the DBP as a
consequence of Lee and Lacdao's letter informing the court
that the summons for ALFA was erroneously served upon
them considering that the management of ALFA had been
transferred to the DBP. In a manifestation dated 22 July 1988,
the DBP claimed that it was not authorized to receive summons
on behalf of ALFA since the DBP had not taken over the
company which has a separate and distinct corporate
personality and existence. On 4 August 1988, the trial court
issued an order advising Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. to take
the appropriate steps to serve the summons to ALFA. On 16
August 1988, Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. filed a Manifestation
and Motion for the Declaration of Proper Service of Summons
which the trial court granted on 17 August 1988.
On 12 September 1988, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion
for reconsideration submitting that the Rule 14, section 13 of
the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no
longer officers of ALFA and Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.
should have availed of another mode of service under Rule 14,
Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication to effect
proper service upon ALFA. On 2 January 1989, the trial court
upheld the validity of the service of summons on ALFA
through Lee and Lacdao, thus, denying the latter's motion for
reconsideration and requiring ALFA to file its answer through
Lee and Lacdao as its corporate officers. On 19 January 1989,
a second motion for reconsideration was filed by Lee and
Lacdao reiterating their stand that by virtue of the voting trust
agreement they ceased to be officers and directors of ALFA,
hence, they could no longer receive summons or any court
processes for or on behalf of ALFA. In support of their second
motion for reconsideration, Lee and Lacdao attached thereto a
copy of the voting trust agreement between all the stockholders
of ALFA (Lee and Lacdao included), on the one hand, and the
DBP, on the other hand, whereby the management and control
of ALFA became vested upon the DBP. On 25 April 1989, the
trial court reversed itself by setting aside its previous Order
dated 2 January 1989 and declared that service upon Lee and
Lacdao who were no longer corporate officers of ALFA cannot
be considered as proper service of summons on ALFA. On 15
May 1989, Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. moved for a
reconsideration of the Order which was affirmed by the court
in is Order dated 14 August 1989 denying Sacoba
Manufacturing, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration.
On 18 September 1989, a petition for certiorari was
belatedly submitted by Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. before the
Court of Appeals which, nonetheless, resolved to give due
course thereto on 21 September 1989. On 17 October 1989,
the trial court, not having been notified of the pending petition
for certiorari with the appellate court issued an Order declaring
as final the Order dated 25 April 1989. Sacoba Manufacturing,
et. al. in the said Order were required to take positive steps in
prosecuting the third party complaint in order that the court
would not be constrained to dismiss the same for failure to
prosecute. Subsequently, on 25 October 1989 Sacoba
Manufacturing, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on
which the trial court took no further action. On 19 March 1990,
after Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to Sacoba
Manufacturing, et. al.'s petition for certiorari, the appellate
court rendered its decision, setting aside the orders of trial court
judge dated 25 April 1989 and 14 August 1989. On 11 April
1990, Lee and Lacdao moved for a reconsideration of the
decision of the appellate court which resolved to deny the same
on 10 May 1990. Lee and Lacdao filed the petition for certiorari.
In the meantime, the appellate court inadvertently made an
entry of judgment on 16 July 1990 erroneously applying the rule
that the period during which a motion for reconsideration has
been pending must be deducted from the 15-day period to
appeal. However, in its Resolution dated 3 January 1991, the
appellate court set aside the aforestated entry of judgment after
further considering that the rule it relied on applies to appeals
from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals, not to appeals from its decision to the Supreme Court
pursuant to the Supreme Court's.
Issue:
a) Whether the execution of the voting trust agreement
by Lee and Lacdao whereby all their shares to the
corporation have been transferred to the trustee
deprives the stockholder of their positions as directors
of the corporation.
b) Whether the five-year period of the voting trust
agreement in question had lapsed in 1986 so that the
legal title to the stocks covered by the said voting trust
agreement ipso facto reverted to Lee and Lacdao as
beneficial owners pursuant to the 6th paragraph of
section 59 of the new Corporation Code.
c) Whether there was proper service of summons on
ALFA through Lee and Lacdao, to bind ALFA.
Ruling:
Lee and Lacdao, by virtue of the voting trust
agreement executed in 1981 disposed of all their shares through
assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as trustee.
Consequently, Lee and Lacdao ceased to own at least one share
standing in their names on the books of ALFA as required
under Section 23 of the new Corporation Code. They also
ceased to have anything to do with the management of the
enterprise. Lee and Lacdao ceased to be directors. Hence, the
transfer of their shares to the DBP created vacancies in their
respective positions as directors of ALFA. The transfer of
shares from the stockholders of ALFA to the DBP is the
essence of the subject voting trust agreement. Considering that
the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP
transferred legal ownership of the stocks covered by the
agreement to the DBP as trustee, the latter because the
stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks.
In the absence of a showing that the DBP had caused to be
transferred in their names one share of stock for the purpose
of qualifying as directors of ALFA, Lee and Lacdao can no
longer be deemed to have retained their status as officers of
ALFA which was the case before the execution of the subject
voting trust agreement. There is no dispute from the records
that DBP has taken over full control and management of the
firm.
The 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new
Corporation Code reads that "Unless expressly renewed, all
rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall automatically
expire at the end of the agreed period, and the voting trust
certificates as well as the certificates of stock in the name of the
trustee or trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new
certificates of stock shall be reissued in the name of the
transferors." However, it is manifestly clear from the terms of
the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP that
the duration of the agreement is contingent upon the fulfillment
of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. Had the five-
year period of the voting trust agreement expired in 1986, the
DBP would not have transferred an its rights, titles and interests
in ALFA "effective June 30, 1986" to the national government
through the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) as attested to in a
Certification dated 24 January 1989 of the Vice President of the
DBP's Special Accounts Department II. In the same
certification, it is stated that the DBP, from 1987 until 1989,
had handled s account which included ALFA's assets pursuant
to a management agreement by and between the DBP and
APT. Hence, there is evidence on record that at the time of the
service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao on 21
August 1987, the voting trust agreement in question was not yet
terminated so that the legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then,
still belonged to the DBP.
It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the
officers or members who compose it. Thus, the role on service
of processes on a corporation enumerates the representatives
of a corporation who can validly receive court processes on its
behalf. Not every stockholder or officer can bind the
corporation considering the existence of a corporate entity
separate from those who compose it. The rationale of the rule
is that service must be made on a representative so integrated
with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable that
he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do
with any legal papers served on him. Herein, Lee and Lacdao
do not fall under any of the enumerated officers. The service of
summons upon ALFA, through Lee and Lacdao, therefore, is
not valid. To rule otherwise will contravene the general
principle that a corporation can only be bound by such acts
which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority.
7. Estate of Ong vs Diaz, GR No. 171713, 17 Dec 2007
2) Facts: - fr: compiled case digest RULES on DNA Evidence
A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer
for support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin
Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky
C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. As alleged by Jinky
in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and
Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and
later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already
married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil
wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial
Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez. From January 1994 to
September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived
together. From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin
Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the
Central Luzon Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor
Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the
hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all
of minor Joanne’s needs that is recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne
and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely
alleging that he is not the father of the child.Rogelio, despite
Jinky’s remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing
and refusing to give support for the child and to acknowledge
her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore
adverted complaint.On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion
to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration
seeking the court’s understanding, as he was then in a quandary
on what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem of
his life.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it
remanded the case to the court a quo for DNA analysis despite
the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio
G. Ong.
Ruling:
As a whole, the present petition calls for the
determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of
support in favor of the said minor. Filiation proceedings are
usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a
legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on
the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological
father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and child.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the
child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
Family Code provides: Article 167. The children shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
8. Cabatania vs CA, GR No. 124814, 21 Oct 2004
A high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.
3) Facts: - UST Compilations
Florencia Regodos filed a petition in behalf of her
minor son for recognition and support from petitioner Camelo
Cabatania. Cabatania, however, denied the alleged paternity
and insisted that Florencia was already pregnant when they
had sex. The RTC gave more probative weight to the
testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she
misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her
husband is still alive. Trial court brushed this
misrepresentation and used as one of its bases of its decision
the similarities on personal appearances of the petitioner and
respondent and favored the respondent’s claim.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be compelled to
acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as his
illegitimate son and to give support to the latter.
Ruling:
No. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard
of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An
order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or
the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence.
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175
of the Civil Code. Private respondent presented a copy of his
birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was
without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate
of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate. In the same vein, the Court ruled that, while a
baptismal certificate may be considered a public document,
it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the child’s paternity. Thus, certificates
issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates
are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and
they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence
to prove the same.
The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid
subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the
presumption that a child born within that marriage is
legitimate even though the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress (Art 167). The presumption of legitimacy does not
only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue
of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
With regards the personal appearance of the child, the
Supreme Court provided that in this age of genetic
profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the
extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or
similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove
paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
b) Impugning legitimate filiation – ART 166
9. Andal vs Macaraig, GR No. 2474, 30 May 1951
As a rule, a child presumed to be legitimate if he was
born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution
of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by
proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to
have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the
300 days next preceding the birth of the child.
1) FACTS: - ibpzn ART 164-166
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria
Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the ownership
and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal
and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant,
donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor
of Emiliano. The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in
January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work
his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can
hardly move and get up from his bed. Since May 1942, Felix
and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as
husband and wife. Sometime in September 1942, the wife
eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Maria’s father until
1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did
not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to
a boy who was, herein petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.
RULING:
YES. Since Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano
died on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a
legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300
days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that
the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome
the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120
days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child.
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano was absent
during the initial period of conception, especially during the
period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September
10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next
preceding the birth of the child Mariano. On the contrary,
there is enough evidence to show that during that initial
period of conception, Emiliano and his wife were still living
under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in
the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit
intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude
cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife.
The Court admit that Emiliano was already suffering from
tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he
could hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen
and his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does
not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where
persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act
even in the most crucial stage because they are more
inclined to sexual intercourse. There is neither evidence to
show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent,
continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence that he
was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the
Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been
overcome.
c) Proving legitimate filiation
10. Gono-Javier vs CA, GR No. 111994, 29 Dec 1994
Facts:
 Petitioners are the children of deceased Catalino
Gono. They claim ownership over five parcels of land
left by their natural grandfather Juan Casocot upon
his on 1964. They are opposed by the nephews and
nieces of deceased Juan Casocot.
 Catalino Gono was the natural child of Juan Casocot
with his common law wife but petitioners alleged
that Catalino was acknowledged by Juan Casocot on
the basis of a statement in a deed of donation of one
of the disputed lands in favor of Eugenia Gonzales,
widow of Catalino Gono, to the effect that among the
reasons for making the donation was the fact that the
donee "is the surviving spouse of my son with my
common law wife."
 The donation was made on March 29, 1954, about 11
years after the death of Catalino Gono in 1942 or
1943.
Issue: WON petitioners are entitled by intestate succession
to the lands left by their natural grandfather in lieu of the
alleged “acknowledgment” through the donation?
Held: No. Since this case came about in 1954, the New Civil
Code was applicable.
Under Art. 278 of the NCC:
“ Recognition shall be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record,
or in any authentic writing.”
In the case at bar, the statement made in the deed of
donation, a public document, is considered as a valid
recognition by virtue of the doctrine of incidental
recognition. Unfortunately, the recognition was too late as
this was made after the death of Catalino. Under the
provision of the NCC, voluntary acknowledgment can only be
effected only during the lifetime of both the acknowledging
parent and the acknowledged illegitimate child.
The reason behind the lifetime rule is that the due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing (Art. 278, Civil Code) is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action
is required), albeit not prohibited, to yet have it declared as
such.
11. Herrera v Alba, GR No. 148220, 15 Jun 2005
1) FACTS: - ibpzn DNA Evidence
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba
(respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed
before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition,
support and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998,
petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied
that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also
denied physical contact with respondent’s mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA
paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support
the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina
C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an
Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she
taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of
the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-
NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former
professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman,
Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology
Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr.
Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and
asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in
establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity
testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates
his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE:
WON DNA Paternity testing violates Herrera’s right against
self-incrimination.
RULING:
No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim
vs CA that DNA testing is not yet recognized in the
Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of
the trial court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case;
however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the
acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object
evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in
the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
It is also considered that the Vallejo Guidelines be considered
by the courts. The Vallejo Guidelines determines weight and
probative value of DNA test results.
The Vallejo Guidelines:
1. how the samples were collected;
2. how they were handled;
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples;
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests; and
6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
2) Issue:
Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in
this jurisdiction to determine filiation.
Ruling:
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing,
we deem it appropriate to give an overview of a paternity suit
and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the
requirements of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence
to establish paternity and filiation.Filiation proceedings are
usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a
legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on
the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological
father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and child.
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she
had sexual relations with the putative father. In our jurisdiction,
corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and
shift it to the putative father.There are two affirmative defenses
available to the putative father. The putative father may show
incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of
either physical absence or impotency. The putative father may
also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men
at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate. The child’s legitimacy may be
impugned only under the strict standards provided by
law.Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father
and child may be offered as part of evidence of paternity.
Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity
proceeding. However, although likeness is a function of
heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify
how much a child must or must not look like his biological
father. This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the
trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of
the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondent’s mother, put forward
a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is
respondent’s biological father. Aware that her assertion is not
enough to convince the trial court, she offered corroborative
proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the
other hand, denied Armi Alba’s assertion. He denied ever
having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that
respondent is Armi Alba’s child with another man. Armi Alba
countered petitioner’s denial by submitting pictures of
respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they
resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become
credibility contests. We now look to the law, rules, and
governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of
incriminating acts on paternity and filiation are allowed in this
jurisdiction.
12. Lucas vs Lucas, GR No. 190710, 6 Jun 2011
1) lawtechworld
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation
with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he
is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted
documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live
birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s
college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis
University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several
articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and
Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial in
nature and therefore summons should be served on him.
Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear
the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and
hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on
the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s
father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC
dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity
action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely,
a prima facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration
which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where
the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse
for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a
full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to
show that the four significant aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing
should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court
can issue a DNA testing order
HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima
facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no
evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba
that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been
widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
when the parties have presented their respective evidence.
They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at
this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to
establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence
and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and
integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate
court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application
of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after
due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii)
was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing
uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has
the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of
the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or
proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that
a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
“good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a
court order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which,
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but
those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity
cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter,
before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in
cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action
refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood
testing The same condition precedent should be applied in
our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for
DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”
B. Illegitimate Children; 175-176, 54 RA 9255; 992 NCC
13. Uyguangco vs CA, GR No. 76873, 26 Oct 1989
Facts:
In the year 1975, Apolinario Uyguangco died
intestate leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children
(her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties
which they divided among themselves. Graciano Bacjao
Uyguangco claims that he is an illegitimate son of
Apolinario and filed a complaint for partition against all the
petitioners because he was left out in the extrajudicial
settlement of Apolinarios estate. Graciano alleged he is
the son of Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao
and he received support from his father while he was
studying at the Medina High School, where he eventually
graduated. Here He was also assigned by his father,
without objection from the rest of the family, as
storekeeper at the Uyguangco store in Mananom from
1967 to 1973. During the course of the trial, the petitioners
alleged that Graciano failed to present any documents
mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the
illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. . The petitioners
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
private respondent could no longer prove his alleged
filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code
because .
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondent is allowed to prove
his alleged filiation under the second paragraph of Article
172 of the Family Code.
Ruling: ART 175
NO. The Supreme Court held that the problem of the
private respondent is that, since he seeks to prove his
filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Family Code, his action is now barred because of his
alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of
this Article 175 reads as follows:
The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be
allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child
or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means
allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple
reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and
can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's
illegitimate filiation. Petition Granted.
14. Bernabe vs Alejo, GR No. 140500, 21 Jan 2002
Facts: - compiled digest/prospec & retroactive effect of laws
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son
with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was born on
September 18, 1981and was named Adrian Bernabe.
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe died as well as his legitimate wife,
leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir.
Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint
praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of
the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabe’s
estate. Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint and
said that the death of the putative father had barred the
action. Further, under the law, an action for the
recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within
the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an
opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the rights of
Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code
which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4
years after the child has attained the age of majority and
that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not
take away his right.
Issue:
Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an
acknowledged illegitimate son.
Ruling:
The Family Code makes no distinction on
whether the former was still a minor when the latter died.
Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a
chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate
children” are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of their
existence. Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the
acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to
establish the filiation of spurious children. Hence, the
petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed.
2) Facts: compiled digest/retroactive application
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son
with his secretary Carolina Alejo. The son was born on
September 1981. The Fiscal died on August 1993. On May
1994, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed a complaint for
Adrian to be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son
of Fiscal Bernabe and such entitled to his share in the
estate. Petitioners are challenging the petition on grounds
that the action has prescribed on ground that the Family
code has retroactive application and hence, the manner of
proving filiation by “open and continuous possession of a
status of a legitimate child” must have been brought
within the lifetime of the putative parent.
2) Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive
application in the case.
Ruling:
The right to an action for recognition which was
granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code has already vested
to Adrian prior the enactment of the Family Code. A
vested right is one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists
and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contingency. Certainly the retroactive
effect of the family code finds no application in this case.
15. Dela Cruz vs Gracia, GR No. 177728, 31 Jul 2009
FACTS: - ibpzn
Jenie was denied the registration of her child’s birth because
the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of
the Father (AUSF) entitled “Autobiography,” did not include
the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was
born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to
his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child.”
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for
injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court
held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the
unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not
contain any express recognition of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the
deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as
recognition of paternity.
RULING:
Yes, it can be considered as a recognition of paternity.Article
176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an
illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the
latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring
through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten
instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there
must be a signature by the putative father in the private
handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be
signed by the acknowledging parent; and
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by
other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the
claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
16. Mendoza vs CA, GR No. 86302, 24 Sep 1991
Facts:
The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring
Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she
was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was
then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at
that time to Emiliana Barrientos. The private respondent
claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to
his dying day. Teopista averred that Mendoza recognized
her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and
according her the rights and privileges of a recognized
illegitimate child. The trial court believed him and
dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The
appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the
court below. Now the issue is before us on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of
her claimed status of an illegitimate child under Article 283
of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Teopista Toring Tufiacao
has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so
holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and
the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation
of "the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice
to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed
status with his own defenses, including evidence now
obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine and
technology. Petition Denied.
2) Issue: W/N the private respondent is the illegitimate
daughter of Mendoza?
Held: Teopista is the illegitimate daughter of Mendoza. An
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation
by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
Special laws”, according to the Civil Code, or “by evidence or
proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,” according
to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.Under Sec. 39, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, the act or declaration of a person deceased or unable
to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related
to him by birth or marriage, may be receivedin evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
17. Manuel v Ferrer, GR No. 117246, 21 Aug 1995
FACTS: - ibpzn
The petitioners in this case were the legitimate children of
spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling. During his
marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with
Ursula Bautista, from which Juan Manuel was born. Juan
Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza
Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter
nuptias over a parcel of land was registered in his name. Two
other parcels of land, were later bought by Juan and
registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a
child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the
spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-
Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own “
daughter “.
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of
Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. Juan
Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later,
on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza,
Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming
for herself the three parcels of land. Modesta executed in
favor of her co-respondent Estanislao Manuel a Deed of
Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half
portion of land. This act of Modesta apparently did not sit well
with the petitioners. The petitioners sought for the declaration
of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners (legitimate children of spouses Antonio
Manuel & Beatriz Guiling) are the legal heirs over one – half
of Juan Manuel’s intestate estate.
RULING:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code… prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and the relatives of the father of mother of
said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood,
but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article
992. Between legitimate family and the illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family, is
in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which
it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognized this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
Furthermore, the complaint of the petitioners seeking the
nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by
Modesta issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of
Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislao Manuel,
was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners not
being the real party-in-interest. In the case, had neither the
standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
18. Dolina vs Vallecera, GR No. 182367, Dec 15, 2010
1) DOCTRINE: - lawtechworld
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is
not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is beyond question,
support follows as matter of obligation.
FACTS:
In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the
issuance of a temporary protection order against Glenn
Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse
under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl added a
prayer for support for their supposed child. She based such
prayer on the latter’s certificate of live birth which listed
Vallecera ‘s employer, to withhold from his pay
such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.
Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolina’s petition
was essentially one for financial support rather than for
protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not
the child’s father and that the signature in
the birth certificate was not here. He also added that the
petition is a harassment suit intended to for him to
acknowledge the child as his and therefore give financial
support.
RTC dismissed petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action
for temporary protection and denied her application for
temporary support for her child?
HELD:
Yes.
RATIO:
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for
her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the
case is the protection and safety of women and children who
are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a
protection order against the respondent in the case can
include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child,
this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and
to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived
with Vallecera.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is
not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if
he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved
his relation to him. The child’s remedy is to file through her
mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as
matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are
entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation
must be duly proved.
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to
establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively,
she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of
compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.
2) project jurisprudence
SUMMARY: The filiation of the child to the parent must
first be established before support from said parent can be
granted by the court
3) michelle.wordpress.com
 Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary protection order against Glenn
Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse
under RA 9262, in 2008.
 In the pro forma complaint Cherryl added a prayer for
support for their supposed child.
 The petitioner based such prayer on the latter’s
certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera ‘s employer,
to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the
RTC may deem appropriate.
 Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolina’s
petition was essentially one for financial support rather
than for protection against woman and child abuses, that
he was not the child’s father and that the signature in
the birth certificate was not here.
 He also added that the petition is a harassment suit
intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and
therefore give financial support.
19. Salas vs Matusalem, GR No. 180284, 11Sept 2013
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate.
Facts:
Respondent Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against petitioner Narciso Salas.
Respondent Matusalem claimed that petitioner is the father
of her son. Petitioner Salas, however, denied paternity of the
child Christian Paulo. The RTC rendered its decision in favor
of respondent. On appeal, the CA affimed the trial court’s
ruling that respondent satisfactorily established the
illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo. Respondent
presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo
Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father
but which is not signed by him.
Issue:
WON the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that
respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son
Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign
in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a
recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative
value to establish filiation to the alleged father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also
indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while
baptismal certificates may be considered public documents,
they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries
therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the
alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.
As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent
showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic
trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian
Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by
petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if
these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article
172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits
as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of
filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned.
20. Grande v Antonio, GR No. 206248, 18 Feb 2014
2) Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide
if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not
the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
1) FACTS: - ibpzn / Art 176, RA 9255
Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio
had an illicit relationship and two sons were born thereafter.
The children were not expressly recognized by respondent
as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil
Registry. Respondent [the father] filed a petition for judicial
approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with
the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the
minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity
of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of
parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio citing the
“best interest of the child”. Respondent’s petition was granted
by RTC and modified by the CA. In CA’s decision, it reversed
the granting of the custody of the two children to the
respondent but affirmed the surname change to of the same
to Antonio. Aggrieved, wife filed petition for certiorari in SC.
Petitioner speculated that Article 176 of the Family Code as
amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, may not be invoked
by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of
his surname without the consent of
their mother.
ISSUES:
1) WON the father can exercise parental authority and
consequently, custody, over his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation.
2) WON the father has the right to compel the use of his
surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of
their filiation.
RULING:
1) NO, petitioner cannot exercise custody over the children.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176
on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal
mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then
custody over the minor children also goes to the mother,
unless she is shown to be unfit.
Respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande
committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the
children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors; she
cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their
children.
2) NO. An acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father.
Under Art 176, the general rule is that an illegitimate child
shall use the surname of the mother. The exception provided
by RA 9255 wherein a surname change “shall” be necessary
upon recognition of paternity, is of no moment (?). The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of “may” in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname
DISCRETIONARY govern and illegitimate children are given
the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
Case is remanded to lower court to determine the choice of
said children.
C. Legitimated Children; 177-182; RA 9858
21. De Santos vs Angeles, GR No. 105619, 10 Sep 2003
(correct date: Dec 12, 1995)
1) Although natural children can be legitimized, and natural
children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged
natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise
be legitimized.
Facts: - UST Compilations
Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was
blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de
Santos. After some time, Antonio fell in love and married
Conchita Talag de Santos, herein private respondent in
another country. This union produced eleven children. Less
than a month later, after the death of Sophia, Antonio and
private respondent contracted another marriage celebrated
under Philippine laws.
After the death of Antonio, private respondent went to court
asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor
in connection with the settlement of her late husband's
estate. After six years, petitioner Santos decided to
intervene. She argued that private respondent's children
were illegitimate. The RTC declared private respondent's ten
children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared
them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the
heirs of Antonio de Santos. Petitioner sought reconsideration
but this was denied. Hence, she filed the instant petition
contending that since only natural children can be
legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated
her half brothers and sisters.
Issue:
WON natural children by legal fiction can be legitimized.
Ruling:
No. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation
to natural children as defined thereunder. There was,
therefore, from the outset, an intent to exclude children
conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of
the law.
Another point to be considered is that although natural
children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal
fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural
children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As has
been pointed out, much more is involved here than the mere
privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children, like
the petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely affected
as her testamentary share may well be reduced in the event
that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on par
with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half
of her share.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has
been decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the
Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of
children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal
fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
In the case at bench, there is no question that all
the children born to private respondent and deceased
Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the
latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still
subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were
married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada,U.S.A.
a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not
change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not
recognized in this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the
decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to
have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the
Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise
aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his
legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily
contracted another marriage with private respondent, this
time here in Tagaytay, attention must be drawn to the fact
that this case has been decided under the provisions of the
Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes
only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate.
"Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure
fiction.