CASES IN INTRODUCTION TO LAW

AC No. 99-634 June 10, 2002

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never
paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration.

The Case

Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:

"x x x xxx xxx

"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in September, 1998,
in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City,
who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of
contract;

"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and some other legal
papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the
dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is
attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);

"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the amount
of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed
the case filed immediately;

"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in court, and
that I should receive notice of its progress;

"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to
be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my last visit
to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my
satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he
left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he personally
follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk
of Court was absent on that day;

"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court
with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was
no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27,
1999, attached as Annex C;

"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office the
following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the
court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because
he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me
by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00,
respectively, copies of which are attached as Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;”

xxx xxx x x x.1

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,2 respondent filed
his Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter
had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting, complainant
requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid.
After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another
demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without
informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the former's law office to deliver the letter to the
addressee.

Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a complaint
(which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement.

He was also requested by complainant to do the following:

1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife

All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.

Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files pertinent to the
Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of
contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his
acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4
million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.

On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary and told her that it was for the
filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of
complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed.
Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the
filing fee later.

Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the complaint
because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered
to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never
arrived at any agreement.

Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint. Respondent
reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first
before payment of respondent's acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return
of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because their law office was
undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent's
checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.

Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone had been
shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
 The IBP's Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:

"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees
of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding
obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame
contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of
the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member
of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant
for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the
respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year.”4

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Commission's recommendation.

Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf
of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.

Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the former's
failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his office
on January 4, 1999 was for attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.

We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense of the client's
cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve
the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal
profession.5 Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in
the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.6

Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant,
because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a
personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.

We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent
for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the
client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid,
promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employment is established.7

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and
the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees.8 Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a
law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to
the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared
-- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.9 They owe entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their
utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law
legally applied.10

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to complainant on January
4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law
firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover,
upon discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct
the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainant's attention to the matter and should have issued another
receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.

The Practice of Law -- a

Profession, Not a Business

In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business.11Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration.13 Duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money.14

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law
office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money
entrusted to them in their professional capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal
of public confidence in the legal profession.16 It may be true that they have a lien upon the client's funds, documents
and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements.
However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received.
Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.17 In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their
client's interest within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.18 Respondent fell short of this standard
when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint
promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power
to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.19

WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which
is instructed to include a copy in respondent's file.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, J.*, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National
Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M.
Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit:
representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
complainant might obtain.

The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal Case No. 7635-55,
for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934,
where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated
in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo
was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a sum of money
based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio
Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure
to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by
default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property
previously attached by complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and
Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent
Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-
88.

Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of
the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No.
56934.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and recommendations:
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT
No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly
appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her
husband was registered and annotated in said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on
October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on
the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel
spouses) has no leg to stand on.

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the same
IBP No. "246722 dated 1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to
the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues,
on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on
Bar Discipline.

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated
March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M.
Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of
her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that
he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme
Court.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4, Resolution)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of law
is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of
honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason,
he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's
oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result
in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding
due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court
for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which
reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the
cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment:
on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular
features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of
the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar
of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights
to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative
nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions
of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and
the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction
of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and,
upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public
welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes
upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly
and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is
not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part
in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for
the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts
explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated
on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity
and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme
lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power
of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is
the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking
solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent
of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and
regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member
of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member
of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership
fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed
to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted
to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should
be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its
Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions
and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no
less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination
to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud.
The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member
of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.

B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and passed
the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together with
the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to
do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by
the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of
the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and
taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief
that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his
status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to
provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September 201212and
submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant
petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based
on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in
signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a
fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him
the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of
members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign
in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission;
rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When
asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo,
you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s
gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as
necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law,17 which is more
than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this
Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession,
and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the
Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy
Development Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.1âwphi1 While the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals
who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional
but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment."22

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts23 as it negates
malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to
know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when
he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys.
However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim
an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without
taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court,
and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the
filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed
indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding
of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the
unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9
is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law.
However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice
of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned
that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice
of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period,
petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice
of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

[B.M. No. 1209. July 1, 2003]

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE BAR MATTER NO. 1209 LAWYER'S OATH
EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 1 2003.
RESOLUTION. B.M. No. 1209(In Re: Petition to Take the Bar Matter No. 1209 Lawyer's Oath, Caesar Z. Distrito,
petitioner.)

Before the court is a Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign in the Roll of Attorneys dated April 22, 2002 filed by
Caesar Z. Distrito, a successful 2001 Bar Examinee.

The petitioner is a former Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairman of Barangay Singcang

Airport, BacolodCity.On September 18, 1999, an Information for Usurpation of Authority or Official Function under
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code[1]cralaw was filed against him which read:

That on or about the 18th day of September, 1999, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being the President of the Bacolod City Sangguniang Kabataan
Federation, a government agency, did then and there under pretense of official position and without being lawfully
entitled to do so, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously preside over the special session of the said Federation, in
violation of the aforestated law.[2]cralaw

The petitioner was conditionally allowed to take the 2001 Bar Examinations[3]cralaw and passed the same.He could
not, however, take the Lawyer's Oath nor sign in the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the above-mentioned
case.
On August 2, 2002, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter[4]cralaw from a certain Mr. Benjie
Montinola informing the said office that there were other cases filed against the petitioner which were not duly
disclosed in the latter's petition to take the bar examinations, to wit:

1.Two counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.) 22 filed sometime in 1999, docketed as B.C.I.S. 99-6735
and 99-6736, before the City Prosecutor's Office of Bacolod;

2.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on July 26, 2001, before the MTCC, Bacolod, in which an adverse
decision dated April 1, 2002 was rendered;

3.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on March 15, 2002, before MTCC, Bacolod.

Mr. Montinola also alleged in his letter that the petitioner took his oath as an Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
member, knowing fully well that he had not yet taken his oath as a lawyer before the Supreme Court nor signed in the
Roll of Attorneys Mr. Montinola further averred:

The fact that CAESAR Z. DISTRITO have (sic)not disclosed the above-mentioned criminal and civil case filed against
him in his application form despite his personal knowledge of the same when he applied for the Bar Exams sometime
in 2001, is tantamount to PERJURY and that should be acted upon by your respectable office to protect the integrity
of our present lawyers who will be our future Prosecutors, Judges, Justices or even High Ranking Cabinet or
Government Officials or even President of our country.

The unethical act of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO when he took his oath as a lawyer/member before a testimonial dinner
tendered by the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter and witnessed not only by it's Officials, present members and honored
guests but by thousands of Television viewers not only in Bacolod City but the whole of Western Visayas if not the
whole country, despite also of his personal knowledge that he is not qualified to do so for the same reason above-
stated, is tantamount to IMPERSONATION that should be properly acted upon by the said body who will be furnished
a copy of this information and to also protect their integrity and to avoid similar incident that may happen in the future
for lack of proper screening.

Mr. Montinola attached to his letter copies of the complaint as well as a copy of the decision in Civil Case No. 26837.

On August 15, 2002, the OBC received another letter from a certain Ms. Christine Angelie M. Espinosa, then SK
Federation President of Bacolod City, which read:

Your Honor:

May I inquire from your good office, whether a bar passer who has not taken his oath in view of the pending criminal
case filed against him can attached (sic) to his name the nomenclature atty.?Such is the case of Mr. Caesar Z. Distrito
, SK Federation, Bacolod City Vice-President whopassed the bar last May 2002, but has not taken his oath due to the
pending criminal case lodged in MTCC branch 4, Bacolod City for Usurpation of Power charge against him by the
undersigned.

Ms. Espinosa attached a copy of an attendance sheet of a Sangguniang Panglungsod committee hearing dated June
21, 2002 where the petitioner's name appeared to have been signed, along with the word "Atty."

On April 23, 2003, the petitioner filed his Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys alleging
that on April 4, 2003, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod, rendered a decision acquitting him in
Criminal Case No. 99609.[5]cralaw Attached thereto was a certified true copy of the decision in the said criminal case
and a certificate of finality of judgment.[6]cralaw The OBC informed the petitioner of the above-mentioned charges
and required him to comment on the same.

In his Comment dated May 12, 2003, the petitioner avers that when he filed his petition to take the 2001 bar exams,
the criminal case for usurpation of authority or official function was the only pending case against him at the time.He
did not mention I.S.B.C. Case Nos. 99-6735 and 6736 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in his petition because he was of
the honest belief that it was no longer necessary for him to do so, considering that the cases had long been settled and
dismissed without even reaching the arraignment stage.[7]cralaw The said criminal cases apparently stemmed from the
debts of some 50 fish vendors at Magsungay Village.The petitioner's father, as the punong barangay, had guaranteed
the same in order to help the fishermen.But as the drawer of the two checks, the complainant filed the action against
the petitioner when the debts remained unpaid.

As regards the civil cases, the petitioner avers that the same stemmed from salary loans that he, along with
other barangay officials and employees, obtained from Fil-Global Credit and Asset Management Inc. and SWIP
Lending Corporation on January 13, 2000 and August 22, 2000, respectively, when he was Barangay SK
Chairman.The barangay treasurer regularly deducted from his salary the payment for the said loans until such time
when he completed the payment to Fil-Global on January 31, 2001 and for SWIUP Lending on April 30,
2001.The barangay treasurer thereafter issued a certification of complete payment.[8]cralaw When the petitioner came
back to Bacolod after the bar exams, he was surprised to learn that their barangay officials and employees were facing
cases for sum of money filed by Fil-Global and SWIP Lending because apparently, their payments were not duly
remitted.He received summons only on October 22, 2001 and April 4, 2002 from the MTCC, Bacolod City.The
finance officer and the treasurer promised to settle everything, but they failed to do so until their term expired
on August 15, 2002.After the decision was rendered by the MTCC, the petitioner paid the plaintiffs in the said cases,
as evidenced by official receipt nos. 8169[9]cralaw and 9019[10]cralaw issued by Fil-Global and SWIP Lending
respectively datedMay 7, 2003.Thereafter, an order of satisfaction of judgment[11]cralaw was correspondingly issued
by the court in civil cases 26837[12]cralaw and 27447.[13]cralaw

Anent the IBP incident, the petitioner stated that an invitation[14]cralaw was sent to him by the IBP Negros Occidental
Chapter to attend the testimonial dinner and the annual judicial excellence awarding ceremonies, but that there was
no mention of any induction ceremony.Considering the he in fact successfully passed the bar examinations and was
being recognized therefore he was inspired to attend the occasion.He admitted that during the occasion, all those who
just passed the bar exams were called for the induction of new members, and that he was left with no choice but to
join the others onstage when his name was called.However, the petitioner did not intend to deceive or to keep the IBP
in the dark, as he in fact informed them of his status.To prove the absence of malice on his part, he did not sign any
document that night.

The petitioner also stated that after some verification as to the identity of the complainant in the Letter-complaint
dated August 22, 2002, he found out that Benjie Montinola awas a non-existing person who cannot claim to be a
"guardian of proper civi[c] responsibility" considering that he is not even a registered voter of Bacolod City and that
he could not be located in the address given, as indicated in a Certification issued by the Commission on Elections,
Bacolod City[15]cralaw and the Office of the Barangay Council of Barangay Singcang Airport.[16]cralaw

Regarding the use of the appellation "Atty.", The petitioner admitted writing the same in the attendance sheet in a
committee hearing of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Bacolod City.He reasoned that he was of the notion that a bar
passer can be called "Attorney," and that what is only prohibited is to practice law, such as appearing in court and
notarizing docunments without the requisite oath-taking before the Supreme Court and signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.

The petitioner averred that the complainant in this case, Ms. Matus Espinosa, had in fact executed an affidavit of
desistance[17]cralaw to attest that there was indeed no misrepresentation on his part.

The petitioner manifested his sincere apology to the Court for any mistake he may have committed.

On May 22, 2003, the OBC made the following recommendation:

Considering that there is no more pending civil, criminal or administrative cases against herein petitioner, he may now
be admitted as a member of the Bar.

Foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that Mr. CAESAR Z. DISTRITO be now allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees.[18]cralaw

There are thus three important matters raised before this Court, the determination of which would materially affect
the fate of the present petition:
First.The petitioner's non-disclosure of a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 and of two other civil cases filed against
him, albeit already dismissed at the time of the filing of his petition to take the 2001 bar examinations.
Second.The petitioner's attendance and participation in an IBP testimonial dinner for new lawyers, when he had not
yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor signed in the Roll of Attorneys.

Third.The petitioner's admitted use of the appellation "Atty." When he had no authority to do so as yet.
The Court sees fit to discuss each one, to serve as reminder to law students and prospective applicants to the bar.

The petitioner's non-disclosure of a

Criminal case for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and two other civil cases filed
against him, albeit already dismissed
at the time of the filing of his petition
to take the 2001 bar examinations.

The petitioner insists that he had not read any requirement in the petition to include cases that had already been
dismissed.[19]cralaw This, the Court cannot quite fathom.As stated by Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Ma.
Cristina B. Layusa:[20]cralaw

The petitioner's contention is quite hard to accept.In the ready-made petition form to take the Bar Examination, the
following is written clearly:

"Note: Indicate any pending or dismissed civil, criminal or administrative case against you and attach pertinent
documents:____________________________."

If petitioner had not read the notation, as what he claimed, why did he disclose his pending case for Usurpation of
authority or Official Function.Moreover, the said instruction is written in the middle of the form, so if petitioner had
not really read the same, he was not mindful of what he was doing which should not be the case of a Bar applicant.
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the requirements for all applicants for admission to
the bar, to wit:

Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Whether or not the petitioner shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of
the Court.An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, fit and proper to practice
law.[21]cralaw The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it.Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.[22]cralaw

It has been held that moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known.Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.The standard of personal
and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of
criminal law.Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[23]cralaw

Admittedly, the petitioner was less than honest when he failed to disclose the two other cases for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and the civil cases involving sums of money which were filed against him, in his petition to take the bar
examinations.He should have known that the said petitionis not to be taken lightly as it is made under oath.The
petitioner, in so doing, violated Rule 7.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[24]cralaw which requires of every
applicant candor and truthfulness.Every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any
criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine the applicant's
moral character.[25]cralaw The petitioner should have realized the implication of any omission on his part, even if
inadvertently made.

In the case of People v. Tuanda,[26]cralaw the Court held that "violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense
which deleteriously affects public interest and public order," and considered the same an offense involving moral
turpitude.The erring lawyer was consequently suspended from the practice of law.

In this case, the fact that the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 did not even reach the arraignment stage
is of no moment; it was the petitioner's duty to disclose the same as it was a material fact which could affect his
application for admission to the bar.

It has also been held that an applicant for the admission to the bar who made a false statement in his application is not
of good moral character.[27]cralaw The concealment or withholding from the court of the fact that an applicant has
been charged with or indicated for an alleged crime is a ground for disqualification of the applicant to take the bar
examination, or for revocation of the license to practice, if he has already been admitted to the bar.If what the applicant
concealed is a crime which does not involve moral turpitude, it is the fact of concealment and not the commission of
the crime itself that makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer.It should be noted that the application was made
under oath, which he lightly took when he made the concealment.[28]cralaw

The petitioner's attendance and

participation in an IBP testimonial
dinner for new lawyers, when he had
not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor
signed in the Roll of Attorneys.

As to the IBP incident, the petitioner claims that he though the occasion was just a plain and simple testimonial dinner
for successful bar examinees that included an awarding ceremony for judges.It was only later when he discovered that
the program was actually a testimonial for new lawyers.[29]cralaw However, a perusal of the invitation[30]cralaw sent
by the IBP to the petitioner reveals that there was an express mention that the affair was for new lawyers, to wit:

Dear Atty. Distrito:

The IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter will hold its Chapter's Judicial Award of Excellence to Outstanding
Judges and Proscutors and Testimonial Dinner for new lawyers on June 28, 2002, 7:00 P.M., at the Ballroom-
A, Business Inn, Lacson Street, Bacolod City.
In behalf of the Officers and members of the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter, I am inviting you to attend said
after being one of the new members of the Bar.Please come in formal attire.
Your presence on this occasion will be highly appreciated.

The Court can only conclude that the petitioner did not take his petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys seriously.He would have us believe that he attended an affair, believing in good faith that it was
meant for those who recently passed the bar, when the invitation he himself attached to his petition states
otherwise.The petitioner's forthrightness and candor with the Court leave much to be desired.

The petitioner's admitted use of the

Appellation "Atty." When he had no
Authority to do so as yet.

The petitioner's erroneous belief that a person who passed the bar examinations may allow himself to be called an
attorney should be corrected.An applicant who has passed the required examination or has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of
office.[31]cralaw The Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of
the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such
record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificates shall be his authority to practice.[32]cralaw The clerk
of the Supreme Court shall keep a Roll of Attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person
admitted when he receives his certificate..[33]cralaw
The Oath is thus a prerequisite to the admission to the practice of law, while the signing in the Roll is the last act that
finally signifies membership in the bar, giving the applicant the right to call himself "attorney".Continued membership
in the IBP and regular payment of membership dues and other lawful assessments that it may levy are conditions sine
qua non to the privilege to practice law and to the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[34]cralaw

The unauthorized use of the said appellation may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.[35]cralawThe
Court may deny the applicant's petition to take the Lawyer's Oath for grave misconduct, such as calling himself and
"attorney" and appearing as counsel for clients in courts even before being admitted to the bar.[36]cralaw Although the
evidence in this case does not include that the petitioner actually engaged in the practice of law, the fact is that he
signed in an attendance sheet as "Atty. Caesar Distrito."He called himself "attorney" knowing fully well that he was
not yet admitted to the bar.[37]cralaw

Thus, we disagree with the findings of the OBC, and find that the petitioner is unfit to become a member of the bar.The
petitioner must show this Court that he has satisfied the moral requirements before he can be admitted to the practice
of law.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO to be allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine
Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby DENIED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court

[B.M. No. 887.August 21, 2001]

IN THE MATTER OF ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW et al.

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 21 2001.
B.M. No. 887(In the matter of Admission to Practice Law of Henry R. Onia, 1998 Bar Examinations passer, spouses
Agripino and Francisa de Vera vs. Henry R. Onia.)

Respondent Henry Rada Onia took and passed the 1998 Bar examinations. After the release of the results of the said
examinations, or on April 16, 1999, a complaint was filed by the Spouses Agripino and Francisca de Vera against the
respondent averring that the latter does not possess the moral qualification expected from a member of the Bar. They,
thus, prayed that respondent be forever barred from becoming a lawyer. Considering that at that time, respondent was
already issued a clearance to take the oath as lawyer together with the other successful examinees, the Court in a
Resolution dated May 3, 1999 allowed respondent to proceed with his oathtaking but ordered the deferment of his
signing of the Roll until the resolution of the instant complaint.

In the complaint dated April 15, 1999, the Spouses de Vera charged respondent with usurpation of authority and
falsification relative to the ejectment case filed against them by Hildergarda Rada-Onia and Laurenlino Rada,
respondent's mother and uncle, respectively, with the Municipal Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan. The plaintiffs
were represented by the law firm, Casino, Creencia and Baldovino Law Offices through Atty. Manuel Pagdanganan
Casino, with office address at 910 San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila. During the pre-trial conference of the case,
respondent appeared as counsel of the plaintiffs when he has not yet passed the bar examinations at that time; and
categorically stated that he is a member of the law firm which was allegedly fictitious and non-existent. Upon
verification of the address given, complainants' found out that the same was the address of respondent's boarding
house in Manila. Complainants further alleged that in some of the pleadings filed in court in the civil case, Atty.
Manuel P. Casino used IBP No. 658724, when the IBP number issued to him for that year was IBP No. 417185.
Complainants concluded that the falsehood and falsification were done with the help and control of respondent.

In the Resolution dated May 18, 1999, the Court En Banc referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
for investigation, report and recommendation. Accordingly, hearings were conducted on June 14, July 17 and 18,
September 6 and 7, 2000. The complainants presented four (4) witnesses: Angelina Mendoza, Jose Luis, Agripino de
Vera and Julius De Vera. Exhibits "A" to "H" were presented as documentary evidence but were, however, not
formally offered. The respondent, on the other hand, testified on his own behalf and presented his mother, Hildegarda
Rada-Onia, as his other witness. Documentary evidence consisting of Exhibits "1" to "19" were also presented and
formally offered, which were not opposed by the complainants.

Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the Office of the Bar Confidant submitted its report and findings, as follows:

Sometime in 1996, Laurentino C. Rada and Hildegarda C. Rada-Onia (plaintiffs), uncle and mother, respectively, of
herein respondent, filed a complaint for ejectment against herein complainants, spouses Agripino and Francisca De
Vera, with the Municipal Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan. Representing the plaintiffs in the said case was the
Casino Creencia and Baldovino Law Offices, through Atty. Manuel Pagdanganan Casino, with office address at 910
San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila. During the pre-trial conference of the case, however, it was respondent who
appeared as counsel for the plaintiffs. Herein complainants, through their counsel, objected to the said appearance of
respondent, as he had not yet passed the Bar examination, let alone admitted tq the Philippine Bar. The trial court
required respondent to submit a legal justification for his appearance as counsel. Respondent cited Sec. 34, Rule l38
of the Rules of Court in support of his claim that he was eligible to appear as counsel before the trial court. In its Order
of October 11, 1996, the trial court found the legal justification of respondent to be insufficient. It thereby denied the
motion of respondent to appear as counsel. With the said order, respondent ceased to appear as counsel for the
plaintiffs. It was, however, the contention of complainants that respondent continued to handle the case for the
plaintiffs by resorting to falsification. The falsification allegedly consisted of forging the signature of Atty. Casino.
The said forgery allegedly became more manifest when the IBP number used in the pleadings submitted in connection
with the said case did not match the IBP number actually issued to Atty. Casino by the IBP, Tarlac Chapter, of which
Atty. Casino is a member.

The complaint must be dismissed.

Respondent cannot be held liable for usurpation of authority or misrepresentation by appearing as counsel for the
plaintiffs in the Civil Case No. 1674. Nothing in the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, which complainants
presented show that respondent held himself out as a lawyer. The most that they could show to substantiate their
accusation of usurpation of authority or misrepresentation against respondent was the latter's appearance during the
pre-trial conference of the said case, where he declared himself to be the counsel for the plaintiffs. Such appearance,
however, was not completed, as complainants, through their lawyer, questioned the same considering that respondent
has not yet been admitted to the Philippine Bar at the time. Respondent explained that he made the said appearance in
the honest belief that he could do so pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The OBC is inclined to give
respondent the benefit of the doubt. Respondent is no stranger to the plaintiffs in the case, they being his mother and
uncle. Hence, as a law student, he took it upon himself to assist them in the litigation. The same is not devoid of any
basis, though, as the said provision under the Rules of Court allows a more educated or capable person to appear in
behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer before municipal courts in relatively simple litigation. Besides, there was
no evidence presented by complainants showing that respondent further appeared as counsel for the plaintiffs before
the trial court or any other courts after the trial court issued an order disallowing his appearance as counsel.

On the alleged falsification being imputed to respondent, complainants again failed to present any convincing evidence
that respondent ever perpetrated the said offense. True, complainants were able to show that the IBP number appearing
in the pleadings purportedly filed by Atty. Casino does not match the actual IBP number issued to him in the year the
said pleadings were filed. Complainants, however, did not present any evidence, which would clearly show that
respondent was responsible for the forgery. At best, their allegation that it was respondent who did the falsification
was speculative. Neither can the similar address of the Casino Creencia and Baldovino Law Offices and that of
respondent be used as a basis to hold the latter liable for falsification. In the course of the investigation, complainants
and respondent stipulated that the said law firm used as its office the residence of respondent at 910 San Diego St.,
Sampaloc, Manila. This belies their claim that the said law office is non-existent and fictitious.
In fine, complainant failed to prove that respondent is morally unfit to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. Even
assuming, however, that the appearance as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1674 during the pre-trial
conference may be considered as unethical or inappropriate, the period (almost two years now) that he has been
deprived to practice law is enough punishment therefor.

As the sixty-day period within which those who took the lawyer's oath on May 4, 1999, including respondent, must
sign the Roll of Attorneys had already elapsed, it is necessary that respondent must take the lawyer's oath anew before
he signs the Roll of Attorneys.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that Henry R. Onia be now allowed to take the lawyer's
oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 1 Bongalonta v. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310
(1995).And one of these requirements which is given importance, far greater than the acquisition of knowledge and
proficiency in law is the possession of good moral character. It is said that all aspects of moral character and behavior
may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. 2 In Re: Al C. Argosino, 246 SCRA 14
(1995).The charges hailed against the respondent, if really true, certainly undermine his qualification for admission
and is a ground for refusal to admit him to the bar. However, the circumstances of the case readily show that there is
no sufficient basis for the Court to deprive the respondent this privilege to practice the profession which he had worked
hard for.
The alleged deception of the respondent is belied by the records which clearly disclose that he never concealed the
fact that lie was not yet a lawyer when he appeared during the pre-trial conference in the ejectment case. His
appearance as a non-lawyer representative or agent of his mother and uncle in said case was, in fact, questioned and
put to issue before the municipal trial court. In the Order dated October 11, 1996, the municipal judge found the legal
justification for his appearance as counsel of the parties insufficient and thus, denied respondent's manifestation and
motion to appear as counsel. The order reads as follows:
ORDER

Pending before this court for resolution is the legal justification filed by counsel for the plaintiffs on September 16,
1996 in compliance with the Order of this court dated August 29, 1996, who not being a member of the bar, was
required to submit legal justification for his appearance as counsel for the plaintiffs.
Said counsel again filed a Manifestation and Motion dated September 26, 1996 praying that he may be allowed by
this court to submit some proceedings in connection with this case before his qualification to appear as counsel is
finally resolved by this court.

The justification relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiffs is the provision of Section 34, Rule 138 and Section 1,
Rule 138A of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 34, Rule 138, said law provides that a party may conduct litigation in person, with the aid of an agent
or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.

Section 1, Rule 138A provides for a law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular four-
year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved
by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil criminal and administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Finding that the said counsel for the plaintiffs does not qualify to appear as counsel pursuant to the above-mentioned
provisions of law, this Court finds his legal justification to be insufficient.

Accordingly, the Manifestation and Motion dated September 26, 1996 should also be denied as a consequence of his
failure to qualify as counsel for the plaintiffs in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the counsel for the plaintiffs is hereby denied by this Court to appear as counsel
in the aforementioned case and his Manifestation and Motion dated September 26, 1996 is hereby also ordered denied.

SO ORDERED. 3 Exhibit "3."

While we may not fully agree with the trial court's ruling on the matter and despite respondent's honest belief that
there was no prohibition for him to appear as such pursuant to Rule 138, Section 34, suffice it to say, that respondent
showed his adherence to the orders of the trial court and thereby, ceased to appear as counsel for his relatives. Such
alleged infraction may even be mitigated by the fact that the parties which respondent represented in the ejectment
case are no strangers to him, as they are his mother and uncle. It is quite understandable that after being sent to law
school and finally, passed the bar examinations, respondent was expected to assist his family members in litigation.
His appearance is not without basis as the rule explicitly provides that:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conduction. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

We also note that the instant complaint is the only instance where respondent's appearance in court was questioned.
There is no evidence to show that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law by holding himself out as a
lawyer when he is not yet a member of the bar 4 See Tan vs. Sabandal, 126 SCRA 60 (1983).or continued to appear
as counsel in the ejectment case.

With respect to the other charges of falsification, we agree that the evidence presented is not sufficient to substantiate
the charges leveled against the respondent.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the complaint; respondent Henry R. Onia is allowed to take the
lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

Very truly yours,

LUZMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;

ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972,
popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in
order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."
(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations
held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed
and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947,
70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling
conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who
obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in
1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations
to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that
request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly
thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371,
embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their
unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature.
The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the
Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after
July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-
one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or
more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after
July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade
or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked
the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted
to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all
concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by
this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision
as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified
as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for
admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These
candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of
them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest
marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have
filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar
motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as
has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of
the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have
amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies
of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the
validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique
M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales,
and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de
Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has
greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American
jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal,
and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place
it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the
proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the
years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and
the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in
addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading
materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the
aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely
more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession
is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately
prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover,
the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant
materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years
and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had
been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945.
Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new
set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of
new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution
of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from the
jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been
directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and
which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a
century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law
had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of
Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061),
of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed
law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable
precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision
of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the
provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any elective office
except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any
power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and
who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the
courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with the judges,
and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the
manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon
admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and
the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution,
evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence
in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is
right in the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the
admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily
implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite
qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a
diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the
legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however
quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said
of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established reputation,
and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students in which department were not only
subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study
before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements,
to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of
preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of
substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no other
object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed
entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever
to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students
before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the
college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone
it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
 xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has simply prescribed
what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please
note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations
be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over
the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of
admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by
this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial,
and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be
revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and
conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which
the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed.
From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English speaking people so
far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature
to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at
law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the
prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its
constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate
legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or
exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of
the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme
and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice is
maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the
judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir the
manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The
quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar
may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute.
(p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking
countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution,
the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of
determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6
Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an
entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may
be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or
an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity
and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute
its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional
power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought
of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and independent of
one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the
legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions.
While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general
and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications
required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only
a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications
do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to
compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law.
(p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature
may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are
well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states,
except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex
parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall.
53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119
N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so
generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt
as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems
clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to
determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that State,
180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of
sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to
the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected
from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz,
C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in
the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He
becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such
attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has
been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an
attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as
are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a
decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department
conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent
power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice
in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law
courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney
and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by
virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be
unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as
such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always
been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact
of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years
preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the
statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair.
The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys
and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become
officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior,
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity
to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial
power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of
appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and
Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to
proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the
latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial
functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function,
and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the
exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court. — A.C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission
to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of
the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of the
legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the
legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the government.
— 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of the law
according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them
to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress
of a judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is
not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may
be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case
with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this
Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and
shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are
hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and
modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines,
Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning
the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue
to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter
and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the
exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend,
disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is
limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a
better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to
admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the
respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the
admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues,
culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill
up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient
administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as
the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that
is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is
realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a few points
to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of
Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña
and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without
taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of
Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as
follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of
the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter,
shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the
Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the
position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the
Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of
Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed
to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court
and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed
examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71
per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the
required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in
the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the
law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to
practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted
to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by
satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged
that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment
to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted
as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates
without examination. It is contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect
to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act
No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of
Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving
the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress
prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular
emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute have been
considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of
the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been
practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had been
practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it
further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for
admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the
office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and
ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be
denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary grade
to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office
of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance
of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission,
sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would
be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination
prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which
will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires
so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-
49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to
fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of
being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year,
to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied
for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would
pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the
aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class
legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued
to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled "An
act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved
March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the
addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the
supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either
in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent
changes in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court
shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly
organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance
by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso
is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in
the aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a
satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right
to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges
upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the constitution,
and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the
administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as
conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law,
persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that
purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes,
and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while
attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and
has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for
different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35
N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for classification
(Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and practiced his
profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void
(State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of
fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning, character,
or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law
prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any
law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in
a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in
the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of
time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as
between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school,
but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient.
Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere
date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law
November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes
named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three
years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed
of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of
study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such
classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested.
The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate
Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and
definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as attorneys at law, that power
can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will
apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications
of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121,
9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any
lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons
of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources
of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it
is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great
value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can
be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications
to establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to
practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations
of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of
infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex
rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to constitute him an
officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once established his
right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that
right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual
upon whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law
without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States during the World War and
received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of
Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least
ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that
it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178
Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon material
differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial
distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and
real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one
class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other
individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there
must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation
and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and
privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is
made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general
average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and
those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average
of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification
is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were not
included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify
the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither
is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has
no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his
right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is
curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949
were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general
average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or
more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was
considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed
to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be objected
to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did
not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly,
it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per
cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it
is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the
effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general
average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said
law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or
judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter
or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not
included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This
power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of
this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate
finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations
of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the
article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes
a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which
vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect
the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of
Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or
forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its
basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore,
void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who,
it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years.
It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they
are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary
to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates,
without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may
reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them.
In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on
admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent
to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these
rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to
the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a
worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render
the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which
are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The
pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins,
and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955,
said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of
the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and
after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced
their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted
and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all
of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent
to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity
with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952
inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per
cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they
have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set.
So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

xxx xxx xxx

they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration which were
denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without invoking said law, which are still pending,
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in previous examinations,
showing the years in which they took the examinations together with their grades and averages, and those who had
filed motions for reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions for
reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those candidates
separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic act,
is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

xxx xxx xxx

 PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

xxx xxx xxx

There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who
have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar examination
of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the
prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused
the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9,
12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the
profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately
concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations successfully,
he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining
the average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land
Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10
per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent;
Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another
examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken
into account in determining their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the
candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having
already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per
cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who
has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the
Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even those
subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other government examination. The Rules of
Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has
previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this
Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from
making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:

The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains
70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need not be examined in said subject
in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three
subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for
the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing
them, by the time that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he
reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects
and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible
because there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in
succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no more that
three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years intervening between each examination
taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice
of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and
proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able
to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would
not hold true of the candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another
three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of requiring
a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and
satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the
practice of law.

xxx xxx xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any application
who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in
any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because
they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not
only prospective but retroactive in its effects.

We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in favor of reducing
the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to the validity of making
such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar
examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have
obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who
have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's
resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but
less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and
this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court
remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of
and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or
rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering
it void and of no effect.

Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the courts, including
the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person
fit, competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate
who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that
year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared,
ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the
passing general average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in
effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared,
undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as
its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal profession and
maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely a special class who have
failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.

Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing
below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does
specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar
examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in accordance with
the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would have the
effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to
obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would
be morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other
professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each
House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It
reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND
INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar
examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the
1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent
in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations;
and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered
as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July 4,
1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may
take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity to those who feel
themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the
bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The
Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary
fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase
in the general averages for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent;
for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent;
and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the
candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent
passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation
has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who
took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available
reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well as the
administration of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would admit to the practice of
law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered the bill a class legislation. This contention,
however, is not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have
already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed
the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot
or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights
already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or
in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.

If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute which Congress has
the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against class legislation, is very expressed in the
following American Jurisprudence:

A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a common disability, attribute,
or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation between those included in the class and
those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the
dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs.
Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for by new
laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike.
Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The
constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with
which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form. . . . The
problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers.
Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)

This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the care of correction only
as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked the
comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with respect
to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12
passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the
Assistant Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which
it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No.
974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill
were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.
[BM No. 1099. January 21, 2003]
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

Gentleman:

Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Bane dated JAN 21 2003.
Bar Matter No. 1099. (IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN THE. ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS (RANDY P. BARENG, Petitioner).)

Before us is the Petition of Randy P. Bareng, Clerk III in Branch 4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MTC),
to take his oath as a member of the . Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

The antecedent facts of this case are:

Among the cases raffled to the MTC were People of the Philippines vs. Nympha Isaac, Criminal Cases Nos. 322928-
322948 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The Court set the trial on October 25, November 4, and 22, 1999,
at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. During the October 25, 1999 hearing, Nympha Isaac, the accused in said case, failed
to appear without any justifiable reason, prompting the public prosecutor "to move: (a) for the cancellation of the bail
bond of the accused; (b) for the arrest of the accused; and (c) for the MTC to proceed with the trial in absentia. The
MTC. granted the motion over .the objection of the private prosecutor.1

On November 4, 1999, the next scheduled date of hearing in the. aforementioned criminal -cases, Atty. Arnold F.
Españo, the private prosecutor, and the private complainant arrived at the MTC to attend said hearing. The lawyer
checked the court's calendar for the day and was surprised to learn that Criminal Cases Nos. 322928-322948 were not
included. The accused was in the courtroom. Atty. Españo then inquired from petitioner why Criminal Cases Nos.
322928-322948 were not calendared for the day when the same were previously scheduled for the said day. He also
asked if the hearing for the day was .cancelled and if so, why was he not notified of such cancellation. Petitioner
replied "May warrant of arrest, di ba pina-aaresto mo kaya hindi sine-set for trial yan." Atty. Españo retorted that in
the previous hearing, the prosecution already moved for trial in absentia and the court ruled that trial should proceed
on said date [November 4], as scheduled. Petitioner answered back "Wala kaming hearing rig criminal
cases ngayon dahil Thursday." Atty. Espano responded "Kayo ang nag-set nito." Petitioner quipped back "Abogado
ka, eh hindi mo pala alam ang ginagawa mo, eh ikaw ang abogado at hindi mo pala alam dng ginagawa mo eh ako,
clerk ako dito, ikaw, abogado, hindi mo pala alam ang ginagawa mo" Irked by petitioner's reply, Atty. Espano
shouted "Masyadong matalas and dila mo ha, ang tinatanong ko bakit hindi naka-set for trial at bakit hindi ako
inabiso at huwag mong sasabihin na di ko alam ang ginagawa ko!" Atty. Españo started walking. Out of the
courtroom, while his client, still inside the courtroom, heard Annie Grace A. Arreola, the Clerk of Court of the MTC,
say: "Masyadong high blood ang lawyer mo, ang lalakas n'yo magpa-aresto eh hindi pala
ninyo a/am ang,ginagawa n'yo."2

On November 15, 1999, Atty. Españo filed, with the Office of the Court Administrator, an administrative complaint
against Judge Leonardo P. Reyes, Annie Grace A. Arreola and petitioner for unilaterally canceling a previously
scheduled trial date for Criminal Cases Nos. 322928-322948 and for disrespectful remarks. The complaint was
docketed as OCA-IPI-No. 99-820-MTJ.

In the interim, petitioner took the Bar Examinations on September 2, 9, 16 and 23, 2001. Petitioner was one of the
successful examinees therein. However, due to the pendency of the aforementioned administrative complaint filed
against him, he was not allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On March 6, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a report with the following recommendation:

"4.That respondent Randy P. Bareng, Clerk III, same court, be likewise found GUILTY of Discourtesy in the Course
of Official Duties -and that he be REPRIMANDED therefor with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely."3
Upon the Court Administrator's recommendation, the administrative case was docketed as em>Arnold F. Españo vs.
Annie Grace A. Arreola, et a/., A.M. No. P-00-1385. Thereafter, a formal investigation ensued.

On April 04, 2002 the Office of the Bar Confidant received a Letter-Petition from petitioner requesting that he be
allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On April 23, 2002, this Court issued a Resolution holding in abeyance the oath taking of petitioner pending the
resolution of the administrative charge against him.

On October 21, 2002, a Resolution was issued in A.M. No. P-00-1385 reprimanding Annie Grace A. Arreola and
petitioner for inefficiency and conduct unbecoming, of a court personnel with a stern warning that the commission of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.4

On November 11, 2002, petitioner filed a Manifestation and/or Compliance renewing his request that he be allowed
to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys. Petitioner averred that he has "already ingrained in his heart
the mandate of the Lawyer's Oath and the Canon of Professional Ethics as well."

On November 19, 2002, the Court issued a Resolution referring the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
On December 10, 2002, the Bar Confidant submitted a Report recommending that petitioner be allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees.

The Court finds merit in the petition.

In her Report where she recommended that the petition be granted, the Bar Confidant stated that:
"As found by the Court, petitioner is guilty of inefficiency and conduct unbecoming of a court, personnel. As such,
the Court resolved to reprimand petitioner with a stern .warning that the commission of similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.

This petition to take the Lawyer's Oath requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing petitioner's admission to
the noble profession of law. The 'inefficiency' of petitioner and his disrespectful utterances towards a lawyer while in
court are conduct unbecoming of a would-be lawyer. However, petitioner should be given a chance considering that
the Court had already reprimanded and warned him. Moreover, the almost one year deprivation of the privilege to
practice law would be considered-enough penalty for petitioner's misconduct."5

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the Bar Confidant. However, it must be stressed that the practice of law
is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character.6 In "In Re: Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., 285 SCRA 5.9 [1998]" the Court
held that insofar as the general; public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, the requirement of good
moral character is, in fact, of greater importance than the possession .of legal learning; thus all aspects of moral
character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the bar. Even as petitioner is
allowed to take his oath as a lawyer, he must take heed of and pay obeisance to the caveat that:

"x x x a lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. As a would be
member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, exacted
from him are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility. To achieve such end, he needs to
strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession. He shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues. He shall not use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper."7

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Randy P. Bareng is allowed to
take the Lawyer's Oath and sign, the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of
appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to the Petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Very truly yours,

LUZVlMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
[B.M. No. 890.April 2, 2002]
RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH, GINGOYON

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 2 2002.
B.M. No. 890(Re: Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon.)

On August 4, 1998, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant his petition to take
the 1998 Bar Examinations.In said petition, he stated that "he has been charged with the crime of Grave Threats
(Criminal Case No. 9693) now already submitted for decision" in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Mandaue City,
Branch 3.Apparently, when petitioner filed a similar petition with the Office of the Bar Confidant in 1994, he had
already submitted all pertinent documents relevant to the criminal case so he was no longer required to submit the
same in 1998, relying mainly on his allegation that the case was still pending.
On September 1, 1998, the Court allowed Victor Rey T. Gingoyon to take the bar examinations subject to the condition
that should he pass the examinations, he shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath until he is cleared of the charge
against him.Victor Rey T. Gingoyon passed the bar.
On April 21, 1999, he filed a petition with the Court praying that he be allowed to take the Layer's Oath scheduled on
May 4, 1999 at the PICC together with the other successful examinees.Attached to his petition were duly authenticated
copies of the Decision dated April 8, 1998 of the Municipal Trial Court, Mandaue City, Branch 3, convicting the
petitioner of the crime of Grave Threats.The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, Decision is hereby rendered finding accused, Victor Rey Gingoyon, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt
of the crime of Grave Threats, and the Court sentences said accused the penalty of arresto mayor medium which is an
imprisonment of Two (2) months and One (1) day and to pay a fine of Pesos: Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and the
civil liability of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as reimbursement for attorney's fees and litigation expenses.Failure
on his part to pay said fine, he shall be subjected to a subsidiary imprisonment equivalent to P8.00 per day.

SO ORDERED.

Mandaue City, Philippines, April 8, 1998.

Likewise, petitioner submitted to the Court the Order of the trial court dated December 2, 1998, granting his
application for probation; and several certifications of Good Moral Character issued by responsible members of his
community.

On May 6, 1999, the Office of the Bar Confidant received a sworn letter-complaint from the Spouses Andres and
Avelina Taran, the private complainants in Criminal Case No. 9693.They alleged that they were the next door
neighbors of petitioner and his family at Cabancalan, Mandaue.The complainants, with their ailing mother and
children have become constant victims of petitioner's threats, harassment and stoning.Because of petitioner's
oppressive acts, they were eventually forced to sell their land, leave the neighborhood and live far away from the
petitioner in order to avoid his regular shooting, stoning and harassment.They pray that petitioner be prevented from
taking his oath as member of the Philippine Bar considering that he does not possess the good moral character required
from a member of the Bar, owing to his criminal conviction for grave threats.

In a Third Motion for Early Resolution filed with the Court on December 28, 1999, petitioner reiterated his prayer that
he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath on the basis of the Order of the trial judge dated December 9, 1999 terminating
Criminal Case No. 9693 after having satisfactorily fulfilled all the terms and conditions of his probation.

The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation.In a Report dated June 23, 2000,
the OBC recommended the denial of the petition.The OBC significantly observed that the decision of the MTC was
dated April 8, 1998 which was clearly four (4) months before he filed his petition to take the bar in August, 1998.If
the criminal case was indeed promulgated on said date, petitioner committed perjury in falsely stating in his petition
that the criminal case filed against him was allegedly still pending.Moreover, petitioner's criminal conviction involves
moral turpitude, unfit for admission to the Bar.

In a Resolution dated July 25, 2000, the Court required the petitioner to present proof of promulgation of the judgment
against him.Pursuant to the resolution, petitioner filed a Certification issued and signed by Clerk of Court Salvacion
Acabodillo of the MTC, Mandaue City, Branch 3 stating that Criminal Case No. 9693 for Grave Threats against Victor
Rey T. Gingoyon was promulgated on August 10, 1998 at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

As to whether or not petitioner had actual notice of his conviction for grave threats prior to his filing of the petition to
take the bar examinations, his Eighth Motion for Early Resolution contained the following explanation:

A.The "Notice of Promulgation" of said case was Personally received by Eva Gingoyon-Abarca (sister of petitioner)
on 06 July 1998 and not by herein petitioner.Copy of her affidavit is attached as Annex "A".
B.Petitioner was made aware of the then scheduled promulgation sometime in the first week of August 1998 only
when he returned home in Cabancalan, Mandaue City from his boarding house in Cebu City (pls. See Annex A).

C.Further, petitioner is attaching herewith the last page of the decision of the above-mentioned case where his
signature appeared (Annex "B").It can be clearly determined that it obviously differs with that signature appearing in
the notice of promulgation (attached to Annex A).

D.If petitioner's memory is right (facts are on file at the Office of the Bar Confidant), he stated in his petition to take
the 1998 Bar Examinations mailed in the third or last week of July 1998, the following entries, among others appeared,
"pending case for Grave Threats at Branch 3, MTCC, Mandaue City."
E.Moreover, assuming for the seek (sic) of argument that petitioner was already aware of the scheduled promulgation
at the time he mailed his petition, he was telling the truth under the "Doctrine of Colorable Truthfor the word
"pending case" is all encompassing and, he did not know then of the decision.For it is a matter of fact and law that
parties in a criminal case would only be aware of its outcome DURING PROMULGATION and not before.

The foregoing allegations especially the fact that it was petitioner's sister who received the notice of promulgation of
judgment and not the petitioner himself was confirmed upon an inquiry made from Executive Judge Galicano C.
Arriesgado, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City.

Given these facts, it is safe to assume that petitioner did not yet have actual knowledge of the judgment against him,
which was promulgated on August 10, 1998 when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations on August 4,
1998.But the more important question is whether or not petitioner possesses the good moral character required for
admission to the bar considering his criminal conviction for grave threats.Undoubtedly, the crime is one involving
moral turpitude.

With the termination of the criminal case against him, petitioner wishes to impress upon the Court that he
now possesses the good moral character required for those seeking admission to the bar.To attest to his righteous and
religious character, petitioner submitted several certifications from responsible members of his community, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

He also submitted the order of discharge from his probation officer which states that he has complied with
all the terms and conditions of his probation without any infractions.In a span of two (2) years, petitioner has filed
eight (8) motions for early resolution asking the Court to accept him to this noble profession.

It must be understood that the practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be given
to everyone who demands it.It is a personal privilege granted to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired
into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.[1]cralaw Thus, the letter-complaint of the Spouses Taran
objecting to petitioner's oath-taking is validly noted considering that petitioner's violent temper for which he was
consequently convicted is certainly unbecoming of a would-be lawyer.

However, after a careful evaluation of the case, we are prepared to give petitioner the benefit of the doubt
that he is morally fit for admission to the bar.In a personal letter of appeal to the Court dated May 3, 2000, petitioner
appears to be sorry and remorseful for his reckless actuation which resulted to his criminal conviction.He prays to be
a full-fledged member of the bar in order to be of help to his septuagenarian parents.He promises "to be a productive
member of society, true to the tenets of the legal profession, of service to the country and God-fearing." It had been
two (2) years past since he first filed the petition to take the lawyer's oath.Hopefully, this period of time of being
deprived the privilege had been long enough for him to do some introspection.

Finally, it is important to stress to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited
for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of selected witnesses.Petitioner is exhorted
to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[2]cralaw
 ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to allow Victor Rey T. Gingoyon to take the lawyer's oath and to
sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees.Let this resolution be
attached to petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.(Puno and Vitug, JJ.,are abroad on official
business)
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D.
VILLARAMA
Acting Clerk of Court

B.M. No. 135 January 29, 1987

PETITION OF SOCORRO LADRERA, 1954 SUCCESSFUL BAR EXAMINEE TO TAKE THE
LAWYER'S OATH.

RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Socorro Ke. Ladrera passed the 1954 bar examinations. Before he could participate in the scheduled oath taking of
successful bar examinees, an administrative complaint for immorality was filed against him by Lucila C. Casas.

Lucila stated that she and Ladrera were married on May 23, 1944 and that when she married him he represented
himself to be single. Sometime in 1948, Lucila learned that her husband had been previously married on March 23,
1936 to Florencia Orticio by whom he had a child called Monserrat. Lucila filed a case for annulment of her marriage
to Ladrera on October 5, 1949. A decision was rendered on February 13, 1950 annulling the marriage and ordering
Ladrera to give P40.00 a month for the support of his three minor children with Lucila.

In 1951, Socorro Ladrera filed a civil case to declare his first wife, Florencia Orticio as presumptively dead, In a
November 24, 1951 decision, the Court of First Instance of Davao stated that Ladrera and Orticio were married on
March 23, 1936 in the Roman Catholic church of Capul, Samar. The couple had a daughter, Monserrat Ladrera, who
lived with the petitioner from birth up to the date of the decision. It appears that, while the couple were living in Cebu,
Florencia Orticio eloped with a certain Ramon E steban and left the conjugal home without the petitioner's knowledge.
Inspite of allegedly determined searches by the petitioner in Samar, Cebu, Bohol, and Manila, Florencia could not be
located or her whereabouts ascertained. The court therefore ruled "that the petition to declare Florencia Orticio
presumptively dead for all intents and purposes of law has satisfactorily been established."

Petitioner Ladrera had three children with his second wife, Lucila C. Casas.

Sometime after the judicial declaration that his first wife was presumptively dead, Ladrera married his third wife,
Socorro Santos by whom he has five children. After Ladrera married a third time, his first wife showed up and filed a
bigamy case against him with the Court of First Instance of Davao. According to the immorality complaint filed by
Lucila, the second wife, this bigamy case was later dismissed as a result of alleged monetary concessions which
Ladrera made in favor of Orticio. Incidentally, the latest information about Florencia Orticio is that she is quite well
off, having inherited properties from her parents and that she teaches Spanish at the University of Eastern Philippines
in Catarman, Samar.

On the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Ladrera, this Court suspended his oath taking and directed
him to file an answer to the complaint. In his Answer, Ladrera alleged that:

... [W]hen he married complainant, he honestly believed that his first wife, Florencia Orticio, was already dead; that
complainant in fact knew that respondent was previously married because respondent's child with Florencia Orticio
lived with respondent and complainant after the latter's marriage and until its annulment; that respondent has paid all
the monthly pensions to complainant's three minor children; that respondent later discovered that complainant's motive
in suing for annulment of her marriage to respondent was to get a share of the properties acquired by respondent, and
as a matter of fact, complainant has squandered and sold the properties adjudicated to her in Civil Case No. 470, and
the money realized from the sales was not used for the benefit of their children; that the value of the properties
adjudicated to the complainant in the case for liquidation of conjugal properties was approximately P37,000.00; that
respondent married Socorro Santos and still lives with her in view of the decision in Civil Case No. 501, dated
November 24, 1951, declaring respondent's first wife, Florencia Orticio presumptively dead; that respondent's
admission in Civil Case No. 399 for annulment of complainant's marriage, that Florencia Orticio was alive and residing
in Manila was made in good faith, he having then received information from his brother, Fr. Emerardo Ladrera, that
Florencia Orticio was in Manila; that subsequent search and inquiries, however, led the respondent to believe that
Florencia Orticio was not alive and this resulted in the filing by respondent of the petition in Civil Case No. 501,
praying that Florencia Orticio be declared presumptively dead; that Criminal Case No. 1863, against the respondent
for bigamy, was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Davao upon motion of the City Attorney of Davao; that
the mere filing of civil cases against respondent does not necessarily reflect immorality on his part, not to mention the
circumstances that said cases were settled or otherwise dismissed; that complainant's charges were motivated by hatred
and revenge, intended as a ruse to compel respondent to give to complainant another ten hectares of first class
agricultural land located in Monteverde, Calinan, Davao City, plus complainant's desire to put respondent down
politically.

The then Supreme Court Clerk of Court, Jose S. de la Cruz, was ordered to investigate the administrative charge and
to submit his report.

On August 31, 1955, de la Cruz submitted his Report, the salient portion of which reads:

It is noteworthy that the complainant had chosen not to testify in the investigation, and that by merely presenting
documentary evidence consisting of copies of the complaint for annulment of marriage in Civil Case No. 399; the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao in said case annulling the marriage between complainant and
respondent; the decision in Special Case No. 501 wherein the Court of First Instance of Davao declared respondent's
first wife, Florencia Orticio, presumptively dead; the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao in Criminal Case
No. 1863 against respondent for bigamy, dismissing said case, the complainant is basing her charges of immorality
against respondent upon the latter's bad faith arising from the fact that, while in the annulment proceedings respondent
and his attorney admitted that Florencia Orticio was alive, in Special Case No. 501 filed in 1951 by respondent, the
latter claimed that said Florencia Orticio could not be located and was unheard from for several years, and from the
fact that he married for the third time Socorro Santos while respondent's first wife was alive, and who, as a matter of
fact, filed a case for bigamy against respondent.

Upon the other hand, the respondent testified during the investigation and declared that he acted in good faith, first, in
marrying complainant; secondly, in instituting Special Case No. 501; and, thirdly, in marrying Socorro Santos. He
explained that when he married complainant in 1944, he honestly believed that his first wife, Florencia Orticio, was
already dead; that he had to admit in the annulment proceedings, Civil Case No. 399, that Florencia was alive because
of a letter he received from his brother, Fr. Ladrera; that he filed the subsequent Special Case No. 501 after suspecting
that complainant's purpose in annulling her marriage to respondent was merely to obtain her snare in the conjugal
properties, and in order also to establish definitely his civil status; and that he married his third wife, Socorro Santos,
after the decision in Special Case No. 501, declaring his first wife Florencia presumptively dead, had become final.

While the complainant's charges are based upon inferences or assumptions, the testimony of respondent is unrefuted
that he acted in good faith In the first place, the fact that no annulment proceeding was instituted by complainant until
after three children were born to her marriage with respondent, at least shows that Florencia Orticio was not generally
known to be alive. In the second place, the admission by respondent and his counsel in the annulment proceeding that
Florencia was alive, is explained by respondent's receipt of a letter from his brother, Fr. Ladrera, to the effect that she
might still be living, which at any rate was the very fact alleged in the complaint for annulment. In the third place,
respondent was constrained to file Special Case No. 501 because he subsequently realized that complainant annulled
her marriage to respondent mainly to get her share of their conjugal properties, and because he also wanted to
respondent settle his own civil status after failing to locate the whereabouts of his first wife, Florencia Orticio; and the
respondent undoubtedly had the right to look for Florencia after his marriage to complainant was judicially set aside
on the ground that Florencia was alive. It is very significant that no opposition whatsoever was interposed in Special
Case No. 501 either by complainant or by Florencia inspite of due publication of the proceedings; and the final decision
therein can be said to have legally paved the way for respondent's third marriage to Socorro Santos. As a matter of
fact, in the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissing the bigamy case against respondent, it was in
effect held that respondent married Socorro Santos without fraudulent intent, and said order had become final.

Complainant's allegation that respondent has failed to comply with his obligation to pay the monthly support of his
three children with complainant as ordered in the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao in Civil Case No.
399, is neither touched nor pressed in complainant's memorandum. At any rate, complainant may avail herself of any
appropriate civil remedy for the collection or enforcement (or even increase) of said support; and respondent has
presented evidence to show that he had complied with his obligation at least to the date of this investigation in March,
1955. The claim that respondent is immoral because of the filing against him of several civil cases, deserves no serious
consideration since, according to respondent's evidence, said cases, aside from having been dismissed or otherwise
settled, do not necessarily imply moral perversity.

WHEREFORE, it is recommended that respondent Socorro Ke. Ladrera be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

The favorable recommendation, notwithstanding, this Court, on September 7, 1955 issued a resolution disqualifying
Ladrera from taking the lawyer's oath, to wit:

Acting upon the complaint for immorality filed by Lucila Casas against Socorro Ke. Ladrera, 1954 successful bar
candidate; the answer filed by the latter; the evidence taken during the investigation; the report of the investigator; as
well as all the circumstances surrounding the case, the Court RESOLVED to disqualify respondent Socorro Ke.
Ladrera from taking the lawyer's oath
A motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution was denied in another resolution issued on October 11,
1955.

Up to now or more than thirty-one years after he passed the bar examinations, Ladrera has not been allowed to take
the lawyer's oath. All his motions to allow him to take the oath filed every year without fail beginning on May 23,
1956 up to September 7, 1982 have been denied. Before us, now is Ladrera's April 15, 1985 urgent motion, to wit:

NOW COMES your petitioner, by and for himself and unto tills Honorable Supreme Tribunal most respectfully stated:

That your petitioner has been deprived from taking his Lawyer's Oath as member of the Philippine Bar since January
20, 1955, because of a petition of Lucila C. Casas who has long ago withdrawn her complaint and has in fact attested
to the good reputation and character of the herein respondent;
That considering the time that has elapsed which is already more than thirty (30) years is more than sufficient
punishment, your respondent now prays this Honorable Tribunal to grant him the privilege to take the Lawyer's Oath
together with the new successful candidates scheduled to take their oath on April 25, 1985 at the Philippine Convention
Center, Manila.

On October 4, 1986, he wrote another letter, this time to the Court Administrator asking for the approval of his petition
of nearly 32 years.

An applicant for admission to the bar must be of good moral character. (Rule 138, Sec. 2). What constitutes good
moral character within the meaning of the rule has been elucidated in precedent cases.

In Carmen E. Bacarro v. Ruben M. Pinataca (127 SCRA 218), this Court cited various precedent cases and ruled:
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of good moral
character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of the legal
profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. (Martin, Ruperto G., "Legal & Judicial
Ethics," 5th ed., p. 15, citing In Re Parazo, 82 Phil 230) As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen. (Planza v. Archangel 21 SCRA 1, 4). He sets an example to his fellow
citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living. (Martin, supra, p. 36) Thus, becoming a
lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration
of becoming a member of the Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the power, jurisdiction and duty to
pass upon the qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for admission to the Bar, that he has measured
up to that rigid and Ideal standard of moral fitness required by his chosen vocation.

The Court, in the past, consistently denied the annual petitions of Ladrera that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
He claimed that when he married his second wife, he sincerely believed that his first wife was already dead. He married
his third wife only after the first wife had been declared presumptively dead and after his second marriage-e had been
annulled. There may have been compliance with a strict or narrow interpretation of the letter of the law but the Court
was of the view that Ladrera had failed to live up to the high moral standards required for membership in the Bar.

All of that, however, is in the past. Ladrera now states that if he has committed an act which justified the suspension
from taking the lawyer's oath, the time that has elapsed is more than sufficient punishment. He submits that "he humbly
believes with all candor and sincerity that he has more than atoned for it by living a very moral and exemplary life
since then."

Apart from his marital misadventures, there is nothing in the records to warrant a permanent denial of Ladreras
petition, He worked as a janitor-messenger in Cebu City while pursuing his college education at night. He has also
served in fairly important positions in the government such as Technical Assistant to President Ramon Magsaysay,
Special Assistant to President Carlos P. Garcia, and member and later Chairman of the Board of People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation. He has served as Treasurer of the Escolta Walking Corporation and Director of the Foreign
Affairs Association of the Philippines.

As early as 1960, then Senator Quintin Paredes endorsed Ladrera's petition stating that the latter was "honest,
dependable, and trustworthy" and followed this up with another endorsement in 1966.

In July 13, 1966, Lucila Casas filed a motion for the withdrawal or dismissal of her complaint. Casas stated as her
"considered opinion" that Ladrera has been sufficiently punished by the then 12-year suspension of his oathtaking as
a lawyer. Casas stated that her children by Ladrera — Teresita, graduating with AB and BSC degrees; Belen,
preparatory medicine student; and Socorro, Jr. an engineering student — were suffering from the stigma of the
punishment which arose from her complaint. Casas observed that Ladrera was "behaving well and leading an
exemplary life."

The records show various indorsements of good character from lawyers, a law professor in Davao City, a congressman,
and others. A priest, Fr. Emiliano Sabandal attested that Ladrera "is a man of high moral character, humble and
possessed with an innate religious quality; as a consequence thereof he is a daily communicant of the blessed
sacrament."

In the 32 years since Ladrera passed the bar examinations, he has supported and sent through college all his children
by the three women he married — a daughter by Florencia Orticio, three children by Lucila Casas, and five children
by Socorro Santos. Some of the children have joined their father in his many petitions asking for the privilege of taking
his lawyer's oath.

Ladrera was a guerrilla officer during World War II in Bohol and Mindanao. After the war, he was elected head of the
Davao War Veterans Association and led the veterans' movement to acquire some of the lands left by Japanese-owners.
He became a successful businessman in Davao, acquiring a gasoline station, three corn and rice mills, and a
transportation line called "Ladrera Overland Transit".
There was moral deliquency in Mr. Ladrera's younger days but he has made up for it by observing a respectable,
useful, and religious life since then. Thirty-two years of rejecting his petitions are enough for chastisement and
retribution. Considering that the respondent has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and demonstrated a
sincere willingness to make up for that moral lapse, the Court has decided to admit him to membership in the Philippine
bar.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION of Mr. Socorro Ke. Ladrera to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.