The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860

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Editorial

Corporate governance implications of disruptive technology:

An overview

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This position paper introduces the special issue on “Innovative Governance and Sustain-
Available online 12 October 2019 able Pathways in a Disruptive Environment”. The paper develops a framework to review
the state of the art in disruptive technology and innovations (DTIs). Then the paper reviews
Keywords: the common characteristics of DTIs, and their implications for the principles and design of
Corporate governance corporate governance and accounting mechanisms at the organisational level. Following
Disruptive technologies
on from that, the paper identifies the defining features of emergent DTI-related structural
Innovation
models that shape the demand for and changes to corporate governance and accounting
mechanisms. The contributions of the three papers in the special issue are discussed. The
paper concludes by proposing several research themes for future research on designing
more innovative and sustainable governance systems, drawing on multidisciplinary
theoretical and methodological perspectives. This complements calls for future research in
accounting in our special-issue papers.
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Introduction

A revolutionary paradigm shift is well under way on how we think about business structures and governance as a
consequence of disruptive technology and innovations (DTI). Technological advances such as artificial intelligence (AI), the
Internet of Things (IoT), and distributed ledger systems such as blockchains, have led to unprecedented changes, often dis-
rupting the way goods and services have traditionally been produced and consumed (Arnold, 2018; Christensen, Raynor, &
McDonald, 2015). The ability to handle large volumes of digitised data in rapid and complex ways through these technolo-
gies has also increased our dependency on more open, multi-platform, networked structures that enable other innovations,
e.g. shared economies and cryptocurrency markets (Luna, Kruchten, Pedrosa, de Almeida Neto, & de Moura, 2014; Termeer,
2009). Schwab (2016) characterises this as the “fourth industrial revolution”, predicting that it will lead to wholesale changes
in entire systems of production, management and governance. Danneels (2004, p. 249) highlights that a “disruptive tech-
nology is a technology that changes the bases of competition by changing the performance metrics along which firms
compete”. Consequently, for accounting, finance, management and other governance professionals, these developments
present extraordinary pressures for information and governance systems that call for more agile, complex and futuristic
approaches. In other words, it is imperative that organisations widen their knowledge boundaries about the risks and impacts
of DTI and be prepared to respond accordingly, or be destined to fail.
Past research, however, offers limited insights on the design of appropriate governance systems for organisations in
relation to DTI. In fact, the rapidly evolving and unpredictable nature of technological innovations are seen to collide with
more traditional approaches to governance which are predominantly hierarchical, i.e. top-down and less self-regulated (Gans,
2016; Turnbull, 1997). Research efforts so far appear to focus more on the emergence and management of disruptive tech-
nologies, with limited attention paid to the design and effectiveness of extant corporate governance and accounting

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2019.100860
0890-8389/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860

mechanisms. For example, in their review of 1,078 papers on disruption research, Hopp, Antons, Kaminski, and Salge (2018)
identify only ten papers relating to accounting and finance. Further, they also highlight that there is a distinct difference in the
papers dealing with radical and disruptive innovations compared with those calling for more research on organisational
capabilities for business-model transformations. Further insights on DTI governance systems are vital for effective and
efficient policy making by government, governance regulators and related institutions.
The overarching purpose of this special issue, entitled ‘Innovative Governance and Sustainable Pathways in a Disruptive
Environment’ is to identify and discuss emergent challenges arising from disruptive technologies and their social impacts for
organisational-level governance. The aims of our introduction to this special issue are three-fold:

1. To provide an overview of the characteristics common to DTIs, and their implications for the principles and design of
corporate governance and accounting mechanisms at the organisational level;
2. To identify the defining features of emergent DTI-related structural models that shape the demand for and changes to
corporate governance and accounting mechanisms; and
3. To propose several research themes for future research on designing more innovative and sustainable governance systems,
drawing on multidisciplinary theoretical and methodological perspectives.

Our discussion of the literature related to the governance of DTI is aided by a general framework comprising the un-
derlying characteristics of such technologies and innovations, components of governance eco-systems and anticipated
outcomes, as depicted in Fig. 1. We begin by giving an overview of the definition and characteristics of DTI, followed by a
description of several common types of DTI (namely, Big Data, cryptocurrency, Blockchain, the sharing economy and
crowdsourcing, including crowdfunding, and their implications for corporate governance and accountability, including in-
dependence and participation in decision-making. We also delineate several emergent or alternate forms of DTI (agile,
collaborative, decentralised, and distributed organisational forms) reflecting differing structural and capability dimensions.
We then discuss the implications for the (re)design of corporate governance and accounting mechanisms to meet the
changing demands. Further, we locate and discuss how the three papers in this special issue (Kuruppu & Lodhia, 2019; Leoni
& Parker, 2019; Moll & Yigitbasioglu, 2019) add insights on what works and does not work within evolving DTI governance
systems, and the continuing demands posed by highly dynamic, yet volatile environments.

2. Disruptive technology and innovation issues

In this section, we review DTI characteristics, followed by technological disruptive forces.

2.1. DTI characteristics

Orlikowski (1992, p. 398) argues that

“Early research studies assumed technology to be an objective, external force that would have deterministic impacts on
organizational properties such as structure. Later researchers focused on the human aspect of technology, seeing it as
the outcome of strategic choice and social action. This paper suggests that either view is incomplete, and proposes a
reconceptualization of technology that takes both perspectives into account.”
This statement reflects an early naïve view of technology as neutral of technological determinism: tech does X. The socio
technical perspective views the social as important and examines how the technological and the social interact in a bi-
directional way. But this stream of research tends to focus more on social determinism: human agents using tech do X.
This perspective is also problematic because it affords too much power to the human agents and too little to the tools. Since
then, a third wave has risen adopting a socio-material lens where a post actor-network theory view of the world is proposed,
in which neither the social nor technical can be understood as primary influencers but both are entangled or imbricated or
assembled. For example, activity theorists generally “underscore that because of its collective origin, the object of the activity
is, by definition, emergent, fragmented, and contradictory” (Nicolini, Mengis, & Swan, 2012, p. 614). The implication of this
understanding is that we need to approach the role of technology in diverse ways.1
According to Kostoff, Boylan, and Simons (2004, p. 142), “[d]isruptive technologies can be either a new combination of
existing technologies or new technologies whose application to problem areas or new commercialization challenges (e.g.,
systems or operations) can cause major technology product paradigm shifts or create entirely new ones”. Christensen and
Bower (1996, p. 202) define disruptive technologies as “technologies … which disrupt an established trajectory of perfor-
mance improvement, or redefine what performance means”. Examples of disruptive technologies include blockchain tech-
nologies, artificial intelligence, digital technologies, shared economy models, and more. In disruptive environments,
innovations (be they technical, processual or commercial) are often unpredictable, ideas are radical, outcomes are uncertain

1
We are grateful to Dr Niamh O'Riordan for her assistance with this material.
 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860 3

Fig. 1. General framework - disruptive technology and innovation governance (DTI) issues.

and ill-defined, and the justification for investments in them difficult to make as markets are either not adequately developed
or may be non-existent (Evans, 2017).
The core literature on DTI has burgeoned since Christensen, Baumann, Ruggles, and Sadtler (2006) (see also, Christensen
et al., 2015; Christensen, McDonald, Altman, & Palmer, 2018) who propose disruptive technology as something that happens
when incumbents are blindsided as they are too busy keeping existing customers happy. In their view, you can look to the
performance trajectories of potential disruptors to single out the ones you need to worry about. Christensen and colleagues
build their arguments based on 77 cases of disruptions that had catastrophic effects on incumbents.2 In his book “Innovator's

2
An example is disruption to the mechanical-excavator industry as a result of hydraulics technology. Christensen (1997) argues that established
companies that built cable-operated excavators were slow to recognise the importance of the hydraulic excavator.
4 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860

Dilemma”, Christensen (1997) concluded that there are two types of technological developments. His first is sustained
technology, where the result is improvements in the rate of product performance, ranging in difficulty from incremental to
radical, and led by the top-performing firms in the industry. His second is disruptive technology, where innovations disrupted
or redefined performance trajectories and arguably resulted in the failure of the industry's leading firms. The general treatise
is that successful organisations risk failure if they do not recognise the distinction between sustaining technologies and
disruptive technologies, and if they fail to invest in nascent disruptive technologies (Kassicieh et al., 2002). As further
highlighted by Kostoff et al. (2004, p. 144): “Possible reasons for their demise include: first, disruptive products are simpler
and cheaper; they generally promise lower, not higher, profit margins; second, disruptive technologies typically are first
commercialized in emerging or insignificant markets; and third, leading firms' most profitable customers generally do not
want, and indeed initially cannot use, products based on disruptive technologies”.
In general, the common characteristics of a DTI context involve unpredictable, volatile markets, rapidly changing envi-
ronments and complex technologies. Consequently, researchers have started querying the association between corporate
governance and DTIs with calls for broader multi-disciplinary, multi-theoretic approaches to designing governance systems
that support organisational decision-making in highly volatile, complex and dynamic environments (Buterin, 2014; Cockcroft
& Russell, 2018; Piazza, 2017). The evolution of more agile and flexible systems of decision-making also raises issues for basic
corporate governance principles such as accountability, transparency and disclosure and their inclusion in the evolving
governance structures and processes. Further, DTIs also tend to be enabled by a convergence of technologies which depend on
shared networks, alliances and other collaborative structures and processes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Belk, 2014; Rocco, 2008). As
such, participative decision-making and issues related to power and delegation become critical in a DTI eco-system. While
some innovations may lead to technology enabled enhancements to governance systems, it is also likely that there are risks
related to degradation of governance oversight and quality.

2.2. Common technology-based disruptive forces

In this section, we provide an overview of five common technology enabled disruptive forces that have been instrumental
in significantly changing business models in unprecedented ways. Table 1 presents prior research related to five common,
high-profile aspects associated with DTI: Big Data, cryptocurrency, blockchain, the sharing economy and crowdsourcing.
These disruptive forces can be classified in two ways: First, technological developments directly relating to the nature of the
digitised data and its potential for re-shaping information for business decision-making or financial transactions such as Big
Data and cryptocurrency, respectively; Second, disruptive technologies affecting the manner in which business transactions
are conducted and recorded through converging technologies such as decentralised and collaborative platforms, e.g.,
blockchain, the sharing economy and crowdsourcing arrangements.

2.2.1. Big Data

In a rather long but comprehensive definition, Boyd and Crawford (2012, p. 663) define Big Data as:

“…a cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon that rests on the interplay of:
(1) Technology: maximizing computation power and algorithmic accuracy to gather, analyse, link, and compare large data
sets.
(2) Analysis: drawing on large data sets to identify patterns in order to make economic, social, technical, and legal claims.
(3) Mythology: the widespread belief that large data sets offer a higher form of intelligence and knowledge that can
generate insights that were previously impossible, with the aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy.”

While what is “big” for some firms may not be for others (Vasarhelyi et al., 2015), managing and using information from
extremely large data sets can help reveal trends and patterns among people and institutions from various different per-
spectives. Bhimani and Willcocks (2014) warn that because of Big Data, sequential linear links between corporate strategy,
firm structure and information systems can no longer be assumed. Commenting on Bhimani and Willcocks (2014), Payne

Table 1
Prior research on selected features of disruptive technology and innovations (DTI).

Type of DTI Prior research

Big Data Appelbaum, Kogan, and Vasarhelyi (2017); Bhimani and Willcocks (2014); Cockcroft and Russell (2018); Payne (2014); Salijeni,
Samsonova-Taddei, and Turley (2018); Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and Tuttle (2015); Warren, Moffitt, and Byrnes (2015)
€hme, Christin, Edelman, and Moore (2015); Lazanis (2015); Piazza (2017); Raiborn and Sivitanides (2015); Ram, Maroun, and Garnett
Cryptocurrency Bo
(2016)
Blockchain € m (2019); Dai and Vasarhelyi (2017); DuPont (2017); Hsieh, Vergne, and Wang (2018); Lazanis (2015); MacDonald, Allen, and
Bystro
Potts (2016); Piazza (2017); Rückesh€auser (2017); Wang and Kogan (2017); Yermack (2017)
Sharing Belk (2014); Botsman and Rogers (2010); Cheng (2016); Martin (2016); Schor (2016)
Economy
Crowdsourcing Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft (2013); Chen, Huang, and Liu (2016); Jame, Johnston, Markov, and Wolfe (2016); Kuppuswamy and
Bayus (2017); O'Leary (2015)
 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860 5

(2014, pp. 493e494) adds that Big Data will cause the “have lunch, buy a brunch” and HiPPO (Highest Paid Person's Opinion)
practices3 to decrease in favour of more rigorous, data-driven decision making. The way risks are identified, assessed and
dealt with calls for firms to invest in appropriate information and data management technologies and human resources. For
instance, financial data which comprises the standard financial metrics (such as assets, liabilities, equity and income) will be
associated with other voluminous enterprise data such as marketing, production and investment portfolios to arrive at de-
cisions, for example, on the nature and amount of investments a firm makes. Thus, while recognising privacy issues,
governance systems need to encompass more seamless access to enterprise data, calling for governance professionals to
understand the limits and opportunities offered by Big-Data analysis and the need for cooperation and data management
capacities within all parts of organisations.

2.2.2. Cryptocurrency
Cryptocurrency is a type of digitised currency that can be used for all types of transactions, allowing for instantaneous
exchanges. It is disruptive, as there is no single administrator or central bank, and it can be exchanged on a peer-to-peer
network without the need for intermediaries. A popular cryptocurrency is Bitcoin, “an online communication protocol
that facilitates the use of a virtual currency, including electronic payments” (Bo € hme et al., 2015, p. 213). Besides using
cryptocurrencies for transaction exchanges, entities can also invest in bitcoin, akin to a monetary asset. However, Bo€ hme et al.
(2015) warn that bitcoin technology also entails several risks: (i) Bitcoin has no money laundering know-your-customer
responsibilities, (ii) Bitcoin does not restrict the sales of questionable products, and (iii) payments are irreversible e errors
cannot be corrected, and purchases cannot be cancelled. Grant and Hogan (2015, p. 29) further highlight that “[p]roponents
hype the benefits of Bitcoin transactions as being faster and cheaper than traditional methods; however, concerns around the
lack of a central governing agency, lack of controls over Bitcoin exchanges, and the volatility of the virtual currency persist”.

2.2.3. Blockchain
Blockchain is a digital ledger of transactions (Chartered Professional Accountants Canada, 2016) that enables creation of
records that are secure, reliable, transparent and accessible. Yermack (2017, p. 7) defines blockchain as “a sequential database
of information that is secured by methods of cryptographic proof”. He characterises blockchain as an alternative to traditional
financial ledgers based on classic double entry bookkeeping, stating (p. 28) that it appears to represent “a leap forward in
financial record-keeping not seen in the introduction of double-entry bookkeeping centuries ago.” Chartered Professional
Accountants Canada (2016) uses the phrase “triple-entry bookkeeping”, which is traditional double-entry bookkeeping;
together with parties to a transaction recording each side of the transaction in a shared blockchain ledger, i.e., representing
the third entry. Participants in a transaction would confirm the integrity of the transaction.
There are numerous implications of blockchain technology for governance and accounting systems. Yermack (2017) and
Piazza (2017) predict the use of blockchain to keep records of share ownership and to keep financial records (possibly through
public blockchain as opposed to “permissioned” blockchain). Blockchain would enable real-time accounting. Rather than
updating the books and records on a monthly or quarterly basis, blockchain would enable near-instant (daily) updating of
accounting information (Bystro € m, 2019). Because Blockchain is a ledger that cannot be altered and cannot be destroyed, it
would improve the trustworthiness of financial statements (Bystro € m, 2019). Dai and Vasarhelyi (2017) consider how
blockchain could enable real-time, verifiable and transparent accounting ecosystems, while Wang and Kogan (2017)
commend blockchain as an accounting information system for its power in real-time accounting, continuous monitoring
and continuous auditing, as well as fraud detection.
However, there are limitations to blockchain technology. Rückesh€ auser (2017) criticises the application of blockchain in
accounting, questioning the immutability of blockchain through decentralisation and its technological rigour. She challenges
the notion that blockchain will prevent fraud and discusses ways in which fraud may not be constrained by blockchain, such
that senior management will continue to be able to perpetrate fraud. There are also warnings regarding the integrity of a
blockchain in that it is only as good as the data that gets recorded in the first place. For blockchains to work well they need to
be large, but this could mean transaction costs are higher, and the time taken to process transactions could be relatively
slower compared to present systems (Davidson, De Filippi, & Potts, 2016).

2.2.4. Sharing economy

While defining the sharing economy can be problematic (Martin, 2016, p. 151), Hamari, Sjo €klint, and Ukkonen (2016, p.
2047) describe what they call “collaborative consumption” as “the peer-to-peer-based activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing
the access to goods and services, coordinated through community-based online services”. Ranchordas (2015) notes that the
sharing economy presupposes two elements: the existence of physical shareable goods that systematically have excess ca-
pacity, and a sharing attitude or motivation. Also, another fundamental assumption underlying sharing economy is that
transaction costs related to the coordination of economic activities will determine sharing behaviours.
Botsman and Rogers (2010) interview business leaders and opinion formers around the world to identify various
collaborative or mediated consumption systems. They highlight how, in the late 1990s and early-mid 2000s, online platforms

3
Meaning data obtained from social interactions over a meal or other intuitive sources in contrast to rigorous objective sources of data.
6 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860

emerged which enabled individuals to establish peer-to-peer relationships in unprecedented volumes and speed. Martin
(2016) notes that early innovations that provided the foundations for the sharing-economy concept include: Ebay, Craigs-
list, Freecycle and Couchsurfing. He notes (p. 151) “business to consumer models of Internet mediated interaction also
emerged which enabled individuals to access (rather than own) assets, perhaps the most prominent of these being the car
rental/sharing service offered by Zipcar”.
Interestingly, Ranchordas (2015 p. 416, p. 443) also argues that while “Uber, Airbnb, Lyft, and other forms of sharing
economy represent growing innovative forms of sharing underused facilities”, governance systems “may either hinder, delay,
or advance innovation”. Ranchordas acknowledges concerns on public safety, health, and limited liability of sharing economy
practices and that the sharing economy opens the door to unfair competition. Some of the critical risks include misrepre-
sentation or poor service delivery, fraudulent behaviours and public liability with traditional legal boundaries still unclear and
legal recourse questionable or uncertain.

2.2.5. Crowdsourcing
Brabham (2008, p. 76) defines crowdsourcing as “a new web-based business model that harnesses the creative solutions of
a distributed network of individuals through what amounts to an open call for proposals.” Examples include: Estimize (Jame
et al., 2016) to crowdsource earnings forecasts, Apple's crowdsourced labour force providing digital content (Bergvall-
Kåreborn & Howcroft, 2013) and crowdsourced data for use by external auditors (O'Leary, 2015). Crowdfunding can be
used to crowdsource equity through platforms such as Kickstarter (Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2017) and JD.com in China (Chen
et al., 2016). Gellers (2016) views technology as a means of crowdsourcing global environmental governance, thereby
overcoming a democratic deficit. Mattingly and Ponsonby (2016) discuss how crowdsourcing, specifically prediction markets,
can improve governance. Prediction markets are tools for channelling a collective intelligence effect, coined the “wisdom of
crowds”. Boards of directors could use shareholder-prediction markets to crowdsource feedback from shareholders on big
corporate strategic decisions such as mergers, disposals, takeover defences, relocations, etc.

3. The governance eco-system

In this section, we discuss several structural forms associated with DTI and key corporate governance challenges they face.

3.1. Corporate governance

In traditional corporate governance, distinguishing governance and management is critical. The governing board com-
prises directors who hold both fiduciary and strategic duties. Fama (1980, p. 293) describes directors as “professional referees”
overseeing management on behalf of the shareholders who appointed them for that purpose. In enacting corporate gover-
nance, directors face “complex multifaceted tasks” but are responsible only for “monitoring and influencing strategy” e not
for day-to-day administration and implementation (Forbes & Milliken, 1999, pp. 491-92). However, past literature is often
replete with examples lacking this distinction, applying the term “governance” to what traditionalists would call manage-
ment tasks. One such example is use of the term “IT governance”. For instance, Bowen, Cheung, and Rohde (2007) state:
“Kaplan (2005) defines IT governance as the set of processes used by the organization to manage IT, i.e., aligning IT with
business objectives, resourcing IT projects, and monitoring IT performance”. They, and Kaplan (2005) who they cite, clearly do
not make the distinction between the management of IT and the governance of IT. Debreceny (2013, p. 129) puts it well when
he asks: “What role do governing bodies, such as the Board of Directors, play in the oversight and direction of IT?” and “What
roles and responsibilities for IT does the governing body assume and what is delegated to senior and operational
management?”.
For the purposes of our paper, we see corporate governance as setting the parameters of the system within which people,
institutions and other stakeholders behave so that the organisation (or the social ecosystem) achieves the desired outcomes
(Rocco, 2008). For Rocco (2008), governance includes the processes, conventions and institutions that determine:

How power is exercised in view of managing resources and interests;

How important decisions are made and conflicts resolved; and

How various stakeholders are accorded participation in these processes.

Put simply, governance is the replacement of traditional ‘‘powers over’’ with contextual ‘‘powers to.’’ The dominant role of
the top-down governing approach is replaced by dominant ‘‘bottom-up’’ and ‘‘horizontal’’ interactions. The Association of
Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) (2012) contend that governance approaches within a DTI context will evolve away
from machine-age metaphors of the organisation, and be increasingly replaced by a biological-era view of the firm as a living,
constantly evolving and adapting ecosystem. Hence the stewardship role will extend to monitoring and nurturing the health
of the firm's entire ecosystem of partnerships and relationships.
 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860 7

3.2. Emergent DTI attributes and organisational forms

In this section, we delineate several emergent attributes and structural forms arising from DTI that call for specific
governance arrangements and capabilities. We discuss four major underpinning attributes commonly cited as fundamental
for governance in highly dynamic, volatile environments: agile, collaborative, decentralised, and distributive/global ar-
rangements. The first two attributes relate to organisational capabilities dealing with agility, adaptiveness, and cooperation
which are critical for dealing with uncertainty and rapid market transformations. The latter two relate to authority, power and
decision-sharing dimensions. Table 2 summarises governance models commonly associated with DTIs. The rapidly evolving
and shifting nature of DTIs has led to a proliferation of terms attempting to define the approaches to their governance
(Durston, Pesce, & Wenborn, 2018), such as “joined-up”/“shared”/“collaborative” governance. Labels such as “disrupting
governance” (Davidson et al., 2016), “digital-era governance”, (Tassabehji, Hackney, & Popovi c, 2016), and “global gover-
nance” (e.g., Voegtlin & Scherer, 2017) are commonplace.

3.2.1. Agile governance

Agility is a critical characteristic denoting the ability to detect and respond to opportunities in a timely and flexible
manner. It supports seizing competitive-market opportunities by assembling requisite assets, knowledge and relationships
with speed and surprise (Goldman, Nagel, & Preiss, 1995; Sambamurthy, Bharadwaj, & Grover, 2003). The fast pace of change
in technology led to the employment of agile methodologies in software development. The philosophy of agile project
management is now spreading beyond software. Similar to the agile responses adopted to software development and
business operations more generally, Schwab (2016) recommends embracing ’agile’ governance. Luna et al. (2014) review the
literature and identify several definitions of agile governance where the common characteristics of such systems are to be
strategic, integrated and fast. For example, Luna, Costa, Maura and Novaes (2010, p. S60) define agile governance as “the
process of defining and implementing the ICT infrastructure that provides support to strategic business objectives of the
organization, which is jointly owned by ICT and the various business units and instructed to direct all involved in obtaining
competitive differential strategic advantage through the values and principles of the Agile Software Development Manifesto”.
They further clarify that agile governance does not replace conventional models and frameworks.

3.2.2. Collaborative (consensual) governance

Collaborative governance emphasises the capacity to be able to work together. This capacity involves bringing people
together across different levels of decision-making, both within and outside organisations. For example, it “…brings public
and private stakeholders together in collective forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision
making.” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 543). Gaining consensus and moving into new markets or product developments is a critical
capacity, which will also support adaptive behaviours needed in disruptive environments.
For example, based on a digital-platform perspective, Constantinides, Henfridsson, and Parker (2018) argue that while
structural complexity can be managed through technological solutions, governance systems can reduce behavioural
complexity within platform structures that often rely on collaborative arrangements. Drawing on Tiwana (2014) who broadly
defines governance platforms as dealing with ‘who decides what’, Constantinides et al. (2018) highlight governance as
encompassing three facets: (i) How decision rights are divided between the platform owner and third-party developers, (ii)
what types of formal and informal control mechanisms are used by the platform owner (e.g., gatekeeping, performance
metrics, processes that developers are expected to follow), and (iii) incentive structures. While the layered, modular “ar-
chitecture can reduce structural complexity, governance can reduce behavioural complexity” (Tiwana, 2014, p. 118).

3.2.3. Decentralised governance

Blockchain represents a new “institutional governance technology of decentralisation” (MacDonald et al., 2016, p. 284).
Atzori (2017, p. 46) argues that blockchain governance would involve citizens self-creating their own systems of governance
“in which centralisation, coercion and socio-political hierarchies are replaced by mechanisms of distributed consensus.”

Table 2
Emergent models of governance.

Type of model Description

Capacity
Agile governance “the ability of human societies to sense, adapt and respond rapidly and sustainably to changes in its environment, by means of the
coordinated combination of agile and lean capabilities with governance capabilities, in order to deliver value faster, better, and
cheaper to their core business.” (Luna et al., 2014, p. 134)
Collaborative “the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the
governance boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public
purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.” (Emerson, Nabachi & Balogh, 2012, p. 2)
Structural
Decentralised Blockchain based concept e “… open, distributed, secure, encrypted and programmable digital ledgers and enabling secure and
governance fully decentralised “P2P” [person-to-person] trade. (Arrun~ ada & Garicano, 2018, p. 2)
Distributed “Is realised without the need for a central authority … the balance of integrity and autonomy; decision-rights; control
governance mechanisms; and incentive structures.” (Zachariadis, Hileman, & Scott (2019, p. 110, p. 114).
8 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860

Hsieh et al. (2018) observe that blockchain governance involves clarity on who has authority (internal and external parties)
over the blockchain; the nature of the authority of these parties (e.g. ownership rights vs. decision authority), the form of
governance (formal and informal) and the level at which it operates (Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten, Miller, & Goldfeder, 2016).
Hsieh et al. (2018, p. 50) add that blockchain technology may lead to novel organisational forms such as “decentralised
autonomous organisations” (DAO) (Buterin, 2014; DuPont, 2017).
For Hsieh et al. (2018), blockchain-based organisations disrupt traditional principal-agent relationships by placing ma-
chines (i.e. the blockchain software programme) at the core of organisational governance, and stakeholders at the edges
(Buterin, 2014). Instead of CEOs or senior managers, it is developers who write the rules (i.e., the software code), in a
decentralised fashion. It is miners (or validators), rather than employees, who verify the validity of economic transactions and
maintain a digitally shared, distributed ledger recording their history.4 There are no headquarters or subsidiaries, but rather a
network distributed in cyberspace that is inherently global and borderless. Stakeholders have power and govern the
blockchain at varying levels in different ways (Narayanan et al., 2016; Yermack, 2017). Thus, blockchain governance revises
understanding about power and control in organisations. Governance is not only borderless but also decentralised (to various
extents) (Atzori, 2017; Yermack, 2017). Anyone can “join” a public cryptocurrency organisation, maintain and update the open
ledger based on “competitive bookkeeping” such as mining or other consensus mechanisms (Yermack, 2017). Decentrali-
sation distinguishes blockchain-based corporate governance from the traditional model based on hierarchies. With decen-
tralisation, governance decisions are made without centralised authorities, but rather through consensus mechanisms in a
non-hierarchical fashion. Blockchain-based corporate governance forms need to be considered in terms of their degrees of
decentralisation.

3.2.4. Distributive/distributed governance

Detomasi (2002) reflects the machine-age metaphor perspective. In the context of globalisation, Detomasi (2002, p. 423)
defines distributive governance (also called “distributed governance”) occurring when:
“…formal governing authority is shared by a variety of interested actors operating in the public, private, and
nongovernmental spheres. Distributive governance buttressesdbut does not replacedindependent national or
organizational authority with a combination of involved state and nonstate actors that work collaboratively to shape
norms, to develop sanctions for governance transgressors …”
Detomasi (2002) describes people working cooperatively in a distributed governance model to shape governance
behaviour and outcomes, differentiating distributive governance models from existing models. Detomasi's (2002) description
of the way Japanese firms use relational rather than arms' length contracting is more like a model based on symbiosis than
competition. In a similar vein, the term horizontal governance has been adopted referring to working through networks in
place of hierarchies; through interdependence rather than power relationships; negotiation rather than control; and ena-
blement rather than management (Phillips, 2004).
Another critical aspect of some of the emergent organisational forms such as collaborative, de-centralised and distributed
governance is that these models engage stakeholders, but far beyond the traditional approach or the way we currently think
about them. The stakeholders themselves can hold a different type of power. They can control data quality and integrity,
including how much and what they would like to share. Consequently, this can further shape internal governance mecha-
nisms and their design.
In this special issue, Leoni and Parker (2019) investigate governance and control issues within Airbnb which is a digitised
shared-economy platform for hosts offering accommodation to guests. Leoni and Parker contend that sharing economy
platforms have recently surged as popular venues of business, enabling people around the world to digitally interact and
temporarily exchange their under-utilised assets. Through a netnographic method, their analysis reveals platform owners
using predominantly formal bureaucratic control systems as mechanisms to govern and control its host and guest users.5
Through users' compliance, they and their activities are made visible to the platform owner, which in turn maintains con-
trol over the value-creation process. Some key revelations of Leoni and Parker's study are that accounting systems play a
critical role as mechanisms of surveillance, monitoring control over digital host and guest users worldwide, while traditional
technologies of governance continue to influence how power and control are maintained by the platform owners.
Kuruppu and Lodhia (2019) deal with changes arising from policy advocacy activism which generate disruptive in-
novations in a non-governmental (NGO) setting. Guided by Laughlin's (1991) model of organisational change, they review
changes in the case NGO's interpretive schemes, design archetypes and organisational sub-systems using a case study of a
large NGO operating in Sri Lanka. Drawing on data collected through semi-structured interviews, document analysis and
participant and non-participant observations, they find that the NGO's governance systems and processes are being moulded

4
Each transaction must be verified. With blockchain, however, that job is left to a network of computers. These networks often consist of thousands (or
in the case of Bitcoin, about 5 million) computers spread across the globe. The cost of this activity (validation or ‘mining’) could be prohibitive and it is not
clear how the cost will be covered. Apart from cryptocurrencies, where the result of the mining/validation is a currency unit that can be sold, blockchain has
not had much application in practice, despite the benefits claimed. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp.
5
Netnography is an interpretive research method that adapts traditional, in-person participant-observation techniques of anthropology to the study of
interactions and experiences manifesting through digital communication (Kozinets, 1998).
 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860 9

in ways that may not achieve the overall purpose of the organisation. Their paper introduces “protective reconfiguration” as a
new change pathway to Laughlin's model of organisational change. They contend that more deliberative, fluid and less
organisation-centric governance structures are necessary for NGOs operating in the policy advocacy space.

4. DTI - governance eco-system

In this section, we consider three key corporate governance mechanisms, together with implications for management
accounting and performance evaluation of DTI.

4.1. Financial reporting

Financial reporting is an important accountability mechanism. Directors hold a fiduciary duty of disclosure to report
company financial affairs faithfully and in compliance with regulatory requirements. Big Data can strengthen financial
reporting measurement processes through new forms of evidence to support how management accounts for transactions
(Warren et al., 2015).
Blockchains could potentially improve the quality of financial reporting in two ways: by making financial statement in-
formation (i) more trustworthy and (ii) more timely (Bystro € m, 2019). Blockchain has the potential of enhancing the timeliness
of, and access to, accounting information (Piazza, 2017). Also, because users of accounting information could be given access
to information, blockchain would increase trust in the quality of the data.
Tan and Low (2017) address the question of how to account for the cryptocurrency bitcoin, noting that no official guidance
has come from accounting standard setters, notwithstanding that guidance for tax purposes has been available since 2014.
They discuss the challenges for standard setters of accounting for a decentralised currency rather than a reporting currency.
Ram et al. (2016) asked 40 financial accounting experts to complete a correspondence analysis, which is an exploratory tool to
present the relations between the characteristics of bitcoin and the themes drawn from an inductive thematic analysis of
prior literature on bitcoin. They supplement their analysis with ten semi-structured interviews. Their correspondence
analysis and interviews reveal that although cost and fair value may be conceptual opposites, “in the eyes of respondents,
these need to be used to achieve the single goal of communicating the economic rationale for holding the Bitcoin” (p.2). In a
detailed analysis, Raiborn and Sivitanides (2015) identify six issues for accounting standard setters to address in accounting
for bitcoin: asset classification, mining activity, investment holdings, exchanges, merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions,
and disclosure.

4.2. External audit

Lazanis (2015) predicts that the accounting profession will be completely transformed because of blockchain. Auditors’
role will be greatly reduced or even completely eliminated. Appelbaum et al. (2017) consider the opportunities for auditors to
modernise their audit procedures by taking advantage of the capabilities of Big Data.
If companies kept all their transactions and balances on a blockchain, then the blockchain could eliminate the need for
auditors to provide an opinion on the financial statements. Since transactions in the blockchain cannot be tampered with,
mistrust leading to the requirement for audit is removed (Bystro €m, 2019). The advent of crowdsourcing has led to phrases
such as “armchair auditors”, coined by former UK prime minister, David Cameron, “sidewalk auditors” and “social audits” (i.e.
using the public as auditors) (O'Leary, 2015). In interviews with Big Four audit partners, Trompeter and Wright (2010) find
evidence of the expanded use of more powerful technology in audits resulting in greater use of, and reliance on, analytics.
Caringe and Holm (2017) interviewed 15 external auditors to investigate external auditors' role in a technological environ-
ment. They find that the monitoring role of external auditors is reduced by the increased information environment. The
technological environment allows auditors to provide assurance services beyond the audit of the financial statements, giving
them more opportunities for value-adding activities.

4.3. Internal audit

Internal audit relates to assurance activities undertaken by either staff within companies or service providers external to
companies with the aim of adding value and improving organisational operations. The key function of internal audit is to
improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes of organisations. Vasarhelyi et al. (2015)
predict that auditing will increasingly rely on external sources of information, like blockchain and Big Data. Internal audi-
tors of companies using blockchain could conduct continuous internal audits, with audit trails and account analysis at the
push of a button. Rooney, Aiken, and Rooney (2017) consider the challenge of blockchain for internal auditors: they will have
to access information in new formats; they will have to maximise the value of real-time continuous information; internal
auditors from multiple organisations will need to work collaboratively. Zhang, Yang, and Appelbaum (2015) predict that with
the advent of Big Data, auditing will become a continuous process, while Yoon, Hoogduin, and Zhang (2015) call for the use of
Big Data as complementary audit evidence. Mattingly and Ponsonby (2016) describe how internal auditing and external
auditing could use prediction markets as pre-diagnostic tools for eliciting accurate information and for forecasting.
10 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860

4.4. Management accounting and performance evaluation

Management accounting and performance evaluation systems play a critical role in producing information for decision-
making and performance indicators to assess and control performance where possible. However, as highlighted by
Beaubien (2013) and Elbashir, Collier, and Sutton (2011), such systems (e.g. enterprise-resource planning, and business in-
telligence systems) have become largely automated, thus enabling access to large amounts of data (Big Data) in a very short
period of time, if not instantaneously.
As highlighted by Arnold (2018, p. 14), “once data are entered into the ERP [enterprise resource planning] system, the BI
[business intelligence] system can make all of the management accounting and management control information instantly
available and disseminate it throughout the organisation, whether it is information for an operational manager's digital
dashboards or CEO's smartphones”. However, Arnold (2018) also warns that there is a cost to the use of data in this more open
manner e which is likely to be a loss of privacy, raising challenges on how good governance principles (e.g. accountability
towards data ownership, having a voice in questioning data integrity or privacy around performance evaluations and
assurance of such data) become critical.

5. Future research

Overall, the design of governance mechanisms within disruptive environments appears to demand greater flexibility,
agility, openness and a multi-layered framework. In this special issue, Moll and Yigitbasioglu (2019) comprehensively review
the accounting literature on several potential and actual disruptive impacts caused by four Internet-related technologies:
cloud, Big Data, blockchain and artificial intelligence (AI). For example, access to distributed ledgers (blockchain) and Big Data
supported by cloud-based analytics tools and AI will automate decision making to a large extent. They argue that these
technologies may significantly improve financial visibility and allow more timely intervention due to the perpetual nature of
accounting. However, given the number of tasks of which technology has relieved accountants, these technologies may also
lead to concerns about the profession's legitimacy and the role of accountants. Their findings suggest that scholars have not
given sufficient attention to these technologies and how these technologies affect the everyday work of accountants. Moll and
Yigitbasioglu (2019) also present several more avenues for further research.
We add to Moll and Yigitbasioglu's (2019) line of suggestions for future studies in this area by broadening the field of
inquiry to include the role of other governance stakeholders who either affect or are affected by accounting mechanisms. In
this paper, we offer five areas ripe for the study of disruptive innovation (DTI) and governance.

5.1. First: having the right governance culture for adaptivity

Sustaining innovations relative to disruptive innovations entail less uncertainty in both technological and business-model
change. The use of more traditional monitoring and incentive schemes based on say budget forecasting or “waterfall” pro-
duction methods are likely to be matched with information needs and decision-making needs. However, disruptive in-
novations are much more challenging as both technology and business models that have been successful can become defunct
quite suddenly. As such, the cultural aspects of governance that support the capability to rapidly transform to new markets
and production that supports agile and future-oriented thinking becomes vital. While past studies have focused on gover-
nance of sustaining innovations, more research is needed on how organisational learning and change management in
disruptive environments can be managed. This will include finding both human and financial resources to have the right
leadership and resources to act upon ‘unprecedented’ opportunities.

5.2. Second: technologies themselves need to converge

There are a multitude of technologies that shape organisation's capacity to strategically govern DTIs, and often these
technologies need to work in tandem. For example, decision making on investing in a particular technology or market could
be supported by the use of Big Data aided by artificial intelligence, but that may need data or regulatory support from a
blockchain network. Consequently, governance systems involving rights to access data and costs of data-creation and sharing
become vital. Rocco (2008) calls for four key functions in a framework for governance of converging technologies:

Supporting the transformative impact of the new technologies;

Advancing responsible development that includes health, safety and ethical concerns;

Encouraging national and global partnerships; and

Establishing commitments to long-term planning and investments centred on human development.

Research in this area is scant and researchers from multi-disciplinary backgrounds are potentially needed.
 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860 11

5.3. Third: social implications of disruptive technologies

While disruptive technology has been hailed for the innovative changes that it brings, some significant (unintended) social
implications have already surfaced as a result of the disruptions. A theme recurring in our paper is the distribution of power
and its implications for access to the benefits of DTI or related ethical issues.
For example, in terms of changing social implications and the sharing economy, Airbnb (and other accommodation-
sharing services), while providing interesting and more economic alternatives to hotels for travellers, has led to housing
shortages in some tourist cities. A daily rate for accommodation is normally much more attractive for landlords than renting
out on a long-term basis to local inhabitants. This resulted in locals not being able to find affordable accommodation in their
own neighbourhoods and close to their workplaces. This (unintended) consequence has caused some cities (e.g., Barcelona) to
limit the amount of accommodation that can be offered on this basis in order to protect local inhabitants from exorbitant
prices and accommodation shortages. Another consequence is that some landlords would vacate their premises over summer
months (or in high season) to rent it on an accommodation-sharing platform over this period. Again, this causes a lot of
disruption for long-term tenants that want continuity of tenancy.6
The appeal of cryptocurrency like bitcoin has been undermined by its reputation as a fringe alternative to traditional
financial systems, as well as by volatility, security issues and lack of regulation. For example, cryptocurrency is amenable for
illegal transactions, at times referred to as transactions on the dark web, due to it being impossible to track. This has been
detrimental to its general acceptance as an international currency, replacing for example the US$. Taken together with the
(high levels of) volatility of cryptocurrency, and the reality that if the code is lost7 the cryptocurrency investment cannot ever
be recovered, made cryptocurrency a high-risk proposition with a flavour of illegal activities, without the benefits of a trusted
authority or central server. However, cryptocurrencies like Facebook's Libra, a digital currency that will be accessible via a
digital wallet in Messenger and WhatsApp, could change the image of cryptocurrencies by being underwritten by ‘trusted’
companies.8 Facebook's bid to get its 2.4 billion users to use Libra could help legitimize a sector that struggles to garner
broader public interest and confidence.
Another issue is the tax implications of some of these disruptive technologies. The nature of the sharing economy often
results in the actors (i.e., accommodation providers or ride providers), being individuals, not declaring these activities for
income tax purposes and/or paying rates and other taxes as commercial operators. While this results in governments and
local councils losing out on taxes, it also creates unfair advantage at the cost of the taxpayer as the formal providers of these
services (i.e., hotels and taxi companies), being commercial enterprises, have to pay these taxes. In some jurisdictions,
governments are trying to tax, for example, private accommodation providers renting out parts of their own homes. Arguably
of greater concern is the failure of Big-Tech companies to pay their fair share of taxes (Toplensky, 2018). In July 2019, France
introduced a digital services tax (White, 2019).

5.4. Fourth: governance stakeholder challenges

More specifically, we propose further study on how three other governance stakeholder groups: board of directors;
shareholders and regulatory bodies, may bridge the gap between the needs arising from disruptive technologies and
traditional regulatory models and approaches. In addition, further study is required to better understand how corporate
governance can support Christensen's (1997) two types of technological developments: sustained technology and disruptive
technology.
Power relations lie at the heart of corporate governance and DTI is changing these power relations, moving from more
hierarchical traditional governance approaches to self-governance approaches. These changing power relations deserve
further study.

5.4.1. Board of directors

The board of directors are charged with both fiduciary duties and strategic development responsibilities. Evans (2017, p.
217) argues that “[e]ach company will need to implement effective oversight of the technology to even stay competitive,
requiring a much deeper understanding from existing board members than appears within current literature”. Questions
boards face include: What are the types of risks faced by my organisation emanating from disruptive technologies? How can
boards be better prepared to address these risks? Will boards have to change their composition? Arguably, one suggestion is
that the solution to the technological disruption problem is to add a technical expert to the board of directors (e.g., Bravard,
2015; Moyo, 2016). An interesting alternate view is that by Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles (2005, p. S14) in relation to non-
executive directors who contend that independence and some distance from day-to-day management can enhance board

6
While the sharing economy also puts pressure on traditional businesses, i.e., accommodation sharing like Airbnb puts pressure on the hotel industry
while ride sharing like Uber and Ola put pressure on taxi companies, this is the consequences of more competition in the field.
7
If for example you lose the laptop or USB with the crypto code, you can never recover your cryptocurrency.
8
Facebook is framing Libra as an alternative to traditional financial services for the billions of people worldwide who lack access to banking. It is backed
by 28 companies and non-for-profits, including finance and tech giants such as Mastercard and Uber, although several companies withdrew from the
project in October 2019.
12 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860

functioning: “In practice, such experienced ignorance can be a very valuable resource for a board”. Overall the question of
board composition, culture and board dynamics will need review.

5.4.2. Shareholders
Shareholders can function as a critical monitoring mechanism over managerial decisions. However, the benefits of doing
so is often proportionately related to the percentage of shares owned (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
Yermack (2017) and Piazza (2017) predict that blockchain will affect shareholders. If it is used to record shareholdings, it
will result in timely and accurate recording of ownership, providing transparency to identify who owns shares and debt in
companies, thereby reducing opportunistic behaviour by companies, stock exchanges and regulators. It would not be so easy
to build secret positions in companies and make a killing. Yermack (2017) also expects that with blockchain, trading would
become cheaper and quicker, with consequent easier entry and exit by major shareholders. Blockchain might also impact
managerial stock options, for example, by reducing their ability to use insider information for personal profit.

5.4.3. Regulators
Regulators play a critical role in setting the boundaries and standards of governance. How regulators view and deal with
disruptive innovations will also need to expand into real-time and ‘agile’ policymaking. For example, regulators could be
provided blockchain access to review transactions in real time. (Chartered Professional Accountants Canada, 2016). Yermack
(2017) also cautions that a new model of governance will be required to govern the blockchain itself, with a governance
process in which users agree to protocols for the underlying software code to be changed. Society will require new rules,
controls, best-practice models and skills to facilitate a smooth transition to a blockchain-enabled future (Chartered
Professional Accountants Canada, 2016).
Some of the issues researchers could focus on include e ‘How will government policies and regulatory changes, say
taxation developments, affect approaches by boards to risks from disruptive technology? To what extent will hard laws and
soft laws such as rules, international treaties, or codes of conduct remain fit for purpose? For example, regulation of banks
focusses on regulations, while the outside world moves on. The regulations are not fit for purpose for the new world and
reflect status quo thinking. The regulatory framework is behind, playing catch up, solving yesterday's problems.
In particular, we call for studies on the social practice and the impacts disruptive technologies and innovations on
governance mechanisms such as the board of directors, financial reporting, audit committees, internal and external auditing,
shareholders and regulation.

5.5. Fifth: theoretical development

Dealing with DTI involves capacity to adapt and transform appropriately at both the individual and organisational levels.
Past studies relating to governance behaviours under highly uncertain and complex environments have adopted multiple
conceptual stances in understanding managerial and firm behaviours e.g., agency, organisational psychology, stewardship,
stakeholder, and resource dependency theories to name a few (Aghion, Van Reenen, & Zingales, 2013; Gans, 2016; Kapoor &
Klueter, 2017). However, many studies have not examined how individual predispositions towards risk and accountability
affect organisational-level outcomes. Given that good governance of DTI is dependent on attributes such as agility and
collaboration, individual and organisational-level psychology theories, e.g., adaptive capacity and social network theories
(Bhimani & Willcocks, 2014; Camps & Marques, 2014), may be relevant.
Further, future studies may also use multiple theories to better understand how accounting information and performance
indicators may become invalid when transaction processing and business models change dramatically. For example, more
rigorous and real-time performance indicators may be needed when using cryptocurrencies. Further, Kapoor and Klueter
(2017, p. 86) conclude, based on a two-year field study of the pharmaceutical industry in the US, that “when evaluating
emerging technologies, managers should assess not only the new functionality and associated competences that their
companies may need to develop but also whether the emerging technology has a significantly different customer value
proposition and profit equation”. Their findings signal the need for more research on the different theories of organisational-
change models to determine how governance mechanisms can help transform business models to make the needed change.
Additional research on how managerial incentives, particularly those based on bonuses and financial performance, affect the
propensity or use of different accountability mechanisms in highly volatile and ambiguous situations, can be helpful for
understanding good governance.
Consequently, future studies that research the manner in which risk management at both the individual and organisa-
tional levels become important to understand how governance systems can be better designed to help organisations deal
with unprecedented business model transformations.

6. Conclusion

Disruptive technology poses both challenges and opportunities for enhancing corporate governance. This special issue
provides fruit for thought and action, calling on insights from three distinct papers and related literature, on how to better
 Editorial / The British Accounting Review 51 (2019) 100860 13

design and utilise corporate governance and accounting mechanisms within DTI contextual settings. Agile, collaborative and
expeditious decision-making are not only valuable but necessities for effective and efficient governance. Governance
stakeholders both within and external to organisations need to be knowledgeable and proactive in assessing and responding
to the risks and opportunities offered by DTI. The challenge for researchers is to identify and foster governance design and
systems that balance human and technical demands created by rapidly shifting waves of technology and societal needs.

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Niamh M. Brennan
University College Dublin, Ireland
Nava Subramaniam*
RMIT University, Australia
Chris J. van Staden
Auckland University of Technology, New Zealand
 Corresponding author. RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC 3000, Australia.
E-mail address: nava.subramaniam@RMIT.edu.au

2 September 2019
Available online 12 October 2019