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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to question the undifferentiated treatment of individual traders
as “dumb noise traders?”. We question this undifferentiated verdict by conducting an analysis of the
cognitive competence of individual investors.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors let experts (both experienced researchers as well as
practitioners) assess the mathematical and verbal reasoning demands of investment tasks investigated
in previous studies.
Findings – Based on this assessment, this paper concludes that individual investors are able to
perform a number of complex cognitive actions, especially those demanding higher-order verbal
reasoning. However, they seem to reach cognitive limitations with tasks demanding greater
mathematical reasoning ability. This is especially unfortunate, as tasks requiring higher mathematical
reasoning are considered to be more relevant to performance. These findings have important
implications for future regulatory measures.
Research limitations/implications – This study has two non-trivial limitations. First, indirect
measurement of mental requirements does not allow authors to make definite statements about the
cognitive competence of individual investors. To do so, it would be necessary to conduct laboratory
experiments which directly measure performance of investors on different investment and other
cognitively demanding tasks. However, such data are not available for retail investors on this
market to the best of the authors’s knowledge. We therefore think that our approach is a valuable
first step toward understanding investors’ cognitive competence using data that are available at
this moment. Second, the number of analyzed (and available) tasks is rather low (n ⫽ 10) which
limits the power of tests and restricts the authors from using more profound (deductive) statistical
analyses.
Practical implications – This paper proposes to illustrate information in key investor documents
mostly verbally (e.g. as proposed by Rieger, 2009), compel exchanges and issuers of retail derivatives to
create awareness for the results of the reviewed studies and our conclusion and to offer online math
trainings especially designed for individual investors to better prepare them for different trading
1. Introduction
The market for retail derivative products has experienced a rapid growth over recent
decades. The current market volume of outstanding products in Germany alone
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amounts to approximately €90 billion and to more than €700billion in Europe. Banks
and other financial institutions issue a wide assortment of financial instruments that
require no minimum trading lots and are thus particularly designed for individual
investors. Retail derivatives allow investors to follow more sophisticated (e.g. leveraged)
trading strategies than classical instruments like stock investments alone. The German
market for retail derivatives is highly sophisticated and offers investors a range of more
than 1.1million different outstanding products.
However, recent literature shows that individual investors often do not act rationally
when making an investment decision. Most often they do not even behave particularly
skillfully[1]. Black (1986) simply dismisses individual investors as “noise traders”.
Meyer et al. (2014) conclude that individual investors do not have any “predictive power
whatsoever” and simply seem to be “decreasing their wealth to indulge in the adrenaline
of trading highly leveraged products” (Meyer et al., 2014, p. 16.). Schroff et al. (2013)
recap their findings as follows: “Overall, individual investor trading in leverage
products is not particularly skillful”. Barber and Odean (2013) describe the trading
competence of individual investors as “perverse” (Barber and Odean, 2013, p. 1541).
Additionally, individual investors have been found to possess rather low financial
literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Lusardi et al., 2010), while Célérier and Vallée (2014)
conclude that banks exploit retail investors’ low financial literacy and sophistication by
increasing product complexity which in turn decreases investor returns and increases
bank returns. Finally, De Bondt (1998) and Frazzini and Lamont (2008) clearly state that
individual investors are dumb. The importance of these findings becomes even clearer
against the background of the recent financial crisis in 2008 during which individual
investors lost a significant proportion of their wealth, partly due to uninformed trading.
Referring to individual investors as dumb noise traders with perverse trading
strategies is mainly based on the finding that they realize low or even negative (risk
adjusted) returns on average (Barber and Odean, 2013; Bauer et al., 2009; Henderson and
Pearson, 2011; Entrop et al., 2014b). However, the low profitability of individual
investors can have a variety of reasons (e.g. external market factors, and bank margins)
and is not necessarily linked to their low cognitive competence. Probably, one of the
most important motives for trading retail derivatives – as opposed to classical
investment products (Barber and Odean, 2013) – is a distinct desire for gambling and
speculation (Meyer et al., 2014; Bauer et al., 2009; Schmitz and Weber, 2012, Rieger and Dumb noise
Hens, 2012). Thus, investors might be willing to accept substantial risks leading to traders?
negative returns on average (Entrop et al., 2014b), because they draw utility from the
possibility of overproportional gains (or from considering trading itself as
entertainment as shown by Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009; Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009).
Therefore, trading retail derivatives and averaging negative returns are not necessarily
dumb; it might merely reflect a certain attitude to risk and a desire to seek sensation on 47
the part of some investors. Due to this ambiguity, we consider it worthwhile to
investigate the actual cognitive competence and financial literacy of individual
investors in more depth.
For the present paper, we are interested in studies examining the trading competence
of individual investors in retail derivatives. We first conduct a comprehensive literature
analysis in Section 4. We identify ten investment tasks performed by individual
investors trading at the market for retail derivatives. For each of these tasks, we briefly
describe the research question and the cognitive actions related to the investment
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for tasks that individual investors are not able to perform successfully than for those
they are. However, the demands for verbal reasoning are comparable for both groups.
Third, the mathematical demands of a task are highly correlated with the task’s
relevance to overall investment performance, whereas the correlation between verbal
demands of a task and relevance to performance is close to zero. Combining our second
and third findings, we conclude that individual investors are not “dumb”, they merely
possess the “wrong” cognitive abilities needed to achieve higher returns.
Our work contributes to the current literature by presenting a cognitive perspective
on the results of current papers studying the behaviors of investors on the market for
retail derivatives. The results of our study challenge the oversimple verdict that
individual investors are dumb noise traders. On the contrary, our findings are more in
line with Kelley and Tetlock (2013) who find that “researchers should take care when
using retail trading as an empirical proxy for noise trading” (Kelley and Tetlock, 2013,
p. 1263). We thus support a more nuanced differentiation between different kinds of
investor professionalism as do Vong and Trigueiros (2009) or Kuo et al. (2015).
The remaining paper is structured as follows: Section 2 elaborates the psychological
background of our analysis. Section 3 fits our review into the respective financial
background: While recent literature has mainly focused on the pricing behavior of
banks (see the short overview in Section 3), only a very limited number of studies deals
with investor behavior. The results of those studies that are linked to the cognitive
performance of investors are reviewed and interpreted in Section 4. Together with our
survey in Section 5, this chapter forms the principal part of the present study. Section 6
concludes with a discussion of our results.
2. Psychological background
Because of the lack of confidence of earlier investigators in the cognitive abilities of
individual investors (Black, 1986; Meyer et al., 2014), it seems appropriate to consider the
investment process from an information processing point of view, highlighting the
cognitive abilities and limitations of individual investors. To this end, we first provide a
short description of the general information processing system in relation to the
investment process.
To invest in a structured product, several cognitive actions have to be performed, Dumb noise
ranging from basic information processing up to higher-order tasks such as reasoning. traders?
The execution of all of these divergent cognitive actions is restricted by the limited
resources available in the working memory’s central executive and storage components
(Baddeley, 1996, 2000; Logie, 2011; Baddeley and Logie, 1999; Piolat et al., 2005), i.e.
attentional control (Lavie et al., 2004; Burnham et al., 2013), temporary storage of
information (Narimoto, 2011; Loisy and Roulin, 2003), retrieval of information from 49
long-term memory (Unsworth et al., 2013; Kaumann, 2002; Conway and Engle, 1994),
different forms of reasoning (Oberauer et al., 2007; García-Madruga et al., 2007; see also
Oaksford et al., 1996), including the solution of arithmetic problems (Geary et al., 2012;
Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001) and the planning involved in multi-tasking (Law et al., 2006),
are all cognitive tasks which have been shown to be dependent on the capacity of the
storage systems and/or the resources of the central executive within working memory.
Not surprisingly, working memory capacity (WMC) has repeatedly been identified as
the best predictor of performance on intelligence tests (Oberauer et al., 2007), with
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3. Financial background
Demand for retail derivatives (also called securitized derivatives or structured products)
has increased dramatically over the past decades. Besides several Asian markets such
QRFM as Hong Kong or Korea, the German market for retail derivatives is one of the largest
8,1 worldwide. The yearly turnover in Germany alone amounted to approximately €48bn in
2013 (DDV, 2014). Trading on classical options markets is most often not possible or
feasible for retail investors due to market restrictions or large commission fees. Retail
derivatives therefore effectively extend individual investor’s product universe.
After issuance, retail derivatives are traded at special exchanges, where the market
50 maker (and the counterpart for the investor) is the issuing bank itself and sets the prices
for their products. Hence, observed prices are not the direct result of supply and demand
(as normally observed in other markets) but are also heavily influenced by the
price-setting policy of the issuing company. There is a vast amount of literature which
finds that retail derivatives are more expensive than their counterpart on options
exchanges which are only accessible to institutional investors (Wilkens et al., 2003;
Baule, 2011; Stoimenov and Wilkens, 2007; Baule et al., 2008; Entrop et al., 2009;
Grünbichler and Wohlwend, 2005). The recognition of such markups challenges the
cognitive competence of individual investors and plays an important role in some of the
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payout of these products depends on whether at least one of the underlying values
in this basket falls below a certain threshold. If one of the products is below a
given barrier level, the payoff of the certificate is normally linked to the worst
performing underlying in the basket. Otherwise the investor earns high coupons
on his investment.
index DAX and individual stocks from April 2009 to February 2010. Based on Thomson
Reuters NewsScope Content, the authors determine trading intensity especially after
news announcements (Task 4). The cognitive actions related to this investment
behavior are perceiving company-specific news and responding with an investment
decision. The authors find that trading activity increases significantly directly after
positive and negative news announcements, whereby profitability is comparably low
and negative for both news-driven and non-news-driven trades. The authors conclude
that individual investors have neither private information nor any predictive power
whatsoever, but do follow news passively.
Schroff et al. (2015) analyze the demand for information by individual investors in
more depth in a data set of almost 250,000 products (discount, bonus and leverage
certificates) from April 2009 to March 2012. The authors question whether individual
investors actively search for and make use of news made public via traditional news
channels such as newspapers or news-Web sites (Task 5). The cognitive actions related
to this investment behavior are monitoring company-specific news actively, using
Web-based search engines and discussion forums or blogs to actively search for news
and making an investment decision before news are made public via traditional media.
This requires investors to not only rely on market-wide news but to actively formulate
appropriate company-specific searches. Schroff et al. (2015) use Google-search statistics
to determine whether investors search for company-specific news actively before
making an investment decision. The authors find a positive contemporaneous
relationship between queries for firm-specific information and trading activity in
speculative products, partly even irrespective of information supply in the form of
conventionally distributed news. Fink and Johann (2014) come to similar results. These
findings show that investors indeed actively conduct Google searches autonomously to
discover more company-specific information before making an investment decision. In
fact, the authors find that information discovery often takes place in alternative
information channels such as discussion boards or blogs before news is published in the
traditional news media[3].
Schmitz and Weber (2012) analyze the buying and selling behavior of individual
warrant investors after price fluctuations of the underlying, which provides information
on whether individual investors are able to perceive the historical development of quotes
(Task 6). The cognitive actions related to this investment behavior are acquiring Dumb noise
historical quotes, extrapolating the development of historical quotes into the future and traders?
deciding on the direction of the trading strategy (negative or positive feedback-trading).
Feedback-trading can be the result of a number of psychological biases, such as the use
of availability and representativeness heuristics. Past financial data are readily
observable and may be given an unjustified weight in predicting future development.
Although usage of heuristics is generally considered to require less cognitive effort (and 53
to simultaneously increase the likelihood of errors) in comparison to a more reasoned
decision-making process (Katsikopoulos, 2011), investors still need to perform basic
cognitive actions for a feedback-trading strategy. Schmitz and Weber (2012) use a data
set from a large German discount broker containing more than 1,400 investors and
almost 90,000 single transactions in the period from 1997 to April 2001. They show that,
on aggregate, individual investors follow negative feedback-trading strategies. Baule
and Blonski (2012) relativize this finding by differentiating between investors of
different degrees of professionalism. They show that the feedback-direction depends on
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investor professionalism and differs for puts and calls. Regardless of the actual direction
of feedback trading, both studies come to the result that individual investors do indeed
follow feedback-trading strategies.
Blonski (2014) analyzes another kind of perception of information. He conducts a
survey among potential investors (undergraduate students from a broad range of study
programs) with a total of 237 participants. The goal of this investigation was to analyze
the persuasibility of individual investors by economically irrelevant information. For
this purpose, each participant was provided with a one-page Key Investor Information
Document of one fictitious structured financial product (discount certificates, bonus
certificates and express certificates) with a description of its functionality. As with
actual issuer prospectuses, these documents contained scenarios to illustrate the
profitability of the product with respect to the development of the underlying[4]. These
scenarios varied in terms of “suggested return” and “suggested risk”, defined as the
arithmetic mean of product return and variance within the scenarios. The participants
were asked for their estimation of product return and risk. The author was interested in
whether these scenarios impact investor judgment or not (Task 7). The cognitive actions
related to not being influenced by these possibly biased scenarios are understanding
that the scenarios are fictitious and do not represent an indication on the part of the bank
(regarding the performance of a product) and thus not giving weight to these scenarios
when judging profitability of a product. According to the anchor heuristic and
availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), investors’ estimation of product
return and risk should be influenced by these scenarios. However, the authors ran a
battery of models and robustness checks and conclude that investors are hardly affected
by biased (economically irrelevant) scenarios.
The next task deals with the development of a sound understanding of the product
when investing in retail derivatives. As the complexity of retail derivatives can become
quite high (as indicated in Section 3), it seems relevant to thoroughly understand the
nature and complexities of a product before making an investment decision. Entrop et al.
(2014b) investigate the performance of individual investors investing in discount
certificates and bonus certificates (Task 8). The underlying of their analyzed products
comprises a broad range of stocks and the analyzed trading period lies between 2004
and 2008. The cognitive actions investigated in this study are developing a comparable
QRFM understanding of discount and bonus certificates, understanding payoff structures of
8,1 more complex products and understanding the path-dependent capital protection of
bonus certificates. The authors show that individual investors exhibit a negative risk
adjusted return (even before transaction costs) for discount certificates. However, this
return is even more negative for bonus certificates. Annual returns on investments in
discount certificates amount to ⫺3 per cent and fall as low as ⫺10 per cent for more
54 complex bonus certificates. One explanation for this finding is that the increased payout
complexity of bonus certificates in comparison to more easily understood discount
certificates puts a too high cognitive load on the reasoning abilities of individual
investors[5].
Task 9 analyzes whether investors are able to learn from their past trading
experience. Bradbury et al. (2014) question whether an increase in experience leads to a
better understanding of products and hence to more rational investment decisions based
on a more sensitive perception of the risk-return-profile of the certificates. The authors
simulate trading experience by showing random samples of a previously described
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return distribution to their 105 participants in the base experiment. The related
cognitive actions are learning from trading experience to better understand the
relationship between risk and return and drawing appropriate conclusions for future
investment behavior. The authors find that simulated experience indeed leads to a better
understanding of the product’s risk-return-profile and prompts investors to reconsider
their investment decision. Hence, they are able to draw conclusions and to learn from
their investment experience.
Task 10 deals with the conjunction fallacy. In an experimental study, Rieger (2012)
examined to what extent individual investors (more than 40 test subjects) are able to
give adequate probability estimates. According to the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1982, 1983), people tend to estimate the probability of two (or more)
independent events occurring simultaneously as higher than the probability of only one
of these events occurring alone:
The cognitive action related to not falling prey to the conjunction fallacy is to
understand and be able to draw inferences from stochastic relationships. Rieger
investigated two different worst-of-products with three (Product 1) or one (Product 2)
comparable underlying value(s). Thus, the development of these products depends on
whether at least one of the underlying values falls below a certain threshold (Rieger,
2012, p. 114). Participants estimated the probability that at least one of the three
underlying values of Product 1 falls below the threshold to be lower than the probability
that the one underlying of Product 2 falls below this same threshold. Transferred to the
conjunction fallacy, these events represent the possibility that the barrier of the products
has never been hit at any time before or at maturity. Thus, participants fell prey to the
conjunction fallacy which most likely results from cognitive limitations.
To recapitulate, we conducted an as comprehensive as possible review of as many
tasks analyzed on this market as possible. This short review reveals that while
individual investors are able to perform a certain number of tasks, they are unable to
accomplish others. They are able to invest with sensitivity to prices (Task 1), follow
news passively (Task 4), search for news actively (Task 5), conduct feedback-trading
strategies (Task 6), resist persuasion attempts by banks in scenarios (Task 7) and to Dumb noise
learn from their trading experience (Task 9). On the other hand, they are neither able to traders?
determine product margins (Task 2) nor issuer default risk (Task 3), they do not develop
a sound product understanding for more complex products (Task 8) and fall prey to the
conjunction fallacy (Task 10).
experts in a randomized order. We asked the experts for their estimation of the verbal
and mathematical reasoning demands associated with each task (on a scale from 1 to 7).
Additionally, we asked for the expert’s opinions on the relevance of the respective task
for trading success/performance (again, on a scale ranging from 1 to 7).
We ordered the tasks according to “tasks successfully accomplished” and “tasks not
successfully accomplished” (task feasibility) and overall mental demand (average of
mathematical and verbal reasoning demand). It becomes obvious that, by trend,
mentally more demanding tasks are those which individual investors are not able to
accomplish according to the findings of the reviewed studies[7]. Kendall’s coefficient of
concordance (a normalization of the Friedman test which lies between 0 and 1, see
Kendall and Smith, 1939) comes to about 0.38 for overall mental demand which we
interpret as a fair to mediocre degree of agreement among experts. Considering the three
sub-groups of our sample separately:
(1) this value rises to about 0.45 for the authors of the analyzed studies;
(2) achieves 0.51 for all other researchers; and
(3) drops to about 0.15 for non-researchers.
Overall Relevance to
Task Product mental Math Verbal performance
Table II.
57
of the 50 experts
Dumb noise
on the assessments
analyzed tasks based
relevance of the
Mental demands and
Survey results:
traders?
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8,1
58
QRFM
Table II.
Overall Relevance to
Task Product mental Math Verbal performance
Overall Relevance to
Task Product mental Math Verbal performance
Notes: Overall mental demand is the simple arithmetic mean of verbal and mathematical reasoning demand. Besides the standard deviations, the number
of times the respective task is the lowest ranking task of expert i (min) and the number of times it is the highest ranking task (max) is provided (multiple task
can be the highest or lowest ranked task of expert i when they were assigned the same score). The two groups for the (one-sided) t-tests and the
Kruskal–Wallis tests are task feasibility (accomplishable/not accomplishable)
Table II.
59
traders?
Dumb noise
QRFM This indicates substantially less agreement among the surveyed practitioners.
8,1 The ranking of tasks according to their cognitive demand is our next contribution to
the current research. It becomes obvious that investors are able to perform tasks with an
average verbal reasoning demand of about 4.1 and an average mathematical reasoning
demand of about 3.6 (out of 7, ordinally scaled). They are thus clearly able to perform
reasoning activities of a somewhat higher order and are not simply dumb but rather
60 exhibit a non-negligible cognitive competence. Additionally, we use one-sided t-tests
and distribution-free Kruskal–Wallis tests to test the null hypothesis that the means and
medians of estimated overall mental demand are equal between accomplishable and not
accomplishable tasks (task feasibility). The results of all tests are highly significant.
Thus, overall mental demand is significantly higher for tasks not accomplished
successfully. Analyzing mental demand in more depth by differentiating between
demand for mathematical and verbal reasoning, it becomes obvious that the null is
rejected for mathematical reasoning demands only, but not for verbal reasoning
demands. In fact, the means of verbal reasoning demands are approximately the same
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for both groups (in both cases slightly above 4). These findings suggest that whether
investors can accomplish a task or not depends on the mathematical reasoning demands
associated with the task, not its verbal reasoning demands. This structure is also
illustrated graphically in Figure 1. Running the same tests again separately for the three
subsets, i.e. authors of the reviewed studies, other researchers and practitioners, does
not alter any of our main findings.
Analyzing our result in more depth, we calculate Spearman and Kendall rank
correlation coefficients between the mean and median of the expert’s assessments of
mathematical and verbal reasoning demands and task feasibility (a dummy variable
taking the value 1 if a task was performed successfully and 0 otherwise). This
correlation amounts to almost ⫺0.90 (Kendall: ⫺0.73) for mathematical reasoning
demand and is highly significant at the 1 per cent significance level for both tests (all
correlations are reported in Table III). Both Spearman’s and Kendall’s rank correlations
between verbal reasoning demand and task feasibility are insignificant and close to 0.
Thus, mathematical reasoning is highly correlated with task feasibility, whereas verbal
reasoning demand hardly seems to play any role at all.
Regarding our next research question, we calculate Spearman and Kendall rank
correlation coefficients between the mean of mathematical reasoning demand of a task
and the mean relevance of the task to performance (Table III). This correlation amounts
to approximately ⫹0.65 (Kendall: ⫹0.49) and is significant at the 5 per cent level. On the
other hand, both Spearman and Kendall rank correlations between a task’s verbal
demands and its relevance to performance are again close to zero and insignificant.
Thus, mathematical reasoning demand is (marginally) significantly correlated with
performance, while verbal reasoning demand is not. Additionally, we calculate all
Spearman and Kendall correlation coefficients for the expert’s median assessments and
obtain similar results. However, the link between mathematical reasoning demand and
relevance to performance becomes insignificant and less substantial.
Summing up, we ordered the analyzed tasks (and the investigated products)
according to their complexity based on the estimations of 50 experts (i.e.13 authors of the
reviewed studies, 15 other researchers and 22 practitioners). We showed that investors
can indeed accomplish tasks with an equitable mental reasoning demand (especially:
verbal reasoning demand). However, mathematical reasoning demand seems to
Dumb noise
traders?
61
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Figure 1.
Mean assessment of
mathematical (top
figure) and verbal
(bottom figure)
reasoning demand
per task
These findings are highly germane to future regulatory measures. Investor literacy with
respect to mathematical reasoning abilities is comparably low. Thus, future regulatory
measures aiming to protect individual investors should most strongly concentrate on
verbal demonstrations or explanations and abdicate mathematically demanding ones.
On the one hand, one possible measure could be to illustrate risk and return
characteristics in analogy to a six-sided dice, as proposed by Rieger (2009) to circumvent
presenting formulas. On the other hand, our findings strengthen the call for more
mathematical education for investors, as this seems to be both scarce and relevant.
This could be achieved by raising investor awareness for the results of the reviewed
studies and our overarching interpretation of the results of our survey. Moreover, providers
of online trading systems (e.g. EUWAX) could be compelled to ensure an adequate
understanding of the market and its products by the investors. This could be achieved by
offering suitable (online) trainings before they are allowed to trade. Online math trainings
have been evaluated for different target groups (Al-Omari, 2009; Hodges, 2008) and have
been found to be as effective as traditional face-to-face teaching methods (Frederickson et al.,
2005; Karr et al., 2003). Thus, it seems feasible to develop an online course which teaches
potential investors the mathematical skills required for successful trading.
Our study has two non-trivial limitations. First, our indirect measurement of mental Dumb noise
requirements does not allow us to make definite statements about the cognitive traders?
competence of individual investors. To do so, it would be necessary to conduct
laboratory experiments which directly measure performance of investors on different
investment and other cognitively demanding tasks. However, such data are not
available for retail investors on this market to the best of our knowledge. We therefore
think that our approach is a valuable first step toward understanding investors’ 63
cognitive competence using data that are available at this moment. Second, the number
of analyzed (and available) tasks is rather low (n ⫽ 10) which limits the power of our
tests and restricts us from using more profound (deductive) statistical analyses.
6. Conclusion
The present work reviews earlier study results dealing with the investment behavior of
individual investors on the market for retail derivatives from a cognitive perspective.
We rank these tasks according to the mental ability they demand, as estimated by 50
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Notes
1. See e.g. Barber and Odean (2013) for an overview of irrational stock trading behaviors of
individual investors, and Bauer et al. (2009) or Meyer et al. (2014) for retail derivatives.
2. For more detailed information, see the paper by Rieger (2009, p. 205). If the underlying lies at
or above a specific predetermined threshold (the so called strike price) on one of these due
dates, the certificate is redeemed prematurely and pays back the nominal value plus coupons.
If the underlying trades below this threshold on one of the due dates, the certificate runs
another period. If the certificate still exists at the final due date and the underlying closes
above the strike price, the certificate pays back the nominal value plus coupons. If the
underlying lies below the strike but above another threshold (the so called barrier) at this
QRFM point of time, the certificate only pays back the nominal value without any coupons. If the
8,1 underlying lies below this barrier, the certificate pays back the value of the underlying only.
3. On the downside, the authors also show that trades driven by active demand for information
do not lead to higher returns.
4. To investigate whether even the simple existence of a scenario has an effect, about one third
64 of all documents did not contain any scenarios at all.
5. According to the results of the study conducted by Döhrer et al. (2013), the margin difference
between these two products is too low to explain this large difference.
6. The full survey including the instructions is omitted for the sake of brevity and is gladly
provided upon request.
7. As we did not present the outcomes of the analyzed studies to our experts, this indicates that
our measure for mental demand based on expert opinions seems to be quite valid.
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Further reading
Blonski, S.C., Bos, E.H., Conradi, H.J., Oldehinkel, A.J. and de Jonge, P. (2016), “Associations
between negative and positive life events and the course of depression: a detailed repeated
assessments study”, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, forthcoming.
Philip Blonski is from the University of Hagen, Universitätsstraße 41, 58097 Hagen, Germany. Simon
Christian Blonski works as a Psychologist in Hanover, Germany. We thank Benjamin Newell from the
psychology department of the University of New South Wales for valuable comments. This paper is
based on the PhD thesis of Philip Blonski which was supervised by Professor Dr Rainer Baule. We
thank Rainer Baule for very helpful comments on this paper. Philip Blonski is the corresponding
author and can be contacted at: philip.blonski@gmail.com
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