Carlos vs. Sandoval G.R. No.

179922 December
16, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Juan de Dios Carlos and Teofilo Carlos are brothers. During the lifetime
of their father, their father agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was
made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to
deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Teofilo is married to Felicidad and had a son Teofilo Carlos II.
When Teofilo died, his brother the petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil
Case No. 95-135, against respondents Felicidad and Teofilo Carlos II with the following
causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery
of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was
raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
Petitioner avers that the marriage between his brother Teofilo and Felicidad is null and
void in view of the absence of a marriage license and that their son, Teofilo Carlos II is
neither a natural nor an adopted son of the couple.

Issue:
Can Juan de Dios Carlos the petitioner in this case file a petition for declaration of
nullity on void marriage?

Decision:
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (March 15, 2003); and (2) Marriages celebrated during
the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Applicable law is the law in effect at the time of the celebration of marriage. The marriage
of Teofilo and Felicidad was on May 14, 1962. The New Civil Code is the applicable law.
Under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were
married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate
"proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any
other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest
and must be based on a cause of action.
Can petitioner demonstrate proper interest to be able to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage between his brother Teofilo and Felicidad?

Being not a compulsory heir of his brother Teofilo, petitioner has to first prove that Teofilo
Carlos II is not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo and Felicidad.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings
but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate
of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New
Civil Code, which reads
Art. 1001 “Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children to the other half”.
This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is
found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause
of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
Ablaza vs. Republic G.R. No. 158298
August 11, 2010

Facts:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed before RTC of Masbate, a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. Petitioner alleged that
the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage
license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the
marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted
that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled
him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn
the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the
death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

Issue:

May a person bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of
his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code?

Held:

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to
give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law
prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested
according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the
nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent
amendment of the governing law.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to
the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage, and when. However, that the absence of a provision in the old and
new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an
action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. The plaintiff must still be the party who
stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is
basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name
of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper interest
can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an
interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished
from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having
no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material
interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in
the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws
of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code.

Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate

children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding
to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the
action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the
late Cresenciano's surviving heir.

The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case. (Ablaza vs
Republic, G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010)
Buccat v. Buccat
G.R. No. 47101, 25 April 1941

FACTS:

It was established before the trial court: The Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After several
interviews, both were committed on September 19 of that year .On November 26 the same year, the
plaintiff married the defendant in a Catholic Cathedral in Baguio. They, then, cohabited for about
eighty-nine days. Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on February 23, 1939. Following
this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated. On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for
annulment of marriage before the CFI of Baguio City. The plaintiff claimed that he consented to the
marriage because the defendant assured him that she was virgin. The trial court dismissed the
complaint.

Hence, this appeal. Basically, Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got
married on November 26, 1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March 20, 1939 Godofredo
filed for annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was led to believe by Luida that she was
a virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo appealed.

ISSUE:

Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida
concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

RULING:

No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which
the State is interested and where society rests.

In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting
fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not
suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.
As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married, she must have looked very pregnant
even before they were married. Thus, consent freely given: ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC.

SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.