EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST, 44(3), 198–201, 2009

Copyright

C Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0046-1520 print / 1532-6985 online
DOI: 10.1080/00461520903029014

The Why of Learning

David C. Geary
Department of Psychological Sciences
University of Missouri

Alexander, Schallert, and Reynolds’s (2009/this issue) what, where, who, and when framework
situates different perspectives on learning in different places in this multidimensional space
and by doing so helps us to better understand seemingly disparate approaches to learning. The
framework is in need of a fifth, why dimension. The why dimension helps to place learning
within an evolutionary and cultural perspective and to better understand students’ motivation
to learn and their preferences for what, where, and how to learn.

P. A. Alexander, Schallert, and Reynolds (2009/this issue)
have made an important contribution by organizing the core
principles of learning and placing them in the context of a
what, where, who, and when multidimensional framework.
They are correct in stating that many seemingly disparate
approaches to learning, from behaviorism to constructivism,
differ not because they are necessarily incompatible but be-
cause they occupy different locations in this multidimen-
sional space. Moving forward requires acknowledging this
and understanding the relations among the different perspec-
tives on learning. The Alexander et al. framework is a critical
step forward. At the same time, I was surprised that the why
of learning was not incorporated into the framework. In this
commentary, I provide a rationale for including this fifth
dimension of learning and place this dimension within the
broader framework of evolution.
THE WHY OF LEARNING
Evolutionary development psychology is the study of the so-
cial, psychological, cognitive and neural traits that are com-
mon to all human beings, and the study of the genetic and
experiential mechanisms that shape the developmental ex-
pression of these traits so they are adapted to local conditions
(Geary & Bjorklund, 2000). Evolutionary educational psy-
chology is the study of the relation between evolved cogni-
tive systems and accompanying motivational and behavioral
biases (e.g., play) and the learning of evolutionarily novel
information (e.g., natural selection) and competencies (e.g.,
Correspondence should be addressed to David C. Geary, Department
of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri, 210 McAlester Hall,
Columbia, MO 65211-2500. E-mail: GearyD@missouri.edu
reading) in the modern school and workplace (Geary, 2007).
An evolutionary perspective helps to frame Alexander et al.’s
(2009/this issue) what, where, who, and when of learning and
points to the importance of the why of learning.
Why do children learn easily and with little effort in some
domains, such as language, and often with difficulty and
sometimes not at all in others, such as reading? Why do we
ask children to learn in many of the latter domains? Why
are children (and adults) motivated to learn about their peers
(e.g., through gossip) and why are these activities valued
more highly than learning in many other areas, such as math-
ematics? Why do humans have an extended development
period that allows for evolutionarily novel learning?
The why of learning is the functional component that
ties the what, where, who, and when dimensions to vari-
ous sources of motivation, from evolutionary to cultural to
interindividual. In other words, what children learn (e.g.,
reading vs. language), where they learn it (e.g., school vs.
social discourse), who needs to learn it (e.g., all children
in modern societies but few if any in traditional ones), and
when they learn it (e.g., kindergarten vs. adulthood) depends
on why they need to learn it. Children in traditional societies
today and during nearly all of our evolutionary history did
not need to learn how to read, because their later success
in culturally important activities was not dependent on this
competence. Children in modern societies must learn how to
read to function socially and occupationally in adulthood and
must learn to read early in their schooling because reading is
critical for learning in many content domains, from biology
to history. These cultural differences, as well as historical
change within a culture, help us to frame why children need
to learn one competence and not another and an evolution-
ary perspective helps us to frame why the learning of some
competencies is easy for children and others are difficult.

From an evolutionary perspective, the why addresses the
survival and reproductive functions of the trait. Evolved
functions must be expressed by means of some combina-
tion of proximate brain, perceptual, cognitive, and behav-
ioral mechanisms. The operation of these mechanisms can
result in inherent, reflexive behaviors that do not require
learning per se, as defined by Alexander et al. (2009/this
issue). These can range from the unconditioned-stimulus–
unconditioned-response relations of classical conditioning
(Timberlake, 1994) to bounded rationality and decision mak-
ing (Simon, 1956; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). The latter in-
clude fast and automatic emotional and behavioral responses
to information that has been of significance during human
evolution, for example, selective attention to and processing
of angry facial expressions and corresponding emotional and
behavioral reactions (Öhman, 2002). The combination recre-
ates the stimulus-response relations that led to the evolution
of these systems. The why of this bounded rationality can
be found in the adaptive advantages to the ability to quickly
identify and respond to opportunity and threat; specifically,
opportunities (e.g., to develop a relationship) or threats
(e.g., an angry facial expression) that covaried with survival
and reproductive prospects during our species’ evolutionary
history.
Although these relations would not count as learning us-
ing Alexander et al.’s (2009/this issue) definition, there are
other features of evolved systems that would count. As an ex-
ample, inherent constraints on the range and types of sounds
processed by the auditory system—whether these are shared
with other species—combined with hearing one’s native lan-
guage result in changes in phoneme perception in the 1st
year of life that in turn is part of natural language learning
(Doupe & Kuhl, 1999; Kuhl et al., 1997). These are evolved
systems that are modified by experience, that is, the changes
in these systems represent some form of learning as defined
by Alexander et al. But why are some aspects of the evolved
mind and brain subject to learning-related change and others
not?
I have suggested that the key to understanding plasticity in
evolved systems is variations in selective pressures across-
and within- lifetimes (Geary, 2005). There are some com-
ponents of social relationships, such as processing the basic
architecture of the human face, that are the same from one
generation to the next and during an individual lifetime, but
other aspects of social life are highly variable; the dynamics
of dyadic and intergroup relationships, as examples, are not
entirely predictable. The invariance of the former is predicted
to result in stable, modular brain and cognitive mechanisms
and corresponding stimulus-response relations, as described
above. These fast and automatic stimulus-response relations
are common in our species and in other species. Social behav-
ior of many species of monkey is highly stereotypical, such
that, for example, the evolved behavioral interactions of dom-
inant and submissive individuals is ritualized (Parker, 2003).
These types of fast and automatic behavioral sequences pro-
WHY OF LEARNING 199
vide the advantage of reducing physical aggression, in this
example, but also come at a cost to behavioral flexibility.
The ability to vary behavior and cope with social dynam-
ics in nonroutine ways can provide a competitive advantage.
In comparison to monkeys, the social behavior of great apes,
such as chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), is less ritualized and
thus less predictable from one social encounter to the next
(Parker, 2003). Our own species is extreme in this regard: To
be sure, there are common cross-cultural features of human
social behavior (e.g., attachment, reciprocity in friendships;
Bugental, 2000) but the specifics of these dynamics can vary
considerably from one culture and encounter to the next. So-
cial flexibility and to some extent unpredictability likely pro-
vided our ancestors, and us, with an evolutionary advantage.
Stated differently, individuals who can vary their approaches
to resolving social conflict and who can predict the strate-
gies and counter strategies of others are at a competitive
advantage in comparison to their less flexible peers. Once
an advantage to the creation of variable and less predictable
social and behavioral strategies began to evolve, the poten-
tial for a within-species arms race emerged. The details are
beyond the scope of this commentary, but this type of arms
race appears to have occurred during our evolutionary his-
tory (see R. D. Alexander, 1989; Geary, 2005; Flinn, Geary,
& Ward, 2005). Moreover, as populations of our ancestors
increased in size and as they expanded into various regions
of the world, social competition became more intense and the
ecologies in which they were situated (e.g., seasonal weather
change) less stable. The combination of social and ecological
changes resulted in further advantages to the ability to cope
with highly variable social dynamics and with evolutionarily
novel ecologies.
These types of selection pressures are predicted to result
in increases in the ability to adapt to novelty and change and
thereby an ability to learn new things. The threefold increase
in brain size during human evolution and the near doubling
of the length of the developmental period are consistent with
this prediction (Bailey & Geary, 2009; Bogin, 1999). The
latter includes a long childhood—the period of slow growth
from 6 to 11 years of age—and an extended adolescence. It
is during this time that children and adolescents learn about
the nuances of their local social group and the ecologies in
which they are situated. They learn cultural myths, customs,
and how to achieve success in their group as well as how to
get resources from the ecology; in some ecologies, for in-
stance, it takes 20 years to master hunting (e.g., Kaplan, Hill,
Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000; Palmer, Ellsworth, & Stead-
man, 2009). In short, there are evolved systems that allow us
to learn evolutionarily novel information and to create new
ways of doing culturally important activities.
Across traditional societies, most of the variation in what
children learn from one culture to the next will be organized
around the domains of folk psychology, folk biology, and folk
physics. These respective constellations of abilities support
social relationships and the ability to use other species for
200 GEARY

food and medicine and to navigate and use tools. For chil- the demands of living in a modern society, not the demands
dren and adolescents to learn about the nuances of their social of living in a traditional one. The why of much of secondary
groups and ecologies, there must be accompanying motiva- learning is not at all obvious to children, or even many adults.
tional and behavioral biases that result in the experiences This is the reason children and adolescents would prefer to
that support this type of learning (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, spend time with peers than doing mathematics homework,
2002; Scarr, 1992). These child-initiated activities include despite the fact that the latter activities lay the groundwork
social play with peers, exploration of the ecology, and im- for many modern occupations (Csikszentmihalyi & Hunter,
itation of adults and older children, among other activities. 2003). A why dimension of learning helps us to better un-
The experiences are predicted to result in learning, specifi- derstand these motivational differences, and why learning in
cally, changes in folk systems and knowledge that prepares some domains is more difficult for children than learning
the child for adult life in their culture. in others, and why children prefer some ways of learning
I have proposed that there has been a coevolving change (e.g., peer group discussions) over others (e.g., mathematics
in the brain (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and cogni- worksheets).
tive (e.g., working memory, attentional control) systems that
operate on folk domains such that we can now create highly
CONCLUSION
novel knowledge (e.g., Newtonian physics) and abilities (e.g.,
reading) that go well beyond the variation in folk knowledge
Alexander et al.’s (2009/this issue) what, where, who, and
found across traditional cultures (Geary, 2005, 2007, 2008).
when multidimensional framework helps us to put different
I call this evolutionarily novel knowledge and abilities bio-
theories of learning into perspective and to understand that
logically secondary; as contrasted with biologically primary
disagreements are not necessarily the result of incompati-
folk knowledge. Over the last several millennia, the cross-
bility of one theory of learning or another but sometimes
generational accumulation of secondary cultural knowledge
because the theories occupy different places in this multidi-
and artifacts, such as books, has occurred at such a rapid
mensional space and thus address different questions. Incor-
pace that the attentional and cognitive biases that facilitate
porating a why dimension into Alexander et al.’s framework
the fleshing out of folk abilities during children’s natural
will allow us to better understanding why students prefer
activities do not have evolved counterparts to facilitate the
some methods of learning (e.g., in peer groups) over others
learning of secondary knowledge and abilities.
(e.g., worksheet practice), their motivation or lack thereof
The evolution of human childhood and adolescence might
for engaging in some forms of learning, and will help us
have been to facilitate the learning of culturally important
to better situate the where (classrooms vs. peer groups) and
skills and about social dynamics in their culture, but with the
when (e.g., based on dictates of a multigrade curriculum) of
rapid accumulation of secondary knowledge and the emer-
learning historically and cross-culturally.
gence of modern economies, technologies and so forth, the
From an evolutionary perspective, the why of learning has
what of learning has changed dramatically, as has the where
shifted from implicit to explicit. The motivation to engage in
(modern schools, not peer groups) and the when (e.g., learn-
the activities (e.g., social play) that promote folk learning is
ing whole number arithmetic before fractions) of learning.
built into evolved folk domains and thus there is no reason to
The why of learning has also changed and must be acknowl-
articulate the why of learning to children. In modern societies,
edged in any multidimensional framework for learning. Peo-
the why of learning is more strongly related to historically
ple readily learn about the plants and animals in their local
recent cultural changes and technological and scientific in-
ecology and important aspects of their “essence” (e.g., their
novations than to our evolutionary history, and thus the why
behavioral tendencies; Atran, 1998) but have many miscon-
of learning will not be obvious to students and thus their
ceptions about how natural selection operates on these same
motivation to engage in the associated activities may wane.
species (Shtulman, 2006). There are many other mismatches
An explicit understanding of the why of learning in modern
between peoples’ folk intuitions about the social, biologi-
schools may be important for understanding how to address
cal, and physical worlds and scientific knowledge in these
these motivational issues and for theory builders to under-
domains.
stand why some students have these motivational issues.
There is no need to motivate children and adolescents to
engage in various types of social, exploratory, and object
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