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Akuntansi Keperilakuan Bab 10
Akuntansi Keperilakuan Bab 10
Abstract
Recent empirical studies support self-interest as the sole basis for economic decisions (as predicted by agency
theory). However, cognitive moral development (CMD) theory suggests that decision makers will allow ethical/moral
considerations to constrain their economic behaviour. The purpose of this study is to resolve the essential con¯ict
between the tenets of agency theory and CMD theory. The results of a laboratory experiment suggest that both moral
reasoning level and adverse-selection conditions (self-interest) can have a signi®cant eect on managers' project eva-
luation decisions. Speci®cally, managers are likely to continue a project that is expected to be unpro®table only when
adverse selection conditions are present and moral reasoning level is low. Thus, agency theory may not be generalizable
to accounting-based economic performance. # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Research supports the agency theory contention ®rm, hence an incentive to shirk (Baiman, 1982).
that managers are motivated by self-interests The second condition occurs when a manager pos-
(Harrison & Harrell, 1993; Harrell & Harrison, sesses relevant information that is not available to
1994: subsequently referred to as H&H). The others, hence privately-held information.
H&H studies have developed an expanded view of The results of the H&H studies suggest that
rational economic decision-making based on an project managers experiencing the presence of
agency theory framework. This view suggests a adverse selection conditions (i.e. possess both an
con¯ict of interests arises when individuals are incentive to shirk and privately-held information)
contracted to act in the economic interests of the are likely to act in their own self-interests by con-
®rm and yet are motivated to reach decisions which tinuing to support (their own prior chosen) pro-
maximize their own economic interests. Two con- jects that are likely to be unpro®table. However,
ditions are described where a manager might sacri- when only one or neither of these two factors is
®ce the ®rm's interest for their personal interests. present, the project managers are more likely to
One of these conditions occurs when a manager's discontinue such projects. These ®ndings are con-
own economic interests diverge from those of the sistent with the expanded view of rational deci-
sion-making incorporated into agency theory.
*Corresponding author. Tel:+1-732-571-3663;fax:+1-732-
263-5515. However, these studies fail to consider a pre-
1
The data upon which this study is based may be obtained viously proposed alternative explanation to man-
from the authors upon request. agers' economic decision-making. Noreen (1988)
0361-3682/99/$Ðsee front matter # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
P II: S0361 -3 682( 98) 00027 -0
174 R.W. Rutledge, K.E. Karim/Accounting, Organizations and Society 24 (1999) 173±184
disputes the idea of pure self-interest motivated lower levels. Contracts are often used to allocate
economic decision-making. Casual observation resources and outputs when such a delegation
suggests that while there may be some people who relationship exists (Harris & Raviv, 1978). Agency
are unreservedly opportunistic, others do con- theory is predicated on viewing the ®rm as a set or
strain their own behaviour out of an ethical sensi- nexus of contracts among factors of production
bility or conscience (Noreen, 1988, p. 359). While (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling,
the ®ndings of the H&H studies provide signi®cant 1976; Baiman, 1982), and examines the relation-
results, not all subjects' (i.e. agents') responses were ships between principals (e.g. the ®rm or its senior
motivated by self-interests. Agency theory cannot management) and agents (e.g. project managers).
explain why many subjects in the H&H studies were Within the agency theory framework, both the
willing to sacri®ce their self-interests in order to principal and the agent reach decisions that are
bene®t the interests of their ®rm (i.e. the principal). motivated solely by self-interest (Fama, 1980;
A possible explanation for such behaviour may be Baiman, 1982, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Kanodia
found by examining the proposition discussed by et al., 1989). The principal's interests are assumed
Noreen. That is, many individuals will constrain to be in accordance with the pro®t maximization
their self-interest behaviour due to the in¯uence of motive of the ®rm. However, the agent's self-
ethical considerations. Thus, many individuals will interest may be either in accordance with, or in
reach decisions that bene®t the ®rm (i.e. the overall con¯ict with, the overall interests of the ®rm.
good) because they rely on ethical considerations When the agent's interests are in con¯ict with
to constrain their behaviour. those of the ®rm, the agent is said to have an
The purpose of this study is to provide an incentive to shirk. Thus, an incentive to shirk
improved model of managers' decision-making motivates the agent to make decisions that con¯ict
behaviour. Accordingly, this paper examines the with the pro®t maximization of the ®rm.
potential in¯uence of ethical considerations on The agency model assumes that in order to act
managers' economic decisions when the circum- on the incentive to shirk, the agent must have an
stances for adverse selection (do or do not) exist. opportunity to shirk. Availability of information
Speci®cally, an interaction eect is proposed can provide the vehicle for this opportunity. The
whereby both ethical considerations and adverse problem of adverse selection arises when the agent
selection conditions aect the economic decision is motivated to misrepresent private information
to continue a failing course of action. The in order to implement a decision that con¯icts
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. with the overall interests of the ®rm. If the ®rm
First, is a discussion of relevant theoretical issues and the agent have the same availability of infor-
and the development of testable hypotheses. Sec- mation (i.e. information symmetry), then the ®rm
ond, is a description of the experimental design, can verify whether the agent is acting in accor-
including the procedures used for the ethical eva- dance with the overall interests of the ®rm. The
luation and the decision-making experiment. This agent will not have the opportunity for undetected
is followed by the data analysis and results of the shirking or to make decisions that con¯ict with the
experiment. Lastly, implications and other con- overall interest of the ®rm. However, when the
cluding remarks are provided. agent has private information that is not available
to the ®rm (i.e. information asymmetry), the ®rm
can no longer verify that the agent's decisions are
1. Theoretical issues and hypotheses in accordance with the ®rm's interests. This pro-
vides the agent with the opportunity to shirk by
making decisions that con¯ict with the interests of
1.1. Agency theory the ®rm. When the agent is under conditions of an
incentive to shirk and an opportunity to shirk (e.g.
In most organizations, decision-making author- private information) the problem of adverse selec-
ity is delegated from higher levels within the ®rm to tion can occur. Adverse selection will in¯uence the
R.W. Rutledge, K.E. Karim/Accounting, Organizations and Society 24 (1999) 173±184 175
agent to act in his/her own self-interest and dis- manner. Therefore, the assumption implicitly dis-
regard the interests of the ®rm. regards the existence (and possible in¯uence) of
Harrell and Harrison (1994) found support for the high ethical reasoning individual.
the contention that when agents (e.g. project Prior research indicates that ethical and moral
managers) have both an incentive to shirk and reasoning levels have a direct relationship with
privately-held information, they will act in their one's ethical performance. For example, Ponemon
own self-interest and not maximize the expected (1992) examined the underreporting of audit time
pro®ts of the ®rm. The actions of agents in their behaviour of auditors from a national public
self-interest provides an explanation as to why accounting ®rm. The study reports a signi®cant
some managers allocate additional resources to a negative correlation (p < 0.05) between DIT P-
project, even when unfavourable economic pro- scores (a measure of moral reasoning level) and
spects indicate the project should be cancelled (e.g. the extent of underreported audit time. The results
a failing project). Accordingly, the ®rst hypothesis support the contention that auditors at lower
of this study is stated as follows: levels of moral reasoning underreport audit time
more than those at higher moral reasoning levels.
H1. Project managers who experience Ponemon (1993) examined the eects of ethical
conditions associated with adverse selection intervention and ethical reasoning on students'
(both an incentive to shirk and possess pri- economic decisions in a Prisoners' Dilemma type
vately-held information) will exhibit a greater economic choice experiment. He established a
tendency to continue an unpro®table project decision rule based on DIT P-scores to classify
than project managers that do not experience each subject as either a freerider or cooperative.
these conditions. The simple decision rule correctly classi®ed 28 of
37 subjects (p < 0.05). The study concluded that
This study extends the Harrell and Harrison students' ethical reasoning may be an important
research in two ways: (1) it expands potential factor in explaining an individual's payment
support for the hypothesis by testing it in a choice. (Ponemon, 1993, p. 206).
modi®ed context (i.e. modi®ed test instrument), Tsui and Gul (1996) examined the eects of
and (2) the current study uses subjects that are ethical reasoning and locus-of-control on auditors'
more appropriate for the required decision-mak- ability to resist a client's request to ignore unrec-
ing task. They are more mature and have sig- orded liabilities. The authors found a signi®cant
ni®cantly greater real world business experience interaction between ethical reasoning and locus-
(see demographics). of-control on the auditors' responses (p < 0.04).
High ethical reasoning auditors were more likely
1.2. The eects of ethical reasoning (than low) to resist management's pressure, espe-
cially for the external locus-of-control auditors.
Agency theory assumes that an individual's The studies discussed above provide evidence of
actions are endogenously derived and based on a direct relationship between ethical reasoning and
well speci®ed preferences and beliefs. When performance. They provide evidence that the ethi-
agency theory is applied to an economic setting, cal reasoning of project managers is likely to
the individual's preferences and beliefs are attrib- in¯uence their decisions. That is, many profes-
uted an extreme and immediate self-interest and sional decisions are conditioned by one's beliefs
sel®sh character. This assumption has been criti- and values. At the lowest level of moral reasoning,
cized for its simplicity and narrowness (McKean, individuals make their decisions based on obedi-
1975; Collard, 1978; Noreen, 1988; Baiman, 1990). ence and punishment. They may act in their own
It disregards the possibility of an altruistic or self-interest if the probability of detection and
unsel®sh belief system. Moreover, this assump- punishment are low. However, at higher levels of
tion ignores the possibility that some individuals, moral reasoning, individuals will make decisions that
for ethical reasons, may not act in such an egoistic are conditioned by their feelings and expectations
176 R.W. Rutledge, K.E. Karim/Accounting, Organizations and Society 24 (1999) 173±184
about their relationships with others and/or by H3. (a) When the conditions for adverse
their self-chosen ethical principles. selection are present (i.e. an incentive to shirk
In the context of this study, low moral reason- and private information exist), project man-
ing level managers should be more likely than high agers with a low level of moral reasoning will
moral reasoning level managers to act in their own have a greater preference for continuing an
self-interests. This will in¯uence them to continue unpro®table project than project managers with
a project, even in the face of probable unfavorable a high level of moral reasoning.
economic prospects. Accordingly, the second
hypothesis of this study is stated as follows: (b) When the conditions for adverse selection
are not present (i.e. an incentive to shirk and
H2. Preference for continuing an unpro®t- private information do not exist), there will be
able project will be greater for project man- no signi®cant dierence in the preference for
agers with a low level of moral reasoning than continuing an unpro®table project between
for project managers with a high level of moral project managers with a low level of moral
reasoning. reasoning and project managers with a high
level of moral reasoning.
It is likely that the con¯icting forces between
agency theory in¯uences (e.g. self-interest beha-
viour) and CMD theory (e.g. moral development) 2. Method
will produce a predictable outcome. That is, moral
development is expected to constrain managers' self- A laboratory experiment was conducted to see if
interest decision-making behaviour in the presence moral reasoning has a constraining in¯uence on a
of adverse selection conditions (Noreen, 1988; Har- project manager's evaluation decision. A 22
rell & Harrison, 1994). This implies an interaction experimental design is used to examine this issue.
between the two main eects. When conditions for The dependent variable is the subjects' preference
adverse selection are not present (i.e. an incentive for dis/continuing a project (as more fully descri-
and opportunity to shirk), low moral reasoning bed below). The following is a description of the
managers will act to satisfy their own interests, and subjects and procedures used to collect the experi-
high moral reasoning managers will constrain their mental data.
behaviour. But when conditions for adverse selec-
tion are not present (i.e. an incentive and opportu- 2.1. Subjects
nity do not arise), the dierence between the actions
of managers with low moral reasoning and man- The study included a total of 67 participants.
agers with high moral reasoning should not be sub- Each participant possessed an undergraduate
stantial. Both types of managers' interests will be degree and was enrolled in a Master Degree pro-
aligned with those of the ®rm.2 Accordingly, the gram (MBA or MS-accounting) at a large public
third hypothesis predicts an interaction eect university in the Southeast US. Most of the sub-
between moral reasoning level and the conditions jects had taken graduate level courses including
associated with adverse selection, as follows: courses in ®nancial and managerial accounting.
The average subject was 27 years of age. Thirty-
eight (56.7%) of the subjects were male and 29
2
When adverse selection conditions do not exist (no incen- (43.3%) were female. Most of the subjects had
tive to shirk and no private information), the actions of high budgetingexperience (an average of 2.5 years), and
and low moral reasoning will make the decision based on supervisory experience (an average of 2.7 years).
abedience and punishment considerations. They will dis-
Ninety-one percent of the subjects had profes-
continue a project that is expected to be unpro®table because of
the likelihood of detection and punishment. High moral rea- sional business experience; the average length of
soning managers are likely to discontinue the project based on such experience was in excess of 5 years. Addi-
ethical principles. tionally, 60% of the subjects had one or more
R.W. Rutledge, K.E. Karim/Accounting, Organizations and Society 24 (1999) 173±184 177
courses in ethics. The only signi®cant dierence in of return for the remaining 3 years is projected to
the background experience between males and be below the minimum acceptance rate (ÿ2.01
females was where the males in the sample were versus 16.00%). Subjects were instructed to accept
found to have greater budgeting experience than the accuracy of all computations.
the females (p < 0.04). The relevant work experi- Suggestions for improving upon prior experi-
ence and education of the participants indicate mental project evaluation tasks were employed in
that they were well quali®ed for the manage- this study. For example, both retrospective (past-
rial decision-making task that was required of oriented) and prospective (future-oriented) infor-
them. mation were provided to the participants (Conlon
& Leatherwood, 1989). Concrete, rather than
2.2. Procedures ambiguous, circumstances were presented that
included probabilistic information about future
In the experimental task, all subjects were performance expectations (Northcraft & Wolf,
instructed to assume the roll of project manager 1984; Bowen, 1987). Additionally, the opportunity
(see Appendix for the two scenarios presented to cost of a decision to continue each project was
the subjects). 4 years ago, as project manager, they provided (Northcraft & Neale, 1986).
invested in a project with an estimated 7-year life. Each subject was randomly assigned to com-
At this time they are managing the project and plete one of the two cases.3 In one version of the
must decide whether the project should be con- case, subjects experienced the two conditions
tinued or discontinued. The participants were associated with adverse selection: private infor-
instructed that the actual results of the project mation, and an incentive to shirk. They were told
were better than expected during the ®rst 4 years that (1) the information about the project's success
(annual cash in¯ows were originally projected to or failure is not available to others in their ®rm or
be $320,000 and actual annual cash in¯ows were industry (private information), and (2) the dis-
$350,000 for the ®rst 4 years). Unexpected events continuance of the project would cause to others
have caused the projected annual cash in¯ows to in the ®rm and industry to believe the project was
be only $25,000 for the remaining 3 years of the a failure. This would damage their reputation as a
project. The decision at this time is between con- highly talented manager and probably cause a
tinuing or discontinuing the project. If the project competing ®rm to withdraw an oer of a more
is discontinued, the cash from the salvage of the important position at a higher salary (an incentive
project can be used to purchase government bonds to shirk).
yielding 10% annually for the next three years. If In the second version of the case, the subjects
the project is continued, the seven-year (entire did not experience the conditions associated with
project life) expected return will be in excess of the adverse selection. They were told that (1) the
minimum acceptance rate for new investments information about the project's success or failure
(17.29 versus 16.00%). However, the internal rate is available to others in their ®rm and industry
(public information), and (2) the discontinuance
of the project would cause others in the ®rm and
industry to believe the project was a failure, but
Table 1
Demographic data (in mean years except for SROM scores)
would not damage their well-established reputa-
tion (reduced incentive to shirk).
Males Females Total
(n=38) (n=29) (n=67)
Fig. 1. Kohlberg's six stage of cognitive moral development [adapted from Kohlberg (1969)]
level of moral reasoning.7 The independent vari- 3. Data analysis and results
able of adverse selection condition (as described in
the procedures section, above) also varied at two A two-way ANOVA was used to examine H1
levels. The subjects either: (1) experienced the through H3. The ANOVA includes the following
conditions associated with adverse selection two factors: (1) an adverse selection condition
(adverse selection conditions present), or (2) did variable with two levels (present and not present),
not experience the conditions associated with and (2) a moral reasoning variable with two levels
adverse selection (adverse selection conditions not (low and high). The dependent variable is each
present). individual's project evaluation response. The
Subjects completed the experiment by ®lling out results of the ANOVA are presented in Table 2.
a background questionnaire designed to collect Hypothesis 1 (H1) predicts that the adverse
information about demographic characteristics, selection conditions will aect a project manager's
and prior work and educational experience. After project evaluation decision. Table 2 indicates that
completing the questionnaire, subjects were the level of the adverse selection condition had a
debriefed. statistically signi®cant main eect on the man-
ager's project evaluations (p < 0.0001). As Table 3
indicates, when adverse selection conditions are
7
The SROMs scoring was done after the experiment proce- present (i.e. subjects have an incentive to shirk and
dures were complete. This division of subjects between high possess private information), subjects' mean eva-
and low levels was chosen because it represents the largest gap
luation was 4.882, whereas the mean evaluation
between scores that is near the median. Additional using only
the top third of SROM scores as high level and the bottom for subjects when adverse selection conditions
third of SROM scores as low level yielded essentially the same were not present was 7.677. This result is con-
results as presented here. sistent with H1, since project managers had a
180 R.W. Rutledge, K.E. Karim/Accounting, Organizations and Society 24 (1999) 173±184
greater preference for continuing a failing project reasoning is 5.613, and for subjects with a high level
when conditions for adverse selection exist than of moral reasoning is 6.806. This result is consistent
when such conditions did not exist. with H2, since project managers' preference for
Hypothesis 2 (H2) suggests that moral reasoning continuing an unpro®table project were greater for
level will aect a manager's project evaluation deci- managers with low moral reasoning levels than for
sion. Table 2 indicates that there is a statistically managers with high moral reasoning levels.
signi®cant main eect for the level of moral reason- An interaction between moral reasoning levels
ing (p < 0.0323). As indicated in Table 3, the mean and adverse selection conditions is predicted by
evaluation for subjects with a low level of moral Hypothesis 3 (H3). As indicated in Table 2, this
interaction is statistically signi®cant (p < 0.0166).
Table 2 A closer look at Table 3 indicates the nature of
Two-way analysis of variance results for managers' project this interaction. When the conditions for adverse
evaluation decisions selection are not present (i.e. no private informa-
Source DF SS MS F Pr>F tion or incentive to shirk), the dierence between
the evaluations of high versus low moral reasoning
Model 3 194.446 64.815 10.97 0.0001
level subjects is only 0.162 (i.e. 7.750±7.588).
Error 63 372.240 5.909
Corrected total 66 However, when the conditions for adverse selec-
R2=0.343 tion are present, the dierence between the eva-
luations of high and low moral reasoning level
Test of Hypotheses 1±3 using the type III MS for subject as an
error term:
subjects is 2.772 (i.e. 6.105±3.333). These results
are consistent with H3, and suggest that ethics
Source DF TYPE III SS F Pr>F constrains self-interest based behaviour.
Moral 1 28.314 4.79 0.0323
reasoning
Adverse 1 144.649 24.48 0.0001 4. Discussion
selection
Moral 1 35.768 6.05 0.0166
reasoning
4.1. Limitations
adverse
selection The ®ndings and implications of this study should
be considered within the context of its strengths and
Table 3 limitations. Laboratory experiments have the
Mean project evaluation decision responses for moral reasoning potential for high internal validity due to the con-
and adverse selection condition variables (including std. error trolled environment within which the decision-mak-
and cell size) ing behaviour can be studied. However, such
Moral Adverse selection condition Totals control should lead to caution in generalizing the
reasoning results to other groups or to other situations.
Not present Present
level Further, the usual caveats related to controlled
experiments apply. For instance, the subjects indi-
Low 7.750 3.333 5.613 cated that their background included substantial
(0.413) (0.558) (0.526) managerial, budgeting, and educational experi-
n=16 n=15 n=31 ence. Since they were not randomly selected from
High 7.588 6.105 6.806 the population of all managers that make project
(0.781) (0.540) (0.476) evaluation decisions, they may not be representa-
n=17 n=19 n=36
tive of this population. As with all experiments of
Totals 7.667 4.882 6.254 this type, the case situations are simpli®ed abstrac-
(0.443) (0.452) (0.358)
tions of real world situations. Therefore, although
n=33 n=34 n=67
care was taken in order to include all necessary and
1= Continue project; 10= Discontinue. relevant information, the cases remain abstractions.
R.W. Rutledge, K.E. Karim/Accounting, Organizations and Society 24 (1999) 173±184 181
Despite these limitations, the following discussion the ®rst two hypotheses must be interpreted with
is supported by the results of this study. caution.The signi®cant interaction between
adverse selection conditions and a manager's ethi-
4.2. Discussion of ®ndings cal reasoning level can be interrupted in two dif-
ferent mannners, as follows: (1) a manager's
According to agency theory, self-interest is the ethical reasoning level has a grater eect on pro-
basis for managers' economic decision behaviour. ject evaluation decisions under high adverse selec-
This con¯icts with implications from CMD theory tion conditions than on decisions under low
that individuals' decision behaviour is in¯uenced adverse selection conditions, or (2) adverse selec-
by their level of moral development and ethical tion conditions have a greater impact on the pro-
principles. This study uses a laboratory experi- ject evaluation decisions of managers with low
ment to consider this con¯ict by examining the ethical reasoning than managers with high ethical
eect of ethical considerations on decisions reasonign levels. As predicted by H3 (and sug-
reached under conditions of adverse selection (e.g. gested by ethical theory), the adverse selection
on managers' project evaluation decisions). conditions have the greatest impact on the project
Three research hypotheses were developed and evaluation decisions of managers with low ethical
tested in a laboratory experiment. Adverse selec- reasoning levels. Such managers allowed the pre-
tion conditions (an incentive to shirk and private sence of agency conditions (i.e. incentive and
information) were manipulated to test for a main opportunity to act in their self-interest) to aect
eect on managers' project evaluation decisions. their economic decisions. Alternatively, project
Moral reasoning level was also employed as an evaluation decisions of managers with high levels
independent variable in an attempt to examine its of ethical reasoning were not signi®cantly in¯u-
impact on managers' project evaluation decisions. enced by the presence of adverse selection condi-
Based on the ®rst and second hypotheses, main tions. It is interesting to note that managers were
eects for the adverse selection conditions and more likely to continue than discontinue a failing
moral reasoning level were expected. Further, in project only when both the conditions for adverse
conjunction with the third hypothesis, an interaction selection are present, and the moral reasoning level
was predicted between the adverse selection condi- is low. This can be seen from Table 3, where the
tions and the manager's level of moral reasoning. only cell that has a mean response less than the
A statistically signi®cant main eect was found continue/discontinue mid-point of 5.5 is in the
for adverse selection conditions on a manager's presence of adverse selection conditions and low
project evaluation decision. This supports H1, and moral reasoning level. This supports the contention
is consistent with agency theory. It suggests that that ethics constrains self-interest based behaviour.
managers are more likely to continue a probable
failing project under conditions of adverse selec- 4.3. Implications
tion (an incentive to shirk and private informa-
tion) than when they are not under such The most important implication from this study
conditions. A statistically signi®cant main eect relates to the generalizability of agency theory in
was found for the manager's moral reasoning level the domain of accounting-based economic
on his/her project evaluation decision. This sup- decisions. That is, accounting information can
ports H2, and suggests that managers are more in¯uence manager's decisions. However, agency
likely to discontinue probable failing projects when theory fails to explain many of the decisions that
they have a high level of moral reasoning than result from the receipt of such information. The
when they have a low level of moral reasoning. results of this study suggest that agency models of
Further, a statistically signi®cant interaction self-interest based managerial decision-making
was found between adverse selection conditions are incomplete and need to be re®ned to include
and the manager's moral reasoning level. This other potential in¯uences. In particular, the con-
supports H3, and suggests that the results from tention from agency theory that individuals make
182 R.W. Rutledge, K.E. Karim/Accounting, Organizations and Society 24 (1999) 173±184
economic decisions based solely on their self- would, therefore, cause no signi®cant damage to
interest is not supported by this study. Rather, your well-established reputation.
managerial self-interest may be constrained by Four years ago, you decided to invest
ethical considerations, which casts much doubt on $1,000,000 into machinery to produce a new pro-
the agency theory assumption that behaviour is duct, product A. Your decision was based on the
motivated solely be self interest. following budgeted information:
well established reputation as a highly talented machinery can be sold for $100,000. This amount
manager. The information about this project's could be invested in government bonds to yield
projected unfavorable future performance is 10% annually for the next 3 years. If the project is
already widely known to others in your ®rm and continued now, the results presented below are
industry since the actual information above is expected (the ®rm's discount rate and minimum
public information. acceptance rate remain at 16%):
Will you continue or discontinue project A?
(please circle one of the numbers on the scale below) Payback period for entire product
life (years 1±7) 2.667 years
De®nitely De®nitly Internal rate of return for entire
Continue Discontinue product life (years 1±7) is above
1 2 3 4 5 j 6 7 8 9 10 the 16% minimum 17.29%
Internal rate of return for
A.1.Case 2: High adverse selection condition remaining 3 years of product
(incentive to shirk, private information) A (years 5±7) is below the 16%
You are a junior project manager with a growing minimum ÿ2.01%
reputation for completing pro®table projects. This
growing reputation of successfully managing pro- If you decide to discontinue the project now,
jects has recently caused a competing ®rm to initiate others in your ®rm and industry will believe the
recruiting discussions for a more important position project was a failure, which will damage your
with a substantially higher salary. However, being reputation as a highly talented manager. This will
associated with a project which is unpro®table probably cause the competing ®rm to withdraw its
would damage your growing reputation and your oer of a more important position at a substantially
immediate marketability. Four years ago, you higher salary. As manager of the project, the
decided to invest $1,000,000 into machinery to interim information about its success or failure
produce a new product, product A. Your decision presented above is available only to you; this infor-
was based on the following budgeted information: mation is not available to others in your ®rm or
industry. If you continue the project now, no further
Lifetime of product 7 years progress reviews are planned, and therefore, no
Annual net cash in¯ows $320,000 information about the project's success or failure
Salvage value of machinery after will be known to others in your ®rm or industry
7 years $50,000 until the project is completed (in three years); your
Discount rate and minimum reputation as a highly talented manager will remain
acceptance rate for new investments 16% intact.
Payback period 3.125 years Will you continue or discontinue project A?
Internal rate of return is above (please circle one of the numbers on the scale
the 16% minimum 25.86% below)