JUST COMPENSATION
vs.
Invoking Ministerio v. City of Cebu, 40
SCRA 464, the Supreme Court said that
suit may lie because the doctrine of State
immunity cannot be used to perpetrate
an injustice. This ruling was reiterated in
De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 223 SCRA 11, where it was held
that the “public respondents’ belief that
the property is public, even if buttressed
by statements of other public officials, is
no reason for the unjust taking of
petitioner’s property”; after all, the TCT
was in the name of the petitioner.
WHETHER MARINE MAMMALS,
THROUGH THEIR STEWARDS, HAVE
LEGAL STANDING TO PURSUE THE
CASE;
As to standing, the Court declined to
extend the principle of standing beyond
natural and juridical persons, even
though it recognized that the current
trend in Philippine jurisprudence “moves
towards simplification of procedures and
facilitating court access in environmental
cases.” Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court
explained, “the need to give the Resident
Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any
Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to
bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws.”
1
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y
MACARAMBON
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002
FACTS: The accused was convicted of
violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act). The antecedent facts of his
conviction are as follows:
Evidence for the prosecution shows that
on March 11, 1999, an interisland
passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5,
sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about
3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel
was about to dock at the port of Iligan
City when its security officer, Diesmo,
received a complaint from passenger
Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy
suspected one of her co-passengers at
cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and
four (4) other members of the vessel
security force accompanied Canoy to
search for the suspect whom they later
found at the economy section. The
suspect was identified as the accused,
Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was
informed of the complaint and was
invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With
his consent, he was bodily searched, but
no jewelry was found. He was then
escorted by 2 security agents back to the
economy section to get his baggage. The
accused took a Samsonite suitcase and
brought this back to the cabin. When
requested by the security, the accused
opened the suitcase, revealing a brown
bag and small plastic packs containing
white crystalline substance. Suspecting
the substance to be “shabu,” the security
personnel immediately reported the
matter to the ship captain and took
pictures of the accused beside the
suitcase and its contents. They also
called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance.
But the accused countered this by saying
that the Samsonite suitcase containing
the methamphetamine hydrochloride or
“shabu” was forcibly opened and
searched without his consent, and hence,
in violation of his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
Any evidence acquired pursuant to such
unlawful search and seizure, he claims,
is inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid
HELD: YES
The right against unreasonable search
and seizure is a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution. Evidence
acquired in violation of this right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Whenever this right is
challenged, an individual may choose
between invoking the constitutional
protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It
should be stressed, however, that
protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its
agent. The constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures
applies as a restraint directed only
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against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against
the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the
accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only
after they found “shabu” inside the
suitcase that they called the Philippine
Coast Guard for assistance. The search
and seizure of the suitcase and the
contraband items was therefore carried
out without government intervention, and
hence, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure
does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the
accused-appellant that the search and
seizure performed by the vessel security
personnel should be considered as one
conducted by the police authorities for
like the latter, the former are armed and
tasked to maintain peace and order. The
vessel security officer in the case at bar is
a private employee and does not
discharge any governmental function.
NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the
following facts must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of
the object identified as a prohibited or a
regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized
by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
The things in possession of a person are
presumed by law to be owned by him. To
overcome this presumption, it is
necessary to present clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. In this case, the
accused points to a certain Alican “Alex”
Macapudi as the owner of the
contraband, but presented no evidence to
support his claim. No witnesses were
presented to prove that there is such a
living, breathing, flesh and blood person
named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted
the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if
he does exist, he has friends, fellow
businessmen and acquaintances who
could testify and support the claim of the
accused. Mere denial of ownership will
not suffice especially if, as in the case at
bar, it is the keystone of the defense of
the accused-appellant. Stories can easily
be fabricated. It will take more than bare-
bone allegations to convince this Court
that a courier of dangerous drugs is not
its owner and has no knowledge or intent
to possess the same.
PUBLIC ASSEMBLY
SEC. 4. PERMIT WHEN REQUIRED
AND WHEN NOT REQUIRED. — A
written permit shall be required for any
person or persons to organize and hold a
public assembly in a public place.
However, no permit shall be required if
the public assembly shall be done or
made in a freedom park duly established
by law or ordinance or in private
property, in which case only the consent
of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required, or in the
campus of a government-owned and
3
operated educational institution which
shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational
institution. Political meetings or rallies
held during any election campaign period
as provided for by law are not covered by
this Act.
SEC. 5. APPLICATION
REQUIREMENTS. — ALL
APPLICATIONS FOR A PERMIT SHALL
COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING
GUIDELINES:
(a) The applications shall be in writing
and shall include the names of the
leaders or organizers; the purpose of
such public assembly; the date, time and
duration thereof, and place or streets to
be used for the intended activity; and the
probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the
public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the
duty and responsibility of applicant
under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the
office of the mayor of the city or
municipality in whose jurisdiction the
intended activity is to be held, at least
five (5) working days before the scheduled
public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which
must be duly acknowledged in writing,
the office of the city or municipal mayor
shall cause the same to immediately be
posted at a conspicuous place in the city
or municipal building.
SEC. 6. ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON
THE APPLICATION. —
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf to issue or
grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present
danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or
public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his
behalf shall act on the application within
two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the
permit shall be deemed granted. Should
for any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept the
application for a permit, said application
shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and
shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is
imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who
must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in
writing and served on the application
within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit,
the applicant may contest the decision in
an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal
Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the
Intermediate Appellate Court, its
decisions may be appealed to the
appropriate court within forty-eight (48)
hours after receipt of the same. No appeal
bond and record on appeal shall be
required. A decision granting such permit
or modifying it in terms satisfactory to
the applicant shall, be immediately
executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this
section shall be decided within twenty-
four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases
filed hereunder shall be immediately
endorsed to the executive judge for
disposition or, in his absence, to the next
in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by
formal appeals are hereby allowed.
4
KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, ONG G.R.
NO. 177721 JULY 3, 2007
CITIZENSHIP, NATURALIZATION
DECEMBER 4, 2017
FACTS:
Respondent announced an appointment
in favor of respondent Ong as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up
the vacancy created by the of Associate
Justice R. J. Callejo, Sr. Petitioners claim
that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen,
that this fact is plain and incontestable,
and that his own birth certificate
indicates his Chinese citizenship.
Petitioners contend that the appointment
extended to respondent Ong through
respondent Executive Secretary is
patently unconstitutional and issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
IS SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE ONG A
NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN?
RULING:
No. It is clear from the records of the
Court that respondent Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-
born status by the Bureau of Immigration
and the DOJ cannot amend the final
decision of the trial court stating that
respondent Ong and his mother were
naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, no substantial change or
correction in an entry in a civil register
can be made without a judicial order,
and, under the law, a change in
citizenship status is a substantial
change.
The series of events and long string of
alleged changes in the nationalities of
respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various
births, marriages and deaths, all entail
factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings so as to correct the existing
records on his birth and citizenship. The
chain of evidence would have to show
that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s
mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to
what still appears in the records of this
Court. Respondent Ong has the burden
of proving in court his alleged ancestral
tree as well as his citizenship under the
time-line of three Constitutions. Until
this is done, respondent Ong cannot
accept an appointment to this Court as
that would be a violation of the
Constitution. For this reason, he can be
prevented by injunction from doing so.
FIRESTONE CERAMICS VS CA / Civil Service Commission,
REPUBLIC VS CA
FACTS:
 This case involves a 99-hectare
land presumptively belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines,
which land had been adjudicated
to private individuals by a court
alleged to be without jurisdiction.
 The assailed decision does not
indicate the classification of the
land in question, when the herein
private respondents obtained their
decree of registration thereover.
 Since the validity of the said
decision and the original certificate
of title as well as transfer
certificates of title issued pursuant
thereto hinges on the classification
of subject area at the time it was so
adjudicated, determination of the
validity of the disposition thereof is
in order.
 Petitioner filed Motions to Refer to
the Court En Banc these
consolidated cases
ISSUE:
WON the SC should hear the case en banc
HELD:
YES. Under Supreme Court Circular No.
2-89, as amended by the Resolution of
5
November 18, 1993: the following are
considered en banc cases:
1. Cases in which the
constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law,
executive order, or
presidential decree,
proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which
the appealed decision
imposes the death penalty;
3. Cases raising novel
questions of law;
4. Cases affecting
ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions,
resolutions or orders of the
Commission on Elections,
and Commission on Audit;
6. Cases where the penalty
to be imposed is the
dismissal of a judge, officer
or employee of the judiciary,
disbarment of a lawyer, or
either the suspension of any
of them for a period of more
than one (1) year or a fine
exceeding P10,000.00 or
both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or
principle laid down by the
court en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed;
8. Cases assigned to a
division which in the opinion
of at least three (3) members
thereof merit the attention of
the court en banc and are
acceptable to a majority of
the actual membership of
the court en banc; and
9. All other cases as the
court en banc by a majority
of its actual membership
may deem of sufficient
importance to merit its
attention.
In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court conceded that it is
not infallible. Should any error of
judgment be perceived, it does not
blindly adhere to such error, and the
parties adversely affected thereby are
not precluded from seeking relief
therefrom, by way of a motion for
reconsideration. In this jurisdiction,
rectification of an error, more than
anything else, is of paramount
importance.
On March 8, 2000, the Third Division
voted 4-1 to deny petitioners' motion to
transfer these cases to the Banc. Thus, on
March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on
the consulta and thereafter, voted 9-5 to
accept the cases for the Banc to pass upon
in view of the finding that the cases above
entitled are of sufficient importance to
merit its attention. Evidently, the action
of the Court under the premises is a
legitimate and valid exercise of its
RESIDUAL POWER within the
contemplation of paragraph 9 of the
Resolution En Banc of November 18,
1993, which reads: "All other cases as
the court en banc by a majority of its
actual membership may deem of
sufficient importance to merit its
attention."
Untenable is the contention of Justice
Panganiban that the Chief Justice and the
eight (8) Associate Justices who voted to
treat these consolidated cases as En
Banc cases, have not given any cogent or
compelling reason for such action.
Considering that paragraph 9 of the
Resolution of this Court dated November
18, 1993, has been cited to support the
majority opinion, it is decisively clear that
these consolidated cases have been found
to be of sufficient importance to merit the
attention and disposition of the entire
Court en banc and therefore, the prayer of
the Republic of the Philippines and the
private petitioners for the
reconsideration, is meritorious. The
aforesaid finding by the Court
constitutes a reason cogent and
compelling enough to warrant the
majority ruling that the Court En
Banc has to act upon and decide
petitioners' motions for
reconsideration.
It bears stressing that where, as in the
present cases, the Court En
Banc entertains a case for its
resolution and disposition, it does so
without implying that the Division of
origin is incapable of rendering
objective and fair justice. The action of
the Court simply means that the nature of
the cases calls for en banc attention and
consideration. Neither can it be concluded
that the Court has taken undue advantage
of sheer voting strength. It was merely
guided by the well-studied finding and
sustainable opinion of the majority of its
actual membership — that, indeed,
subject cases are of sufficient importance
meriting the action and decision of the
whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil
that all the members of this highest Court
of the land are always embued with the
noblest of intentions in interpreting and
applying the germane provisions of law,
jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of
the Court — to the end that public interest
be duly safeguarded and rule of law be
observed.
In the two consolidated cases under
consideration, however, the Motions for
Reconsideration of the petitioners,
Republic of the Philippines and Firestone
Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending and
unresolved.
Taking into account the importance of
these cases and the issues raised, let
alone the enormous value of the area in
litigation, which is claimed as government
property, there is merit in the prayer of
petitioners that their pending motions for
reconsideration should be resolved by the
Court En Banc.
WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases
are considered and treated as en
banc cases