DR. RUBEN C. BARTOLOME VS.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 243288, 28 AUGUST 2019

FACTS:
Ruben C. Bartolome filed a petition to change his name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court before the RTC
of Parañaque City. The petitioner prays for the correction of his name from “Feliciano Barthlome” as appearing in his
birth certificate to the name that he allegedly use since his childhood, “Ruben [Cruz] Bartolome”. After the posting and
publication the petitioner presented different proofs of his identity which all bears the name “Ruben C. Bartolome.

The RTC denied the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, insufficiency of evidence, and
improper venue.It was held that the procedure sought for the change of the petitioner’s first name is incorrect, and RA
9048 is the proper remedy. As regards with the prayer to correct the last name it was denied for improper venue. It was
further held that the RTC of Manila where the civil registrar is located is the proper venue, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Lastly, the evidences presented was not sufficient to prove that he had been habitually called
“Ruben C. Bartolome” since childhood.

The CA held that the petitioner should have filed the correction in the entries of his birth certificate under RA
9048, instead of Rule 103. It was likewise held that the petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the
surname of his father and his siblings is spelled as “Bartolome”.

The OSG argued that the CA correctly denied the petition. A petition pursuant to RA 9048 before the civil
registry should have been filed first in order to change his first name and to correct the spelling of his surname.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the change/correction sought in the petitioner’s first name, middle name, and surname, as
appearing in his birth certificate, from Feliciano Bartolome to Ruben Cruz Bartolome should be filed under RA 9048,
Rule 103, or Rule 108.

HELD:
The Court DENIED the petition for lack of merit, and AFFIRMED the decision of the CA.

The changes sought by the petitioner are all covered by RA 9048. In connection to this, the change sought in
the petitioner’s first name from “Feliciano” to “Ruben” is covered by Section 4(2) of RA 9048, as amended, on the
ground that he had habitually and continuously used “Ruben”, and is publicly known by that first name. Further, the
inclusion of the petitioner’s middle name “Cruz”, and the correction of his last name from “Batholome” to “Bartolome”,
a mere clerical error, and is covered by Section 2 of the said law. The latter may be readily corrected by merely referring
to the existing records of the Civil Registrar such as the last name of the petitioner’s parents and immediate family
members. Therefore, the petition should have been filed in the local civil registry of the city or municipality where the
records sought to be changed or corrected is being kept, pursuant to Section 3 of RA 9048, as amended.

The petitioner can only avail the appropriate judicial remedies when the changes/corrections sought through
the administration’s proceeding are denied. Hence, if the prayer to administratively change the first name was denied,
the same may be brought under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. And if the prayers to administratively correct the middle
name and surname were denied, the same may be brought under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

DESIDERIO DALISAY INVESTMENTS, INC. v.s. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

G.R. No. 231053, APRIL 4, 2018

DOCTRINE:
 For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

FACTS:
 Involved is a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-18203, T-18204, T-255986, and
T-255985, with an aggregate area of 2,450 sq.m., including the building erected thereon, situated in Agdao, Davao
City.
 Sometime in the year 1976, respondent Social Security System (SSS) filed a case before the Social Security
Commission (SSC) against the Dalisay Group of Companies (DGC) for the collection of unremitted SSS premium
contributions of the latter's employees.
 On March 11, 1977, Desiderio Dalisay, then President of petitioner Desiderio Dalisay Investments, Inc. (DDII), sent
a Letter to SSS offering the subject land and building to offset DGC's liabilities subject of the aforementioned cases
at P3, 500,000.
 On July 24, 1982, DDII issued a Resolution stating that the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-18204 and T-
8227 together with all improvements thereon be sold to SSS in order to settle the unremitted premiums
and penalty obligations of DDII, Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., and Desidal Fruits, Inc. In the same Board
Resolution, Desiderio Dalisay, or in his absence, Veronica Dalisay-Tirol (Dalisay-Tirol), was authorized to sign in
behalf of the corporation any and all papers pertinent to effect full and absolute transfer of said properties to the
SSS.
 On May 21, 1982, the real estate appraisers Joson, Capili and Associates sent a letter to him informing him
that the total value of the lots is (P1,954,777.78), rounded to P1,955,000. This Appraisal Report was then
indorsed to the SSC.
 On May 27, 1982, during a meeting (1982 Meeting) of the SSS' Committee attended by Atty. Cabarroguis,
representing DGC, explained that the DGC is in financial distress and is in no way capable of settling its obligation
in cash. When asked what the DGC's offer is, he stated that he has "the authority to offer [the properties] in the
amount of 2 million pesos." He also assured them that that they will turn the properties over to SSS free of liens
and encumbrances. The offer for dacion was accepted at the appraised value of P2, 000,000.

 As regards the implementation of the dacion, Atty. Cabarroguis stated that "the Legal Department of the SSS can
prepare the Deed of Sale or whatever documents that have to be prepared. My clients are ready to vacate the
premises and you can have it occupied anytime."
 During the same Meeting, Atty. Cabarroguis likewise relayed to SSS that they are requesting that the P2, 000,000
amount be applied first to the unpaid premiums and the excess be used to settle part of the penalties due.
 On May 28, 1982, DDII's total liabilities with SSS covering unpaid premium contributions, inclusive of penalties
and salary/calamity loan amortizations, amounted to P4, 421,321.62.
 On June 9, 1982, the SSC issued Resolution and accepted DDII's proposed dacion en pago pegged at the
appraised value of P2, 000,000.
 The SSC then informed DDII of its acceptance of the proposed dacion in payment, including its specified
terms and conditions, via a Letter dated June 17, 1982.
 On July 8, 1982, Dalisay-Tirol, Acting President and General Manager of Dalisay Investment, informed SSS that
the company is preparing the subject property, especially the building, for its turnover on August 15, 1982.
 Later, or on July 31, 1982, An Affidavit of Consent for the Sale of Real Property was executed by the surviving
heirs of the late Regina L. Dalisay, stating that in order to settle the companies' obligations to SSS, they expressly
agree to the sale thereof to the SSS for its partial settlement.
 On September 18, 1989, Desiderio Dalisay passed away.
 As of November 30, 1995, the company's total obligations allegedly amounted to P15, 689,684.93.
 Later, or on December 29, 1995, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) executed a Deed of Confirmatory Sale in
favor of DDII for properties that it reacquired, including the property subject of the present dispute.
 On March 20, 1998, Eddie A. Jara (Jara), Assistant Vice-President of the SSS - Davao I Branch, executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the properties subject of the instant case because of the companies' failure to turn
over the certificates of title to SSS.
 Then, on April 2, 1998, Jara sent a letter to Dalisay-Tirol, formally demanding the certificates of title over the
properties subject of the dacion.
 In her reply dated May 5, 1998 to the April 2, 1998 Letter, Dalisay-Tirol, who was then the President of DDII, stated
that the corporation could not at that time give due course to and act on the matter because of several issues that
need to be resolved first, including two cases involving the subject properties, to wit:
(1) the properties are being claimed by the estate of Desiderio F. Dalisay, Sr. and included in the inventory already
filed by the executrix, where the corporation's stockholders are contesting said inclusion; and
(2) The SSS' pending petition covering the properties where the accuracy and propriety of the amount of PI5,
605,079.25 contained therein has yet to be substantiated and verified. She likewise pointed out that the "Board
Resolution covers only (2) parcels of land which were proposed and submitted for the purpose of a negotiated
sale to settle unremitted premiums and penalties."
 On November 18, 1999, DDII, through its Managing Director Edith L. Dalisay-Valenzuela, wrote a letter addressed
to SSS President and Chief Executive Officer Carlos A. Arellano, requesting the reevaluation and reconsideration
of their problem.
 On January 18, 2000, DDII issued a Letter to SSS proposing the "offset of SSS obligations with back rentals
on occupied land and building of the obligor." It alleged that SSS is bound to pay back rentals totaling
P34, 217,988.19 for its use of the subject property from July 1982 up to the present. It likewise demanded
for the return of the said property.
 Despite repeated written and oral demands made by SSS for DDII to deliver the titles of the subject
property, free from all liens and encumbrances, DDII still failed to comply.
 On October 8, 2002, DDII filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages against
SSS with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, in Davao City.
 In said complaint, DDII asserted that it is the owner of the subject property. It averred that when SSS filed the
abovementioned cases, the late Desiderio Dalisay, during his lifetime and as president of the company, offered
the property appraised at P3, 500,000 to SSS for the offsetting of said amount against DGC's total liability to SSS.
SSS accepted such but only in the amount of P2, 000,000 and subject to certain conditions.
 It also insists that while negotiations with SSS were still ongoing, it decided to vacate the subject property in favor
of SSS to show goodwill on its part. Unfortunately, the negotiations were not fruitful as they failed to agree on the
terms and conditions set forth by SSS. Furthermore, DDII insists that Atty. Cabarroguis' alleged acceptance of the
proposals of SSS was not covered by any Board Resolution or Affidavit of Consent by the corporate and individual
owners of the properties.
 According to DDII, there was no meeting of the minds between the parties. Consequently, there was no dation in
payment to speak of, contrary to the claim of SSS. With these, DDII asserted that SSS owes it P43, 208,270.99
as back rentals for its use of the property from 1982 onwards. It also prayed for attorney's fees and costs of
litigation.
 In its Answer, SSS argued that the offer for dacion was categorically accepted by SSS, thereby perfecting such.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SSS’ claim which allegedly casts a cloud on DDII’s title is valid and operative

RULING:
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed August 12, 2016 Decision and March 10, 2017
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03233-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED. The complaint for
quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 29,353-02, is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

 For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
 Here, if dacion en pago was perfected, or even consummated, then SSS’ claim which allegedly casts a cloud on
DDII’s title is valid and operative, and consequently, the action for quieting of title filed by DDII will not prosper.
 To determine whether or not there was indeed a perfected, or even consummated dation in payment, it is necessary
to review and assess the evidence and events that transpired and see whether these correspond to the three
stages of contract of sale.
 The stages of contract of sale are:
1. Negotiation, which covers the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the
contract to the time the contract is perfected;
 Here, the offer was validly reduced.
 The late Desiderio Dalisay, on March 11, 1977, offered to SSS that they partially settle their obligations to the
latter via dacion. Dalisay offered several properties for P3, 500,000 in favor of SSS to partially extinguish
petitioner's obligation which amounted to P4,421,321.62.
 Then, years later or on May 27, 1982, the SSS' Committee met with the corporation, represented by Atty.
Cabarroguis. During said meeting, Atty. Cabarroguis explained that he has "the authority to offer [the
properties] in the amount of 2 million pesos." He also gave them an assurance that that they will turn the
properties over to SSS free of liens and encumbrances, and that his clients are ready to vacate the premises
and you can have it occupied anytime.
 The petitioner was well aware of what transpired during the meeting and the agreements reached. In fact, the
SSC issued Resolution where it accepted DDII's proposed dacion en pago at P2, 000,000.
 We emphasize that it is only now, in this action for quieting of title filed decades after the conclusion of the
1982 Meeting, that DDII questioned Atty. Cabarroguis' authority to represent the corporation. Because
of this, the Supreme Court was sufficiently convinced that Atty. Cabarroguis acted within the scope
of the authority given him, which includes offering the properties at P2, 000,000. There was tacit
ratification of the agency.
 The Court rule that DDII's offer was validly reduced from P3, 500,000 to P2, 000,000.

2. Perfection, which takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements of the sale, which is the meeting
of the minds of the parties as to the object of the contract and upon the price.
 Here, the acceptance is absolute and unqualified.
 According to the CA, SSC Resolution constitutes an absolute and unequivocal acceptance which perfected
the offered dacion. Thus, when possession of the subject property was delivered to SSS, this signified a
 transfer of ownership thereon, consistent with the supposedly perfected agreement. The Court agreed with
the CA that there was perfected dation in payment.
 Within the purview of the law on sales, a contract of sale is perfected by mere consent, upon a meeting of the
minds on the offer and the acceptance thereof based on subject matter, price and terms of payment. It is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price.
 It is clearly shown by the records that the SSS simply agreed to said proposal when it included such in its
Resolution. It is not a new condition imposed by the SSS as petitioner argues.

3. Consummation, which begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the contract of
sale.
 Here, the transfer of possession to SSS tantamount to "delivery"
 Agreeing with SSS, the CA held that the agreement on dacion en pago was consummated by DDII's delivery
of the property to SSS. This is correct.
 While a contract of sale is perfected by mere consent, ownership of the thing sold is acquired only upon its
delivery to the buyer. Upon the perfection of the sale, the seller assumes the obligation to transfer ownership
and to deliver the thing sold, but the real right of ownership is transferred only "by tradition" or delivery thereof
to the buyer.
 Material to the case at bar is tradition by real or actual delivery contemplated Article 1497 of the same Code.
 The petitioner DDII insists that its delivery of the property to SSS was only to show its goodwill in the
negotiations. The records, however, reveal otherwise.
 It is well to emphasize that nowhere in their communications or during the discussions at the meeting
is it stated that the company will turn over possession of the property to SSS to show its goodwill
while the negotiations were pending.
 Contrary to petitioner's arguments, we are of the view that the turnover was in fact tantamount to tradition
and was not done simply to show goodwill on the part of the company. What was only left to be done
was for the corporation to surrender the certificates of title over the properties, free from all liens and
encumbrances as promised during the 1982 meeting, so as to facilitate its transfer in SSS' name.
 This being the case, We find that SSS has validly and in good faith acquired title to the property subject
of the dispute, making the action to quiet title filed by DDII improper.
 it is well to emphasize that in order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff
must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject-matter of the action. Legal
title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. In the absence of such
legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.
 Here, DDII having divested itself of any claim over the property in favor of SSS by means of sale via
dacion en pago, petitioner has lost its title over the property which would give it legal personality to
file said action.

MILLER V. ESPENIDA
(FILIATION)

FACTS:
Joan is allegedly the illegitimate child of her mother Lennie Espenida with John Miller. The latter was legally married to
Beatriz Marcaida with whom he has four children – petitioner Glenn and siblings Charles, Betty, and John Jr.

After John Miller’s death, Joan, through her mother Lennie, filed before the RTC a Petition for Partition and Accounting
of John’s estate with a prayer for preliminary attachment, receivership, support, and damages. Lennie presented Joan’s
birth certificate which purportedly showed John to be her registered father.

Thereafter, Glenn filed the said separate petition seeking the cancellation of Joan’s birth certificate. He claimed that his
father did not acknowledge Joan as a natural child, pointing out that the Miller patriarch’s signature was not in her birth
certificate.

Joan countered Glenn’s claims contenting that while her alleged father did not sign her birth certificate, John Miller
openly and continuously recognized her as his child. She said that she grew up in his ranch and that it was John Miller
who had financed her studies at John Miller Primary School. She also said that John Miller, in his holographic will, gave
her 1/8 share of his estate and, in a 1987 document, had assigned Betty to act as her guardian and her inheritance
administrator until she attains the age of majority. Joan also said Betty obtained an education plan for her upon John
Miller’s bidding.
RTC issued a judgment in Joan’s favor and held that “due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummate act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further action is required.”

Glenn elevated the case to the CA which denied his appeal. The CA, applying Article 173 in relation to Article 173 of
the Family Code, found that John’s holographic will, where he gave Joan 1/8 of his estate, had sufficiently established
his paternity.

Glenn moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA.

Glenn, through his surviving legal heirs, filed before the SC a Petition for Review on Certiorari against Joan and the
Local Civil Registrar of Gubat, Sorsogon.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s judgment allowing private respondent Joan Espenida Miller to
continue using the surname Miller.

HELD
Yes. SC nullified and set aside the decision

The SC stressed that petitioners sought the correction of Joan’s surname in her birth certificate registered as LCR No.
825. They want Joan to use her mother’s surname, Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an
acknowledged illegitimate child of the late John Miller. This type of petition, according to the SC, is governed by Rule
108 of the Rules of Court on the Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry.

What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of correcting a single letter in private
respondent’s surname due to a misspelling. Rather, private respondent’s filiation will be gravely affected, as changing
her surname from Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her identity, but her
successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial,” held the Court.

Citing Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court held that “legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.”
It added that impugning the legitimacy of a child is governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

MARGIE SANTOS MITRA, PETITIONER, VS. PERPETUA L. SABLAN-GUEVARRA, REMEGIO L. SABLAN, ET

AL.
G.R. No. 213994
April 18, 2018

Doctrine:
The last page of the will is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgement portion, which the testator and
the witnesses are not required to sign.

The omission of the number of pages in the attestation clause, this was supplied by the Acknowledgment
portion of the will itself without the need to resort to extrinsic evidence. Such omission does not in any way serve as
hindrance to probate.

Facts:
On June 26, 2006, Mitra (petitioner) filed a petition for the probate of the notarial will of Remedios Legaspi
(Legaspi) with prayer for issuance of letters testamentary before the RTC. It was alleged that the petitioner is the de
facto adopted daughter of Legaspi; that Legaspi, single, died on December 22, 2004 in Caloocan City; that Legaspi left
a notarial will, instituting the petitioner, Orlando Castro, Perpetua Sablan Guevarra, and Remigio Legaspi Sablan, as
her heirs, legatees and devisees; that Legaspi left real and personal properties with the approximate total value of P1,
032,237.00; and that Legaspi named Mary Ann Castro as the executor of the will.
Perpetua and Remegio (respondents), who claim to be Legaspi's legal heirs, opposed the petition. They aver
that the will was not executed in accordance with the formalities required by law; that since the last page of the will,
which contained the Acknowledgement, was not signed by Legaspi and her instrumental witnesses, the will should be
declared invalid; that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written.

The RTC ruled in favor of Mitra. The probate court explained that the last page of the will is but a mere
continuation of the Acknowledgement portion, which the testator and the witnesses are not required to sign. CA
reversed the decision and adhered to the strict compliance of the rule in the attestation clause that the number of pages
must be contained therein.

Issue:
Whether or not the last page of the will, which was a mere continuation of the Acknowledgement, must be
signed by the instrumental witness to allow probate in compliance with Art. 805 of the NCC.

Whether or not whether the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause renders
such will defective.

Ruling:
The Court REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the CA and AFFIRMED the RTC.

It is uncontested and can be readily gleaned that the instrumental witnesses signed on each and every page
of the will, except the last page. Such being the case, the CA erred in concluding otherwise. There is no doubt that the
requirement under the Article 805 of the Civil Code, which calls for the signature of the testator and of the instrumental
witnesses on each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last, was complied with.

Legaspi's last will and testament has substantially complied with all the formalities required of a notarial will.
It has been proven that Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses signed on every page of the will, except on the last,
which refers to the Acknowledgment page. With regard to the omission of the number of pages in the attestation clause,
this was supplied by the Acknowledgment portion of the will itself without the need to resort to extrinsic evidence.
Contrary to the CA conclusion, such omission does not in any way serve as hindrance to probate.

SANTOS V. SANTOS 2019

GR NO.214593

FACTS:

● Dana and Leodegario first meet each other in 1982 common friend. Their relationship developed into
a romance. Soon, the couple began living together. Their cohabitation produced two children. As
their business ventures prospered, Dana and Leodegario married each other on December 3, 1987,
before a Catholic priest. Two more children were born to the couple after the marriage;
● However, their relationship started to deteriorate as time passed by. Heated arguments and
suspicions of infidelity marred their marriage so much, so that in 200 I, Dana and Leodegario filed a
joint petition for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, which was granted;
● Subsequently Leodegario filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage alleging
psychological incapacity on the part of Dana;
● The trial court declared the marriage between Dana and Leodegario null and voiid on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The court held that Dana was afflicted with grave, incurable, and juridically
antecedent Histrionic Personality Disorder;
● Dana filed a Notice of Appeal but she withdrew her appeal and instead filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment with the RTC, alleging that extrinsic fraud and mistake prevented her from presenting her
case at the trial;
● The trial court denied Dana's petition, ruling that there was no sufficient allegation of fraud or mistake
in the petition;
● Subsequenty, under the auspices of the appellate court mediator, Dana and Leodegario entered into
a compromise agreement, 13 where they agreed to transfer the titles to their conjugal real properties
in the name of their four common children;
● Dana filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court when it denied her petition for relief and allowed the Decision dated June 24, 2009 to stand
despite her inability to present her evidence;
○ The appellate court found the Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition for
Decision unmeritorious. It held that the marital ties between Dana and Leodegario had been
severed by the trial court's decision of June 24, 2009; hence, the compromise agreement
did not involve the validity of their marriage but only their property relations. Furthermore,
the appellate court found that Dana, in her Motion to Archive Case, had Decision 5 G.R. No.
 214593 conceded her intention to have the case dismissed upon compliance with the
stipulations of the Compromise Agreement.
LEGAL ISSUE:
● Whether or not the assailed resolutions of the CA, which terminated her case by reason of the compromise
agreement, were erroneous for being contrary to the State's legal mandate to defend the sanctity of marriage.

RULING:
● The petition has no merit.
● The core issue in this petition is the propriety of setting aside the judgment upon compromise rendered by the
court a quo. Dana maintains that the judgment should be vacated because of Leodegario's alleged breach of
their compromise; and because she did not intend to compromise the issue of the validity of her marriage;

● The Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA and the defensor vinculi regarding the finality of the RTC
decision; however, we do not agree with their assertions as to the effect of the decision on the subsequent
proceedings a quo;
● WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated April 15, 2014
and September 26, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115420, are hereby AFFIRMED insofar
as they declared the proceedings CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SARTO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 206284, FEB. 28, 2018)

Doctrine: A divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition by
Philippine courts may be required before the effects of a divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction.

Facts: Redante and Maria Socorro (both natives of Buhi, Camarines Sur) were married on Aug. 1984 in Angono, Rizal.
Sometime after, Maria left for Canada to work as a nurse and she later on applied for Canadian citizenship; such was
granted and acquired on April 1988.

Maria Socorro then filed a divorce to sever her marital ties with the petitioner in British Columbia, Canada. The divorce
was granted by the Supreme Court of the said area on Nov. 1988.
She came back to the Philippines in 1992 for vacation. Maria and Redante was convinced by the latter’s mother and
grandparents to give their marriage a second chance to which they acceded.

This resulted to the birth of their daughter in 1993. Unfortunately, their efforts to save their marriage were futile.

Redante met Fe to whom he admitted that he was previously married to Maria Socorro who, however, divorced him.
Despite of this, their romance culminated and blossomed in their marriage in 1998 in Naga City. They established a
conjugal home in Pasay City and had two (2) children.

Their relationship, however, turned sour when Ma. Socorro returned to the Philippines and met with Redante to
persuade him to allow their daughter to apply for Canadian citizenship. After learning of Redante and Maria Socorro's
meeting and believing that they had reconciled, Fe decided to leave their conjugal home.

Fe then filed a complaint for bigamy against Redante. On October 2003, Redante Sarto was charged with the crime of
bigamy for allegedly contracting two (2) marriages:

1. with Maria Socorro (not legally terminated); and

2. with private complainant Fe Aguila.

Redante entered a plea of not guilty and admitted that he had contracted two marriages but interposed the defense
that the first marriage was legally dissolved by divorce obtained in a foreign country. The defense presented a
Certificate of Divorce to prove the fact of divorce.

Issue: Whether the trial and appellate court erred when they found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy

Ruling:
The Court AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals and the RTC.
Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages.
It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of
a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. Since the divorce was a defense raised by
Redante, it is incumbent upon him to show that it was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro's
country's national law.

A divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts
may be required before the effects of a divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction.

Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Proving the foreign law under which the divorce was secured is mandatory
considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws. For the
purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented and admitted in
evidence. This is in consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only
after it is presented and admitted in evidence.

Additionally, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them must present copies thereof
and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Pursuant to these rules, the divorce
decree and foreign law may be proven through:

(1) an official publication; or

(2) copies thereof attested to by the officer having legal custody of said documents. If the office which has custody is
in a foreign country, the copies of said documents must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of evidence presented by the defense to
prove the divorce, is the certificate of divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia.
This certificate of divorce is insufficient to rebut the charge against Redante.

First, the certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and jurisprudence. As discussed
previously, the divorce decree required to prove the fact of divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign
court and not a mere certification. Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree,
it was not accompanied by a certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed in
Canada, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented by the
defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with Maria
Socorro's national law.

Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of
divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro - whether an absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited
divorce which merely suspends it - and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be ascertained.
As such, Redante failed to prove his defense that he had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent
marriage to Fe.

VAN DE BURG V. PNB (ART. 19)

FACTS
The late spouses Romulus and Evelyn Aguilar (late spouses Aguilar) used to be borrowing clients of Philippine
National Bank. The late [spouses Aguilar's] sugar crop loans, which were obtained and were secured by real estate
mortgage over four registered parcels of land.

However, for failure of the late spouses Aguilar to pay their obligations with [PNB], the mortgage was foreclosed and
subsequently, ownership of the subject four pieces of property was consolidated under the name of [PNB].

With the enactment of RA 7202, the late Romulus Aguilar wrote [PNB], and he stated: "Since our indebtedness with
the PNB had been foreclosed, we are asking your good Office for a reconsideration of our account based on the
Sugar Restitution Law." After the death of Romulus Aguilar, his spouse, the late Evelyn Aguilar, received a letter from
[PNB], during which occasion [PNB] informed the late Evelyn Aguilar that while the subject loan account was covered
by the provisions of RA 7202 and have been audited by the Commission on Audit (COA), the late Evelyn Aguilar was
still required to comply with recomputation and auditing by COA.

Plaintiffs-appellees Aguilar [the Aguilars] claimed that they complied with the stated requirements.
Children of the late spouses Aguilar, Glenn Aguilar, in behalf of his siblings, Astrid Van de Brug and Martin Aguilar,
wrote [PNB] and asked that they be accorded the benefits of RA 7202. Through his letters, Glenn Aguilar also made
mention of an allegedly similar case, docketed as Civil Case No. 7212 entitled Sps. Fred and Mildred Pfleider vs.
PNB, et al., then pending before RTC, Branch 45, Bacolod City, wherein [PNB] purportedly entered into a
compromise agreement with Sps. Pfleider, notwithstanding consolidation of the foreclosed property under the bank's
name.

[PNB] replied in writing and stated, among other matters, that: "Since PNB has already acquired the properties at the
foreclosure sale, it can now exercise its rights as owner of these properties, including the right to convey the same to
the DAR and to receive the proceeds thereof from Land Bank of the Philippines, without any right to the excess
proceeds, if any, inuring/accruing to your favor."

Hence, the case for implementation of RA 7202 with damages was filed by [the Aguilars]. .

For its part [PNB] further contended that [the Aguilars] cannot invoke the compromise agreement it entered into with
Sps. Fred and Mildred Pfleider in Civil Case No. 7212 because [the Aguilars] were not parties to the case.

RTC ruled in favor of the Aguilars.

The RTC found PNB guilty of malice and bad faith in not pursuing its duty in helping the Aguilars avail of the benefits
of RA 7202 and, pursuant to Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, justified the award of moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses in favor of the Aguilars. 23

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, PNB appealed to the CA.

The CA granted the appeal and reversed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE
Does PNB have an obligation to accord the Aguilars the same treatment as it accorded the spouses Pfleider
regarding the crediting of the VOS or CARP proceeds of their respective agricultural lots against their respective
sugar crop loans covered by RA 7202?

HELD
No. The Aguilars are not privies to the Compromise Agreement between PNB and the spouses Pfleider. Regarding
law, as PNB's source of obligation, the CA correctly ruled that the Aguilars are not entitled to restitution under RA
7202. Thus, RA 7202 cannot be invoked as the statutory basis to compel PNB to treat the Aguilars similarly with the
spouses Pfleider.
Also, in Heirs of Purisima Nala v. Cabansag,77 the Court observed:

Preliminarily, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular provision of law under
which it (sic) held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on the allegations in respondent's complaint, it
may be gathered that the basis for his claim for damages is Article 19 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in
the performance of one's duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.78

In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.79

It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed, and
he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. 80 Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad
judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a
breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill
will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.81

To make PNB liable under the principle of abuse of rights, the Aguilars have the burden to prove the requisites
enumerated above. They claim that they are similarly circumstanced as the spouses Pfleider and there was no
reason for PNB to treat them differently.82

PNB has explained that there are differences in the circumstances of its two sugar crop loan debtors which, to PNB,
justify the different accommodations that it accorded to them. The settlement agreement between PNB and the
spouses Pfleider was to the effect that PNB would credit as payment the CARP proceeds of the foreclosed
agricultural properties in the Compromise Agreement provided that the case filed against PNB was withdrawn.87

According to PNB, the Aguilars, on the other hand, did not signify their conformity to the recomputation as audited
and certified by the COA and refused to sign the restructuring agreement because they insisted that the CARP
proceeds be first considered as loan payments and should be deducted from their loan accounts. 88 PNB has taken
the position that if the CARP proceeds were to be credited to the loan accounts of the Aguilars in the recomputation,
then, the restructuring agreement would no longer be needed because the CARP proceeds were more than enough
to cover the net balance of their accounts and, if that was allowed, there would be nothing to amortize.

PNB further contends that the Aguilars cannot invoke its Compromise Agreement with the spouses Pfleider because:
(1) the former are not parties thereto; (2) the principle of relativity of contract would be violated; and (3) PNB 's
freedom to enter into contracts would also be violated if PNB would be compelled to accommodate the Aguilars.89

Given the foregoing explanation by PNB, it was incumbent upon the Aguilars, to make PNB liable for damages based
on the principle of abuse of rights, to prove that PNB acted in bad faith and that its sole intent was to prejudice or
injure them. The Aguilars, however, failed in this regard.

Also, the Court notes from the duly notarized Compromise Agreement between the spouses Pfleider and PNB dated
December 30, 199990 that the accounts of the former to the latter were crop loans ("sugar and sugar-related loans")
and, thus, covered by RA 7202,91 unlike the accounts of the Aguilars which included non-RA 7202 accounts, as
mentioned in the narration of facts. Since the Aguilars were delinquent in their accounts, including their non-RA 7202
accounts, and the mortgaged properties of the Aguilars similarly secured the non-RA 7202 accounts, PNB had no
option but to foreclose the mortgage.

To recapitulate:

A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is
exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with
the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
injure another.92

In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.93

In this case, the Aguilars failed to substantiate the above requisites to justify the award of damages in their favor
against PNB, who merely exercised its legal right as a creditor pursuant to RA 7202.