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Will not the enactment of baseline law (RA
9522) result to waiver of certain parts of our
territory?
No, it will not. UNCLOS III and its ancillary
baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution
of territory. Under traditional international law
typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose)
territory through occupation, accretion, cession
and prescription, not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treaty's
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. It cannot be over-emphasized enough
that RA 9522 is a baseline law enacted to
implement the 1982 LOSC, which in turn seeks
to regulate and establish an orderly sea use
rights over maritime zones. The baseline law
aims to mark-out specific base points along the
Philippine coast from which baselines are
drawn to serve as starting points to measure
the breadth of the territorial sea and maritime
zones. And let it be noted that under UNCLOS
III, it is recognized that countries can have
territories outside their baselines. (M AGALLONA
V . E RMITA, G.R. N O.  187167, [AUGUST 16, 2011])
What is the doctrine of official immunity?
Public officers should not be hampered in the
performance of their duties or in making
decisions for fear of personal liability for
damages due to honest mistake. Whatever
damage they may have caused as a result of
such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is
in the nature of a damnum absque injuria.
Mistakes concededly committed by public
officers are not actionable absent any clear
showing that they were motivated by malice or
gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
(F AROLAN V . S OLMAC M ARKETING C ORP ., G.R.
N O.  83589, [M ARCH 13, 1991])
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May the DOH, an unincorporated
government agency, invoke immunity from
suit?
Yes. DOH is an unincorporated agency which
performs sovereign or governmental functions.
 An unincorporated government agency without
any separate juridical personality of its own
enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested
with an inherent power of sovereignty.
 Accordingly, a claim for damages against the
agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the
need to distinguish between an unincorporated
government agency performing governmental
function and one performing proprietary
functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its
function is governmental or incidental to such
function; it has not been upheld in favor of the
latter whose function was not in pursuit of a
necessary function of government but was
essentially a business. Moreover, it is settled
that if a Complaint seeks to "impose a charge or
financial liability against the state," the defense
of non-suability may be properly invoked.
Undoubtedly, in the event that PPI succeeds in
its suit, the government or the state through the
DOH would become vulnerable to an imposition
or financial charge in the form of damages. This
would require an appropriation from the national
treasury which is precisely the situation which
the doctrine of state immunity aims to protect
the state from. (D EPARTMENT OF H EALTH V . P HIL
P HARMAWEALTH , I NC ., G.R. N O.  182358,
[F EBRUARY 20, 2013], D EL C ASTILLO  )
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
In its petition (certiorari) to the supreme
court after the RTC denies its petition for
cancellation of ECC of a corporation, may
the petitioner NGO include the resident
marine species of a body of water as
petitioners? Will these marine species be
acknowledged by the supreme court to have
locus standi?
No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no
need to give resident marine species legal
standing as our rules already allow any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth
noting here that the NGO is joined as real
parties in the petition and not just in
representation of the marine species. Thus,
there is no need to acknowledge the legal
standing of the marine species. (R ESIDENT
M ARINE M AMMALS OF THE P ROTECTED S EASCAPE
T AÑON S TRAIT V . R EYES , G.R. N OS . 180771 &
181527, [APRIL 21, 2015])
Who can exercise police power?
The power is inherently vested in the
Legislature. However, Congress may validly
delegate this power to the President, to
administrative bodies and to lawmaking bodies
of local government units. Local government
units exercise the power under the general
welfare clause [Sec. 16,R.A. 7160], and under
Secs. 391, 447, 458 and 468, R.A. 7160.
How may an LGU exercise police power?
 A valid ordinance must not only be enacted
within the corporate powers of the local
government and passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law. In order to declare
it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must
also comply with the following substantive
requirements, namely: (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be
fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) it must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not
be unreasonable. (M OSQUEDA V . P ILIPINO
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B ANANA G ROWERS & E XPORTERS ASSOCIATION ,
I NC ., G.R. N OS . 189185 & 189305, [AUGUST 16,
2016])
Who can exercise eminent domain?
Congress and, by delegation, the President,
administrative bodies, local government units,
and even private enterprises performing public
services.
Local government units have no inherent power
of eminent domain. Sec. 19 of the Local
Government Code confers such power to local
governments, but the power is not absolute; it is
subject to statutory requirements [M ASIKIP
V .C ITY OF P ASIG , G.R. N O.  136349, J ANUARY 23,
2006;  LAGCAO V . J UDGE LABRA, G.R. N O. 
155746, O CTOBER 3, 2004].
When the power is exercised by the
Legislature, the question of necessity is
generally a political question [M UNICIPALITY OF
M EYCAUAYAN , B ULACAN V . I NTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE C OURT , 157  SCRA 640];  but when
exercised by a delegate such as a local
government unit, the determination of whether
there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a
 justiciable question [R EPUBLIC V . LA O RDEN DE
P O.  B ENEDICTINOS , 1 SCRA 649].
When is the reckoning point of market value
of the property?
Compensation is determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint for eminent domain,
but where the filing of the complaint occurs after
the actual taking of the property and the owner
would be given undue incremental advantages
arising from the use to which the government
devotes the property expropriated, just
compensation is determined as of the date of
the taking [N ATIONAL P OWER C ORPORATION V .
C OURT OF APPEALS , 254 SCRA 577] 
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
Is payment of just compensation required
when the government takes over privately
owned public utility or business affected
with public interest in cases of emergency?
The temporary takeover by the government
extends only to the operation of the business
and not to the ownership thereof. As such, the
government is not required to compensate the
private entity-owner of the said business as
there is no transfer of ownership, whether
permanent or temporary. The private entity-
owner affected by the temporary takeover
cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for
the use of said business and its properties, as
the temporary takeover by the government is in
exercise of the police power and not the power
of eminent domain . (AGAN , J R.  V . P HILIPPINE
I NTERNATIONAL AIR T ERMINALS C O.  , I NC ., G.R.
N OS . 155001, 155547 & 155661, [M AY 5, 2003])
%%? B%,, &C $%@D(*
What are the valid warrantless arrests?
Rule 113, Section 5, Rules of Criminal
Procedure
Section 5.  Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
—  A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed,
and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
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In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112
Is drug testing required for public officials?
The Supreme Court declared as
unconstitutional the provisions of RA 9165
requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office and persons accused of crimes.
However, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the said RA insofar as
random drug testing for secondary and tertiary
school students, as well as for officials and
employees of public and private offices is
concerned. The need for drug testing to at least
minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough
to override the individual’s  privacy interest
under the premise. (S OCIAL J USTICE S OCIETY V .
D ANGEROUS D RUGS B OARD , G.R. N OS . 157870,
158633 &161658, [N OVEMBER 3, 2008])
Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy
for posts posted in facebook?
Petitioners have no reasonable expectation of
privacy that would warrant the issuance of a
writ of habeas data when their daughters
shared the incriminating pictures with their
Facebook friends. Before one can have an
expectation of privacy in his or her Online
Social Network activity, it is necessary that the
user in this case, the sanctioned students,
should manifest the intention to keep certain
posts private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or limit its
visibility. (V IVARES V . S T.  T HERESA' S C OLLEGE ,
G.R. N O.  202666, [S EPTEMBER 29, 2014])
Does the right to privacy extend to business
offices? May privacy be violated by a private
individual, not the state?
Yes on both questions. An individual’s  right to
privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
should not be confined to his house or
residence as it may extend to places where he
has the right to exclude the public or deny them
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
access. The phrase “prying  into the privacy of
another’s residence,”  therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual
considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not
infringe on his right to privacy. (S POUSES H ING
V . C HOACHUY , S R.  , G.R. N O.  179736, [J UNE 26,
2013], D EL C ASTILLO  )
What is the test used to determine whether
there is infringement of the right to privacy?
What are its requisites?
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of
the right to privacy, courts use the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test. The Supreme Court
enunciated that “the  reasonableness of a
person’s  expectation of privacy depends on a
two-part test:
(1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has
exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
(2) this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable.” (S POUSES H ING
V . C HOACHUY , S R.  , G.R. N O.  179736, [J UNE
26, 2013], D EL C ASTILLO  )
What is the regulation based on captive-
audience doctrine?
 A regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which
undertakes selectively to shield the public from
some kinds of speech on the ground that they
are more offensive than others. A government
regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine may not be justified if the supposed
“captive audience”  may avoid exposure to the
otherwise intrusive speech. The commuters are
not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUV’s  and
transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in
the posted election campaign materials since
they may simply avert their eyes if they find the
same unbearably intrusive. (1-U NITED
T RANSPORT K OALISYON V . C OMMISSION ON
E LECTIONS , G.R. N O.  206020, [APRIL 14, 2015])
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Discuss diplomatic negotiation privilege v.
Deliberative process privilege.
The privileged character of diplomatic
negotiations has been recognized in this
 jurisdiction. Deliberative process covers
documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies
are formulated. The privileged status of such
documents rests, not on the need of national
security, but on the realization that officials will
not communicate candidly among themselves if
each remark is a potential item of discovery and
front page news, the objective of the privilege
being to enhance the quality of agency
decisions. While the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential, the offers exchanged
by the parties during the negotiations continue
to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
published. (AKBAYAN C ITIZENS ACTION P ARTY V .
AQUINO , G.R. N O.  170516, [J ULY 16, 2008])
What is the O ’brien test?
The United States Supreme Court, through
Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v.
O'Brien: [A] government regulation is sufficiently
 justified
(1) if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government;
(2) if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
(3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and
(4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First
 Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
This is so far the most influential test for
distinguishing content-based from content-
neutral regulations and is said to have "become
canonical in the review of such laws." It is
noteworthy that the O'Brien test has been
applied by this Court in at least two cases.
Under this test, even if a law furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest,
it should be invalidated if such governmental
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
interest is "not unrelated to the suppression of
free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose
is unrelated to the suppression of free speech,
the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the
restriction on freedom of expression is greater
than is necessary to achieve the governmental
purpose in question . (S OCIAL W EATHER
S TATIONS , I NC . V . C OMMISSION ON E LECTIONS ,
G.R. N O.  147571, [M AY 5, 2001])
What is heckler’s veto?
Heckler’s  veto — an attempt to limit unpopular
speech. A heckler's veto occurs when an acting
party's right to freedom of speech is curtailed or
restricted by the government in order to prevent
a reacting party's behavior. The common
example is that of demonstrators (reacting
party) causing a speech (given by the acting
party) to be terminated in order to preserve the
peace.
What is the distinction between strict
neutrality and benevolent neutrality?
Strict Neutrality protects the principle of church-
state separation with a rigid reading of the
principle while the benevolent neutrality
protects religious realities, traditions and
established practice with a flexible reading of
the principle. Benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion
specifically into account not to promote the
governments favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance.
 A three-step process is followed in weighing the
states interest and religious freedom when
these collide. First, has a statute or government
action created a burden on the free exercise of
religion? Second, is there a sufficiently
compelling state interest to justify this
infringement of religious liberty? Third, has the
state in achieving its legitimate purposes used
the least intrusive means possible so that the
free exercise is not infringed any more than
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necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the
state? (E STRADA V . E SCRITOR , A.M. N O.  P-02- 
1651 ( FORMERLY OCA I.P.I. N O.  00-1021-P),
[AUGUST 4, 2003])
How must the state weigh the right of a
conscientious objector vis a vis a
governmental interest?
In a situation where the free exercise of religion
is allegedly burdened by government legislation
or practice, the compelling state interest test in
line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would
warrant an exemption from obligations under
the RH Law, unless the government succeeds
in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important
secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the
RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a
conscientious objector's right to religious
freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor,
there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war
plagues a conscientious objector. One side
coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the
other entices him to a clean conscience yet
under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical
practitioners whose religious beliefs are
incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to
refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modern reproductive
health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately
burdened as he has been compelled to perform
an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has
written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause
is the respect for the inviolability of the human
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
conscience. (S POUSES I MBONG V . O CHOA, J R.  ,
G.R. N OS . 204819, [APRIL 8, 2014])
May the DOJ issue a hold departure order
(JDO), watchlist order (WLO) and allow
departure order (ADO) without court order?
No. The DOJ has no inherent power to issue
HDO, WLO and ADO. It is not its business to do
so. As such, it is a compulsory requirement that
there be an existing law, complete and
sufficient in itself, conferring the expressed
authority to the concerned agency to
promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ cannot
make rules, its authority being confined to
execution of laws. The DOJ cannot justify the
restraint in the liberty of movement on the
ground that it is necessary to ensure presence
and attendance in the preliminary investigation
of the complaints. There is also no authority of
law granting it the power to compel the
attendance of the subjects of a preliminary
investigation, pursuant to its investigatory
powers under E.O No. 292. Its investigatory
power is simply inquisitorial and unfortunately,
not broad enough to embrace the imposition of
restraint on the liberty of movement. (G ENUINO
V . D E LIMA, G.R. N OS . 197930 [APRIL 17, 2018])
May the court allow bail on the basis of
humanitarian grounds?
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,
regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the
charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve
the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial (E NRILE V . S ANDIGANBAYAN , G.R.
N O.  213847 , [AUGUST 18, 2015])
(
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What happens when the accused jumps
bail?
The Constitutions authorizes trial in absentia of
the accused in case of his non-appearance
after arraignment despite due notice simply
because he thereby waives his right to meet the
witnesses face to face among others. An
express waiver of appearance after
arraignment, is of the same effect. However,
such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia
does not mean that the prosecution is thereby
deprived of its right to require the presence of
the accused for purposes of identification by its
witness which is vital for the conviction of the
accused. (C ARREDO V . P EOPLE , G.R. N O.  77542,
[M ARCH 19, 1990])
The trial court has the duty to rule on the
evidence presented by the prosecution against
all the accused and to render its judgment
accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives’
re-appearance or re-arrest. They are deemed to
have waived their right to present evidence on
their own behalf and to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses who testified against
them. (G IMENEZ V . N AZARENO , G.R. N O.  L- 
37933, [APRIL 15, 1988])
Do ordinary citizens have legal standing to
file a case for enforcement of environmental
rights? May the us be held liable for
violation of UNCLOS even if it is not a
signatory thereto?
Yes. Firstly, an ordinary individual had the
standing to file a case referencing the landmark
case of Oposa v. Factoran, where the court has
recognized the “public right”  of citizens to a
“balanced  and healthful ecology.”  Ordinary
citizens have the legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights. Secondly,
a foreign warship’s  unauthorized entry into our
internal waters with resulting damage to marine
resources is one situation in which Articles 30
and 31 may apply. Even if the US is a non-
member of the UNCLOS, it does not mean it
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
coastal state over its internal waters and
territorial sea. (ARIGO V . S WIFT , G.R. N O.  2016])
206510, [S EPTEMBER 16, 2014])
What are the elements for precautionary
principle to apply?
Under the precautionary principle, where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation. Three
elements need to concur, namely: uncertainty,
threat of environmental damage and serious or
irreversible harm. Although the precautionary
principles allows lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a connection between the serious
or irreversible harm and the human activity, its
application is still premised on empirical
studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary
basis for effective policy choices under the
precautionary principle (M OSQUEDA V . P ILIPINO
B ANANA G ROWERS & E XPORTERS ASSOCIATION ,
I NC ., G.R. N OS . 189185 & 189305, [AUGUST 16,
2016])
%%%? -%(%E)'*D%+
Are foundlings considered as natural-born
citizens?
Yes. Adopting the legal principles from the 1930
Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention of
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of
the Philippines. As the empirical data provided
by the PSA show, that presumption is at more
than 99% and is a virtual certainty. In sum, all of
the international law conventions and
instruments on the matter of nationality of
founds were designed to address the plight of a
defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. (P OE - 
)
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LLAMANZARES V . C OMMISSION ON E LECTIONS ,
G.R. N OS . 221697  & 221698-700, [M ARCH 8,
What are the requisites for citizenship
proceedings to attain res judicata?
When citizenship is raised as an issue in
 judicial or administrative proceedings, the
resolution or decision thereon is generally not
considered as res judicata unless:
(1) a person’s  citizenship is raised as a
material issue in a controversy where the
person is a party;
(2) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the
resolution thereof; and
(3) the finding of citizenship is affirmed by the
Supreme Court. (G O V . B UREAU OF
I MMIGRATION AND D EPORTATION , G.R. N O. 
191810, [J UNE 22, 2015])
May citizenship be attacked collaterally?
No. It is clear that only the State through its
representatives designated by statute, may
question the illegally or invalidly procured
certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. HRET no matter
how complete and exclusive, does not carry
with it authority to delve into the legality of the
 judgement of naturalization in the pursuit of
disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise
would operate as a collateral attack on the
citizenship of the father which is not
permissible. (V ILANDO V . H OUSE OF
R EPRESENTATIVES E LECTORAL T RIBUNAL , G.R.
N OS . 192147 & 192149, [AUGUST 23, 2011])
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
X claims that he has a lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation for
purposes of his application for
naturalization. However, he depends on his
parents for sustenance. Should his petition
be granted? What is the meaning of
lucrative trade?
No. He was not even listed as an employee or
included in the payroll of his family’s  zipper
business. Even assuming that he was
employed, his non-inclusion in the payroll
suggests an intent to evade taxes or to conceal
the true nature of his employment and the
amount of his salary of income. It is the
concealment of truth; an attempt to circumvent
with impunity the tax laws, labor laws relative to
the employment of aliens, and other law that
would otherwise regulate respondent’s   actions
during his stay in the country. (R EPUBLIC V .
H UANG T E F U,  G.R. N O.  200983, [M ARCH 18,
2015, D EL C ASTILLO  ])
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of
some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation means not only that the
person having the employment gets enough for
his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown
that the employment gives one an income such
that there is an appreciable margin of his
income over his expenses as to be able to
provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work
and thus avoid ones becoming the object of
charity or a public charge. His income should
permit him and the members of his family to live
with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the
prevailing standard of living, and consistently
with the demands of human dignity, at this
stage of our civilization. (R EPUBLIC V . O NG , G.R.
N O.  175430, [J UNE 18, 2012], D EL C ASTILLO  )
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%.? ,)@%*,#(%.)
A)+#$(F)'(
What are the characteristics of
congressional power to revoke the
declaration of martial law by the President?
1. Congress may revoke the proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President
2. Congress may take into consideration not
only data available prior to, but likewise
events supervening the declaration.
3. Congress' review mechanism is automatic
in the sense that it may be activated by
Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.
(LAGMAN V . M EDIALDEA , G.R. N O.  231658 
[J ULY 4, 2017], D EL C ASTILLO  )
What is the informing power of congress?
When the Congress investigates, it is not simply
in aid of legislation or by way of oversight, it is
performing an equally important and
fundamental power and duty --- the informing
function by way of investigating for the purpose
of enlightening the electorate.
 Arthur M. Schlesinger, in THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY, aptly quotes Wilson on
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT on this
power:
Congress’s “only whip,”  Wilson said, “is
investigation,”   and that “the  chief purpose of
investigation, even more than the direction of
affairs, was the enlightenment of the electorate.
The inquisitiveness of such bodies as Congress
is the best conceivable source of information….
The informing function of Congress should be
preferred even to its legislative function.”  For
“the  only really self-governing people is that
people which discusses and interrogates its
administration.” (J. AZCUNA S DISSENT IN
’  
AKBAYAN C ITIZENS ACTION P ARTY V . AQUINO ,
G.R. N O.  170516, [J ULY 16, 2008])
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
Who may be nominees of a party list
representing marginalized and
underrepresented group?
1. Those who are members of the party list at
least 90 days prior to the date of the
election; and
2. Members of the marginalized
/underrepresented group Or those who
have a history of advocacy for that group
(ATONG P AGLAUM , I NC . V . C OMMISSION ON
E LECTIONS , G.R. N O.  203766  [APRIL 2,
2013])
Is it mandatory for the congress to
automatically convene in joint session in the
event that the president proclaims a state of
martial law and/or suspends the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines
or any part thereof?
No. In its literal and ordinary meaning, the
Constitutional provision grants the Congress
the power to revoke the President's
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
prescribes how the Congress may exercise
such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or
special session. The use of the word "may" in
the provision — such that "[t]he Congress x x x
may revoke such proclamation or suspension x
x x" —  is to be construed as permissive and
operating to confer discretion on the Congress
on whether or not to revoke.
The clear meaning of the relevant provision in
 Article VII, Section 18 is that the Congress is
only required to vote jointly on the revocation of
the President’s  proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. But, the deliberations on Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1986 ConCom does not
reveal a manifest intent of the framers to make
it mandatory for the Congress to convene in
 joint session following the President's
proclamation and/or suspension, so it could
deliberate as a single body, regardless of
whether its Members will concur in or revoke
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the President's proclamation and/or
suspension. (P ADILLA V . C ONGRESS OF THE
P HILIPPINES , G.R. N OS . 231671 & 231694, [J ULY
25, 2017])
 .? )G)-/(%.)
A)+#$(F)'(
May the executive department be compelled
to espouse claims in behalf of human rights
violations committed by another country
during world war II?
No, espousal of claims is a political question,
not a justiciable controversy. Political questions
refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.
Certain types of cases often have been found to
present political questions. One such category
involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that "[t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative--
'the political'--departments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to
 judicial inquiry or decision. (V INUYA V . R OMULO ,
G.R. N O.  162230, [APRIL 28, 2010], D EL
C ASTILLO  )
What is the distinction between pardon and
amnesty?
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and
as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned,
because the courts take no notice thereof; while
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive
with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a
public act of which the courts should take
 judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes
of persons or communities who may be guilty of
political offenses, generally before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives
the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor
work the restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence" while amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the
law precisely as though he had committed no
offense. (B ARRIOQUINTO V . F ERNANDEZ , G.R.
N O.  L-1278, [J ANUARY 21, 1949])
Are cross-border augmentations from
savings in one department to another
allowed under the constitution?
No. By providing that the President, the  
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the
Constitutional Commissions may be authorized
to augment any item in the GAA “for   their
respective offices,”  Section 25(5), supra, has
delineated borders between their offices, such
that funds appropriated for one office are
prohibited from crossing over to another office
even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient
item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of
funds cross-border transfers or cross-border
augmentations. (ARAULLO V . AQUINO III, G.R.
N O.  209287 [J ULY 1, 2014])
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Are local chief executives empowered to call
on the armed forces to suppress allegations
of terrorist attacks?
No. A local chief executive is not endowed with
the power to call upon the armed forces at his
own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his
authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces,
the police, and his own Civilian Emergency
Force. The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. (K ULAYAN V . T AN , G.R. N O.  187298,
[J ULY 3, 2012])
Does the president have the power to create
new offices?
No. The creation of a new office remains a
legislative function. However, the President’s
has the power to reorganize “already existing”
offices within the Office of the President Proper
(OPP). Further, the President has the power to
create an Ad hoc Office/Committee, which can
only be justified under faithful execution clause
and power to investigate, and not under power
of control. (B IRAOGO V . P HILIPPINE T RUTH
C OMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. N O.  192935 
[D ECEMBER 7, 2010])
.%? H/A%-%#, A)+#$(F)'(
Must the JBC vote unanimously when the
integrity of the candidate in the judiciary is
put in question?
Yes. When an integrity question arises, the
voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a
nominee to a judicial post becomes
"unanimous" instead of the "majority vote.
Considering that the JBC rule employs the term
"integrity" as an essential qualification for
appointment, and its doubtful existence in a
person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that
is, the unanimous vote of all the members of
the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that
"integrity" as used in the rules must be
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
interpreted uniformly. Hence, this unanimity rule
envisions only a situation where an applicant's
moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that
the "unanimity rule" only comes into operation
when the moral character of a person is put in
issue. It finds no application where the question
is essentially unrelated to an applicant's moral
uprightness. (J ARDELEZA V . S ERENO , G.R. N O.  No. For the protective writ of amparo to issue in
213181, [AUGUST 19, 2014])
NB: Justice Jardeleza is in the Supreme Court
right now because the SC in the above-cited
case ruled that the allegation against Jardeleza
(ie different legal strategy in handling of the
arbitration case does not related to the moral
character of the nominee and thus, not a
question of integrity where unanimous vote is
required.
What is the demarcation when quo warranto
may be used as a remedy to oust a public
officer (member of the supreme court) from
office?
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, and
to obliviate confusion in the future as to when
quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible
public official may be availed of, and in keeping
with the Court's function of harmonizing the
laws and the rules with the Constitution, the
Court herein demarcates that an act or
omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official's
qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the
subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that
the requisites for the commencement thereof
are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions,
even if it relates to the qualification of integrity,
being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a validly
appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot
be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding,
but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is
impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or
disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
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otherwise. (R EPUBLIC V . S ERENO , G.R. N O. 
237428, [M AY 11, 2018])
Is it enough for proof of disappearance to be
alleged for a petition for a writ of amparo to
prosper?
enforced disappearance cases, allegation and
proof that the persons subject thereof are
missing are not enough. It must also be shown
by the required quantum of proof that their
disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, [the
government] or a political organization, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give
information on the fate or whereabouts of [said
missing] persons. (N AVIA V . P ARDICO , G.R. N O. 
184467, [J UNE 19, 2012], D EL C ASTILLO  )
 .%%? -&'*(%(/(%&'#,
-&FF%**%&'*
Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction over a
quo warranto case against a presidential
candidate for not meeting the residency and
citizenship requirement?
Insofar as the qualification of a presidential
candidate is concerned, no rule expressly
authorizes or vests COMELEC of jurisdiction to
determine the qualification of a presidential
candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding
before an authority properly vested with
 jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualification may be by statute, by executive
order or by a judgment of a competent court or
tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a
prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the
Constitution," neither can the certificate of
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
candidacy be cancelled or denied due course
on grounds of false representations regarding
his or her qualifications, without a prior
authoritative finding that he or she is not
qualified, such prior authority being the
necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found. (P OE -  taking of private property without just
LLAMANZARES V . C OMMISSION ON E LECTIONS ,
G.R. N OS . 221697  & 221698-700, [M ARCH 8,
2016])
The COMELEC issued a resolution that
reads: “right to reply. - all registered
political parties, party-list groups or
coalitions and bona fide candidates shall
have the right to reply to charges published,
or aired against them. The reply shall be
given publicity, or aired against them. The
reply shall be given publicity by the
newspaper, television, and/or radio station
which first printed or aired the charges with
the same prominence or in the same page or
section or in the same time slot as the first
statement.” Is the resolution valid?
Yes. When it comes to election and the
exercise of freedom of speech, of expression
and of the press, the latter must be properly
viewed in context as being necessarily made to
accommodate the imperatives of fairness by
giving teeth and substance to the right to reply
requirement. The Constitution itself provides as
part of the means to ensure free, orderly,
honest, fair and credible elections, a task
addressed to the COMELEC to provide for a
right to reply. Given that express constitutional
mandate, it could be seen that the Fundamental
Law itself has weighed in on the balance to be
struck between the freedom of the press and
the right to reply. Accordingly, one is not merely
to see the equation as purely between the
press and the right to reply. (GMA N ETWORK V .
COMELEC, G.R. N O.  205357, [S EPTEMBER 2,
2014])
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Broadcasters argued that the right to reply
provision burdens their exclusive right over
airwaves. Is their contention tenable?
No. Respondent likewise sees no merit in
petitioners' claim that the Resolutions amount to
compensation. Respondent emphasizes that
radio and television broadcasting companies do
not own the airwaves and frequencies through
which they transmit broadcast signals; they are
merely given the temporary privilege to use the
same. Since they are merely enjoying a
privilege, the same may be reasonably
burdened with some form of public service, in
this case, to provide candidates with the
opportunity to reply to charges aired against
them. (GMA N ETWORK V . COMELEC, G.R. N O. 
205357, [S EPTEMBER 2, 2014])
Does the Civil Service Commission have
jurisdiction over an administrative case
against an erring member of the Philippine
national police?
Yes. Uniformed members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) are considered
employees of the National Government, and all
personnel of the PNP are subject to civil service
laws and regulations. Petitioner cannot evade
liability under the pretense that another agency
has primary jurisdiction over him. Settled is the
rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law. The CSC, as the central
personnel agency of the Government, is
mandated to establish a career service, to
strengthen the merit and rewards system, and
to adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The
civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters.
Specifically, Section 91 of RA 6975 (1990) or
the DILG Act of 1990 provides that the "Civil
Service Law and its implementing rules and
regulations shall apply to all personnel of the
Department", to which herein petitioner
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
belongs. (C APABLANCA V . C IVIL S ERVICE
C OMMISSION , G.R. N O.  179370, [N OVEMBER 18,
2009], D EL C ASTILLO  )
Is the ombudsman’s power to remove
merely recommendatory?
No, the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss
erring public officials and employees. It is
already well-settled that "the power of the
Ombudsman to determine and impose
administrative liability is not merely
recommendatory but actually mandatory." As
we have explained in Ledesma v. CA, the fact
"[t]hat the refusal, without just cause, of any
officer to comply with [the] order of the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or
employee is a ground for disciplinary action
[under Section 15 (3) of RA 6770] is a strong
indication that the Ombudsman's
'recommendation' is not merely advisory in
nature but is actually mandatory within the
bounds of law." (Fajardo v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 173268, [August 23,
2012], Del Castillo)
 .%%%? ,#" &'
+/B,%- &CC%-)$*
What are the modes of acquiring title to
public office?
(1) Appointment
(2) Designation and
(3) Pag lumingon ka, akin ka. [joke lang ni
guys ha. Pawa lang sa kulba :D]
What determines the status of the position
of an employee?
It is the regulation or the law creating the
Service that determines the position of the
employee. It is not the absence or presence of
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the required appointment from the CSC, or the
membership of an employee in the SSS or in
the GSIS that determine the status of the
position of an employee.
What is the arias doctrine?
Heads of offices cannot be convicted of a
conspiracy charge just because they did not
personally examine every single detail before
they, as the final approving authorities, affixed
their signatures to certain documents. In the
words of the Supreme Court --- We would be
setting a bad precedent if a head of office
plagued by all too common problems —
dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork,
multiple assignments or positions, or plain
incompetence —  is suddenly swept into a
conspiracy conviction simply because he did
not personally examine every single detail,
painstakingly trace every step from inception,
and investigate the motives of every person
involved in a transaction before affixing his
signature as the final approving authority.
(ARIAS V . S ANDIGANBAYAN , G.R. N OS . 81563  &
82512, [D ECEMBER 19, 1989])
When is the arias doctrine inapplicable?
The doctrine is inapplicable when conspiracy is
adequately proven, such that a unity of purpose
and unity in the execution of an unlawful
objective are sufficiently established. Further,
the doctrine is inapplicable when, by virtue of
the duty given by law as well as by rules and
regulations, the public official had the
responsibility to examine certain documents to
ascertain whether it was proper to sign it.
(B ACASMAS V . S ANDIGANBAYAN , G.R. N O. 
189343 [J ULY 10, 2013])
What is the difference between a de facto
officer and a mere usurper?
(1) A de facto officer has color of right or title to
the office or has apparent authority to hold the
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
office and has done so in good faith, while a
usurper has neither lawful title nor color of right
or title to the office; (2) the act of a de facto
officer is valid as if it was done by a de jure
officer but that of a usurper is absolutely null
and void; (3) a de facto may be removed
through a direct proceeding only.
What is the effect of a disapproval by the
CSC of a publ ic officer’s appointment?
If the basis for disapproval is not “violation of
civil service law”,  the appointee is entitled to a
salary. Otherwise, the appointing authority shall
be personally held liable for the salary of the
appointee. (N AZARENO V . C ITY OF D UMAGUETE ,
G.R. N O.  181559, [O CTOBER 2, 2009], D EL
C ASTILLO  )
To warrant dismissal, does dishonesty have
to be committed in the course of duty?
No. Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal,
need not be committed in the course of the
performance of duty by the public officer, for it
inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or
employee to continue in office and the discipline
and morale of the service. (B ALASBAS V .
M ONAYAO , G.R. N O.  190524, [F EBRUARY 17,
2014], D EL C ASTILLO  )
In cases involving public official, when does
a breach of duty constitute gross
negligence?
There is gross negligence when a breach of
duty is flagrant and palpable. (R E:   R EPORT ON
THE P RELIMINARY R ESULTS OF THE S POT AUDIT
IN THE R EGIONAL T RIAL C OURT , B RANCH 170,
M ALABON C ITY , A.M. N O.  16-05-142-RTC,
[S EPTEMBER 5, 2017], D EL C ASTILLO  )
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Can an administrative offense be condoned
by election or re-election?
No. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no
constitutional or statutory basis in our
 jurisdiction to support the notion that an official
elected for a different term is fully absolved of
any administrative liability arising from an
offense done during a prior term. The concept
of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all
times, as mandated under the 1987
Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea
that an elective local official's administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he
was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post. (C ARPIO -M ORALES V .
C OURT OF APPEALS , G.R. N OS . 217126-27,
[N OVEMBER 10, 2015])
Should the abandonment of the
Aguinaldo/Condonation Doctrine in
Ombudsman vs. CA be applied
prospectively?
Yes. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
While the future may ultimately uncover a
doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule,
recognized as "good law" prior to its
abandonment. (C ARPIO -M ORALES V . C OURT OF
APPEALS , G.R. N OS . 217126-27, [N OVEMBER 10,
2015  CITING P EOPLE V . J ABINAL , 1974)
With the abandonment of the
Aguinaldo/Condonation Doctrine, does it
then become impossible to condone an
administrative offense?
No. Liability arising from administrative offenses
may be condoned by the President in light of
Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
If the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less
serious than criminal offenses. (C ARPIO - 
M ORALES V . C OURT OF APPEALS , G.R. N OS .
217126-27, [N OVEMBER 10, 2015]   CITING
LLAMAS V . O RBOS , 1991)
Does the ombudsman have jurisdiction over
GOCCS without original charters?
No. The Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction only
over public officials/employees of GOCCs with
original charters. Even if the government later
on acquires controlling interest, as in the case
of PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not
have an “original charter”. (C ARANDANG V .
C ARANDANG , G.R. N O.  148076  [J ANUARY 12,
2011])
May the Ombudsman exercise jurisdiction
over the investigation of cases under other
investigating agencies of the government?
Yes. the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any
stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.
(B USUEGO V . O FFICE OF THE O MBUDSMAN , G.R.
N O.  196842, [O CTOBER 9, 2013])
Is the Ombudsman’s administrative
disciplinary power over a deputy
ombudsman and special prosecutor
exclusive?
No. Such power is shared with the President as
the appointing authority. Unquestionably, the
Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to
discipline his own people and mete out
administrative sanctions upon them, including
the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service. However, it is equally without question
that the President has concurrent authority with
respect to removal from office of the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit
under specified conditions. (G ONZALES III  V .
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O FFICE OF THE P RESIDENT OF THE P HILS ., G.R.
N OS . 196231 & 196232, [S EPTEMBER 4, 2012])
Under what conditions should the
ombudsman defer a matter to the
President?
Where the Office of the President was the first
to initiate a case, prudence should prompt the
Ombudsman to desist from proceeding
separately, and to defer instead to the
President's assumption of authority, especially
when the administrative charge involves
"demanding and soliciting a sum of money"
which constitutes either graft and corruption or
bribery, both of which are grounds reserved for
the President's exercise of his authority to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman. (G ONZALES III  V .
O FFICE OF THE P RESIDENT OF THE P HILS ., G.R.
N OS . 196231 & 196232, [S EPTEMBER 4, 2012])
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan
does not have jurisdiction over her as she
does not receive any salary or remuneration
as a up student regent. She further
contends that she is not a public officer with
salary grade 27; and is, in fact, a regular
tuition fee-paying student. Is petitioner
correct?
No. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. While the first part of Section 4
(A) of P.D. No. 1606 covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials
whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27
and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court. P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
this category. (S ERANA V . S ANDIGANBAYAN , G.R.
N O.  162059, [J ANUARY 22, 2008])
Remittances from sequestered corporations
and proceeds from the sale of corporation
shares, which formed part of M arcos’ ill -
gotten wealth, were converted by petitioner
as his cash advances. Can petitioner be
held liable for failing to remit the
remittances and proceeds?
Yes. ill-gotten wealth assumes a public
character as they supposedly originated from
the government itself, and must, perforce, be
returned to the public treasury, subject only to
the satisfaction of positive claims of certain
persons as may be adjudged by competent
courts. Accordingly, the proceeds from the
sales thereof should likewise be remitted to the
public treasury. (S ABIO V . F IELD I NVESTIGATION
O FFICE , G.R. N O.  229882, [F EBRUARY 13, 2018])
How are items classified as ill-gotten wealth
treated under the law?
Under Section 63 of RA 6657, as amended, all
amounts derived from the sale of ill-gotten
wealth recovered through the PCGG shall
accrue to the CARP fund and shall be
considered automatically appropriated for such
purpose pursuant to Sections 20 and 21 of EO
229 (“Providing  Mechanisms for the
Implementation of CARP). (S ABIO V . F IELD
I NVESTIGATION O FFICE , G.R. N O.  229882,
[F EBRUARY 13, 2018])
Mid-way through the incumbent’s third term,
a recall election was called. The incumbent
won the recall and thereafter served his
fourth term. Was there a violation of the
three-term limit rule?
No. An elective official, who has served for
three consecutive terms and who did not seek
the elective position for what could be his fourth
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term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official's
service. Therefore, he was in the interim, i.e.,
from the end of the third term up to the recall
election, a private citizen. The break or
interruption need not be for a full term of three
years or for the major part of the 3-year term;
an interruption for any length of time, provided
the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break
the continuity of service. (S OCRATES V .
C OMMISSION ON E LECTIONS , G.R. N O.  154512 
[N OVEMBER 12, 2002])
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Legislative authority was delegated to the
secretary of justice to promulgate rules and
regulations on the subject of lethal injection,
and to supervise the director of the bureau
of corrections in promulgating the lethal
injection manual. In the IRR, however, the
manual’s execution proce dure did not
provide for a mode of review or approval
from the secretary. Is the execution
procedure invalid?
Yes. The Secretary of Justice has practically
abdicated the power to promulgate the manual
on the execution procedure to the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for
a mode of review and approval thereof. Being a
mere constituent unit of the Department of
Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not
promulgate a manual that would not bear the
imprimatur of the administrative superior, the
Secretary of Justice as the rule-making
authority. Such apparent abdication of
departmental responsibility renders the said
paragraph invalid. (E CHEGARAY V . S ECRETARY
OF J USTICE , G.R. N O.  132601, [O CTOBER 12,
1998])
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The constitution prohibits congress from
creating private corporations to prevent the
granting of special privileges to certain
individuals, families, or groups.
Consequently, was the creation of the
Philippine national red cross (PNRC)
through RA 95 invalid?
No. The PNRC Charter does not come within
the spirit of the constitutional provision, as it
does not grant special privileges to a particular
individual, family, or group, but creates an entity
that strives to serve the common good. A closer
look at the nature of the PNRC would show that
there is none like it not just in terms of structure,
but also in terms of history, public service and
official status accorded to it by the State and
the international community. PNRC’s  structure
is, therefore, sui generis. Notably, the Republic
of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva
Conventions, established the PNRC as a
voluntary organization. (LIBAN V . G ORDON , G.R.
N O.  175352, [J ANUARY 18, 2011])
When conducting preliminary investigation,
does a public prosecutor exercise
adjudicatory powers?
No. The public prosecutor exercises
investigative powers to determine whether,
based on the evidence presented to him, he
should take further action by filing a criminal
complaint in court. In doing so, he does not
adjudicate upon the rights, obligations or
liabilities of the parties before him. (M ANILA
E LECTRIC C O.  V . ATILANO , G.R. N O.  166758,
[J UNE 27, 2012])
What is the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies? What is the effect
if it is not observed?
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires that where a remedy before
an administrative agency is provided, the
administrative agency concerned must be given
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the opportunity to decide a matter within its
 jurisdiction before an action is brought before
the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is a ground for dismissal of the action.
(U NIVERSITY OF S ANTO T OMAS V . S ANCHEZ , G.R.
N O.  165569, [J ULY 29, 2010] D EL C ASTILLO  )
What is demotion? When is there demotion?
There is demotion when an employee is
appointed to a position resulting to a diminution
in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which
may or may not involve a reduction in salary.
Where an employee is appointed to a position
with the same duties and responsibilities but a
rank and salary higher than those enjoyed in his
previous position, there is no demotion and the
appointment is valid. While this principle and its
corollary are plain, it is through the use of
misleading premises that a semblance of
demotion was attempted to be passed off in this
case. (B AUTISTA V . C IVIL S ERVICE C OMMISSION ,
G.R. N O.  185215, [J ULY 22, 2010], D EL
C ASTILLO  )
What is the standard to determine that a
reorganization was validly done? How may
one be removed pursuant to a valid
reorganization?
In this jurisdiction, a reorganization is valid
provided that it is done in good faith. As a
general rule, the test of good faith lies in
whether the purpose of the reorganization is for
economy or to make the bureaucracy more
efficient. Removal from office as a result of
reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good
faith. A demotion in office, i.e., the movement
from one position to another involving the
issuance of an appointment with diminution in
duties, responsibilities, status or rank which
may or may not involve a reduction in salary, is
tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for
it. Consequently, before a demotion may be
effected pursuant to a reorganization, the
observance of the rules on bona fide abolition
of public office is essential. (B AUTISTA V . C IVIL
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
S ERVICE C OMMISSION , G.R. N O.  185215, [J ULY
22, 2010], D EL C ASTILLO  )
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What is devolution?
Devolution refers to the act by which the
national government confers power and
authority upon various LGUs including “the
transfer of records, equipment, and other
assets and personnel of national agencies and
offices corresponding to the devolved powers,
functions and responsibilities.” (R EPUBLIC V .
D ACLAN , G.R. N OS . 197115 & 197267, [M ARCH
23, 2015], D EL C ASTILLO  )
A parcel of land was donated to the Bureau
of Animal Industry (BAI). Upon enactment of
the LGU, the functions of BAI were devolved
to the LGUs. Is it proper to demand for the
return of the donated parcel?
No. Devolution cannot have any effect on the
donations made to the Republic. (R EPUBLIC V .
D ACLAN , G.R. N OS . 197115 & 197267, [M ARCH
23, 2015], D EL C ASTILLO  )
May a vice mayor appear in behalf of a client
claiming damages against national power
corporation?
No. NPC is considered a government
instrumentality. Section 2 of the Administrative
Code is clear and unambiguous. It categorically
provides that the term "instrumentality" includes
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Hence there is no room for construction. All that
has to be done is to apply the law as called for
by the circumstances of the case. It is not
disputed that the NPC is a government-owned
or controlled corporation. Therefore following
Section 2 of the Administrative Code the NPC is
clearly an instrumentality of the government.
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It is also significant to point out that in M ACEDA
V . M ACARAIG the Court stated that "[t]he NPC is
a government instrumentality with the
enormous task of undertaking development of
hydroelectric generation of power and
production of electricity from other sources, as
well as the transmission of electric power on a
nationwide basis, to improve the quality of life of
the people pursuant to the State policy
embodied in Section [9], Article II of the
Constitution. (R EPUBLIC V . R AMBUYONG , G.R.
N O.  167810, [O CTOBER 4, 2010], D EL C ASTILLO  )
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Can COMELEC refuse to registration on the
basis of religious and public morals
grounds?
No. Governmental reliance on religious
 justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality. Government action, including its
proscription of immorality must have a secular
purpose. That is, the government proscribes
this conduct because it is “detrimental  to those
conditions upon which depend the existence
and progress of human society”  and not
because the conduct is proscribed by the
beliefs of one religion or the other. Moreover,
moral disapproval, WITHOUT MORE, is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in
the party-list system. (ANG LADLAD LGBT P ARTY
V . C OMMISSION ON E LECTIONS , G.R. N O.  190582,
[APRIL 8, 2010], D EL C ASTILLO  )
After the execution of an affidavit of
renunciation, can the continued use of a
foreign passport amount to disqualification?
Yes. The use of a foreign passport amounts to
repudiation or recantation of the oath of
renunciation by a natural-born Filipino citizen
who was naturalized abroad and who
subsequently availed of the privileges under
 "#$$%&$ '&()* +&,%(%-#, ,#" $).%)")$
R.A. 9225. Matters dealing with qualifications
and eligibility for public elective office must be
strictly complied with. (ARNADO V . C OMMISSION
ON E LECTIONS , G.R. N O.  210164, [AUGUST 18,
2015], D EL C ASTILLO  )
Can a person who has filed his COC be held
liable for premature campaigning prior to
the start of the campaign period?
No. The rule is that a candidate is liable for
election offenses only upon the start of the
campaign period. The expressly states that
“any  person who files his certificate of
candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be
considered a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy.” And that “any unlawful
act or omission applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the campaign
period. (P ENERA V . C OMMISSION ON E LECTIONS ,
G.R. N O.  181613 (R ESOLUTION  ), [N OVEMBER 25,
2009])
What is a pre-proclamation controversy?
 A pre-proclamation controversy is any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by
any candidate or by any registered political
party or coalition of political parties before the
board or directly with the Commission, or any
matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and
236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appearance of the election
returns. (S AÑO , J R.  V . C OMMISSION ON
E LECTIONS , G.R. N O.  182221, [F EBRUARY 3,
2010], D EL C ASTILLO  )
Can election returns be excluded solely on
the grounds of a pre-proclamation
controversy?
No. The mere invocation of the grounds of a
pre-proclamation controversy, without more, will
not justify the exclusion of election returns
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which appear regular and authentic on their
face. (S AÑO , J R.  V . C OMMISSION ON E LECTIONS ,
G.R. N O.  182221, [F EBRUARY 3, 2010], D EL
C ASTILLO  )
Can a certificate of votes be used to prove
alteration?
Yes. However, to be admissible to prove
alteration, the certificate of votes must comply
with:
(1) Section 16 of R.A. 6646  – the certificate of
votes shall contain the number of votes
obtained by the candidate, the number of
the precinct, the name of the city or
municipality, the total number of voters who
voted in the precinct and the date and time
issued, and shall be signed and thumb-
marked by each member of the board; and
(2) Section 17 of R.A. 6646  – the certificate of
votes must be subsequently authenticated
at the time of its presentment to the Board
of Canvassers in the event that it shall be
used to prove tampering. (D OROMAL V .
B IRON , G.R. N O.  181809, [F EBRUARY 17,
2010], D EL C ASTILLO  )
Will the death of the protestant extinguish
an election contest?
No. Considering that an election contest is
imbued with public interest, unlike in an
ordinary suit, the death of the protestant does
not extinguish an election contest. The
candidate who is likely to succeed had the
protestant been declared the winner, like a vice-
elect, will be the real- party-in-interest. (P OE V .
M ACAPAGAL -ARROYO , P.E.T. C ASE N O.  002 
(R ESOLUTION  ), [M ARCH 29, 2005])
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Does the creation of a joint committee of

DOJ and COMELEC for the purpose of
conducting preliminary investigation in
election cases encroach upon the powers of
the COMELEC?
No. While the composition of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team is
dominated by DOJ officials, it does not
necessarily follow that the COMELEC is
inferior. Under the Joint Order, resolutions of
the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the
COMELEC in accordance with the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. (ARROYO V . D EPARTMENT
OF J USTICE , G.R. N OS . 199082, 199085  &
199118, [S EPTEMBER 18, 2012])

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What is the meaning of ex aequo et bono?

Ex Aequo et Bono appears in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice
which states: This provision shall not prejudice
the power the Court to decide a case ex aequo
et bono, if both of  the parties agree thereto. Ex
 Aequo et Bono literally means that the ICJ will
decide the case before it on the basis of what is
 just and fair according to equity and good
conscience. To be clear, Ex Aequo et Bono
may be invoked if there is no rule in
international law which may be applied to the
present controversy. Nonetheless, consent of
both parties is still required.

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