E. Garcia, et. Al vs HRET GR. No. 134792 (12 August 1999)
COMELEC
Facts:
Harry Angpin was elected as the representative for the 3rd
district of Manila. However, there has been a petition for quo warranto filed
before the HRET against Congress man Harry Angping. Petitioners
questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in the
House of Representatives claiming that the latter was not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, which is a constitutional requirement. Upon the
petitioner’s filing of their petition, they have paid the required 5,000php
filing fee.
However, HRET issued a resolution dismissing the petition for
failure to pay 5,000 php as deposit. The petitioners then filed the cash
deposit and filed for a motion for reconsideration with a receipt attached.
However, it was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the HRET has committed a grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for quo warranto of petitioners even after the
payment of deposit fee
Ruling
No, the HRET did not commit grave abuse in dismissing the petition. The
HRET has a judgment call and has the authority to implement its rules. As
long as the exercise of such discretion is based on a well-founded factual
and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to
the Tribunal. In view of the delicate nature of the charge against
Congressman Angpin, the observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure
must be taken seriously if they are to obtain their objective. The petitioners
are duty bound to know and are expected to properly comply with the
procedural requirements laid down by the tribunal without being formally
orered to do so. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and swift
dispensation.
SAQUILAYAN V. COMELEC 416 SCRA 658
FACTS:
1. SAQUILAYAN and JARO were candidates for the Office of
Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
2. SAQUILAYAN was proclaimed winner.
3. JARO instituted an Election Protest Case before the RTC,
contesting the results of all 453 election precincts. He alleges
the ff:
a. Votes in favor of JARO were considered stray
b. Ballots and votes were misappreciated (considered
null and void, or counted in favor of SAQUILAYAN)
c. Votes that were void (containing stickers or markings)
were counted in favor of SAQUILAYAN, etc..
4. SAQUILAYAN filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by
the RTC.
5. Questioning the denial of his Motion to Dismiss, the COMELEC
(Division) ruled in favor of SAQUILAYAN and ordered the
dismissal of the election protest. It ruled that JARO’s allegations
failed to state a cause of action, on the basis of Pena v. HRET.
* Pena v. HRET held that the bare allegations of massive fraud,
widespread intimidation and terrorism, without specification and
substantiation of where and how these occurrences took place,
render the protest fatally defective.
6. Upon reconsideration sought by JARO, the COMELEC En
Banc, SAQUILAYAN’s Motion to Dismiss was again dismissed,
and the Election Protest Case was ordered to proceed.
HELD:
1. The present case is similar to Miguel v. COMELEC, which the
COMELEC En Banc used as basis in ordering the Election
Protest Case to proceed.
2. IN both cases, the protestants questioned all the precincts in
their respective municipalities.
3. As Miguel v. COMELEC is more recent than Pena v. HRET (as
used by the COMELEC Division), then the former should prevail
in case of a conflict.
4. Furthermore, election contests involve public interest.
Technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to
stand if they constituted an obstacle to the determination of the
true will of the electorate.
5. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
6. Allowing the election protest to proceed would be the best way
of removing any doubt as to who was the real candidate chosen
by the electorate.
7. Decision of COMELEC En Banc affirmed.
Soller v.
Facts:
Ferdinand Thomas Soller and Angel Saulong were both
candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in
the May 1998 elections. On May 14, 1998, Soller was proclaimed by the
municipal board of canvassers as the duly elected mayor. On May 19,
1998, Saulong filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of the
proclamation/exclusion of election return. On May 25, 1998, Saulong also
filed an election protest before the RTC. Soller moved to dismiss
Saulong’s protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping and
failure to state a cause of action. On July 3, 1998, the COMELEC
dismissed the petition filed by Saulong. On the other hand, the RTC
denied Soller’s motion to dismiss. Soller then filed a petition for certiorari
with the COMELEC contending that the RTC acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the election protest.
COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition. Hence, this suit.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC, sitting en banc, has jurisdiction over
Soller’s petition
Held:
No. Sarmiento v. COMELEC applies. The authority to resolve a
petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the
questioned order of the trial court falls within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC by division and not en banc.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of private
respondent's election protest
Held:
No. A close scrutiny of the receipts will show that Saulong failed
to pay the filing fee of 300 pesos for his protest as prescribed by the
COMELEC rules. A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
paymeny of the prescribed docket fee. Patently, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over Saulong’s protest. The SC also held that the verification
of the protest was defective. Since the petition lacked proper verification, it
should be treated as an unsigned pleading and must be dismissed. The
protest likewise failed to comply with the required certification against
forum shopping. Saulong successively filed a petition for annulment of the
proclamation/exclusion of election return and an election protest. Yet, he
did not disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed a petition for
annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election returns.
Joker Arroyo vs HRET & Augusto Syjuco
HRET’s Jurisdiction – Excess and Lack Thereof
After the May 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected
Congressman of the lone district of Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559 votes
over his opponent. His opponent Syjuco protested the declaration before
the HRET. Syjuco alleged that Arroyo won due to massive fraud hence he
moved for revision and recounting. HRET gave way but during the process
some HRET employees and personnel conducted some irregularities to
ensure Syjuco’s win. After some paper battles between the two, Syjuco,
realizing that mere revision and recounting would not suffice to overthrow
the more than 12,000 votes lead of Arroyo over him, revised his complaint
by including and introducing in his memorandum cum addendum that his
complaint is actually based on a broader and more equitable non-
traditional determination of the existence of the precinct-level document-
based anomalies and that the revision he initially sought is just incidental
to such determination. The 3 justices members of the HRET ruled that
such amendment is already beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the 6
representative members ruled otherwise. Consequently, by a vote of 6-3,
the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by Syjuco and the HRET later
declared Syjuco as the winner.
ISSUE: Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
HELD: However guised or justified by Syjuco, this innovative theory he
introduced for the first time in his memorandum cum addendum indeed
broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what he originally
sought-the mere revision of ballots. From his initial prayer for revision
which lays primary, if not exclusive emphasis on the physical recount and
appreciation of ballots alone, private respondent’s belated attempt to inject
this theory at the memorandum stage calls for presentation of evidence
(consisting of thousands of documents) aside from, or other than, the
ballots themselves. By having done so, Syjuco in fact intended to
completely abandon the process and results of the revision and thereafter
sought to rely on his brainchild process he fondly coined as “precinct-level
document-based evidence.” This is clearly substantial amendment of the
election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal
rules.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1513 January 19, 2000
ALFREDO B. ENOJAS, JR., complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, Jr., RTC, Branch 47, Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan, respondent.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is an Administrative Complaint charging Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott,
Jr. with serious misconduct, inefficiency, and gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant Alfredo B. Enojas, Jr. was a candidate for mayor of the
Municipality of Roxas, Palawan in the May 8, 1995 local elections.
According to the canvass of election returns, complainant obtained seven
thousand three hundred twenty-nine (7,329) votes, lower by forty-eight
votes than the seven thousand three hundred seventy seven (7,377) votes
of Jose R. Rodriguez, who was proclaimed winner on May 26, 1995.
On June 1, 1995, complainant filed an election protest, docketed as
Election Case No. 891 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court in
Puerto Princesa City presided over by Judge Panfilo S. Salva. Alleging
massive fraud and irregularities, complainant (Protestant in said case)
sought revision of ballots in 102 precincts of Roxas, Palawan.
On June 9, 1995, Jose R. Rodriguez (Protestee) sent in an Answer
praying for the dismissal of the election protest and interposing a
counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.
On July 11, 1995, Judge Panfilo S. Salva denied protestee's motion to
dismiss. Considering that the 102 ballot boxes, election documents and
book of voters were already delivered to and deposited with the trial court,
at the time and the required fees and deposits therefor remitted by the
protestant, Judge Salva ordered the revision of ballots to proceed.
After completing the revision of thirty nine (39) contested ballot boxes,
Judge Salva granted1 protestant's motion to terminate the revision,
ordered the stenographer and revision committee to submit their revision
reports within 30 days2 and set the case for hearing.
On October 13, 1995, Judge Salva inhibited himself from trying the case
on the ground that the protestee, Jose R. Rodriguez, is related by
consanguinity to his wife. In due time, the case was then reraffled to
Branch 47 presided over by Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.
On November 14, 1995, Judge Gacott Jr. issued an order3 granting
protestee's motion for leave to file an amended answer. Thus, on
November 15, 1995 protestee presented a motion to amend his answer,
and submitted the corresponding amended answer. Accompanying the
same was a pre-trial brief. The Amended Answer contained new matters
not appearing in the original answer, and affecting the merits of the
controversy, in violation of Section 8 of COMELEC Rule 35. The following
day, complainant submitted his opposition thereto on the ground that the
said pleadings merely tended to delay the disposition of the election
protest.
On November 28 and 29 1995, the parties submitted their respective
exhibits consisting of public, official and other election documents.4 But on
December 7, 1995, the protestee begged leave of court, this time to file a
motion to dismiss, which motion to dismiss was attached thereto,5 alleging
the same grounds averred in previous pleadings.
On December 10, 1995, a Sunday, Judge Gacott, Jr. issued an order
denying admission of the certified true copies of the documents marked
Exhibits "A", "B", "D", and "E" on the ground that they were not properly
identified.6
On December 15, 1995, respondent judge issued an order giving the
complainant up to 12:00 o'clock noon of the next day to submit his
opposition to protestee's motion to dismiss. On the same day, December
15, 1995, the complainant sent in his opposition to the motion to dismiss,
contending that subject motion to dismiss was frivolous, presented to
unduly delay the disposition of the election case, and without any legal
and factual basis.
On December 19, 1995, respondent judge, relying on the case
of Manchester et al. vs. Court of Appeals et. al.,7 issued the following
Order dismissing the election case, to wit:
This Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide this case due
to the deliberate non-payment by the protestant of the required
or correct fee.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the motion to
dismiss filed by the protestee thru Counsel to be meritorious and
well-founded, AS PRAYED FOR, the Court hereby orders this
election protest dismissed, with cost against the protestant.
The motion for reconsideration of the Order dated December 10,
1995 is now moot and academic. Ergo, same no longer merits
consideration by this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
(Emphasis supplied)
Theorizing that the said action of respondent judge constituted serious
misconduct, inefficiency, and gross ignorance of the law, Alfredo B. Enojas
Jr. instituted the administrative case under scrutiny, praying for the
dismissal of respondent judge from the service.
On September 27, 1997, respondent judge submitted his Comment,
contending that the proceedings in subject election case were above
board and regular. He explained that the complaint is an exaggeration
concocted by Atty. Constante P. Pimentel, lawyer of the protestant, who
was scolded and reprimanded by him (respondent judge) who got irked at
his (Pimentel) grandstanding during court sessions. Respondent judge
described Atty. Constante P. Pimentel as an old but disrespectful and
arrogant lawyer although he does not bear him ill will, hatred and
rancor.1âwphi1.nêt
As regards the present charges against him, respondent judge answered
in general terms, stating that there is no law, rule or regulation requiring
him or any other judge, for that matter, to be perfect in all his orders,
judgments or decisions, for he is only a human being susceptible to
innocent errors. It is the submission of respondent judge that in his
pronouncements, orders, decrees and decisions, it is enough that he be
guided by the yardstick of "moral certainty" — that whatever he does,
performs or decides is right and legal. What is important, he pointed out, is
that his acts, actions, deeds or decisions are never tainted with
dishonesty, corruption or monetary consideration.
In seeking his exoneration from this case respondent judge theorized that
there should be no more reason for the institution of the case as the same
administrative complaint had been the subject of complainant's Appeal
by Certiorari to the Commission on Elections, which gave due course
thereto and decided the same for complainant. According to respondent
judge, when the case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings, he voluntarily inhibited himself therefrom and subject
electoral protest was reraffled to Branch 50 presided over by Judge Nelia
Y. Fernandez, who decided said election protest for the complainant, who
then took his oath of office as municipal mayor of Roxas, Palawan.
Respondent judge reasoned out that he decided the said election protest
in the honest belief that his action was correct, and that he was never
motivated by dishonesty, fraud or corruption in issuing the Order under
attack.
On September 23, 1998, this Court referred the matter to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation. In
a letter dated March 31, 1998, the OCA required respondent judge to
manifest in writing if he was amenable to have the case resolved on the
basis of the pleadings on record, without further proceedings.
On May 31, 1999, respondent judge responded that he was leaving it to
the Court whether to pass upon the case on the basis of the pleadings
already in or to conduct further proceedings. But respondent judge
expressed the hope that the desistance earlier made by the complainant
should be reason enough to dismiss the case. In the same breathe,
however, respondent judge turned the tables around, sort of, and accused
the complainant of attempting to bribe him Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos, through a certain Herbert Bavaria, a "kumpare" of
his. Respondent judge claims that the attempted bribe which he rejected
was for a favorable ruling in the same election protest. As his reaction to
the said rebuff, complainant resorted to the institution of the present
administrative case; respondent judge maintained.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the imposition of a
fine of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos, in view of the fact that
respondent judge had been previously reprimanded and fined Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos for gross ignorance of the law. 9
After a careful review of the records on hand, the Court discerns merit in
the report and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator.
To begin with, withdrawal of a complaint or subsequent desistance by the
complainant in an administrative case does not necessarily warrant its
dismissal. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of
the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be
detestable.10 Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the
complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power.11 The Court does
not dismiss administrative cases against members of the Bench merely on
the basis of withdrawal of the charges.12 Desistance cannot divest the
Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complainant against
the respondent.13 To be sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct and
actuations of officials and employees of judiciary. And the program and
efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should
not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between the
parties.14
On the question of propriety of dismissal by respondent judge of subject
election case, the root cause of the controversy sued upon, the Court is of
the opinion, and so holds, that the respondent judge ignored applicable
pronouncements by this Court on the matter of payment of docketing fees.
Respondent judge based the assailed dismissal of subject election protest
on the ruling in Manchester Development corporation et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.15 — that a case is deemed commenced only upon the
payment of the docketing fee, and the court acquires jurisdiction thereover
only upon payment of the prescribed docketing fee. He erroneously cited
and placed reliance on the Manchester case in dismissing the said
election protest, disregarding pronouncements by the court enjoining the
application of such rulling in election cases.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al. vs. Asuncion, et al.,16 the ruling
in Manchester was modified in that it is not only the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading but also the payment of the prescribed
docketing fee, that vest jurisdiction in a trial court over the subject matter
and/or nature of the action. However, where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docketing fee, the court
may allow payment of such fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond prescriptive or reglementary period.17
Be that as it may, the Court has categorically said that the doctrine
enunciated in Manchester and in later cases cannot be made to apply in
election cases. Thus, in Pahilan vs. Tabala et al.18 this Court held:
Furthermore, there are strong and compelling reasons to rule
that the doctrine we have established in Manchester and cases
subsequent thereto cannot be made to apply to election cases.
As we have earlier stated, the cases cited are ordinary civil
actions whereas election cases are not. The rules which apply
to ordinary civil actions may not necessarily serve the purpose
of election cases, especially if we consider the fact that election
laws are to be accorded utmost liberality in their interpretation
and application, bearing in mind always that the will of the
people must be upheld. Ordinary civil actions would generally
involve private interests while all election cases are, at all times,
invested with public interest which cannot be defeated by mere
procedural or technical infirmities.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case now before us, and in election cases in general, it is
not the amount of damages, if any, that is sought to be
recovered which vests in the courts the jurisdiction to try the
same. Rather, it is the nature of the action which is
determinative of jurisdiction. Thus, regardless of the amount of
damages claimed, the action will still have to be filed with the
Regional Trial Court. In such a case, the evil sought to be
avoided in Manchester and like cases will never arise.
Peremptorily, there will be no occasion to apply the rulings in the
cases mentioned. In addition, the filing fee to be paid in an
election case is a fixed amount of P300.00. There will
consequently be no opportunity for a situation to arise wherein
an election contest will have to be dismissed for failure to state
the exact amount of damages and thus evince an intent to
deprive the Government of the docket fees due.
xxx xxx xxx
To summarize, the evil sought to be avoided in Manchester and
similar cases can never obtain in election cases since (1) the
filing fee in an election case is fixed and not dependent on the
amount of damages sought to be recovered, if any; and (2) a
claim for damages in an election case is merely ancillary to the
main cause of action and is not even determinative of the court's
jurisdiction which is governed by the nature of the action filed.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity
do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be
erroneous. A judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent
proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to
cause an injustice. This does not mean, however, that a judge need not
observe propriety, discreteness and due care in the performance of his
official functions.19
But the attendant facts and circumstances in the present administrative
case, call for the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. The
charge against the respondent judge is not a mere error of judgment but
utter disregard of established rules amounting to gross ignorance of the
law.
The Pahilan case was decided by this Court on February 21, 1994, long
before December 19, 1995, when the respondent judge decided the
election protest in question. Being the prevailing doctrine on the matter,
respondent judge was duty bound to adhere to, and apply, the same, and
he cannot feign ignorance thereof because the Code of Judicial Ethics
requires him to be an embodiment of, among other desirable
characteristics, judicial competence.20 It need not be stressed here that
one of the principal duties to which a judge of the law must ever be faithful
is that of being abreast with law and jurisprudence, since, as it has often
been advanced, the administration of justice requires continuous study of
the law and jurisprudence.21 But, a perusal of the challenged order reveals
that respondent judge failed to live up to what is expected of him as a
dispenser of justice.
Furthermore, the conclusion arrived at by him that there was deliberate
non-payment of the correct docketing fees was belied by the fact that as
early as August 16, 1995, Judge Salva, who was then acting on the case
before he inhibited therefrom, had already issued an order for the release
of the P30,000.00 deposit of complainant to be paid to the revisors and
stenographer. In the same order, the balance of P15,000.00 was to be
refunded to the protestant. Verily, there was no reason to accuse the latter
of deliberate non-payment of docketing fees since the amount totaling
P2,572.90 of which the government was supposed to have been
shortchanged could have been deducted easily from the refundable
amount which was still within the control of the court. Besides, one of the
reasons for Judge Salva's decision to start the revision of ballots was
complainant's showing that the required fees and deposits had been
remitted. On this basis alone, the dismissal of the case by respondent
judge cannot be perceived as anything but inappropriate or improper.
Taking into account that the respondent judge was fined P10,000.00 in the
aforementioned case of People vs. Gacott, supra, the OCA recommended
here the imposition of a fine of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos.
All things studiedly viewed in proper perspective, let alone the fact that the
conduct of respondent judge under the premises was somewhat untainted
with fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the court finds the recommendation of
OCA in order. The Court has to consider also that the respondent judge is
now sixty-six (66) years old, afflicted with hypertension and diabetes,
diseases which bear heavily on his day-to-day official performance.
The allusion that the complainant tried to bribe the respondent judge in the
election case below is too unsubstantiated to call for extended disquisition.
WHEREFORE, Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and is hereby ordered to pay a fine of Fifteen
Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be punished more severely. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134792 August 12, 1999
PERLA GARCIA, PAZ CRUZ and GERALDINE PADERNAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)
and REP. HARRY ANGPING (3rd DISTRICT MANILA), respondents.
YNARE S-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal be summarily dismissed for failure to pay cash deposit,
not withstanding that petitioner rectified payment thereof?
On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten (10) day period from
respondent Harry Angping's proclamation as duly elected Representative
for the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners, all duly registered voters in the
district, filed a petition for quo warranto1 before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against Congressman Harry
Angping. Petitioners questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping to
hold office in the House of Representatives, claiming that the latter was
not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a constitutional requirement.
They prayed that Congressman Angping be declared ineligible to assume
or hold office as member of the House of Representatives and for the
candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates to be proclaimed the winner.
Upon filing of their petition, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000.00
filing fee.2
On June 10, 1998, however the HRET issued a Resolution3 dismissing the
petition for quo warranto for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit
required by its Rules. After recieving a copy of the aforesaid Resolution,
petitioners paid the P5,000.00 cash deposit4 on June 26, 1998 and
attached the corresponding receipt to the Motion for Reconsideration5 they
filed with the HRET on the same day. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view of Rule 32 of the 1998
HRET Rules which required a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing
fees for quo warranto cases.6
Hence, the instant Petition,7 filed on August 14, 1998, anchored upon the
following grounds —
THE RESPONDENT HRET COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DENYING THE PETITION BELOW DESPITE ACTUAL
PAYMENT BY HEREIN PETITIONER (ALBEIT LATE) OF THE
REQUIRED CASH DEPOSIT OF P5,000.00, THEREBY STRICTLY AND
LITERALLY CONSTRUING THE HRET RULES IN CONTRAVENTION
OF RULE 2 (OF THE SAME RULES) ENJOINING A LIBERAL
CONSTRUCTION THEREOF.
THE RESPONDENT HRET COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION BELOW UPON A MERE
TECHNICALITY EVEN AS THE EVIDENCE AND/OR DOCUMENTS
ATTACHED THEREIN CLEARLY SHOW THE INELIGIBILITY OF
RESPONDENT ANGPING TO HOLD AND/OR CONTINUE TO ASSUME
OFFICE AS MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.8
On September 24, 1998, Congressman Angping filed his Comment9 to the
petition arguing that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed as
the dismissal of the petition below was based on clear and unambiguous
provisions of the HRET which leave no room for liberal construction.
Furthermore, Congressman Angping argued that this Court is not a trier of
facts and that all election contests lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HRET.
Prior to that, on September 18, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed a Manifestation to the effect that under the terms of this Court's
Resolution dated August 25, 1998 requiring only respondent Rep. Harry
Angping to comment, the Office of the Solicitor General is not required to
file a comment on the petition on behalf of the HRET. This Manifestation
was noted by this Court in its Resolution dated October 13, 1998.
10
On October 15, 1998, petitioners filed their Reply stressing that
according to Rule 21 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, summary dismissals
may be ordered by the HRET in case of non-payment of the required cash
deposit within the prescribed time only in election protest cases and not
in quo warranto proceedings. Petitioners also assert that this Court can
very well resolve the merits of their petition for quo warranto in as much as
the Alien Certificate of Registration attached to their petition, being a
public document, is admissible as proof of Congressman Angping's
ineligibility to hold office, without need for proof as to its authenticity and
due execution.
The first issue to resolve is whether or not this Court can take cognizance
of the instant petition for certiorari.
Under the Constitution,11 the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members. This
does not, however, bar us from entertaining petitions which charge the
HRET with grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, in Libanan vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,12 we explained our assumption of
jurisdiction in election related cases involving the HRET as follows —
. . . In Robles vs. HRET (181 SCRA 780), the Court has
explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond
judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in
the exercise of this Courts so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . .
. upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution
was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of
its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon
a determination of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of discretion, that there has to be
a remedy for such abuse".
In the old, but still relevant, case of Marrero vs. Bocar (66 Phil.
429), the Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any
event, upon a clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of
power as will constitute a denial of due process". The Court
does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. HRET (199 SCRA 692),
venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government; it comes in only
when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution itself calls for remedial action.
That this Court may very well inquire into the issue of whether the
complained act of the HRET has been made with grave abuse of
discretion may be inferred from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
which has expanded judicial power to include the determination of
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."
This leads us to the second issue of whether or not the HRET has
committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition
for quo warranto of petitioners and in refusing to reinstate the same even
after the payment of the required Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash
deposit.
Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides that in addition to filing
fees, a petitioner in quo warranto proceedings should make a Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit with the Tribunal.
It is not disputed that petitioners did not initially pay the required cash
deposit; but after their petition was summarily dismissed by the HRET for
such non-payment, petitioners rectified their inadvertence and paid the
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) required cash deposit, at the same time
seeking a reconsideration of the dismissal.
Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides —
RULE 32. Cash Deposit. — In addition to the fees prescribed in
the preceding Rule, each protestant, counter-protestant or
petitioner in quo warranto shall make a cash deposit with the
Tribunal in the following amounts:
(1) in a petition for quo warranto, Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos;
(2) if the protest or counter-protest does not require
the bringing to the Tribunal of ballot boxes and other
election documents and paraphernalia from the
district concerned, Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos;
(3) if the protest or counter-protest requires the
bringing of ballot boxes and election documents and
paraphernalia. Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos for
each precinct involved therein; Provided, that in no
case shall the deposit be less than Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos;
(4) if, as thus computed, the amount of the deposit
does not exceed Seventy Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) Pesos, the same shall be made in full
with the Tribunal within ten (10) days after filing of the
protest or counter-protest;
(5) if the deposit exceeds Seventy Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) Pesos, partial deposit of at least
Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos shall be
made within ten (10) days after the filing of the protest
or counter-protest. The balance shall be paid in such
installments as may be required by the Tribunal on at
least five (5) days advance notice to the party
required to make the deposit.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, Rule 21 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET governing
summary dismissal of election contests provides, to wit —
RULE 21. Summary Dismissal of Election Contest. — An
election protest or petition for quo warranto may be summarily
dismissed by the Tribunal without the necessity of requiring the
protestee or respondent to answer if, inter alia:
(1) the petition is insufficient in form and substance;
(2) the petition is filed beyond the period provided in
Rules 16 and 17 of these Rules;
(3) the filing fee is not paid within the period provided
for filing the protest or petition for quo warranto;
(4) in case of protests where a cash deposit is
required, the cash deposit or the first P100,000.00
thereof, is not paid within ten (10) days after the filing
of the protest;
 (5) the petition or copies thereof and the annexes
thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible.
(underscoring ours)
Rule 33 of the Rules likewise provides —
RULE 33. Effect of Failure to Make Cash Deposit. — If a party
fails to make the cash deposits or additional deposits herein
provided within the prescribed time limit, the Tribunal may
dismiss the protest, counter-protest, or petition for quo warranto,
or take such action as it may deem equitable under the
circumstances.
It may be argued that unlike in the case of election protests, no period is
provided for to make the cash deposit in the case of petitions for quo
warranto. However, the cash deposit required in quo warranto cases is
fixed, i.e., P5,000.00. It does not vary nor can it be varied; it is required to
be paid together with the filing fee at the time the petition is filed. It is
different from a protest and/or counter-protest where the amount of the
required cash deposit is yet to be determined since it has to be based on
the number of ballot boxes and other election documents and
paraphernalia to be collected and brought to the Tribunal. Therefore,
depending on the amount that may be required for the collection of the
ballot boxes and other election documents and paraphernalia, the parties
are given specified periods within which to pay. Thus, when the required
amount of cash deposits does not exceed P75,000.00, the party
concerned must make the deposit within ten (10) days after the filing of the
protest or counter-protest; otherwise, when it exceeds P75,000.00 he is
required to make a partial deposit of at least P75,000.00 likewise within
ten (10) days and the balance payable in installments as may be
determined by the Tribunal.
Petitioners herein, Peril Garcia, Pat Cruz and Geraldine Padernal, filed
their petition for quo warranto on May 29, 1998. However, the required
cash deposit of P5,000.00 was paid only on June 26, 1998, which was
after the dismissal of the petition and only after an unreasonable delay of
twenty-eight (28) days. Indeed, in dismissing the petition the HRET acted
judiciously, correctly and certainly within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment
call of the HRET which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As long as
the exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal basis,
as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal.
The petition for quo warranto attacks the ineligibility of Congressman
Angping to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives, not
being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. This is a serious charge
which, if true, renders Congressman Angping disqualified from such office.
In view of the delicate nature and importance of this charge, the
observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure must be taken seriously if
they are to attain their objective, i.e., the speedy and orderly determination
of the true will of the electorate. Correlatively, party litigants appearing
before the HRET or to be more precise, their lawyers, are duty bound to
know and are expected to properly comply with the procedural
requirements laid down by the Tribunal without being formally ordered to
do so. They cannot righteously impute abuse of discretion to the Tribunal if
by reason of the non-observance of those requirements it decides to
dismiss their petition. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and swift
dispensation.
Therefore, we find that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in applying its Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition for quo warranto.
Accordingly, the instant petition for certiorari cannot prosper.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there
is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, (b) there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying
the proceeding. There must be a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.13
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the
public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave
abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility."
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion
may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged
misappreciation of acts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may
not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy
for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal
or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction,
not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or
conclusions of the lower court. As long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment
which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil
action for certiorari.14
Indeed, the function of this Court is merely to check whether grave abuse
of discretion has been committed by the HRET in the dismissal of the
petition for quo warranto before it. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court will prosper only if there is a showing of grave abuse of
discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent tribunal.15 In the absence of such a showing, there is no
reason for this Court to annul the decision of the respondent tribunal or to
substitute it with its own judgment, for the simple reason that it is not the
office of a prosper only if there is a showing of grave abuse petition
for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. In this
case, as we have stated above, we find that the HRET committed no
grave abuse of discretion. The instant petition must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157249 November 28, 2003
HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and OSCAR JARO, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
The present petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeks a reversal of the resolution of Commission on Elections
(Comelec) en banc, which ordered the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite1 to proceed with the hearing of the
election protest filed by Oscar Jaro (Jaro) against Homer T. Saquilayan
(Saquilayan).
The facts are not disputed.
Petitioner Saquilayan and respondent Jaro were candidates for the Office
of Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite in the May 14, 2001 local elections.
After the votes were canvassed, Saquilayan was proclaimed the winner for
having received 27,494 votes against Jaro’s 26,746 votes.
On May 28, 2001, Jaro instituted an Election Protest Case (EPC No. 01-
02) before the RTC of Imus, Cavite contesting the results in all 453
election precincts in the Municipality of Imus. Saquilayan filed his Answer
with Motion to Dismiss contending, among other things, that the election
protest failed to state a cause of action. The Motion to Dismiss was denied
by the RTC in an Order dated July 31, 2001.
Saquilayan questioned the denial before the Comelec’s Second Division
through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, which was docketed as
SPR No. 19-2001. On January 22, 2002, the Second Division ruled in
favor of Saquilayan and ordered the dismissal of the election protest.
Jaro sought a reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the case was
elevated to the Comelec en banc. On February 26, 2003, the Comelec en
banc issued the questioned resolution granting Jaro’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Saquilayan’s petition was thereunder dismissed and
EPC No. 01-02 was ordered to proceed.
Aggrieved, Saquilayan filed the present petition.
The whole controversy revolves around the following averments contained
in Jaro’s election protest:
Grounds for the Protest
6. Protestant hereby impugns the correctness of the results reflected in the
election returns in ALL the 453 protested precincts of the Municipality of
Imus, Cavite on the following grounds:
 7.1. Votes in the ballots lawfully and validly cast in favor of
protestant were deliberately misread and/or misappreciated by
various chairmen of the different boards of election inspectors;
7.2. Valid votes of protestant were intentionally or erroneously
counted or tallied in the election returns as votes of protestee;
7.3. Valid votes legally cast in favor of protestant were
considered stray;
7.4. Ballots containing valid votes for protestant were
intentionally and erroneously misappreciated or considered as
marked and declared as null and void;
7.5. Ballots with blank spaces in the line for Mayor were just
read and counted in favor of protestee;
7.6. Ballots prepared by persons other then the voters
themselves, and fake or unofficial ballots wherein the name of
protestee was written, were illegally read and counted in favor of
protestee;
7.7. Groups of ballots prepared by one (1) person and/or
individual ballots prepared by two (2) persons were purposely
considered as valid ballots and counted in favor of protestee;
7.8. Votes that were void, because the ballots containing them
were posted with stickers or because of pattern markings
appearing in them or because of other frauds and election
anomalies, were unlawfully read and counted in favor of
protestee; and
7.9. Votes reported in some election returns were unlawfully
increased in favor of protestee, such that protestee appeared to
have obtained more votes than those actually cast in his favor.
The Second Division of the Comelec unanimously ruled that the above
allegations failed to state a cause of action, citing as a basis the Court’s
ruling in Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.2
In said case, petitioner Teodoro Peña, the losing party in the
congressional elections, contested 700 out of 742 election precincts
without specifying the precincts where the anomalies allegedly occurred.
Furthermore, Peña made only general allegations, to wit: 3
7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were
tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and
terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and
after the voting, and during the counting of votes and the preparation of
election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results of
the election. Among the fraudulent acts committed were the massive vote-
buying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of petitioner’s known
supporters through systematic deletion of names from the list of voters,
allowing persons to vote in excess of the number of registered voters,
misappreciation, misreading and non-reading of protestant’s ballots and
other irregularities.
The Court in that case dismissed the election protest, holding that the
failure to make specific mention of the precincts where wide-spread
election fraud and irregularities occurred, and the bare allegations of
massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism, without specification
and substantiation of where and how these occurrences took place, render
the protest fatally defective. As explained by the Court:
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance
means that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the
allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the faintest whisper
of authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss
the petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected official may, and
always [will,] be held up by petitions of this sort by a losing candidate.
However, the Comelec en banc, voting 4-3,4 ruled that what is applicable
to the case is the ruling in Miguel v. Comelec.5 In the Miguel case, therein
respondent Eladio Lapuz filed an election case against James Miguel who
defeated the former in the mayoralty race in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Lapuz
questioned the results in all the precincts on the following grounds:
a) Rampant switching of ballot boxes and stuffing of ballot boxes
with fake ballots;
b) Padding of votes in favor of petitioner;
c) Misappreciation of ballots to the prejudice of private
respondent;
d) Counting of illegal and/or marked ballots and stray votes in
favor of petitioner;
e) Misreading and mis-tallying of ballots or votes;
f) Massive vote-buying;
g) Substitution of votes;
h) Multiple voting by flying voters and harassment of voters;
i) Massive disenfranchisement;
j) Massive threats, coercion and intimidation of voters.
Therein petitioner Miguel argued that the general allegations of fraud and
irregularities were not sufficient to order the opening of ballot boxes and
counting of ballots. The Court, however, found the allegations embodied in
the election protest to be serious enough to necessitate the opening of the
ballot boxes to resolve the issue of fraud and irregularities in the election.
The facts of the present petition are similar to those in Miguel rather than
to those in Peña. In Miguel, there was a controversy between two
candidates for municipal mayor, while Peña dealt with candidates for a
congressional district office.1âwphi1 Also, one reason that led to the
dismissal of the election protest in Peña was the protestant’s failure to
specify the 700 out of the 743 precincts where the alleged anomalies
occurred. In both Miguel and the present petition, the protestants
questioned all the precincts in their respective municipalities.
Furthermore, the Miguel case, being the more recent decision, should
prevail in case of a conflict, under the well-established doctrine that a later
judgment supersedes a prior one in case of an inconsistency. 6
In closing, the Court reiterates its pronouncement in Carlos v. Angeles:7
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural
barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective
officials. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not
be defeated by mere technical objections. In an election case, the court
has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who
is the real candidate elected by the electorate. The Supreme Court frowns
upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way
not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also
the correct ascertainment of the results.1âwphi1
No doubt, allowing the election protest to proceed would be the best way
of removing any doubt as to who was the real candidate chosen by the
electorate. Barring the proceedings due to technicalities and procedures
accomplishes nothing except possibly to suppress the will of the majority.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
and the Resolution of the Comelec en banc in SPR No. 19-2001 is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139853 September 5, 2000
FERDINAND THOMAS M. SOLLER, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PINAMALAYAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO (Branch 42) and ANGEL M.
SAULONG, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the resolution
promulgated on August 31, 1999, in COMELEC special relief case SPR
No. 10-99. The resolution dismissed petitioner's petition to set aside the
orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, dated
October 1, 1998 and February 1, 1999, which denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss the election protest filed by private respondent against petitioner
and the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections.
On May 14, 1998, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner
Ferdinand Thomas Soller duly elected mayor.
On May 19, 1998, private respondent Angel Saulong filed with the
COMELEC a "petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of
election return".1 On May 25, 1998, private respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, an election protest
against petitioner docketed as EC-31-98.
On June 15, 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest.
Petitioner also moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping, and failure to state cause of
action.2
On July 3, 1998, COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by
private respondent.
On October 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but said motion was denied.
Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending
that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent's election
protest.
On August 31, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's suit.
The election tribunal held that private respondent paid the required filing
fee. It also declared that the defect in the verification is a mere technical
defect which should not bar the determination of the merits of the case.
The election tribunal stated that there was no forum shopping to speak of.
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of
its en banc ruling is prohibited except in a case involving an election
offense.3 Since the present controversy involves no election offense,
reconsideration is not possible and petitioner has no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Accordingly,
petitioner properly filed the instant petition for certiorari with this Court.
On September 21, 1999, we required the parties to maintain the status
quo ante prevailing as of September 17, 1999, the date of filing of this
petition.
Before us, petitioner asserts that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction:
[I]
... IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ELECTION PROTEST DESPITE HIS (sic)
LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME BY REASON OF THE
FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PAY ALL THE
REQUISITE FILING FEES.
[II]
... IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT'S RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ELECTION PROTEST DESPITE THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF HIS PETITION IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE AND
ITS FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
[III]
...IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS THE
ELECTION PROTEST BELOW ON THE GROUNDS OF FORUM-
SHOPPING AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT
CIRCULAR REQUIRING A TRUTHFUL CERTIFICATION OF NON-
FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE
THEREOF.4
In our view, notwithstanding petitioner's formulation of issues, the principal
question presented for our resolution is whether or not public respondent
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of private respondent's election
protest.
At the outset, even if not squarely raised as an issue, this Court needs to
resolve the question concerning COMELEC's jurisdiction. Unless properly
resolved, we cannot proceed further in this case.
Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution reads:
"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition
of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the
Commission en banc."
Thus, in Sarmiento vs. COMELEC5 and in subsequent cases,6 we ruled
that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority
to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation
controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of
the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards
election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
As can be gleaned from the proceedings aforestated, petitioner's petition
with the COMELEC was not referred to a division of that Commission but
was, instead, submitted directly to the Commission en banc. The petition
for certiorari assails the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss
private respondent's election protest. The questioned order of the trial
court is interlocutory because it does not end the trial court's task of
adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other.7 In our view, the authority to resolve
petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the
questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the
COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc. Note that the order
denying the motion to dismiss is but an incident of the election protest. If
the principal case, once decided on the merits, is cognizable on appeal by
a division of the COMELEC, then, there is no reason why petitions
for certiorari relating to incidents of election protest should not be referred
first to a division of the COMELEC for resolution. Clearly, the
COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
petitioner's petition in the first instance.
Since public respondent COMELEC had acted without jurisdiction in this
case, the petition herein is without doubt meritorious and has to be
granted. But in order to write finis to the controversy at bar, we are
constrained to also resolve the issues raised by petitioner, seriatim.
Petitioner contends that private respondent's protest should have been
dismissed outright as the latter failed to pay the amount of P300.00 filing
fee required under the COMELEC rules.8 Petitioner's contention is
supported by Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure9 and corresponding receipts10 itemized as follows:
P368.00 - Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;
P 32.00 - Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7022478;
P 46.00 - Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;
P 4.00 - Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 4167602;
P 10.00 -- Legal Research Fund fee, O.R. 2595144, and;
P 5.00 -- Victim Compensation Fund, O.R. 4167979
-----------
P465.00
Close scrutiny of the receipts will show that private respondent failed to
pay the filing fee of P300.00 for his protest as prescribed by the
COMELEC rules. The amount of P368.00 for which OR 7023752 was
issued for the Judiciary Development Fund as shown by the entries in the
cash book of the clerk of court.11 Thus, only P32.00 with OR 7022478
credited to the general fund could be considered as filing fee paid by
private respondent for his protest. A court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. 12 Patently, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent's election
protest. Therefore, COMELEC gravely erred in not ordering the dismissal
of private respondent's protest case.
We have in a string of cases13 had the occasion to rule on this matter.
In Loyola vs. COMELEC, the clerk of court assessed private respondent
therein the incorrect filing fee of P32.00 at the time of filing of the election
protest. Upon filing his counter-protest, petitioner was assessed to pay the
same amount. Subsequently, the trial court remedied the situation by
directing the parties to pay the balance of P268.00. On review, we held
that the lapse was not at all attributable to private respondent and there
was substantial compliance with the filing fee requirement. The error lies in
the Clerk's misapplication and confusion regarding application of Section 9
of Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and this Court's
resolution dated September 4, 1990 amending Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court. An election protest falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court, in which case the Rules of Court will apply, and
that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is primarily intended to govern
election cases before that tribunal. But the Court declared that this
decision must not provide relief to parties in future cases involving
inadequate payment of filing fees in election cases. Our decisions
in Pahilan and Gatchalian bar any claim of good faith, excusable
negligence or mistake in any failure to pay the full amount of filing fees in
election cases.
In Miranda vs. Castillo, private respondents each paid per assessment the
amount of P465.00 as filing fees. Of this amount, P414.00 was allocated
for the JDF, P 10.00 for legal research fund, P5.00 for victim
compensation fee, and only the amount of P32.00 was regarded as filing
fee. The Court considered the amount as partial payment of the P300.00
filing fee under the COMELEC rules and required payment of the
deficiency in the amount of P268.00. But then again, the Court reiterated
the caveat that in view of Pahilan, Gatchalian, and Loyola cases we would
no longer tolerate any mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing
fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola decision
on March 27, 1997.
Clearly then, errors in the payment of filing fees in election cases is no
longer excusable. And the dismissal of the present case for that reason is,
in our view, called for.
Besides, there is another reason to dismiss private respondent's election
protest. We note that the verification of aforesaid protest is defective. In
the verification, private respondent merely stated that he caused the
preparation of his petition and he has read and understood all the
allegations therein.14 Certainly, this is insufficient as private respondent
failed to state that the contents of his election protest are true and correct
of his persoral knowledge.15 Since the petition lacks proper verification,
it should be treated as an unsigned pleading and must be dismissed. 16
Further, we find that private respondent did not comply with the required
certification against forum shopping.1âwphi1 Private respondent
successively filed a "petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion
of election return" and an election protest. Yet, he did not disclose in his
election protest that he earlier filed a petition for annulment of
proclamation/exclusion of election returns.
It could be argued that private respondent's petition for annulment of
proclamation/exclusion of election returns was a pre-proclamation case.
The issues raised in that petition pertain to the preparation and
appreciation of election returns and the proceedings of the municipal
board of canvassers. But note that such petition was filed after the
proclamation of petitioner as the winning candidate, thus, the petition was
no longer viable, for pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be
entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidates have been
proclaimed. It might even be claimed with some reason that private
respondent, by resorting to the wrong remedy, abandoned his pre-
proclamation case earlier filed.17
Nonetheless, private respondent's belief that he no longer had a pending
case before the COMELEC because he deemed it abandoned upon filing
of his protest is not a valid reason for non-disclosure of the pendency of
said pre-proclamation case. Note that the COMELEC dismissed private
respondent's pre-proclamation case only on July 3, 1998. Before the
dismissal, said case was legally still pending resolution. Similarly, the fact
that private respondent's protest was not based on the same cause of
action as his pre-proclamation case is not a valid excuse for not complying
with the required disclosure in the certification against forum shopping.
The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory.
Failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused by the fact that
a party is not guilty of forum shopping. The rule applies to any complaint,
petition, application or other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the
party filing it has actually committed forum shopping. Every party filing any
initiatory pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not and will
not commit forum shopping. Otherwise we would have an absurd situation,
as in this case, where the parties themselves would be the judge of
whether their actions constitute a violation of the rule, and compliance
therewith would depend on their belief that they might or might not have
violated the requirement. Such interpretation of the requirement would
defeat the very purpose of the rule.18
Taking into account all the foregoing circumstances in this case, we are
persuaded that respondent Regional Trial Court erred and committed
grave abuse of discretion in failing to dismiss private respondent's election
protest against petitioner. And to reiterate, respondent COMELEC en
banc had no jurisdiction to affirm the refusal of respondent trial court to
dismiss private respondent's election protest.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
RESOLUTION of public respondent COMELEC is hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
September 21, 1999, is made permanent. The Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, is hereby ordered to
DISMISS election protest EC No. 31-98. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118597 July 14, 1995
JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and
AUGUSTO L. SYJUCO, JR., respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Congressional candidate private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., filed
an election protest before public respondent House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) five days after the Makati board of canvassers
proclaimed petitioner Joker P. Arroyo the duly elected congressman for
the lone district of Makati in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and
local elections. Essentially premised on alleged irregularities/anomalies in
the tabulation and entries of votes and massive fraud, private respondent
Syjuco sought the revision and recounting of ballots cast in 1,292 out of
the total 1,714 precincts of Makati from which result he aimed to be
declared as the duly elected congressman of Makati. Petitioner filed a
counter-protest questioning the residence qualification of private
respondent Syjuco, but the same was dismissed by public respondent
HRET.
As prayed for by private respondent, revision of the ballots was
undertaken, but not without serious irregularities having been unearthed in
the course thereof. Tasked by public respondent HRET to investigate on
the matter, now retired Supreme Court Justice Emilio Gancayco confirmed
the irregularities and anomalies engineered by some HRET officials and
personnel.1 The findings contained in Justice Gancayco's Report and
Recommendation were aptly summarized in the "Dissenting Opinion" of
Justice Bidin in this wise:
In his Report and Recommendation, Justice
Gancayco found, in essence, that the respondent
HRET employees, while taking advantage of their
official authority and control over the operational
details of the revision of ballots, and for corrupt
motives, subverted the revision exercise in at
least three (3) protest cases, including this case
(HRET Case No. 92-019), by maintaining a pool of
individuals subject to their control which were offered
or foisted upon party litigants as their revisors. Once
functioning as party-revisors, these individuals
implemented instructions given by the respondent
HRET employees to pilfer, dump (i.e., place ballots
voted for one party with other ballots which do not
indicate votes for either party such as unclaimed,
stray, spoiled or unused ballots, or ballots for other
candidates), and mark (in order to spoil) or fill-in
ballots of one or the other of the litigants.
At the core of Justice Gancayco's findings and
evaluation are protested precincts in this case which
exhibited cases of dumping, consistent reduction in
Arroyo votes, falsification of revision reports and
pilferage of ballots, as testified on by the prosecution
witness, principally, Atty. William Chua and Mr.
Ritchillier M. Matias.2
On this point, Justice Gancayco declared:
. . . Arroyo votes were consistently reduced at the
revision and the deducted votes were found and
included in the stray ballots, while Syjuco was always
constant and "there were instances where ballots
were deducted from the protestee (Arroyo)" and that
"another modus operandi is to falsify the revision
reports by intercalation, false entries or simply
switching of true results of the counting.
Congressman Joker Arroyo is the classic victim of this
unlawful exercise."3
At or about the time the revision was completed and with three precincts
left unaccounted for, private respondent Syjuco moved for the withdrawal
of these remaining unrevised protested precincts on the ground that he
has presumably overtaken petitioner Arroyo's lead of 13,559 votes.
With neither private respondent Syjuco nor petitioner Arroyo availing of
their right to move for a technical examination after completion of revision,
as provided for under Rules 42-49 of the HRET Rules, reception of their
respective evidence followed.
Private respondent's evidence were all documentary and voluminous at
that consisting of over 200,000 pages. These exhibits, however, and which
private respondent as well as public respondent HRET4 does not seriously
dispute are in general, "mere photocopies and not certified or
authenticated by comparison with the original documents or identification
by any witness . . . ."5 and were formally offered by merely asking that they
be marked. On the other hand, petitioner's evidence consisted of certified
true copies of the Revision Reports and election returns.6 Despite the
vigorous objection raised by petitioner with respect to the admission of and
the probative value of private respondent's exhibits, public respondent
HRET admitted the evidence for whatever they may be worth.7
Thereafter, pursuant to Rule 66 of the HRET Rules, 8 petitioner and private
respondent filed their respective memoranda simultaneously. In his
memorandum cum addendum, private respondent veered away from his
original posture that his protest should be decided on the basis of a
revision and recounting of ballots, and instead called upon public
respondent HRET to decide the case on the basis of what private
respondent himself expressly admits as a "truly innovative and NON-
TRADITIONAL process" — the PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED
EVIDENCES. Private respondent thus averred, among others, that:
2.3. Scope and Emphasis of the Instant Protest case.
2.3.1. Protestant implores the Tribunal to take special and careful
NOTE of the fact that while one cannot deny that adjudication of
the REGULAR protest case generally rests on the result and
outcome derived from the revision and subsequent appreciation of
the BALLOTS which are disputed and contested by the parties in
the course of the revision proceedings — in this particular
instance, the protestant has opted to resort to a truly innovative
and NON-TRADITIONAL process, by undertaking . . . our most
concerted efforts in identifying and presenting such extensive
numbers of . . . what protestant has denominated as PRECINCT-
LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED EVIDENCES (sic).
2.3.2. Thus, readily discernible, not only from the comprehensive
ADDENDUM of protestant, but more so from the volumes of
documentary exhibits presented, adduced and admitted, is the
relentless pursuit undertaken by protestant to locate most relevant
electoral documents used not only during the actual
balloting/voting stage, but also those availed of even much earlier,
as early (as) the time of the registration of voters. Such
resourcefulness had undoubtedly resulted in the accumulation of
what has now been appropriately coined by protestant as
"Precinct-Level, Document-Based Evidences."
xxx xxx xxx
2.3.5. However, significant and material as they are, the results
gathered from the ordinary and traditional BALLOT revision
process, do not constitute the ONUS of protestant('s) case. From
protestant's point of view, "the ballot(s) themselves bear only
incidental significance in our chosen approach, because, in our
world of cause and effect, the ballots are mere effects of the
document-based anomalies. . . . ." [ADDENDUM, D-3;
Presentation, Part 2, Revision of Ballots]. For truly, the
CONCENTRATION . . . the emphasis is on the Precinct-Level
Document-Based Evidence.
2.3.6. And in so concentrating, the Tribunal should realize that the
protestant, even as early as the filing of the protest soon after
protestee's proclamation, was fully aware that in disputing the
sham victory of protestee, the anticipated/expected results of the
regular, traditional and normal process of REVISION of ballots,
would, by itself, be unavailing, and insufficient to overturn
protestee's supposed victory.
2.3.7. Hence, when in the ADDENDUM, there is a continuing
reference to the GRAND PATTERN OF MASSIVE DOCUMENT-
BASED FRAUDS (sic) AT PRECINCT LEVEL, such is simply in
support of the initial allegation and pronouncement contained in
the original protest, where protestant has asserted most strongly
that "There was massive fraud in the above-protested precinct." . .
. and that the protest was instituted precisely "in order that the
massive fraud perpetrated against the protestant shall be
corrected" . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
[iv] Protestee most definitely failed to comprehend the very CORE
of protestant's electoral protest. His was devoted to the traditional
and normal BALLOT-BASED procedure, where protestee pounds
recklessly and incessantly on alleged irregularities and anomalies
in the ballots during the REVISION, completely blocking his mind
to the fact that protestant's action is founded principally and mainly
on electoral anomalies which occurred long BEFORE the revision
was ever conducted; ANOMALIES in the precinct level, committed
even before the elections of May 11, 1992, like in the voters'
registration process; and also ANOMALIES during the election
day, at the actual balloting.
xxx xxx xxx
[vii] On the other hand, as the proponent of the electoral
protest, herein protestant was well-aware from the moment of
commencement of the protest that to overcome a substantial
margin of well over 12,000 votes, the revision of the ballots alone
would not suffice.
xxx xxx xxx
4.2. Besides, as discussed in detail above, protestant's protest
case rests NOT on the results of the revision, which is categorized
as "incidental"; but mainly on the broader and more equitable
NON-TRADITIONAL determination of the existence of the
PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED ANOMALIES, minutely
detailed in the ADDENDUM, and its supporting evidence.
(emphasis supplied; Ibid., pp. 14-16)9
By reason of private respondent's new allegations, public respondent
HRET ordered him to show cause why his protest should not be
dismissed. The "show-cause" order reads in part:
It appearing from the memorandum and addendum filed by
protestant Syjuco, after revision of the ballots case in the 1,292
protested precincts as prayed for in his Amended Protest,
that inter alia, herein protestant was well-aware from the moment
of the commencement of the protest that to overcome a
substantial margin of well over 12,000 votes, the revision of ballots
alone, would not suffice, and that the electoral protest case rests
"NOT" on the results of the revision which he considers as merely
"incidental" to the broader and more equitable NON-
TRADITIONAL determination of the existence of the PRECINCT-
LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED ANOMALIES' (pp. 14-15; 16),
without, however, demonstrating any legal basis or implementing
procedures therefor; it appearing further that protestant Syjuco's
memorandum and addendum appear to incorporate substantial
amendments which broaden the scope of his protest, change his
theory of the case at this stage of the proceedings or introduce
additional causes of action in violation of Rule 28. Revised Rules
of the Tribunal, . . . ." (Res. No. 93-277)10
However, by a 6-3 vote (the six Congressmen-members as against the
three Justices-members), public respondent HRET resolved not to dismiss
the protest, to continue with the examination and evaluation of the
evidence on record, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits. The
Resolution was issued on February 15, 1994. In their dissenting opinion,
the three (3) Justices-members had this to say:
. . . that protestant's radical shift in his cause of action from the
original and traditional ballot revision process to his "innovative
and non-traditional process", which he now calls precinct-level
document-based anomalies, has no legal precedent; it constitutes
a substantial amendment, which if considered, will broaden the
scope of the electoral protest or introduce an additional cause of
action in violation of Rule 28 of the Revised Rules of the Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
Since the allegation of the protest and its prayer calls for
recounting and revision of the ballots in order that the alleged
massive fraud perpetrated against protestant shall be corrected,
the instant protest should be decided in accordance with the
tradition process of recounting and revision (and ultimately
appreciation) of ballots as provided by the Rules of the Tribunal
and not by any innovative and non-traditional process
denominated as precinct-level document-based evidence alleged
in protestant's memorandum.
Nonetheless, protestant was candid enough to admit in his
memorandum "that to overcome a substantial margin of all over
12,000 votes, the revision of ballots alone would not suffice."
However, to keep his protest alive, after the adverse result of the
revision, protestant has to devise the broader and (allegedly) more
equitable non-traditional determination of the existence of
precinct-level document-based anomalies' even if the same is not
authorized by law nor even alleged in his protest.11
Petitioner moved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. No hearings were
conducted thereafter.
Then on January 25, 1995, public respondent HRET, by the same vote of
six Congressmen-members against three Justices-members, rendered its
now assailed Decision annulling petitioner Arroyo's proclamation and
declaring private respondent Syjuco as the duly elected congressman.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. ANNULLING and SETTING ASIDE the proclamation of Protestee
JOKER P. ARROYO.
2. DECLARING Protestant AUGUSTO L. SYJUCO, JR. as the duly
elected Representative, Lone District of Makati, National Capital
Region, for having obtained, after due revision and appreciation, a
 plurality of 1,565 votes, over the second placer Protestee Joker P.
Arroyo, and for not being disqualified from holding said office.
In view of the seriousness of the massive frauds, irregularities and
violations of election laws found in this case and in conformity with
the constitutional mandate of the Commission on Elections "to
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices"
(par. (6), Sec. 2, ART. IX-C, 1987 Constitution), the Tribunal,
Resolved to REFER this case to the Commission on Elections for
appropriate actions, including but not limited to, investigation of any
and all parties concerned, or who may have participated in said
violations or frauds committed.
On any irregularities or offenses in this case, found to have been
committed by any public officers and employees, during the May,
11, 1992 electoral processes, involving misuse of public office, in
violation of the constitutional provision that "Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modes lives." (SEC. 1, ART. XI, 1987 Constitution), the Tribunal also
Resolved to REFER to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (SEC. 2.
ART. XI, 1987 Constitution) for appropriate actions, including but not
limited to, investigation of any and all public officers and employees
concerned who may have participated in said irregularities or
offenses, or who may have been negligent in the performance of
their duties.
For the foregoing purposes, and if requested by the Commission on
Elections and/or the Office of the Special Prosecutor, records or
copies of this case shall be made available or forwarded to them for
their reference or evidence.
Costs are charged against Protestee Arroyo, pursuant to Rule 36 of
the Tribunal.
As soon as this Decision becomes final, notice and copies thereof
shall be sent to the President of the Philippines, the House of
Representatives through the Speaker, and the Commission on
Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
SO ORDERED.12
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of public respondent HRET's
decision, petitioner Arroyo filed the instant petition setting forth the
following issues:
A. Whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion and without jurisdiction when it refused to dismiss HRET
Case No. 92-109 after Syjuco had belatedly changed the theory of
his case and introduced new issues and, thereafter, when it
proceeded with the protest.
B. Whether or not the HRET's Decision in Case No. 92-019 dated
25 January 1995 was rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due
process.
C. Whether or not public respondent acted capriciously, arbitrarily,
and with grave abuse of discretion when it:
(1) Rejected long standing legal doctrines and precedents on
elections and annulment;
(2) Disregard the people's right to suffrage;
(3) Ignored the basic rules of evidence and breached the internal
procedures of the Tribunal; and
(4) Gravely and/or deliberately misapprehended the facts.13
Briefly stated, the crucial question involved in this case is: Did public
respondent HRET commit grave abuse of discretion in (1) proceeding to
decide the election protest based on private respondent's "precinct level
document based anomalies/evidence" theory; (2) rendering judgment on
the kind of evidence before it and the manner in which the evidence was
procured, and (3) annulling election results in some contested precincts?
I. The "precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory
However guised or justified by private respondent, this innovative theory
he introduced for the first time in his memorandum cum addendum indeed
broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what he originally
sought-the mere revision of ballots. From his initial prayer for revision
which lays primary, if not exclusive emphasis on the physical recount and
appreciation of ballots alone, private respondent's belated attempt to inject
this theory at the memorandum stage calls for presentation of evidence
(consisting of thousands of documents) aside from, or other than, the
ballots themselves. By having done so, private respondent in fact intended
to completely abandon the process and results of the revision and
thereafter sought to rely on his brainchild process he fondly coined as
"precinct-level document-based evidence." This is clearly substantial
amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the
HRET internal rules which reads:
After the expiration of the period for filing of the
protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto,
substantial amendments which broaden the scope of
the action or introduce an additional cause of action
shall not be allowed. . . . .
The majority members of the Tribunal in fact had already sensed the
impropriety of private respondent's belated shift of theory when it issued
its "show-cause" order requiring the latter to explain why his election
protest should not be dismissed. But the majority violated with open eyes
its own rules when they resolved not to dismiss the protest — a clear
indication of grave abuse of discretion. The least that public respondent
HRET could have done thereafter was to conduct further hearing so that
petitioner Arroyo may have examined, objected to and adduced evidence
controverting private respondent Syjuco's "precinct-level document-based
evidence" despite the time within which the parties are allowed to present
their evidence has already lapsed.14 But nothing in the records indicates
that one was conducted. Petitioner's right to due process was clearly
violated at this particular stage of the proceedings.
Granting that private respondent's change in theory (being a substantial
amendment) is merely disallowed and not a valid ground for the outright
dismissal of his election protest, nonetheless it has been consistently held
that substantial amendments to the protest maybe allowed only within the
same period for the filing of the election protest15 which, under Rule 16 of
the HRET Rules, is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.
Private respondent's "precinct-level document-based anomalies/evidence"
theory having been introduced only at the homestretch of the proceedings,
he is bound by the issue which he essentially raised in his election protest
and that is, a revision of the ballots will confirm his victory and the
irregularities/anomalies and massive fraud foisted upon him during the
1992 synchronized elections. For the rule in an election protest is that the
protestant or counterprotestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had
raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the
statutory period for the filing of protest or counter
protest. 16 (emphasis supplied) Private respondent is therefore bound by
the final results of the revision confirming petitioner's victory over him by a
plurality of 13,092 votes.17 Petitioner's inevitable victory in the revision was
even conceded to by private respondent himself when he stated in his
memorandum cum addendum that:
. . . in disputing the sham victory of protestee, the
anticipated/expected results of the regular, traditional
and normal process of REVISION of ballots, would, by
itself, be unavailing and insufficient to overturn
protestee's supposed victory (quoted on p. 6 of this
decision).
This statement is clearly an admission against private respondent's own
interest equally binding and conclusive upon him, there being no showing
that he made it through palpable mistake (Section 4, Rule 129, Rules of
Court).
Thus, the final results of the revision and the admission of his eventual
loss therein were sufficient reasons to confirm at a much earlier time
petitioner Arroyo's victory over private respondent Syjuco. These are the
offshoots of the theory and cause of action private respondent Syjuco
originally banked on (revision). Private respondent cannot escape its
adverse effects by later on contriving unprecedented and wholly untested
processes or theories such as the "precinct-level document-based
anomalies/evidence", the applicable and well-settled principle being "a
party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he
stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate
his theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate
the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal".18 This is in
essence putting private respondent in estoppel to question the revision. In
this connection, what the Court said in "Lucero vs. De Guzman" (45 Phil.
852, 871-872), becomes meaningfully relevant:
When the boxes are opened and the truth concerning an election
made accessible, considerations of public policy require that the proof
thus supplied should be accepted. The public at large has the deepest
concern in the integrity of elections, and this public interest must be
regarded as well as the technical rights of the litigants themselves. It
would be most scandalous for us to sanction a practice under which a
party to an election contest could be permitted to force an examination
of the ballots and when the result is found unfavorable to himself
require the court to cover up the wrong, with consequences injurious
to the cause of justice. When boxes are opened at the instance of the
 parties to the contest, they are estopped from questioning the true
result of the revision whatever that result may be. The plain duty of the
court, under the circumstances presented in this case, was to proceed
to a revision of the count, with the report of the commissioners before
him, and assisted by the facts appearing in those documents.
II. The kind of evidence used and how they were procured
a) The majority members of public respondent HRET undisputedly
admitted and appreciated as evidence mere photocopies of election-
related documents when there is not even the slightest showing that the
original or even certified true copies thereof cannot be reasonably
produced before the Tribunal. These photocopies violate the best
evidence rule19 which is simply meant that no evidence shall be received
which is merely substitutionary in its nature so long as the original
evidence can be had.20 They should have been rejected altogether
unworthy of any probative value at all, being incompetent pieces of
evidence.
b) Certain vital election documents (such as certified xerox copy of the
number of registered voters per precinct and photocopies of statements of
votes) were procured at the sole instance of the ponente of the majority
decision21 which, as the Tribunal readily admitted, were never offered in
evidence by either of the parties.22 Aside from that, acting upon the self-
serving allegation of private respondent Syjuco supported by mere
photocopied election documents that around 12,075 signatures of voters
scattered in 777 precincts were forged or falsified, the majority
congressmen-members of the Tribunal by themselves without the
participation of any of the three (3) remaining Justices-members, declared
that 10,484 of the contested signature are fake.23 This course of action
grossly violates not only Rule 68 of the Tribunal's own rules which requires
that all questions shall be submitted to the Tribunal as a body, but also
Rule 5 thereof which further requires the presence of at least one (1)
Justice-member to constitute a valid quorum. In order, therefore, that any
and all matters presented before it can be properly addressed and
considered, the Tribunal is mandated to act as a collegial body. And
without collective effort as enjoined by Rule 68 but qualified by Rule 5 in
this particular and most crucial stage of the proceedings, any resulting
action purporting to be the official act the Tribunal should be, as it is
hereby, struck down as highly irregular. The Court in "Free Employment
and Workers Association (FEWA) vs. CIR" (14 SCRA 781, 785) held that:
. . . the Commissioners cannot act upon their own information, as could
jurors in primitive days. All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence
submitted or to be considered, and must be given opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence in
explanation or rebuttal. In no other way can a party maintain its rights or
make its defense. In no other way can it test the sufficiency of the facts to
support the finding; for otherwise, even though it appeared that the order
was without evidence, the manifest deficiency could always be explained
on the theory that the Commission had before it extraneous, unknown, but
presumptively sufficient information to support the finding. (United States
v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R. Co., 226 U.S. 14, ante, 104, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 5)
III. Nullification of election results
The power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest care
as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in
extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to
the fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that
elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to take
any other step.24 Thus, as a guide for the exercise of this power, no less
than public respondent Electoral Tribunal itself has laid down two
mandatory requisites for the annulment of election returns based on fraud,
irregularities or terrorism, namely (1) that more than fifty percent (50%) of
the total number of votes in the precinct or precincts were involved, and
(2) that the votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated by such
fraud, irregularities or terrorism.25 Public respondent HRET proceeded to
annul 50,00026 votes without a dint of compliance with these requisites as
it annulled the results on the basis of lost or destroyed ballots despite the
presence and availability of election return
and other competent secondary evidence whose authenticity were never
questioned,27 and on the basis of alleged forged signatures which were
never competently proved and substantiated by private
respondent.28 Further, the tribunal nullified the 10% margin in several
contested precincts with alleged substitute voting which the dissenting
opinion correctly observed as "a far cry from the existing 50% rule".29 What
is even worse is that the nullification of these votes was based on
inadmissible documents some of them not offered in evidence by private
respondent. The Court cannot countenance such blatant nullification of
votes as it fails to comply with the established standard on annulment.
Elections should never be held void unless they are clearly illegal; it is the
duty of the court to sustain an election authorized by law if it has been so
conducted as to give a free and fair expression of the popular will, and the
actual result thereof is clearly ascertained. 30
Additionally, public respondent HRET disregarded election results on
several precincts on the basis of omissions committed either through mere
oversight or plain negligence on the part of election officials or employees.
The bulk of these omissions consisted of lack or absence of the signature
of the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors on the voter's affidavits
or lists of voters/voting records, absence or excess of detachable
coupons, number of detachable coupons not tallying with the number of
ballots, and missing voter's lists. We find that these omissions, mainly
administrative in nature, cannot be used as a ground to nullify election
results in the absence of a clear showing of fraud. Voters duly registered
and who have exercised their right of suffrage should not be penalized by
disregarding and junking their votes due to omissions not of their own
making. The settled rule is that in the absence of fraud, mere irregularities
or omissions committed by election officials which do not subvert the
expression of popular will, as in this case, cannot countenance the
nullification of election results.31 Corollarily, the misconduct of election
officers or irregularities on their part will not justify rejecting the whole vote
of a precinct (as was done in this case) where it does not appear that the
result was affected thereby, even though the circumstances may be such
as to subject the officers to punishment.32 These omissions are not
decisive since actual voting and election by registered voters had taken
place in the questioned precincts.33 The Court, therefore, cannot stamp
with approval the conduct exhibited by public respondent HRET as it was
attended by arbitrariness.
From the above findings, it now becomes apparent why private
respondent's argument that the petition should be dismissed for failure to
first file a motion for reconsideration of public respondent HRET's majority
decision, is untenable. Indeed, the general rule is that a tribunal rendering
a decision must be given an opportunity to rectify its error through a
motion for reconsideration. However, the partiality of the majority of the
members of the Electoral Tribunal having been shown through their
concerted action to disregard tribunal rules and the basic rules on
evidence, recourse for a reconsideration of its decision becomes nugatory
and an immediate recourse to this Court can be had based on the
fundamental principle of due process. And it is well-settled that a prior
motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with if, as in this case,
petitioner's fundamental right to due process was violated.34
All told, the procedural flaws which marred the proceedings in the public
respondent HRET from the time private respondent's "precinct-level
document based anomalies/evidence" theory was embraced by the
majority members up to the rendition of judgment suffice in themselves to
render the public respondent HRET's majority decision declaring private
respondent Syjuco as the duly elected congressman of the then lone
district of Makati a complete nullity. The persistent and deliberate violation
of the Tribunal's own governing rules and of even the most basic rules of
evidence cannot be justified by simply invoking that procedural rules
should be liberally construed. For even if Rule 2 of the Tribunal's internal
rules states that:
In case of reasonable doubt, these rules shall be
liberally construed in order to achieve a just,
expeditions and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every contest brought before the
Tribunal.
Rule 80 of the very same internal rules expressly makes the Rules of
Court, Supreme Court decisions, and Electoral Tribunal decisions of
suppletory application. In fact, public respondent HRET quite consistently
in the past ultimately relied on the rules of evidence established by the
Rules of Court in disposing election cases brought before it. To name a
pertinent few: "Cuneta vs. Claudio" (HRET Adm. Case No. 92-010, Feb.
24, 1994); "Hernandez vs. Sanchez" (HRET Case No. 92-012, July 27,
1993); "Loyola vs. Dragon" (HRET Case No. 92-026, Jan. 31, 1994); and
"Claver vs. Bulut" (HRET Case No. 92-015, Nov. 23, 1993). More
specifically, in the "Cuneta" case, the HRET struck down certain foreign
documents presented by petitioner Cuneta as being inadmissible under
the best evidence rule (Section 4, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and for failure
to meet the requirements for the admissibility in evidence of foreign
documents under Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as
applied in the "Hernandez" case and in "De Leon vs. Sanchez" (HRET
Case No. 92-013). In the "Loyola" case, certain pictures presented by
protestant Loyola depicting the unlawful display of protestee Dragon's
streamer outside the authorized areas were not given any probative value
by the HRET for their lack of identification and authentication by any
witness other than protestant Loyola who presented the pictures by
himself. And in the "Claver" case, the HRET said that it can only consider
documents formally offered in evidence, a ruling made apparently
pursuant to Rule 60 of the HRET internal rules which provides that:
Evidence not formally presented shall be deemed
waived and shall not be considered by the Tribunal in
deciding the case.
and as likewise provided in Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
which reads:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
But why the change of heart and open defiance in this case when the very is SET ASIDE. Private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., having been
same objections raised by public respondent HRET in these cases found guilty of indirect contempt, is hereby fined the amount of one
squarely apply to the entirety of private respondent's massive thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to be paid within five (5) days from receipt of
documentary evidence? this decision. SO ORDERED.

If the Court, in striking down the majority decision of public respondent

HRET, pays unwavering reverence to the rules of evidence as provided by
the Rules of Court and jurisprudence, it is because they have been tested
through years of experience as the most effective means of ferreting out
the truth in any judicial controversy. And the Court will not allow even the
slightest diminution of, much less a complete and brazen departure from
these time-honored rules especially when the will of the electorate as
expressed through the ballot, is at stake. Rules and uniformity of
procedure are as essential to procure truth and exactness in elections as
in anything else.35 Thus, with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings
before the public respondent HRET and its majority decision in the
election protest filed by private respondent, petitioner's proclamation as
the winning congressman of the then lone district of Makati is deemed not
to have been challenged at all.

And finally, in a Resolution dated March 14, 1995 the Court required
private respondent to explain why he should not be held for indirect
contempt since his statements in his Addendum which he prepared
without aid of counsel appear to seriously undermine the integrity of some
members of the Court, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Despite Mr. Arroyo's unconscionable barrage on the six (6)
congressional membership in the HRET, records will show that I
have not questioned the integrity of any of the three (3) Justices,
despite the fact that on various occasions, I have been convinced,
in my heart, that at least two (2) of them were working for
protestee Arroyo in HRET deliberations and the resultant delays
therein. (p. 2)
xxx xxx xxx
There may also be linkages between protestee Arroyo and Justice
Flerida Ruth Romero, about whom unkind rumors are rife that Her
Honor is "gumagapang" in the Supreme Court, for Arroyo. (p. 2)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . we submit that like Caesar's wife this case at bar should be
handled by magistrates who have not "shared a bed" with
protestee Arroyo, at one time or another. (p. 3)
xxx xxx xxx
If Arroyo had been a stranger to Justice Bidin, could Arroyo have
moved Justice Bidin, through a mere phone call, to violate HRET
Rule 38? (p. 10).

The Court notes that even a Justice who is not a member of the HRET has
been made the object of calumny in extremely vulgar language by
imputing linkages between her and petitioner, although a thinly veiled
attempt was made by private respondent to absolve himself by ascribing
such imputation to "unkind rumors".

In compliance thereto private respondent filed an explanation dated March

25, 1995. In his explanation, private respondent averred that he merely
expressed a simple citizen's grievance in accordance to his observations
and based on his firm convictions and beliefs and that his statements were
not aimed at seriously undermining the integrity of some Members of the
Court. Private respondent, in closing, offered his apology. We find the
explanation unsatisfactory. Implicit in his statements is the notion that
aforesaid Justices are insensible and partial in the adjudication of the case
which could make their actuation suspect. The statements make it plain
that said Justices were not free from appearance of impropriety as it
emphasized that said Justices must be above suspicion at all times like
Ceasar's wife. Indeed, the above statements manifest the idea that the
dispensation of justice can be compromised through unsubstantiated
linkages. These statements not only undermine the integrity of some
members of this Court but also degrade the administration of justice.

To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary

language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration,
or which could have the effect of "harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the
source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation
upon which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief.36

Want of intention to undermine the integrity of the Court is no excuse for

the language employed by private respondent for it is a well-known and
established rule that derogatory words are to be taken in the ordinary
meaning attached to them by impartial observers (Paragas v. Cruz, 14
SCRA 809, 812; In re Franco, 67 Phil. 313, 316; Rheem of the Philippines
v. Ferrer, supra at p. 446). Finding private respondent's statements
contemptous and uncalled for he is hereby declared guilty of indirect
contempt.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED,

and public respondent HRET's majority decision dated January 25, 1995