Joseph P. Gaviola | Special Proceedings | Thursday | 7:30-9:30 PM| Atty.

Tangarorang

CASE ANALYSIS:

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and
CARLOS EUSEBIO

G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956

FACTS:

Eugenio Eusebio filed with CFI Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate
of his father, Andres Eusebio. The petition states that Andres was residing in Quezon City.
Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said
petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They pray for the dismissal of the case upon the ground
that venue had been improperly filed.

CFI overruled this objection and granted said petition.

Amanda Eusebio et al filed an appeal before SC.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not venue has been properly laid.

RULING: YES.

Up until October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was always domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga.
He had a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City. Before he transferred to the
house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and treated in his son’s residence, which was a doctor.
It is well settled that “domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one
own’s health” even if coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of
illness, to return home. Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is
that Andres retained such domicile.

It is notable that Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no
direct evidence of such intent – Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City
indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify
on the matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some
of his children remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his house at 889 – A Espana
Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed by
Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his
death stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.

To change domicile, the following requisites must be present:

(1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice,

(2) physical presence at the place chosen,
(3) intention to stay therein permanently.

Although Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because
the third requisite is absent.

Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal
because they introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that
appellants specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same.

In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the
estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of

Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

FACTS:

Virginia G. Fule filed with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration for the estate of
Amado G. Garcia. At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special
administratrix over the estate. CFI granted the motion.

Preciosa B. Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the order appointing
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since:

 No notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate;
 There has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a
regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be
preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and,
 Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia,
therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While the MR is pending, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix.

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by
Virginia G. Fule with the CFI was published in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general
circulation in Southern Luzon.

Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular

Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original
petition in four aspects. Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition because this attempts to confer
jurisdiction on the CFI, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the
original petition was deficient.
Virginia G. Fule filed an omnibus motion praying for authority to take possession of properties
of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from
the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed
the motion.

CFI denied the motion for reconsideration.

Preciosa moved for reconsideration insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised
by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d)
appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special
administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.

During the hearing, Preciosa presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing
that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Fule testified that Amado
was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death.

The CA rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Malvar for lack of
jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration Fule elevated the matter on appeal by certiorari to the
SC.

Before Fule could receive the decision of the CA, Preciosa had already filed a petition for letters
of administration before the CFI of Quezon City, with a motion for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate. Judge Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa as special
administratrix.

ISSUE/S:

What does the word “resides” refer to in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court?

RULING:

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court states:

“If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
 assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.”

It is a doctrinal rule that the term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as
distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” The term “resides,” like, the terms “residing”
and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.

The term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary.

A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.
The death certificate shows that the decedent’s last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased’s residence certificate for 1973
obtained three months before his death; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia’s last place of residence was at
Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Fule’s petition for
letters of administration was improperly laid in the CFI of Calamba, Laguna.

ANALYSIS

Both the Eusebio and Garcia-Fule case discussed on the matter of residence. In the said cases, it
has been emphasized that residence is critical in determining the proper venue of filing for the
appointment of administrator or executor of an estate.

In Eusebio, the decedent had lived in Quezon City and Pampanga. In determining the decedent's
real residence, with respect to the determination of proper venue, the Supreme Court concluded
that it is with Pampanga. The court ruled that residence is not easily changeable. An intent to
return must be established. As for the Garcia-Fule case, the confusion was whether the residence
of the decendent is in Laguna or Quezon City. As resolved by the Supreme Court, Amado G.
Garcia's residence is in in the latter, not the former. The court explained that a death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. In this case, the death
certificate shows that the decedent's residence is at Quezon City. Further, the decendent's
resident certificate, which is acquired three months prior his death, shows that he resides in
Quezon City.
 TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA VENTURA,
MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA vs. GREGORIA VENTURA and HER
HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND,
PEDRO D. CORPUZ

G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988

FACTS:

Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include the appellees.
In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and
appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate.

The will was admitted to probate. Gregorio Ventura died on September 26, 1955. Appellant
Maria Ventura filed a motion for her appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favor. Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters
testamentary was issued in her favor. Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of the estate of
Gregorio Ventura.

Maria Ventura filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive. Said
account of administration was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz,
Exequiel Victorio, and Gregoria Ventura. Maria Ventura filed a motion to hold in abeyance the
approval of the accounts of administration or to have their approval without the opposition of the
spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and Gregoria Ventura and Exequiel Victorio on the
ground that the question of the paternity of Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura is still
pending final determination before the Supreme Court and that should they be adjudged the
adulterous children of testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to oppose the
approval of the counts of administration. The motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the
accounts was denied.

The case was set for pre-trial.

Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura filed four motions, namely:

(1) motion to remove the executrix Maria Ventura which was supplemented on April 27,
1965;
(2) motion to require her to deposit the harvest of palay of the property under administration
in a bonded warehouse;
 (3) motion to render an accounting of the proceeds and expenses of Administration; and
(4) motion to require her to include in the inventory of the estate certain excluded properties.
An opposition to said motions was filed by the heirs Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura
and by the executrix Maria Ventura herself.

The executrix Maria Ventura finally submitted her accounts of administration covering the
period 1961 to 1965 which were again opposed by the respondents. The executrix filed her
supplemental opposition to the aforesaid four motions and prayed that the joint supplemental
motion to remove the executrix be denied or held in abeyance until after the status of Mercedes
and Gregoria Ventura as heirs of the testator is finally decided.

The court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds of the estate,
was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the matter
of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the
estate, rendered the questioned decision.

Hence, the petitioner made an appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified?

RULING: YES.

Other than the instant special proceedings, there are two other civil cases involving the estate of
the deceased Gregoria Ventura. Gregoria and Mercedes Ventura claimed that they are the
legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife Paulina Simpliciano, who died in 1943, and
asked that one-half of the properties described in the complaint be declared as the share of their
mother in the conjugal partnership, with them as the only forced heirs of their mother Paulina.
Subsequently, another Civil Case was filed by Alipio, Eufracia and Juliana, all surnamed
Simpliciano, against Gregorio Ventura and the two sisters, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura,
before CFI Nueva Ecija. They alleged that as the only children of Modesto Simpliciano, sole
brother of Paulina Simpliciano, they, instead of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, whom they
claimed are adulterous children of Paulina with another man, Teodoro Ventura and as such are
not entitled to inherit from her, are the ones who should inherit the share of Paulina Simpliciano
in the conjugal Partnership with Gregorio Ventura.

It appears that on November 4, 1959, after a joint hearing of Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476, the
lower court rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura
to be the legitimate daughters of Paulina Simpliciano and Gregorio Ventura XXX; ordering the
defendant Maria Ventura, as administratrix of the estate of Gregorio Ventura XXX

The court annulled the institution of the heirs in the probated will of Gregorio Ventura.
Accordingly, Maria Ventura appealed the February 26, 1964 and June 11, 1964 orders of the
probate court in Special Proceedings No. 812 before the Supreme Court, this Court, through
then-Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo, ruled, as follows: And so, acting on appellees' motion
to dismiss appeal, it is Our considered opinion that the decision in Civil Cases Nos.1064 and
1476 declaring that appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of the
deceased Gregorio Ventura and his wife, Paulina Simpliciano, and as such are entitled to the
annulment of the institution of heirs made in the probated will of said deceased became final and
executory upon the finality of the order, approving their partition directed in the decision in
question.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering
the previous appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic.

This would now necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the following
provision: Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: When and to whom letters of administration
granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;" xxx

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while
the next of kin are Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of
kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the
decedent's property. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is
more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the
strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of
kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference
over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence,
under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be
appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion
of the Court, in order to represent both interests.
 CANDELARIO VILLAMOR, PILAR DE LA SERNA, BARTOLOME VILLAMOR,
RAFAELA RETUYA, SOFRONIO VILLAMOR, PILAR SEMBLANTE, ELEUTERIO
VILLAMOR, CARIDAD GORECHO, MARCOS OR and GUADALUPE CEDEÑO vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DANIELA CENIZA UROT, in her capacity as
administratrix of the estate of Fr. Nicanor Cortes, under Sp. Proc. No. 3062-R

G.R. No. L-41508 June 27, 1988

FACTS:

After the death of Bartolome Cortes, Special Proceedings No. 227 was instituted for the
settlement of his estate. Fr. Diosdado Camomot, a close friend of Bartolome, was named
administrator. Paula Cortes Villamor and Ireneo Cortes Villamor, claiming to be the legitimate
children of Rufino Cortes, filed a petition for the administration of the estate of Rufino Cortes, to
protect their rights and counteract the effects of Special Proceedings No. 262-C. Notice of the
hearing of the petition was published in the "Nasud," a newspaper of general circulation on
October 13, 20 and 27, 1938. Appointed administrator in this proceeding was one Moises
Mendoza, who thereafter submitted an inventory of the properties allegedly belonging to the
estate of Rufino Cortes.

Ireneo and Paula Villamor sold the parcel of land described in the Project of Partition as parcel 5
to Claudia Labos and Gregoria Suico, and Ireneo Villamor obtained free patent titles over parcels
1, 2, 4, 6 and 7. Only parcel no. 3 remained unregistered.

Following Ireneo's death, his children, now petitioners, executed an extra-judicial partition,
dividing the remaining 6 parcels of land among themselves.

The court, through Judge Clementino Diez, denied the motion of the nephews and nieces of Sixta
Ceniza to be declared her heirs and declared Fr. Nicanor Cortes as the only and universal heir of
Sixta Ceniza. Fr. Nicanor Cortes executed a Deed of Conveyance in favor of several persons
wherein he conveyed ten parcels of land which included those received by his mother under the
Project of Partition. On August 28, 1969, Fr. Nicanor Cortes died in Barcelona, Spain. Appointed
administratrix was respondent Daniela Ceniza Urot filed Civil Case No. 11726 against
petitioners, successors-in-interest of Ireneo Villamor of the seven parcels of land and Paula
Villamor, for recovery received in the Project of Partition, accounting and receivership.

Petitioners, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the cause of action
is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of limitations. The Court denied the motion to
dismiss. When petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on August 19, 1970,
petitioners came to this Court by means of certiorari, but the same was denied. Petitioners filed
their answer and alleged as special defenses that aside from the fact that Special Proceedings No.
343-C was a proceeding in rem and all the requirements to obtain jurisdiction over the person of
anybody have been complied with, Fr. Nicanor Cortes had personal knowledge of Special
Proceedings No. 343-C; that the question of legitimacy of Ireneo and Paula Villamor had been
duly pleaded and raised as the principal issue in Special Proceedings No. 343-C; that the
question of declaration of heirship of the two Villamor had already been resolved by the court in
said proceedings and have long become final, entry of judgment having been made on March 18,
1954; that with the age, respectability and social standing of Sixta Ceniza, no court could have
tolerated the alleged acts of Ireneo and Paula Sixta Ceniza Villamor committed against Sixta
Ceniza; that Sixta Ceniza had the best legal advice and ample protection from her counsels, a
legal preliminary at the time and a dean of the University of Visayas and Fr. Diosdado Camomot,
then the secretary to the Archbishop of Cebu, and after the death of Sixta Ceniza, Fr. Nicanor
Cortes appeared through counsel in Special Proceedings No. 363 where Escolastico Ceniza
applied as administrator but was denied by the court in favor of Fr. Camomot upon the
recommendation of Fr. Nicanor Cortes; and that all these times, Fr. Nicanor Cortes never
complained nor raised any objection to the inventory of Special Proceedings No. 364 which was
taken as a part of the inventories in Special Proceedings 262-C and 343-C. As affirmative
defenses, the petitioners alleged that the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action,
intrinsic fraud being the basis of the complaint; that the cause 6f action is barred by prior
judgment and by the statute of limitations; and, that the complaint states no valid cause of action.

The court rendered judgment against the petitioners holding that Ireneo and Paula Villamor took
advantage of the helplessness of Sixta Ceniza when they had the Project of Partition
thumbmarked by her; that Ireneo and Paula Villamor resorted to false and fraudulent
representations in Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 in that they misrepresented that they
were the legitimate children of Rufino Cortes, when in truth, they were merely natural children
of Rufino Cortes and that the properties described in the inventory pertained to Rufino Cortes
when in fact, said properties belonged to Eugenia Cortes and after her death, the same passed to
Eustaquio Cortes; that Fr. Nicanor Cortes had no knowledge of the fraudulent proceedings as
well as the Project of Partition; that Ireneo and Paula Villamor, in collusion with the
administrator Moises Mendoza and with the support and encouragement of Fr. Camomot who
enjoyed the implicit trust of Fr. Nicanor Cortes, misled the probate court into authorizing the
delivery of the parcels of land to them; that when the probate court approved the project of
partition, there was no hearing for the purpose of determining the parties lawfully entitled to the
estate nor was there an opportunity given to Fr. Nicanor Cortes to intervene or oppose; that under
the circumstances, the fraud committed by Ireneo and Paula Villamor was extrinsic or collateral;
and that the fraud was discovered for the first time by Atty. Ramon Ceniza, son of Jose Ceniza,
one of the heirs at law of Fr. Cortes only in March 1970.
On appeal, the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, as adverted to above, affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, hence, the present recourse.

Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals, like the trial court, totally ignored the letters of
Fr. Nicanor Cortes disclaiming ownership and acknowledging the fact that petitioners and/or
their predecessors-in-interest are the owners and possessors of the lands in question, which
exhibits could have decided outright all the issues that Fr. Cortes had personal knowledge of
Special Proceedings Nos. 262-C and 343-C and that the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners
did not commit fraud against him. Petitioners insist that the helplessness of Sixta Ceniza could
not have vitiated the project of partition for although she had become blind and could not walk
by herself at the time she affixed her thumbmark on the project of partition, her mental faculty
was very clear. It is further argued that all the fraud alleged by private respondent were within
the line of deliberation of the probate court or intrinsic fraud and could not have been extrinsic or
collateral fraud; and therefore the cause of action of private respondent had long prescribed,
considering that from September 1948 or some 22 years since petitioners' predecessors-in-
interest came to possess the lands, petitioners have been in peaceful, notorious, public, actual and
continuous possession, adversely against the whole world in concepto de dueño until they were
disturbed in June 1970 when they received copies of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-11726.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petitioners have a better right to the properties

RULING: YES.

In his testimony, Fr. Diosdado Camomot declared categorically that he informed Fr. Nicanor
Cortes about Special Proceedings No. 343 6 and that he sent him a copy of the project of
partition. He explained that as administrator of the estate of Fr. Bartolome Cortes, he
encountered trouble with the administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 343, Moises Mendoza, who claimed
that the properties under his [Camomot's] administration belonged to Rufino Cortes; that when
informed of said problem, Sixta Ceniza advised him to write Fr. Nicanor Cortes about it, which
he did; that in reply to his letter, Fr. Nicanor Cortes recommended that he settle the case
amicably; and that after a long process of negotiation, the project of partition in question was
executed and approved by the court, a copy of which he sent to Fr. Nicanor Cortes.

Highly significant is the fact that among the witnesses who testified before the trial court, it was
only Fr. Camomot who had personal knowledge of the events leading to the execution of the
project of partition. Notwithstanding, the trial court, instead of according great weight to his
testimony, summarily brushed it aside and even reached the unwarranted conclusion that he was
in collusion with Ireneo and Paula Villamor. The testimony of Fr. Diosdado Camomot, however,
is too detailed and straightforward to be a mere product of concoction or fabrication or a device
to cover-up the collusion imputed to him by the trial court. Furthermore, said testimony is
corroborated by other evidence on record that sustains its veracity. That he communicated with
Fr. Nicanor Cortes was corroborated by Roure Ceniza-Sanchez, a witness for therein plaintiff-
administratrix Daniela Ceniza Urot. She testified that being the administrator, it was Fr.
Camomot who informed Fr. Nicanor Cortes about the properties of his parents. That the petition
in Special Proceedings No. 343 was among the matters brought to the attention of Fr. Nicanor
Cortes by Fr. Camomot can be deduced from the letter of Fr. Nicanor Cortes dated August 20,
1948, addressed to Pesing (Dra. Felicisima Cortes-Veloso].

If it were not true that Fr. Camomot had informed Fr. Nicanor Cortes about Special Proceedings
Nos. 262 and 343 there would be no basis for Fr. Cortes to observe or comment that "apparently,
a new court trouble is brewing before the old one is completely settled. At that time, the only
court proceedings in progress were Special Proceedings Nos. 262, 343 and 227. The "old one"
adverted to by Fr. Nicanor Cortes could not refer exclusively to Special Proceedings No. 227 as
surmised by Roure Ceniza-Sanchez, as the only trouble being encountered by Fr. Camomot as
administrator of the estate of Fr. Bartolome Cortes in Special Proceedings No. 227 was the claim
of Moises Mendoza as administrator in Special Proceedings No. 343 over the properties under
Fr. Camomot's administration. The trial court's conclusion that the "old one" could not refer to
Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 for the reason that the project of partition had been
executed as early as December 7, 1946, is erroneous. While it may be true that said project of
partition had already been executed, there still remained some loose ends that needed tieing up,
so that it was not until November 25, 1953 that both proceedings were ordered closed and
terminated. The phrase "before the old one is completely settled" used by Fr. Cortes is thus
apropos.

The other evidence on record from which knowledge by Fr. Nicanor Cortes of both Special
Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 and the project of partition could be in erred are his letters dated
April 6, 1967, May 11, 1967, November 29, 1962 and December 1, 1967, addressed to Ipyon
[Concepcion Rosal], Mrs. Dulce Rallos Gitgano, Awang [Paula Villamor] and Mr. and Mrs.
Candelario Villamor, respectively, and the Deed of Conveyance dated May 9,1962.

In his testimony, Candelario Villamor Identified the land where Concepcion Rosal wanted to
build her house as parcel "No. 1 on page five of the complaint." He further Identified the land
which Mrs. Dulce Rallos Gitgano wanted to buy as "from the land which is the share of Ireneo
Cortes Villamor and Paula Cortes Villamor and found in the project of partition on page four of
said project of partition and boundary number two."
The records show that when Fr. Nicanor Cortes left the Philippines to become a monk, he was
already 44 years old. He must have known then who the owners of the lands referred to were and
certainly at that time neither Awang [Paula Villamor] nor Candelario was in possession thereof.
Yet, in his replies to the letters of Mesdames Rosal and Gitgano, he stated by name and with
certainty the persons whom the latter should approach and who could properly exercise the right
of disposition over said lands. In the absence of any showing that Awang and Candelario were
designated as representatives or administrators of Fr. Cortes' properties, the only logical
conclusion reached is that Fr. Nicanor Cortes knew the circumstances under which Awang and
Candelario acquired ownership and possession of the lands in question and that he recognized
such ownership and possession, otherwise he would not have given the advice or suggestions
found in his letters.

Fr. Nicanor Cortes' letter of November 29, 1962 to Awang.

In the Deed of Conveyance dated May 9, 1962 executed by Fr. Nicanor Cortes before the Consul
General of the Republic of the Philippines, Madrid, Spain, wherein he ceded and transferred ten
[10] parcels of land in favor of several persons for and in consideration of One Peso, Philippine
currency and other valuable considerations.

The portions of Fr. Cortes' letters and Deed of Conveyance show beyond any iota of doubt that
he was kept posted on the developments in the Philippines. He knows that his mother received
some lands as "share" and that Candelario had acquired lands. He also knew the succession of
ownership of the lands to which he succeeded as sole heir of his mother in Special Proceedings
No. 364-P, From these statements, it would not be unreasonable or far-fetched to draw the
conclusion that he knew about Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 as well as the project of
partition which were the root and origin of the "share" of his mother, the lands acquired by
Candelario, as well as the lands inherited by him.

By reason of this circumstance, Fr. Nicanor Cortes is charged with knowledge of Special
Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 as well as the Project of Petition.

The loss and/or destruction of the pre-war records in Special Proceedings No. 262-C renders the
determination of whether or not Fr. Nicanor Cortes was duly notified thereof an impossibility.
However, the probability of his having been notified cannot be totally discounted. On the other
hand, no personal notice was due Fr. Nicanor Cortes in Special Proceedings No. 343-C, not
being the presumptive heir of Rufino Cortes. Thus, if it were true that Fr. Nicanor Cortes had no
notice of Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343, the failure to give such notice must be attributed
to whoever instituted Special Proceedings No. 262 wherein Fr. Cortes was a presumptive heir,
and not to Ireneo and Paula Villamor, the petitioners in Special Proceedings No. 343, wherein Fr.
Cortes was not a presumptive heir and where the publication of the petition as required by law
was sufficient to give notice to the whole world including Fr. Cortes.

The lower courts portrayed Sixta Ceniza as an old woman, who because of her "helplessness,"
became an easy prey to unscrupulous individuals like the predecessors-in-interest of the
petitioners. The petitioners, however, contend that although it is true that Sixta Ceniza was blind
and could not walk without somebody escorting her, her helplessness only affected her physical
condition for according to Roure Ceniza-Sanchez, a granddaughter with whom said Sixta Ceniza
lived at that time, Sixta Ceniza's mental faculty was "very clear".

Just because a person is blind or of poor memory, it does not follow that she is of unsound said.
This Court has ruled that where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither
old age, nor is health nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might
sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will.

If Sixta Ceniza were really "helpless," in the sense understood by the courts, when she affixed
her thumbmark in the project of partition, on December 7, 1946, how was she able to validly
donate lands to "those who served her and those to whom gratitude were due by means of
documents signed on October of 1947 before Notary Fermin Yap" as Fr. Nicanor Cortes himself
communicated to Awang"?

The lower courts likewise relied on the alleged absence of evidence showing that Rufino Cortes
had at any time been declared an owner of the lands in question for taxation purpose poses.

It is clear therefore that a partition presupposes that the thing to be divided is owned in common.
It is immaterial in whose name the properties were declared for taxation purposes for it is
presumed beforehand that the parties to the partition admit the fact of co-ownership and now
want to effect a separation of interest.

What is intriguing is the fact that although Fr. Nicanor Cortes had a number of surviving first
cousins, he chose and preferred a stranger, Fr. Diosdado Camomot as his attorney-in-fact to take
charge of his and his Nanay's affairs. And even more intriguing is the fact that in the proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of his mother, he took steps to have the appointment of
Escolastico Ceniza, brother of private respondent, who was appointed as Special Administrator,
revoked 27 and in which he succeeded. To ascertain what constitutes "a discovery of the facts
constituting the fraud," reference must be had to the principles of equity. In actions in equity, the
rule is that the means of knowledge are equivalent to actual knowledge; that is, that a knowledge
of facts which would have put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry which, if followed up,
would have resulted in a discovery of the fraud, was equivalent to actual discovery.
In the instant case, the discovery must be deemed to have taken place, at the latest, on August 18,
1955, when Judge Clementino Diez, in Special Proceedings No. 364-R declared Fr. Nicanor
Cortes as the only and universal heir of Sixta Ceniza and granted letters of administration to Fr.
Diosdado Camomot, the person constituted by Fr. Nicanor Cortes as his attorney-in-fact in said
proceedings. From that time, the law imputes to Fr. Cortes knowledge of Special Proceedings
Nos. 262 and 343, the project of partition, and such facts and circumstances as would have him,
by the exercise of due diligence, to a knowledge of the fraud. During the time that Special
Proceedings No. 364-R had been pending circumstances existed which should have aroused Fr.
Nicanor Cortes' suspicion or put him on inquiry considering that the inventory submitted therein
specifically made mention of Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 and the project of partition.

The period of prescription commenced to run from August 18, 1955. However, from said date up
to his death on August 28, 1969, Fr. Nicanor Cortes remained silent and failed to assert his right.
He even conveyed at least three lands which were among those apportioned to Sixta Ceniza in
the Project of Partition to several persons. Her predecessor-in-interest, Fr. Nicanor Cortes, not
having filed any action for reconveyance within the prescriptive period provided by law, neither
could private respondent do so now, for her right cannot rise higher than its source. Finally, it is
well-settled that the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants
not only a presumption that the party entitled to assert it, either had abandoned it or declined to
assert it, but also casts doubt on the validity of the claim of ownership. Such neglect to assert a
right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances
causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

ANALYSIS:

The Ventura case talks about the validity of the appointment of an executor or executrix. The
same remains to be effective if a will exists. In this case, however, there was a preterition making
the institutions in the will invalid. As a result, there was an intestacy. Because of this, the
appointment of an executor becomes unneeded. As for the Villamor case, the preference of the
administrator was explained. In this instance, a stranger was appointed instead of a family
member. The court invalidated the same and gave the petitioners a better right to the properties
subject to the inheritance of the decedent.
CASE DIGESTS:

Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN,

PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS
JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN vs. Hon. COURT
OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA

G.R. No. 150206 March 13, 2009

FACTS:

Pacana alleges that she is the sole owner of land located in Cagayan de Oro City which she
inherited from her mother, Hermogena, the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana
Clarito. At the death of Juan Gabatan, the subject property was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo
Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. Prior to her death,
Hermogena demanded the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death, the
respondent also did the same, but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender
the subject property.

Petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. They
further contend that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was
survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest),
Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan
and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession
thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the
improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent.

RTC favors the respondent

CA affirmed the same decision declaring that respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan
was sufficiently established during trial.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the property in favor of the respondent.

RULING: YES.

The respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned
her claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her
to present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint. -­‐ Here, two conflicting birth
certificates of respondents were presented at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony,
presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which
indicated that her mother’s maiden name was "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan."

Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of the respondent’s handwritten
birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by the respondent. Among the
differences was the respondent’s mother’s full maiden name which was indicated as "Hermogena
Calarito" in the handwritten birth certificate. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted,
was an original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of
1950’s vintage but this Court is unable to concur in the trial court’s finding that Exhibit 1 was of
a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial court’s bases for doubting the
authenticity of Exhibit 1.

Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners’
Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two competent witnesses. Even assuming purely for
the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable
document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondent’s filiation to her alleged
grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would have
proven was that respondent’s mother was a certain "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." It does not
prove that same "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan" is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA
held that the conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only
proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena. It was absolutely crucial to the respondent’s
cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To
reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that
the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or
an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, the respondent should have
presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present
other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, the respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the
best evidence of Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the
RTC. Neither did the respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically
evidencing Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH

MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI
CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER
G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009

FACTS:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Decision
dated April 28, 2000, and Resolution dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995, in Civil Case No. 89-
092, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced by
respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and
Catalino Acantilado.

Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate
Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Alejandro died. Petitioners herein are their three
children. Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint"
for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court. They claim to be the first
family of Alejandro.

Petitioner children filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss because Discangcopan failed to
pay the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners point to Disangcopan’s petition which contains
an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private
respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the proper docket fees were paid for “Complaint” for the judicial partition of
properties.

RULING: YES.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the party filing the case paid less than the
correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court,
the responsibility of making a deficiencyassessment lies with the same clerk of court. In such a
case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a party’s
reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees. As every citizen has
the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his
duties and performs them in accordance with law, the party filing the case cannot be penalized
with the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment. However, the party concerned will be required
to pay the deficiency.
In the case at bar, petitioner children did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket
fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of
whether Disangcopan correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of court’s assessment.

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR. vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS

G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006

FACTS:

Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International,
Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic
Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was
raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of
legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a
corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit
facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi
Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers
of respondent AMEX and may be served with summons and other court processes at their office
address. The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of
petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The
first dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to
pay her purchases in the United States in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when
petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo,
Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to attend the Congressional
Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.

The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards was allegedly unjustified as they resulted from
respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its
balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the
corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late
payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled
by respondents on July 20, 2000.

Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental
anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a
result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly
and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the venue has been properly laid

RULING: YES.

Petitioner Saludo’s complaint for damages is a personal action. As such, it is governed by

Section 2, Rule 4 of ROC. The term “residence” as employed in the rule on venue on personal
actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode whether permanent or
temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from “domicile” which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.

The definition of “residence” for purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated
with the term “domicile”; When analyzed, the term “residence” requires two elements—(1)
intention to reside in the particular place, and (2) personal or physical presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. For purposes of venue, the less technical
definition of “residence” is adopted; Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one’s domicile.

Since a congressman, or the lone representative of a particular district, has his residence (or
domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also
deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions.
Following the definition of the term “residence” for purposes of election law, a congressman for
a particular locality not only has the intention to reside therein but also the personal presence
therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The fact that a party’s community tax
certificate was issued in a place other than where he claims to be a resident of is of no moment
because the same does not preclude his having a residence in another locality for purposes of
venue. Courts are allowed “to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or
are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions”. The concept of “facts of common knowledge” in the context of judicial
notice has been explained as those facts that are “so commonly known in the community as to
make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among
reasonable men”. The fact of a congressman being duly elected could be properly taken judicial
notice of by a trial court, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the community
where it sits. A congressman’s residence in his province where he was elected could be properly
taken judicial notice of by the trial court.