G.R. No.

200334 July 30, 2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,

vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of
their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more
apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what
could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of
society.

Squarely raised in· this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless
arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based on
their personal knowledge. The information as to the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text
message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly
contained the contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without
the accused having been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within the
meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop
and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly,
and without improper pressure or coercion.

The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article III,
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence, the accused should
be acquitted.

According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector
Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a
text message from an unidentified civilian informer"2 that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin
Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect."5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1
Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint
in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.6 A passenger
jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver
disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were
carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified
as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack
while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.10

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao
told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their
barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks
of what looked like marijuana.13 Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet
gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag."14
"SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police station."15
Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags"16 inside the station.17

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit)
requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.18 Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces
of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,"19 and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected
marijuana.20

PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.21 PSI Bayan personally
delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police
Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were
indeed marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5
grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1 grams.25 The marijuana collected from
Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaed’s and
Dayao’s bags.27

According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney
to take him"28 to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and
recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel,
Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s] help in
carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a sack."32 Cogaed agreed because they were
both going to the market.33 This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1
Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know.34 SPO1
Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation.35 Thereafter,
SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station.36 These facts
were corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot
where Cogaed was apprehended.37

At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head."38 The bags were also
opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.39

It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.40 The information against them
states:

That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La
Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN
DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody and
possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four
hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.

CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165
(otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002").41

The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union.42 Cogaed
and Dayao pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14
years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.44 Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision45 dated May 21,
2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and
to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46

The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was
not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that hewas about to do so or
that had just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also
be considered illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest,
Cogaed "waived his right to object to such irregularity"49 when "he did not protest when SPO1
Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag."50

Cogaed appealed51 the trial court’s decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and
affirmed the trial court’s decision.52 The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against
warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened
his bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.

The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN
UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE

THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE

THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY
VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.54

For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of
marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the search should be
admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.

In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the requirements on
the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55

We find for the accused.

II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many
dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and
seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the
requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause
that can only be determined by a judge.56 The existence of probable cause must be established by
the judge after asking searching questions and answers.57 Probable cause at this stage can only
exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by
the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the things to be
searched.58

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless.59 In the Rules
of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant.60 This
court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured."61 The
known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consentedwarrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)

III

One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk"
searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court.63
Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the
search conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to ensure that
there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals65 was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation
whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information."66 This court stated that the
"stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search
warrant."67

The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all
the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches68) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer
finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe —
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the
police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of
an illicit act.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented
by people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish
eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner."71 The suspicion increased when the man avoided
the police officers.72 These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on
drugs.73 These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and]
investigate."74

In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk.76 This man was also
"wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled.78 His flight
added to the suspicion.79 After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade
firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government
agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first."82 This was also a valid search.

In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing
a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative
of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding
something as well.

The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag.
The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the
driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:

COURT:
Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the passenger
jeep?

WITNESS:

A Not yet, Your Honor.83

SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:

COURT:

Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to believe that
the accused were carrying marijuana?

WITNESS:

A No, Your Honor.84

The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers
otherwise.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion
of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is
necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything less
than this would be an infringementupon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

IV

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge
to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases adopting
the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious
circumstances as probable cause:

The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.87 (Emphasis supplied)

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of
suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged."88

Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable
cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine reason"91 to serve the purposes of
the "stop and frisk" exception:92

Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.93 (Emphasis supplied,
footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely
on a single suspicious circumstance.95 There should be "presence of more than oneseemingly
innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."96 The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on only one
suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.98

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the
probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched
was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting
the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been
enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is
compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of
protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:

[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety
and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)

The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving
dangerous drugs.

The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta.102 In that case, an informant told the
police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus.103 At the bus
terminal, the police officers prepared themselves.104 The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
street105 and identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged
that she allowed them to look inside her bag.107 The bag contained marijuana leaves.108

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal.109 There were no
suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the subsequent search and seizure.110 It
was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The evidence obtained was not
admissible because of the illegal search.112 Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113

Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police’s informant,
who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.114 Here, the National Bureau
ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs.115 The NBI
waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat.116
Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what turnedout to
be marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the searchand seizure was illegal.118 Aminnudin was
acquitted.119
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been
receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles
City."121 One night, the police received information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the
Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout.122 A car "arrived and parked"123 at the hotel.124The
informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs.125 The man alighted
from his car.126 He was carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately apprehended him and
discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding.128

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s situation when the
police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no valid‘stop-and-frisk’."129

VI

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there
to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, withouta
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest was made. At
the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to
commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected,
"two elements must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done inthe presence or within the view of the arresting officer."130 Both elements were missing
when Cogaed was arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.

Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last
allowable warrantless arrest.

VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not
object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:

Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence
to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee.132 (Citations omitted) Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection
was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive
intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the
waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all
cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned again from
the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:

ATTY. BINWAG:

Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their bags, is it
not?

WITNESS:

A Yes, ma’am.

Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?

A Yes, ma’am.

Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?

A None, ma’am.

Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents ofthe bag,
you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?

A It seems they were frightened, ma’am.

Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it
not?

A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied)

The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s responses to Judge
Florendo’s questions:

COURT:

....

Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?

A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was somewhat
frightened. He was a little apprehensive and when he was already stepping down and he put down
1âwphi 1

the bag I asked him, "what’s that," and he answered, "I don’t know because Marvin only asked me to
carry."134

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police
officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer. The police officer must also
1âwphi 1

inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of
his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer
must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or
her constitutional rights. There must be anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy
requires no less.

VIII
The Constitution provides:

Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.135

Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this
constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of
general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures."137 It ensures that
the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon
and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags,
a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict
Cogaed.

Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law
enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better. However,
we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution.
Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to
protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union
and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he
is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 205926 July 22, 2015

ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision 2 dated October 20, 2011 and the
Resolution 3dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813, which
affirmed in toto the Judgment 4 dated July 28, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner Alvin Comerciante y
Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 5 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:

That on or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been lawfully
authorized to possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet (sic) each containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white crystalline substance with a
total of 0.43 grams which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LA W. 6

According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo
Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag) were aboard
a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo,
Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted,
at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick
Dasilla 7 (Dasilla) - standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them
handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately
stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla At a distance of around five (5) meters, P03
Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two
(2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later
confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 8

After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the
RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence,
the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence.9

In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a
notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of
a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers
claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their
release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to
undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. 10

The RTC Ruling

In. a Judgment 11 dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and ordered him to pay a
fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00.12

The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which yielded
two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation, the R TC opined that there was probable
cause to justify the warrantless arrest, considering that P03 Calag saw, in plain view, that
Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend the latter.
Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent that P03 Calag was impelled by any malicious
motive, he must be presumed to have properly performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante.13

Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision 14 dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held that P03
Calag had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given that the latter was
committing a crime in flagrante delicto; and that he personally saw the latter exchanging plastic
sachets with Dasilla. According to the CA, this was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion that
those sachets might be shabu, and thus, P03 Calag had every reason to inquire on the matter right
then and there.15

Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration 16 which was, however, denied in a Resolution
17 dated February 19, 2013. Hence, this petition. 18

The Issue before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's
conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that P03 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless
arrest on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest,
i.e., the plastic sachets containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in
his acquittal. 19

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the
Philippines, maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the "stop
and frisk" rule, especially considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal
drugs. 20

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 2, Article III 21 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in
the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable"
within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches
and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III 22 of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which
instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches
and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. 23

The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. 24 In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot
be reversed. 25 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules
on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:

SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 112.

The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may be
lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on
personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; ( c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped
from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. 26

For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and ( b) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. 27 On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application
that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.28
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section (b),
he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. 29

A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no
lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. P03 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a
motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and
Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them
handing plastic sachets to the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest.
P03 Calag's testimony on direct examination is revelatory:

Pros. Silao:

Q: Now on July 30, 2003 around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, kindly tell the court where were you?

A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma' am.

xxxx

Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling?

A: Eduardo Radan, Ma' am.

Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan?

A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group, ma'am.

Q: While you were along Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City, what unusual incident that
happened if any?

A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet to someone.

xxxx

Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two male persons you already
identified?

A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am.

Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that particular act?

A: They were quite facing me then.

0: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing this Private Road, Hulo,
Mandaluyong City?

A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am.

Q: And who was driving the motorcycle?

A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am.

Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, what did you do?

A: We stopped ma'am.

Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or less?

A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am.

Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was the reaction of these two
male persons?

A: They were surprised, ma'am.

xxxx

Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself as police officer?

A: They were surprised.

Q: When you say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you say that they were surprised?

A: They were stunned.

Q: After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer?

A: I arrested them, ma' am. I invited them.

Q: What did you say to them? How did you invite them? In short, napakasimple Lang ng tanong ko
sa yo eh. Did you say anything?

Court:

Mr. Witness, stop making unnecessary movements, just listens.

Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala? Witness: Wala po.

Pros. Silao: Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?

Court: You keep touching your eyes. Just relax. Answer the question, ano sinabi mo sa kanila?

Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit?

Witness: Wala po.

xxxx

Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you recover the plastic
sachet?
A: From his hand ma'am.

Q: Left or right hand?

Pros. Silao: You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo Kung Hindi mo matandaan, no
problem. Kaliwa, kanan or you cannot recall? 30

(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag, even assuming
that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a
distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers
per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets
held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to
Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag that the former had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion
and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact,
even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put
by P03 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest
under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 31 That his reasonable
suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession
of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the
province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was
indeed shabu. 32

Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule
113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. As already
discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that P03 Calag had personal
knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough
that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a
crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. 33

In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search
made on Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed, 34 the Court had an opportunity to
exhaustively explain "stop and frisk" searches:

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
1a\^ /phi1

offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced
police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they
should have the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves observe - whether an
individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer,
with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

xxxx
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge
to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the
"stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious
circumstances as probable cause:

The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause,
but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and
frisk" exception:

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely
on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one seemingly
innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The
Constitution prohibits "umeasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one
suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search. [35]] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not
1âw phi 1

enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine
reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and
frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.

In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence
for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all
criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, 'the Decision dated October 20, 2011 and the
Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held
for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200370 june 7 2017

MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 Mario Veridiano y Sapi (Veridiano) assails the
Decision2 dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution3 dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 33588, which affirmed his conviction for violation of Article II, Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 9165.4

In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna,5 Veridiano was
charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Information read:

That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being permitted or authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2. 72 grams of dried
marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial on
the merits ensued.7

During trial, the prosecution presented PO 1 Guillermo Cabello (PO 1 Cabello) and POI Daniel
Solano (POI Solano) to testify.8

According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a
certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a
certain alias "Baho," who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to
obtain illegal drugs.9

P03 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO I Cabello and P02 Alvin Vergara (P02
Vergara) who were both on duty. 10 Chief of Police June Urquia instructed POI Cabello and P02
Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna. 11

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.

They allowed some vehicles to pass through after checking that he was not on board. 12 At around
10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna. 13 They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. 14 The police
officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and
to remove the contents of their pockets.15
The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana."
16
POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. 17 Veridiano was arrested and
apprised of his constitutional rights. 18 He was then brought to the police station.19

At the police station, PO 1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO 1 Solano, who also placed
his initials. 20 PO 1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought
with the seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory.21 The contents of the tea
bag tested positive for marijuana.22

For his defense, Veridiano testified that he went to the fiesta in San Pablo City on January 15,
2008.23 After participating in the festivities, he decided to go home and took a passenger jeepney
bound for Nagcarlan.24 At around 10:00 a.m., the jeepney passed a police checkpoint in Barangay
Taytay, Nagcarlan.25 Veridiano noticed that the jeepney was being followed by three (3) motorcycles,
each with two (2) passengers in civilian attire.26

When the jeepney reached Barangay Buboy, Nagcarlan, the motorcyclists flagged down the
jeepney.27 Two (2) armed men boarded the jeepney and frisked Veridiano.28 However, they found
nothing on his person.29 Still, Veridiano was accosted and brought to the police station where he was
informed that "illegal drug was ... found in his possession. "30

In the Decision dated July 16, 2010,31 the Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Accordingly, he was sentenced to
suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00.32

Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested."33 He
argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a
poisonous tree. "[['34]] Veridiano further argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule
on chain of custody. 35

On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that "[t]he legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over [the person of the accused]."36 Thus, by entering his plea, Veridiano
waived his right to question any irregularity in his arrest.37 With regard to the alleged illegal
warrantless search conducted by the police officers, the prosecution argued that Veridiano' s
"submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he consented to the warrantless
search. 38

On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision39 affirming the guilt ofVeridiano.40

The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in jlagrante delicto" of having marijuana in
his possession.41 Assuming that he was illegally arrested, Veridiano waived his right to question any
irregularity that may have attended his arrest when he entered his plea and submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.42 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that Veridiano consented to the
warrantless search because he did not protest when the police asked him to remove the contents of
his pocket.43

Veridiano moved for reconsideration, which was denied in the

Resolution dated January 25, 2012.44

On March 16, 2012, Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.45

Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in violation of his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.46 He asserts that his arrest was illegal.47 Petitioner was
merely seated inside the jeepney at the time of his apprehension. He did not act in any manner that
would give the police officers reasonable ground to believe that he had just committed a crime or
that he was committing a crime. 48 Petitioner also asserts that reliable information is insufficient to
constitute probable cause that would support a valid warrantless arrest. 49

Since his arrest was illegal, petitioner argues· that "the accompanying [warrantless] search was
likewise illegal."50 Hence, under Article III, Section 2,51 in relation to Article III, Section 3(2)52 of the
Constitution, the seized tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the fruit
of a poisonous tree."53

Nevertheless, assuming that the seized tea bag containing marijuana is admissible in evidence,
petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to preserve its integrity.54 The apprehending team did
not strictly comply with the rule on chain of custody under Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165.55

In a Resolution dated June 13, 2012, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the
petition. 56 In the Manifestation and Motion dated August 1, 2012,57 respondent stated that it would no
longer file a comment.

The following issues are for this Court's resolution:

First, whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;

Second, whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner; and

Lastly, whether there is enough evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

The Petition is granted.

The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and
(c) any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as
constitutionally inadmissible.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised
through a motion to quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived and an accused is "estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."58

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active
participation during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. 59 The
reason for this rule is that "the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused."60

Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from
questioning the admissibility of evidence seized.61 The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected
when an accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in atimely manner.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are
separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.

As a component of the right to privacy,62 the fundamental right against unlawful searches and
seizures is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. 63

To underscore the importance of an individual's right against unlawful searches and seizures, Article
III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution considers any evidence obtained in violation of this right as
inadmissible. 64

The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures.65 It is only directed
against those that are unreasonable.66 Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the
scope of the prohibition and are not forbidden. 67

In People v. Aruta, 68 this Court explained that the language of the Constitution implies that "searches
and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest."69 The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution and reiterated in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. 70

However, People v. Cogaed71 clarified that there are exceptional circumstances "when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless."72 The following are recognized instances of permissible
warrantless searches laid down in jurisprudence: (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest,"73 (2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,"' (3) "search of a moving vehicle," (4) "consented
warrantless search[es]," (5) "customs search," (6) "stop and frisk," and (7) "exigent and emergency
circumstances."74

There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a search and seizure is reasonable. In any given
situation, "[w]hat constitutes a reasonable ... search ... is purely a judicial question," the resolution of
which depends upon the unique and distinct factual circumstances. 75 This may involve an inquiry
into "the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured." 76

II

Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the determination of whether the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto of having marijuana in his possession making the warrantless search lawful. 77

This Court disagrees. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search
is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be
reversed."78 For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant.
Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this
warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test79 as explained in Cogaed:

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer."80

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an inflagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In
Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused
did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession
of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended. 81

The warrantless search in People v. Racho82 was also considered unlawful.83 The police officers
received information that a man was in possession of illegal drugs and was on board a Genesis bus
bound for Baler, Aurora. The informant added that the man was "wearing a red and white striped [t]-
shirt."84 The police officers waited for the bus along the national highway.85 When the bus arrived,
Jack Racho (Racho) disembarked and waited along the highway for a tricycle.86 Suddenly, the police
officers approached him and invited him to the police station since he was suspected of having
shabu in his possession.87 As Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a white envelope fell
yielding a sachet of shabu.88

In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court observed that Racho was not
"committing a crime in the presence of the police officers" at the time he was apprehended.89
Moreover, Racho's arrest was solely based on a tip.90 Although there are cases stating that reliable
information is sufficient to justify a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, they were covered
under the other exceptions to the rule on warrantless searches.91

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest.92 The rule requires that
an offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time."93 That a crime was in
fact committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. 94 An arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is committed up
to the point of arrest.

Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it.

People v. Gerente95 illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court. In
Gerente, the accused was convicted for murder and for violation of Republic Act No. 6425.96 He
assailed the admissibility of dried marijuana leaves as evidence on the ground that they were
allegedly seized from him pursuant to a warrantless arrest.97 On appeal, the accused's conviction
was affirmed.98 This Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b)
of the Rules of Court. The police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
indicating that the accused killed the victim:

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime,
they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers
had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening
to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of
facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without
a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the
law as his two companions did.99 (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts surrounding the
commission of an offense was underscored in In Re Saliba v. Warden. 100

In Re Saliba involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers suspected Datukan Salibo
(Salibo) as one (1) of the accused in the Maguindano Massacre. 101 Salibo presented himself before
the authorities to clear his name. Despite his explanation, Salibo was apprehended and detained. 102
In granting the petition, this Court pointed out that Salibo was not restrained under a lawful court
process or order. 103 Furthermore, he was not arrested pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest: 104

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear
his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in
the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor
attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that
he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. 105 (Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante delicta arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers
that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the
tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any
overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed.10

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal
knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just
committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search
under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

III

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and
frisk" searches.

A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua 107 as "the act of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." 108 Thus, the
allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for
weapons."109

Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed
towards crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 110

Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While
probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a
suspicion or hunch. 111 Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their
experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot. 112
Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search. 113

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 114 the police officers conducted surveillance operations in Caloocan
City Cemetery, a place reportedly frequented by drug addicts.115 They chanced upon a male person
who had "reddish eyes and [was] walking in a swaying manner."116 Suspecting that the man was high
on drugs, the police officers approached him, introduced themselves, and asked him what he was
holding.117 However, the man resisted. 118 Upon further investigation, the police officers found
marijuana in the man's possession. 119 This Court held that the circumstances of the case gave the
police officers justifiable reason to stop the man and investigate if he was high on drugs. 120

In People v. Solayao, 121 the police officers were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on
the presence of armed persons within Caibiran.122 They met a group of drunk men, one (1) of whom
was the accused in a camouflage uniform. 123 When the police officers approached, his companions
fled leaving behind the accused who was told not to run away. 124 One (1) of the police officers
introduced himself and seized from the accused a firearm wrapped in dry coconut leaves. 125 This
Court likewise found justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused when "his companions fled upon
seeing the government agents." 126

The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were considered valid because the accused in
both cases exhibited overt acts that gave law enforcers genuine reason to conduct a "stop and frisk"
search. In contrast with Manalili and Solayao, the warrantless search in Cogaed127 was considered as
an invalid "stop and frisk" search because of the absence of a single suspicious circumstance that
would justify a warrantless search.

In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya would be transporting
marijuana. 128 A passenger jeepney passed through the checkpoint set up by the police officers. The
driver then disembarked and signaled that two (2) male passengers were carrying marijuana. 129 The
police officers approached the two (2) men, who were later identified as Victor Cogaed (Cogaed)
and Santiago Dayao, and inquired about the contents of their bags. 130
Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of marijuana in Cogaed's
bag. 131 In holding that the "stop and frisk" search was invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was
not a single suspicious circumstance" that gave the police officers genuine reason to stop the two (2)
men and search their belongings. 132 Cogaed did not exhibit any overt act indicating that he was in
possession of marijuana. 133

Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any
act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his
possession. Reasonable persons will act in a nervous manner in any check point. There was no
evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them
to infer anything suspicious.

IV

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be
surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with
clear and convincing evidence. 134 Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be
"unequivocal, specific, intelligently given ... [and unattended] by duress or coercion."135

The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the circumstances. 136
This may involve an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was given such as "the
presence of coercive police procedures."137

Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which
amounts to no consent at all. 138 In Cogaed, this Court observed:

Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment
brought about by the police officer's excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and
the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is
knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.139

The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner consented to the
warrantless search.

Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. The rules governing
searches and seizures have been liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for practical
purposes.140 Police officers cannot be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search
warrant when time is of the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating transactions
involving contraband or dangerous articles. 141 However, the inherent mobility of vehicles cannot
justify all kinds of searches.142 Law enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause. 143

A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. 144 Due to the number of cases
involving warrantless ·searches in checkpoints and for the guidance of law enforcers, it is imperative
to discuss the parameters by which searches in checkpoints should be conducted.

Checkpoints per se are not invalid. 145 They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the
lives of individuals and ensure their safety. 146 They are also sanctioned in cases where the
government's survival is in danger. 147 Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a]
motorist'sright to 'free passage'"148 to a certain extent, they must be "conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists." 149 The extent of routine inspections must be limited to a visual search.
Routine inspections do not give law enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches. 150

In Valmonte v. De Villa, 151 this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor
its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search[es]."152 Thus, a search where an "officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a
light therein" is not unreasonable. 153

However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers
have probable cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle
contains instruments of an offense. 154

Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they are limited to a
visual search. This holds especially true when the object of the search is a public vehicle where
individuals have a reasonably reduced expectation of privacy. On the other hand, extensive
searches are permissible only when they are founded upon probable cause. Any evidence obtained
will be subject to the exclusionary principle under the Constitution.

That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does not justify an
extensive search absent probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of
confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse
suspicion.

Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped
information, there have been other circumstances that justified warrantless searches conducted by
the authorities.

In People v. Breis,155 apart from the tipped information they received, the law enforcement agents
observed suspicious behavior on the part of the accused that gave them reasonable ground to
believe that a crime was being committed.156 The accused attempted to alight from the bus after the
law enforcers introduced themselves and inquired about the ownership of a box which the accused
had in their possession. 157 In their attempt to leave the bus, one (1) of the accused physically pushed
a law enforcer out of the way. 158 Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the terminal and
leaving one's belongings behind is unusual conduct.159

In People v. Mariacos, 160 a police officer received information that a bag containing illegal drugs was
about to be transported on a passenger jeepney. 161 The bag was marked with "O.K."162 On the basis
of the tip, a police officer conducted surveillance operations on board a jeepney.163 Upon seeing the
bag described to him, he peeked inside and smelled the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from
the bag. 164 The tipped information and the police officer's personal observations gave rise to
probable cause that rendered the warrantless search valid. 165

The police officers in People v. Ayangao166 and People v. Libnao167 likewise received tipped
information regarding the transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers had probable cause
to arrest the accused based on their three (3)-month long surveillance operation in the area where
the accused was arrested. 168 On the other hand, in Ayangao, the police officers noticed marijuana
leaves protruding through a hole in one (1) of the sacks carried by the accused. 169
In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable
limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any
1âwphi1

law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that
may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception.
The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

There are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless searches. There are searches based on
reasonable suspicion as in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 170 where this Court justified the warrantless
search of the accused who attempted to flee with a buri bag after the police officers identified
themselves. 171

On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because of heightened security. In Dela Cruz v.
People, 172 the search conducted on the accused was considered valid because it was done in
accordance with routine security measures in ports. 173 This case, however, should not be construed
to apply to border searches. Border searches are not unreasonable per se; 174 there is a "reasonable
reduced expectation of privacy" when travellers pass through or stop at airports or other ports of
travel. 175

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag
containing marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle
in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction,
petitioner must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No.
16976-SP and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario
Veridiano y Sapi is hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement
unless he is being held for some other lawful cause
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 205823, August 17, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. REGIE BREIS Y ALVARADO AND GARY YUMOL Y
TUAZON,*Appellants.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 26 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
04916, affirming the Decision2 dated 14 February 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Baguio City
(trial court) in Criminal Case No. 30409-R.

The Facts

Appellants Regie Breis y Alvarado (Breis) and Gary Yumol y Tuazon (Yumol) were charged with violation of
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) as follows: Lawlib raryofCR Alaw

That in the afternoon of February 10, 2010, at Gov. Pack Road, this City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control marijuana with a
recorded net weight of 8,181 grams of dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops wrapped in plastic and further
wrapped with brown packaging tape and placed inside a brown box, without the authority of law and
knowing fully well that said dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops are dangerous drugs, in violation of the
afore-cited provisions of law.

CONTRARY TO LAW to Sec. 11 of RA 9165.3

Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, where the prosecution presented witnesses
Intelligence Officers 1 Elizer Mangili (IO1 Mangili) and Ryan Peralta (IO1 Peralta) of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency - Cordillera Administrative Region (PDEA-CAR); while the defense presented the
testimonies of appellants.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution's version of the facts, as summarized by the trial court, is as follows: Lawlib raryofCR Alaw

Around 3:00 o'clock PM of February 10, 2009 (sic), an informant went to the PDEA-CAR field office at Melvin
Jones, Harrison Road, Baguio City and offered the information that the accused were bound to transport a
box of marijuana from Baguio City to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Mangili gathered that the accused have
been frequently traveling from Pampanga to Baguio to get marijuana bricks from their supplier at La
Trinidad, Benguet. Mangili referred the informant to Senior PDEJA Officer Tacio for further interview and
then the matter was referred to the PDEA Officer-in-Charge Edgar Apalla, who after careful evaluation,
ordered Agent Tacio to form a team for the entrapment of the accused.

Agent Tacio created a team composed of Mangili and Peralta as arresting officer and seizing officer,
respectively, and briefed them on the operations to be conducted. Tacio disclosed to the team that the
accused were to transport by a public transport bus from Baguio City to Dau, Pampanga bricks of marijuana
packed in a carton and that the departure from Baguio was scheduled at around 5:00 o'clock PM of that day.
The accused Breis would be in a white t-shirt with "Starbucks" logo and dark jeans while accused Yumol
would be wearing a black t-shirt with a white print and blue jeans. Both the accused were described as
standing about 5 feet and 5 inches, thin, and dark complexion.

When the briefing was through, the team proceeded to the Genesis Bus terminal at Governor Pack Road,
Baguio City at around 4:30 o'clock PM. Due to time constraints, the PDEA team chose not to secure any
warrant nor coordinate with the nearest police station.

Upon reaching the bus terminal, Mangili asked the bus conductor to identify the bus which would leave at
5:00 o'clock PM. Mangili was directed to Genesis bus with plate number TXX 890. Thus, pretending to be
passengers, Mangili and Peralta boarded the bus and they observed two male individuals whose physical
appearances fitted the descriptions given by the informant. Both agents likewise saw a box placed in
between the legs of accused Breis.

Mangili sat behind the accused while Peralta, stood near where the accused were seated. In order to have a
clearer view of the box tucked in between the feet of accused Breis if the same fit the box described by
informant, Mangili took the seat opposite where the accused were seated and saw that the box was with the
markings "Ginebra San Miguel" and which was described by the informant. Mangili then casually asked
accused Yumol who owned the "Ginebra San Miguel" box, the accused replied that it was theirs.

Accused Yumol suddenly stood up and tried to leave but before he could do so, Peralta blocked his way while
Mangili confronted accused Breis and asked what was contained in the box. Instead of answering, Breis
shoved Mangili and tried to flee but Mangili was able to block his way as he was much larger than the
accused Yumol (sic). Mangili ordered him to sit down.

Agent Peralta then summoned the back-up officers to help secure the bus and subdue the accused. After
introducing themselves as PDEA agents, Mangili asked the accused Breis to open the box but Breis ignored
the request which made Mangili lift and open the box. He took one brick and discovered it was marijuana.
The "Ginebra San Miguel" box yielded three more bricks of marijuana. Mangili then marked the items on
site.

Agent Peralta then informed the accused that they were being arrested for violation of Rep. Act No. 9165
and then he read their constitutional rights in Pilipino to them.

Thereafter, the team returned to the PDEA-CAR office of Melvin Jones, Baguio City for documentation such
as the preparation of the affidavits of Agents Mangili and Peralta, Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of both
accused, Request for Physical Exam and Request for Laboratory Exam. Inventory likewise was done around
7:43 o'clock PM on February 10, 2010 at the said PDEA-CAR office.

After the documentation and inventory, the accused were brought to the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center (BGHMC) and Medico-Legal Certificates were issued showing that the accused had no
external signs of physical injuries at the time of their examination. Chemistry Report No. D-08-2010
indicates that the confiscated items from the accused yielded positive to (sic) the presence of marijuana, a
dangerous drugs (sic).4

Version of the Defense

The defense's version of the facts, as summarized by the trial court, is as follows:
Lawl ibra ryofCRAlaw

Accused, both construction workers, left Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga for Baguio at around 6:00 o'clock AM of
February 9, 2010 to visit a certain Edwin Garcia, an acquaintance and a resident of Loakan, Baguio City.
Edwin Garcia had offered the accused to be upholsterers in his upholstery business way back in December of
2008.

At around 11:00 o'clock AM, the accused arrived in Baguio City and because they did not know the exact
address and contact number of Edwin Garcia, they took a chance and decided to take a cab to Loakan.
However, they failed to find Garcia's house despite asking the residents of Loakan. So, they decided to go
back to the Genesis bus terminal and go back home to Pampanga.

Upon reaching the terminal, they ate and took the 4:30 o'clock PM bus for Pampanga. They were already
boarded when accused Yumol stepped out to buy a bottle of water. Thereafter, Mangili went near accused
Breis and uttered something inaudible, and thinking that the seat he was occupying was Mangili's, accused
Breis stood up to give up his seat but instead Mangili pushed him and accused Breis asked what seems to be
the problem. Mangili then asked if he owns the box under the seat in front of his, Breis replied in the
negative. Mangili then opened the box, got one of the bricks contained therein, sliced the same and saw that
it was marijuana. Accused Breis, infuriated, retorted that the accusation is baseless and malicious.

Mangili then summoned his companions and they dragged accused Breis outside the bus when suddenly,
accused Yumol arrived and inquired what the commotion was all about. The group then asked if he (Yumol)
was a companion of accused Breis and when he answered positively, Yumol was likewise apprehended.

Both the accused were then brought to the PDEA Office and were forced to admit ownership of the box of
marijuana, but they refused and thus they were hit with the bricks of marijuana. One of the agents even
squeezed the scrotum of accused Yumol in the hope that he will admit ownership over the box of
marijuana.5

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's version, upholding the presumption of regularity in favor
of the PDEA agents and finding no evil or ill-motive on their part. On the other hand, the trial court found
appellants' defense of frame-up too incredible and outlandishly preposterous. The trial court also held that
the warrantless search and seizure and the warrantless arrest of appellants were valid. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:6 reda rclaw

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Regie Breis y Alvarado and Gary Yumol y Tuazon
GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and each to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00.

Both the accused are immediately ORDERED TO BE TRANSFERRED to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa
City, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.7

The lone assignment of error in the Brief for the Accused-Appellants is as follows: Lawl ibra ryofCRAlaw

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.8

In their appeal, appellants argued that the PDEA agents did not comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article
II of RA 9165, and that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody over the seized items.

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the requirements of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 were satisfied. Further, the Court of Appeals found no break in the custody of the
seized items that might compromise their evidentiary integrity. The appellate court also upheld the legality
of the warrantless search and arrest of appellants. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals reads: Lawlib raryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appealed Decision dated February 14, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 61, in Criminal Case No. 30409-R, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.9

In the present appeal, appellants and appellee adopted their respective briefs10 filed before the Court of
Appeals as their supplemental briefs.11 reda rc law

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

Procedure on Seizure and Custody of Drugs

Appellants argue that the procedure on seizure and custody of drugs, specified in Section 21, paragraph 1,
Article II of RA 9165, was not complied with. In support of this contention, appellants state that: (1) the
PDEA agents did not immediately conduct the inventory at the place where the items were seized, and did
so only at the PDEA-CAR field office;12 and (2) the representatives from the media, barangay and
Department of Justice (DOJ) were present during the inventory conducted at the field office, but not at the
place of the seizure during actual confiscation.13 redarclaw

Appellants are mistaken. The PDEA agents who apprehended appellants did not deviate from the procedure
prescribed by law and regulations. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165 provides the procedure to
be followed in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs: Lawlib raryofCR Alaw

1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9165, which reads: Lawlib raryofCRAlaw

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory' and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant
is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; x x x. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Appellants insist that the PDEA agents should have conducted the inventory at the place where the drugs
were seized. However, the IRR clearly provides that in case of warrantless seizures, the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
team. The physical inventory and photograph were conducted at the PDEA-CAR field office, a fact that
appellants themselves acknowledge14 and testified to by IO1 Mangili15 and IO1 Peralta.16 redarclaw

The requirement of the presence of a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public
official during the physical inventory and photograph was also complied with. The representatives from the
media and the DOJ and an elected barangay official were present at the inventory conducted at the PDEA-
CAR field office, as evidenced by their signatures17 on the Inventory of Seized Item18 and photographs taken
during the inventory.19 In fact, this is not contested by appellants.20 reda rcl aw

Hence, we find no deviation from the procedure prescribed by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165
and its IRR.

Chain of Custody Established

What IO1 Mangili did in the bus upon seizure of the drugs was to mark the same, which is not to be
confused with taking the physical inventory. Marking is not a requirement of RA 9165 or its IRR, but has
been held to be an initial stage in the chain of custody: Lawlibra ryofCRAlaw

Nonetheless, the Court has acknowledged the practical value of the process of marking the confiscated
contraband and considered it as an initial stage in the chain of custody - a process preliminary and
preparatory to the physical inventory and photograph requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165:Lawli bra ryofCRAlaw

This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of
protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under
Section 29 [of Republic act No. 9165] and on allegations of robbery or theft.
"Marking" is the placing by the apprehending officer of some distinguishing signs with his/her initials and
signature on the items seized. It helps ensure that the dangerous drugs seized upon apprehension are the
same dangerous drugs subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the
police station or at some other practicable venue rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the
"chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the
same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence — should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.

"Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition. Indeed, marking upon immediate confiscation has been
interpreted as to even include marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. In
this case, the dangerous drugs taken from accused-appellants were marked in his presence immediately
upon confiscation at the very venue of his arrest.21 (Citations omitted)

Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs from the time
of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.22 What assumes primary importance in drug cases is the prosecution's proof, to the point of
moral certainty, that the prohibited drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same
item recovered from his possession.23 reda rclaw

Appellants argue that the prosecution was not able to establish the chain of custody over the seized
drugs:Lawli bra ryofCRAlaw

The irregularities in the handling procedure of the seized items are manifold. There is no indication what
steps were taken after the seizure, whether the items were turned over to the investigator or to the desk
officer before SPO4 Abordo allegedly delivered it to the crime laboratory.

How can the trial court rule that the integrity of the corpus delicti was preserved when in fact, the
prosecution failed to identify who was in possession of the marijuana from the place of the seizure; to whom
the same was turned over; and how it came to the custody of SPO4 Abordo who allegedly delivered the
seized items at (sic) the laboratory. Nor was there any prosecution's evidence showing the identity of the
person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drug after its examination and pending presentation in
court.24

Appellants' argument fails to impress.

The links that the prosecution must endeavor to establish with respect to the chain of custody are the
following: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from
the forensic chemist to the court.25 redarclaw

In this case, the prosecution adequately established the unbroken chain of custody over the marijuana
seized from appellants.

The records show that the seized drugs were marked immediately upon confiscation by IO1 Mangili with his
initials and signature, the date, and the letters A, B, C or D to distinguish the bricks, in the presence of
appellants.26 redarclaw

The seized drugs were brought, together with appellants, to the PDEA-CAR field office. IO1 Mangili acted in
both capacities of apprehending officer and investigating officer. IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta testified that
they conducted the investigation and the inventory.27 redarclaw

IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta also testified that it was their evidence custodian, Senior Police Officer 4 Abordo
(SP04 Abordo), who brought the seized drugs to the Crime Laboratory for examination.28 A thorough review
of the records reveals that the Request for Laboratory Exam29 shows that the seized drugs were delivered on
10 February 2010 by SP04 Abordo and received by Police Officer 2 Florendo and Police Senior Inspector
Rowena Fajardo Canlas (PSI Canlas). PSI Canlas was the forensic chemist who conducted the examination
on the seized drugs and signed Chemistry Report No. D-08-201030 (chemistry report).

The chemistry report indicates that the "specimen submitted are retained in this laboratory for future
reference."31 Through subpoena32 upon PSI Canlas, the marijuana was brought to court and marked during
the preliminary conference held on 7 April 2010.33 re darclaw
Appellants contend that the prosecution's failure to discuss in detail each link in the chain of custody
negated the integrity of the evidence. This is misplaced: Lawli braryofCR Alaw

x x x It must be remembered that testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it
is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. As such, what is of importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The integrity of the evidence
is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has
been tampered.34 (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Mali,35 we held: La wlibra ryofCRAlaw

The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous drug itself. To sustain conviction, its
identity must be established in that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit. The chain of custody requirement performs this function as it ensures
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.36

In this case, the prosecution was able to show that the same drugs seized and marked by IO1 Mangili were
the same ones he identified at the trial.37 Further, the records consistently show that the markings on the
bricks of marijuana consisted of the initials and signature of IO1 Mangili, the date and A, B, C, or D, as
evidenced by the photograph38 taken during the inventory and the chemistry report describing the submitted
specimen as follows: Lawl ibra ryofCRAlaw

A-One (1) carton knot tied with gray plastic straw labeled GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL with markings '02-10-2010
ELM and signature', containing four (4) bricks of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops each wrapped with
plastic and further wrapped with brown packaging tape with the following markings and recorded net
weights:Lawl ibra ryofCRAlaw

A-1 - [02-10-2010-A ELM and signature] = 2000.1 grams

A-2 = [02-10-2010-B ELM and signature] = 2158.3 grams
A-3 = [02-10-2010-C ELM and signature] = 2051.1 grams
A-4 = [02-10-2010-D ELM and signature] = 1971.5 grams39
(Emphasis supplied)

The presumption is that the PDEA agents performed their duties regularly. There being no evidence showing
bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered, we find that the prosecution sufficiently
established the chain of custody. Consequently, the corpus delicti was also established.

Warrantless Search and Seizure and Arrest

Although it was not raised as an error, it is imperative that we rule on the validity of the warrantless search
and seizure and the subsequent warrantless arrest of appellants.

It is well settled that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. No less than the Constitution guarantees this right -

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.40

Further, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.41 However, the rule against warrantless searches and seizures admits of exceptions, such as the
search of moving vehicles. In People v. Libnao,42 the Court held: Lawl ibra ryofCRAlaw

Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of
securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to
routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains a[n] item, article or object which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction.43

Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.44 The determination of probable cause must be
resolved according to the facts of each case.45
redarclaw

The Court has ruled in several dangerous drug cases46 that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search. In People v. Mariacos,47 the police received at dawn information that a baggage
of marijuna was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. There, the informant
described the bag containing the prohibited drugs. The Court held that the police had probable cause to
search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.48 re darc law

In the present case, the vehicle that carried the prohibited drugs was about to leave. The PDEA agents made
a judgment call to act fast, as time was of the essence. The team arrived at the terminal around 15
minutes49 before the bus was scheduled to depart. Upon boarding the bus, IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta
identified two men fitting the description given by the informant in possession of a box described50 by the
informant to contain marijuana.

Moreover, the PDEA agents had reasonable suspicion based on appellants' behavior that the latter were
probably committing a crime. IO1 Mangili casually asked appellant Yumol who owned the box at their
(appellants') feet. After answering that it belonged to them (appellants), Yumol suddenly stood up and tried
to leave. IO1 Peralta prevented him from getting off the bus. Then IO1 Mangili asked appellant Breis what
was contained in the box. Instead of answering, Breis shoved IO1 Mangili and tried to flee. It must be noted
that IO1 Mangili identified himself as a PDEA agent before either appellant tried to leave the bus:
Lawlibra ryofCRAlaw

Q And you wanted to confirm your suspicion by asking from Gary

Yumol who owns the box?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Gary Yumol, of course, did not give you any answer?
A He said that it is theirs.
Q Did you also talk to the companion of Gary Yumol?
A After Gary stood up suddenly I also spoke to Regie Breis.
Q And did he also give you any answer?
A He just pushed me and tried to leave the bus.
xxxx
Q Before you talked to Gary Yumol did you identify yourself as
PDEA agents?
A When I asked him who owns the box, I then identified myself.
Q Did you ask them if you can see the contents of the box?
A I told Regie to open the box but he did not want that's why I was the
one who opened it.
Q Gary Yumol according to you stood up?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when he stood up, he was held by Agent Peralta?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Regie Breis also stood up after you talked to him?
A Yes, sir.
Q But he was also held by Agent Peralta?
A I was the one who told him to sit down.
Q Before you told him to sit down did you introduce yourself as
a PDEA agent?
A Yes, sir.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellants' act of standing up to leave the bus under different circumstances may be natural; but it is not so
in this case. In People v. Aminnudin,52 the warrantless arrest of Aminnudin based on an informant's tip that
he was carrying marijuana was declared unconstitutional because there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. There, the Court found that "[t]o all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel."53 redarclaw

In contrast to the instant case, appellants were attempting to get out of a bus that was about to leave the
terminal, and not one that had just arrived, where the other passengers were, as can be expected, seated in
preparation for departure. It is unnatural for passengers to abruptly disembark from a departing bus,
leaving their belongings behind. Any reasonable observer would be put on suspicion that such persons are
probably up to no good. To a trained law enforcement agent, it signaled the probability that appellants were
committing an offense and that the objects left behind might be contraband or even dangerous articles.

Indeed, as observed by the PDEA agents, appellants were not simply passengers carrying a box in a bus.
They engaged in suspicious behavior when they tried to flee after IO1 Mangili showed interest in their box
and identified himself as a PDEA agent. Worse, in his attempt at flight, Breis pushed IO1 Mangili, already
knowing that the latter was a PDEA agent. This brazen act on the part of Breis only cemented the belief that
appellants were likely hiding a wrongdoing and avoiding capture by law enforcers.

The act of Breis in physically pushing IO1 Mangili and attempting to flee constitutes resistance defined under
Article 151 of the Revised Penal Cjode (RPC).54 Before a person can be held guilty of the crime of resistance
or disobedience to a person in authority, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew
that the person he disobeyed or resisted is a person in authority or the agent of such person who is actually
engaged in the performance of his official duties.55 reda rc law

As a PDEA agent, IO1 Mangili is a law enforcement agent and as such is an agent of a person in authority as
defined in the RPC.56 IO1 Mangili was in the act of investigating a lead, and possibly apprehending violators
of RA 9165, in accordance with the mandate of the PDEA.57 He announced his identity as such agent to
appellants. It may even be gleaned that knowing that IO1 Mangili was a PDEA agent was precisely the cause
of the attempted flight of appellants.

The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of persons in authority when not serious in nature
constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151, and not direct assault under Article 148 of the
RPC.58 This is because the gravity of the disobedience to an order of a person in authority or his agent is
measured by the circumstances surrounding the act, the motives prompting it and the real importance of
the transgression, rather than the source of the order disobeyed.59 The pushing of IO1 Mangili is not of such
serious defiance to be considered direct assault, but is resistance nonetheless.

The Court has held justified resistance to illegal or abusive acts of agents of persons in authority. In Chan
Fook,60 the Court quoted Groizard: Lawl ib raryofCRAlaw

A person in authority, his agent or a public officer who exceeds his power can not be said to be in the
exercise of the functions of his office. The law that defines and establishes his powers does not protect him
for anything that has not been provided for.

The scope of the respective powers of public officers and their agents is fixed. If they go beyond it and they
violate any recognized rights of the citizens, then the latter may resist the invasion, specially when it is clear
and manifest. The resistance must be coextensive with the excess, and should not be greater than what is
necessary to repel the aggression.

The invasion of the prerogatives or rights of another and the excess in the functions of an office, are the
sources that make for legitimate resistance, especially, in so far as it is necessary for the defense of the
persons or their rights in the manner provided for in article 8 of the Penal Code.61
Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IO1 Mangili did not exceed his authority in the performance of his duty. Prior
to Breis' resistance, IO1 Mangili laid nary a finger on Breis or Yumol. Neither did his presence in the bus
constitute an excess of authority. The bus is public transportation, and is open to the public. The expectation
of privacy in relation to the constitutional right against unreasonable searches in a public bus is not the
same as that in a person's dwelling. In fact, at that point in time, only the bus was being searched, not
Yumol, Breis, or their belongings, and the search of moving vehicles has been upheld.

Moreover, appellants are not in any position to claim protection of the right against unreasonable searches
as to the warrantless search of the bus. The pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court (USSC) in
Rakas v. Illinois62 regarding the Fourth Amendment rights63 is instructive: Lawlib raryofCR Alaw

Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be
vicariously asserted. A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the
introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had
any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. And since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate
the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment
rights have been violated to benefit from the rule's protections.64 (Citations omitted)

It being established that IO1 Mangili was not in violation of Yumol's or Breis' rights as he was searching the
bus, there is no excess of authority, clear and manifest or otherwise, for either Yumol or Breis to lawfully
resist. Hence, the act of Breis in pushing IO1 Mangili was an unlawful resistance to an agent of a person in
authority, contrary to Article 151 of the RPC.

Breis' commission of a crime in view of, and against IO1 Mangili, and proclivity for resorting to acts of
violence further justify the warrantless search of appellants.

A further point. Appellants each attempted to alight from a departing bus, leaving behind their belongings.
They may be deemed to have abandoned the box in their flight. A thing is considered abandoned and
possession thereof lost if the spes recuperandi (the hope of recovery) is gone and the animus revertendi
(the intention of returning) is finally given up.65 That appellants got up to leave a departing bus without
bringing their box points to the absence of both spes recuperandi and animus revertendi. Indeed, although
their flight was thwarted by the PDEA agents, both appellants intended to leave the box behind without
returning for it. Abandonment has the effect of converting a thing into res nullius.66 reda rc law

In the United States, abandoned articles, such as those thrown away, are considered bona vacantia, and
may be lawfully searched and seized by law enforcement authorities.67 Put to question in Abel v. United
States68 was the admissibility of incriminating articles, which had been thrown away, that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation recovered without warrant. The USSC held that the articles were abandoned and
that there was nothing unlawful in the government's appropriation of such abandoned property.69 In Hester
v. United States,70 defendants and his associates ran away from officers, and in the process discarded a jar
and a jug. The USSC held no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when officers examined the contents of
the discarded items without warrant.71 In California v. Hodari,12 police officers, without warrant, pursued
defendant who threw a rock of cocaine into an alley as he was running. The USSC upheld the admissibility of
the abandoned cocaine.73 redarclaw

Applied analogously, there is no objectionable warrantless search and seizure of the box of marijuana
abandoned in the bus by appellants.

Given the above discussion, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid.

Having been found with prohibited drugs in their possession, appellants were clearly committing a criminal
offense in the presence of IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta. The subsequent warrantless arrest falls under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court: Lawlib raryofCR Alaw

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:Lawlib raryofCRAlaw

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
xxxx

Hence, the warrantless arrest of appellants is lawful.

Defenses of Denial and Frame-Up

Appellants' defenses of denial and frame-up were disbelieved by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.74 We find no reason
to deviate from this rule.

The defenses of denial and frame-up cannot prevail over the positive and categorical assertions of the PDEA
agents who were strangers to appellants and against whom no ill-motive was established.75 Further, such
defenses failed to overcome the documentary and physical evidence presented by the prosecution.

In light of the foregoing, appellants' conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs is in order.

Penalty for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs

The penalty for illegal possession of dangerous drugs is provided in Section of RA 9165: Lawlib ra ryofCRAlaw

SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law/, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following
quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof: Lawl ibra ryofCRAlaw

xxxx

7) 500 grams or more of marijuana;

xxxx

The penalty imposed upon appellants is in order.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 26 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04916, affirming the Decision dated 14 February 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
61, Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 30409-R, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry