Statutory Construction Digest
NFL vs. Eisma
Issue:
Whether the labor arbiter can pass on a suit for damages filed by the
employer, respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.
Yes. The labor arbiter can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer,
respondent Zamboanga Wood products.
It was held that the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. By
opinions of the court: “Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial
proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court
and is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed, must be conferred
by law in words that do not admit of doubt.”
Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively
from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should be resolved on the
basis of the law or statute now in force. The law in presidential Decree 1691
which took effect on May 1, 1980, amending Article 217 of the Labor code
returned the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the labor arbiters.
Provided for explicitly, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge
then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the
authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages,
arising from picketing that accompanied a strike that was squarely within the
express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated.
It has been the constant ruling of the Court and the words of the ponencia of
Justice Moreland still call for obedience that "The first and fundamental duty
of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."
Paat vs. CA
Facts:
On May 19, 1989, while on its way to bulacan from san jose Baggao
Cagayan, private respondent’s truck was seized by the DENR personnel
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Layugan of CENRO issued
an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days to submit
an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. However, private
respondents failed to submit an explanation. Thus, DENR Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained CENRO’s action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277. Private
respondent then filed for reconsideration but was denied. Subsequently, the
case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to
private respondent’s letter for reconsideration as an appeal to the secretary.
However pending resolution, a suit for replevin (Civil Case 4031), was filed
by Private Respondent against petitioners with the RTC Branch 2 of
Cagayan. Private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and
forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR
allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted
that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used
in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second
paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent
provision reads as follows:
SECTION 68. xxx
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
Private respondent further contended that the seizure is illegal, as the truck
was not used in the commission of the crime (of qualified theft under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), as
allegedly admitted by the Regional Executive Director, releasing the latter
from criminal liability.
Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to
dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents
had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court thereafter issued
a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondent.
Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition
for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals
which sustained the trial courts’ order ruling that the question involved is
purely a legal question. Hence, the petition with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals.
Issues:
Whether without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property
which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in
DENR pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Whether the authority to confiscate or to forfeit conveyances only belongs to
the courts, in light of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705?
Whether the Secretary of DENR and his representatives are empowered to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest
products in favor of the government?
HELD:
No. The court could not legally entertain an action for replevin. It is
important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations and the protection, development and management of forest
lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. By the
very nature of its function, it should be given a free hand unperturbed by
judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit
filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the
domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. The court held that “while the
administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused
by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A
long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
No. The authority to confiscate or to forfeit does not only belong to the court.
The provision of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 should be read together with Sec. 68a
to give way to the clear intention of the law which allows the DENR authority
in cases of violation of the code.
In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect
to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the
light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed,
and they should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
Yes. The Secretary of DENR and his representatives are empowered to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest
products in favor of the government. It should be noted that the truck was
seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without
the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of
P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,
unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the
Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the
conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. The court ruled
that the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for
administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible
Decision
The Court granted the petition for certiorari and set aside and reversed the
decision of Court of Appeals and directed the Secretary of DENR to resolve
the controversy.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAPA
FACTS:
Defendant Mario Mapa, was accused of a violation of Sec. 878 in connection
with Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amend by C.A. No.
56 and as further amended by R.A. No. 4 which is the illegal possession of
firearm of one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number,
with six rounds of ammunition.
Defendant admitted the possession of firearms, provided evidences for his
appointment as secret agent of Hon. Feliciano Leviste, Governor of
Batangas, and cited the case of People v. Macarandang as his defense.
The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and sentencing him to imprisonment for one
year and one day to two years. The appeal was elevated to the Supreme
Court for the question of law.
ISSUE:
Whether an appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to
the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution
for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition?
HELD:
No. The court held that the law is explicit and clear. No provision is made for
a secret agent to legally possess a firearm. The accused reliance on People
v. Macarandang is misplaced since Macarandang was a secret agent to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaign which sufficiently
put him within the category of a “peace officer” covered by the exemption.
It is not within the power of the Court to set aside the clear and explicit
mandate of a statutory provision for the first and fundamental duty of courts
is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them.
Thus, the conviction of the accused must stand.
Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the
respondent judge: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners".
The minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the
aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and
Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy,
oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses
were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code which provides
that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children
or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.
Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla
and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family
unit, but would result in the reduction of their legitimes. It would also produce
an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to
the policy of the law. The respondent court ruled in favour of spouses
Agonoy.
ISSUE:
Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified
to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
No. The words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute
clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise,
the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be
the subject of statutory construction
The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and,
as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren. To
add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would
violate the legal maxim “that what is expressly included would naturally
exclude what is not included".
The intention of the law is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare
of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy
life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. Under the
law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification
to adopt.
The petition is denied.
Paras v. Comelec
FACTS:
A petition for recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters
of Barangay Pula, Cabanatuan City against petitioner, Danilo Paras, who
won in the 1994 barangay elections. Acting on the petition for recall, public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the
petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the
recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered
voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law.
However, Comelec deferred the recall election to December 16, 1995 in view
of petitioners’ opposition.
To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC
Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action
2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order. After conducting a
summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should
not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without Comelec approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-
scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant petition
for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that
the recall election is now barred as there would be a Sangguniang Kabataan
elections on the first Monday of May 1996; citing Sec. 74 (b) of R.A. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no recall
shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
Petitioner also cited the case of Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo
to support the argument, in which the Court considered the SK election as a
regular local election.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is a regular local election.
HELD:
No. The Sangguniang Kabataan election is not a regular local election
construing so would defeat the purpose of the law for there will never be
recall election rendering the provision inutile. In the interpretation of a
statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, must be considered together with
the other parts, and must be kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.
Petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the
court cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following
admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict
rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That
intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that
vivifieth… The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its
spirit and intent.
However, The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for having become
moot and academic. The recall is no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under Sec. 74(b) of the Local Government Code considering the next
regular election involving the barangay office officials was scheduled on May
1997, seven months away.
Floresca v. Philex Mining
GR L-30642., 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142)
FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining
Corporation (Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-
in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint
alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the lives of its men working underground. Petitioners, with the
exception of Floresca, recovered damages under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.
However, a special committee report on the accident indicated that the
respondent company failed to provide adequate safety protection and
showed negligence on their part. Subsequently, the petitioners file a civil
case in pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly
Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, before respondent Court. The
respondent court dismissed the case for damages on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Hence, the petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch XIII, dated December 16, 1968.
Issues:
Whether the cause of action is in the nature of workmen’s compensation
claim or claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the civil code.
Whether the petitioners have the right of a selection or choice of action
between availing the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
or suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages.
Whether the court legislate in the instant case.
HELD:
 The court ruled that the nature of petitioners’ complaint is not compensation
based on Workmen’s Compensation Act, but a complaint for damages.
Under compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation
benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-
connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the
fault of the employer. Whereas, damages are awarded to one as a
vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity
recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person,
property or relative rights, through the act or default of another. In the
allegation of the petitioners, there was no complaint that the employee died
from accident arising out of and in the course of their employment to
constitute compensation under WCA. Instead, petitioners alleges gross and
reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the
lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting
in the death of the employees working underground. It is a given that a
contractual relationship exist between Philex and the deceased employees,
the alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount
to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it
may be held liable for damages.
Yes. The court held that the petitioners have the right to choose between
availing the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and
suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages, but
cannot simultaneously pursue both course of action. However, in the case
were petitioners have already recovered damages on WCA which was
based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, if the regular courts awarded greater
amount than they received, payments made under the WCA should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor to prevent
the instance of double jeopardy.
In hearing of the case, divergent opinions of amici curiae where submitted in
their respective memoranda. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured
employee or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint
to recover damages with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an
employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions and not compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. Atty. Angara believes otherwise and
submitted that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury
or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. While Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is
selective; that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of
choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for
higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Atty.
Bocobo agreed on Atty. Bacungan ‘s stand and adds that once the heirs
elect the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to
avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an
action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.
No. In allowing the petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court held that it
did not legislate but instead merely applied and gave effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice. Under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land. This
was restated by the Court through the late Chief Justice Castro in People vs.
Licera that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions,
although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean.
The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the
law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
Mandated by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “No judge
or court shall decline to render judgement by reason of the silence, obscurity
or insufficiency of laws”, the court argued that in some cases it must legislate.
In the language of Justice Holmes, the court in certain cases “do and must
legislate” to fill the gaps of the law; because the mind of the legislator, like
all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases
to which the law may apply nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to
anticipate all situations.
Republic vs. CA and Molina (GR 108763, 13 February 1997)
FACTS
This a petition for review on certiorari challenging the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio,
on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Respondent Roridel married Reynaldo
on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila after a year a son was
born. In the petition, she alleged that Reynaldo had shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations;
that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred spending more
time and squandering his money with his friends; depending on his parents
for assistance; being dishonest in their finances; and being unable to support
and abandoning them as the head of the family. The couple lived separately
for more than three years when she lived with her parents in Baguio City.
During the pre-trial Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer
live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
Evidences which consisted of testimonies of the respondent wife, her friend,
a social worker and a psychiatrist were presented to the court attesting the
“psychological incapacity” of the respondent’s husband. The latter did not
present any evidence as he only appeared during the pre-trial
ISSUE:
Whether the lower courts erred in the interpretation of “psychological
incapacity” as “opposing or conflicting personalities”.
HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals and RTC of La Trinidad Benguet erred in their
liberal interpretation of “psychological incapacity”. In Santos vs. CA, it was
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor
physical) incapacity . . . It is clear intendment of the law to confine the
meaning to the most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly
demonstrate an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must also exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated and must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
In the present case, it was not proven that the psychological defect spoken
of is an incapacity. The court ruled that it appears to be more of a "difficulty,"
if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. The mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
There had been no evidence showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
From the submission of amici curiae and the Courts own deliberation, the
following are the guidelines in the interpretation of and application of Art. 36
of the Famili Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

Decision
the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists
and remains valid.
9. Aisporna v. CA (GR L-39419, 12 April 1982)
FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the reversal
of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of the
City Court of Cabanatuan which found the petitioner guilty for having violated
Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended) and sentenced
her to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Petitioner was
Petitioner Mrs. Aisporna was charged for allegedly acting as an insurance
agent without first securing a certificate of authority to act as such from the
office of the Insurance Commissioner. However, Petitioner argued that she
was not liable because she did not receive any compensation for her work
and that being the wife of Rodolfo S. Aisporna, who was duly licensed by
Insurance Commission as an agent, she naturally helped him in his work, as
a clerk; and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro
had called by telephone to renew, which at that time, her husband, was
absent thus she left a note on for her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner can be considered as an insurance agent without
reference to the second paragraph and only in accordance with the first
paragraph of Sec. 189 of Insurance Code.
HELD:
No. The respondent court’s ruling that under the second paragraph of
Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an
insurance for compensation, but, in its first paragraph, there is no necessity
that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be called an
insurance agent is wrong.
The appellate court has established ultimately that the petitioner-accused
did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy.
To receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a
violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. This allegation is
essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be
sustained.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as
a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce harmonious whole. 13 A statute must be so construed as to
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 14 The
meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any
single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses
or sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a
whole. 15 Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context. This means that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment, not separately and independently. 16 More importantly,
the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a
particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is
associated. 17
10. China Bank v. Ortega (GR L-34964, 31 January 1973)
FACTS:
A complaint was filed against B & B Forest Development Corporation for the
collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court
declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the
reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or
Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. the plaintiff sought the
garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant B & B Forest Development
Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a notice of
garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served
on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Petitioners resisted two
orders from the court which compel him to inform the court within 5 days of
receipt of order whether or not there is deposit in CBC of B&B Forest
Development Corporation and if there is any deposit to hold the same intact
and not allow any withdrawal until further order of the court. Hence,
Petitioners instituted the petition and cited provisions of Republic Act No.
1405 as follow:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in
the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of
the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office,
except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment,
or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty
of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation.
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution
to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof
any information concerning said deposits.
Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an
imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
Petitioners claimed that in complying with the court order, under the
aforementioned provisions, Tan kim Liong will be held criminally liable and
the bank may be exposed to a possible damage suit by B&B Forest
Development Corporation
Issue:
Whether, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, a banking
institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the
bank deposit of a judgment debtor.
HELD:
No. The court clarified that the intention of the lawmakers in passing RA
1405 was not to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy
a final judgement. Since the purpose is for garnishment to insure a
satisfaction of judgement and not real inquiry to the bank deposit, the
Supreme Court held that the order of the lower court are to be affirmed.
11. Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista (GR L-37867, 22
February 1982)
FACTS:
Calixto Gasilao, a war veteran of good standing, filed his claim for disability
pension on October 19, 1995 under RA 65 Sec. 9, but was disapproved by
the board of administrator of PVA. He again filed for disability pension but
was disapproved on December 18 1955 die to petitioners failure to complete
supporting papers.
On august 8, 1968 his claim was approve and requested respondents that
his claim be made retroactive as of the date when his original application
was filed or disapproved in 1955. Petitioner, PVA did not act on respondent
Gasilao’s request so he instituted a case with the CFI Manila. Respondent
Court granted Gasilao’s request that retroact his pension benefits. Hence,
the petition.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in granting the retroactivity of Gasilao’s
pension.
HELD:
No. The laws on veteran pension must be liberally construed as to grant
veterans the proper recognition since it is a governmental expression of
gratitude to those who rendered service for the country. The spirit and intent
of the law must prevail. Congress made the law to retroact prior to the
application since its purpose is to compensate a class of men who suffered
in the service for the hardships they endured and the danger they
encountered, and most particularly to those who have become incapacitated
for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty.
Thus, Gasilao’s claim was sustained.
12. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. SSC (GR L-15045, 20
January 1961)
Facts:
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social
Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and
charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly,
wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,"
be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. The request
was based on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover
religious and charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and activities
organized for profit. The request was denied, hence the appeal.

The legal provisions of the Social Security Law defined the term “employer"
as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the
Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind
and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards
the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by
the Government", an "employee" refers to "any person who performs
services for an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts
are used and who receives compensation for such services", while
"Employment", covers any service performed by an employer except those
expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government,
or any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities including
corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domestic service in
a private home, employment purely casual, etc
Issue:
Whether the act is a labor law and does not cover religoues & charitable
institutions that is limited only to businesses and activities organized for
profit.
Held:
No. The Social Security Law also covers religious and charitable institutions
and was enacted by the legislative in pursuant to the policy of the Republic
of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security
system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the
Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the hazards of
disability, sickness, old age and death. It is an enactment that affords
protection to labor and in full accord with the constitutional provisions on
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of
all the people.
It is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on
the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less
permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except those
expressly excluded. In the case at bar, the court ruled that the definition of
the term "employer" is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and
charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit, This is made more
evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or
entities are not included. It is also significant to note that when Republic Act
No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions
organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of
said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8).
That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of
Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that
the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within
the scope of the law.
13. David vs. Comelec, 271 SCRA 90
Facts:
Alex David, in his capacity as barangay chairman of Caloocan City
(barangay 77 zone 7), filed a petition for prohibition of the holding of the
barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of 1997.
Petitioner, Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter, filed a petition to
seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional:
1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows:
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang
kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular
election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding
of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related
thereto;
3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No.
8250 otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended
to defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections;[2]
The Court further resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they
raised basically the same issue, worded differently: How long is the term of
office of barangay officials?
Issues:
1. Whether the local government code of 1991, RA 7160, governs the term
of office of the officials.
2. Whether RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years
constitutional?
3. Whether petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that
provided under RA 7160?
Held:
1. Yes. The court ruled that the local government code, RA 7160, governs
the term of office of the officials since it was enacted later than RA 6679;
Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later
law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. It is to be
presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it.
In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have known the newer
one and hence could not have intended to change what they did not know.
Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and not
the other way around.
2. Yes, citing the actual deliberations of the Constitutional Commissions
intent, the term of office of elective officials should be determined by law;
more precisely, as provided for in the Local Autonomy Code. It does not
specify any limitation or prohibition, thereby giving the lawmakers full
discretion to fix the terms.
3. Yes. The barangay officials are estopped from contesting the applicability
of the 3 year term provided by RA 7160 as they were elected under the
provisions of the said code. Following the petitioners theory that the
applicable is RA 6679, the election of petitioner David as well as the
barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was illegal.
The petitions are DENIED for being completely devoid of merit.
Extrinsic aids
The court, in ruling the case, used several extrinsic aids such as the historical
background of the law, the legislative intent of the Constitutional
Commissions, thru its actual deliberation and by inviting As amicus curiae,
former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
14. Salvatierra v. CA (GR 107797, 26 August 1996)
Facts:
On June 15, 1970 a parcel of land, lot No. 27 and 149 sqm portion of lot No.
26, was bought by respondents, spouses Lino Longalong and Pacienca
Mariano from Venancio Salvatierra, who inherited the said land from his
brother Enrique Salvatierra; that died intestate and was survived by his
legitimate brothers,
Tomas, Bartolome, and Macario, and a sister, Marcela.
It was discovered in 1982, that the 149 sqm portion of lot No. 26 was outside
the respondent’s fence; and that Anselmo Salvatierra was able to obtain a
title of the whole lot 26, 749 sqm, in his name. Efforts to settle the matter at
the barangay level proved futile because Purita Salvatierra (widow of
Anselmo) refused to yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to return to the
latter the disputed portion of land. Thus, respondents, Longalong, filed a
case with the RTC for the reconveyance of the said portion of Lot 26. The
court a quo dismissed the case on the following grounds: 1) that Longalong,
et al. failed to establish ownership of the portion of the land in question, and
2) that the prescriptive period of four (4) years from discovery of the alleged
fraud committed by defendants predecessor Anselmo Salvatierra within
which plaintiffs should have filed their action had already elapsed
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents, longalong,
and stated that a vendor can sell only what he owns or what he is authorized
to sell. As to the co-owner of a piece of land, he can of course sell his pro
indiviso share therein to anyone, but he cannot sell more than his share
therein.
Petitioners, Salvatierra, are ordered to reconvey to respondents, Longalong
the 149-sq. m. portion of Lot No. 26 registered in the name of Anselmo
Salvatierra; and petitioners are furthermore ordered to pay respondents, the
amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Hence, petitioners in this case filed a petition for certiorari assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether private respondent, Longalong, is entitled to reconveyance of the
149 square meters in Lot 26.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that private respondent, Longalong, is
entitled to reconveyance of the 149 square meters in Lot 26.
The Court established that Anselmo’s act of registering the whole Lot No. 26
in his name was intended to defraud Venancio who was then legally entitled
to a certain portion of said lot by the extrajudicial partition. Thus, according
to the New Civil Code if property is acquired through mistake or fraud the
person obtaining it is by force of law considered a trustee of an implied trust
so the prescribe time of ten (10) years should be assumed. The complaint
for reconveyance was filed by the Longalong spouses on November 22,
1985, only five (5) years after the issuance of the title over Lot No. 26 in the
name of Anselmo Salvatierra. Hence prescription has not yet set in.
The Court finds no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extra judicial
partition. The terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, hence the
literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. Pursuant to Article
1370 of the Civil Code, “If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control.
No reversible errors can be attributed to the findings of the respondent Court
of Appeals because the decision herein assailed was properly supported by
substantial evidence on record, which were not in any way impugned by the
petitioners.
15. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company (GR
L-25316, 28 February 1979)
Facts:
In a mandamus petition, petitioner claim that according to RA 2023, loans
granted by the credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll
collection from the respondent’s employee’s wages and salaries.
The lower court dismissed the claim. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the
employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's
salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union and this mandatory
character does not convert the credit union's credit into a first priority credit.
Held:
Yes. If the legislative intent in enacting Rep. Act 2023 were to give first
priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of
their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared so but it
only compel the employer to make deduction. It has been repeated time and
time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is
nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as
to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed.
Thus, the appealed decision must be affirmed.
16. Abellana v. Marave (GR L-27760)
Facts:
Petitioner, Francisco Abellana, driving his cargo truck, hit a motorized
pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers. A criminal case against him
was filed with the city of court of Ozamis which found the accused guilty as
chared, damages in favour of the offended parties are likewise awarded. The
accused, now petitioner, filed an appeal to such decision with the Court of
First Instance. Another separate and independent civil action for damages
allegedly suffered by respondents was also filed with another CFI of Misamis
Occidental, where Crispin Abellana, the alleged employer was included as
defendant. Both of the petitioners sought the dismissal of such action
principally on ground that there was no reservation for the filling thereof in
the City Court of Ozamis, arguing that it was not allowable at the stage where
the criminal case was already on appeal. Respondent judge was not
persuaded, thus the motion to dismiss was denied.
Issue:
Whether a grave abuse of discretion was committed by the judge after his
decision to deny the motion to dismiss of the petitioners.
Held:
No. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
judge on which his decision upheld the substantive right of the petitioner.
The restrictive interpretation of the petitioner of “the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party ...reserves his right to institute it
separately” should be avoided as it result in its emasculation and give rise to
serious constitutional question.
As admonished by Justice Frankfurter, not to fall prey to the vice of
literalness.
A counsel, in serving the interest of his client, must not ignore the basic
purpose of a litigation, which is to assure parties justice according to law. He
is not to fall prey to the vice of literalness. The law as an instrument of social
control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to
be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed
an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an
alleged right.
Thus, petition for certiorari is dismissed.
17. PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations (GR L-43760, 21 August
1976)
Facts:
The National Federation of Free Labor Union( Naflu) was named as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming
Milss, CompanyInc. By the respondent director of Labor Relations, Carmelo
Noriel.
The Election result was 429 votes in favour of the respondent union, 414 for
petitioner union, 4 votes abstained and 17 spoiled votes, ten of which were
cast to the petitioner union and was not counted.
Issue:
Whether there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent,
when he choose not to read the spoiled ballot and declared the respondent
union as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees of the Philippine
Blooming Mills Company Inc.
Held:
No. there was a grave abuse of discretion when the respondent exercise his
duty as a public official required to certify the candidate who obtained the
majority votes. As Justice Malcom said, “Courts will and should respect the
contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive
officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly
erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby." Since then, such a doctrine
has been reiterated in numerous decisions . As was emphasized by Chief
Justice Castro, "the construction placed by the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given
controlling weight."Thus, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
18.Philippine Apparel Workers’ Union v. NLRC (GR L-50320, 31 July
1981)
Facts:
On 31 July 1981, the Court rendered judgement and granted petitioner,
increased allowance, negotiated wage increase as well as other wage
increases embodied in the collective bargaining agreement to cover all
employees of Philippine Apparel Inc. effective April 1, 1977.
A motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision was filed by
private respondent. The Court, on October 21, 1981 denied the aforesaid
motion for reconsideration and the denial was declared final Entry of
judgment was made on October 30, 1981.
On January 10, 1983 petitioner flied an "Urgent Manifestation and Motion"
claiming that despite its filing of a motion for execution dated November 12,
1981, a manifestation and motion dated February 10, 1982, and another
manifestation and motion dated February 26, 1982, the execution arm of
public respondent NLRC continued to fail to implement the decision of this
Court.
The respondent, NLRC, failed to implement the decision of the court. In in
its Comment on petitioner's "Urgent Manifestation and Motion" explained
that it could not issue a writ of execution because the actual or exact
amounts of the various awards due the members of the petitioner union
could not be determined.
The petitioner prayed that those obstructing the implementation of the
decision be declared in contempt especially the Bagong Pilipino Philippine
Apparel Workers’ Union and private respondent PAI, for circumventing the
final decision of the court by offering the members of petitioner the amount
of 500 each as full payment of their claims in the instant case.
On October 27, 1983, the court granted the petition and instructed the
Respondent to fully implement the Court’s decision on July 31, 1981. In that
same order, respondents were adjudged guilty of contempt .
Issue:
Whether the Court erred in granting the petition of petitioner and finding
respondents guilty of contempt on its decision on October 27, 1983.
Held:
No. The judgment in this case has already become final and executory and
as such the prevailing party as a matter of right is entitled to a writ of
execution. NLRC’s delayed submission of the Report of Examiner gave way
to negotiations on how judgement may be executed. The quit claims and
releases signed by the employees are considered null and void.
In their obvious attempts to derail the implementation of the Court's decision
which had long become final and executory as far back as over six years
ago on October 21, 1981, private respondents endlessly belabored the
Court's ruling finding them guilty of contempt.
Thus, the Court enjoined the respondent NLRC to fully implement the Court's
Resolution dated October 27,1983.
19. IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong (GR L52415, 23 October 1984)
Facts:
On 20 June 1975, petitioner filed a complaint before the National Labor
Commission against respondent bank for the payment of holiday pay.
Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was
certified for arbitration on July 7, 1975.
On August 25, 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano, ruled in favour of the
petitioner and ordered the respondent bank to pay wages to all its employees
for all regular holidays since November 1, 1974. Respondent bank complied
to the order of Arbiter Soriano by paying their holiday pay up to and including
January 1976. PD 850 was promulgated amending Article 94 of the Labor
Code on the right to holiday pay. Consequently. On February 16, 1976 by
authority of article 5 of the same code, the Ministry of Labor promulgated
rules and regulations which contain a section that define who will receive
holiday pay; thus the respondent bank stopped the payment of holiday pay
to its employee. The petitioner filed a motion for writ of execution to enforce
arbiter’s decision but the respondent filed an appeal and was later dismissed
by the Labor Arbiter. Respondent then filed with the Minister of Labor and
got a favourable response. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether respondent, Amado G. Inciong, acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he set aside on
appeal, the decision of Labor Arbiter even though it has already become final
and had been partially executed on the basis of an Implementing Rule &
Policy Instruction by the Ministry of Labor.
Held:
Yes. The Secretary if labor exceeded his authority when he set aside the
decision of final judgement of a quasi-judicial body. A final judgement once
given cannot be annulled or modified otherwise it will result to endless
litigation thereby rendering the law inutile.
Thus, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT IS SET ASIDE, AND THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER
RICARTE T. SORIANO DATED AUGUST 25, 1975, IS HEREBY
REINSTATED.
20. Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople (GR L-44717, 28
August 1985)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the public
respondent which denied the petitioner's claim for holiday pay and its claim
for premium and overtime pay differentials basing the decision on Sec. 2,
Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and in issuing Policy Instruction No.
9, which respectively provide:
Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working
days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established
minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month
whether worked or not.
On 20 May 1975, petitioner, instituted a complaint with the regional office
No. IV of Department of Labor against private respondent for the payment of
10 unworked legal holiday as well as for premium and overtime differentials
for worked legal holidays from November 1, 1974.
Both Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in favour of petitioner but on appeal the
Department of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the
petitioner's claim for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether the respondent Minister of Labor acted contrary to law and
jurisprudence and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Sec. 2,
Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and in issuing Policy Instruction No.
9, in excluding the petitioner a from holiday pay.
Held:
Yes, while it is true that the minister has the authority to perform and
implement “guidelines” to clarify the labor code, it is limited and the Court
can declare it null and void if proven to be erroneous. An administrative
interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the
statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Article 4 of the Labor
Code, states that 'All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations,
shall be resolved in favor of labor. Petitioner were not among those excluded
by PD 850 from the benefits of such holiday pay.
Thus, The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Minister’s order,
and reinstated the decision of the NLRC affirming the resolution of the Labor
Arbiter.
21. Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission (GR L-16704, 17
March 1962)
Facts:
23. Perfecto v. Meer GR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)
Facts:
In 1947, mr justice Greforio Perfecto, appellee, was required by
36. Villavert v. ECC GR L-48605, 14 December 1981 (110 SCRA 233)
Facts:
Petitioner, Domna N. Villavert, mother of the late Marcelino N. Villavert who
died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis, employed as a Code Verifier in the
Philippine Constabulary, filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her
son under P.D. No. 626 as amended with the Government Service Insurance
System. The said claim was denied by the Government Service Insurance
System on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an
occupational disease and that the petitioner had failed to show that there
was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert
and the nature of his employment.
The petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission
which affirmed the decision of the respondent, Government Service
Insurance System, denying the claim on the ground that the petitioner did
not present evidence that the illness of Marcelino N. Villavert, acute
hemorrhagic pancreatitis, was caused or aggravated by the nature of his
duties as employee of the Philippine Constabulary.
The records showed that a day before the death of Marcelino, he reported
as usual to the Constabulary Computer Center at Camp Crame, Quezon City
and performed his duties not only as code verifier but also handled
administrative functions, computer operation and typing jobs due to shortage
of civilian personnel. Although he was complaining of chest pain and
headache late in the afternoon of December 11, 1975, after a whole day of
strenuous activities, Marcelino was still required to render overtime service
until late in the evening of the same day, typing voluminous classified
communications, computing allowances and preparing checks for the salary
of Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police personnel
throughout the country for distribution on or before December 15, 1975. He
went home late at night and due to fatigue, he went to bed as soon as he
arrived without taking his meal. Shortly thereafter, Marcelino was noticed by
his mother, the herein petitioner, gasping for breath, perspiring profusely,
and mumbling incoherent words. The petitioner tried to wake him up and
after all efforts to bring him to his senses proved futile, she rushed Marcelino
to a hospital where he was pronounced dead at 5:30 o'clock in the morning
of December 12, 1975, the cause of death was acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to her son’s death benefits.
Held:
Yes, the petitioner is entitled to her son’s death benefits.
The Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation stated that
the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown despite
extensive researches in this field, although most research data are agreed
that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the
development of the disease. From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear
that Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was
directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as coder
verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary.
There is no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a "bout of alcoholic
intoxication" shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he used
drugs.
It should be noted that Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, provides that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation
of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor."
Thus, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission sought to
be reviewed is set aside and judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
Government Service Insurance System to pay the petitioner death benefits
in the amount of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00).
38. Ty v. First National Surety (GR L-16138, 29 April 1961)
Facts:
Plaintiff, Diosdado C. Ty, employed as operator mechanic foreman in the
Broadway Cotton Factory, insured himself in 18 local insurance companies,
among which being the eight above named defendants, which issued to him
personal accident policies. On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out which
totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory while fighting his way out of
the factory, he was injured on the left hand by a heavy object.
Plaintiff then filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim
with defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the policy, which reads
pertinently as follows:
INDEMNITY FOR TOTAL OR PARTIAL DISABILITY
If the Insured sustains any Bodily Injury which is effected solely through
violent, external, visible and accidental means, and which shall not prove
fatal but shall result, independently of all other causes and within sixty (60)
days from the occurrence thereof, in Total or Partial Disability of the Insured,
the Company shall pay, subject to the exceptions as provided for hereinafter,
the amount set opposite such injury:
PARTIAL DISABILITY
LOSS OF:
xxx xxx xxx
Either hand ............................................................................ P650.00
xxx xxx xxx
... The loss of a hand shall mean the loss by amputation through the bones
of the wrist....
Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reason that there
being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by
him was not covered by his policy. Thus, plaintiff sued the defendants in the
Municipal Court of this City but was denied hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether plaintiff is entitled to indemnity under the insurance policy for the
disability of his left hand.
Held:
No. While the Court sympathize with the plaintiff, the Court cannot go beyond
the clear and express conditions of the insurance policies, all of which define
partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of
the wrist." There was no such amputation in the case at bar. All that was
found by the trial court, which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical
injuries "caused temporary total disability of plaintiff's left hand." Note that
the disability of plaintiff's hand was merely temporary, having been caused
by fracture of the index, the middle and the fourth fingers of the left hand.
The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the
parties.As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only
amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an
interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary
disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. For
obscure words or stipulations should be interpreted against the person who
caused the obscurity, and the ones which caused the obscurity in the cases
at bar are the defendant insurance companies.
39.De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance (GR L-21574, 30 June 1966)
Facts:
This is an appeal by the Capital Insurance & Surety Company, Inc., from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, ordering it to indemnify
therein plaintiff Simon de la Cruz for the death of the latter's son, to pay the
burial expenses, and attorney's fees.

Eduardo de la Cruz, employed as a mucker in the Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc.,
holder of an accident insurance policy underwritten by the Capital Insurance
& Surety. The insured participated in a non-professional boxing contest
sponsored by his employer. He slipped and was hit by his opponent on the
left part of the back of the head, causing him to fall, with his head hitting the
rope of the ring. Eduardo died of hemorrhage, intracranial, left.
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and who was named beneficiary
under the policy, thereupon filed a claim with the insurance company for
payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. As the claim was
denied, De la Cruz instituted the action in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. Defendant insurer set up the defense that the death of the
insured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental
and, therefore, not covered by insurance.
After due hearing the court rendered the decision in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether the death of the insured is covered by the policy.
Held:
Yes. The terms "accident" and "accidental", as used in insurance contracts,
have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts
in their ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken
to mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.
The death of the insured in the case at bar is entitled to indemnification under
the policy; for if the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the
insured's voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the
act which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of
policies insuring against death or injury from accident.
In the present case, while the participation of the insured in the boxing
contest is voluntary, the injury was sustained when he slid, giving occasion
to the infliction by his opponent of the blow that threw him to the ropes of the
ring. Without this unfortunate incident, that is, the unintentional slipping of
the deceased, perhaps he could not have received that blow in the head and
would not have died. The fact that boxing is attended with some risks of
external injuries does not make any injuries received in the course of the
game not accidental. In boxing as in other equally physically rigorous sports,
such as basketball or baseball, death is not ordinarily anticipated to result.
If, therefore, it ever does, the injury or death can only be accidental or
produced by some unforeseen happening or event as what occurred in this
case.
Furthermore, the policy involved herein specifically excluded from its
coverage —
(e) Death or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging in football,
hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing of any kind,
mountaineering, or motorcycling.
Death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests was not
declared outside of the protection of the insurance contract. Failure of the
defendant insurance company to include death resulting from a boxing
match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the
conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such
death.5
the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.
so ordered.
40.Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance (GR L-4611, 17
December 1955)
Facts:
Plaintiff, a merchant of Albay, owned 4 warehouses, which was insured
together with its contents of stocks of copra and hemp, with the defendant
Company since 1937. In the morning of July 21, 1940 a fire of undetermined
origin which lasted for almost a week completely destroyed the bodegas and
the merchandise stored therein. Plaintiff, informed the insurance company
but the latter resisted payment, claiming violation of warranties and
conditions, filing of fraudulent claims, and that the fire had been deliberately
caused by the insured or by other persons in connivance with him.
Qua Chee Gan, his brother Qua Chee Pao, and some employees of his were
indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of arson but were acquitted by the
trial court in a final decision on 9 July 1941.
The CFI granted the action that was instituted by Plaintiff to recover the
proceeds of certain fire insurance policies. Hence the Insurance Company
appealed directly to the Supreme Court. It contends that a warranty in a fire
insurance policy prohibited the storage in the premises of oils (animal and/or
vegetable and/or mineral and their liquid products having a flash point below
300 degrees Fahrenheit. Gasoline, which has a flash point below 300
degrees Fahrenheit was stored therein.
Issue:
Whether gasoline may be construed as oil to warrant the forfeiture of claims
under the insurance policy
Held:
No. The appellant insurance company avers, that the insured violated the
"Hemp Warranty" provisions of policy, against the storage of gasoline, since
appellee admitted that there were 36 cans (latas) of gasoline in the building
designed as "Bodega No. 2" that was a separate structure not affected by
the fire. But gasoline is not specifically mentioned among the prohibited
articles listed in the so-called "hemp warranty." The cause relied upon by the
insurer speaks of "oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or their
liquid products having a flash point below 300o Fahrenheit", and is decidedly
ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, "Oils" mean "lubricants"
and not gasoline or kerosene.And how many insured are in a position to
understand or determine "flash point below 300 Fahrenheit.
By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms
and phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against
the insurer and liberraly in favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture
Insurance is, in its nature, complex and difficult for the layman to understand.
Policies are prepared by experts who know and can anticipate the hearing
and possible complications of every contingency. So long as insurance
companies insist upon the use of ambiguous, intricate and technical
provisions, which conceal rather than frankly disclose, their own intentions,
the courts must, in fairness to those who purchase insurance, construe every
ambiguity in favor of the insured.
41. Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping Lines (GR L-34382, 20 July
1983)
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari the decisions of the CFI of Manila
dismissing the complaints of plaintiff-petitioner on the ground of lack of
capacity to sue. The court ruled that the contracts could not be validated by
the subsequent procurement of the license.
Petitioner, Home Insurance Company instituted two cases of recovery
damages against Respondent Companies, COLUMBIAN PHILIPPINES,
INC and Eastern Shipping.
Petitioner claimed reimbursement with regards to the amount of insurance
paid to the Consignees, Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation of the
Philippines (coils of Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire Rods) & International
Harvester Macleod, Inc. (30 packages of Service Parts of Farm Equipment
and Implements), due to the losses and damages suffered by the cargoes
and goods.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in holding that the contracts entered into by
Home Insurance could not be validated by the subsequent procurement of
license.
Held:
Yes. By obtaining the necessary license to conduct business in the
Philippines, petitioner already has the legal capacity to sue. It has long been
the rule that a foreign corporation actually doing business in the Philippines
without license to do so may be sued in our courts. The Court distinguish
between the denial of a right to take remedial action and the penal sanction
for non-registration. Insofar as transacting business without a license is
concerned, Section 69 of the Corporation Law imposed a penal sanction-
imprisonment and a penalty for transacting business without registration.
And insofar as litigation is concerned, the foreign corporation or its assignee
may not maintain any suit for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand.
However, the Corporation Law is silent on whether or not the contract
executed by a foreign corporation with no capacity to sue is null and void ab
initio.
There is no question that the contracts are enforceable. The requirement of
registration affects only the remedy. The objective of the Corporation Law
was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. It must
be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not
hamper the development of trade relations and which fosters friendly
commercial intercourse among countries.
42. CO v. REPUBLIC

FACTS:
Petitioner, Benjamin Co, born and raised in the Philippines of Chinese
parents; educated of schools recognized by the government; married to
Leonor Go with a two-month child; can speak English, Tagalog and Ilocano,
of good moral character; and a Chinese merchant of tobacco, filed and was
granted the petition for naturalization.
After the hearing, the court ordered that after a lapse of two years from date
of decision becomes final and requisites provided for in RA No. 503 have
been complied with, a certificate of naturalization shall be issued to
petitioner.
However, the Government appealed the decision, contending that petitioner
did not meet all the necessary requirements prescribed by the law to qualify
him to become a Filipino citizen. On cross-examination, he believes in the
laws of the Philippines and in democracy but cannot state exactly the
principles which is not sufficient to comply the requirement of the law that
one must believe in the principles underlying the constitution. When asked
why he did not file his income tax returns, he stated that his father already
filed it and he merely promised that he will file his; and he only presented his
alien certificate of registration and none of his wife and child.
Issue:
Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by law
in order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen.
Held:
Yes. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily
refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in
the law. The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not
necessarily include the constitution which is the fundamental law of the land,
nor does it cover all the principles underlying our constitution.
Furthermore, petitioner also failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner in his relation with our government since he failed to
file his income tax and to register his wife and child with the Bureau of
Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Act.
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor
of the government and against the applicant.
43. Lee Cho (@ Sem Lee) v. Republic (GR L-12408, 28 December 1959)
Facts:
Petitioner, Lee Cho who was born in China of Chinese parents and who
came to the Philippines sometime in February 1921, filed for naturalization
before the CFI of Cebu without first complying with the requirement of filing
a declaration of intention to become a Filipino Citizen.
He alleged that he possess all the qualification –continuous residence in the
country for at least 30 years, educated in a government recognized school,
speaks and writes English and Cebu dialect, cleared of tax liability, and hold
an alien certification –and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.
Petitioner married a Chinese national with whom he had 13 children born in
Cebu, all of which are issued alien certificate with the exception of Lourdes
Lee who married a naturalized Filipino citizen named Lim Kee Guan. At
present, his children are studying in private schools and colleges recognized
by the government with the exception of William Lee who is not of school
age, Angelita who rendered only grade five and Lourdes who stopped in third
year high school.
However, the Government disputed the claim contending that petitioner has
failed to comply with the requirement of the law regarding his duty to afford
primary and secondary education to all his children because he failed to give
such education to his daughters Angelita Lee and Lourdes Lee.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was able to comply with the requirements for
naturalization.
Held:
No. Evidences in petitioner acts portrayed betrayal of his sincerity because
two of his children did not receive the required teaching of Philippine Civics
because of unsatisfactory reasons such as early marriage of Angelina Lee,
and an admittance in the open court that in spite of illness, Lourdes Lee,
continued her study in an unrecognized Chinese school by the government.
Philippine History and Philippine Government, subjects that are precisely
required of aliens who desire to embrace Philippine citizenship for their
indoctrination on matters concerning our history, government and
nationalism. Considering that the provisions of the Naturalization Law should
be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may
be fully fulfilled, The Court was persuaded to conclude that petitioner has
failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petition should be
denied.
44. Guerrero v. CA (GR L-44570, 30 May 1986)
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the decision of Agrarian Relations ordering defendants-
spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to reinstate plaintiff Apolinario Benitez
to the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare coconut holding in question,
located at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria Aurora Sub-province Quezon and to
maintain said plaintiff in the peaceful possession and cultivation thereof, with
all the rights accorded and obligations imposed upon him by law.
The petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists in the case at bar since
on August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share
tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system. On September
10, 1971, Republic Act 6389 amending Republic Act 3844 declared share
tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy.
The facts of the case are as follows:
In 1969, Apolinario Benitez was hired by spouses Guerreros to take care of
their cows which were grazing within their coconut plantation in Quezon.
Benitez was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation
where he and his family stayed. For his work related to coconuts, he shared
1/3 of the proceeds and was paid 500 a year for attending to the cows.
Sometime in the early part of 1973, Benitez felt aggrieved by the Guerroro’s
acts of refraining him from gathering nuts to the portion of land where he
used to so he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit
in the Office of the President in Malacanang, Manila. This led to an execution
of an agreement of tenancy which will be governed by RA 1199, The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-
hectare portion of the plantation, with threats of bodily harm if he persists to
gather fruits therefrom. Spouses Guerreros, then assigned Rogelio and
Paulino Latigay to do all his work and demolished the cottage where Benitez
lived with his family. Hence, the case for reinstatement with damages.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in ruling that a tenancy relationship exists between
the parties Manuel Guerrero and Apolinario Benitez.
Held:
No. from the records it was established that the private respondents’ status
is agricultural tenants under the legal definitions.
The law defines "agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a
person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by
another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of
the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the
former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both. (Section 3, Republic
Act 1199, The Agricultural tenancy Act, as amended.)
Beside the agreement on 1973 which clearly indicate a tenancy relationship
exist. Respondent Benitez has physically possessed, cultivated and lived on
the landholding continuously from 1969 until he was ejected from it. A hired
laborer would not build his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the
same upon his dismissal or termination any time. Such conduct is more
consistent with that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure
under the law.
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship is the agreement
to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing
in favor of the petitioner-landowners.
The agricultural laborer works for the employer, and for his labor he receives
a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the
other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His
share is necessarily dependent on the amount of harvest.
There is no question that the latest law on land and tenancy reforms
seeks to abolish agricultural share tenancy as the basic relationship
governing farmers and landowners in the country. But the petitioners'
arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back the
advances in agrarian reform law. The repeal of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the
movement not only towards the leasehold system but towards eventual
ownership of land by its tillers. The phasing out of share tenancy was
never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or
hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever.
However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the rule that the
repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute is
a mere general principle. Among the established exceptions are when
vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired.
Thus the respondent's status as agricultural tenant should be without
question. Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right
to continue working until such relationship is extinguished according to law.
The code of Agrarian Reforms (RA 6389) and The Agricultural Tenancy Act
of 1954 (Republic Act 1199), and other republic ats all provide for the
security of tenure of agricultural tenants. Ejectment may be effected only for
causes provided by law, to wit:
l) Violation or failure of the tenant to comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the tenancy contract or any of the provisions of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act;
2) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's
share unless the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force
majeure;
3) Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that specified by the
agreement of the parties;
4) Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices:
5) Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the tenant;
6) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his
immediate family or farm household of a crime against the landholder or a
member of his immediate family. (Section 50, Rep. Act 1199).
None of the above causes exists in the case at bar. The respondent has
been unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of
Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering the reinstatement of respondent as
tenant and granting him damages therefor. The respondent's right as share
tenant do not end with the abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to
"uplift the farmers from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to make them
dignified, self-reliant, strong and responsible citizens ... active participants in
nation-building", agricultural share tenants are given the right to leasehold
tenancy as a first step towards the ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal
sought to be achieved by the government program of land reform.
45. Bello v. CA (GR L-38161, 29 March 1974)
• Rules of Court
Facts:
Petitioners spouses were charged for estafa before the City Court of Pasay
for allegedly having misappropriated a lady's ring received by them from Atty.
Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were
convicted and sentenced under respondent city court's decision.
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal to the Respondent City Court, Court of
First Instance of Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss
appeal" on the ground that since the case was within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the city court and the court of first instance and the trial in the
city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken
directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary
Act, Republic Act 296, as amended.
Petitioners opposed the prosecution's dismissal motion and invoking the
analogous provision of Rule 50, section 3 directing that the Court of Appeals
in cases erroneously brought to it "shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall
certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the
grounds therefor," prayed of the court of first instance if it should find the
appeal to have been wrongly brought before it, to certify the same "to either
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court."
The respondent city court did find that the appeal should have been taken
directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and
remand of the records to the city court "for execution of judgment."
Petitioners then filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the
People and respondent city court to prohibit the execution of the judgment
and to compel respondent city court to elevate their appeal to the
Respondent Court of Appeals.
Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Instance may
have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court, it
held that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as
“principal party respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at all even
on the assumption that Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”
Issue:
Whether the formal impleading of the court of first instance which issued the
challenged order of dismissal was indispensable.
Held:
No. although respondent court recognized the error of the respondent city
court,
The former gravely erred in holding that it could not "correct" the respondent
city court’s "wrong action" and grant the relief sought of having the appeal
elevated to it since said court's presiding judge "who should have been-made
under Rule 65, sec. 3 10 herein principal party respondent, but he was not."
as the court ruled in Torre vs. Ericta, a respondent judge is "merely a nominal
party" in special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and
that he "is not a person "in interest" within the purview (of Rule 65, section 5
12)" and "accordingly, he has no standing or authority to appeal from or seek
a review on certiorari" of an adverse decision of the appellate court setting
aside his dismissal of a party's appeal and issuing the writ of mandamus for
him to allow the appeal.
It is readily seen from the cited Rule that the court of first instance or
presiding judge who issued the challenged order or decision is but a nominal
party, the real parties in interest being "the person or persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in the court" and who are charged with the duty
of appearing and defending the challenged act both "in their own behalf and
in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings." Hence, the
formal impleading of the court of first instance which issued the challenged
order of dismissal was not indispensable and could be "overlooked in the
interest of speedy adjudication."
The Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always
cautioned against "narrowly"interpreting a statute "as to defeat the purpose
of the legislator" and stressed that "it is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or
absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it
would be unjust or lead to absurd results". In the construction of its own
Rules of Court, this Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them
to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void —
that is certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate
repugnancy and inconsistency — by holding as it does now that courts of
first instance are equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss
misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper appellate
court.
46. City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (GR 14355, 31
October 1919)
Facts:
The city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance, praying
that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal
Avenue.
The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community
of Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it was a
unnecessary because other routes were available, which would fully satisfy
the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the
resting places of the dead.
The Court of first instance ruled that there was no necessity for the
expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each
and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint.
Hence the appeal of plaintiff, contending that, it has established the fact
under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any
land it may desire; that the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private
lands for public purposes under Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of
the city of Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private
property for public use."
Plaintiff also argued that that the only function of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the
court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of
the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor.
Issue:
Whether the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of in
expropriation proceedings.
Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of
Manila.
Held:
Yes. From Act No. 190 section 248, the Supreme Court has authority to
inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the plaintiff. If the
Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no right of expropriation
existed, it shall remand the cause to the Court of First Instance with a
mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession of the property
and that he recover whatever damages he may have sustained by reason of
the possession of the plaintiff.
The power of the Court is not limited to question or inquiry. When the
legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to
ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent
domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon,
those questions.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation,
and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power
upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find
(a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in
accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions
imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land
must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon
trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them
fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in
accordance with law.
No. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question is used by the
general community of Chinese. It is a well-known fact that cemeteries may
be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general
community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a
family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood. Where a
cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can
be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity
extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith
for future use.
Expropriation Laws
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State,
or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and
the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No
species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is
guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the
freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and,
for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his
consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly
interpretation. (Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases
cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is
one of the most delicate exercise of government authority. It is to be watched
with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the
inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property
of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions
of the law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and
to protect it from abuse. Not only must the authority of municipal corporations
to take property be expressly conferred and the use for which it is taken
specified, but the power, with all constitutional limitation and directions for its
exercise, must be strictly pursued. (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th
Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil.,
411.)
47. Villanueva v. Comelec (GR L-54718, 4 December 1985)
Facts:
On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice
Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his
companion Mendoza, who withdrew candidacy with an unsworn letter in his
own handwriting, upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in the election with
a margin of 452 votes (3,112 votes as against his opponent respondent
Lirio's 2,660 votes) but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and
proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that
Petitioner’s candidacy was not duly approved by Respondent because
petitioner’s name does not appear in the Comelec’s certified list of candidate.
Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation but was
dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that Mendoza’s
unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was
effective, Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not
withdraw after January 4, citing the pertinent legal provisions, as follows:
The 1978 Election Code provides:
SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered
withdraw ... unless the candidate files with the office which received the
certificate ... or with the Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal ...
SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate
with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should ... withdraw ... any voter
qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for the office for
which ... the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a candidate on or before
midday of election ...
Issue:
Whether Mendoza’s informal withdrawal is a ground to disqualify petitioner.
Held:
No. The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality
which should not be used to frustrate the people's will in favor of petitioner
as the substitute candidate. The legal requirement that a withdrawal be
under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to
observe the requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity. In
fact, Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had been accepted by the election
registrar without protest nor objection.
Furthermore, the Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's
substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the
substance and spirit of the Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code.
Since there was no time to include petitioner's name in the Comelec list of
registered candidates, because the election was only four days away,
petitioner as substitute candidate circularized formal notices of his candidacy
to all chairmen and members of the citizens election committees in
compliance with the suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager.
The Supreme Court resolved to reconsider and sets aside the questioned
Resolutions of Comelec and annuls the proclamation of Lirio as elected vice-
mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly
elected vice-mayor of said municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said
office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions. The resolution is
made immediately executory.
48. In RE Tampoy (GR L-14322, 25 February 1960)
Facts:
This concerns the probate of a document which purports to be the last will
and testament of one Petronila Tampoy. The trial court denied the petition
on the ground that the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of
the testatrix.
Hence the appeal. Petitioner alleged that although the first page of the will
does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the same however expresses
her true intention to give the property to her whose claims remains
undisputed. She wishes to emphasize that no one has filed any to the
opposition to the probate of the will and that while the first page does not
bear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears her
thumbmark and both pages were signed by the three testimonial witnesses.
Moreover, despite the fact that the petition for probate is unoppossed, the
three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the
document expresses the true and voluntary will of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether the trial Court erred in denying the petition.
Held:
No. The contention cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express
provision of the law. Thus, Section 618 of Act 190, as amended, requires
that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in the
presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other, which
requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause. This requirement
is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will.
Thus, it has been held that "Statutes prescribing the formalities to be
observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed.
A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements;
otherwise it is entirely void.' All these requirements stand as of equal
importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective
execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in them, either to super
add other conditions or dispense with those enumerated in the statutes.
49. Capati v. Ocampo, GR L-28742, April 30, 1982)
Facts:
Plaintiff Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga, contractor of the
Feati Bank for the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur, on May
23, 1967, entered into a sub-contract with the defendant Dr. Jesus Ocampo,
a resident of Naga City.
The contract agreement stipulated that, construction must be completed
before June 5 1967, and that all actions arising out, or relating to this
contract may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Naga.
Defendant Ocampo finished the construction only on June 20, 1967 thus
plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga an action for recovery
of consequential damages.
Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
venue of action was improperly laid but Plaintiff filed an opposition to the
motion, claiming that their agreement to hold the venue in the Court of First
Instance of Naga City was merely optional to both contracting parties. In
support thereof, plaintiff cited the use of the word "may " in relation with the
institution of any action arising out of the contract.
The lower court, in resolving the motion to dismiss, ruled that "there was no
sense in providing the aforequoted stipulation, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 4
of the Revised Rules of Court, if after all, the parties are given the discretion
or option of filing the action in their respective residences," and thereby
ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether the CFI erred in its decision to dismiss the complaint of defendant.
Held:
No. The Court ruled that the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question
is simply permissive. By the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file
their suits solely and exclusively with the Court of First Instance of Naga.
They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving
their right to seek recourse in the court. Since the complaint has been filed
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the
venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court.
It is well settled that the word "may" is merely permissive and operates to
confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may
be" connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary
verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.
50. GMCR vs. Bell Telecommunications, 271 SCRA 790
Kintanar vs. Bell Telecoms [G.R. No. 126526]
First Division, Hermosisima Jr. (J): 2 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no
part.
Facts: On 19 October 1993, Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.
(BellTel) filed with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) an
Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure,
Install, Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications
Services and to Charge Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the
Issuance of Provisional Authority (NTC Case 93-481). At the time of the filing
of this application, private respondent BellTel had not been granted a
legislative franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications
service. Since BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised applicant, it was
excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments for local
exchange carrier service Only GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla
Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation,
among others, were beneficiaries of formal awards of service area
assignments in April and May 1994. On 25 March 1994, RA 7692 was
enacted granting BellTel a congressional franchise which gave private
respondent BellTel the right, privilege and authority to carry on the business
of providing telecommunications services. On 12 July 1994, BellTel filed with
the NTC a second Application (NTC Case 94-229) praying for the issuance
of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation,
operation and maintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic
and international) and tandem telephone exchanges and facilities using wire,
wireless, microwave radio, satellites and fiber optic cable with Public Calling
Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an
integrated system. In the second application, BellTel proposed to install
2,600,000 telephone lines in 10 years using the most modern and latest
state-of-the-art facilities and equipment and to provide a 100% digital local
exchange telephone network. BellTel moved to withdraw its earlier
application docketed as NTC Case 93-481. In an Order dated 11 July 1994,
this earlier application was ordered withdrawn, without prejudice. BellTel’s
second application was opposed by GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications,
Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications
Corporation, Capitol Wireless, Inc., Eastern Misamis Oriental Telephone
Cooperative, Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc., Midsayap Communication,
Northern Telephone, PAPTELCO, Pilipino Telephone Corporation,
Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation,
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. and Extelcom and
Telecommunications Office. On 20 December 1994, BellTel completed the
presentation of its evidence-in-chief. On 21 December 1994, BellTel filed its
Formal Offer of Evidence together with all the technical, financial and legal
documents in support of its application. Pursuant to its rules, the application
was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD) for
study and recommendation. On 6 February 1995, the CCAD submitted to
Deputy Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum manifesting that
“based on technical documents submitted, BellTel’s proposal is technically
feasible.” Subsequently, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory Division of
CCAD, conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of BellTel.
On 29 March 1995, it was declared that BellTel has the financial capability
to support its proposed project at least for the initial 2 years. Agreeing with
the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy
Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and
expressly signified their approval thereto. In view of the favorable
recommendations by the CCAD and two members of the NTC, the Legal
Department thereof prepared a working draft 10 of the order granting
provisional authority to BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by
Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not
signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying for
the issuance of a provisional authority, BellTel filed on 5 May 1995 an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the Issuance of a Provisional
Authority. No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus,
on 12 May 1995, BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion reiterating
its earlier prayer. In an Order dated 16 May 1995, signed solely by
Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC, instead of resolving the two
pending motions of BellTel, set the said motions for a hearing on 29 May
1995. On said date, however, no hearing was conducted as the same was
reset on 13 June 1995. On the latter date, BellTel filed a Motion to
Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve), praying for the promulgation
of the working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to BellTel,
on the ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed
by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a
majority out of the three commissioners composing the NTC. On 4 July 1995,
the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by Commissioner
Simeon Kintanar.
On 17 July 1995, BellTel filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for
Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the
aforestated Order dated 4 July 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate. On
26 July 1995, the Court issued a Resolution referring said petition to the
Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant to Section
9, par. 1 of BP 129. On 23 September 1996, the Court of Appeals
promulgated decision, granting BellTel’s petition for a writ of Certiorari and
Prohibition, setting aside NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 for
being contrary to law. BellTel’s petition for mandamus was also granted,
directing the NTC to meet and banc and to consider and act on the draft
order within 15 days. Chairman Kintanar and the opposing
telecommunications companies filed their separate petitions for review.
The Supreme Court dismissed the instant consolidated petitions for lack of
merit; with costs against petitioners.
1. NTC is a collegial body; Vote requirement
NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of
the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein.
Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, absent the
required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
2. Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
Commission
Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The
NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the
commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a
case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC.
Having been organized by EO 146 as a three-man commission, the NTC is
a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when it was
acting as a one-man regime.
3. Historical milieu of the NTC: CA 146 as amended by RA 2677
On 17 November 1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act
146 which created the Public Service Commission (PSC). While providing
that the PSC shall consist of a Public Service Commissioner and a Deputy
Commissioner, the law made it clear that the PSC was not a collegial body
by stating that the Deputy Commissioner could act only on matters delegated
to him by the Public Service Commissioner. As amended by RA 2677, the
Public Service Commission was transformed into and emerged as a collegial
body, composed of one Public Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate
Commissioners. The amendment provided that contested cases and all
cases involving the fixing of rates shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
4. Historical milieu of the NTC: PD 1 (Integrated Reorganization Plan)
On 24 September 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed, into
law, PD 1 adopting and approving the Integrated Reorganization Plan which,
in turn, created the Board of Communications (BOC) in place of the PSC.
This time, the new regulatory board was composed of 3 officers exercising
quasi-judicial functions. On 25 January 1978, the BOC promulgated its
“Rules of Procedure and Practice” in connection with applications and
proceedings before it.
5. Historical milieu of the NTC: EO 546, merger of BOC and the
Telecommunications Control Bureau as NTC
On 23 July 1979, President Marcos issued Executive Order 546, creating
the Ministries of Public Works, and of Transportation and Communications,
merged the defunct Board of Communications and the Telecommunications
Control Bureau into a single entity, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). The said law was issued by then President Marcos in
the exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of EO 546 provides that “the
Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two Deputy
Commissioners, preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and another an
economist.” The Executive Order took effect on 24 September 1979 .
However, the NTC did not promulgate any Rules of Procedure and Practice.
Consequently, the then existing Rules of Procedure and Practice
promulgated by the BOC was applied to proceedings in the NTC.
6. Historical milieu of the NTC: Opinion of Justice Secretary (Puno)
entitled to great weight but not conclusive upon the courts
The opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight. However,
the same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts. The Puno Opinion
that the NTC is not a collegial body is not correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does
not specifically state that the NTC was a collegial body, and neither does it
provide that the NTC should meet En Banc in deciding a case or in exercising
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. But the absence of such
provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of the NTC under the
context of Section 16 of EO 546 and under the Rules of Procedure and
Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of said
Rules, the BOC (now the NTC), a case before the BOC may be assigned to
and heard by only a member thereof who is tasked to prepare and
promulgate his Decision thereon, or heard, En Banc, by the full membership
of the BOC in which case the concurrence of at least 2 of the membership
of the BOC is necessary for a valid Decision.
7. Historical milieu of the NTC: BOC Rules are NTC Rules, Philippine
Consumers Foundation vs. NTC
While it may be true that the BOC Rules of Procedure was promulgated
before the effectivity of Executive Order 546, however, the Rules of
Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice and procedure before the
NTC when it was established under Executive Order 546. This was
enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of ‘Philippine Consumers
Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission, 131
SCRA 200′ when it declared that: “The Rules of Practice and Procedure
promulgated on 25 January 1978 by the Board of Communications, the
immediate predecessor of NTC govern the rules of practice and procedure
before the BOC then, now NTC.”
8. Commission defined
A Commission is a body composed of several persons acting under lawful
authority to perform some public service. (City of Louisville Municipal
Housing Commission versus Public Housing Administration, 261
Southwestern Reporter, 2nd, page 286). A Commission is also defined as a
board or committee of officials appointed and empowered to perform certain
acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or service . . . (Black,
Law Dictionary, page 246). There is persuasive authority that a ‘commission’
is synonymous with ‘board’ (State Ex. Rel. Johnson versus Independent
School District No. 810, Wabash County, 109 Northwestern Reporter 2nd,
page 596).
9. Statutory Construction: “And” construed
The conjunctive word ‘and’ is not without any legal significance. It is not, by
any chance, a surplusage in the law. It means ‘in addition to’ (McCaull
Webster Elevator Company versus Adams, 167 Northwestern Reporter,
330, page 332). The word ‘and’, whether it is used to connect words, phrases
or full sentence[s], must be accepted as binding together and as relating to
one another. From the context of Section 16 of Executive Order 546, the
Commission is composed of a Commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners;
not the commissioner alone.
10. Statutory Construction: Every part of statute should be given
effect
In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given effect on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of
dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes, “that the thing may rather have
effect than be destroyed.” Herein, if it was the intention of President Marcos
to constitute merely a single entity, a ‘one-man’ governmental body, instead
of a commission or a three-man collegial body, he would not have constituted
a commission and would not have specifically decreed that the Commission
is composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and
the 2 deputy commissioners.
11. Use of word “deputy” does not militate against the collegiality of
the NTC
Even if Executive Order 546 used the word ‘deputy’ to designate the 2 other
members of the Commission does not militate against the collegiality of the
NTC. The collegiality of the NTC cannot be disparaged by the mere nominal
designation of the membership thereof. Such nominal designations are
without functional implications and are designed merely for the purpose of
administrative structure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC.
12. NTC Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 void
NTC Circular No. 1-1-93, Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93, and the Order
of Kintanar declaring the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial entity, are
contrary to law and thus null and void. Administrative regulations derive their
validity from the statute that they were, in the first place, intended to
implement. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null
and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. The fact that
implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the
institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be
a ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations
are an erroneous interpretation of EO 546 and in the context of and its
predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to
validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish
interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.
13. Courts cannot refrain from duty to nullify illegal regulations
Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently null
and void for being totally violative of the spirit and letter of EO 546 that
constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no court may shirk from its duty of
striking down such illegal regulations.
14. Only the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar are indispensable
parties in the action for certiorari
In its certiorari action before the Court of Appeals, BellTel was proceeding
against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar for the former’s adherence and
defense of its one-man rule as enforced by the latter. Thus, only the NTC
and Commissioner Kintanar may be considered as indispensable parties.
After all, it is they whom BellTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the
court for having acted in grave abuse of their discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
15. Oppositors not absolutely necessary in an action for certiorari, as
the action does not go into merits of the case; Claim of non-joinder of
indispensable parties untenable
The oppositors in NTC Case 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the
final determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as chairman of NTC
because the task of defending them primarily lies in the Office of the Solicitor
General. Furthermore, were the court to find that certiorari lies against the
NTC and Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors’ cause could not be
significantly affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse of
discretion goes not into the merits of the case in which the oppositors are
interested but into the issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the
merits of a case, that the same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of
at least two members of the commission. All that Court of Appeals passed
upon was the question of whether or not the NTC and Commissioner
Kintanar committed grave abuse of discretion, and so the Supreme Court
must review and ascertain the correctness of the findings of the appellate
court on this score, and this score alone.
16. Mandamus does not control discretion
Jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety of mandamus in causing a quasi-
judicial agency to exercise its discretion in a case already ripe for
adjudication and long-awaiting the proper disposition. As to how this
discretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm outside the office of the
special civil action of mandamus. It is elementary legal knowledge, after all,
that mandamus does not lie to control discretion. Herein, when the Court of
Appeals directed Commissioners to meet en banc and to consider and act
on the working draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel, said
court was simply ordering the NTC to sit and meet en banc as a collegial
body, and the subject of the deliberation of the 3-man commission would be
the said working draft which embodies one course of action that may be
taken on BellTel’s application for a provisional authority. The appellate court
did not order the NTC to forthwith grant said application.
17. No evidence proffered that working draft was obtained by BellTel
was obtained through illegal means
The working draft was said to have been prepared by Atty. Basilio Bolante
of the Legal Department of the NTC; initialed by the CCAD Head, Engr.
Edgardo Cabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez. No
one among the aforementioned persons has renounced the working draft or
declared it to be spurious. Petitioners have not proffered a single piece of
evidence to prove the charge that the working draft of the order granting
provisional authority to BellTel was obtained by the latter through illegal
means. In the ultimate, the issue of the procurement of the working draft is
more apropos for a criminal or administrative investigation than in the instant
proceedings largely addressed to the resolution of a purely legal question.
51. Alfon v. Republic (GR L-51201, 29 May 1980)
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte filed a petition praying
that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to
Estrella S. Alfon for the following reasons:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;
2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same
name;
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy
and all her friends and acquaintances know her by this name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.

Issue:
Whether a legitimate or legitimated children are required to use the surname
of their father.
Held:
No, the word "principally" as used in Art. 364 of the Civil Code is not
equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it
is equally entitled. Moreover, this Court held in Haw Liong vs. Republic
The following may be considered, among others, as proper
or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a
petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a
consequence of a change of' status, such as when a natural
child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the
change is necessary to avoid confusion
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood,
borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal
certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades
up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this
name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and
given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage
likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully
her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid
and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
52. Rura v. Lopena (GR L-69810-14, 19 June 1985)
Facts:
Petitioner Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts
of estafa committed on different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol. The five cases were jointly tried and a single
decision was rendered.
Petitioner applied for probation. The application was opposed by a probation
officer of Bohol on the ground that petitioner is disqualified for probation
under Sec. 9 (c) of the Probation law thereof which disqualifies from
probation those persons:
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of
an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one
month and one day and or a fine of not less than Two
Hundred Pesos.
The court denied the application for probation. A motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied. Hence the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is disqualified for probation.
Held:
No. The court ruled that when he applied for probation he had no previous
conviction by final judgment and the only conviction against him was the
judgment which was the subject of his application. The statute relates
"previous" to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the
crime.
Thus, the petition is granted and the respondent judge is directed to give due
course to the petitioner's application for probation.
53. NHA vs Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985)
Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco ,a project engineer of respondent National
Housing Corporation (NHC), was separated from the service for having been
implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On March
25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC
with the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC
had no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner then elevated the case to the
NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC,
respondent NHC appealed before the Court and on January 17, 1985, a
decision, was rendered reinstating the the decision of the labor arbiter
On January 6, 1989, petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission a
complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction thus On
February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the
case. On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
It ratiocinated that:
The Board finds the comment and/or motion to dismiss meritorious. It was
not disputed that NHC is a government corporation without an original
charter but organized/created under the Corporate Code.
Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the government, including government owned and controlled
corporations with original charters.
From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it is clear that respondent
NHC is not within the scope of the civil service and is therefore beyond the
jurisdiction of this board.
On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for
illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent
NHC and On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R.
Caday ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by
respondent as there was evidence in the record that the criminal case
against him was purely fabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss the
charges against him. Hence, the conclusion d that the dismissal was illegal
as it was devoid of basis, legal or factual.
On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on
March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the
decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.[10]
Hence, the petition for certiorari to set aside the Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, which reversed
the Decision dated May 21, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue
Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code.
Held:
No. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and
/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not
by the Labor Code. Hence,
Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:
"The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees,
including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall
be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations x x x.
The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided:
The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
54. Aparri vs Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231 (1984)
FACTS:
Private respondents, National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) created under R.A. 1160, thru its Board of
Directors, on January 15 1960, under Resolution No. 13 appoint petitioner,
Bruno Appari, as the General Manager of office of subject to approval
of the President.
The power of the Board of Directors of the NARRA to appoint the general
manager is provided for in paragraph (2),Section 8, Republic Act No. 1160
(approved June 18, 1954), to wit:
Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. — The Board of
Directors shall have the following powers and duties: ...
2) To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager ..., subject to the
recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of
the President of the Philippines, .... The Board, by a majority vote of all
members, may, for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of Economic
Coordination and with the approval of the President of the Philippines,
suspend and/or remove the General Manager and/or the Assistant General
Manager (p. 46, rec., emphasis supplied).
On March 15, 1962, the Board approved Resolution No. 24 wherein
the President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the
incumbent General Manager up to March 31, 1962.
Thus Petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Manila on March
29, 1962 , a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction praying that
the resolution of NARRA be annulled and the Board be commanded to allow
petitioner to continue office until he vacates said office in accordance with
the law,
On October 21, 1963 the then CFI of Manila dismissed the petition for the
case has become academic by reason of the approval of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844) which abolished the NARRA
and transferred its functions and powers to the Land Authority and thereby
dismissing the instant petition without pronouncement as to costs"

On appeal to the then Court of Appeals, the appellate tribunal affirmed the
decision of the lower court in dismissing the petition for mandamus
Hence the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the Board Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or
dismissal of petitioner without cause.
Held:
No. The Court ruled that hat the term of office of the petitioner expired on
March 31, 1962. The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite
period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. It
is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term" with the purview of
statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office
under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law.
However, the power to fix the term is vested in the Board of Directors subject
to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the
approval of the President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 (series of
1962) speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the
petitioner.
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law,
by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit
of the public. The right to hold a public office under our political system is
therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and
by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. There
is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to
have any vested right in an office or its salary.
55. Demafiles vs. Comelec, GR L-28396, 29 December 1987
Facts:
The new municipality of Sebaste in Antique province held its first election of
officers November 14, 1967, with the petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the
respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty.
On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting
as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised
Election Code, to disregard, as "obviously manufactured", the election return
from precinct 7 on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were
registered (of whom 188 voted), when, according to a certificate of the
municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of
October 30, 1997.
At its session on the following day, November 22, the board, over the
objection of one member, voted to reject the return from precinct 7 and then
proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The
resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for Demafiles.
Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of
Sebaste.
Petitioner, challenged the right of the two board members to sit considering
that they are re-electionist. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of
Petitioner. However, Galido asked for reconsideration, stating that the said
board members in question were disqualified only when the board was
acting as a provincial but not as municipal and that the COMELEC
resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation of officials was issued
without giving him an opportunity to be heard.In light of this, Respondent
Commission reversed its previous decision.
Galido was proclaimed and the respondent Commission held "that the
canvass and proclamation already made of the local officials . . . stands".
Demafiles, after failing to secure a reconsideration of the latter resolution
filed a petition. Hence the case.
Galido, argued that the case is moot because he had taken his oath and
assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870 section 2 of
the statute which reads:
The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality of Sebaste
shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have
qualified
Issue:
(1) Whether the case is moot and academic.
(2) Whether the provincial board members, who were candidates for re-
election, were disqualified from sitting in the board.
Held:
(1)No. The court ruled that the last portion of the provision — "and shall have
qualified" — is devoid of any meaning; it is unmitigated jargon in or out of
context, and does not warrant the respondent's reading that the term of office
of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their
proclamation. It is quite probable that that is what the legislature meant. But
here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense
of judicial modesty forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from
supplying. A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to
contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might
wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration.
Accordingly, the general rule is that the term of office of municipal officials
shall begin on the first day of January following their election, and so the
assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way affected the basic
issues in this case, which we need not reach and resolve.
(2) Yes. From the clear provisions of Sec 28 of the Revised Election Code
which provides that any member of the provincial board who is a candidate
for an elective office shall be incompetent to act in said board in the
performance of its duties in connection with the election.
The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a
provincial board of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal
canvassing body new municipalities, and so we make none.
Thus The court ordered that the resolutions of the Commission on Elections
are set aside, proclamation of the respondent Benito B. Galido is annulled.
The respondent Commission on Elections was directed to appoint new
members of the board of canvassers and to immediately thereafter to order
the board of canvassers as reconstituted to convene, canvass all votes
including those appearing in the return from precinct 7, and, in accordance
with the results of such canvass, proclaim the winning candidates.
56.Arabay vs CFI of Zamboanga del Norte, 66 SCRA 617
Facts:
The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for
the selling and distribution of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and
petroleum based products. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other
petroleum products, filed with the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte a complaint against the City of Dipolog, contesting the validity of such
on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to levy under
Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that municipalities may not impose
tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline.
the court a quo rendered judgment upholding the validity of the questioned
provision of Ordinance No. 53, as amended, essentially on the grounds that
the Arabay, Inc. failed to present evidence that the tax provision in question
imposed a sales tax, and the tax prescribed therein was, moreover, not a
specific tax on the products themselves but on the privilege of selling them.
Issue:
Whether the questioned tax provision imposes a sales tax.
Whether the Arabay, Inc. is entitled to a tax refund.
HELD:
(1) Yes. Dipolog levies a sales tax, not only because the character of the
ordinance as a sales tax ordinance was admitted by the parties below, but
as well because the phraseology of the said provision reveals in clear terms
the intention to impose a tax on the sale of oil, gasoline and other petroleum
products. Thus, the ordinance provides: "There shall be charged for the
selling and distribution of refined and manufactured oils ... based on the
monthly allocation actually delivered and distributed and intended for sale ...
by the Company or supplier to any person ... whether as dealer ... or as
operator of any station ... the following tax payable monthly: ..." It is quite
evident from these terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is
directly dependent upon or bears a direct relationship to the volume of sales
which the owner or supplier of the itemized products generates every month.
The ordinance in question therefore exacts a tax based on sales; it follows
that the Municipality of Dipolog was not authorized to enact such an
ordinance under the local Autonomy Act.
(2) Even if the prohibition contained in section 2 of RA 2264 applies only to
municipalities and not to chartered cities; the obligation of the City of Dipolog
to refund the sum collected under the void provisions of an ordinance
enacted while it was still a municipality, is not open to doubt. The court ruled
that ruled that the legality of an ordinance depends upon the power of the
municipality at the time of the enactment of the challenged ordinance.
The right of the Arabay, Inc. to a refund of the local sales taxes it had paid
under the questioned ordinance may not, however, include those levied on
its gasoline sales. The relevant proviso of Section 2 of the Local Autonomy
Act states:
... Provided, That municipalities and municipal districts shall,
in no case, impose any percentage tax on sales or other taxes
on articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code:
The reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso
in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress, in excluding
gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power
of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes.
57. US vs Hart, 26 Phil 149
Facts:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty by the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy under the provision of
Act No. 519 which read as follows "(1) Every person having no apparent
means of subsistence, who had the physical ability to work, and who
neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; (2) every person
found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling housed, or
tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support;
(3) every person known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar, ladrone, either by
his own confession or by his having been convicted of either said offenses,
and having no visible or lawful means of support when found loitering about
any gambling house, cockpit, or in any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every
idle or dissolute person of associate of known thieves or ladrones who
wanders about the country at unusual hours of the night; (5) every idle
person who lodges in any barn, shed, outhouse, vessel, or place other than
such as is kept for lodging purposed, without the permission of the owner or
a person entitled to the possession thereof; (6) every lewd or dissolute
person who lives in and about houses of ill fame; every common prostitute
and common drunkard, is a vagrant."cral
Hence the appeal.
The Attorney-General insisted that as visible means of support would not be
a bar to a conviction under any one of the last four clauses of the act,
The punctuation of the paragraph in question is divided into seven clauses,
separated by semicolons. To say that two classes of vagrants are defined in
paragraph 2, as to one of which visible means of support or a lawful calling
is not a good defense, and as to the other which such a defense is sufficient,
would imply a lack of logical classification on the part of the legislature of the
various classes of vagrants.
In the case at bar, all three of the defendants were earning a living by
legitimate methods in a degree of comfort higher than the average. Their
sole offense was gambling, which the legislature deemed advisable to make
the subject of a penal law.
When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the
courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that
the construction of the statute of the statute which will give it effect. The
construction finally adopted should be based upon something more
substantial than the mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the
punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in
apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as thus
punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not
conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to a change the punctuation when
necessary, to give to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature,
disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting
others where necessary.
58. Victoria vs. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 109005, January 10, 1994
59. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Seagate Technology, G.R. No.
153866, Feb. 11, 2005
60. Matabuena v. Cervantes, GR L-28771, March 31,1971
Facts:
The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased
Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living
maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila
Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court
sustained the latter’s stand.
The lower court reasoned that "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of
the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage.
When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant
on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not
yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only
when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation
had been executed."
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the Article 133 of the Civil Code applies to common-law wife.
Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as
void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-
law relationship. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in
ancient law.
the principle of statutory construction is that what is within the spirit
of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise
the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be
attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation
purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence
to its avowed objective.
61. People v. Santayana GR L-22291, November 15, 1976
Facts:
Accused, Jesus Santayana, a “special agent” appointed by Col.Maristela
Chief of CIS, was found in plaza Miranda in possession of a pistol with
ammunitions without license to possess them. The case underwent trial after
which the accused was convicted of the crime charged with its
corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Santayana as special agent of the CIS which
apparently authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts him from
securing a license or permit.
Held:
Yes, since there is no question that the accused was appointed as CIS secret
agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms, Under the
Macarandang doctrine he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the
pistol in question.
62. Rubio, Jr. vs. Paras, G.R. No. 156047, April 12, 2005
63. Mutuc v. Comelec, GR L-32717, November 26, 1970
Facts:
Petitioner, Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, was prohibited by respondent, Comelec, from using tape jingles
in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers .
The justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the
Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates "to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."
Issue:
Whether the taped jingles can be categorized under the phrase “and the
like”.
Held:
No, the Court cannot give merit to the justification of the COMELEC under
the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as
those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated
in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind –being made of that kind
–referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
candidate responsible for its distribution.
Furthermore, respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in
conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the
Constitution. The Court could not adhere to a ruling which would nullify a
constitutional right as free speech.
Thus, respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited
from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid
order banning the use of political taped jingles.
64. People v. Manantan, GR L-14129, July 31, 1962
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of
First Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged
with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. which provided the
following:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no
officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national,
provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil
service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any
influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to
vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.
The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice
of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54
of the Revised Election Code but the lower court denied the motion holding
that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54.
A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it
was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and
pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused
upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the
appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue:
Whether a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code?
Held:
No. the court ruled that a justice of the peace is not included in the prohibition
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The maixim "casus omisus pro
omisso habendus est" is invoked by the defendant-appellee , under the said
rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to
have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then
indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and
deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus"
can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that
the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law,
or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just
called "judges." To accept the defense contention is to render ineffective a
policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
65. Lopez v. CTA,GR L-9274, February 1, 1957)
Facts:
Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany.
The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs
duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplies invoices. Said
customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently,
however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment,
additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and
imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the
reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed
to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal,
filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax
Court, by its resolution of May 23, 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground
that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of
Manila, citing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court.
From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to us, seeking a
reversal of said resolution of dismissal.
Petitioner contends that the literal meaning of Section 11 of Republic Act No.
1125 should be adopted in the sense that the Court of Tax Appeals has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Commissioner of Customs over Appeals from
decisions of Collectors of Customs, so that a person adversely affected by a
decision of a Collector of Customs is given the choice of appealing the said
decision either to the Commissioner of Customs or to the Courts of Tax
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the literal meaning of Section 11 of RA 1125 should be adopted
and that the Court of Tax Appeal has concurrent jurisdiction over the
decisions of Collector of Custom.
Held:
No. Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of
the Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand, section 11 of the
same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may
appeal mentions among others, those affected by a decision or ruling
of the Collector of Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner of
Customs. The court ruled that a clerical error was committed in section
11, mentioning therein the Collector of Customs. It is more reasonable
and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act, the Legislature meant
and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of
Collector of Customs.
The two remedies suggested by petitioners are entirely different, one
from the other; an appeal to the Commissioner of Customs is purely
administrative, whereas, appeal to the Court of Tax Appeal is
manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before one resorts to the
Courts, the administrative remedy provided by law should first be
exhausted.
Under the rules of statutory construction, it is not the letter but rather the
spirit of the law and intention of the Legislature that is important and which
matters. When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal
import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous results, or would
contravene the clear purposes of the Legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the latter
of the law.
66. Sanciangco v. Rono , GR L-68709, July 19, 1985
Facts:
Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz
City. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of and was
appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the City's
Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental but was
not successful.
petitioner informed respondent Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming his duties as
member of that body Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 697:
Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy.
(1) Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active officers and members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Integrated National Police, as well as
officials and employees of government-owned and
government-controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries,shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided,
however, that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister,
the Members of the Cabinet, and the Deputy Ministers shall
continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the
filing of their certificates of candidacy.
(2) Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians
or barangay officials shall, upon filing certificate of candidacy
be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
(Emphasis supplied)
The matter was elevated to respondent Minister of Local Government Jose
A. Rono who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed
to have resigned from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate
of Candidacy.
Petitioner impugns said ruling on the ground that since Section 13(2) of
Batasan Pambansa Blg. 697 makes no distinction between elective and
appointive officials, the legislative intent is clear that even appointive
Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision.
Issue:
Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latter’s filing of a
certificate of candidacy for the Batasan.
Held:
Yes. The legislative intent of Sec. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear that even
appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said
provision. Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner, by filing his certificate of
candidacy for the Batasan Pambansa ceased, ipso facto, to be an appointive
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, he remains an elective Barangay
Captain from which position he may be considered as having been on
"forced leave of absence." He also continues as President of the Association
of Barangay Councils but will need a reappointment by the President, as
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City as the law speaks
of "members who may be appointed by the President."
67. Lozano vs. Yorac, G.R. Nos. 94521 &4626, October 28, 1991
68. Manila Railroad Co. v.Collector of Customs (GR 30264, 12 March
1929)
Facts:
Manila Railroad Company, plaintiff-appelle, on all of its railway wagons use
dust shield is to cover the axle box in order to protect from dust the oil
deposited therein which serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel.
Insular Collector of Customs, defendant-appellant, classified dust shield
under par. 141 of sec 8 of the Tariff Law, however, on appeal, The CFI
overruled the decision and classified dust shield under par. 197 of the same
law.
Sec. 8 of the Tariff Law provides:
141. Manufactures of wool not otherwise provided for, forty per centum ad
valorem
197. Vehicles for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof,
ten per centum ad valorem
Issue:
Whether the court erred in the classification of dust shield.
Held:
No. The Court ruled that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields
under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing
to classify them under paragraph 141 of the same section of the law.
There are present two fundamental considerations which guide the way out
of the legal dilemma. The first is by taking into account the purpose of the
article and then acknowledging that it is in reality used as a detached part or
railways vehicles. The second point is that paragraph 141 is a general
provision while paragraph 197 is a special provision. Where there is in the
same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the
general enactment must be taken to effect only such cases within its general
language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.
69. Almeda vs. Florentino, 15 SCRA 514
Facts:
70. Laxamana v. Baltazar (GR L-5955, 19 September 1952)
Facts:
In July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended, the vice-
mayor Jose T. Slazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of
the Revised Administrative Code. However, the provincial governor, acting
under section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code (R.A. 180), with the
consent of the provincial board appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of
Sexmoan, who immediately took the corresponding official oath.
The two statutory provisions read as follows:
SEC. 2195. — Temporary disability of the mayor. Upon the occasion
of the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the
Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there
be no Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election
received the highest number of votes.
SEC. 21 (a). Vacancy in elective provincial, city or municipal office.
— Whenever a temporary vacancy in any elective local office occurs,
the same shall be filled by appointment by the President if it is a
provincial or city office, and by the provincial governor, with the
consent of the Provincial Board, if it is a municipal office. (R.A. 180,
the Revised Election Code.
Issue:
Whether Laxamana has the right to assume office.
Held:
Yes. the contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the
executive officers charged with its execution deserves great weight in the
courts.
the allegedly conflicting sections, could be interpreted in the light of the
principle of statutory construction that when a general and a particular
provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former (sec. 288, Act
190). In other words, section 2195 referring particularly to vacancy in the
office of mayor, must prevail over the general terms of section 21 (a) as to
vacancies of municipal (local) offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may
be deemed an exception to or qualification of the latter.4 "Where one statute
deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the
same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if
possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of
whether it was passed prior to the general statute."
It is well-settled that a special and local statute, providing for a particular
case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in
its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include
the cases embraced in the special law. . . . It is a canon of statutory
construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly
repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special
provisions, of such earlier statute. (Steamboat Company vs. Collector, 18
Wall. (U.S.), 478; Cass County vs. Gillett, 100 U.S. 585; Minnesota vs.
Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 396.)
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general — the
terms of the general brood enough to include the matter provided for in the
special — the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception
to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular
71. Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan (GR L-21516, 29 April 1966)
Facts:
The petitioner-appellee, Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative
franchise under Republic Act No. 399 for an electric light, heat and power
system at Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan,and was also issued a
certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service
Commission on 18 March 1954. the City of Butuan issued Ordinances
numbered 11, 131 and148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts
of any business operated in the city. Butuan Sawmill, Inc. questioned the
validity of the taxing ordinance which is deemed to have impaired the
obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitioner of property without due
process of law. On the other hand, Respondent maintained that it was vested
with the “power to provide for the levy and collection of taxes for general and
special purposes” as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1950.
Issue:
Whether the city of Butuan can authorized to tax the franchised Butuan
Sawmill.
Held:
No. Examination of the laws involved shows that the inclusion of the
franchised business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the City of Butuan within
the coverage of the questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the broad power
of taxation of the city under its charter; nor can the power therein granted be
taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise,
since its charter did not expressly nor specifically provide any such power.
Be it noted that the franchise was granted by act of the legislature on 18
June 1949 while the city's charter was approved on 15 June 1950.
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general — the
terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the
special — the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception
to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular case
72. Arayata vs. Joya, 51 PHIL 654
FACTS:
Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots, and he started paying the Government
for such. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited, he conveyed
some of the lots to respondent F. Joya as administrator. Cecilio died before
fully paying the Government for the lands. His widow, herein petitioner,
was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision
on conjugal property. The court then sought to deliver the property to
Florentino for liquidation and distribution. Petitioner claimed that under Act
1120, Sec. 16, the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon
compliance with requirements of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act
1120’s full conveyance of the property to the widow.
HELD:
Act 1120 prevails. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition,
disposition, and transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the Civil
Code. The Civil Code is a general law, while Act 1120 is a special law. The
special law must prevail.
general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions
above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons
or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions
of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city
"Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by
any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control
or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189
governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present
action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article
2189 is decisive thereon.

73. City of Manila vs. Teotico, 2 SCRA 267

Facts:
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico, was about to
board a jeepney, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, he suffered several injuries
in the different part of his body and was brought to a hospital for treatment.
Thus, he filed , with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint —
which was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of
police. The CFI dismissed the complaint and on appeal was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals under Article 2189 of the Civil Code.
City of Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the
latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for
the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the
entire Philippines.
Hence the case.

Issue:
Whether the applicable code in the present case us RA 409.
Held:
No. The Court ruled that it is true that, insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a