DC Arc Flash Hazards and Protection in Photovoltaic Systems
Finley R. Shapiro1 and Brian Radibratovic2
1
The Pennsylvania State University, 4801 South Broad Street, Philadelphia, PA 19112
2
Power Analytics Corporation, 10805 Rancho Bernardo Road, Suite 270, San Diego, CA 92127
Abstract — Combiner boxes and disconnect switches in
commercial and utility scale photovoltaic systems are locations of
DC arc flash hazards. We calculate the DC arc flash hazard at
various points of a PV system, and develop a simple factor that
relates the power of part of a PV array to the potential arc flash
heat exposure. Practical considerations for protecting workers,
and opportunities for improved equipment and procedures, are
also discussed.
Index Terms—arc flash, personal protective clothing
I. INTRODUCTION
Potential hazards from DC arc flashes in commercial and
utility scale photovoltaic (PV) systems are receiving increased
attention [1]. This attention accompanies other work on DC
arcing in PV systems [2], [3] and work on DC arc flashes in
other systems [4]─ [6]. In this paper we discuss the calculation
of the arc flash hazard at various points in the DC side of a
photovoltaic system, following the IEEE Guide for Performing
Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, IEEE Standard 1584-2002 [7]
and the National Fire Protection Association’s NFPA 70E
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace [8]. We also
discuss practical considerations for protecting workers from
DC arc flashes, and opportunities for improved equipment and
procedures.
An arc flash is a blast of very hot air caused by a sudden
electric arc, possibly including vaporized metal from the
sources of the arc. Severe burns have been suffered by persons
who had the misfortune of being hit by the blast from an
unexpected arc flash. Arc flash hazards are situations in which
an arc flash may occur, and are studied to determine how to
protect workers who need to be at the locations of these
hazards. The severity of an arc flash hazard is quantified by
the heat energy per unit area, called the “incident energy” (IE),
to which an individual could be exposed during an arc flash
accident. The typical goal of a calculation of arc flash incident
energy is to determine the appropriate personal protective
equipment (PPE) for people working in area of the hazard.
PPE includes protective clothing and eye and ear protection,
and may be rated for a maximum IE or for a hazard category
specified in NFPA 70E.
Another important calculation is the “arc flash boundary,”
defined as a distance at which the calculated IE is equal to
1.2cal/cm2. This is the incident energy which a person can
receive a second degree burn. A person entering an arc flash
boundary needs to wear appropriate PPE.
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In most large commercial and utility scale PV systems,
hundreds or thousands of PV panels, with a combined rated
output ranging from 10kW to over 1MW DC, are connected in
series and parallel before the electricity is converted to AC. At
some points in these systems, there may be DC voltages up to
1000V and currents over 1kA. Testing procedures often
require access to these areas while the DC voltage is present,
and sometimes when DC current is flowing. During this work
there is a hazard of arc flashes due to equipment failure or
human error.
Arc flash safety is discussed in detail in NFPA 70E Article
130. Section 130.5 discusses the need for an arc flash hazard
analysis to determine safe work distances and requirements for
Personal Protection Equipment (PPE), including protective
clothing and eye and ear protection. In place of a complete
analysis, the section also allows the use of arc flash hazard
categories (given in Section 130.7) for choosing PPE, based on
the equipment in use and the situation. The use of these
categories is quite popular. However, the categories specified
for DC equipment are based on very different current-voltage
characteristics than those of PV arrays.
Since the NFPA’s arc flash hazard categories are not
appropriate for the DC side of PV systems, an arc flash hazard
analysis using calculated incident energies is called for. We
discuss here the calculation of the incident energy taking into
account the unique features of a PV system. This calculated
incident energy is then part of the arc flash hazard analysis that
leads to the selection of appropriate PPE. We also show the
calculation of the arc flash boundary.
Our calculations of incident energy and arc flash boundaries
are based on the methods in NFPA 70E and IEEE Standard
1584-2002. We use work distances and exposure times that are
standard for arc flash calculations as suggested in these
publications. We assume proper system design, especially the
proper sizing and operation of protective fuses.
The calculations incorporate the maximum power that can
feed an electric arc without blowing a fuse. Worse arc flashes
could occur if fuses are incorrectly sized or fail to interrupt the
flow of current when they should, but such accidents should be
unlikely.
II. DC ARC FLASHES IN PV SYSTEMS
Fig. 1 shows the general electrical design of the DC part of a
typical commercial or utility scale PV array. Each string of
modules shown on the left typically has 10 to 20 individual
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solar modules connected in series, with a total rated output of their arc flash hazards from those of other DC systems. The
power per string of about 2 to 5kW and a total open circuit current-voltage relationship of a PV module, string, or array
voltage of 400V to 1000V DC. Commonly, the negative has the same general shape as that of a PV cell. Modules
outputs of the strings are connected to ground at the inverter, deliver the maximum power to the rest of the circuit when
and the fuses and disconnects are only on the positive outputs. operating at their maximum power point. At the maximum
There are also some systems in which this is reversed, and power point, the current is typically about 90% of the short
other systems in which neither side is connected to ground and circuit current, and the voltage is about 90% of the open circuit
fuses and disconnects are on both sides of the string outputs. voltage. This is distinct from a traditional Thévenin-type
This does not alter our calculations here. power source, for which the maximum power current is 50%
of the short circuit current and the maximum power voltage is
‚ 50% of the open circuit voltage.
 ƒ „ In a PV array, the maximum output power, short circuit
… current, and maximum power point current are limited
 … † primarily by the intensity of light hitting the modules. These
cannot increase without a change in the light or temperature.
PV modules are rated by testing them under a set of con-
... ... ditions known as Standard Test Conditions (STC). The short
circuit current, maximum output power, and other parameters
 ‚ of a PV module at STC are found on the label of every module
ƒ
and also on spec sheets. However, under some bright sunlight
… conditions a PV module can output more than its rated power
 and current at STC. For this reason, the National Electrical
Code (NEC) [9] requires that designs use a maximum output
current of 1.25 times the rated short circuit current, and fuse
sizes are determined on this basis.
Fig. 1. Generalized electrical schematic of the DC side of a
commercial or utility scale PV system. 1: Strings of modules; 2: 1st
level combiner boxes; 3: 1st level disconnects; 4: 2nd level combiner III. INCIDENT ENERGY CALCULATIONS
box; 5: 2nd level disconnect; 6: Inverter. st
A. 1 Level Combiner Box—Disconnect Open
First level combiner boxes (marked 2 in Fig. 1) typically We first calculate the maximum incident energy in a first
have inputs from 10 to 20 strings of modules. In some systems level combiner box (2 in Fig. 1) when the first level DC
each first level combiner box and its first level disconnect (3 in disconnect (3 in Fig. 1) is open, based on the principles in
Fig. 1) are in the same enclosure. This reduces part count and IEEE Standard 1584-2002 and NFPA 70E. Following the
field wiring, but there are many systems in which these units NEC, we will use the rated power of a string times 1.25 as the
are separate. maximum power that a string can contribute to an arc in the
Second level combiner boxes (4 in Fig.1) are not present at combiner box. This power will not cause the string’s fuse to
all in smaller systems or systems with many small inverters. If blow. With N strings connected to the combiner box, we
a second level combiner box is present, it may receive inputs define the maximum power that all of the strings can
from as few as two first level combiner boxes up to more than contribute to an arc as
20. The second level combiner box and second level
disconnect (5 in Fig. 1) may be in the same enclosure, and may
   


 1.25 
  1.25 (1)
be in the inverter’s enclosure. Second level combiner boxes
are sometimes called “recombiner boxes” or “subcombiner
boxes.”
Many different types of DC faults are possible in this
system. These include ground faults between any wire and
ground, faults between different strings of modules, and faults
between the positive and negative outputs at the various stages
of combining the string outputs.
A ground fault is the most likely cause of an electric shock.
However, the most likely cause of an arc flash is an electrical
fault between the combined positive and negative outputs of
multiple strings of PV modules, located inside a first or second
level combiner box or disconnect enclosure.
Several features of PV systems distinguish the determination
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where PBOX is the sum of the rated power of all of the modules
feeding the combiner box.
If the thermal energy emitted by the arc is spread over the
surface of a sphere a distance D from the arc, the incident
energy is the total thermal energy divided by 4πD2. However,
when the arc is in an enclosure, the incident energy is
concentrated in one direction rather than spreading uniformly.
In this case, NFPA 70E recommends multiplying the
calculated incident energy for a sphere by a factor of 3.
When a fuse will not blow to reduce or interrupt an arc, as in
this case, IEEE-1584 recommends an exposure time of 2
seconds. It is assumed that in this time a person would move
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away from the arc flash. Using these values, we calculate the
incident energy as:
"#$ '
 
  1.25  2 s  238  (2)
%& ()*+
At the standard working distance D=45.5cm (18”), (2) be-
comes
"#$
 
  0.069
"/+ %0
This is the incident energy that might reach body parts 18”
from the arc during an arc flash accident. Fingers and hands
that are closer could be exposed to a greater incident energy.
The array in a residential scale PV system typically has a
rated power between 1 and 8kW. In such a system the
calculated incident energy is less than 0.6cal/cm2. However,
PBOX in a large commercial or utility scale PV system could be
40kW or larger, leading to an arc flash hazard incident energy
of 3cal/cm2 or larger at 18”.
The arc flash boundary is the value of D in (2) at which the
IE is equal to 1.2cal/cm2,
1  112
 cm
This distance is less than 30cm for most residential PV
systems, but could be 66cm or larger in commercial and utility
scale systems.
B. 1st Level DC Disconnect—Disconnect Open
Now consider the output side of a 1st level DC disconnect. It
is protected by a fuse in the second level combiner box that is
rated to the sum of the rated short circuit currents of all of the
strings feeding the first level combiner box times 1.25 for
bright sunlight, times 1.25 again for the error margin of the
fuse, rounded up to the next available fuse size. The maximum
power current is about 0.9 times the short circuit current, and
the roundup could increase the fuse rating by a factor of 1.2.
Therefore, the maximum arc that does not blow the fuse in the
2nd level combiner box could produce an incident energy as
much as
3.453.4 "#$
 
   0.069
6.7 "/+ %0
"#$

  0.11
"/+ %0
under conditions in which this much power is available from
the rest of the array.
If multiple 1st level combiner boxes are connected to the
second level combiner box, the power in (5) could be available
for an arc under modest sunlight conditions. Brighter sunlight
could cause the fuse to blow. The brightness necessary to
blow the fuse depends on the number of 1st level combiner
boxes connected to the second level combiner box.
The arc flash boundary is also larger in the disconnect than
in the combiner box. We calculate the maximum arc flash
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boundary by inserting the additional factors from (5) into (2),
giving an arc flash boundary
1  142
 cm (6)
C. 1st Level DC Disconnect Closed
If the 1st level DC disconnect is closed, the incident energy
of an arc flash in either the 1st level combiner box or the 1st
(3)
level DC disconnect could be as much as the sum of (3) and
(5),
"#$
 
  0.18 . (7)
"/+ %0
This is an upper limit. Depending on the design of the array,
the 1st level combiner box may only be able to contribute less
than the amount in (3) under the sunlight conditions that
produce the incident energy in (5). So the total incident energy
will be between (5) and (7).
The upper limit for the arc flash boundary is now
1  182
 cm (8)
nd nd
(4) D. 2 Level Combiner Box and 2 Level DC Disconnect
In the 2nd level combiner box and the 2nd level DC
disconnect, the calculation of incident energy is the same as in
(2), except now in place of PBOX we now use PARRAY, the rated
power of the entire array or subarray connected to the inverter.
This is
 
;  0.069
"#$
. (9)
"/+ %0
which is also the maximum incident energy for an arc flash
inside the inverter. The arc flash boundary is
1  112
; cm (10)
at these locations..
The results in (3) through (10) are summarized in Table I. It
is important to note that all of these calculations are of incident
energy at a distance of 18”. The same approach can be used to
calculate incident energies at other distances.
IV. DISCUSSION
(5)
The practical issue is what should be done to protect
workers who build, commission, test, and maintain these
systems. Several factors must be considered.
1) Some electrical testing of a PV system must be done while
the system is operating, when the second level disconnect
and at least one first level disconnect are closed.
2) Combiner boxes are often not built to facilitate testing. A
typical combiner box is shown in Fig. 2. The unit has a
protective shield over the most hazardous areas, but
workers may remove it for measuring the voltage at the
attachment points under it.
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 TABLE I
CALCULATED MAXIMUM INCIDENT ENERGY AT 18” FROM A PV DC ARC FLASH AND ARC FLASH BOUNDARY
PBOX AND PARRAY ARE IN KILOWATTS
Maximum Incident
Location Energy at 18” (cal/cm2)
st st
1 level combiner box with the 1 level
DC disconnect open
st
1 level DC disconnect output when
disconnect is open
st st
1 level combiner box and 1 level DC
disconnect when disconnect is closed
nd nd
2 level combiner box and 2 level DC
disconnect
3) Testing often involves measuring currents in individual
strings. It can difficult to wrap a current probe, such as one
shown in Fig. 3, around wires in a combiner box such as
those on the left of Fig. 2. Manipulating the wires generally
requires inserting a finger or tool into the combiner box.
The current probe in Fig. 4 is better suited to the purpose,
but the wires will still need to be manipulated.
4) Many PV systems are maintained by companies that did
not build them. Workers often do not have access to
information on arc flash hazards before going to a site, and
are unlikely to do the calculations once they arrive.
5) Design errors that increase arc flash hazards, such as
incorrect fuse sizes, may only be discovered while
inspecting or maintaining a system, if then.
6) It is a common misconception that systems are safe to work
on without PPE if the disconnects are open.
7) Testing and maintaining PV systems often requires
climbing multi-story ladders, working in hot sunny
locations, and other situations where heavy personal
protection equipment is a substantial burden and can itself
be a source of risk. Overdressing can be unsafe.
8) Equipment can be spread out. The second level combiner
box may be at ground level, while the first level
disconnects may be on a roof, far away, or both.
V. SUGGESTIONS
Our calculations suggest that a significant DC arc flash
hazard may exist in commercial and utility scale PV systems.
Further research is necessary into DC arc flashes in the voltage
and current ranges found in PV systems to make more accurate
calculations of arc flash hazards possible.
Even without test results, appropriate personal protection
equipment needs to be selected and issued to workers who
work on large PV systems. Training programs for workers
who install and maintain PV systems need to include
discussions of arc flash hazards and PPE for them.
Calculations of arc flash hazards at different locations
should be done as a routine part of the design PV arrays with
ratings greater than 10kW. All combiner boxes and DC
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Arc Flash Boundary
(cm)
0.069 PBOX 112

0.11 PBOX 142

up to 0.18 PBOX up to 182

0.069 PARRAY 112
;
disconnects should have warning labels specifying the
calculated incident energy of an arc flash there. In addition, arc
flash hazards at different locations should be described on
electrical schematics, and also stated prominently in
documentation that goes from the designer to those who
install, own, and maintain a PV system.
As importantly, equipment needs to be designed for safe
testing and maintenance. Test points should be included so that
voltage and current testing can be accomplished while
minimizing exposure to arc flash hazards.
Lastly, DC arc flash safety should be considered in the
design of PV systems. The biggest hazards for DC arc flashes
are in second level combiner boxes and disconnects, and in
first level combiner boxes and disconnects due to backflow
from second level combiner boxes. Most commercial and
utility scale PV systems use inverters rated to 250kW or
higher, each fed by a second level combiner box. However,
some systems use an alternative design with multiple “string
inverters,” each typically with a rating in the 20 to 50kW
range. Such a system either has no second level combiner
boxes, or the power feeding each second level combiner box is
no more than slightly greater than the inverter’s power rating.
While improved output, monitoring, and reliability have been
prime reasons for choosing this type of design [10], the
advantage of reduced DC arc flash risks should be considered.
An extension of the idea of using multiple string inverters is
to use microinverters or AC modules. These products are
frequently used for residential PV systems, but are uncommon
in system with a rated power greater than 20kW. The
important feature of these systems is that only one PV module
can feed power to a DC arc flash. As most PV modules have a
rated power of 200 to 300W, the calculated DC arc flash
incident energy is below the level of concern.
Systems with many smaller inverters, microinverters, or AC
modules may have more locations with AC arc flash hazards
than a system with larger inverters. This requires a separate
analysis, but AC arc flash hazards are better understood than
DC arc flash hazards [5]─ [7].
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 VI. CONCLUSIONS [3] F. Reil, A. Sepanski, W. Herrmann, J. Althaus, W. Vaaßen and
H. Schmidt, "Qualification of arcing risks in PV modules," in
Present knowledge of DC arc flashes suggests that hazards
38th IEEE Photovoltaic Specialists Conference, 2012.
exist in the DC part of large PV systems. We have presented
[4] D. R. Doan, "Arc flash calculations for exposures to DC
an approach to calculating the hazard categories at different
systems," IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, vol. 46,
locations, based on our present knowledge. Some suggestions
no. 6, pp. 2299-2302, 2010.
for improving arc flash safety in PV systems are also given.
[5] R. H. Lee, "The other electrical hazard: electric arc blast burns,"
IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Vols. IA-18, no. 3,
ACKNOWLEDGMENT pp. 246-251, 1982.
[6] T. Papallo, "Arc flash calculations using a physics-based circuit
The authors are grateful to Kevin Wright of United
model," IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, vol. 48,
Management & Consultants for suggesting this topic of work
no. 4, pp. 1230-1236, 2012.
and for comments on the manuscript.
[7] IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations,
IEEE Standard 1584-2002, IEEE, 2002.
REFERENCES [8] National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 70E Standard for
Electrical Safety in the Workplace, 2012.
[1] J. N. Yuventi, "Electrical arc-flash energy calculations for
[9] National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 70 National
photovoltaic systems," in 38th IEEE Photovoltaic Specialists
Electrical Code, 2012.
Conference, 2012.
[10] A. Golnas, "PV system reliability: an operator's perspective," in
[2] J. Johnson, M. Montoya, S. McCalmont, G. Katzir, F. Fuks, J.
38th IEEE Photovoltaic Specialists Conference, 2012.
Earle, A. Fresquez, S. Gonzalez and J. Granata, "Differentiating
series and parallel photovoltaic arc-faults," in 38th IEEE
Photovoltaic Specialists Conference, 2012.

Fig. 3. A current probe that is difficult to use in a combiner box.

Fig. 2. A typical combiner box.

Fig. 4. Another current probe that can be used in a combiner box.

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