15. EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, vs.

VICENTE PALANCA

Facts:

The action was instituted by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels of real
property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in question was executed by the original defendant herein,
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank. After the execution
of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have been his native country; and he
there died, upon January 29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine Islands.

As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was necessary for the
plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by publication pursuant to section 399 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was
made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same time that the order of the court should deposit
in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his
last place of residence.

The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the defendant not having appeared,
judgment was, taken against him by default. Upon July 3, 1908, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In
this decision it was recited that publication had been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about this
notice having been given mail. The court, upon this occasion, found that the indebtedness of the defendant
amounted to P249,355. 32, with interest from March 31, 1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant
should, on or before July 6, 1908, deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of
the judgment, and it was declared that in case of the failure of the defendant to satisfy the judgment within such
period, the mortgage property located in the city of Manila should be exposed to public sale. The payment
contemplated in said order was never made; and upon July 8, 1908, the court ordered the sale of the property. The
sale took place upon July 30, 1908, and the property was bought in by the bank for the sum of P110,200. Upon
August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court.

About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the precise, upon June 25, 1915, a motion was made in
this cause by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default of July 2,
1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The
basis of this application, as set forth in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered
thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the
action.

Issues:

1. WON the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the
mortgage
2. WON those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.

Held:

Jurisdiction

The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising judicial power, is used in several different, though
related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action
or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the
property which is the subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and
thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may
grant.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of
legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized
and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court,
may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found
in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage
of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential
jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the
registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the
instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate
the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by
which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and
is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to
certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or
obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the
circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole
object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other
form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action
becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with
reference to the principles governing actions in rem.

On Due Process

xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due
process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be
given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a
foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which
appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally
provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence
is known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a
means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial
proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it.

It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner
shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands,
and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the
probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it
is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the
provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice
unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of
all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be
considered absolutely necessary.

The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of
actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by
agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have
been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendant’s last known address constitute denial of due process?

The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice,
if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and
hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by
publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our
opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.

It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a
question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can
be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the
requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction,
there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the
judgment. In the application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so
rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity
for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly
unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due
process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been
violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these
conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law has not been infringed.

16. IN THE MATTER OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF JOSE VAÑO, . TEODORO VAÑO, vs. PAZ VAÑO

Facts:

Jose Vaño died on January 28, 1950, in the City of Cebu, he was 78 years old and he died of P. T. B. (pulmonary
tuberculosis). He left properties valued at P95,913.05 as per inventory of the administrator but which according to
the evidence are worth much more. On February 11, 1950, Teodoro Ceblero Vaño petitioned the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to have a document supposed to be the last will and testament of Jose Vaño, Attesting that
Teodoro Ceblero Vaño is his son, and that he bequeath to Teodoro Ceblero Vaño all his properties.

On March 24, 1950, Paz Vaño Vda. de Garces and the supposed heirs of Jesus Vaño, brother of Jose Vaño, filed an
opposition stating that the will of the deceased Jose Vaño was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of Teodoro Ceblero who is not an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Jose Vaño;
That the said Jose Vaño was mentally incapable to make a will on December 11th, 1949; That the signature of the
testator Jose Vaño was procured by fraud and trick on the part of Teodoro Ceblero and the said deceased Jose
Vaño never intended that the said document should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto; That the
instrument now offered for probate as will of the deceased Jose Vaño is written in English language which is not
the usual and proper language of the deceased, and if the deceased would have had made any will he should have
it written in Spanish; That the deceased Jose Vaño had time and again told his sister and nephews that he will not
execute a will because he wants to leave all his estate in favor of his brother and sister, and nephews;
On August 29, 1950, Ireneo Vaño one of the persons included in the opposition, filed a motion stating that an
opposition has been filed against the probate of said will; That he is named as one of the oppositors, without his
knowledge and consent;That he does not oppose nor intends to oppose the probate of the will in question,
because that document contains a true expression of the wish and desire of Jose Vaño as to who shall inherit his
property. Thus, he prays to cancel his name from the list of oppositors.

Said motion of Ireneo Vaño was granted by the Court. In the course of the hearing, he was presented as one of the
witnesses for petitioner Teodoro and he declared that he used to go to his uncle's house where Teodoro lived and
he saw that Teodoro was treated as a son by Jose Vaño, who paid for Teodoro's board at the Colegio del Niño
where the two of them were students; that he never authorized anyone to include him as oppositor to the
probate of the will of Jose Vaño and that he did not oppose its probate.

The three attesting witnesses Pedro Ceniza, Dr. Osmundo Rama and Atty. Nazario Pacquiao testified for the
petitioner and assured the court that Exhibit "A" was the last will and testament of the late Jose Vaño; that he
signed Exhibit "A" in their presence, and that each of them signed the same after him in his presence and in the
presence of each other; that at the time of the execution of the document in the afternoon of December 11, 1949,
the testator was of sound and disposing mind and memory and that it was his voluntary act, no pressure or
influence having been exerted on him; that the blank space after the letter "I" in the first paragraph of Exhibit "A"
was filled out by the testator himself although they (witnesses) differ as to who filled out the blank spaces on the
document where the words "11th" and "December" appear. Atty. Pacquiao told the court that it was he who
prepared the will (Exhibit A) pursuant to the wishes of the testator.

For the opposition Ciriaca Alse who formerly worked as a servant in the household of Teodoro Vaño, Dolores
Garces de Falcon, a daughter of Paz Vaño Vda. de Garces and Carmen Vallore testified. The burden of their
testimony is that from November 1949, Jose Vaño was already very sick; that in December he was in serious if not
critical condition; that he was always in bed, oftentimes unable to move or open his eyes and he could not
maintain any conversation with anyone; that he had to be fed by someone; and that he was bed-ridden and
already had bed-sores. The idea sought to be conveyed by them was that the testator was in no condition to
execute a will.

Mr. Edgar Bond, an examiner of questioned documents was presented by the opposition as a handwriting expert
and he told the court that after examining the supposed signature of Jose Vaño on Exhibit "A" and comparing them
with his accepted standard signatures, he was convinced that the signatures on Exhibit "A" were forgeries. His
testimony was vigorously objected to by counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the genuineness of the
signature of the testator on Exhibit "A" was never placed in issue because the written opposition of the opponents
virtually admitted said genuineness and merely claimed that the will was not the testator's voluntary act because
said signature was obtained thru trickery and that undue pressure and influence were brought to bear upon him.

Issue: WON the trial court erred in permitting appellees over the objection of appellant to present evidence
which are contrary to their allegations in their opposition.

Held:

As the law in our jurisdiction on the probate of wills now stands, we are inclined to adopt that the law itself fixes or
determines the issue, because under section 12, Rule 77, of the Rules of Court, before the probate court can allow
the will it must be satisfied upon proof taken and filed that the will was duly executed, and that the testator at the
time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence,
or fraud. Also, under section 9 of the same rule, a will may be disallowed (a) if not executed and attested as
required by law; (b) if the testator was mentally incapable of making a will; (c) if it was executed under duress, or
the influence of fear, or threats; (d) if it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part
of the beneficiary; and (e) if the signature of the testator was procured by fraud and trick. The oppositors in the
present case therefore were not precluded from attacking the will on the ground of forgery despite the fact that
their opposition was confined to grounds (b), (c) and (d) of section 12, Rule 77 as stated above.
On the other hand, section 10 of the same rule 77 provides that "anyone appearing to contest the will must file a
writing stating his grounds for opposing its allowance; and serve a copy thereof on the petitioner and other
residents of the province interested in the estate.

Of course, as we have already stated, an oppositor objecting to the probate of the will on one or two specific
grounds may, during the hearing add to the grounds and submit evidence in support of the same, but when this
happen as it did in the present case, one is more or less justified in inferring that the oppositors were not sure of
their ground; that they were in doubt as to the basis of their opposition, a fact which naturally and not
inconsiderably weakens their stand. One of the grounds of their opposition was that the signature of the testator
was procured by fraud and trick, thereby leading one to believe, including the court and the petitioner that said
signature was genuine but was not valid. At the hearing, said oppositors completely changed their stand and
claimed that the signature was actually forged. As we have already said, that conduct and attitude, changeable and
uncertain, does not strengthen their position.

Let us now go to the evidence on the alleged forgery of the signatures of the testator Jose Vaño.

There is no question that there are differences and discrepancies between the two signatures reading "Jose Vaño"
on Exhibit "A" and the genuine, accepted signatures of the testator even as late as the last part of the year 1949.
But we should not forget that on December 11th of the same year when he executed Exhibit "A", he was suffering
from apparently advanced pulmonary tuberculosis as well as rheumatism which according to Dr. Osmundo Rama
who had been treating him until the day he died, affected his joints. The testator was then 78 years old, lying in
bed most of the time, so much so that he developed bed-sores, sitting up in bed only once in a while, and at those
times, his hands trembled. It is natural that his signatures on Exhibit "A" should lack the firmness, rhythm, lack of
effort and continuity of motion that they had before he became quite ill and infirm.

17. JOSE LAM, vs. ADRIANA CHUA

Facts:

The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by
Adriana Chua against Jose Lam. Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were married on January 13,
1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such
psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently
failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with Jose
on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties; said
agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28,
1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with
her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null
and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.

Summons was duly served on Jose Lam on March 22, 1994. Despite the lapse of fifteen days after service of
summons, no responsive pleading was filed by him. Hence, the trial court issued an Order dated April 13, 1994,
directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio Barrera to conduct an investigation for determination whether or not
there was collusion between the parties and to submit his report thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor
Barrera filed his Report stating that "there seems to be no collusion between the parties".

Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract dated May 25, 1977 between Jose and one Celia
Santiago, and another Marriage Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock, 5 showing that Jose
had been married twice before he married Adriana in 1984.

On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner Adriana Chua
and respondent Jose Lam null and void for being bigamous by nature.
On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration 8 thereof but only insofar as the decision awarded
monthly support to his son in the amount of ₱20,000.00. He argued that there was already a provision for support
of the child as embodied in the decision dated February 28, 1994 of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana
agreed to contribute ₱250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child.

Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common fund had even amounted to ₱500,000.00.

On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lam’s motion for reconsideration ruling that the
compromise agreement entered into by the parties and approved by the Makati RTC before the marriage was
declared null and void ab initio by the Pasay RTC, is of no moment and cannot limit and/or affect the support
ordered by the latter court.

Issue:

1. WON the honorable court of appeals erred in finding that the trial court’s ruling that the compromise
agreement between petitioner and respondent where they bound themselves to contribute the amount
of two hundred fifty thousand pesos (₱250,000.00) to a common fund for the benefit of their child does
not bar the trial court in annulment case to again award support in favor of the child.
2. WON the court exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the nullity of the marriage.

Held:

The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they ruled that the amount of support is by no
means permanent.

“Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be
modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It
cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.”

Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him and Adriana, as
approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John
Paul. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in the compromise
agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be considered final
and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of
the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support.

II

The Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of the proceedings and the decision rendered by the
trial court.

First, the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Adriana with the Pasay
RTC is the psychological incapacity of Jose without any prayer for the support of her child. Adriana presented,
formally offered her evidence in support of the petition and submitted the case for decision as of May 12,
1994.14 But on a motion to re-open filed by her on June 23, 1994, the trial court set the case for reception of
evidence on July 6, 1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to present evidence of two previous marriages
contracted by Jose with other women to prove that the marriage between Adriana and Jose was null and void for
being bigamous. It is only at the July 6, 1994 hearing that respondent Adriana first claimed support for John Paul
when she testified in open court.
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by the admission of the additional evidence. The
ground relied on for nullity of the marriage was changed from the psychological incapacity of Jose to that of
existence of previous marriages of Jose with two different women with an additional claim for support of the child.
Such substantial changes were not reflected in the petition filed with the trial court, as no formal amendment was
ever made by Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten phrase "And for respondent to support the child of
petitioner in an amount this Honorable Court may deem just and reasonable"15 found at the ultimate paragraph of
the petition, as allowed by the Pasay RTC. There is nothing on record to show that petitioner Jose was notified of
the substantial changes in the petition of Adriana.

Second, the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be present on July 6, 1994 for the presentation of
evidence by Adriana and to refute the same. Although copy of the motion filed on June 23, 1994 with a notice of
hearing on June 27, 1994 was sent to Jose, the record does not show that he received the notice in due time;
neither does the record show that he was notified of the subsequent hearing held on July 6, 1994 where Adriana
presented the marriage certificates and claimed for the support of their child sans the presence of Jose.

Third, the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of the Order dated July 6, 1994 wherein the trial
court granted the Urgent Motion to Re-Open of respondent Adriana and forthwith allowed her to present her
evidence to prove that petitioner herein contracted previous marriages with different women.

Fourth, the evidence presented by respondent regarding her claim for support for John Paul is glaringly insufficient
and cannot be made a valid basis upon which the Pasay RTC could have determined the monthly amount of
₱20,000.00 for the support to be given to John Paul by petitioner Jose.

It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions
except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond them is coram non-judice
and void. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or the
scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not merely irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to
collateral attack.

The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court upon a subject within its general jurisdiction, but which is
not brought before it by any statement or claim of the parties, and is foreign to the issues submitted for its
determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial court to have rendered judgment on issues not
presented in the pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The amendment of the petition to reflect the
new issues and claims against Jose was, therefore, indispensable so as to authorize the court to act on the issue of
whether the marriage of Jose and Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should have
been awarded for the support of John Paul. When the trial court rendered judgment beyond the allegations
contained in the copy of the petition served upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
deprived petitioner Lam of due process.

Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana and Jose for being bigamous is concerned,
the decision rendered by the Pasay RTC could be declared as invalid for having been issued beyond its jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, considering that Jose, did not assail the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana in his
motion for reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court of Appeals and
with us, he likewise did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to receive evidence and render
judgment on his previous marriages with other woman which were not alleged in the petition filed by Adriana.
Petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana and therefore,
the Court will not undo the judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for
being bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this, however,
admits of an exception where estoppel has supervened.

18. ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
Facts:

The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private
respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him
and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from
his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its
value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita
Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was
formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since
then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the
business.

In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of the business.
She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the
records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business
operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof.
As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.

Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring
that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction
over the case. 3

Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter
erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer"
and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home, and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee
relationship between him and petitioner.4

NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, 6 hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: WON the Court may exercise judicial review over decisions rendered by NLRC

Held:

As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been
understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original
action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases
that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction
to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies
generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie
from decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC
cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and
impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor
Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court or of any other court for that matter.

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an
oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In
fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the
Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion
which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records
of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No.
10452.

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score
we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which,
not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or
ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the
increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious
action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of
the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

19. LINGNER & FISHER GMBH, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Facts:

DEUTCHE MILCHWERKE DR. A. SAUER (DMW for brevity) was a firm in West Germany manufacturing PRODUCTS
(probably chemicals) under the trademarks FISSAN, etc. Private respondent Philippine Chemical Laboratories, Inc.
(PHILCHEM, for brevity) is a local company which apparently also manufactures and sells chemicals.

DMW and PHILCHEM executed a so-called Agency AGREEMENT the basic provision of which was that PHILCHEM
would be the exclusive importer of the PRODUCTS into the Philippines. The benefit to PHILCHEM would be the
profits realized from re-sale in this country of imported PRODUCTS.

It appears that, subsequently, the DMW interests were acquired by LINGNER & FISHER GMBH LINGNER for
brevity). On other hand, LINGNER was a subsidiary of BEECHAM GROUP LTD. which, through BEECHAM PRODUCTS
INTERNATIONAL (BEECHAM, for brevity), had opened an office in this country at Unit A, Padilla Building, Emerald
Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, under the supervision or managership of one named TANNER. LINGNER and
BEECHAM can be deemed to constitute a single personality. Subsequent reference to LINGNER will include
reference to DMW and BEECHAM.

The AGREEMENT was automatically renewed once, or up to February 28, 1973, and finally terminated on August
31, 1977.
By letter dated February 25, 1977, through the law firm of Ozaeta Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta, Buenaventura,
Sayoc and De los Angeles (the Law Firm, for brevity) PHILCHEM was advised that LINGNER was interested in
continuing business relationship with PHILCHEM and will be interested in negotiating a new contract and that,
prior to the signing of a new contract, LINGNER was proposing that the old contract be extended by mutual
agreement for a period of six (6) calendar months beginning March 1, 1977 to expire automatically on August 31,
1977 if no contract is entered into. The proposal was accepted by PHILCHEM, and no new contract having been
signed by August 31, 1977, the AGREEMENT terminated on that date,

On July 20, 1979, PHILCHEM presented a claim to LINGNER for P1,055,000.00 under the ROYALTY CLAUSE. The
claim was discussed between PHILCHEM and TANNER of BEECHAM with the intervention of the Law Firm. No
settlement having been arrived at, PHILCHEM, on August 6, 1980, filed a complaint against BEECHAM alone in Civil
Case No. 38086 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. The summons issued could not be served on BEECHAM,
the Sheriff having reported that BEECHAM was neither a company registered in the Philippines, nor resident at the
given address of Unit A, Padilla Building, Emerald Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila.

Issues:

1. WON LINGNER was doing business in the Philippines;

2. WON LINGNER could be validly summoned through the Law Firm as its agent.

Held:

LINGNER went on certiorari to the Intermediate Appellate Court where it reiterated the plea that summons could
not be validly served on it through the Law Firm; and it also requested that a hearing be held, conformably to the
provisions of Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, on the question of whether or not LINGNER was doing
business in this country.

The Appellate Court held that summons served through the Law Firm was valid on the strength of Johnlo Trading
Co. vs. Flores (88 Phil. 741 [1951]); and it further ruled that receiving evidence on whether or not LINGNER was
doing business in the Philippines could not be justified under the cited Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Considering the Comment, Reply, Rejoinder and Surrejoinder submitted by the parties, we resolved to give due
course, without requiring the submittal of memoranda.

The Appellate Court acted correctly in denying the request for an evidentiary hearing. Evidence necessary in
regards to factual issues raised in cases falling within the Appellate Court's original and appellate jurisdiction
contemplates "incidental" facts which were not touched upon, or fully heard by the trial or respondent Court. The
law could not have intended that the Appellate Court would hold an original and full trial of a main factual issue in
a case, which properly pertains to Trial Courts.

It is our view that evidence as to whether LINGNER was doing business in the Philippines, even before the Trial
Court, is no longer necessary in view of the fact that PHILCHEM and LINGNER were contractees in the AGREEMENT
and the claim of PHILCHEM is based on the ROYALTY CLAUSE of that AGREEMENT. Whether LINGNER is or is not
doing business in the Philippines will not matter because the parties had expressly stipulated in the AGREEMENT
that all controversies based on the AGREEMENT "shall fall under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts". In other
words, there was a covenant on venue to the effect that LINGNER can be sued by PHILCHEM before Philippine
Courts in regards to a controversy related to the AGREEMENT.

A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to
conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a Court complaining that he had not been
validly summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served
on said defendant.

For the expeditious determination of this controversy, therefore, in view of the insufficiency of evidence that
LINGNER is doing business in the Philippines, which is a sine qua non requirement under the provision of Section
14, Rule 14 of the Rules before service of process can be effected upon a foreign corporation and jurisdiction over
the same may be acquired, it is best that alias summons on LINGNER be issued, in this case under the provisions of
Section 17, Rule 14, in relation to Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which recognizes the principle that venue can be
agreed upon by the parties. If a local plaintiff and a foreign corporation have agreed on Philippine venue, summons
by publication can be made on the foreign corporation under the principle of liberal construction of the rules to
promote just determination of actions.

20. Russel vs. Vestil

Facts:

On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents, denominated "DECLARATION
OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City . The complaint, in substance, alleged
that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu. The land was previously
owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses, the property was
inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had remained
undivided until petitioners discovered a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this
deed, private respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are also
entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed that
the document was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral
partition of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document
be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs.

On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under
section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela.

Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section
19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.

On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. A Motion for
Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners on January 30, 1995 alleging that the same is contrary to law
because their action is not one for recovery of title to or possession of the land but an action to annul a document
or declare it null and void, hence, one incapable of pecuniary estimation failing within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. Private respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration.

On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge issued another Order denying the motion for reconsideration.

Issue: WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MAN-2275.

Held:

We find merit in the petition.

Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment of a
document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL
PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.

Private respondents, on the other hand, insists that the action is one for re-partition and since the assessed value
of the property as stated in the complaint is P5,000.00, then, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises.

We agree with petitioners.

The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation and
therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates
that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does
exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00
or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).

However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."

The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private
respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and
divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled
to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main
action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein.

21. LAPITAN, vs. SCANDIA, INC., and GENERAL ENGINEERING CO.,

Facts:

Andres Lapitan has appealed directly to this Court against an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, his complaint for rescission and damages against appellees Scandia, Inc., of
Manila and General Engineering Co. of Cebu.

Lapitan's complaint in the court below averred that on April 17, 1963 he purchased from Scandia, Inc., through its
sub-dealer in Cebu City, General Engineering Co., one ABC Diesel Engine, of 16 horse power, for P3,735.00, paid in
cash; that he bought the engine for running a rice and corn mill at Ormoc City, Leyte; that defendants had
warranted and assured him that all spare parts for said engine are kept in stock in their stores, enabling him to
avoid loss due to long periods of waiting, and that defendants would replace any part of the engine that might
break within twelve months after delivery. Plaintiff further charged that on June 28, 1963, the cam rocker arm of
the engine broke due to faulty material and workmanship and it stopped functioning; that the sellers were unable
to send a replacement until August 29, 1963; that barely six days after replacement the new part broke again due
to faulty casting and poor material, so he (Lapitan) notified the sellers and demanded rescission of the contract of
sale; that he sought return of the price and damages but defendants did not pay. He, therefore, prayed (1) for
rescission of the contract; (2) reimbursement of the price; (3) recovery of P4,000.00 actual damages plus P1,000.00
attorney's fees; (4) recovery of such moral and exemplary damages as the court deems just and equitable; and (5)
costs and other proper relief.
After filing answers disclaiming liability, Scandia, Inc., moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the total
amount claimed was only P8,735.00, and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court, under
Republic Act 3828, amending the Judiciary Act by increasing the jurisdiction of municipal courts to civil cases
involving P10,000.00 or less.

After argument, the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.

Issues:

1. WON rescission was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and

2. WON the claimed moral and exemplary damages, besides the price of P3,735.00, P4,000.00 actual
damages, and P1,000.00 attorneys' fees, the value of his demand exceeded the jurisdiction of the
municipal court.

Held:

A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, 1 this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class
cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to
be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that
the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of
June 11, 1901).

Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by
courts of first instance. And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why an action for
rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a rescission being a counterpart, so to speak, of "specific
performance". In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an investigation into facts that would
justify one act or the other. No award for damages may be had in an action for rescission without first conducting
an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts of first
instance would have to make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation expressly held
to be so by this Court. Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for rescission
has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action
for rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation — a
prayer which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have suffered
as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule
against splitting a cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.

Of course, where the money claim is prayed for as an alternative relief to specific performance, an equivalence is
implied that permits the jurisdiction to be allocated by the amount of the money claim. But no such equivalence
can be deduced in the case at bar, where the money award can be considered only if the rescission is first granted.

We, therefore, rule that the subject matter of actions for rescission of contracts are not capable of pecuniary
estimation, and that the court below erred in declining to entertain appellant's action for lack of jurisdiction.

22. The Good Government Corporation vs. Tutaan

Facts:

The complaint, filed on January 16, 1974, is an action to recover from the private respondents Guillermo De los
Reyes and Marcelina Marcelo the sum of P1,520.00 plus interest, and the sum equivalent to 25% of the total
amount due as attorney’s fees and, in default of payment thereof, to order the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
executed by said private respondents covering personal properties valued at P15,340.00, located at Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Gregorio Emperado and Leonarda de la Cruz were made party defendants for the reason that they were
the co-makers of the promissory note executed by the private to evidence the loan.

On October 19, 1974, the private respondents filed their answer thereto claiming that the loan sued upon is only
one of five (5) loans secured by them from the petitioner wherein they were charged usurious interest; and that
the balance due the petitioner is only P1,260.00 which they are willing to pay upon the petitioner’s furnishing
them with all the copies of the documents signed by them in connection with the loan obtained by them from the
petitioner.

For failure to plead, defendant Gregorio Emperado was declared in default while the case against the defendant
co-maker Leonarda de la Cruz was dismissed without prejudice.

On February 17, 1975, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction for
the reasons that the petitioner, in its complaint, seeks and prays for a sum of money amounting to P1,520.00
which comes under the original jurisdiction of the municipal court, and that in view of the alternative prayer for
foreclosure of mortgage, the complaint should have been filed in the proper court of Bulacan where the chattels
are located and where the deed of chattel mortgage is registered. 4

On April 25, 1975, the respondent court sustained the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice to its
refiling in the proper form and in the proper court. The reason for the dismissal is that:

"The complaint filed by plaintiff is clearly one for collection for otherwise, if it were for foreclosure of mortgage,
defendants Gregorio Emperado and Leonarda de la Cruz would not have been included as party-defendants. Their
inclusion indicates the intent of plaintiff to also collect from them.

"The case being one for a sum of money, the cause of action must be governed by the law on jurisdiction.
Assuming the validity of plaintiff’s principal claim of P1,520.00, interest thereon at 12% per month from August 4,
1973, and attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of said amount, the total thereof cannot and will not reach
P10,000.00. It then becomes clear that this case must fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the city
court."

On May 7, 1975, the petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order of dismissal but the same was
denied on June 25, 1975.

On July 27, 1975, the petitioner, without prior leave of court, again filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal which the respondent court denied on August 8, 1975.

Issue: WON respondent court has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

On the issue of which court has jurisdiction, the case of Seno v. Pastolante, Et Al., 10 is in point. It was ruled therein
that although the purpose of an action is to recover an amount plus interest which comes within the original
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court, yet when said action involves the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage
covering personal properties valued at more than P2,000, (now P10,000.00) the action should be instituted before
the Court of First Instance.
In the instant case, the action is to recover the amount of P1,520.00 plus interest and costs, and involves the
foreclosure of a chattel mortgage of personal properties valued at P15,340.00, so that it is clearly within. the
competence of the respondent court to try and resolve.

23. Quismundo vs CA

Facts:

It appears that on February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants of petitioner, filed a complaint with the trial
court praying that their relationship with petitioner be changed from share tenancy to a leasehold system,
pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, their request therefor having been denied by
petitioner.3

On March 2, 1988, private respondents further filed a motion for the issuance of an order authorizing the
supervision by the deputy sheriff of the court of the harvesting and liquidation of the 1987-1988 sugarcane crops,
which motion was granted by the trial court in an order dated March 3, 1988.

On March 16, 1988, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action since the law that
should allegedly govern the relationship of the parties is Act No. 4115, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
271, and not Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit in an order
dated June 2, 1988.

On June 18, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial order, invoking as an additional
ground the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case under the authority and by reason of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, specifically Executive Order No. 229 and Republic Act No. 6657.

Pending the resolution of said motion for reconsideration, private respondents filed another motion dated
November 9, 1988, for the supervision of harvesting. On December 6, 1988, the trial court granted the motion of
private respondents and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner then elevated the controversy to respondent court on a petition for certiorari but, as stated at the
outset, said court upheld the jurisdiction of the court below.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated October
9, 1990. Not satisfied therewith, petitioner is now before us raising the sole issue of jurisdiction.

Issue: WON the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City has no jurisdiction to try the case at bar considering that the
exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate agrarian cases has already been vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) by Executive Order No. 229, as amended by Republic Act No. 6657.

Held:

We find said contention tenable.

Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests in the Department of
Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters. The pertinent
provision of said executive order reads as follows:

SECTION 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA).
The DAR shall have powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to
enforce its order or decisions.

The decisions of the DAR may, in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately
executory notwithstanding such appeal.

In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the
courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the regional trial courts and the jurisdiction of the former was
vested in the latter courts.

However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days
after its release for publication in the Official Gazette,14 the regional trial courts were divested of their general
jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian
Reform.

Thus, in the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, at the time private respondents filed their
complaint, was already bereft of authority to act on the same. The allegation of private respondents that their
complaint was filed on November 3, 1987, and not on February 13, 1988 as found by the Court of Appeals, is
immaterial since as of either date Executive Order No. 229 was already in effect.

The foregoing holding is further sustained by the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, which took effect on June 15, 1988. The said law contains provisions which evince and support the
intention of the legislature to vest in the Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian
reform matters.

Section 50 of said Act substantially reiterates Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229 vesting in the Department of
Agrarian Reform exclusive and original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform

In addition, Sections 56 and 57 thereof provide for the designation by the Supreme Court of at least one (1) branch
of the regional trial court within each province to act as a special agrarian court. The said special court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction only over petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners
and the prosecution of criminal offenses under said Act. Said provisions thus delimit the jurisdiction of the regional
trial court in agrarian cases only to these two instances.

It is also worth noting at this juncture that the resolution of this case by the Department of Agrarian Reform is to
the best advantage of private respondents since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the
administrative agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are
summary in nature and the department is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that
agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive action or
proceeding

24. Laresma vs. Abellana

Facts:

On May 24, 1994, respondent Antonio P. Abellana filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo,
Cebu, against petitioner Justino Laresma, a farmer, for recovery of possession of Lot 4-E of subdivision plan psd.
271428, a parcel of agricultural land located in Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu. The lot had an area of 21,223 square
meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 47171. He alleged, inter alia, that since 1985, the
petitioner had been a lessee of a certain Socorro Chiong, whose agricultural land adjoined his own; and that
sometime in 1985, the petitioner, by means of threat, strategy, and stealth, took possession of his property and
deprived him of its possession.
In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner averred that the dispute between him and the respondent was
agrarian in nature, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR, involving as it did his right of possession covered by
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-031817 issued to his wife Praxedes. He alleged that the property titled in
the name of the respondent consisted of a portion of that property owned by the Spouses Vicente and Susana
Paras covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 780 which was placed under OLT under Presidential Decree No.
27. Being a beneficiary of the agrarian reform program of the government, his wife was issued CLT No. 0-031817
on July 13, 1982 over a portion of the property, Lot No. 00013, with an area of 0.1700 hectares. Since then, he and
his wife became owners of the property and, as such, were entitled to the possession thereof.

The parties agreed to defer further proceedings for the conduct of an ocular inspection of the property to
determine whether Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 was, indeed, a part of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No.
47171.

The petitioner denied being the tenant of the respondent. He testified and adduced evidence that he and his wife
were married on September 23, 1953, and, thereafter, resided in the property of the Spouses Paras where he was
a tenant.22 He delivered one-half of the produce from the land to Susana Paras and kept the rest as his share.
Shortly thereafter, the Spouses Paras sold a portion of the property to the respondent. Sometime in 1976 or 1977,
the subject property was placed under the OLT.23 The respondent and Roque Paras protested the inclusion of the
property, which was, however, rejected. 24 The petitioner also testified that after the death of the Spouses Paras,
he gave the share of the produce to the spouses' daughter, Socorro Chiong. 25

On October 30, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner.

The court ruled that, as evidenced by the contract of lease executed by Praxedes Laresma and Socorro Chiong, the
petitioner was the tenant of Chiong and not of the respondent. Thus, the court had jurisdiction over the case.

Issues:

1. WON the action of the respondent in the trial court is in reality an indirect attack on the validity of CLT
No. 0-031817 issued to Praxedes Laresma in the guise of an action for recovery of possession (accion
publiciana) of the property covered by TCT No. 47171;
2. WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the respondent

Held:

We agree with the respondent that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over his action against the petitioner. The bone
of contention of the parties and the decisive issue in the trial court was whether or not Lot No. 00013 covered by
CLT No. 0-031817 is a portion of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 under the name of the respondent. This is the
reason why the parties agreed to have Lot No. 00013 resurveyed in relation to Lot 4-C owned by Socorro Chiong
and to Lot 4-E titled in the name of the respondent. After a calibration of the evidence on record and the reports of
Epan and Navarro, the trial court ruled that Lot No. 00013 formed part of Lot 4-C owned by Socorro Chiong and
not of Lot 4-E titled in the name of the respondent.

Plaintiff unabashedly claims that defendant has never been his tenant over the former's property, Lot No. 4-E, but
defendant claims otherwise. The evidence of plaintiff tends to establish that defendant is not his or has never been
his tenant over his agricultural land, Lot 4-E, but defendant Justino Laresma is rather the tenant of Socorro Chiong
over her property, Lot 4-C. In support of this contention that defendant is not plaintiff's own tenant but that of
Socorro Chiong, plaintiff offered and adduced the contract of lease duly entered by and between Socorro Chiong
and defendant [Exhibit "B"] in 1977 wherein it was clearly stipulated [that] Socorro Chiong as the agricultural
lessor leased a portion of her land to defendant, in the latter's capacity as agricultural lessee of Lot 4-C with the
obligation to pay Socorro Chiong rentals during the stipulated crop years.

This particular contract of lease [Exhibit "B"] does not show that plaintiff is a privy (sic) to it. It is (sic) goes to show
that plaintiff is [not] bound by the terms and conditions thereof.
We agree with the ruling of the RTC that, as gleaned from the material averments of his complaint, the action of
the respondent against the petitioner is not an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The
well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined
by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.32 In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v.
Cyborg Leasing Corporation, we ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the
subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to
dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. 34 Once
jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. We also held in Arcelona v. Court of
Appeals that, in American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from lack of jurisdiction may be
determined from the record of the case, not necessarily from the face of the judgment only.

It must be stressed that the regular court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple
expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties. But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. If, after hearing,
tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over
the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court
which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of
the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even
by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the
same ex mero motu or motu proprio. A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could
never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.

We agree with the ruling of the trial court that based on the material allegations of the respondent's complaint
and even on the admission of the petitioner, the latter had never been an agricultural tenant of the respondent. In
fact, the respondent claimed that based on the CLT issued to his wife, they became the owner of the property
covered therein. As such, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the said action. The dispute between the respondent,
as plaintiff, and the petitioner, as defendant, in the RTC involving the de jure possession of Lot 4-E covered by TCT
No. 47171 is not an agrarian dispute.

Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the ownership of the
subject property.

Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could
have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition for
injunction in the first place.42

However, we find and so hold that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. In this case, the
respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner on May 24, 1994. Hence, the jurisdiction of the regular court
over the nature of this action is governed by Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994. Section 3
thereof amended Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, and reads:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined
by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

25. ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, vs. HERRERA,

Facts:

On August 14, 1969, petitioner and private respondent entered into an agreement thereby for and in
consideration of P55,430.00, the former agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land with a special condition that
should private respondent as purchaser complete the construction including the painting of his residential house
on said lot within two (2) years from August 14, 1969, petitioner, as owner, has agreed to refund to private
respondent the amount of P10.00 per square meter. When the aforesaid special condition was fulfilled, private
respondent, on May 17, 1971 accordingly notified in writing the petitioner of the same and requested for his
refund amounting to P4,820.00.

Upon failure of petitioner to pay his obligation, private respondent on May 6, 1972 filed a complaint for sum of
money and damages with the City Court of Manila, Branch II, against petitioner. A motion to dismiss was filed by
petitioner on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and improper
avenue. City Court Judge Jose B. Herrera in his order dated June 27, 1972 held in abeyance the resolution on the
motion until after the trial of the case on the merits.

On November 17, 1972, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the claim of private respondent in his
complaint, being less than P10,000.00, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the city court.

Issues:

1. WON action is for specific performance of contract; and

2. WON actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation such as complaints
for specific performance of contract are exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance.

Held:

The action involved in this case is one for specific performance and not for a sum of money and wherefore
incapable of pecuniary estimation because what private respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's
obligation under a written contract to make a refund but under certain specific conditions still to be proven or
established. In a case for the recovery of a sum of money, as the collection of a debt, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation (Lapitan vs. Scandia Inc., 24 SCRA 479) because the obligation to pay the debt is
not conditioned upon any specific fact or matter. But when a party to a contract has agreed to refund to the other
party a sum of money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions and only upon compliance therewith
may what is legally due him under the written contract be demanded, the action is one not capable of pecuniary
estimation. The payment of a sum of money is only incidental which can only be ordered after a determination of
certain acts the performance of which being the more basic issue to be inquired into.

Although private respondent's complaint in the court a quo is designated as one for a sum of money and damages,
an analysis of all the factual allegations of the complaint patently shows that what private respondent seeks is the
performance of petitioner's obligation under the written contract to make the refund of the rate of P10.00 per
square meter or in the total amount of P4,820.00, but only after proof of having himself fulfilled the conditions
that will give rise to petitioner's obligation, a matter clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to reverse the order appealed from and the complaint filed with the
City Court of Manila, Branch II, docketed as Civil Case No. 211673 is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
 26. PIAPI vs. TALIP

Facts:

On August 28, 1998, petitioners filed with the said RTC a complaint for reconveyance and damages with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 3715.

The complaint alleges that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful, continuous
and open possession for more than 30 years of a parcel of land consisting of 3.2 hectares situated in Piapi, Padada,
Davao del Sur. It is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-(3331)-4244 of the Registry of Deeds, same
province, issued in the name of Juan Jayag and has a market value of P15,000.00. The same land was subdivided
into lots consisting of 100 square meters each, where the individual petitioners built their houses. On the
remaining portion were constructed their barangay center, multi-purpose gym and health center. Respondent
fraudulently obtained from the said Registry of Deeds a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in his name. In 1998, he
paid real estate taxes and subsequently, he threatened to build a barb-wire fence around the land.

Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
considering that the assessed value of the land is only P6,030.00. Respondent, citing Section 33 (3) of BP Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. No. 7691, maintains that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur.

On January 12, 1999, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated April 20, 1999.

Issue: WON the court has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

Petitioners contend that under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended, the RTC has jurisdiction over the
complaint for reconveyance since it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The contention is bereft of merit. This case is analogous to Huguete vs. Embudo. [6] There, petitioners argued that
a complaint for annulment of a deed of sale and partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. However, we ruled that 'the nature of an action is not determined by what is
stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where the
ultimate objective of the plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in
the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.

Indeed, basic as a hornbook principle is that the nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction
over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. [7]

It can easily be discerned that petitioners' complaint involves title to, or possession of, real property. However,
they failed to allege therein the assessed value of the subject property. Instead, what they stated is the market
value of the land at P15,000.00.

The Rule requires that 'the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof , shall
be alleged by the claimant. [8] It bears reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners' complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering
that their action involves the title to or interest in real property, they should have alleged therein its assessed
value. However, they only specified the market value or estimated value, which is P 15,000.00 . Pursuant to the
provision of Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur,
not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.

27. Iniego vs Purganan

Facts:

On 1 March 2002, private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and damages against Jimmy
T. Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the
said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident that happened when a
freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private respondent’s jitney which private respondent was driving
at the time of the accident.

On 24 August 2002, private respondent filed a Motion to Declare defendant in Default allegedly for failure of the
latter to file his answer within the final extended period. On 28 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit
and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground, among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the cause of action of the case.

On 21 October 2002, public respondent Judge Guillermo G. Purganan, acting as presiding judge of the RTC, Branch
42, Manila, issued the assailed Omnibus Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the petitioner and the Motion to
Declare Defendant in Default of the private respondent. Pertinent portions of the Omnibus Order.

The plaintiff opines that this court has exclusive jurisdiction because the cause of action is the claim for damages,
which exceeds P400,000.00. The complaint prays for actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00, moral damages
in the amount of P300,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P150,000.00. Excluding attorney’s fees in
the amount of P50,000.00, the total amount of damages being claimed is P490,000.00.

Proceeding on the assumption that the cause of action is the claim of (sic) for damages in the total amount
of P490,000.00, this court has jurisdiction. But is the main cause of action the claim for damages?

This court is of the view that the main cause of action is not the claim for damages but quasi-delict. Damages are
being claimed only as a result of the alleged fault or negligence of both defendants under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code in the case of defendant Pinion and under Article 2180 also of the Civil Code in the case of defendant Iniego.
But since fault or negligence (quasi-delicts) could not be the subject of pecuniary estimation, this court has
exclusive jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are capable of pecuniary
estimation; hence, the jurisdiction in such cases falls upon either the municipal courts (the Municipal Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts In Cities, And Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), or the Regional Trial
Courts, depending on the value of the damages claimed.

Petitioner argues further that should this Court find actions for damages capable of pecuniary estimation, then the
total amount of damages claimed by the private respondent must exceed P400,000.00 in order that it may fall
under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioner asserts, however, that the moral and exemplary damages claimed by
private respondent be excluded from the computation of the total amount of damages for jurisdictional purposes
because the said moral and exemplary damages arose, not from the quasi-delict, but from the petitioner’s refusal
to pay the actual damages.

Issues:
 1. WON Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of
a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts, and are
therefore capable of pecuniary estimation.
2. WON the amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds
of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages
arise from the same or from different causes of action.

Held:

According to respondent Judge, what he referred to in his assailed Order as not capable of pecuniary estimation is
the cause of action, which is a quasi-delict, and not the amount of damage prayed for.7 From this, respondent
Judge concluded that since fault or negligence in quasi-delicts cannot be the subject of pecuniary estimation, the
RTC has jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed respondent Judge in this respect. 8

Respondent Judge’s observation is erroneous. It is crystal clear from B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, that what must be determined to be capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation is not the cause of action,
but the subject matter of the action.9 A cause of action is "the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff."10 On the other hand, the "subject matter of the
action" is "the physical facts, the thing real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to
which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong committed by the defendant."11

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts] would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought like
suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or
for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance [now Regional Trial Courts]. x x x.13 (Emphasis supplied.)

Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of
money for the damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The damages claimed in such
actions represent the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus
sought to be recovered by the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought, and is not merely incidental
thereto or a consequence thereof. It bears to point out that the complaint filed by private respondent before the
RTC actually bears the caption "for DAMAGES."

Fault or negligence, which the Court of Appeals claims is not capable of pecuniary estimation, is not actionable by
itself. For such fault or negligence to be actionable, there must be a resulting damage to a third person. The relief
available to the offended party in such cases is for the reparation, restitution, or payment of such damage, without
which any alleged offended party has no cause of action or relief. The fault or negligence of the defendant,
therefore, is inextricably intertwined with the claim for damages, and there can be no action based on quasi-delict
without a claim for damages.

We therefore rule that the subject matter of actions for damages based on quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary
estimation.

II
Despite our concurrence in petitioner’s claim that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are
capable of pecuniary estimation, we find that the total amount of damages claimed by the private respondent
nevertheless still exceeds the jurisdictional limit of P400,000.00 and remains under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

The distinction he made between damages arising directly from injuries in a quasi-delict and those arising from a
refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more apparent than real, as the damages sought by respondent
originate from the same cause of action: the quasi-delict. The fault or negligence of the employee and the juris
tantum presumption of negligence of his employer in his selection and supervision are the seeds of the damages
claimed, without distinction.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral and exemplary damages arose from a cause of
action other than the quasi-delict, their inclusion in the computation of damages for jurisdictional purposes is still
proper. All claims for damages should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of
whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court allows a party to assert as many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d)
of said section provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. 15

Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a single cause of action or different causes of
action, it is the total amount thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case at bar remains with the RTC,
considering that the total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral and exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00.

In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation. As such,
they fall within the jurisdiction of either the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on the amount of damages
claimed. In this case, the amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for
all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages
arise from the same or from different causes of action.

28. Brgy. San Roque vs. Heirs of Pastor

Facts:

Petitioner filed before the MTC of Talisay, Cebu, a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an
Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that"
[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just
compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such
power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent
domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title
to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be
filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value
of the subject property was less than P20,000.

Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of
the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos

Held:

In support of its appeal, petitioner cites Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; .
. . ." It argues that the present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The test to determine
whether it is so was laid down by the Court in this wise:h

"A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases,
besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be
more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the
first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of
June 11, 1901)." 10

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with
the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. In National Power
Corporation v. Jocson, the Court ruled that expropriation proceedings have two phases:jgc:chanrobles.co

"‘The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not
of dismissal of the action, ‘of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.’ An order of dismissal, if this be
ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done
by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules
expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, ‘no objection to the exercise of the right of
condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.’

"The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of ‘the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.’ This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings
of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave
nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .’"

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of
its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts
determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due
process. 13 In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a
matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to
determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that
amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.