Contents

WHAT ARE COMPETITION LAWS:................................................................................. 2

COMPETITION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN.............................................................. 3
WHAT CONSTITUTES ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR? .................................... 3
ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION: .................................................................................. 4
IDENTIFICATION OF ABUSIVE USE OF DOMINANT POSITION ............................ 7
REMEDIES.............................................................................................................................. 7
PAKISTANI CASES ............................................................................................................... 8
BAHRIA TOWN/ NAYATEL CASE ................................................................................ 8
TELECOM COMPANY CASE ......................................................................................... 9
MURREE BREWERY/ SIZA FOODS CASE ................................................................ 10
COMPETITION IN BANGLADESH ................................................................................. 11
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF COMPETITION LEGISLATION ................................ 12
SECTION 16 OF COMPETITION ACT OF BANGLADESH 2012: .............................. 12
PENALTY .............................................................................................................................. 14
CONCERNS RAISED REGARDING COMPETITION ACT OF BANGLADESH: .... 14
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BANGLADESH ................................................................ 15
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PAKISTAN: .............................. 16
BIBLIOGRAPHY: ................................................................................................................ 20

1
INTRODUCTION TO COMPETITION:

Competition is considered the quintessential element of a market economy. It offers a

choice of several alternative services and products. Fair competition entails a better
allocation of resources by the fact that the producer permanently supervises the ratio
between them and expenses. Of course, the producer cannot influence the market
alone, but through all the competitive relationship that they have with other producers.
These ratios will lead to a price decrease but in the same time the market grows by
stimulating buyers. Sometimes the desire to strengthen a dominant market position, to
attract many more potential clients and to eliminate their competitors, the traders are
using a variety of actions and illegal acts that have as consequences adverse
environmental effects.

Competition benefits everyone; businesses, consumers and the economy as a whole. It

encourages businesses to compete for customers. Buyers of goods and services, from
individual consumers to businesses, benefit by paying less and having more choice
and better quality. Competition results in open, dynamic markets, featuring increased
productivity, innovation and better value.1

WHAT ARE COMPETITION LAWS:

The laws thatare intended tomakesure the there is fair competition
betweenbusinesses,for example by making rules to control monopolies.

The law aims to promote healthy competition. It bans anticompetitive agreements

between firms such as agreements to fix prices or to carve up markets, and it makes it
illegal for businesses to abuse a dominant market position. You need to be aware of
the main rules to avoid breaking the law or becoming a victim of others’ anti-
competitive practices. There are heavy penalties for infringements. Offenders can be
fined, disqualified from being a director and, in some cases, sent to prison. Under
competition law, mergers between businesses can also be prevented if they might

1
Mihai Mărginean, “Positive and Negative Effects Analysis in Abuse of Dominance,” CCPC Research 17,
no. 2(26) (December 2017): 128-137, https://www.ccpc.ie/business/help-for-business/competition-
law-how-does-it-apply-to-my-business/(accesseddecember, 2017).

2
reduce competition, and uncompetitive markets can be investigated through market
studies.2

COMPETITION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN

The Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) is an independent quasi-regulatory,
quasi-judicial body that helps ensure healthy competition between companies for the
benefit of the economy.

The Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) was established on 2 October 2007

under the Competition Ordinance, 2007, which was promulgated in November 2009.
Major aim of this Ordinance was to provide for a legal framework to create a business
environment based on healthy competition for improving economic efficiency,
developing competitiveness and protecting consumers from anti-competitive
practices.

Prior to the Competition Ordinance, 2007, Pakistan had an anti-monopoly law namely
‘Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance’
(MRTPO) 1970. The Monopoly Control Authority (MCA) was the organization to
administer this Law. In the fast changing global and national economic environment,
the MRTPO, 1970 was inadequate to address competition issues effectively.

Competition Ordinance, 2007 replaced the MRTPO.After getting approve,

Competition Ordinance 2007 finally transformed into Competition Act 2010.3

WHAT CONSTITUTES ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR?

Competition law specifies certain types of behaviour which are expressly prohibited.
These include agreements which:

• Fix prices

• Limit or control production or markets

• Share markets or sources of supply

2
Annual Report on A quick guide to competition and consumer protection laws that affect your
business (UK: Assets Publishing Services, 2007) ,2.
3
Annual Report of Competition Commission Pakistan on About us (Islamabad: Competition
Commission of Pakistan, 2010),6.

3
 • Apply different conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage

• Abusing a dominant position. Competition law does not prohibit you from
having a dominant position; it only prohibits the abuse of that position.
Generally, you would be considered to be dominant if you are able to act
without first considering the reaction of your customers or rivals, e.g. if you
can increase your prices because you know that your customers have very few
alternative sources of supply and so will have little choice but to pay the
higher price. You will not be in breach of competition law if your business’s
vigorous competitiveness takes sales away from less efficient rivals, as this is
competition working effectively.

ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION:

The ECJ (the European Court of Justice) gave a definition of dominance that still
stands today: a dominant position is a position of economic strength that enables a
firm to prevent effective competition on the relevant market; a firm with a dominant
position has the power “to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors, its customers and ultimately of it consumers.” In economic terms, one
would, hence, say that a dominant position is one in which the firm has a “reasonably
large” degree of market power.4

While it is not possible to give an exact boundary, it is frequently stated that if the
market share is above 50%, dominance is essentially presumed, while to date, there
have been no cases where a firm with a market share of significantly less than 40%
was found to be dominant.5

Firms are not forbidden from having market power, however, firms with significant
market power are banned from using certain business strategies that other, non-
dominant, firms are free to use. Presumably, the idea is that welfare and consumer
surplus can be hurt if dominant firms would be allowed to engage in such
(anticompetitive) practices. As will be clear, the challenge now is how to separate

4
Eric van Damme, “Abuse of a Dominant Position: Cases and Experiments”, Tilberg Journal 3: 8 (2006):
223-233.
5
Ibid, 3.

4
normal competitive behaviour from behaviour that should be classified as anti-
competitive and, hence, be forbidden6

Specifically in relation to dominance, the 2010 Competition (section 2, subsection e)

defines a dominant position as the ability of one or more sellers in a market to behave
to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers, consumers and
suppliers; or if an undertaking’s share of the relevant market exceeds 40 per cent.

The Competition Act (section 3, subsections 2 and 3) prohibits the abuse of a

dominant position through any practice that prevents, restricts, reduces or distorts
competition in the relevant market. These practices include, but are not limited to,
limiting production or sales, unreasonable price increases, charging different prices to
different customers without objective justifications, tie-ins that make the sale of goods
or services conditional on the purchase of other goods or services, predatory pricing,
refusing to deal and boycotting or excluding any other undertaking from producing,
distributing or selling goods, or providing any service.

Additionally, section 29 of the CCP General Enforcement Regulation 2007 prescribes

that the Commission, in assessing the competitive effects of abuse of dominant
position in the relevant market, may consider the following factors of dominance
including, but not limited to, commonly used measures such as:

(a) Market share. Market share of the concerned undertaking and for this purpose
may use information from a variety of sources including the main parties, other
competitors, customers, buyers, suppliers, trade associations and market research
reports. Market share can be measured in terms of revenues, volumes, production
capacities or outputs, depending on the markets concerned and the information
available;

(b) Concentration measures. Measures of the degree of concentration may

generally be looked at as an indicator of the ability of leading undertakings in a
market to exercise market power. Other competitive constraints will need to be
considered before finding that these undertakings have such market power;

(c) Structural factors: There may be other structural factors that can provide
indications of current competitive conditions within the market.7

6
Ibid, 4.

5
SECTION 3 OF COMPETITION ACT 2010:
(1) No person shall abuse dominant position.

(2) An abuse of dominant position shall be deemed to have been brought about,
maintained or continued if it consists of practices which prevent, restrict, reduce or
distort competition in the relevant market.

(3) The expression “practices” referred to in subsection (2) shall include, but are not
limited to,---

(a) limiting production, sales and unreasonable increases in price or other unfair
trading conditions;

(b) price discrimination by charging different prices for the same goods or services
from different customers in the absence of objective justifications that may justify
different prices;

(c) tie-ins, where the sale of goods or service is made conditional on the purchase of
other goods and services;

(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of the contracts;

(e) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions on other parties, placing

them at a competitive disadvantage;

(f) predatory pricing driving competitors out of a market, prevent new entry, and
monopolize the market;

(g) boycotting or excluding any other undertaking from the production, distribution or
sale of any goods or the provision of any service; or

7
United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, Voluntary peer reviews of competition law
and policies 4: UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2013,4 (New York and Geneva United Nation Publication: 2013):
13.

6
(h) refusing to deal.8

IDENTIFICATION OF ABUSIVE USE OF DOMINANT

POSITION
Once the dominance of an enterprise is established, the next step is to examine the
conduct of the dominant enterprise and to see whether that falls under the categories
of abuse mentioned under the Act. An abuse of dominant position may be generally
categorised into:

• ‘exclusionary’ (an upstream dominant enterprise supplies the input to its

downstream affiliate at lower cost than its downstream rival – leading to price
squeeze, causing a competitive disadvantage to the downstream rival, for e.g. if
the input cost charged to the downstream affiliate is Rs. 100 to the downstream
rival it is Rs. 130, thus there is an inherent competitive disadvantage of Rs. 30 to
the rival firm) and,
• ‘exploitative abuses’ (dominant player charges excessive price from consumers or
exploits them due to its dominance).9

REMEDIES
Section 31(a) of the Competition Act also sets the guidelines for structuring remedies
in cases involving abuse of dominant position. The provision allows the Commission
to formulate behavioural and structural remedies. The latter involve dissolution,
divorcement and divestiture, as well as requiring access to an essential facility and
mandatory licensing.

Section 31(a) read with section 38(2) empowers the Commission to impose penalties
for abusive conduct, in addition to framing remedies. Since the commencement of its

8
The Competition Act, 2010 (XIX OF 2010), (Islamabad: Official Gazette of Pakistan, Oct 13th 2010),3.
9
Dr. Vijay Kumar Singh, “Competition Law: Dominant Position and its Abuse: Identification of Abusive
Use of Dominant Position”, Ministry of Human Resources Development Project National Mission
Education-ICT India 5: 9 (2014): 233-240.

7
activities, the Commission has ordered behavioural and structural remedies, as well as
imposed penalties for abuse of dominant position.10

SECTION 31 OF COMPETITION ACT 2010:

Orders of the Commission.

I) The Commission may in the case of

(a) an abuse of dominant position requires the undertaking concerned to take such
actions specified in the order as may be necessary to restore competition and not to
repeat the prohibitions specified in Chapter II or to engage in any other practice with
similar effect

SECTION 38 OF COMPETITION ACT 2010:

Penalty.

(2) TheCommission may Impose penalties at thefollowingrates namely: -

a) For a contravention of any provision of Chapter II of the Act, an amount not

exceeding seventy-five million rupees or an amount not exceeding ten percent
of the annual turnover of the undertaking, as may be decided in the
circumstances of the case by the Commission; or
b) For non-compliance of any order, notice or requisition of the Commission an
amount not exceeding one million rupees, as may be decided in the
circumstances of the case by the Commission; and
c) For clause (e) in sub-section (1)11, an amount not exceeding one million
rupees as may be decided in the circumstances of the case by the Commission.

PAKISTANI CASES
BAHRIA TOWN/ NAYATEL CASE
The Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) has fined Bahria Town (Private)
Limited PKR 2 million for abusing its dominant position and restricting Nayatel from

10
United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, Voluntary peer reviews of competition law
and policies 4: UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2013,4 (New York and Geneva United Nation Publication: 2013):
13.

8
providing cable, internet and telephony (CIT) services to the residents of phase 1-6 of
Bahria Town, Rawalpindi in violation of Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2010.

The order held that Bahria Town is dominant in the relevant market to grant ‘right of
way’ for provision of telephony and broadband services in phase 1-6 of Bahria Town,
Rawalpindi and that it had misused this dominance by not granting the right of way to
Nayatel. This act of refusal was discriminatory, exclusionary and resulted in loss of
any choice for consumers and restriction of competition in the market.

CCP has ordered Bahria Town grant ‘right of way’ on fair, reasonable and
competitive terms and prices for laying down CIT infrastructure. Additionally,
Nayatel is also asked to ensure that while laying down and installing its fibre-optic
cable, it should use the best technology and reinstate footpaths and all infrastructures
to the satisfaction of Bahria Town.

Analysis:

The decision is likely to set a precedent for housing societies across Pakistan that
block certain service providers in their localities due to exclusive contracts with single
operator. CCP continuously strives in promoting a healthy competition in all spheres
of commercial and economic activity and to protect consumers from anti-competitive
behaviour.12

TELECOM COMPANY CASE

The Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) has set aside and disposed of show
cause notice issued to Wateen Telecom Limited and also set aside the findings of its
enquiry in the matter of alleged violation of Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2010.

The residents DHA Phase 5 Lahore complained to the CCP that Wateen Telecom was
bundling its “Analogue Television Service” with the “Digital Television and Internet
Services.”

Resultantly, in the absence of any other cable television service provider in the area,
Wateen was allegedly abusing its dominant position by tying various products. After
the enquiry, a show cause notice was issued to Wateen.

12
Bahria Town /Nayatel Case for Abuse of Dominant Position (Islamabad: competition commission of
Pakistan), 2(13)/BTNC-ISB/CCP/2017.

9
The enquiry claimed that in the relevant market for the provision of Hybrid Fibre
Coaxial (HFC)-based analogue television service in Phase V of DHA Lahore, Wateen
had prima facie abused its dominant position by tying its different products in
violation of Section 3 of the Competition Act 2010.

After hearing the parties, the CCP’s bench passed the order. The order noted that
television broadcasting sector is under a transition from Analogue to Digital Services
based on the directions of sector regulator, i.e. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory
Authority (Pemra). As per the settled jurisprudence in EU, since the Analogue and
Digital TV Services cannot be sub segmented into two separate product markets,
hence the question of a tie-in of substitutable services with the same relevant market
does not arise.

The order stated that the enquiry report has erred in establishing the relevant product
and geographic market in this matter. The relevant market within Phases I to V of
DHA is that of “Pay TV services” wherein various other players also are competing;
hence no market is foreclosed and accordingly, no case for abuse of dominance is
established.

Analysis:

The bench set aside and disposed of the show cause notice issued to Wateen. The
decision shows the impartiality and unbiased approach of CCP bench.13

MURREE BREWERY/ SIZA FOODS CASE

In Murree Brewery Company Ltd v Siza Foods (Pvt) Ltd., the complainant, Murree
Brewery (MB), sent several letters to SIZA foods, a franchisee of McDonald’s,
requesting that its non-alcoholic beverages be considered for sale in McDonald’s fast-
food outlets in Pakistan. McDonald’s ignored the requests of MB. Consequently, MB
complained to the Commission for refusal to deal by McDonald’s amounting to abuse
of dominant position. The Commission conducted an enquiry, which revealed that
McDonald’s had an exclusive dealing arrangement with Coca-Cola and that
McDonald’s enjoyed a dominant position in the relevant market of international fast-
food restaurants. CCP noted that even though exclusive dealing agreements are

13
Wateen Telecom Company (Islamabad: Competition Commission Pakistan), 3/WTCE-ISB/CCP/ 2019.

10
vertical restraints, the competition concerns are nonetheless predominantly
“horizontalˮ in that the exclusive dealing arrangement has an impact on the rivals of
the manufacturer, who are foreclosed from having access to the buyer. Further, where
the buyer happens to be the dominant player, it inevitably (by virtue of its exclusive
dealing arrangement with the manufacturer) engages in refusals to deal with the rivals
of manufacturer, and thus attracts the provisions of section 3. McDonald’s understood
the concerns of the Commission, and volunteered the following undertaking, which
was accepted by the bench:

“SIZA hereby undertakes that SIZA will, in addition to the products of

the Coca-Cola Company sell such other beverages which, after review, are
shown to conform to the global quality standards prescribed by McDonald’s to
its licensees/franchisees from time to time and which are available in the
quantities required and on reasonable commercial terms, and in conformity
with the requirements of the relevant franchise agreement, and that the other
beverages will be placed in a chiller/beverage cooler within its restaurants and
at kiosks (space permitting) at a place visible to customers, but without having
to make any structural changes in any of its restaurants or kiosks in order to
accommodate such additional beverages.ˮ

As it was a consent decree, no appeal was submitted. CCP did not impose any
penalty, keeping in view the cooperative behaviour of the party and its legal
counsel.14

COMPETITION IN BANGLADESH
In the absence of an established and effective competition legislation, restrictive trade
practices have prevailed in the markets and eroded consumer interests & rights. There
are no evidences documenting the anti-competitive behavior of business companies
operating in Bangladesh. The most common anti-competitive actions are shown in the
diagram-

14
United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, Voluntary peer reviews of competition law
and policies 4: UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2013,4 (New York and Geneva United Nation Publication: 2013):
13.

11
 50
45
40
35
30
25
20 Ani-competitive…
15
10
5
0

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF COMPETITION LEGISLATION

• Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practice (Control and Prevention) Ordinance,
1970 is valid but never got implemented.

• Recently Bangladesh has enacted the Competition Act, 2012:

– To encourage, ensure and maintaincompetitive environment in

business; and

– To prohibit, control and eradicate anti-competitive practices.15

SECTION 16 OF COMPETITION ACT OF BANGLADESH 2012:

Abuse of dominant position

(1) No enterprise shall abuse its dominant position.

(2) for the purposes of sub-section (1), it shall be deemed to be an abuse of dominant
position, if an enterprise

15
Dr. Tureen Afroz, Challenges in Implementation of Competition LawinBangladesh(UK: General Press,
2015), 7.

12
(a) imposes directly or indirectly unfair or discriminatory condition in purchase or
sale of goods or services or discriminatory price or predatory price in purchase or sale
of goods or services;

(b) limits or restricts production of goods or provision of services or market thereof or

technical or scientific development relating to goods or services to the prejudice of
consumers;

(c) indulges in practice or continue to do practices which prevents others to access in

the market;

(d) makes conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of

supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts; or

(e) uses its dominant position in one relevant market to enter into, or protect, other
relevant market.

Explanation.

For the purposes of this section,

(i) “dominant positionˮ means a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the

relevant market which enables it to

(1) operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market; or

(2) affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour;

(ii) “predatory priceˮ means the sale of goods or provision of services at a price which
is below the cost of production of the goods or provision of services in order to
reducing or eliminating competition.16

16
The Competition Act, 2012 (XXIII OF 2012), (Dhaka: Official Gazette of Bangladesh, 21st June
2012),16.

13
PENALTY
SECTION 20 OF COMPETITION ACT OF BANGLADESH 2012
Proceeding after inquiry.

If appears to the Commission after conducting an inquiry under section 18 that any
person has entered into an anticompetition agreement or misused his dominant
position, the Commission may take any one or more than one of the following
measures, namely:

(a) to direct any person involved in such agreement or abuse of dominant position

(i) to discontinue his activities and not to re-enter into such agreement or to
discontinue such abuse of dominant position; and

(ii) to impose such administrative financial penalty as it may deem fit which
may not exceed 10% of the average of his turnover for the last 03 (three)
preceding financial years;17

CONCERNS RAISED REGARDING COMPETITION ACT OF

BANGLADESH:
Though the competition law has already been passed and although it creates a
mechanism to ensure its implementation, much concern has been raised over its
practical execution and potential effectiveness. The problems identified in this regard
are:

•Lack of clarity: Perhaps understandably, the law is not able to clearly specify the
precise line beyond which an agreement would become anti-competitive or an action
an abuse of dominant position.

•Time lag in establishing the Commission: The Act will not be effective until the
Commission is established, and past experience shows that such regulatory
commissions usually take a long time to form, stretching from a few months to a
couple of years.

17
The Competition Act, 2012 (XXIII OF 2012),20.

14
•Lack of market knowledge: There is insufficient information and research/published
materials on market behavior/practice in Bangladesh, which may hinder identification
of anti-competitive practices.

•Confidence: In order to be effective, the Commission will need to overcome the

common perception of regulatory authorities as slow, inefficient, and subject to
influence. People are unlikely to lodge a complaint unless they are convinced of the
standards of the Commission. In a recent panel discussion on the potential
implementation problems, leading businessman Syed Manzur Elahi cited an example,
stating that businesspeople are aware of the tax ombudsman but they do not go there
due to a lack of confidence in that office.

•Misuse of the Act: In a similar vein, past experiences demonstrate that regulatory
bodies are often susceptible to political and economic influences. There is a fear that
the Act might be misused.

•Overlapping functions and conflict of interests: As suggested by Pradeep S. Mehta,

secretary general of Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) International, there
are always some ambiguities in countries with multiple regulatory authorities. Giving
an example, he said the Commission's functions may overlap with that of the power
and energy regulatory commission or the telecom commission, potentially leading to
conflicts over jurisdiction or turf wars.18

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BANGLADESH

For the time being it can be said that the passing of the Competition law is certainly a
welcome move, but its success will depend on a strong Commission and proper
implementation. For the way ahead, the following points should be given priority:

• Ensure coordination among the concerned ministries and organizations to make the
law effective.

• Establish as soon as possible, an independent, neutral, and transparent Commission

with adequate authority and human and financial resources.

18
Rafia Afrin, “Will Bangladesh’s New Competition Law Prove Effective?” University of liberal Art
Bangladesh 5: 7(2012): 200-212.

15
• Learn from the lessons provided by other countries.

• Create awareness among the population and business community19

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PAKISTAN:

A. Conclusions

The achievements of the Competition Commission of Pakistan since its inception in

November 2007 are internationally recognized by the world competition community,
as well as local business, media, the Government and civil society. It has been
performing a crucial leadership role in taking the Pakistani economy forward to a
greater level of confidence in a competition-based and consumer welfare-oriented
market system. As an institution, CCP has gained countrywide recognition of an
excellent reputation based on integrity, technical competence and governance. In fact,
there is a clear perception that it has been an essential example for institution-building
in Pakistan, favouring not only the consistency and stability of the institutions
themselves, but also the legal certainty that can attract the inflow of investments. In
previous analyses of the progress of CCP, experienced and respected commentators
have called attention to what the agency has done, with outstanding competence in
ascending a steep learning curve, concluding that it is to be considered one of the
best-performing newly established agencies in the developing world.

Naturally, CCP struggles against difficulties that often challenge competition agencies
in economies with a long tradition of strong government control, including a deficient
public understanding of competition policy, slow judicial review and incomplete
support from other parts of the Government, mainly translated into the lack of
adequate financial autonomy.

Among the major strengths of CCP that were repeatedly mentioned during the peer
review process are a recognized mindset toward the importance of complying with
and enforcing the law and not only of punishment; that the Commission is not against
profit-making but in favour of regulating the market; that transparency is very
accountable with fairly clear decisions; and that it runs a notable and successful
advocacy programme, including the very useful policy notes. CCP is also considered
19
Ibid.

16
to have an excellent sense of responsibility and has managed to create a good leniency
policy, making the business community look for legal counsel on competition issues
beforehand.

The Commission’s staff is composed of high-level and quality professionals, rather

than bureaucrats, often prepared to be open to receiving inputs and critics.

The number of decisions of CCP from its creation in 2007 compared to the number of
decisions of the old Monopoly Control Authority shows how active CCP has been. It
has secured well-timed resolution of merger review proceedings, even though some
improvements may be suggested in relation to the decision-making process. For
instance, the numbers of conditional and disapproval decisions are considerably low
when compared with the total number of decisions.20

Some recommendations are made below with a view to facilitating the enforcement of
competition law and policy issues in Pakistan in a more efficient manner.

B. Recommendations

1. Institutional arrangements

Although the different professional experience and backgrounds of members of the

Commission bring the necessary interdisciplinary exchange, it would be expected that
more economists would also be chosen to become members, in addition to CCP staff,
especially those with knowledge and experience in industrial organization or related
fields.

2. Improvement of competition legislation and policies

Section 1, subsection 1, paragraph 3 of the Competition Act states that the Act shall
apply to all undertakings and all actions or matters that take place in Pakistan and
distort competition within Pakistan. Even though CCP has construed properly the
sense of the provision by its practice and jurisprudence, legislative change is
considered desirable in order to establish that the law should apply not only to all
undertakings, actions or matters that take place in Pakistan, but also elsewhere if they

20
United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, Voluntary peer reviews of competition law
and policies 4: UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2013,4 (New York and Geneva United Nation Publication: 2013):
16.

17
have any effect or consequence in Pakistan. Several worldwide cartel cases were
sanctioned in different countries under the fact that the members of the cartel had
exports into those jurisdictions but no activity within those countries.21

4. International cooperation

Given its active involvement in key working groups of the International Competition
Network (ICN), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
it is recommended that CCP becomes directly involved with the work of relevant
substantive areas. This would allow CCP to better interact and contribute to the
activities of those international organizations and initiatives, bringing benefits to the
internal work of the Commission and its departments.

5. Consumer affairs

(a) CCP Office of Fair Trade should increase its ties and relations with private
consumer protection associations and NGOs throughout the country, creating a
network for proliferating best practices, awareness and supervision for preventing
deceptive marketing practices.

(b) Profiting from a successful initiative in the competition area, CCP could organize
an international conference in Pakistan, aiming to encourage the promotion of
consumer protection issues at the federal and provincial levels of government,
including the enactment of provincial legislation and the consequent creation of
institutions in charge of handling consumer affairs.

6. Judicial review

21
United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, Voluntary peer reviews of competition law
and policies 4: UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2013,4 (New York and Geneva United Nation Publication: 2013):
17.

18
(a) In view of the significant backlog of cases involving CCP in courts, the
constitution of special or specialized benches in courts may be considered for
expeditious disposal.

(b) The frequent interaction and discussion of cases among lawyers engaged by the
Commission and between these lawyers and the Commission is very important and
necessary for the enrichment of CCP court representation and decisions.22

22
United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, Voluntary peer reviews of competition law
and policies 4: UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2013,4 (New York and Geneva United Nation Publication: 2013):
18.

19
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Afrin, Rafia. Will Bangladesh’s New Competition Law Prove Effective?ULAB Bangladesh:
2012.

Afroz, Dr. Tureen. Challenges in Implementation of Competition LawinBangladesh. UK:

General Press, 2015.

Competition commission of Pakistan Introduction. Brief History and About US. Islamabad:
2010.

Competition commission of Pakistan. CCP Imposes PKR 2 Million Fine on Bahria Town for
Abuse of Dominant Position. Islamabad: 2017.

Competition commission of Pakistan. CCP To Proceed Against PtCL For Abusing Its
Dominant Position. Islamabad: 2018.

Kumar Singh, Dr. Vijay. Competition Law: Dominant Position and its Abuse: Identification
of Abusive Use of Dominant Position. India: 2014.

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