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LOEWEN GROUP, INC.

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It was October 1999, almost one year since North America’s second-largest funeral
chain, the Loewen Group, Inc., of British Columbia, Canada, had filed for bankruptcy. Although
a series of events had contributed to the decision to file, the legal team for CEO Ray Loewen
pointed to a seemingly innocuous lawsuit in Mississippi as the beginning to the end for the
company. The Loewen Group, Inc., (LG) had been on a successful binge of acquiring local
community funeral homes until it purchased several homes in Biloxi, Mississippi, which had

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previously sold funeral insurance provided by Jerry O’Keefe. O’Keefe sued LG when the
company’s newly acquired funeral homes chose to use insurance provided by another LG
affiliate. O’Keefe claimed this violated his exclusive right to sell the insurance for the homes.
What began as a modest $10-million contract dispute had mushroomed into a $500-million
judgment against LG. Although LG managed to negotiate a settlement with O’Keefe for $175
million, the trial had taken a dramatic toll on the company. It had colored investors’ perceptions
to the point that the trial appeared to be the major contributor in 1998, to LG’s ultimate demise.1
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From the time of the early November 1995 announcement of the verdict in the O’Keefe
trial, until the settlement with O’Keefe in February 1996, it appeared as though LG had
exhausted all its legal alternatives to ameliorate the economic impact of the harsh judgment
against the company. Beginning in 1997, however, a couple of lawsuits arose based on Chapter
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11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Enacted in 1993, NAFTA was a
landmark agreement to promote and enhance trade among the United States, Canada, and
Mexico. Chapter 11 dealt specifically with the rights and protections of investors and their
investments in NAFTA countries. The first Chapter 11 lawsuits sought damages against Canada
and Mexico based on a claim of violations of investor rights. Following the lead of those suits,
the Loewen Group decided to file the first such lawsuit against the U.S. government. The LG
suit, however, claimed that investors’ rights had been violated because of unfair treatment by the
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U.S. judicial system (i.e., the Mississippi courts and the U.S. Supreme Court). The claim argued
that LG had not received a fair trial in Mississippi because the judge had allowed prejudicial
testimony, portraying a Canadian firm as a threat to U.S. consumers.

1
All dollar figures in the case are expressed in U.S. dollars.
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This case was prepared by Ali Erarac (Darden ’04), under the supervision of Professor Kenneth Eades. It was
written as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of an administrative
situation. Copyright © 2004 by the University of Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All
rights reserved. To order copies, send an e-mail to sales@dardenpublishing.com. No part of this publication may
be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School
Foundation.

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A tribunal appointed within the U.S. Justice Department would ultimately decide whether
the case would be heard under Chapter 11, and, if so, what damages would be awarded. The
challenge of estimating damages as a result of the O’Keefe judgment was now facing LG’s legal
team and would be a critical component of LG’s case.

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The Deathcare Industry

The deathcare industry comprised an array of providers of funeral and burial goods and
services, including funeral directors, cemeterians, and such third-party sellers as florists, casket
sellers, and insurance providers. In 1995, U.S. funeral homes and cemeteries represented a $12-
billion industry, performing nearly two million funerals and burials a year at an average cost of

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$7,520 (funeral, burial, and monument). The deathcare industry had historically been
fragmented, with limited overlap among various segments of the funeral and burial enterprises.
Funeral homes and funeral directors sold funeral merchandise and services, while cemeterians
and monument/memorial dealers sold monuments and memorials. A funeral home or cemetery
generally arranged cremation services, and flowers were provided by independent florists.

The two largest companies in the industry, the Loewen Group and Service Corporation
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International (SCI), were significantly changing the deathcare business. LG and SCI had been
buying and managing locally owned funeral homes and cemeteries and removing the
segmentation between the product lines. The growth of funeral insurance (“preneed” insurance)
had been a catalyst for much of the change that had occurred within the industry. Before the
advent of preneed insurance, nearly all funerals and burials were arranged after a loved one’s
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death. Therefore, when the family members found themselves in need of funeral arrangements,
their choice of a local funeral home was more likely ruled by emotion than careful thought,
which effectively eliminated competition among funeral providers. In contrast, preneed
insurance allowed customers to purchase funeral and burial goods and services by shopping and
planning. It had become particularly popular to shop for expensive, high-margin items such as
caskets, which were sold readily over the Internet.
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The Loewen Group

Manitoba-born Ray Loewen began to run funeral homes at the age of 21. When he
turned 27, in 1967, he bought his first funeral home, in Ontario, and then another one in British
Columbia. By 1975, Loewen owned 14 homes. After a five-year stint as a member of the B.C.
legislature and a failed foray into high-rise development in Vancouver, Loewen rechanneled his
energies into the business he knew best. In 1985, he formed the Loewen Group to acquire
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funeral homes across the continent. Fueled by a public offering, Loewen bought funeral homes
worth $24 million in 1987, to begin his pursuit of Service Corporation International, the world’s
largest funeral chain. By 1995, LG had nearly 10,000 employees in 814 funeral homes and 179
cemeteries across North America. LG’s income statements and balance sheets for the period
1996–98 are given in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2, respectively.

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Loewen’s strategy was to target family-owned homes where control was about to transfer
from one generation to the next. Loewen understood that in communities where it was important
to be buried by the same people who buried your grandfather, the funeral home’s family name
and solid reputation meant continued success. Therefore, LG maintained the seller’s name and
staff after the ownership change. Moreover, all employees were made part-owners of the new

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enterprise, receiving five LG shares. To justify the premiums paid to buy out the local
businesses, the Loewen Group relied on cost savings from suppliers, realizable by the centralized
purchasing power of a large corporation.

The Loewen Group’s operating strategy required several key components to be

successful:

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• Finding the right target companies: Most funeral businesses were small, family-owned
enterprises. LG’s consolidation strategy sought to find those families looking for the
benefits offered by a large public company, including cash or near-cash payment, capital
available for investment in the business, and a professionally managed organization.
Receiving cash or shares that were easily converted into cash allowed owners to realize
the full value of their business quickly and to diversify their personal wealth into other
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unrelated investments. If the business had a number of family members with varying
amounts of ownership, a buyout allowed the family members to liquidate their
investments without suffering through a long, contentious negotiation process with the
rest of the family to determine a fair value for their shares.
• Paying the right price: Loewen’s financial and managerial strengths were important
factors in convincing owners to sell to LG rather than conduct a difficult search for an
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individual buyer. Moreover, in consideration of the benefits offered to the owners, LG

could purchase the business at a favorable price and add further value to the enterprise by
adding such cost efficiencies as cost savings through centralized, high-volume
purchasing, which served to enhance LG’s return on investment.
• Making a liquid offer: A major competitive advantage of a large public corporation was
the ability to make a cash or near-cash offer for an acquisition. In contrast, an individual
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buyer with limited resources might be forced to make an offer contingent upon obtaining
bank financing or upon receiving financing directly from the sellers. Moreover, even if a
corporate offer included common shares that were traded on a public stock exchange, the
seller could easily convert those shares into cash.
• Access to capital: Between 1988 and 1995, the Loewen Group grew from 98 to 815
funeral homes. This massive expansion required frequent access to public debt and
equity markets, which in turn made the costs of debt and equity key components in the
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economic viability of LG’s growth strategy. Without the ability to access external funds
at competitive costs, Loewen would lose the ability to make cash offers that most of the
business owners desired.
• Maintaining original-owner continuity: A large part of the value of the funeral home was
its local reputation and the community’s recognition of the family name. Loewen’s

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strategy was to keep the original name of the business and to keep interested family
members as managers.

The success of this strategy and its expected future success created enviable stock returns for LG
over the period 1990–95. During these six years, Loewen investors realized a fivefold increase

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in their investment. In contrast, the S&P 500 rose only 64 percent during the same period.

As the Loewen Group fueled its impressive growth with its acquisition strategy, most
sellers expressed satisfaction with how LG dealt with them. For example, Lee Breeland Jr., a
Mississippi funeral-home operator since 1959, gave LG high marks: “They have done a better
job, as far as I can tell, than the others. In this trade area, they have retained a large number of
the staff that live in the community and have served past generations.” There were, however,

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several minor lawsuits from disgruntled sellers along the way, including a suit brought by Jerry
O’Keefe, who operated funeral homes in Mississippi that competed with LG.

The O’Keefe Trial

For as long as people on Mississippi’s Gulf Coast could remember, two things had
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always been true: 1) if you died in Biloxi, you were buried by Jeremiah O’Keefe, and if you
died in adjacent Gulfport, Bob Riemann would do the honors. Despite the bitter rivalry that
existed between their families, both names were highly trusted when the need arose to bury a
loved one. The Loewen Group entered the Mississippi market in 1990, by purchasing funeral
homes from the Riemann family. The problem for O’Keefe arose in 1991, however, when LG
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purchased funeral homes owned by Riemann in Jackson, Mississippi. For 16 years, O’Keefe had
held an exclusive contract to supply those homes with preneed, funeral-expense insurance. In
April 1991, O’Keefe complained that the former Riemann homes had violated their 1974
agreement by selling insurance policies supplied by a Loewen affiliate. Loewen’s lawyers
admitted that other insurance products had been sold, but they maintained that O’Keefe’s
preneed policies—payable in cash—were different from the burial policies sold by LG’s
affiliate, which were payable in funeral goods and services.
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Despite an attempted out-of-court settlement, the case continued to snowball until

O’Keefe decided to take it to court by suing for $10 million in damages. The Loewen Group
began to enlist the help of an impressive group of experts for its legal team, including a
Mississippi senator, a state representative, and a former Supreme Court justice. Feeling
outgunned, O’Keefe hired a famous litigator, Willie Gary, who was known for his ability to
convince juries to award huge damages. Like most U.S. lawyers, the charismatic Gary worked
on a contingency-fee basis that often rewarded him with up to 40 percent of the judgments
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awarded to his clients. His success had made him a multimillionaire, as attested by his profile on
TV’s Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous and his private Gulfstream jet, which he named Wings of
Justice.

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On September 13, 1991, the eight-woman, four-man jury began examining the first of
358 exhibits and hearing more than 40 witnesses. From the beginning, Gary’s strategy was to
plead the emotional side of the case. While LG’s lawyers stuck to the fine points of contract law,
Gary concentrated on side issues calculated to offend the jurors’ consumer sensibilities.
Eventually, he succeeded in switching the jury’s focus from a contract dispute to what an LG

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attorney referred to as a general attack “on allegedly big, rich, foreign corporations that come in
and oppress the poor, underprivileged people of Mississippi.” For example, Gary made an issue
of LG’s habit of raising prices when it took over funeral homes, whereas LG used its witnesses
to attribute the price increases to historical underpricing by the businesses. With Gary’s help, the
jurors reacted by becoming upset by the idea that LG would raise the price of a funeral.
According to juror Rosie May Clincy, a 62-year-old retired widow residing in a weather-beaten
bungalow in northwest Jackson, “They make it too expensive for the poor people to get buried,

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and I’m one of the poor people.”

Gary also succeeded in discrediting LG executives by meticulously attacking statements

they made during testimony. For example, Gary seemed to have convinced the jury that Ray
Loewen himself was a liar by attacking his reference to his 110-foot yacht, the Alula Spirit, as
merely a “boat.” He also criticized Loewen for understating the amount spent by LG on
acquisitions in 1995. Loewen had stated that $400 million had been “spent;” however, press
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releases revealed that $630 million had been signed or closed. Loewen’s argument that “signed”
was not the same as “spent” did not convince jury foreman Glenn Millen, 63, a retired engineer,
who stated, “I wouldn’t believe that guy [Loewen] for anything in the world. . . . He got on the
stand and he perjured himself. He got on the stand, and he laughed at us. He didn’t think it was
any big deal.” Perhaps the final blow to Ray Loewen’s credibility came from the Reverend
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Edward Jones, representing the Tennessee-based National Baptist Congress, a coalition of eight
million African American churchgoers. Two weeks before the trial, the National Baptist
Congress gave LG first crack at selling funeral urns and cemetery plots to its members. One of
the jurors surmised that Jones was called in to show the jury, two-thirds of whom were black,
“what a good guy Loewen is for doing this.” Nevertheless, the same juror later recounted that
the strategy backfired because the black jurors were upset when Gary said the deal would be
worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year to LG, and that Jones had negotiated it without the
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benefit of legal counsel.

Gary also managed to inject the issue of foreign ownership into the trial on several
occasions, including once when he compared O’Keefe’s struggle with Loewen to the Japanese
bombing of Pearl Harbor:

Something inside [Jerry O’Keefe] said . . . fight on. [Ray Loewen] lied to him,
and a voice said fight on. . . . When they cheated him, a little voice said fight on.
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. . . He’s a fighter, and he’s fought them. You see, that little voice . . . it’s called
faith. . . . It’s called pride, in America. . . . It is called love, love for your country.
. . . You see, that little voice didn’t just start speaking in 1991, when we started
this lawsuit. That voice started back in 1941, on December 7, when our boys
were bombed in the morning while they were sleeping. It was a Sunday morning,

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Sunday morning, caught them sleeping, got bombed, but on December the 8th,
early in the morning, Jerry O’Keefe got out of his bed and found his way down to
the recruiter’s office. He was just a young lad then, just 19 years of age, but he
wanted to fight for his country, and he fought, and he fought.

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Gary made no secret of his strategy when he commented to local reporters: “These people [the
Loewen Group] need to be taught a lesson. . . . I can do it with a straighter face than anything I
have done before in my life when they are gouging poor people.” One equity analyst took
exception to the logic of Gary’s approach to the case: “[Gary] has a flamboyant, stream-of-
consciousness approach to the jury that was well suited to this case. However, we were unable
to find a coherent discussion of the facts or the issues in the plaintiff’s closing statement.”

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Logical or not, on November 1, 1995, the jury found, by an 11–1 vote, that the Loewen
Group was liable for malicious breach of contract, common-law fraud, bad-faith dealing,
engaging in predatory trade practices, and attempted monopolization. As part of its decision, the
jury awarded plaintiff Jerry O’Keefe $100 million in compensation and $160 million in punitive
damages. The judge, however, ruled that the jury had erred in awarding punitive damages
because it had not yet determined the Loewen Group’s net worth. Therefore, on the following
day, after LG’s legal team had presented the company’s net worth as $700 million, the jury voted
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10–2 to increase the punitive damages to $400 million. The total judgment was now $500
million—$29 million more than LG’s 1994 sales and 13 times its profits. Ray Loewen was
outraged: “It’s an issue of how the lower court, a local businessman, and the plaintiff’s lawyers
orchestrated something for their own selfish goals. . . . I call it sophisticated extortion. They
know how to use and manipulate the system.”
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On the Toronto and NASDAQ stock exchanges, shareholders suffered a 20 percent loss
over two days as LG shares fell from approximately $40 to $32 a share (see Exhibit 3). With
48.2 million shares outstanding (see Exhibit 4), the stock-price drop represented a total loss of
market capitalization equal to $388 million. Based on his 20 percent ownership of the company,
Ray Loewen personally suffered an $80-million loss. Despite the fact that most observers felt
the award was outrageously high, Judge Graves announced that the award would be upheld, and
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LG stock fell another $2.87. LG’s other outstanding publicly traded securities included a
preferred stock and several bonds, all of which also lost market value, albeit to lesser extents
than the common stock.

As was its right, the Loewen Group appealed the case to the Mississippi Appellate Court.
Unfortunately, Mississippi law required that, in order to obtain a stay of execution on a trial
judgment, the appellant first had to post the entire amount of the verdict, plus 15 percent, by way
of an appeal bond, which had to be collateralized with cash or cash equivalent. Although LG
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had a market capitalization before the judgment of about $2 billion, it could not readily obtain
$625 million in cash. Despite its many efforts, LG succeeded only in getting a letter of credit for
$125 million, for which it incurred bonding costs of $7.4 million. As the court’s deadline
approached, LG actively sought to obtain a ruling that would allow it to appeal the Mississippi
requirement of a $625-million bond so that LG’s $125-million bond would be acceptable.

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All of LG’s attempts to change the bonding requirements, however, proved unsuccessful.
On January 26, 1996, with its back against the wall, LG entered into an agreement with O’Keefe
for a $175-million settlement. The settlement included a $50-million cash payment, $4 million a
year for 20 years, and 1.5 million Loewen shares (guaranteed at $30 a share). LG announced the
value of the settlement in present-dollar terms as $135 million. Despite the significant reduction

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in the award, however, Loewen’s legal team remained stunned. One member of the team
remarked, “Prior to this, the largest punitive award affirmed by the courts in Mississippi was just
$1.5 million, against a company whose net worth was $8 billion. So, the jury comes in and
awards 275 times that, against a company less than one-eighth the size. That’s an incredibly
bizarre result.”

In addition to the award payments to O’Keefe and the bonding costs incurred, the trial

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had several other costs associated with it. For example, once the jury rendered its verdict,
virtually all of LG management’s efforts were diverted toward the appeal process and the
negotiation settlement. The cost of management’s time and effort devoted to the post-trial events
was estimated to be $2.1 million. Moreover, LG incurred significant litigation costs, which
approximated $10 million. LG’s lawyers also felt pressured to settle another case that happened
to be pending against LG in the U.S. district court in Philadelphia. Rather than risk another
onerous judgment from a U.S. court, LG agreed to settle the suit—which would normally have
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cost no more than $3 million—for $30 million.

In 1998, three years after the verdict, LG commenced arbitration against the United
States under Chapter 11 of NAFTA (see Exhibit 5 for Chapter 11–based lawsuits). LG claimed
that the trial judge repeatedly allowed O’Keefe’s attorney to make “extensive, irrelevant, and
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highly prejudicial references” to Loewen’s foreign nationality, as well as race- and class-based
distinctions. LG also claimed that the Mississippi trial court violated NAFTA’s Article 1102,
which prohibited discrimination against foreign investors by admitting anti-Canadian and pro-
American testimony and comments. LG pointed to this discrimination as a basis for the jury’s
inexplicably large verdict. Moreover, LG contended that numerous other provisions of NAFTA
had been violated:
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• By permitting nationality-, race-, and class-based testimony and comments, the

Mississippi trial court violated Article 1105, which provided a minimum standard of
treatment for foreign investors.
• The excessive verdict and judgment violated Article 1105.
• The Mississippi court’s arbitrary application of the bonding requirement violated Article
1105.
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• The discriminatory conduct, the excessive verdict, the denial of the right to appeal, and
the coerced settlement violated Article 1110, which barred the uncompensated
expropriation of investments of foreign investors.
• The United States failed to live up to its obligations under Article 1105 to provide “full
protection and security” to foreign investments. LG claimed that the United States was

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liable for Mississippi’s breaches because Article 1105 required contracting states to take
all necessary measures to ensure that provisions of the Agreement were observed by state
and provincial governments.

As LG’s legal team formalized these complaints, it began to think about the damages it should

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ask as compensation for the Mississippi verdict. Based on the recommendations of a financial
expert, LG’s team was confident that certain financing costs could be claimed as damages.

1. Borrowing costs: At the time of the O’Keefe trial, LG had $933 million of interest-
bearing debt. As a result of LG’s debt rating being lowered from BBB to BB+, the
company’s borrowing rates increased 60 basis points (yield to maturity increased from
6.78 percent to 7.38 percent), and debt-issuance costs increased 137.5 basis points. For

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the debt added during the three years following the verdict ($1,037 million, $1,344
million, and $1,105 million for 1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively), the sum of the
incremental borrowing costs and issuance costs totaled $20.5 million for 1996, $32.8
million for 1997, and $36.1 million for 1998.
2. Equity costs: At the time of the O’Keefe trial, LG had 48.2 million shares of common
stock outstanding and 3.0 million shares of floating-rate preferred stock outstanding. LG
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relied on frequent equity issuances to fund its acquisition strategy. For the years 1996–
98, the Loewen Group issued 10.54 million, 14.61 million, and 0.06 million shares,
respectively.2 Assuming a stock-price reduction of $12 a share, the implied increased
cost of raising equity was $126.5 million for 1996, $175.4 million for 1997, and $0.7
million for 1998.
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3. Convertible preferred in lieu of common: At the time of the O’Keefe trial, LG had not
found it necessary to issue any convertible securities because of its sound financial
condition. Shortly after the O’Keefe trial, however, the Loewen Group resorted to
issuing convertible preferred stock because the company did not want to enter the
common-equity market immediately after a bad-news shock to the stock price. LG
management estimated that the convertible raised $37.5 million less than it would have
realized without the impact of the O’Keefe trial. In addition, the preferred stock cost LG
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an incremental dividend (over the common dividend) of $9.3 million a year. It was not
until after the settlement with O’Keefe that LG management resumed issuing common
equity.

A second expert witness, who was a finance professor at a top business school, opined that
estimating damages was a simple matter of measuring the “economic loss of firm value as
measured by the change in market prices of all the financial claims on the company’s assets.”
The professor argued that an efficient capital market measured the economic impact of “events”
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every day as evidenced by the change in the prices of the stocks and bonds that were freely
traded on the public markets. For example, if a company was 100 percent equity financed with
one million shares outstanding and its stock price fell $1 on the day the CEO announced his

2
This included shares issued to the public, shares issued for legal settlements, and shares issued for acquisitions.

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retirement, one could assign a value of $1 million to the CEO’s departure. If the company had
debt as part of its capital structure, then one would have to add in the value impact of the debt
loss to find the total loss of firm value as a result of the CEO’s resignation.

Estimating damages was an extremely important component of the Loewen Group’s suit

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against the U.S. Justice Department. It was critical for the legal team to develop a strategy for
estimating the damages as well as for constructing a compelling explanation as to why its chosen
methodology was appropriate. Regardless of how the damages were estimated, they would need
to be expressed in October 1999, after-tax U.S. dollars.3 Because of a recent case precedent,
LG’s team felt comfortable using 8.0 percent as the annual, after-tax investment rate for the four-
year period beginning with the O’Keefe trial in October 1995, and ending in October 1999. It
was unclear, however, whether the finance professor’s “efficient market–event methodology” or

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a simple itemization and summation of all the relevant costs would be better received by the
tribunal.
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No
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3
Loewen’s tax rate was half the statutory corporate rate of 35 percent because of a section of the Tax Code that
dealt with earnings stripping. In effect, LG’s large accumulation of nondeductible interest expenses meant that each
new dollar of noninterest, tax-deductible expense resulted in 17.5 cents of tax savings for the company. The
peculiarities of the Tax Code, however, implied that any added borrowing costs were not deductible expenses. As
was normally true for most corporations, the costs of raising and servicing common and preferred equity were also
not tax-deductible items.

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Exhibit 1

LOEWEN GROUP, INC.

Income Statements, December 1996–98

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($ millions)

1996 1997 1998

Sales 1,232 1,592 1,747

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Cost of sales 782 1,062 1,298
Gross profit 450 530 449
SG&A 105 142 192
EBITDA 345 387 256
Depreciation 78 102 136
EBIT 267 285 120
Interest expense 125 182 280
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Special items (5) (28) (1,002)
Pretax income 137 75 (1,163)
Total taxes 40 4 (253)
Minority interest 10 10 11
Net income 88 61 (921)
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Cash preferred div. 12 14 14

No
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Exhibit 2

LOEWEN GROUP, INC.

Balance-Sheet Statements, December 1996–98

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($ millions)

1996 1997 1998

Cash 25 53 145
Receivables 257 359 341
Inventory 44 50 53

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Total current assets 341 477 552

PP&E 940 1,139 1,270

Intangibles 765 904 1,151
Deferred charges 113 167 194
Equity and other investments 1,624 2,133 2,047
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Total assets 4,790 6,433 7,186

Debt, current portion 109 62 1,344

Notes payable - - 102
Accounts payable 33 39 71
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Total current liabilities 265 291 1,707

Total long-term debt 1,957 2,501 2,143

Deferred LT taxes - - 321
Minority interests 103 107 115
Total liabilities 3,354 4,233 5,794
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Preferred stock 215 224 242

Common equity 1,220 1,976 1,151
Total stockholders’ equity 1,436 2,200 1,392

Common shares outstanding 59.06 73.91 74.06

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Exhibit 3

LOEWEN GROUP, INC.

Loewen Group’s Weekly Security Prices

rP
Preferred Common Bond Preferred Common Bond
11-Aug-95 26.28 34.13 97.31 1-Mar-96 24.38 28.56 96.00
18-Aug-95 26.43 34.75 97.40 8-Mar-96 24.58 29.25 96.13
25-Aug-95 27.02 37.13 97.73 15-Mar-96 24.26 28.13 95.93

yo
1-Sep-95 27.40 38.75 97.95 22-Mar-96 24.40 28.63 96.02
8-Sep-95 27.28 38.25 97.88 29-Mar-96 24.58 29.25 96.13
15-Sep-95 27.07 37.38 97.76 5-Apr-96 24.81 30.06 96.27
22-Sep-95 27.31 38.38 97.90 12-Apr-96 24.45 28.75 96.05
29-Sep-95 27.97 41.25 98.26 19-Apr-96 24.61 29.31 96.15
6-Oct-95 27.85 40.75 98.20 26-Apr-96 25.09 31.00 96.44
13-Oct-95 27.70 40.09 98.11 3-May-96 24.23 27.88 95.93
op
20-Oct-95 27.68 40.00 98.10 10-May-96 24.86 30.00 96.32
27-Oct-95 27.50 39.25 98.00 17-May-96 24.51 28.75 96.10
3-Nov-95 25.76 31.88 96.96 24-May-96 23.99 26.95 95.78
10-Nov-95 25.31 30.25 96.68 31-May-96 24.53 28.75 96.12
17-Nov-95 25.75 31.88 96.94 7-Jun-96 24.60 29.00 96.17
tC

24-Nov-95 24.19 26.75 95.97 14-Jun-96 24.58 28.94 96.16

1-Dec-95 24.23 26.88 95.99 21-Jun-96 24.71 29.38 96.23
8-Dec-95 23.93 25.94 95.81 28-Jun-96 24.96 30.25 96.39
15-Dec-95 23.43 24.38 95.49 5-Jul-96 24.82 29.75 96.30
22-Dec-95 23.35 24.13 95.43 12-Jul-96 24.78 29.63 96.28
29-Dec-95 23.72 25.31 95.67 19-Jul-96 24.40 28.25 96.04
No

5-Jan-96 23.97 26.13 95.83 26-Jul-96 24.10 27.25 95.86

12-Jan-96 23.61 25.00 95.60 2-Aug-96 24.44 28.38 96.07
19-Jan-96 23.45 24.50 95.50 9-Aug-96 24.73 29.38 96.25
26-Jan-96 22.01 20.50 94.52 16-Aug-96 24.62 29.00 96.19
2-Feb-96 24.13 27.73 95.84 23-Aug-96 24.84 29.75 96.32
9-Feb-96 23.91 27.00 95.71 30-Aug-96 24.77 29.50 96.28
16-Feb-96 24.40 28.63 96.02
Do

23-Feb-96 24.41 28.69 96.03

This document is authorized for educator review use only by NAJAM SAHAR, Riphah International University until Apr 2019. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright.
Permissions@hbsp.harvard.edu or 617.783.7860
 -13- UV0515

t
os
Exhibit 4

LOEWEN GROUP, INC.

Loewen Group’s Common and Preferred Stock Prices before O’Keefe Trial

rP
Shares Outstanding Week before Closing Price per Share Week
O’Keefe Trial Judgment before O’Keefe Trial Judgment
Common stock 48.2 million $39.25
Preferred stock 3.0 million $27.50

yo
op
tC
No
Do

This document is authorized for educator review use only by NAJAM SAHAR, Riphah International University until Apr 2019. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright.
Permissions@hbsp.harvard.edu or 617.783.7860
 -14- UV0515

t
os
Exhibit 5

LOEWEN GROUP, INC.

NAFTA Chapter 11 Lawsuits

rP
PARTIES ISSUE DAMAGES SOUGHT
(US$)

Ethyl v. Canada U.S. chemical $201 million

Apr. 14, 1997 company challenges
Canadian

yo
environmental
regulation of gasoline
additive MMT

Metalclad v. Mexico U.S. firm challenges $90 million

Jan. 13, 1997 Mexican municipality’s
refusal to grant
construction permit for
toxic-waste dump and
State declaration of
op
ecological zone

Source: http://www.citizen.org/trade/nafta/CH__11/
tC
No
Do

This document is authorized for educator review use only by NAJAM SAHAR, Riphah International University until Apr 2019. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright.
Permissions@hbsp.harvard.edu or 617.783.7860