Tañada v.

Tuvera
136 SCRA 27
J. ESCOLIN
FACTS OF THE CASE
 Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders.
HELD
 The respondents moved for a dismissal of the case, on the ground of lack of legal
standing, but the Court, referring to jurisprudence, held otherwise.
o “When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator (in this case, the petitioners) at whose instigation
the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws.”
o Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
 Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates.
o It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
o The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
 Art. 2, Civil Code. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided
o The Court held that the argument is correct only insofar as the fifteen-day
automatic publication is concerned; Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of
its effectivity.
 Section 1 of CA 638’s object is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens.
  Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the legal maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no one
compliance therewith” as provided for by Article 3 of the New Civil Code.
 Much emphasis must be given to the publication requirement, given that this is the time
when President Marcos was president—a time when the people have bestowed upon
him a power enjoyed solely by the legislature.
 The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general
applicability” is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.

o It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances “of a public

nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due process.
 It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first
be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
 Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned.
 The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
 Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential
decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition
o The answer is all too familiar: the operative fact doctrine. The actual existence
of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. An all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
 Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is “an operative fact which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored.
o The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
  In Pesigan vs. Angeles,11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that
“publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.”

RULING
 WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
OPINIONS
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with qualification
 I am unable to concur insofar as the opinion written by Justice Escolin would
unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished Presidential issuances to have a binding force and effect.
o Such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From
the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty.

 The pronouncement made by the Court would lend itself to the interpretation that such a
legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the
Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so
aptly pointed out.
 It is true that what is decided now applies only to past “presidential issuances.”
o Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible
misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be
impressed with binding force or effectivity.
 In sum, the concurrence only goes insofar than to affirm that publication is essential to
the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette.
o The Civil Code, particularly Article 2, upon which the requirement is based, is
itself only a legislative enactment. It does not and cannot have the juridical
force of a constitutional command.
  A later legislative or executive act which ahs the force and effect of law
can legally provide for a different rule.
 Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character.
o That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted,
with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to
such a pronouncement.
 Tañada v. Tuvera
146 SCRA 446 (1986)
J. CRUZ
FACTS OF THE CASE
 The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision.
 Specifically, they ask the following questions:
(1) What is meant by law of public nature of general applicability?
(2) Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
(3) What is meant by publication?
(4) Where is the publication to be made?
(5) When is the publication to be made?
 The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and
that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
 In the Comment required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed:
o Ffirst that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore
be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not
always imperative;
o That publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official
Gazette;
o That in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding.
 This elicited a Reply refuting these arguments. Came next the February People Power
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view
of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court.
o Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be
published;
o That publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette;
o That, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was
not supported by eight members of this Court.
  The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
 "ART. 2, Civil Code. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication."

HELD
 The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
o This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
o Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
 It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed
with altogether.
o The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
o Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One
can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to
operate.
 The conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all.
o It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes
"the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative
enactments of the government.
On what is meant by law of public nature of general applicability
 The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do
not apply to them directly.
 In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature.
o To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to
the public as a whole.
 All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
o Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
o Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

 On the other hand, interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need
not be published.
 Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
 Even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
 All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public
place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements,
 The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not
merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body
is supposed to enforce.
 However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid
down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are
not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
  The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws
 There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership.
o Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are
more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly.
 The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required
or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been
made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. (As further amended by EO 200 by
President Cory Aquino)
RULING
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.