Caucasus University

School of Governance

Rwandan Genocide and the US indifference

International Relations introductory course

Lecturer – Eka Akobia

Giorgi Esaiashvili

Tbilisi
2019
Contents

Introduction ............................................................ 3

Prelude, process and outcome ................................ 4

Theoretical Framework .......................................... 5

Conclusion ............................................................... 6

Bibliography .......................................................... 8

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Introduction

Nowadays, international law consists of rules and standards that are generally accepted between
nations. Over the years, a norm has developed that the most serious and cruel acts of violence should
be perceived as a concern for all humanity. As a matter of fact, these international treaties and
conventions are widely followed by the International community; Nevertheless, historical events have
more than once proved that sovereign countries often treat serious human right abuses as some sort of
a domestic problem that should be no concern for the outside world.

After the notoriously known Nazi Holocaust during World War II, countries came together and
signed the Genocide Convention in 1948. The world pledged to “prevent and punish” genocide in case
of both, war and peacetime. (Goldstein& Pevehouse 2017, 230) Despite the existence of international
tribunals, human rights treaties, and conventions, massive humanitarian crimes still occur and a vivid
example of that is 1994 when over the course of just hundred days, about 800 000 people were killed
in Rwanda by the ethnic Hutu extremists. The genocide was partially caused by the death of the
President of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, when his aircraft was shot down above Kigali
airport in 1994. (BBC World, 2019) As the slaughter unfolded in Rwanda, the international community
didn’t take any necessary action and stood by, while only 5,000 troops could have been more than
enough to easily change the unfortunate outcome.

Around this time, the US embassy at Kampala had information that weaponry was crossing the
border. Even the Central Intelligence Agency was aware that the rebels’ military strength was growing
and the bloody escalation of ethnic tension in Rwanda was just a matter of time. Nevertheless,
Washington ignored help and all the assistance that was given to the rebels by the government of
Uganda. Only after years passed, Bill Clinton publicly apologized for the US’s inaction during the
genocide. (Epstein, Helen C. 2017)

The essay aims to analyze the circumstances and the political interests that defined the United
States’ indifferent position while the genocide in Rwanda was committed against the Tutsi. Above
mentioned is especially relevant for the smaller countries that are constantly relying on foreign
humanitarian and military aid during the times of destabilization.

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 The main question that the essay will try to answer is, what caused the US’s non-intervention
policy in 1994, during Rwanda’s genocide? To investigate this, the essay will use a qualitative, desk
research method and a theoretical framework.

Prelude, process and outcome

In the Pre-colonial Rwanda, the difference between two ethnic groups was mainly economic.
While Tutsi was a ruling minority class, Hutu were mostly peasants and made up around 85 percent
majority of the population. After Belgians acquired the colonial mandate from Germans, they started
enforcing new ideas and decided that because of this “inevitable” racial difference, Tutsis as superiors,
were pre-destined to rule the country. This approach hardened the polarization and caused even more
tension between two ethnic groups. (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne 2016, 231-234)

After gaining independence in 1961 Hutus took over the government and most of Tutsis had to
leave the country. However, those who were in exile in Uganda, created a military group called
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and struck their homeland from the north. The whole country was
filled with anger and racial hatred. (Epstein, Helen C. 2017) In 1993 treaty was formed and the United
Nations sent its peacekeeping troops to Rwanda, but the tranquility turned out to be rather short. On
the basis of a massive mistrust between two parties, the murder of Hutu president - Habyarimana
became the start of a raging slaughter. In order for the UN to have been effective, it would’ve definitely
needed more soldiers. The reality was that not a single state expressed the desire to volunteer, so the
Security Council decided to stand aside. (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne 2016, 231-234)

At that time the US president’s administration was clearly aware that Rwanda was sinking into a
genocide in the early April of 1994. Despite the fact, information was deliberately neglected and buried
to justify the non-intervention later. As many years passed, classified documents and intelligence
reports revealed that the officials only privately used a term genocide after 3 weeks from the beginning
of mass killings but preferred not to say it publicly because President Bill Clinton decided not to get
involved. (Carroll, Rory 2004)

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 As a result, genocide in Rwanda costed lives of 800,000 people. It took quite a large period of time
for this massacre to be even recognized as a genocide committed towards Tutsis. As a matter of fact, it
is widely considered that even in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, a lot of people have died in
Congo over the last twenty-five years, which is again, accredited to the “collateral damage” of the
events that took place in 1994. (Köpp, Dirke 2019)

Theoretical Framework

A relevant theory should be applied to the events mentioned above, in order to answer the
research question and analyze the actions of the US, driven by its political interests. As the event
unfolded, it was clear that no country volunteered to send troops to end the conflict. Accordingly, we
can assume that states couldn’t see any value in sacrificing their own soldiers to save the citizens of
Rwanda. This argumentation leads to a typical realist popular opinion, which in this case might be the
best way to interpret and explain the US’s motivations.

Realism as a way of political thinking goes centuries back and establishes itself as a long tradition.
Famous Chinese strategists Sun Tzu who lived 2,000 years ago, would always argue that while ruling
the state that was often confronted with hostile and armed neighbors, there was no place for moral
reasoning. As opposed to idealism, realism interprets international relations mostly in terms of power
and national interest. (Goldstein& Pevehouse 2017, 38) While not a single IR theory has been reliable
enough to explain everything in an international order, Realism still holds a central and a very
important position among them. Within this framework, we can consider that the behavior of a state
is purely in the pursuit of self-interest, as they rationally operate as autonomous actors in the system
of an international anarchy without a central government. (Goldstein& Pevehouse 2017, 39)

Subsequently, the US decided to deny the intervention, which clearly highlights the focal points
mentioned in the previous paragraph. Unfortunately for the Tutsis, there were no political, strategic or
economic interests overlapping between the US and Rwanda. President along with its administration

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couldn’t see a tangible outcome of intervening in the country that was so far and isolated from the
American interests and the society.

One of the major factors that also defined the US foreign policy at that time and changed the
outlook of America’s global role, was a result of an unfortunate military mission that took place in
Somalia in 1993. Later on, the reluctance of the US to send its troops on peacekeeping missions
internationally, was named as the “Somalia Syndrome”. This operation started during the Bush
administration and ended with an attempt to capture Somali military commander and a political leader
- Mohamed Aidid. The intervention ended up being catastrophic in the October of 1993 when eighteen
US soldiers were killed after two of their helicopters got shot down. Congress reacted to this very badly
and claimed that President Clinton was turning down the American interests and was appealing to
“social work”. At that time Clinton had just recently taken the office and he decided to withdraw all
the US forces throughout the following few months. (Bissell, Jonathan 2017)

With this recent controversial complication, US inaction during the Rwanda genocide hasn’t
caused any noticeable protest either in congress or within the American society. People who talked
about this issue in 1994, only cautioned and reminded President Clinton of the disaster of Somalia and
the lessons that should’ve been already learned by that time. (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne 2016, 231-234)

Conclusion

Every conflict has a very unique, complex nature and includes various actors and interest groups
within itself. The same can be said about the Rwandan genocide, which ended up being known as one
of the largest acts of mass killing since the horrors of World War II. Nevertheless, analyzing the case
with the use of the framework of an IR theory such as Realism has managed to answer the initial
research question of the essay - what caused the US’s non-intervention approach in 1994.

It is clear that the heart of the US foreign policy was driven by the national interests of the state
and vividly neglected the international responsibilities to protect. Organizations and International law
play a great role in world peace and stability but ultimately, when superpowers see the personal value

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in their action they act. Otherwise, if not fulfilling their national interests, they simply do not. This is
exactly the precise representation of the tragedy of commons and an example of where the
responsibility to protect will continue to fail to live up to the expectations.

Years after the Rwandan genocide, Bill Clinton made a pubic speech where he apologized and
expressed his great guilt over the incident. “Given the broader context, it was seen as impossible to
contemplate American intervention, because nobody was for it. My great regret is, again, that we and
I did not say, 'Let's test the limits of this possibility Too many people are dying. We cannot accept that
this is inconceivable.” (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne 2016, 231-234) These words of President Clinton
imply that making difference was somewhat beyond him as an individual, which once again
corresponds to the idea of Realism that the interstate actions are taken according to the International
system and not the internal makeup of individual states.

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Bibliography

1. Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. International Relations. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Pearson, 2017.

2. Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne. Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases .
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

3. Epstein, Helen C. “America's Secret Role in the Rwandan Genocide.” The Guardian. Guardian
News and Media, September 12, 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/sep/12/americas-secret-role-in-the-rwandan-
genocide.

4. “Rwanda Genocide: 100 Days of Slaughter.” BBC News. BBC, April 4, 2019.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506.

5. Carroll, Rory. “US Chose to Ignore Rwandan Genocide.” The Guardian. Guardian News and
Media, March 31, 2004. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/31/usa.rwanda.

6. Köpp, Dirke. “Opinion: Deadly Effects of Rwandan Genocide Still Felt Today: DW. Daily
Wire. DW, April 6, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-deadly-effects-of-rwandan-
genocide-still-felt-today/a-48239716.

7. Bissell, Jonathan. “How America Did Nothing to Stop a Genocide.” Fair Observer, September
25, 2017. https://www.fairobserver.com/region/africa/us-national-security-strategy-rwanda-
genocide-africa-analysis-17002/.

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