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EPM AS ASSURANCE FOR COMMUNICATION SAFETY. DISCUSS WHAT ARE

THE EW THREATS NOWADAYS AND THE BEST EPM TO BE IMPLEMENT BY
SIGNAL CORPS IN ENSURING SECURED COMMUNICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

"All war is based on deception." - Sun Tzu

1. The weapons and technologies of war are constantly evolving - changing more rapidly
year to year in the 21st Century than they did century to century when Chinese general Sun
Tzu wrote The Art of War some 2,500 years ago. Yet Sun Tzu's writings remain central
guidelines even today; the need to control the high ground is applicable to one of the most
advanced and increasingly critical realms of modern combat: Electronic Warfare (EW).

2. New technologies give commanders better options on how to employ that capability.
That is an inevitability and an absolute positive for the Army, with greater capabilities and
technologies empowering us to accomplish our goals. The force today is drastically different
from what it was 10 years ago. Advances in EW enable a commander to make decisions he
never had 50 years ago. In the past, a commander may have had no choice but to allow an
adversary to use a specific asset or to destroy that asset. EW gives that commander other
options, such as degrading or disabling an asset for a period of times.

3. Electronic warfare (EW) is military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum,

which encompasses the interception, identification and location of electromagnetic emissions,
the employment of electromagnetic energy to reduce or prevent hostile use of the
electromagnetic spectrum and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.1 The purpose
of electronic warfare is to deny the opponent the advantage of, and ensure friendly
unimpeded access to, the EM spectrum. EW can be applied from air, sea, land, and space by
manned and unmanned systems, and can target humans, communications, radar, or other
assets. The activities of EW are applicable across the whole spectrum of military operations
and are not confined to warfare, conventional or otherwise. In peacetime, armies attempt to
intercept, locate and identify the source of a potential adversary’s electronic emissions.
4. When radio systems (or wireless telegraphy) were introduce early in the Twentieth
Century, they suffered from limited range, large and heavy equipment. Additionally, radio
transmissions could be intercept and jammed easily that is render unreadable if another radio

1 MAF EWTC, Basic Electronic Warfare, EWTC, Malaysia, 2005, p (08-09)-3.

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transmitted on the same frequency with sufficient signal strength. Nevertheless, radio systems
offered the ability for naval forces to communicate with warships at sea.

5. The first recorded use of jamming occurred during the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05).
A Russian radio operator accidentally discovered the radio frequency used by Japanese artillery-
spotting ships, to pass adjust gun-aiming adjustments. By continually transmitting on this
frequency, the Russian effectively blocked out Japanese radio transmissions and the gunfire
repeatedly missed the targets.

6. The First World War also saw the introduction and impact of radio detection finding
(DF). The British Navy used coastal radio direction finders (deployed in 1914), to detect the
movement of German warships and submarines. This enabled the British to maintain an
effective naval blockade and to avoid the threat from German submarines.

7. With the increasing dependence on commanders C3 systems, domination of the

electromagnetic spectrum is vital. The communications method used in a military
environment
must guarantee secure command and control despite the use of Electronic Support Measures
(ESM) and Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) by an enemy. Electronic Protective Measures
(EPM) can be use to ensure communications at all tactical levels even when an opponent
attempts to hinder, disturb or disrupt operations. ECM-resistant, reliable communication links
are therefore essential for any successful military operation.

8. Electronic Protective Measure (EPM) or Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM)

is define as actions taken to ensure friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum against an
EW threat. Thus, EPM is the art of reducing the effectiveness of an EW threat so that the cost
of
effective EW becomes prohibitive for the enemy.2 There is one fundamental difference
between EPM and ECM. EPM is mostly concerned with techniques which are embodied in
the design of electronic equipment (e.g., radar, radio and its constituent parts like receiver,
transmitter, etc.) while ECM usually requires a separate item or unit of equipment which
operates in its own right and not as an adjunct to another system.

2 Weapons and Systems Engineering Department, United States Naval Academy - Chapter 11, Countermeasure
<https://fas.org/man/dod-101/navy/docs/fun/part11.htm>

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9. Many EPM features are incorporate in the radar design. Thus, EPM is mostly
concerned with the discussion of various radar design principles that have been developed on
the basis of various ECM threats which a particular radar system can possibly encounter.
Most of the EPM techniques are based on the characteristics of transmitted radar pulse, which
in turn, depends upon the radar parameters like power, frequency, PRF, pulse length, antenna
gain, antenna polarisation, antenna scan, receiver's probability of intercept, etc. Today, a wide
range of EPM techniques are employed and divide by three categories which are Spatial
EPM, Spectral EPM and Temporal EPM. Some of the important techniques, I will show in
the next sub topic below.

10. Scope. The scope of this paper work covers the EW threats nowadays and the best
EPM to be implement by signal corps in ensuring secured communications.

AIM

11. The aim of this research is to discuss about the EW threats and provide a solution and
an understanding on the EPM techniques that can be use by our Signal Corps in order to
encounter the national EW threats. (provide understanding then only propose a solution –
rearrange)

EW THREATS

12. Electronic warfare systems – whether on land or aboard ships and aircraft – tap the
electromagnetic spectrum to sense, protect, and communicate but, when necessary, these
same system can be turned against adversaries to deny their ability to disrupt or use radio,
infrared, or radar signals. Today’s EW systems tend to rely on databases of known threats
with predefined countermeasures, which can limit their ability to quickly adapt and respond
to new advanced threats. Soon, these systems may increasingly be task with isolating
unknown hostile radar signals within dense electromagnetic environments and responding
quickly with effective electronic countermeasures.

13. Modern tactical communications networks offer unprecedented communications and

data access capabilities. With these capabilities come new threats and cyber security
challenges. A major distinction between the threat profile for a Military Tactical Network and

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the civilian equivalent is the adversary. Adversary always take chances on the weakness of our
armed forces especially on the technology of our equipment and weapons. Malaysian Armed
Forces (MAF) now regards the defence of national interests as fundamental to its sovereignty
and independence. In line with that the principal objective of the National Defence policy is
the protection and defence of Malaysia’s interests and territories from domestic and external
threats.3

14. For 2019, the nation of Malaysia is rank 41 (of 137) out of the countries currently
considered for the annual Global Firepower review. Malaysia holds a Power Index rating of
0.6523 (0.0000 being perfect).4 Each nation is assess on individual and collective values.
Therefore, due to the review, MAF must have more efforts to make sure all the capabilities in
our defence security enhanced and well controlled. There are so many threats that we have to
overcome including terrorist threats, cyber security threats and electronic warfare threats. All
these threats have a devastating effect if not handled properly and there are no attempt to
prevent or overcome ourselves from becoming a target country.

CATEGORIES OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE THREATS TO RADIO

COMMUNICATION

15. Communications have always been the heart of command and control. On today's
highly sophisticated battlefield, the Army places even greater dependence on communications
and other battlefield electronic systems. The enemy knows that both sides to an extent not
known in the past will use Electronic Warfare (EW). How vulnerable we are to enemy EW
depends very much on the communicator.

16. In my paper, I am considering the components below can be a threat to radio

communications. They are as follows:

a. Enemy’s Electronic Support Measures (ESM), which include: Search,

Intercept, Monitoring and Location.
b. Enemy’s Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) which seek to prevent or reduce
the effectiveness of communications systems by jamming or to deception.
c. Human Errors.

Enemy’s Electronic Support Measures (ESM)

3 MINDEF, Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Official Portal Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, nd, viewed 5
June 2016, <http://www.mod.gov.my/phocadownload/DASAR-PERTAHANAN/ndp.pdf>
4 <https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=malaysia>

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17. Electronic Support Measures (ESM) are essentially the passive activity of listening to
an enemy's transmissions. ESM combined with firepower, jamming and deception can
provide a powerful means of attacking an enemy's command and control system. A COMINT
system as shown in Figure 1 would pose a considerable threat to friendly communication
systems.

Figure 1: Communication Intercept Equipment

18. ESM with its components of Search and Intercept, Monitoring, Direction Finding and
Analysis has the two-fold aim of acquiring operational or combat intelligence, and steerage
information for offensive EW. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) produces
intelligence of immediate tactical value such as orders of battle, the location and identity of
enemy HQs and units, movement information, indicators of enemy intentions and
information on enemy electronic and cryptographic systems. It gives a commander a long
range, 24 hour, surveillance capability. The ESM system requires a high accurate, high speed
and instantaneous controller to acquire updated information every moment.5 ESM thus
provides most of the information on which EW operations depend and as such is the
fundamental component of any EW system. Figure 2 shows a communication link and a
second link from the transmitter to an intercept receiver. Note that the transmit antenna gain
to the desired receiver and to the intercept receiver may be different.

5 Bite Controller for ESM Systems by Pandu. J & Sreenivasu. B.

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Figure 2: The Transmitter to

Intercept Receiver Desired Receiver
Link

19. The enemy uses Radio Electronic Combat (REC) measures to collect intelligence data
against our systems. This is what intercept provides. The enemy then decides what REC
would be appropriate from the data gained through intercept. The enemy will use selected
reconnaissance assets to detect and locate terminals, links, and relays. The enemy will
attempt to those communications, which he considers are priority targets. Figure 3 depicts the
enemy's REC cycle. The goal of REC is to disrupt friendly use of the electromagnetic
spectrum through destruction, deception, or jamming. The enemy will coordinate all three in
an attempt to deprive us of command and control.

Figure 3: The Transmitter to

Intercept Receiver
Desired Receiver Link

20. The first thing that the enemy must do is intercept our radio signal. All they need to do
is a radio receiver that operates in the same mode and on the same frequency that you are
using to transmit. The mere fact that you are operating gives the enemy valuable information.
It tells him that you are in the area and by the number of stations operating on the same
frequency; he can estimate the size of the unit. If your net is operating in the clear, his
language specialists can understand exactly what is the communication is about for
even more information. When he analyses the traffic pattern, he can figure out which station
is the net control station (NCS) and identify the headquarters. By further traffic analysis, he

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can determine changes in the level of activity that could mean a movement or upcoming
operation.

21. It is difficult for the enemy to fix on a satellite terminal. However, the radios used for
command and control are highly vulnerable to REC. Through an alert enemy signals
intelligence effort, it's risks disclosing our capabilities and operations. The enemy monitors
intercepted signals and performs traffic analysis to provide a variety of information, which
can be exploit, such as:

a. Supported CP identification.
b. Location of TACSAT terminals.
c. Tracking of unit movements.
d. Relative importance of TACSAT to command and control.
e. Weaknesses in our command and control systems--poor operating procedures,
poor COMSEC, lack of redundant or alternate systems, and overloaded networks.

Enemy’s Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)

22. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) is concerned with active measures taken to

eliminate or reduce an enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum for communications.
ECM comprises jamming, electronic deception and neutralisation. Jamming aims to impair
the effectiveness of the adversary’s electronic equipment or systems by degrading the quality
of the signal at a receiver. Electronic deception aims to confuse or mislead the adversary or
the adversary’s electronic systems. Neutralisation is the use of electromagnetic energy to
either disrupt or permanently damage adversary communications or electronic equipment.
The power required for neutralisation is typically many times larger than that required for
effective jamming of a receiver.6 When a communication signal is jammed, there is a link
from the desired transmitter to the receiver and a link from the jammer to the receiver like as
in Figure 4.

6 M. Frater and M. Ryan, ‘Vulnerability of Digitized Platforms to Modern RF Electromagnetic Weapons’, SPIE
Aerosense 2000 conference, Orlando, 18–20 April 2001.

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Figure 4: Jamming link from the desired

transmitter to the receiver and proportional

23. A primary REC threat is the

enemy's ability to locate key communications through radio direction finding (RDF). The
enemy's goal is to limit, delay, or nullify our command, control, and intelligence systems
during critical combat periods. When the enemy locates a friendly communication emitter, he
determines if it is a primary target. Once an emitter becomes a primary target, disruption may
take the form of destruction, deception, or jamming. There are two types of Communication
ECM:

a. Jamming. The aim of communication jamming is to prevent the enemy

from communicating. A successful jamming signal will degrade the performance of
the target receivers. Jamming is very much a double-edged weapon, as its
uncontrolled use will almost certainly conflict with friendly ESM and communication
activities and even some radar systems. The three most common types of
communications jamming are spot, barrage and swept jamming.

b. Deception. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) which seek to prevent or

reduce the effectiveness of enemy's communications systems by jamming or to
deception. Communication Deception, sometimes known as spoofing, is the other
active and disruptive action of EW. Whereas jamming is aim at preventing the
enemy's radio transmissions being effective, deception is use to mislead and confuse.
(GIVE SOME EXAMPLES, IMITATIVE DECEPTION,ETC).

24. Threat forces employ a large number of RDF sets and communications intelligence
(COMINT) analysts to exploit friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The enemy's
goal is to locate and destroy as many commands, fire support, special weapons, and
intelligence sites as possible during the first critical phase of the battle. He will continue to
locate and destroy whenever possible; and when he locates sites that he cannot or does not
want to destroy, these become his prime jamming targets. Jamming is an effective way to

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disrupt control of the battle. All it takes is a transmitter, tuned to your frequency, with the
same type of modulation and with enough power output to override the signal at your
receiver.

Human Error

25. A failure on the part of the human to perform a prescribed act or task within specified
limits of accuracy, sequence, or time which could result in damage to equipment and property
and disruption of scheduled operations or have no consequences at all. Most of the human
errors occur because humans are capable of doing so many different things in many diverse
ways. Human error is commonly define as a failure of a planned action to achieve a desired
outcome.7 A human or radio operator error can be defined as an act or set of act which results
in communication interruption, communication failure and can cause the equipment failure
due to the carelessness from human. List below shows us a few of human error descriptions:

a. Humans often are not good at assessing their own information.

b. Humans emotions effect their performance.
c. Humans perceptions are slower compared to the equipment.
d. Information overload to humans can sometimes be a problem.

26. “You are your own worst enemy”. In EW that is true because the less we do to
protect our self, the more the enemy can hurt. The human error can be the most dangerous
threat that can be happen in both side of forces.
ELECTRONIC PROTECTIVE MEASURE (EPM)

27. In order to overcome the threats, a protective action must be taken so that the leaking
of information does not happen. Reliable radio communication links are essential for any
successful military operation protecting such communications is a very most important part
of modern warfare. The communications method used in a military environment must
guarantee secure command and control despite the use of electronic countermeasures (ECM)
by an enemy.

28. Electronic Protective Measures (EPM) must be employ to permit friendly

communications at all tactical levels even when an opponent attempts to hinder, disturb or
disrupt operations. There are a few ways of action can be taken by EPM especially action
taken to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of
electromagnetic energy. There are two sub-divisions:
7 National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority P 1
<https://www.nopsema.gov.au/resources/human-factors/human-error/ >

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a. Active EPM. Detectable measures, such as altering transmitter parameters as

necessary, to ensure friendly use effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

b. Passive EPM. Undetectable measures, such as operating procedures and

technical features of equipment, which are meant to ensure friendly effective use of the
electro- magnetic spectrum.

29. EPM involves Active and Passive action taken to protect personnel, facilities and
equipment from the effects of enemy or indeed friendly EW actions. They prevent the enemy
from gaining intelligence from friendly transmissions and safeguard C3 systems and active
sensor use.
One important way in which EPM differs from the other EW subdivisions is that all tactical
units should practise it, not just by specialist EW units.8 Unlike other aspects of EW, EPM is
directly associated with the tactical communications system. Its techniques relate to the
employment of the tactical communications system or to specific features of the equipment
that makes up the tactical communications system. To minimise an enemy’s opportunity for
successful ESM and ECM operations, the following measures are recommend to us:

a. Regular briefings for command personnel on the latest EW threats.

b. Regular training for key staff in the recognition of enemy EW activity and the
application of suitable EPM.
c. During training avoid use of WARM or detectable EPM.
d. Rigorous EMCON is advice.

ROLE OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS IN MILITARY

30. The history of radio in the military is long and complex. Radio waves are used to
communicate and send important messages with orders, locations and critical information.
During wartime, these transmissions become especially important. During World War II,
coded transmissions sent over radio became increasingly sensitive as opposing forces worked
to intercept and decode the messages. The radio waves were the most reliable forms of
communication, and ceasing communication through radio was not an option. This led to
entire divisions dedicated to encrypting messages over the radio. Ultimately, members of the
Navajo Nation were deployed by the United States to speak in their native language. Japan

8 C ommunications Electronic Warfare and the D igitised Battlefield by Michael Frater and Michael
Ryan Oct 2001 p 19.

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could not decrypt the language, and the language was a major factor in successful radio
communications during World War II.

31. Radio was not only important as a tool during the war for military use, it also served
as an outlet for communicating progress to the masses. Radio transmissions were used to
update listeners on military movements and battles. It also worked for propaganda and drove
unity in the war effort. It has since continued to play an important role in communicating, but
the channels have turned into more segmented, opinion-based programming.

32. In the early decades of radio, governments either seized exclusive control over
broadcasting or acquired control of the spectrum through licensing of stations and users of
shortwave. Controls over broadcasting have become such a familiar feature of daily life that
they are seldom question. Yet a different scenario can be imagine, in which the goal was
empowering a multitude of grassroots voices, with accountability to communities rather than
governments, station owners and advertisers. Imagining an alternative evolution of radio, as a
technology for peace, can alert us to the importance of shaping and using today’s
technologies for peace rather than war.

33. Modern militaries rely on communications equipment that uses broad portions of the
spectrum to conduct military operations. This allows forces to talk, transmit data, provide
navigation and timing information, and to command and control forces all over the world. They
also rely on this to know where adversaries are, what adversaries are doing, where friendly
forces are, and what effects weapons achieve. As a result, modern militaries attempt to dominate
the spectrum through electronic warfare.9

EPM COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES IN RADIO TACTICAL

34. The second major military use of radiated electromagnetic energy is communications
sending of messages from one element of force to another. The radio communication bands
that are most commonly used by the military are - HF band (3-30 MHz), VHF band (112-135
MHz) and UHF band (225-400 MHz). The relationship of electronic warfare to
communications is more complex than to other uses of electromagnetic radiations, because
both the presence of message and its contents are required to be protected during its

9 Congressional Research Service, 24 May 2019, Defence Primer: Electronic Warfare

<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11118.pdf>.

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transmission until it reaches its intended user. Determining the presence of enemy message is
the goal of Communication Intelligence (COMINT), whereas providing protection to the
contents of message during transmission is the goal of Communication Security (COMSEC).
Communication Security again has two parts.

35. The first is Operating Methods, which deny the enemy access to the friendly messages
and friendly communication channels, and the second is Cryptologic Methods, which deny-
the understanding of the contents of friendly messages to the enemy even if he does get
possession of them. The Operating Methods are mainly concerned with common sense. For
example, if the location of a particular aircraft in flight must be conceal then 'radio silence' is
impose. Normally, 'call signs' (to conceal the identity of the stations), frequency changes and
operating time changes (to conceal the identity of operations), passwords or authentication (to
maintain the genuineness or identities of the sender and receiver), etc. are used for
communication security.

36. There are also a number of cryptologic methods or encryption techniques to conceal
the contents of the message from the enemy, even if he does get hold of them. To counter an
ECM, in the order of priority or requirement, the communications EPM equipment must
adopt the following four doctrines or guidelines:

a. First priority. Prevent the transmissions from being observe by the enemy at
all imperceptibility (also referred to as low probability of intercept, LPI).
b. Second priority. Minimise the possibility of extracting intelligence from such
transmissions as may be detect - inscrutability.
c. Third priority. Maximise the chance of survival of the communications
facility against the threat of physical attack-physical invulnerability.
d. Fourth priority. Maximise the chance of survival of communications facility
against jamming--electromagnetic invulnerability.

37. There are a number of EPM communication techniques to meet the above-mentioned
priorities or requirements. Some of the important ones are mention here.

a. Encryption. It reduces the intelligence value of an intercepted signal, because

the enemy fails to understand fully- secured encrypted digital message.

b. Privacy. This technique, though short of encryption, also plays an important

role in the protection of a message to some extent. The message is semi-secured and
often it is of analogue type. This technique had much recognition because even if it

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protects the message only for relatively short intervals, it is of great value in a tactical
environment.

c. Frequency Hoppers. Slow and fast frequency hoppers are the current EPM
'fashion goods'. They are relatively invulnerable to standoff jamming, are less
detectable and possess low probability of intercept, but they are vulnerable to modern
direction finders.

d. Command Frequency Change. They change frequency when under attack,

and thus provide a limited means of evading a jamming attack.

e. Single Sideband (SSB). This technique provides low probability of intercept

because no carrier is present.

f. Null Steering. This technique provides the survival of a communication

facility against jamming. In this, the outputs from two or more antennas are so
combined that a 'null' may be steered towards jamming signals or other interference.

g. Null Steering with Smoke-Screen Jammer. This is a very powerful

technique for imperceptibility, inscrutability, electromagnetic attack, except in
vulnerability to physical attack. This technique uses a 'clean jammer' on one's own
working channel. The jammer, which is of an expendable type, is placed as far
forward as possible towards the enemy and null steers are used to cancel the effect of
the jammer on own-side communication.

h. Groundsat. This is an unattended on-frequency VHF repeater that can be

used to confuse the apparent point of origin of a transmission, which can hence
deflect the physical attack. It is vulnerable to electromagnetic attack, which could take
over the groundsat. By adding a null steering device to both groundsat and receiver,
great resistance to electromagnetic attack is achieved at the cost of complexity. Also,
by using smokescreen jammer and the groundsat with the null steering, an unusual all
round EPM capability is achieved.

i. Spread Spectrum. Spread spectrum technique gives protection from

interception and jamming, and thus provides a low probability of intercept. Spread
spectrum produces very low energy density per channel in narrow-band receivers and
per frequency band in wide-band receivers. It can, therefore, be entirely undetectable.

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Electromagnetic (EM) attack can be a disaster, but steerable notch filters can combat
EM attack by line spectra.

j. Millimeter Wave (MMW). The millimeter wave region (30-300 GHz)

consists of a number of bands. Without prior knowledge, the ECM system must be
prepared to jam all the bands, which is a very difficult task. So, they provide increased
immunity to unwanted detection.

k. Meteor Scatter. This technique uses the ionised gas trail produced by very
small meteors entering the atmosphere to reflect VHF transmissions. Such long range
transmissions (say 1000 km and above) are difficult to jam or intercept.

l. Source Coding. Digital source coding, which involves irregular 'burst' data
transmissions of short duration but relatively high data rate provides low probability
of intercept. The battle of electronic warfare-EPM against ECM-thus continues and
every day, new and more sophisticated technology is being called into use. The
management and integration of large amount of data, increasingly of disparate origin
and type, will be one of the major challenges for battlefield communications in the
1990s and beyond. The battle of electronic warfare-EPM against ECM-thus continues
and every day, new and more sophisticated technology is being called into use. The
management and integration of large amount of data, increasingly of disparate origin
and type, will be one of the major challenges for battlefield communications in the
1990s and beyond.

EPM TECHNIQUES TO BE IMPLEMENT IN SIGNALS

38. The primary purpose of tactical communications system is to enable effective

command and control by providing effective communications between commanders and their
subordinates. Differing requirements for communications dictate that the tactical
communications system is not provided as a single homogeneous network, but that a variety
of different subsystems are used. These subsystems are illustrate in Figure 5. 10 At the lower
level, combat troops carry a device that must be a network node as well as an access terminal.
Limited battery power and the need for small omnidirectional antennas mean that ranges and
capacities are constrained. At the higher level, the large capacities necessary for trunk
communications will require semi-mobile platforms for the foreseeable future. Large power
10 M. Ryan and M. Frater, ‘An Architectural Framework for Modern Tactical Communications Systems’, IEEE
Military Communications Conference (MILCOM 2000), Los Angeles, 23–25 Oct. 2000.

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requirements must be met by the use of generators, and high-gain antennas must be deployed
on guyed masts to provide reasonable ranges. This variation in requirements has led to the
traditional (and ongoing) subdivision of the tactical communications system into combat net
radio (CNR and trunk subsystems.

Figure 5: An architectural framework for the tactical communications system

THE BEST TECHNIQUES IN ENSURING SECURED COMMUNICATION

39. In my research, I will focused the EPM techniques due to Malaysian Armed Forces
asset in communication. However, I will still tell in general about all the EPM techniques so
that everyone aware about the important of EPM in EW threats. According to Sapura Thales
Electronics presentation, our CNR 10 is the latest types of radio FastNet that supplied and
used by Malaysian Armed Forces. The security system that embedded inside the radio is as
Figure 6 below:

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Figure 6: Dedicated response to Each EW Threat

40. In order to ensure security in communication in the battlefield, a close relationship

exist between EPM and signal security (SIGSEC). EPM are those actions taken to protect and
ensure continued effective use of communications, surveillance, and acquisition devices from
enemy ECM. SIGSEC techniques are design to increase the security of our transmissions.
Both SIGSEC and EPM should be re-plan and based on the enemy’s ESM, ECM and
destructive capabilities. SIGSEC techniques cover the areas of emission security (also called
emission control or EMCON), transmission security, crypto security, and physical security.
Each of these areas will protect you from one or more of the enemy's threats of interception,
radio direction finding, jamming, imitative electronic deception, and destruction.

a. Emission Security/Control (EMCON). The first line of defence against

enemy EW action, and the key to successful defence is control of electromagnetic
emission. Radios and other emitters should be turn on only when required for the
successful accomplishment of the mission. Enemy intercept analysts look for patterns,
which can be turn into usable information for the enemy commander. Making short
transmissions, masking antenna locations, using directional antennas, and using the
lowest possible power output are some of the actions that will protect you and your
unit from enemy EW. All radios remain silent while the unit makes its tactical
manoeuvre. EMCON should always be use and planned. It is the first line of defence
for a radio operator against interception and RDF.

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b. Transmission Security. Transmission Security (TRANSEC) is use to ensure

the availability of transmissions and limit intelligence collection from the
transmissions. In addition, I describe TRANSEC as that making it difficult for
someone to intercept or interfere with communications without prior accurate
waveforms, modulation schemes, and coding (Nicholson, 1987). The roles of
TRANSEC in protected communications are:

(1) Prevent Interception – TRANSEC measures are used in transmission

of a signal to make the signal less likely to be detect and intercept. Detection
implies an adversary could determine that a signal is being transmit.
Interception implies that an adversary could capture the signal in some useful
form.
(2) Prevent Disruption of Reception – TRANSEC measures are added to a
signal to increase the likelihood of successful reception in the presence of
adversarial efforts such as jamming and/or naturally occurring
noise/disruptions.
(3) Prevent Communications Deception – TRANSEC measures are added
to a signal to provide authentication that the signal originated from the
intended source.
(4) Prevent Derivation of Intelligence by Analysis of Transmission
Characteristics such as Signal Parameters or Message Externals – TRANSEC
measures are added to obfuscate the RF signal itself or the data transmitted by
the signal to prevent an adversary from obtaining intelligence data from the
transmission itself.

c. Crypto Security. Crypto security deals with codes, key lists, and
communications security devices. This is the third line of defence for the radio
operator. The need for emission control and transmission security still exists--
probably more because, if the enemy cannot get information, he might attempt to
destroy or jam our station. In addition, it is very important for all radio
operators to use only authorized codes and to realize that using homemade codes is
dangerous. Homemade codes offer no protection at all. Their use is not authorize and
it is a serious violation of security. If critical information must be transmit, it should
be encrypt or sent by secure means.

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d. Physical Security. Physical security is the fourth line of defence for the radio
operator. Physical security means using common sense measures to protect your
radio and related material, such as CEOIs and key lists, from unauthorized use and
abuse. A radio is an important item of equipment and only well-trained and fully
briefed personnel should use it.

e. Frequency Hoping Spread Spectrum (FHSS). FHSS is a method of

transmitting radio signals by rapidly switching a carrier among many frequency
channels, using a pseudorandom sequence known to both transmitter and receiver. In
other words, FHSS spreads the bandwidth by sending the narrowband signal in
different frequency bands at different times.11 According to Sapura Thales Electronic
presentation, the best answer for our new PR4G F@stNet to response on the EW
threats are as in Figure 7 below:

Figure 7: The Best Answer to Face EW Threat in PR4G F@stNet Radio

RECCOMENDATIONS

41. (MUST RECOMMEND THE BEST EPM TECHNIQUES FROM WHAT HAVE
BEEN DISCUSSED EARLIER, IF ALL, RECOMMEND ALL WHICH MUST BE
SUPPORTED WITH IMPORTANT SKILLS TO BE ACQUIRED BY ALL
COMMUNICATORS AS FOLLOWS: )

11 Military Wireless Communications; John M. Shea University of Florida p 17.

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IMPORTANCE SKILLS TO DEVELOPE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AMONG

RADIO COMMUNICATORS

Listening

41. Listening is at least 50% of emergency communications. Discipline yourself to focus

on your job and “tune out” distractions. If your attention drifts at the wrong time, you could
miss a critical message. Listening also means avoiding unnecessary transmissions.

Microphone Techniques

42. Even something as simple as using your microphone correctly can make a big
difference in intelligibility. For optimum performance, hold the mic close to your cheek, and
just off to the side of your mouth. Talk across, rather than into, the microphone. This will
reduce breath noises and “popping” sounds that can mask your speech.

43. Speak in a normal, clear, calm voice. Raising your voice or shouting can result in
over-modulation and distortion, and you will not be heard any louder at the receiving end.
Speak at a normal pace. Rushing your words can result in slurred and unintelligible speech.
Pronounce words carefully, making sure to enunciate each syllable and sound. The golden
rule in emergency situations is “the worse it gets, the more you have to slow down and stay
calm!”

Transmitting a Message

44. Speak slowly when transmitting a message. Remember, the radio operator receiving
your message must write it down on a Message Handling Form so that it can be delivered to
the intended recipient. Most of us talk much faster than a receiving operator can write.
Consequently, the receiving operator will have to ask you to repeat portions of the message
that he did not get. He may repeatedly ask you to repeat section after section as he
laboriously tries to copy down your message. This common problem wastes enormous
amounts of net time, preventing others from getting their messages transmitted.

Brevity and Clarity

45. Each communication should consist of only the information necessary to get the
message across clearly and accurately. Extraneous information can distract the recipient and
lead to misinterpretation and confusion. If you are the message author and can leave a word
out without changing the meaning of a message, leave it out. Avoid using contractions within

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your messages. Words like “don’t” and “isn’t” are easily confused. If someone else has
drafted the message, work with the author to make it more concise.

46. Be sure to say exactly what you mean. Use specific words to ensure that your precise
meaning is conveyed. Do not say, “that place we were talking about’” when “Libbey Park” is
what you mean. Using non-specific language can lead to misunderstandings and confusion.

Plain Language

47. As hams, try to use a great deal of “jargon” (technical slang) and specialized
terminology in your daily conversations. Most of us understand each other when we do, and
if we do not on occasion it usually makes little difference. In an emergency, however, the
results can be much different. A misunderstood message could interrupt our mission.

Phonetics

48. Certain words in a message may not be immediately understood. This might be the
case with an unusual place, such as “Franconia” or an unusual last name, like “Smythe.” The
best way to be sure it is understood correctly is to spell it. The trouble is, if you just spell the
word using letters, it might still be misunderstood, since many letters sound alike. “Z” and
“C” are two good examples. For that reason, radio communicators often use “phonetics.”
These are specific words that begin with the letter being sent. For instance, “ARRL” might
be spoken as “alpha romeo romeo lima.”

Tactical Call Signs

49. Tactical call signs identify the station’s location or its purpose during an event,
regardless of who is operating the station. This is an important concept. The tactical call sign
allows you to contact a station without knowing our friend call sign of the operator. It
virtually eliminates confusion at shift changes or at stations with multiple operators.

TECHNOLOGY UPDATE (EXCLUDE - POINT OF DISCUSSION CAN BE

INCLUDED IN EPM TECHNIQUES ABOVE WHERE APPLICABLE)
50. Electronic Protective Measures (EPM) at every level must be employ to our forces
such as:
a. Forward Error Correction (FEC) to ensure the data is receive safe and correct.
b. Fast, reliable synchronization and signaling between routers and switches
assure operation even in hostile environments. Flood search and automatic alternative

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routing guarantee communication continuity as long as a transmission link can be

establish.
c. The encryption devices can provide a very high degree protection without bit-
error multiplication.
d. Automatic output power control in combination with directional antennas
decrease the risk of the detection of the radio signal.
e. Adaptive frequency hopping with durable synchronization system improves
resistance to jamming. Frequency evasion is also offer for fixed frequency operation.

CONCLUSION

51. As a conclusion, radio is also one of the equipment that belongs to EPM. Accurate
and thorough use of radio can have a great impact on the success of an operation where
accurate and effective messages can be deliver perfectly. As a radio communicator, they
should know the important factors in raising their awareness when using radio so that the
enemy should not intercept the conversation or message to be deliver.

52. The enduring lesson from recent conflicts since the Gulf War is that what can be seen
can be hit, and what can be hit can be killed. The function of ‘seeing’ is now much more
sophisticated and entails electronic, optical and acoustic sensors that can have up to global
coverage. These sensors can be linked in real time to computer-controlled weapon systems
with unparalleled accuracy and lethality. However, such qualities are not enough. The
decisive advantage on the modern battlefield will go to the commander who can gather and
exploit information most effectively.

53. While this is greatly assist by the technologies associated with the information
revolution, the human element is arguably the most significant. As a result of the information
revolution, future commanders can have unparalleled information available to them; they will
be able to ‘see’ the full extent of the battlefield even if it spans the globe. Commanders will
not have it all their own way, however. Future command-and-control systems will be heavily
reliant on communications and information systems that cannot operate if access to the
electromagnetic spectrum is denied. So, while the information revolution promises to deliver
an enormous improvement in capability to commanders, it also creates the potential for new
vulnerabilities. These new vulnerabilities offer new opportunities for the application of
electronic warfare on the digitised battlefield. Greater investment is therefore required in
offensive and defensive EW equipment, personnel and training.

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54. As armies expend large sums of money seeking to attain the advantages of
digitisation, consideration must be given to the flipside of the information revolution—the
increased role of electronic warfare on the modern digitised battlefield. Arguably, for every
ringgit that is spend on battlefield communications and information systems, few ringgit
should be spend on the EW capabilities required to protect these systems and to target an
adversary’s systems.

(Word count: 6,652)

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