SECOND DIVISION

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT G.R. No. 176438

INSURANCE CORPORATION
(PDIC), Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE
RURAL BANK, INC., RURAL
BANK OF CARMEN (CEBU),
INC., BANK OF EAST
ASIA(MINGLANILLA, CEBU),
INC., Promulgated:
and PILIPINO RURAL BANK
(CEBU), INC., January 24, 2011
Respondents.

x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) assailing the September
18, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals-Cebu (CA-Cebu), which granted the
petition for injunction filed by respondents Philippine Countryside Rural Bank,
Inc. (PCRBI), Rural Bank of Carmen (Cebu), Inc. (RBCI), Bank of East Asia
(Minglanilla, Cebu), Inc. (BEAI), and Pilipino Rural Bank (Cebu), Inc. (PRBI), all
collectively referred to as Banks. The dispositive portion of the CA-Cebu decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the petition

for injunction is hereby GRANTED. The respondent PDIC is restrained
from further conducting investigations or examination on petitioners-
banks without the requisite approval from the Monetary Board.

SO ORDERED.[1]

In a resolution dated January 25, 2007, the CA-Cebu denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.[2]

THE FACTS

On March 9, 2005, the Board of Directors of the PDIC (PDIC Board) adopted
Resolution No. 2005-03-032[3] approving the conduct of an investigation, in
accordance with Section 9(b-1) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3591, as amended, on
the basis of the Reports of Examination of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) on ten (10) banks, four (4) of which are respondents in this petition
for review. The said resolution also created a Special Investigation Team to
conduct the said investigation, with the authority to administer oaths, to examine,
take and preserve testimony of any person relating to the subject of the
investigation, and to examine pertinent bank records.

On May 25, 2005, the PDIC Board adopted another resolution, Resolution
No. 2005-05-056,[4] approving the conduct of an investigation on PCRBI based on
a Complaint-Affidavit filed by a corporate depositor, the Philippine School of
Entrepreneurship and Management (PSEMI) through its president, Jacinto L.
Jamero.
On June 3, 2005, in accordance with the two PDIC Board resolutions, then PDIC
President and Chief Executive Officer Ricardo M. Tan issued the Notice of
Investigation[5] to the President or The Highest Ranking Officer of PCRBI.

On June 7, 2005, the PDIC Investigation Team personally served the Notice of
Investigation on PCRBI at its Head Office in Pajo, Lapu-Lapu City.[6]

According to PDIC, in the course of its investigation, PCRBI was found to have
granted loans to certain individuals, which were settled by way of dacion of
properties. These properties, however, had already been previously foreclosed and
consolidated under the names of PRBI, BEAI and RBCI.[7]

On June 15, 2005, PDIC issued similar notices of investigation to PRBI[8] and
BEAI.[9]

The notices stated that the investigation was to be conducted pursuant to Section 9
(b-1) of the PDIC Charter and upon authority of PDIC Board Resolution No. 2005-
03-032 authorizing the twelve (12) named representatives of PDIC to conduct the
investigation.[10]

The investigation was sought because the Banks were found to be among the ten
(10) banks collectively known as Legacy Banks. The Reports of General and
Special Examinations of the BSP as of June 30, 2004, disclosed, among others, that
the Legacy Banks were commonly owned and/or controlled by Legacy Plans
Inc. (now Legacy Consolidated Plans, Inc.), and Celso Gancayco delos Angles, Jr.
and his family.[11]

The notice of investigation was served on PRBI the next day, June 16, 2005.[12]

On June 25, 2005, a separate notice of investigation[13] was served on RBCI. The
latter provided the PDIC Investigation Team with certified copies of the loan
documents they had requested, until its president received an order directing him
not to allow the investigation.[14]
Subsequently, PRBI and BEAI refused entry to their bank premises and access to
their records and documents by the PDIC Investigation Team, upon advice of their
respective counsels.[15]

On June 16 and 17, 2005, Atty. Victoria G. Noel (Atty. Noel) of the Tiongson &
Antenor Cruz Law Office sent letters to the PDIC[16] informing it of her legal
advice to PCRBI and BEAI not to submit to PDIC investigation on the ground that
its investigatory power pursuant to Section 9(b-1) of R.A. No. 3591, as
amended (An Act Establishing The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Defining Its Powers And Duties And For Other Purposes), cannot be differentiated
from the examination powers accorded to PDIC under Section 8, paragraph 8 of
the same law, under which, prior approval from the Monetary Board is required.

On June 17, 2005, PDIC General Counsel Romeo M. Mendoza sent a reply to
Atty. Noel stating that PDICs investigation power, as distinguished from the
examination power of the PDIC under Section 8 of the same law, does not need
prior approval of the Monetary Board.[17] PDIC then urged PRBI and BEAI not to
impede the conduct of PDICs investigation as the same constitutes a violation of
the PDIC Charter for which PRBI and BEAI may be held criminally and/or
administratively liable.[18]

On June 27 and 28, 2005, the Banks, through counsel, sought further clarification
from PDIC on its source of authority to conduct the impending investigations and
requested that PDIC refrain from proceeding with the investigations.[19]

Simultaneously, the Banks wrote to the Monetary Board requesting a clarification

on the parameters of PDICs power of investigation/examination over the Banks
and for an issuance of a directive to PDIC not to pursue the investigations pending
the requested clarification.[20]
On June 28, 2005, PRBI and BEAI again received letters from PDIC, dated June
24, 2005, which appeared to be final demands on them to allow its
investigation.[21] PRBI and BEAI replied that letters of clarification had been sent
to PDIC and the Monetary Board.[22] Pending action on such requests, PDIC was
requested to refrain from proceeding with the investigation.[23]

Notwithstanding, on July 11, 2005, the Banks received a letter, dated July 8, 2005,
from the PDIC General Counsel reiterating its position that prior Monetary Board
approval was not a pre-requisite to PDICs exercise of its investigative power.[24]

Not in conformity, on July 28, 2005, the Banks filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with a Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction (RTC Petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC-
Makati) which was docketed as Civil Case No. 05-697.[25]

In the RTC Petition, the Banks prayed for a judgment interpreting Section 9(b-1)
of the PDIC Charter, as amended, to require prior Monetary Board approval before
PDIC could exercise its investigation/examination power over the Banks.[26]

PDIC filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
said petition since a breach had already been committed by the Banks when they
received the notices of investigation, and because PDIC need not secure prior
Monetary Board approval since examination and investigation are two different
terms.[27]

Later, the Banks withdrew their application for a temporary restraining

order (TRO) reasoning that lower courts cannot issue injunctions against
PDIC. Thus, the Banks instituted a petition for injunction with application for TRO
and/or Preliminary Injunction (CA-Manila petition) before the Court of Appeals-
Manila (CA-Manila). The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 91038.[28]

Even before the CA-Manila could rule on the application for a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, the RTC-Makati dismissed the petition on the ground that
there already existed a breach of law that isolated the case from the jurisdiction of
the trial court.[29]
The Banks filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC for lack
of merit.[30] On February 10, 2006, the Banks filed a notice of appeal[31] which they
later withdrew on February 28, 2006.[32]

In view of the dismissal of the RTC-Makati petition, the CA-Manila dismissed the
petition for injunction for being moot and academic. In its Decision,
dated February 1, 2006,[33]the CA-Manila wrote:

What remained for the petitioners to do was to litigate over the breach or
violation by ordinary action, as the circumstances ensuing from the breach
or violation warrant. The ordinary action may either be in the same case, if
the RTC permitted the conversion, in which event the RTC may allow the
parties to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, pursuant to
Sec. 5, Rule 63; or the petitioners may file another action in the proper
court (e.g. including the Court of Appeals, should injunction be among the
reliefs to be sought) upon some cause of action that has arisen from the
breach or violation.[34]

Thereafter, on March 14, 2006, the Banks filed their Petition for Injunction
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction[35] (CA-Cebu Petition) with the CA-
Cebu (CA-Cebu).

On March 15, 2006, the CA-Cebu issued a resolution granting the Banks
application for a TRO. This enjoined the PDIC, its representatives or agents or any
other persons or agency assisting them or acting for and in their behalf from
conducting examinations/investigations on the Banks head and branch offices
without securing the requisite approval from the Monetary Board of BSP.[36]

During the pendency of the CA-Cebu petition, PDIC filed with this Court
a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65
docketed as G.R. No. 173370.[37] It alleged that the CA-Cebu committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the Banks petition, and in issuing a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction.[38]
 On July 31, 2006, this Court issued a resolution dismissing the petition
for certiorari in G.R. No. 173370. The Resolution reads:

Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition

for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order dated 19 July 2006, the Court resolves
to DISMISS the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned
resolution of the Court of Appeals is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Moreover, the petition failed to conform with Rule 65 and other
related provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
governing petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed with
the Supreme Court, since petitioner failed to submit a verified statement of
material date of receipt of the assailed resolution dated 16 May 2006 in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 65 in relation to the second paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46. In any event, the petition is premature since no motion
for reconsideration of the questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals
was filed prior to the availment of this special civil action and there are no
sufficient allegations to bring the case within the recognized exceptions to
this rule.[39]

On September 18, 2006, after both parties had submitted their respective
memoranda, the CA-Cebu rendered a decision granting the writ of preliminary
injuction,[40]pertinent portions of which read:

[A]fter undergoing a series of amendments, the controlling law with

respect to PDICs power to conduct examination of banks is-prior approval
of the Monetary Board is a condition sine qua non for PDIC to exercise its
power of examination. To rule otherwise would disregard the amendatory
law of the PDICs charter.

The Court is not also swayed by the contention of respondent that what it
seeks to conduct is an investigation and not an examination of petitioners
transactions, hence prior approval of the Monetary Board is a mere
surplusage.

The ordinary definition of the words examination and investigation would

lead one to conclude that both pertain to the same thing and there seems
to be no fine line differentiating one from the other. Blacks Law Dictionary
defines the word investigate as to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination and the word
examination as an investigation. In Collins Dictionary of Banking and
 Finance, the word investigation is defined as an examination to find out
what is wrong.

In the case of Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Ortega,
et al.,[41] the Supreme Court using Ballentines Law Dictionary defines an
investigation as an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery or
collection of facts concerning the matter or matters involved. Such
common definitions would show that there is really nothing to distinguish
between these two (2) terms as to support the PDIC view differentiating
Section 9 (b-1) from paragraph 8, Section 8 of the PDIC Charter.

In the realm of the PDIC rules, specifically under Section 3 of PDIC

Regulatory Issuance No. 2205-02[42] investigation is defined as:
Investigation shall refer to fact-finding examination, study, inquiry, for
determining whether the allegations in a complaint or findings in a final
report of examination may properly be the subject of an administrative,
criminal or civil action.

From the foregoing definition alone, it can be easily deduced that

investigation and examination are synonymous terms. Simply stated,
investigation encompasses a fact-finding examination. Thus, it is
inconsistent with the rules if respondent PDIC be (sic) allowed to conduct
an investigation without the approval of the Monetary Board.

Moreover, the Court sees that the rationale of the law in requiring a
(sic) prior approval from the Monetary Board whenever an examination or
in this case an investigation needs to be conducted by the PDIC is
obviously to ensure that there is no overlapping of efforts, duplication of
functions and more importantly to provide a check and balance to the
otherwise unrestricted power of respondent PDIC to conduct
investigations on banks insured by it.

With the foregoing premises, this Court rules that a prior approval
from the Monetary Board is necessary before respondent PDIC can
proceed with its investigations on petitioners-banks.[43]

PDIC moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution

dated January 25, 2007.[44]

Hence, this petition.

 THE ISSUES

I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT BANKS VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST
FORUM SHOPPING WHEN THEY FILED THE PETITION FOR
INJUNCTION BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS-CEBU.

II.

WHETHER THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT OF MAKATI IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATATO THE PETITION FOR
INJUNCTION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS-CEBU.

III.

WHETHER PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF ITS OPPORTUNITY TO

BE HEARD WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS-CEBU ISSUED THE
WRIT OF INJUNCTION.

IV.

WHETHER THE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONERS ARE THE SAME

ISSUES RAISED IN G.R. NO. 173370 WHICH WAS EARLIER
DISMISSED BY THIS COURT.

V.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT

PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS IS NECESSARY BEFORE THE PDIC MAY
CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF RESPONDENT BANKS.

THE COURTS RULING

I - Whether respondent banks violated the

rule against forum shopping when they filed
the petition for injunction before the Court of
Appeals-Cebu.

II - Whether the pronouncement of the

Regional Trial Court of Makati in the
petition for declaratory relief constitutes res
judicata to the petition for injunction in the
Court of Appeals-Cebu.

In the recent case of Sameer Oversees Placement Agency, Inc. v. Mildred

R. Santos,[45] the Court discussed the matter of forum shopping:

Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse

judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of
two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. There is forum shopping where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, namely: (a) there is identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there is
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same set of facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars
is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. It is
expressly prohibited by this Court because it trifles with and abuses court
processes, degrades the
administration of justice, and congests court dockets. A willful and
deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for
summary dismissal of the case, and may also constitute direct
contempt.[46]

Juxtaposing the RTC-Makati, CA-Manila and CA-Cebu petitions, what must

be determined here, is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present between
and among these petitions, i.e. whether (a) there is identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there is identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same set of
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other.

The first element is clearly present as between the RTC-Makati petition and
the CA-Cebu petition. Both involved the Banks on one hand, and the PDIC on the
other.

The second and third elements of litis pendentia, however, are patently
wanting. The rights asserted and reliefs prayed for were different, though founded
on the same set of facts. The RTC-Makati Petition was one for declaratory relief
while the CA-Manila Petition was one for injunction with a prayer for preliminary
injunction.

A petition for declaratory relief is filed by any person interested under a

deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation, before breach or violation, thereof, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties
thereunder.[47]

Injunction, on the other hand, is a judicial writ, process or proceeding

whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a
mandatory injunction, or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is
called a prohibitory injunction. As a main action, injunction seeks to permanently
enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued by the court and contained in
the judgment.[48]

Clearly, there is a marked difference between the reliefs sought under an

action for declaratory relief and an action for injunction. While an action for
declaratory relief seeks a declaration of rights or duties, or the determination of any
question or validity arising under a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation, or under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, under which his rights are affected, and before breach or
violation, an action for injunction ultimately seeks to enjoin or to compel a party to
perform certain acts.
 Moreover, as stated in the RTC-Makati Decision, because the Banks had
already breached the provisions of law on which declaratory judgment was being
sought, it was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same. Any judgment
rendered in the RTC-Makati petition would not amount to res judicata in the CA-
Manila Petition. Thus, the RTC was correct in dismissing the case, having been
bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for declaratory judgment.

As between the CA-Manila and the CA-Cebu petitions, the second and third
elements of litis pendentia are absent. The rights asserted and reliefs prayed for
were different, although founded on the same set of facts.

The CA-Manila Petition is a petition for injunction wherein the Banks

prayed that:

1) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order be issued commanding
the respondent and all its officers, employees and agents to cease and
desist from proceeding with the investigations sought to be conducted on
the petitioners head and branch offices while the Petition for Declaratory
Relief before Branch 58 of the Makati Regional Trial Court is pending.

2) After due proceedings, judgment be rendered declaring as

permanent the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order prayed for above.

Other equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.[49]

[Underscoring supplied]

The CA-Cebu Petition, on the other hand, is denominated as a Petition for

Injunction With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining
Order. The Banks prayed therein that:

1) Upon filing of this Petition, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or

Temporary Restraining Order be issued forthwith, enjoining Respondent
PDIC and all its officers, employees and agents to cease and desist from
conducting examinations/investigations on Petitioner Banks head and
branch offices without securing the requisite approval from the Monetary
 Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as required by Sec. 8, Paragraph
8 of the PDIC Charter, as amended;

2) After due proceedings, judgment be rendered declaring as permanent

the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for above.

Other equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.[50]

As can be gleaned from the above-cited portions of the CA-Manila and CA-
Cebu petitions, the petitions seek different reliefs.

Therefore, as between and among the RTC Makati, and the CA-Manila and
CA-Cebu petitions, there is no forum shopping.

III - Whether petitioner was deprived of its

opportunity to be heard when the Court of
Appeals-Cebu issued the writ of injunction.

PDIC alleges that the CA-Cebu, in issuing the TRO in its March 15, 2006
Resolution, and subsequently, the preliminary injunction in its May 16, 2006
Resolution, violated the fundamental rule that courts should avoid issuing
injunctive relief which would in effect dispose of the main case without
trial.[51] PDIC argues that a TRO is intended only as a restraint until the propriety
of granting a temporary injunction can be determined, and it goes no further than
to preserve the status until that determination.[52] Moreover, its purpose is merely to
suspend proceedings until such time when there may be an opportunity to inquire
whether any injunction should be granted, and it is not intended to operate as an
injunction pendente lite, and should not, in effect, determine the issues involved
before the parties can have their day in court, or give an advantage to either party
by proceeding in the acquisition or alteration of the property the right to which is
disputed while the hands of the other party are tied.[53]
 On the other hand, the Banks claim that PDIC was given every opportunity
to present its arguments against the issuance of the injunction.[54] Its active
participation in the proceedings negates its assertion that it was denied procedural
due process in the issuance of the writ of injunction.[55] Citing Salonga v. Court of
Appeals,[56] the Banks state that the essence of due process is the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence one may have in support of ones
defense,[57] and PDIC was able to do so.

On March 15, 2006, the CA-Cebu issued a resolution granting their prayer
for a 60-day TRO, and requiring PDIC to file its comment.[58] The
latter thereafter filed itsComment ad Cautelam dated March 30,
[59]
2006. [Underscoring ours]

On May 16, 2006, the CA-Cebu issued another resolution, this time granting
the prayer for a preliminary injunction and requiring the parties to file their
respective memoranda. PDIC thereafter filed its memorandum dated July 31,
2006.[60]

On September 18, 2006, the CA-Cebu promulgated its Decision granting the
Petition for Injunction.[61] PDIC filed a motion for reconsideration dated October
10, 2006,[62] which was subsequently denied.

The essence of procedural due process is found in the reasonable opportunity

to be heard and submit ones evidence in support of his defense.[63] The Court finds
that procedural due process was observed by the CA-Cebu. The parties were
afforded equal opportunity to present their arguments. In the absence of any
indication to the contrary, the CA-Cebu must be accorded the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their functions. However, as discussed herein, the
matter of whether it erred in its conclusion and issuance of the TRO, preliminary
injunction and final injunction is another matter altogether.
IV Whether the issues raised by petitioner
are the same issues raised in G.R. No.
173370 which was earlier dismissed by this
Court.

In G.R. 173370, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court, PDIC alleged that the CA-Cebu committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the Banks
petition, and in issuing a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction.[64]

In the case at bench, a petition for review under Rule 45, PDICs core
contention is that the CA-Cebu erred in finding that prior approval of the
Monetary Board of the BSP is necessary before it may conduct an investigation of
the Banks.

Clearly then, the two petitions were of different nature raising different
issues.

G.R. 173370 challenged the CA-Cebus having taken cognizance of the

Banks petition and interlocutory orders on the issuance of a TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction.This case, however, strikes at the core of the final decision
on the merits of the CA-Cebu, and not merely the interlocutory orders. While both
G.R. 173370 and the present case may have been anchored on the same set of
facts, that is, the refusal of the Banks to allow PDIC to conduct an investigation
without the prior consent of the Monetary Board, the issues raised in the two
petitions are not identical. Moreover, the disposal of the first case does not amount
to res judicata in this case.

V Whether the Court of Appeals-Cebu

erred in finding that prior approval of the
Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas is necessary before the PDIC may
conduct an investigation of respondent
banks.
PDIC is of the position that in order for it to exercise its power of investigation, the
law requires that:

(a) The investigation is based on a complaint of a depositor or any other

government agency, or on the report of examination of [the] Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and/or PDIC; and,

(b) The complaint alleges, or the BSP and/or PDIC Report of Examination
contains adverse findings of, fraud, irregularities or anomalies committed
by the Bank and/or its directors, officers, employees or agents; and,

(c) The investigation is upon the authority of the PDIC Board of

Directors.[65]

It argues that when it commenced its investigation on the Banks, all of the
aforementioned requirements were met. PDIC stresses that its power of
examination is different from its power of investigation, in such that the former
requires prior approval of the Monetary Board while the latter requires merely the
approval of the PDIC Board.[66] It further claims that the power of examination
cannot be exercised within twelve (12) months from the last examination
conducted, whereas the power of investigation is without limitation as to the
frequency of its conduct. It states that the purpose of the PDICs power of
examination is merely to look into the condition of the bank, whereas the power of
investigation aims to address fraud, irregularities and anomalies based on
complaints from depositors and other government agencies or upon reports of
examinations conducted by the PDIC itself or by the BSP.[67]

The Banks, on the other hand, are of the opinion that a holistic reading of the PDIC
charter shows that petitioners power of examination is synonymous with its power
of investigation.[68] They cite, as bases, the law
dictionary definitions, Section 8, Eighth paragraph[69] and Section 9(b-1)[70] of the
PDIC Charter, and Rule 1, Section 3(1) of PDIC Regulatory Issuance No. 2005-02,
which defines investigation as follows:

(l) Investigation shall refer to fact-finding examination, study or

inquiry for determining whether the allegations in a complaint or findings
in a final report of examination may properly be the subject of an
administrative, criminal or civil action.

The Banks further cite Section X658 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks,
which states:

Sec. X658 - Examination by the BSP. The term examination shall,

henceforth, refer to an investigation of an institution under the
supervisory authority of the BSP to determine compliance with laws and
regulations. It shall include determination that the institution is
conducting its business on a safe and sound basis. Examination requires
full and comprehensive looking into the operations and books of
institutions, and shall include, but need not be limited to the following:

a. Determination of the banks solvency and liquidity

position;

b. Evaluation of asset quality as well as determination

of sufficiency of valuation reserves on loans and other risk
assets;

c. Review of all aspects of bank operations;

d. Assessment of risk management system, including

the evaluation of the effectiveness of the bank managements
oversight functions, policies, procedures, internal control
and audit;

e. Appraisal of overall management of the bank;

f. Review of compliance and applicable laws, rules and

regulations; and any other activities relevant to the above.
After an evaluation of the respective positions of the parties, the Court is of the
view that the Monetary Board approval is not required for PDIC to conduct an
investigation on the Banks.

The disagreement stems from the interpretation of these two key provisions of the
PDIC Charter. The confusion can be attributed to the fact that although
investigation and examination are two separate and
distinct procedures under the charter of the PDIC and the BSP, the words seem to
be used loosely and interchangeably.

It does not help that indeed these terms are very closely related in a generic
sense. However, while examination connotes a mere generic perusal or inspection,
investigation refers to a more intensive scrutiny for a more specific fact-finding
purpose. The latter term is also usually associated with proceedings conducted
prior to criminal prosecution.

The PDIC was created by R.A. No. 3591 on June 22, 1963 as an insurer of deposits
in all banks entitled to the benefits of insurance under the PDIC Charter to promote
and safeguard the interests of the depositing public by way of providing permanent
and continuing insurance coverage of all insured deposits. It is a government
instrumentality that operates under the Department of Finance. Its primary purpose
is to act as deposit insurer, as a co-regulator of banks, and as receiver and
liquidator of closed banks.[71]

Section 1 of the PDIC Charter states:

SECTION 1. There is hereby created a Philippine Deposit Insurance

Corporation hereinafter referred to as the Corporation which shall insure,
as herein provided, the deposits of all banks which are entitled to the
benefits of insurance under this Act, and which shall have the powers
hereinafter granted.

The Corporation shall, as a basic policy, promote and safeguard the

interests of the depositing public by way of providing permanent and
continuing insurance coverage on all insured deposits.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9576 further provides: An Act Increasing the Maximum
Deposit Insurance Coverage, and in connection therewith, to Strengthen the
Regulatory and Administrative Authority, and Financial Capability of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), amending for this purpose R.A.
No. 3591, as Amended, otherwise known as the PDIC Charter.

SECTION 1. Statement of State Policy and Objectives. - It is hereby declared

to be the policy of the State to strengthen the mandatory deposit insurance
coverage system to generate, preserve, maintain faith and confidence in
the countrys banking system, and protect it from illegal schemes and
machinations.

Towards this end, the government must extend all means and mechanisms
necessary for the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation to effectively
fulfill its vital task of promoting and safeguarding the interests of the
depositing public by way of providing permanent and continuing
insurance coverage on all insured deposits, and in helping develop a sound
and stable banking system at all times.

Under its charter, the PDIC is empowered to conduct examination of banks

with prior approval of the Monetary Board:

Eighth To conduct examination of banks with prior approval of the

Monetary Board: Provided, That no examination can be conducted within
twelve (12) months from the last examination date: Provided, however,
That the Corporation may, in coordination with the Bangko Sentral,
conduct a special examination as the Board of Directors, by an affirmative
vote of a majority of all its members, if there is a threatened or impending
closure of a bank; Provided, further, That, notwithstanding the provisions
of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended, Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the Corporation and/or
the Bangko Sentral, may inquire into or examine deposit accounts and all
information related thereto in case there is a finding of unsafe or unsound
banking practice; Provided, That to avoid overlapping of efforts, the
examination shall maximize the efficient use of the relevant
reports, information, and findings of the Bangko Sentral, which it shall
make available to the Corporation; (As amended by R.A. 9302, 12 August
2004, R.A. 9576, 1 June 2009)

xxx. [Underlining supplied]

 Section 9(b-1) of the PDIC Charter further provides that the PDIC Board
shall have the power to:

POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROHIBITIONS

SECTION 9. xxx

(b) The Board of Directors shall appoint examiners who shall have power,
on behalf of the Corporation to examine any insured bank. Each such
examiner shall have the power to make a thorough examination of all the
affairs of the bank and in doing so, he shall have the power to administer
oaths, to examine and take and preserve the testimony of any of the
officers and agents thereof, and, to compel the presentation of books,
documents, papers, or records necessary in his judgment to ascertain the
facts relative to the condition of the bank; and shall make a full and
detailed report of the condition of the bank to the Corporation. The Board
of Directors in like manner shall appoint claim agents who shall have the
power to investigate and examine all claims for insured deposits and
transferred deposits. Each claim agent shall have the power to administer
oaths and to examine under oath and take and preserve testimony of any
person relating to such claim. (As amended by E.O. 890, 08 April 1983;
R.A. 7400, 13 April 1992)

(b-1) The investigators appointed by the Board of Directors shall have the
power on behalf of the Corporation to conduct investigations on frauds,
irregularities and anomalies committed in banks, based on reports of
examination conducted by the Corporation and Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas or complaints from depositors or from other government agency.
Each such investigator shall have the power to administer oaths, and to
examine and take and preserve the testimony of any person relating to the
subject of investigation. (As added by R.A. 9302, 12 August 2004)

xxx. [Underscoring supplied]

As stated above, the charter empowers the PDIC to conduct an investigation

of a bank and to appoint examiners who shall have the power to examine any
insured bank.Such investigators are authorized to conduct investigations on frauds,
irregularities and anomalies committed in banks, based on an
examination conducted by the PDIC and the BSP or on complaints from depositors
or from other government agencies.
 The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to examine
is emphasized by the existence of two separate sets of rules governing the
procedure in the conduct of investigation and examination. Regulatory
Issuance (RI) No. 2005-02 or the PDIC Rules on Fact-Finding Investigation of
Fraud, Irregularities and Anomalies Committed in Banks covers the procedural
requirements of the exercise of the PDICs power of investigation. On the other
hand, RI No. 2009-05 sets forth the guidelines for the conduct of the power of
examination.

The definitions provided under the two aforementioned regulatory issuances

elucidate on the distinction between the power of examination and the power of
investigation.

Section 2 of RI No. 2005-02 states that its coverage shall be applicable to all
fact-finding investigations on fraud, irregularities and/or anomalies committed in
banks that are conducted by PDIC based on: [a] complaints from depositors or
other government agencies; and/or [b] final reports of examinations of banks
conducted by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and/or PDIC.

The same issuance states that the Final Report of Examination [72] is one of
the three pre-requisites to the conduct of an investigation, in addition to the
authorization of the PDIC Board[73] and a complaint.[74] Juxtaposing this provision
with Section 9(b-1) of the PDIC Charter, since an examination is explicitly made
the basis of a fact-finding examination, then clearly examination and investigation
are two different proceedings. It would obviously defy logic to make the result of
an investigation the basis of the same proceeding. Thus, RI No. 2005-02 defines an
investigation as a fact-finding examination, study or inquiry for determining
whether the allegations in a complaint or findings in a final report of examination
may properly be the subject of an administrative, criminal or civil action.[75]

The Banks cite the dictionary definitions of examination and investigation to

justify their conclusion that these terms refer to one and the same proceeding. It is
tempting to use these two terms interchangeably, which practice may be perfectly
justified in a purely literary sense. Indeed, a reading of the PDIC Charter shows
that the two terms have been used interchangeably at some point. However, based
on the provisions aforecited, the intention of the laws is clearly to differentiate
between the process of investigation and that of examination.

In 2009, to clarify procedural matters, PDIC released RI No. 2009-05 or the

Rules and Regulations on Examination of Banks. Section 2 thereof differentiated
between the two types of examination as follows:

Section 2. Types of Examination

a. Regular Examination - An examination conducted independently or

jointly with the BSP. It requires the prior approval of the PDIC Board of
Directors and the Monetary Board (MB). It may be conducted only after an
interval of at least twelve (12) months from the closing date of the last
Regular Examination.

b. Special Examination An examination conducted at any time in

coordination with the BSP, by an affirmative vote of a majority of all the
members of the PDIC Board of Directors, without need of prior MB
approval, if there is a threatened or impending bank closure as determined
by the PDIC Board of Directors. [Underscoring supplied]

Section 3 of RI No. 2009-05 provides for the general scope of the PDIC
examination:

Section 3. Scope of Examination

The examination shall include, but need not be limited to, the following:

a. Determination of the banks solvency and liquidity

position;

b. Evaluation of asset quality as well as determination of

sufficiency of valuation reserves on loans and other risk
assets;

c. Review of all aspects of bank operations;

d. Assessment of risk management system, including

the evaluation of the effectiveness of the bank managements
oversight functions, policies, procedures, internal control
and audit;
 e. Appraisal of overall management of the bank;

f. Review of compliance with applicable banking laws,

and rules and regulations, including PDIC issuances;

g. Follow-through of specific exceptions/ violations

noted during a previous examination; and

h. Any other activity relevant to the above.

Rule 2, Section 1 of PDIC RI No. 2005-02 or the PDIC Rules on Fact-

Finding Investigation of Fraud, Irregularities and Anomalies Committed in
Banks provides for the scope of fact-finding investigations as follows:

SECTION 1. Scope of the Investigation.

Fact-finding Investigations shall be limited to the particular acts or

omissions subject of a complaint or a Final Report of Examination.

From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that the process of examination

covers a wider scope than that of investigation.

Examination involves an evaluation of the current status of a bank and

determines its compliance with the set standards regarding solvency, liquidity,
asset valuation, operations, systems, management, and compliance with banking
laws, rules and regulations.

Investigation, on the other hand, is conducted based on specific findings of

certain acts or omissions which are subject of a complaint or a Final Report of
Examination.

Clearly, investigation does not involve a general evaluation of the status of a

bank. An investigation zeroes in on specific acts and omissions uncovered via an
examination, or which are cited in a complaint.
 An examination entails a review of essentially all the functions and facets of
a bank and its operation. It necessitates poring through voluminous documents, and
requires a detailed evaluation thereof. Such a process then involves an intrusion
into a banks records.

In contrast, although it also involves a detailed evaluation, an investigation

centers on specific acts of omissions and, thus, requires a less invasive assessment.

The practical justification for not requiring the Monetary Board approval to
conduct an investigation of banks is the administrative hurdles and paperwork it
entails, and the correspondent time to complete those additional steps or
requirements. As in other types of investigation, time is always of essence, and it is
prudent to expedite the proceedings if an accurate conclusion is to be arrived at, as
an investigation is only as precise as the evidence on which it is based. The
promptness with which such evidence is gathered is always of utmost importance
because evidence, documentary evidence in particular, is remarkably fungible. A
PDIC investigation is conducted to determine[e] whether the allegations in a
complaint or findings in a final report of examination may properly be the subject
of an administrative, criminal or civil action.[76] In other words, an investigation is
based on reports of examination and an examination is conducted with prior
Monetary Board approval. Therefore, it would be unnecessary to secure a separate
approval for the conduct of an investigation. Such would merely prolong the
process and provide unscrupulous individuals the opportunity to cover their tracks.

Indeed, while in a literary sense, the two terms may be used interchangeably,
under the PDIC Charter, examination and investigation refer to two different
processes. To reiterate, an examination of banks requires the prior consent of the
Monetary Board, whereas an investigation based on an examination report, does
not.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution

of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CEB SP. No. 01550, dated September 18,
2006 and January 25, 2007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
 Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, p. 107. Penned by Justice Pampio A. Abarintos with Justice Agustin S. Dizon and Justice Priscilla
Baltazar-Padilla, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 111.
[3]
Id. at 113.
[4]
Id. at 115.
[5]
Id. at 116.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 25.
[8]
Id. at 120.
[9]
Id. at 126.
[10]
Id. at 120-121, 126-127, 132-133.
[11]
Id. at 20.
[12]
Id. at 27.
[13]
Id. at 132.
[14]
Id. at 29.
[15]
Id. at 29-30.
[16]
Id. at 134-135.
[17]
Id. at 31, 136-141.
[18]
Id. at 136-141.
[19]
Id. at 142-159.
[20]
Id. at 160-161.
[21]
Id. at 579.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Id.
[24]
Id.
[25]
Id. at 572.
[26]
Id. at 579.
[27]
Id. at 579-580.
[28]
Id. at 219.
[29]
Id. at 260.
[30]
Id. at 337.
[31]
Id. at 338.
[32]
Id. at 340.
[33]
Id. at 433.
[34]
Id. at 430-431.
[35]
Id. at 442.
[36]
Id. at 448.
[37]
Id.
[38]
Id. at 583.
[39]
Id. at 152.
[40]
Id. at 94.
[41]
188 Phil. 55, 58 (1980).
[42]
This should read Regulatory Issuance No. 2005-02.
[43]
Rollo, pp. 102-104.
[44]
Id. at 110.
[45]
G.R. No. 152579, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 67, 76-77.
[46]
Id., citing Philippine Islands Corporation for Tourism Development, Inc. v. Victorias Milling Company, Inc.,
G.R. No. 167674, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 561, 569; Tegimenta Chemical Phils. v. Buensalida, G.R. No. 176466,
June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 670, 679; and Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 768,
782.
[47]
Rule 63, Section 1 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
[48]
PEZA v. Carantes, G.R. No. 181274, 23 June 2010.
[49]
Rollo, p. 452.
[50]
Id. at 390.
[51]
Id. at 669.
[52]
Id. at 671, citing Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. IV-A, 1971, p. 185.
[53]
Id., citing Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo, G.R. No. 48603, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA
76, 87.
[54]
Id. at 605.
[55]
Id. at 607.
[56]
336 Phil. 514, 528 (1997).
[57]
Rollo, p. 605.
[58]
Id. at 606.
[59]
Id.
[60]
Id.
[61]
Id. at 94.
[62]
Id. at 606.
[63]
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 461 Phil. 598, 614 (2003), citing Mutuc v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 48108, September 26, 1990, 190 SCRA 43.
[64]
Rollo, p. 583.
[65]
Id. at 673.
[66]
Id. at 82.
[67]
Id.
[68]
Id. at 474-479.
[69]
Section 8 of R.A. 3591 provides:

POWERS AS A CORPORATE BODY

SECTION 8. The Corporation as a corporate body shall have the power

xxx

Eighth To conduct examination of banks with prior approval of the Monetary Board: Provided, That no examination
can be conducted within twelve (12) months from the last examination date: Provided, however, That the
Corporation may, in coordination with the Bangko Sentral, conduct a special examination as the Board of Directors,
by an affirmative vote of a majority of all its members, if there is a threatened or impending closure of a
bank; Provided, further, That, notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, Republic Act
No. 6426, as amended, Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the Corporation and/or the Bangko Sentral, may
inquire into or examine deposit accounts and all information related thereto in case there is a finding of unsafe or
unsound banking practice; Provided, That to avoid overlapping of efforts, the examination shall maximize the
efficient use of the relevant reports, information, and findings of the Bangko Sentral, which it shall make available
to the Corporation; (As amended by R.A. 9302, 12 August 2004, R.A. 9576, 1 June 2009)
xxx
[70]
Section 9(b-1) of the PDIC Charter further provides that the Board of Directors of the PDIC shall have the power
to:

POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROHIBITIONS

SECTION 9. xxx

(b) The Board of Directors shall appoint examiners who shall have power, on behalf of the Corporation to examine
any insured bank. Each such examiner shall have the power to make a thorough examination of all the affairs of the
bank and in doing so, he shall have the power to administer oaths, to examine and take and preserve the testimony of
any of the officers and agents thereof, and, to compel the presentation of books, documents, papers, or records
necessary in his judgment to ascertain the facts relative to the condition of the bank; and shall make a full and
detailed report of the condition of the bank to the Corporation. The Board of Directors in like manner shall appoint
claim agents who shall have the power to investigate and examine all claims for insured deposits and transferred
deposits. Each claim agent shall have the power to administer oaths and to examine under oath and take and
preserve testimony of any person relating to such claim. (As amended by E.O. 890, 08 April 1983; R.A. 7400, 13
April 1992)

(b-1) The investigators appointed by the Board of Directors shall have the power on behalf of the Corporation to
conduct investigations on frauds, irregularities and anomalies committed in banks, based on reports of examination
conducted by the Corporation and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or complaints from depositors or from other
government agency. Each such investigator shall have the power to administer oaths, and to examine and take and
preserve the testimony of any person relating to the subject of investigation. (As added by R.A. 9302, 12 August
2004)

xxx
[71]
Republic Act No. 3591, as amended, Section 1.
[72]
The Final Report of Examination is defined under Section 2, Rule 3 of RI No. 2005-02 as follows:
SECTION 2. Final Report of Examination.
A Final Report of Examination shall refer to the document approved by the PDIC Board or the Monetary Board
containing a written statement/narration of the findings and/or recommendations resulting from an examination of a
bank.
A Final Report of Examination of examiners of PDIC and/or BSP shall contain the following:
If possible, full name(s) and address(es) of the bank and/or its directors, officers, employees or agents or such
description as would identify who appear to be responsible for the commission of fraud, irregularities and/or
anomalies; and
A narration of the relevant and material facts which shows the fraudulent, irregular or anomalous acts or omissions
allegedly committed in a bank.
In addition to the foregoing, copies of relevant documents, if available, should accompany the Final Report of
Examination.
[73]
Section 1, Rule 3 of RI No. 2005-02 states:
SECTION 1. Authorization by the PDIC Board.
In all cases, a fact-finding investigation shall be conducted only upon authorization by the PDIC Board acting on the
recommendation contained in a Final Report of Examination or based on any adverse finding stated therein, and/or a
complaint from a depositor or government agency.
The Board shall likewise authorize the filing of criminal, civil, and/or administrative charges, if warranted. For this
purpose, said authority is delegated to the President and Chief Executive Officer or the General Counsel in
accordance with existing PDIC policies.
[74]
Section 3, Rule 3 of RI No. 2005-02 provides for the definition of a complaint as follows:
SECTION 3. Complaint.
A complaint is a verified statement from a depositor alleging the commission or omission of certain acts which
constitute fraud, irregularity or anomaly in a bank. The complaint shall follow the form attached hereto as Annex A
and/or contain the following:
Full name and address of the complainant;
Full name and address of the bank and/or the names or sufficient description that will identify the directors, officers,
employees and/or agents thereof who appear to be responsible for the commission of fraud, irregularities and/or
anomalies;
A narration of the relevant and material facts which shows the fraudulent, irregular or anomalous act or acts
allegedly committed in a bank;
A statement that the complainant has not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues with
BSP or any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his/her knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; or a full disclosure of the status of an action or claim involving the same issues filed with
BSP or any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency;
An undertaking that if the complainant should thereafter learn that a similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he/she shall report the fact within five (5) days therefrom to PDIC;
If the incident complained of involves the deposit account of the complainant with the subject bank, a statement
authorizing PDIC to look into the desposit account of the complainant for purposes of the investigation; and
Documents and/or affidavits, if any, supporting the allegations in the complaint.
In the absence of any one of the aforementioned requirements other than paragraph [g], the complaint may be
dismissed.
A report from a government agency of fraud/irregularity/anomaly allegedly committed in a bank that is furnished
PDIC, accompanied by a written request for the conduct of an investigation, is considered a valid complaint under
these Rules.
[75]
Sec. 3(I), PDIC Regulatory Issuance No. 2005-02.
[76]
Sec. 3(l), PDIC Regulatory Issuance No. 2005-02.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

JIMMY ARENO, JR., G.R. No. 180302

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
SKYCABLE PCC-BAGUIO, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 5, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Disciplinary action against an erring employee is a management prerogative which,

generally, is not subject to judicial interference. However, this policy can be justified only
if the disciplinary action is dictated by legitimate business reasons and is not oppressive,
as in this case.

This petition for review on certiorari[1] assails the Decision[2] dated May 28, 2007 and the
Resolution[3] dated October 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
94485, which affirmed the February 28, 2006 Decision[4] of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) upholding the legality of petitioner Jimmy Areno Jr.s suspension
and subsequent termination from employment.

Factual Antecedents

On January 17, 1995, petitioner was employed as a cable technician by respondent

Skycable PCC-Baguio. On January 17, 2002, an accounting clerk of respondent,
Hyacinth Soriano (Soriano), sent to the human resource manager a letter-
complaint[5] against petitioner alleging that on two separate occasions, the latter spread
false rumors about her (the first in the middle of 2001 and the second on December 22,
2001). On January 27, 2002, she was again insulted by petitioner when the latter
approached her and said that she was seen going out with Aldrin Estrada, their field
service supervisor, at Central Park, Baguio City. During that incident, petitioner
uttered, Ikaw lang ang nakakaalam ng totoo with malicious intent and in a provocative
manner. Soriano averred that petitioners unscrupulous behavior constituted serious and
grave offense in violation of the companys Code of Discipline.

On the same day, respondent issued a Memorandum[6] requiring petitioner to submit an

explanation within 76 hours from notice thereof. Petitioner submitted his written
explanation[7] dated January 23, 2002 denying all the allegations in Sorianos letter-
complaint and further denying having uttered the statement imputed on him, explaining
thus:

2. That on the 7th of January, 2002 at SkyCable office, I greeted her HELLO, HYA. I
thought she didnt hear me greet her so I continued saying NAKITA NAMIN KAYO
AHSA CENTRAL PARK. With that she answered, KASAMA KO SI EMMAN. Then I
added, BAT NANDOON YUNG 114? Then she reacted TSISMOSO KA KASI! In that
instance, I didnt intend to insult her as she was saying because I never really implied
anything with my statement nor delivered it with malicious intent. So I ended by
saying, BAT DI MO SABIHIN YUNG PROBLEMA MO SA AKIN? IKAW LANG ANG
NAKAKAALAM NIYAN E! In this statement, I was asking her to tell me frankly the
reasons why shes mad at me. I want to stress that I never delivered the statement in a
provocative manner.[8]

An administrative investigation was accordingly conducted on January 31, 2002. In a

Memo[9] dated February 6, 2002, the investigating committee found petitioner guilty of
having made malicious statements against Soriano during the January 7,
2002 conversation, which is categorized as an offense under the Company Code of
Discipline. Consequently, petitioner was suspended for three days without pay
effective February 13-15, 2002. The Memo was allegedly served on February 7, 2002 but
petitioner refused to sign it.

Notwithstanding the suspension order, however, petitioner still reported for work
on February 13, 2002. By reason thereof, respondent sent petitioner a letter denominated
as 1st Notice of Termination[10] requiring him to explain in writing why he should not be
terminated for insubordination. On February 18, 2002, petitioner inquired from
respondent whether he is already dismissed or merely suspended since he was refused
entry into the company premises on February 14, 2002.[11] Respondent replied that
petitioner was merely suspended and gave him additional time to tender his written
explanation to the 1st Notice of Termination.

On March 2, 2002, petitioner again wrote to respondent, this time requesting for further
investigation on his alleged act of spreading rumors against Soriano in order for him to
confront his accuser and present his witnesses with the assistance of counsel. Respondent
denied the request reiterating that there has been substantial compliance with due process
and that a reinvestigation is moot because the suspension was already served.
Anent the new charge of insubordination, petitioner submitted to respondent his written
explanation[12] averring that he still reported for work on the first day of his suspension
because the accusation of Soriano is baseless and her testimony is hearsay. Besides,
according to petitioner, he did not defy any order related to his duties, no representative
of the management prevented him from working and that reporting to work without
being paid for the service he rendered on that day did not in any way affect the companys
productivity.

On March 15, 2002, an investigation on the insubordination case was conducted which
was attended by the parties and their respective counsels. Through a Final Notice of
Termination dated April 1, 2002,[13] petitioner was dismissed from service on the ground
of insubordination or willful disobedience in complying with the suspension order.

Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter

On April 5, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint[14] before the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC against respondent assailing the legality of his suspension and eventual
dismissal. He claimed that his suspension and dismissal were effected without any basis,
and that he was denied his right to due process.

On July 31, 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[15] dismissing petitioners
complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the act of petitioner in spreading
rumors or intriguing against the honor of a co-employee was persistent and characterized
by willful and wrongful intents. It thus held that the order suspending petitioner is a
legitimate exercise of management prerogative and that the deliberate refusal of petitioner
to comply therewith constitutes willful disobedience.

Proceedings before the NLRC

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which, in a Decision[16] dated July 22, 2005 found his
suspension and dismissal illegal. It held that the testimonies given during the January 31,
2002administrative investigation and used as basis for petitioners suspension are
hearsay. The NLRC likewise held that petitioner was deprived of his basic right to due
process when he was not allowed to confront his accuser despite his repeated requests.
Respondent moved for reconsideration.[17] Petitioner, for his part, filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration[18] with respect to the limited award of backwages and to claim
payment of attorneys fees and damages as well.

The NLRC, in its February 28, 2006 Decision,[19] reconsidered its earlier Decision and
reinstated the Labor Arbiters Decision dismissing the complaint. In reversing itself, the
NLRC opined that as shown by the transcripts of the investigation conducted on January
31, 2002, the testimony of Soriano was not, after all, hearsay. The NLRC also considered
the Memorandum dated December 10, 2001 which placed petitioner under deactivation
for three months due to an offense he earlier committed. While under said deactivation
period, the commission of any further infraction warrants the imposition of the penalty of
suspension. Finally, the NLRC struck down petitioners claim that he has no knowledge
of the suspension order since this was never raised before the Labor Arbiter but only on
appeal.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari.[20] On May 28, 2007, the
CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC, ruling that the suspension of petitioner was not
predicated on hearsay evidence; that petitioner was not deprived of due process both at
the company level and during the proceedings held before the NLRC; and that petitioners
failure to comply with respondents suspension order, despite notice thereof, is a case of
willful disobedience of a lawful order which is a valid ground for dismissal.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration.[21] Before acting thereon, the CA required

respondent to file its comment.[22] Although 19 days late, the CA admitted respondents
comment[23] in the interest of justice.[24]

On October 16, 2007, the CA resolved petitioners Motion for Reconsideration as follows:

Finding no cogent reason with which to modify, much less reverse Our assailed Decision
dated May 28, 2007, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 18, 2007 is
hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[25]
 Issues

Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of errors:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE WHIMSICAL AND CAPRICIOUS DECISION OF THE NLRC
WHICH REVERSED ITS ORIGINAL DECISION FINDING THAT WITNESS
HYACINTH SORIANOS TESTIMONY IS NOT HEARSAY AFTER ALL:

A. BY MEANS OF SELECTIVE CITATION ON A PORTION ON PAGE

TWO OF THE FIVE-PAGE UNSWORN TESTIMONY OF HYACINTH
SORIANO THAT HER TESTIMONY IS NOT HEARSAY AFTER ALL
WHEN IN ITS ENTIRETY THE TESTIMONIES ARE DOUBLE-TRIPLE-
HEARSAY AS FOUND [BY] THE RESPONDENT NLRC IN ITS ORIGINAL
DECISION, ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT IN THAT JANUARY 31, 2002
HEARING WITNESS HYACINTH SORIANO DID NOT TESTIFY UNDER
OATH AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS OF THE MINUTES WAS NOT
SIGNED BY THE 3-MEMBER INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, HENCE
THE BASIS OF THE PETITIONERS SUSPENSION WHICH PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS FOUND TO BE A LEGAL ORDER IS NOTHING BUT A
SCRAP OF PAPER.

B. BY SIMPLY STATING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE

PROCESS BECAUSE HE WAS FURNISHED COPY OF THE
TERMINATION NOTICE STATING THE GROUNDS THERETO
ALTHOUGH IN THE PLANT LEVEL INVESTIGATION/HEARING ON
JANUARY 31, 2002, PETITIONER WAS EXCLUDED OR HIS PRESENCE
WAS NOT ALLOWED DURING THE GUIDED/COUCHED
INTERROGATIONS FOR THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESS HYACINTH
SORIANO AND AFTER WITNESS SORIANOS GUIDED/COUCHED
TESTIMONIES ENDED, THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATORS
SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PETITIONER, ONE
AFTER THE OTHER. IN SHORT, DESPITE HIS REPEATED DEMANDS
FROM THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT MANAGEMENT THAT HE BE
ALLOWED TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSER HYACINTH SORIANO,
PETITIONER WAS NOT ALLOWED TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSER.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE UNCONTROVERTED FACT THAT
THE SO-CALLED THREE-DAY SUSPENSION WAS ANCHORED ON A SCRAP
OF PAPER BECAUSE IT WAS NOT SIGNED AND ISSUED BY A COMPANY
OFFICIAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AUTHORIZED TO EFFECT ANY
 DISMISSAL OR SUSPENSION ORDER, THUS PETITIONER DID NOT VIOLATE
ANY LAWFUL ORDER.

III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE WHIMSICAL AND CAPRICIOUS SECOND
DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT NLRC WHICH REVERSED ITS ORIGINAL
DECISION ON THE ALLEGED GROUND:

A. THAT THE PETITIONER KNEW OF HIS SUSPENSION WHEN HE

REPORTED FOR DUTY ON FEBRUARY 13, 2002 AS DECREED IN THE
UNSIGNED SO-CALLED SUSPENSION ORDER ALLEGEDLY
CONSTITUTING INSUBORDINATION WHEN THE FACTS DISCLOSE
THAT PETITIONER DECLINED TO RECEIVE IT PERSONALLY AND HE
ASKED THAT IT BE SENT TO HIM THROUGH REGISTERED MAIL AND
THIS FACT IS ADMITTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT, THUS PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION ARE NOT ONLY
CONTRARY TO THE ADMISSION OF BOTH PARTIES BUT BASED ON
CONJECTURES AND SURMISES.

B. THAT AS FOUND BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IT IS ONLY ON

APPEAL THAT PETITIONER INTERPOSES THE ARGUMENT THAT HE
COULD NOT HAVE KNOWN ABOUT HIS SUSPENSION THUS HE
COULD NOT VIOLATE AN ORDER WHICH HE HAD NOT KNOWN IN
THE FIRST PLACE, IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE, MOREOVER, UPON SCRUTINY IT WAS NOT SIGNED
BY A COMPANY OFFICIAL AUTHORIZED TO EFFECT DISMISSAL OR
SUSPENSION ORDER. THUS THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN ITS FINDING ON THIS MATTER.

IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMMENT DESPITE x
x x NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS ORDER TO FILE
COMMENT [DISREGARDING] THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE RULES
WHICH IS MANDATORY. FURTHERMORE, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT
OF APPEALS [VIOLATED] THE MANDATE OF SECTION 14, ARTICLE VIII OF
THE CONSTITUTION IN ITS DENIAL OF PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WITHOUT STATING THE LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR.[26]
Petitioner contends that his suspension was without any basis since the testimony
of Soriano is hearsay and was not made under oath. Also, the minutes of the investigative
proceeding/hearing was not signed by the investigators. Petitioner likewise contends that
he was denied due process as he was not given the opportunity to contest the evidence
against him. He further insists that the suspension order is a scrap of paper as it was not
signed and issued by an official who is authorized to effectuate such order. And even
assuming that the suspension order is valid, no proof was ever presented to show that he
was indeed served or that he received a copy thereof. Therefore, he could not have
violated any lawful order to justify his dismissal.

Our Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

The CA did not err in admitting the comment of

respondent despite its late filing.

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in admitting respondents Comment to

petitioners Motion for Reconsideration which was filed 19 days late.

A close scrutiny of Section 6, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,[27] which grants

discretionary authority to the CA in ordering parties to file responsive and other pleadings
in petitions for certiorari filed before it, will reveal that such rule is merely directory in
nature. This is so because the word may employed by the rule shows that it is not
mandatory but discretionary on the part of the CA to require the filing of pleadings which
it deems necessary to assist it in resolving the controversies.[28] In the same way, the
admission of any responsive pleading filed by party-litigants is a matter that rests largely
on the sound discretion of the court. At any rate, rules of procedure may be relaxed in the
interest of substantial justice and in order to afford litigants maximum opportunity for the
proper and just determination of their causes.[29] Strict adherence to technical adjective
rules should never be unexceptionally required because a contrary precept would result in
a failure to decide cases on their merits.[30] The CA could not have erred in admitting the
comment, albeit filed late, when it viewed that the interest of justice would be better
served by the policy of liberality.

CA stated legal basis for denying petitioners

motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner next alleges that the CA denied reconsideration without indicating its
legal basis in violation of the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which provides that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor. This requirement, however, was complied with in the instant case, when the CA,
in its resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, stated that it found no
cogent reason to modify, much less reverse itself.[31]

Suspension validly meted out by respondent on

petitioner.

Going now to the merits of the case, the 3-day suspension of petitioner is not
tainted with substantive or procedural infirmities. For one, petitioners insistent claim that
his suspension was predicated on hearsay testimony deserves scant consideration.

The NLRC initially ruled that Sorianos testimony during the investigation on the
alleged act of petitioner in spreading rumors is hearsay. Nevertheless, it reversed itself by
holding that while Soriano stated that her allegation with regard to the first two instances
that petitioner was spreading false information about her is based on what she heard from
other people, her narration of the third instance relating to what has transpired during
their January 7, 2002 conversation is not hearsay. The NLRC ruled quoting in part the
relevant testimony of Soriano as recorded in the transcript of the investigation:

x x x. Indeed, complainant had been spreading malicious information against Ms.

Soriano. It appears that Ms. Soriano had averred that this happened on three (3)
occasions. The first two (2) instances happened in midyear of 2001 and another in
December 2001. the [sic] first two (2) instances were merely referred to by the
complainant in passing. Thus, she stated:

Raul: So ang pag-uusapan natin dito ay yung number 3, yung January 7?

Hya: Opo. Kasi yung mid last year at yung December 23, iniignore ko
lang hanggang nung Jan 7 harap harapan na.

Tessa: Are you considering numbers 1 and 2? Kasi dito naman nag-ugat
yun e.

Hya: Maam kasi ang parang point ko dito is to cite na ngayon may proof
na ako kasi hinarap na nya ako unlike noon napuro hearsay lang.
Ngayon parang Napatunayan ko na thru Jan 7 na totoo nga.
Parang ang ano ko kasi dito is yung intrigue. Yung 1 & 2
 Rumors lang pero nung Jan 7, intrigue na un kasi may mga
taong nakarinig.

Raul: So ang sinasabi mo ba is talagang ang offense is yung pag-insulto

nya? Parang ang talagang intension nya is awayin ka? Parang
alam nya maiinis ka.
Hya: Opo

Raul: Kasi di ba when youre provoking a fight usually hinahamon mo?

In this case ba yung sinabi ni Toto ay parang gumawa sya ng
statement na hindi maganda sa iyo at yung reaction mo ay x x
Hya: Sir siguro sa part ni Toto hindi kasi hes used to it na e. Pero on my
part x x x

Raul: So yun ang interpretation mo sa offense ni x x x.

Hya: Opo.

The foregoing reveals that Ms. Sorianos testimony is not hearsay and neither is it say-
so.[32]

On appeal, the CA affirmed this ruling when it likewise found that the following
statements of Soriano were limited to matters of personal knowledge:

Hya: 12:15, pagbungad ko palang, O HYA KUMAIN PALA KAYO SA CENTRAL

PARK? Sabi ko OO KASAMA KO SI EMAN, sasabihin ko palang yung hindi
na nakasama si May, Ang sabi niya na E NASA LABAS NAMAN YUNG
SASAKYAN NI. tapos sinabi nya yung plate # ni sir Aldrin.

Tessa: Nasa labas daw yung sasakyan ni Aldrin.

Hya: Opo, e di nagtaka ako, nag-argue na kami, tinitingnan na kami ng mga Aes tapos
iniwan ko sya.[33]

The CA and NLRC are in agreement with this finding and since both are
supported by evidence on record, the same must be accorded due respect and finality.

Petitioner still contends that the testimonies elicited during the investigative
hearing were not made under oath, that the record of the proceeding is not admissible for
being unsigned, and that he was not given a chance to confront his accuser, thus,
invoking denial of due process.
 In this case, petitioner was asked to explain and was informed of the complaint
against him. A committee was formed which conducted an investigation on January 31,
2002 by exhaustively examining and questioning both petitioner and his accuser,
Soriano, separately. Petitioner actively participated therein by answering the questions
interposed by the panel members. The proceeding was recorded, and the correctness of
which was certified by respondent thru its Regional Manager, Raul
Bandonill.[34] Undoubtedly, petitioner was given enough opportunity to be heard and
defend himself. It has already been held that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, a formal or trial-type hearing is not essential as the due process
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side.[35]

The decision to suspend petitioner was rendered after investigation and a finding
by respondent that petitioner has indeed made malicious statements against a co-
employee. The suspension was imposed due to a repeated infraction within a deactivation
period set by the company relating to a previous similar offense committed. It is
axiomatic that appropriate disciplinary sanction is within the purview of management
imposition.[36] What should not be overlooked is the prerogative of an employer company
to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the proper conduct of its
business and to provide certain disciplinary measures in order to implement said rules to
assure that the same would be complied with.[37] Respondent then acted within its rights
as an employer when it decided to exercise its management prerogative to impose
disciplinary measure on its erring employee.

Petitioner was validly dismissed on the ground

of willful disobedience in refusing to comply
with the suspension order.

The CA refused to give credence to petitioners assertion of having no knowledge

of the suspension because he refused to receive the suspension order preferring that it be
sent by registered mail. The appellate court affirmed the factual finding of the NLRC that
petitioner was definitely aware of his suspension but only feigned ignorance of the same.
As a rule, we refrain from reviewing factual assessments of agencies exercising
adjudicative functions. Factual findings of administrative agencies that are affirmed by
the CA are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court so long as these
findings are supported by substantial evidence.[38]
Anyhow, evidence on record repudiates petitioners pretension. His insistence that
he had no notice of his suspension is belied by evidence as it shows that the suspension
order was served on petitioner on February 7, 2002 by his immediate superior, Al
Luzano, but petitioner declined to sign it. No acceptable reason was advanced for doing
so except petitioners shallow excuse that it should be sent to him by registered mail.

Petitioner also challenges the validity of the suspension order for being
unsigned. The same has no merit. Upon careful examination, it appears that the
contention was raised for the first time in petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
Decision of the CA. In Arceno v. Government Service Insurance System,[39] the hornbook
principle that new issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal was reiterated. We
emphasized therein that the rule is based on principles of fairness and due process and is
applicable to appealed decisions originating from regular courts, administrative agencies
or quasi-judicial bodies, whether rendered in a civil case, a special proceeding or a
criminal case, citing the case of Tan v. Commission on Elections.[40] Even assuming that it
was raised, the same would be without merit because the suspension order bears the
signature of respondents engineering manager and petitioners immediate superior, Al
Luzano, who, in fact, is a member of the panel committee that conducted an investigation
on the complaint of Soriano against petitioner.

As a just cause for dismissal of an employee under Article 282[41] of the Labor
Code, willful disobedience of the employers lawful orders requires the concurrence of
two elements: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been
willful, i.e., characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated
must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharge.[42] Both requisites are present in the
instant case. It is noteworthy that upon receipt of the notice of suspension, petitioner did
not question such order at the first instance. He immediately defied the order by reporting
on the first day of his suspension. Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the
employee cannot be countenanced. It may encourage him to do even worse and will
render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe.[43]

Petitioner was served the first notice of termination and was given time to submit
his written explanation. A hearing was conducted wherein both parties with their
respective counsels were present. After finding cause for petitioners termination, a final
notice apprising him of the decision to terminate his employment was served. All things
considered, respondent validly dismissed petitioner for cause after complying with the
procedural requirements of the law.

The allegation of fraud should be proven.

On the last point, petitioner posits that the unfavorable Decision of the Labor
Arbiter and the Decision of the NLRC were issued and obtained by means of fraud,
which is a valid ground for their annulment. In our jurisdiction, however, fraud is never
presumed and should be proved as mere allegations are not enough.[44] The burden of
proof rests on petitioner, which, in this case, he failed to discharge.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed May 28,
2007 Decision and October 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 94485 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 ARTURO D. BRION ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 4-41.
[2]
Id. at 44-56; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
Marlene Gonzales-Sison.
[3]
Id. at 58.
[4]
Id. at 130-135; penned by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and concurred in by Commissioners Romeo O. Lagman
and Tito F. Genilo.
[5]
CA rollo, pp. 363-364.
[6]
Id. at 362.
[7]
Id. at 365.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Id. at 366.
[10]
Id. at 361.
[11]
Id. at 368.
[12]
Id. at 356-359.
[13]
Id. at 352-355.
[14]
Id. at 81.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 137-166; penned by Labor Arbiter Monroe C. Tabingan.
[16]
Id. at 116-128.
[17]
Id. at 224-233.
[18]
Id. at 216-222.
[19]
Id. at 130-135.
[20]
CA rollo, pp. 3-28.
[21]
Id. at 384-399.
[22]
Id. at 412.
[23]
Id. at 413-426.
[24]
Id. at 434.
[25]
Rollo, p. 58.
[26]
Id. at 332-334.
[27]
Sec. 6. Order to comment. -- x x x
In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Section 2, Rule 56,
shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court may require the respondents to file their comment
to, and not a motion to dismiss, the petition. Thereafter, the court may require the filing of a reply and such
other responsive or other pleadings as it may deem necessary and proper.
[28]
People v. Ondo, G.R. No. 101361, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 562, 569.
[29]
De Grano v. Lacaba, G.R. No. 158877, June 16, 2009.
[30]
Ambrosio v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75663, January 17, 1990, 181 SCRA 99, 104.
[31]
JRB Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 677, 581-682 (1997).
[32]
Rollo, p. 132.
[33]
Id. at 75.
[34]
CA rollo, p. 433.
[35]
Valiao v. Court of Appeals, 479 Phil. 459, 472 (2004).
[36]
San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 146121-22, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 410,
426.
[37]
Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, 232 Phil. 488, 494 (1987).
[38]
Herida v. F & C Pawnshop and Jewelry Store, G.R. No. 172601, April 16, 2009.
[39]
G.R. No. 162374, June 18, 2009.
[40]
G.R. Nos. 166143-47, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 352.
[41]
ART. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER.- An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of
his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[42]
Gilles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149273, June 5, 2009.
[43]
San Miguel Corporation v. Ubaldo, G.R. No. 92859, February 1, 1993, 218 SCRA 293, 300.
[44]
Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation v. AFP Retirment and Separation Benefits System, G.R. No. 177181, July 7, 2009.
 EN BANC

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS G.R. No. 181704

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(BOCEA), represented by its Present:
National President (BOCEA
National Executive Council) Mr. CORONA,C.J.,
Romulo A. Pagulayan, CARPIO,
Petitioner, VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, in MENDOZA,
his capacity as Secretary of the SERENO,
Department of Finance, HON. REYES, and
NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in his PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN
B. HEFTI, in her capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Promulgated:
Internal Revenue,
Respondents. December 6, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition[1] for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
to declare Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335,[2] otherwise known as the Attrition Act of
2005, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations [3] (IRR) unconstitutional, and
the implementation thereof be enjoined permanently.

The Facts

On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law
R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005.

In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima[4] (Abakada), we said of R.A. No.

9335:
RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless
of employment status.

The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess
of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget
and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the
fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in
the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.

The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or
his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or
their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized
organization.

Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the
allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for
removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls
short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted
by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform
other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an
annual report to Congress.
 The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of
RA [No.] 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose.[5]

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee approved the assailed IRR

on May 22, 2006. Subsequently, the IRR was published on May 30, 2006 in two
newspapers of general circulation, the Philippine Star and the Manila
Standard, and became effective fifteen (15) days later.[6]

Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted
with constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its
members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an
association of rank-and-file employees of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), and represented by its National President, Mr.
Romulo A. Pagulayan (Pagulayan), directly filed the present petition before this
Court against respondents Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales
(Commissioner Morales), in his capacity as BOC Commissioner, and Lilian B.
Hefti, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). In
its petition, BOCEA made the following averments:

Sometime in 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to the mandate of

R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and in order to comply with the stringent deadlines
thereof, started to disseminate Collection District Performance
[7]
Contracts (Performance Contracts) for the lower ranking officials and rank-and-
file employees to sign. The Performance Contract pertinently provided:
xxxx

WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the Implementing Rules

and Regulations (IRR) of the Attrition Act of 2005, that provides for the setting of
criteria and procedures for removing from the service Officials and Employees
whose revenue collection fall short of the target in accordance with Section 7 of
Republic Act 9335.

xxxx
 NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, parties
unto this Agreement hereby agree and so agreed to perform the following:

xxxx

2. The Section 2, PA/PE hereby accepts the allocated Revenue Collection Target
and further accepts/commits to meet the said target under the following
conditions:

a.) That he/she will meet the allocated Revenue Collection Target and
thereby undertakes and binds himself/herself that in the event the revenue
collection falls short of the target with due consideration of all relevant
factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and
regulations promulgated under the Act and its IRR, he/she will voluntarily
submit to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the IRR and Sec. 7 of the Act; and

b.) That he/she will cascade and/or allocate to respective

Appraisers/Examiners or Employees under his/her section the said Revenue
Collection Target and require them to execute a Performance Contract, and direct
them to accept their individual target. The Performance Contract executed by the
respective Examiners/Appraisers/Employees shall be submitted to the Office of
the Commissioner through the LAIC on or before March 31, 2008.

x x x x[8]

BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to the
Governments own policies on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks to big businesses,
the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other economic factors.
BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were coerced and forced to sign the
Performance Contract. The majority of them, however, did not sign. In particular,
officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to sign the Performance
Contracts but they also refused. To ease the brewing tension, BOCEA claimed that
its officers sent letters, and sought several dialogues with BOC officials but the
latter refused to heed them.

In addition, BOCEA alleged that Commissioner Morales exerted heavy

pressure on the District Collectors, Chiefs of Formal Entry Divisions, Principal
Customs Appraisers and Principal Customs Examiners of the BOC during
command conferences to make them sign their Performance Contracts. Likewise,
BOC Deputy Commissioner Reynaldo Umali (Deputy Commissioner Umali)
individually spoke to said personnel to convince them to sign said contracts. Said
personnel were threatened that if they do not sign their respective Performance
Contracts, they would face possible reassignment, reshuffling, or worse, be placed
on floating status. Thus, all the District Collectors, except a certain Atty. Carlos So
of the Collection District III of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA),
signed the Performance Contracts.

BOCEA further claimed that Pagulayan was constantly harassed and

threatened with lawsuits. Pagulayan approached Deputy Commissioner Umali to
ask the BOC officials to stop all forms of harassment, but the latter merely said
that he would look into the matter. On February 5, 2008, BOCEA through counsel
wrote the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to desist from
implementing R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR and from requiring rank-and-file
employees of the BOC and BIR to sign Performance Contracts.[9] In his letter-
reply[10] dated February 12, 2008, Deputy Commissioner Umali denied having
coerced any BOC employee to sign a Performance Contract. He also defended the
BOC, invoking its mandate of merely implementing the law. Finally, Pagulayan
and BOCEAs counsel, on separate occasions, requested for a certified true copy of
the Performance Contract from Deputy Commissioner Umali but the latter failed to
furnish them a copy.[11]

This petition was filed directly with this Court on March 3, 2008. BOCEA asserted
that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their
adverse effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct
resort to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among others, that its members
and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail
to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their
constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective families
prejudice.

In their Comment,[12] respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG), countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due
process and right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG
stressed that the guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not
a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided a
reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is germane to
the purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an
employee may only be separated from the service upon compliance with
substantive and procedural due process. The OSG added that R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR must enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.

In its Reply,[13] BOCEA claimed that R.A. No. 9335 employs means that are
unreasonable to achieve its stated objectives; that the law is unduly oppressive of
BIR and BOC employees as it shifts the extreme burden upon their shoulders when
the Government itself has adopted measures that make collection difficult such as
reduced tariff rates to almost zero percent and tax exemption of big businesses; and
that the law is discriminatory of BIR and BOC employees. BOCEA manifested
that only the high-ranking officials of the BOC benefited largely from the reward
system under R.A. No. 9335 despite the fact that they were not the ones directly
toiling to collect revenue. Moreover, despite the BOCEAs numerous
requests,[14] BOC continually refused to provide BOCEA the Expenditure Plan on
how such reward was distributed.

Since BOCEA was seeking similar reliefs as that of the petitioners

in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, BOCEA filed a Motion to
Consolidate[15] the present case with Abakada on April 16, 2008. However,
pending action on said motion, the Court rendered its decision
in Abakada on August 14, 2008. Thus, the consolidation of this case
with Abakada was rendered no longer possible.[16]

In Abakada, this Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona, declared Section 12[17] of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional and
violative of the principle of separation of powers. However, the constitutionality of
the remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to Section 13 [18] of
R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the contrary is shown, the IRR of
R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.[19]
 Notwithstanding our ruling in Abakada, both parties complied with our
Resolution[20] dated February 10, 2009, requiring them to submit their respective
Memoranda.

The Issues

BOCEA raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335,

AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF THE COVERED BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES[;]

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335,

AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF BIR AND
BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAWS[;]

III.

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS

IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO
SECURITY OF TENURE OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
AS ENSHRINED UNDER SECTION 2 (3), ARTICLE IX (B) OF THE
CONSTITUTION[;]

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS

IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE REVENUE PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION BOARD IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION[; AND]

V.
 WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 IS A BILL OF
ATTAINDER AND HENCE[,] UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT
INFLICTS PUNISHMENT THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FIAT UPON A
PARTICULAR GROUP OR CLASS OF OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
WITHOUT TRIAL.[21]

BOCEA manifested that while waiting for the Court to give due course to its
petition, events unfolded showing the patent unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335.
It narrated that during the first year of the implementation of R.A. No. 9335, BOC
employees exerted commendable efforts to attain their revenue target of P196
billion which they surpassed by as much as P2 billion for that year alone.
However, this was attained only because oil companies made advance tax
payments to BOC. Moreover, BOC employees were given their reward for
surpassing said target only in 2008, the distribution of which they described as
unjust, unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only top officials of BOC got the
huge sum of reward while the employees, who did the hard task of collecting,
received a mere pittance of around P8,500.00. In the same manner, the Bonds
Division of BOC-NAIA collected 400+% of its designated target but the higher
management gave out to the employees a measly sum of P8,500.00 while the top
level officials partook of millions of the excess collections. BOCEA relies on a
piece of information revealed by a newspaper showing the list of BOC officials
who apparently earned huge amounts of money by way of reward.[22] It claims that
the recipients thereof included lawyers, support personnel and other employees,
including a dentist, who performed no collection functions at all. These alleged
anomalous selection, distribution and allocation of rewards was due to the failure
of R.A. No. 9335 to set out clear guidelines.[23]

In addition, BOCEA avers that the Board initiated the first few cases of attrition for
the Fiscal Year 2007 by subjecting five BOC officials from the Port of Manila to
attrition despite the fact that the Port of Manila substantially complied with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9335. It is thus submitted that the selection of these
officials for attrition without proper investigation was nothing less than arbitrary.
Further, the legislative and executive departments promulgation of issuances and
the Governments accession to regional trade agreements have caused a significant
diminution of the tariff rates, thus, decreasing over-all collection. These unrealistic
settings of revenue targets seriously affect BIR and BOC employees tasked with
the burden of collection, and worse, subjected them to attrition.[24]

BOCEA assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR on the following
grounds:

1. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees
right to due process because the termination of employees who had
not attained their revenue targets for the year is peremptory and
done without any form of hearing to allow said employees to
ventilate their side. Moreover, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not
comply with the requirements under CSC rules and regulations as
the dismissal in this case is immediately executory. Such
immediately executory nature of the Boards decision negates the
remedies available to an employee as provided under the CSC
rules.

2. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees
right to equal protection of the law because R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC employees as
compared to employees of other revenue generating government
agencies like the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,
Department of Transportation and Communication, the Air
Transportation Office, the Land Transportation Office, and the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, among others, which are
not subject to attrition.

3. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees
right to security of tenure because R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
effectively removed remedies provided in the ordinary course of
administrative procedure afforded to government employees. The
law likewise created another ground for dismissal, i.e., non-
attainment of revenue collection target, which is not provided
under CSC rules and which is, by its nature, unpredictable and
therefore arbitrary and unreasonable.

4. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the 1987 Constitution because
Congress granted to the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board) the unbridled discretion of formulating the criteria for
 termination, the manner of allocating targets, the distribution of
rewards and the determination of relevant factors affecting the
targets of collection, which is tantamount to undue delegation of
legislative power.

5. R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment

upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without
trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the
Board the power to impose the penalty of removal upon employees
who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the
benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is
immediately executory. Lastly, it disregards the presumption of
regularity in the performance of the official functions of a public
officer.[25]

On the other hand, respondents through the OSG stress that except for Section 12
of R.A. No. 9335, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional, as per our ruling
in Abakada. Nevertheless, the OSG argues that the classification of BIR and BOC
employees as public officers under R.A. No. 9335 is based on a valid and
substantial distinction since the revenue generated by the BIR and BOC is
essentially in the form of taxes, which is the lifeblood of the State, while the
revenue produced by other agencies is merely incidental or secondary to their
governmental functions; that in view of their mandate, and for purposes of tax
collection, the BIR and BOC are sui generis; that R.A. No. 9335 complies with the
completeness and sufficient standard tests for the permissive delegation of
legislative power to the Board; that the Board exercises its delegated power
consistent with the policy laid down in the law, that is, to optimize the revenue
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC; that parameters were
set in order that the Board may identify the officials and employees subject to
attrition, and the proper procedure for their removal in case they fail to meet the
targets set in the Performance Contract were provided; and that the rights of BIR
and BOC employees to due process of law and security of tenure are duly accorded
by R.A. No. 9335. The OSG likewise maintains that there was no encroachment of
judicial power in the enactment of R.A. No. 9335 amounting to a bill of attainder
since R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR merely defined the offense and provided for the
penalty that may be imposed. Finally, the OSG reiterates that the separation from
the service of any BIR or BOC employee under R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR shall be
done only upon due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection, subject to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, and in compliance
with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG opines that the
Performance Contract, far from violating the BIR and BOC employees right to due
process, actually serves as a notice of the revenue target they have to meet and the
possible consequences of failing to meet the same. More, there is nothing in the
law which prevents the aggrieved party from appealing the unfavorable decision of
dismissal.[26]

In essence, the issues for our resolution are:

1. Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the
Board;

2. Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEAs
members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b) security of tenure and
(c) due process; and

3. Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder.

Our Ruling

Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA

has locus standi. BOCEA impugns the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR because its members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC, are
actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEAs members have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR.[27]

However, we find no merit in the petition and perforce dismiss the same.
It must be noted that this is not the first time the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR are being challenged. The Court already settled the majority of the
same issues raised by BOCEA in our decision in Abakada, which attained finality
on September 17, 2008. As such, our ruling therein is worthy of reiteration in this
case.

We resolve the first issue in the negative.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches
of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling
within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.[28] Necessarily imbedded in this
doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin
maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which means what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that
such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.[29] However, this principle of non-delegation of
powers admits of numerous exceptions,[30] one of which is the delegation of
legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board in
this case.

The rationale for the aforementioned exception was clearly explained in our ruling
in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,[31] to wit:

In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative

power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to
this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in todays society, it is
doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and
respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodies the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their
specialized fields the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise
of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements
are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.[32]

Thus, in Abakada, we held,

 Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it
sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
RA [No.] 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the
President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out
the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to

optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing
for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards
and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the
above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets.

Section 4 canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing the

delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets:

SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives

Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced
from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective
revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget
and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection Percent (%) of the Excess

[Over] the Revenue Collection to Accrue to the
Targets Fund
30% or below 15%
More than 30% 15% of the first 30% plus
20% of the remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year

immediately following the year when the revenue collection target was
exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.

Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue

collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as
stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing
(BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC
shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies revenue targets
 as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the
collection districts in the case of the BOC.

xxxxxxxxx

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection

expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved
by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress.
Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as
it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Boards authority
and identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the

agency shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxxxxxxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the
target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as
provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject
to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following
exemptions shall apply:

1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-

created, not exceeding two years in operation, and has no historical
record of collection performance that can be used as basis for
evaluation; and

2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a

recent transferee in the middle of the period under consideration unless
the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential
nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the
district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs
officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought
about by natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes as
may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only
after careful and proper review by the Board.

(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted

in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall be
 immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the
criteria for the separation of an official or employee from service
under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other
relevant laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such
as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and
Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;

xxxxxxxxx

At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient

standards: public interest, justice and equity, public convenience and welfare and
simplicity, economy and welfare. In this case, the declared policy of optimization
of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is
infused with public interest.[33]

We could not but deduce that the completeness test and the sufficient standard test
were fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as evident from the aforementioned Sections
2, 4 and 7 thereof. Moreover, Section 5[34] of R.A. No. 9335 also provides for the
incentives due to District Collection Offices. While it is apparent that the last
paragraph of Section 5 provides that [t]he allocation, distribution and release of
the district reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the
Revenue Performance and Evaluation Board, Section 7 (a)[35] of R.A. No. 9335
clearly mandates and sets the parameters for the Board by providing that such rules
and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the fund shall be in
accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court finds that
R.A. No. 9335, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all its essential
terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards as to negate
BOCEAs supposition of undue delegation of legislative power to the Board.

Similarly, we resolve the second issue in the negative.

Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. In other words,
the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.[36]

Thus, on the issue on equal protection of the laws, we held in Abakada:

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.
With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since
the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR
and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes,
customs duties, fees and charges.

The BIR performs the following functions:

Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. The Bureau of Internal

Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the supervision and
control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed
by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF],
shall have the following functions:

(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and
account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper
performance of its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal
economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and
subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
xxxxxxxxx

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs which

shall be headed and subject to the management and control of the
Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon
the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF] and hereinafter referred
to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:
 (1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees,
charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and
customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other
economic frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and
the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities
in all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
xxxxxxxxx

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform
the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State
exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.]
9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.[37]

As it was imperatively correlated to the issue on equal protection, the issues on the
security of tenure of affected BIR and BOC officials and employees and their
entitlement to due process were also settled in Abakada:

Clearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of

officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of
tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for
causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the
employee. In the case of RA [No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for
removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%)
with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This
standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The
action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and
compliance with substantive and procedural due process.[38]
In addition, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
ones side.[39] BOCEAs apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer
in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335.[40] The concerned BIR or BOC official
or employee is not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left
without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to
all relevant factors[41] that may affect the level of collection. In the same manner,
exemptions[42] were set, contravening BOCEAs claim that its members may be
removed for unattained target collection even due to causes which are beyond their
control. Moreover, an employees right to be heard is not at all prevented and his
right to appeal is not deprived of him.[43] In fine, a BIR or BOC official or
employee in this case cannot be arbitrarily removed from the service without
according him his constitutional right to due process. No less than R.A. No. 9335
inaccordance with the 1987 Constitution guarantees this.

We have spoken, and these issues were finally laid to rest. Now, the Court
proceeds to resolve the last, but new issue raised by BOCEA, that is, whether R.A.
No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22,[44] Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.

On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members
of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a
specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.[45]

In his Concurring Opinion in Tuason v. Register of

[46]
Deeds, Caloocan City, Justice Florentino P. Feliciano traces the roots of a Bill
of Attainder, to wit:
Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few centuries
back, Parliament would at times enact bills or statutes which declared certain
persons attainted and their blood corrupted so that it lost all heritable quality (Ex
Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In more modern terms, a bill
of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a legislative body. It
envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty the deprivation of life or liberty
or property not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative
fiat. While cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of
pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than death) is in intent
 and effect a penal judgment visited upon an identified person or group of
persons (and not upon the general community) without a prior charge or
demand, without notice and hearing, without an opportunity to defend,
without any of the civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial process as
we know it (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972]; Cummings and Missouri, 4
Wall. 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 [1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328, U.S. 303, 90 L.Ed. 1252
[1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965]. Such is the
archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a means of legislative oppression. x x x [47]

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek
to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the
grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for
the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the
constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected.

A final note.

We find that BOCEAs petition is replete with allegations of defects and anomalies
in allocation, distribution and receipt of rewards. While BOCEA intimates that it
intends to curb graft and corruption in the BOC in particular and in the government
in general which is nothing but noble, these intentions do not actually pertain to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, but rather in the faithful
implementation thereof. R.A. No. 9335 itself does not tolerate these pernicious acts
of graft and corruption.[48] As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on
the veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies are in the hands of the
Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains
within the domain of the Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is.
The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest
intendment and language thereof.[49] Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in
its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is
doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.[50] We have so declared in Abakada, and
we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.

WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

(On official leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice


On official leave.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-58.
[2]
Entitled AN ACT TO IMPROVE THE REVENUE COLLECTION PERFORMANCE OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR) AND THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC) THROUGH THE CREATION
OF A REWARDS AND INCENTIVES FUND AND OF A REVENUE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
BOARD AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[3]
Entitled RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9335, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE ATTRITION ACT OF 2005.
[4]
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
[5]
Id. at 267-268, citing Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, and 12 of R.A. No. 9335.
[6]
Id. at 281, 299.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 90-93.
[8]
Id. at 91-92. Emphasis supplied.
[9]
Id. at 97-102.
[10]
Id. at 103-104.
[11]
Id. at 105 and 106.
[12]
Id. at 139-160.
[13]
Id. at 163-180.
[14]
Id. at 182-185.
[15]
Id. at 135-138.
[16]
Id. at 197-198.
[17]
Section 12 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two
senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the
Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have
approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore
cease to exist.
[18]
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the
remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and
effect.
[19]
Supra note 4 at 294-299.
[20]
Rollo, pp. 360-361.
[21]
Id. at 499-500.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 432-436, 435. The CHIP-IN Bulletin in its July 2008 issue named the recipients of rewards, the top
five of which were:
1. Napoleon L. Morales Commissioner/OCOM P 5,293,000.00;
2. Suansing, Jr., Horacio P. District Collector P 1,011,000.00;
3. Dir. Reynaldo V. Umali Acting Director P 908,000.00;
4. Bernardo V. Sales Officer-in-Charge, IAG P 908,000.00;
5. Atty. Reynaldo S. Nicolas Deputy Commissioner/AOCG P 908,000.00.
[23]
Id. at 491-495.
[24]
Id. 495-499.
[25]
Id. at 505-543.
[26]
Id. at 448-471.
[27]
See Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308, 317.
[28]
See Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936).
[29]
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005,
469 SCRA 1, 115-116.
[30]
The recognized exceptions to this principle are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, id. at 117; Santiago v. Comelec, 336
Phil. 848, 897-898 (1997), citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Isagani A. Cruz, PHILIPPINE
POLITICAL LAW 87 (1996).
[31]
G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 696.
[32]
Id. at 719-720.
[33]
Supra note 4 at 277-281. Citations omitted and underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original.
[34]
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:
SEC. 5. Incentives to District Collection Offices. In the event that the BIR or the BOC fails to meet its revenue target
by less than ten percent (10%), the revenue districts, in the case of the BIR, or the collection districts, in the
case of the BOC, which exceed their respective allocations of the revenue target (allocated target), shall be
entitled to rewards and incentives (district incentive) amounting to ten percent (10%) of the excess over its
allocated target: Provided, however, That any BIR revenue district or BOC collection office which deliberately
foregoes any revenue collection in a given year as part of a scheme to avoid a higher allocated target for the
subsequent year shall not be entitled to a district incentive in such subsequent year notwithstanding its having
exceeded its allocated target: Provided further, That the allocated target of any such district shall have been
reported to and validated by the DBCC as required in the immediately preceding section.
The district reward shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the
revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released in the same fiscal year.
The allocation, distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and
regulations of the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.
[35]
Sec. 7 (a) of R.A. No. 9335 provides:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and
functions:
(a) To prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund due to the agency as
provided for in Sections 4 and 5 of this Act: Provided, That the rewards under this Act may also take the form
of non-monetary benefits;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
[36]
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA
78, 167.
[37]
Supra note 4 at 275-277. Citations omitted and underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original.
[38]
Id. at 280-281. Citations omitted and underscoring supplied.
[39]
Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 158000, March 31,
2005, 454 SCRA 701, 717, citing National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. v. National Labor Relations
Commission (4th Division),G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 348, 354 and NFD International
Manning Agents v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116629, January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 239, 246.
[40]
Supra note 33.
[41]
Section 19 of the IRR provides:
SEC. 19. Relevant Factors Affecting Collection. For purposes of Section 7(a) of the Act and Section 18 of this Rule,
the Board shall consider the following, among others, as relevant factors affecting the level of
collection: Provided, That these factors were not taken into account in setting BESF targets:
(a) Enactment of a law that repeals revenue measures, reduces tax and tariff rates, grants tax exemptions,
or otherwise results in the diminution of the tax base or of taxable transactions and activities, including
the entry into force of a treaty or an international agreement that the Philippines entered into resulting
in preferential treatment for certain taxpayers or transactions: Provided, That the Board shall have the
final authority to determine the affected District or Districts as well as the amount of revenues deemed
foregone due to such enactment or entry into force;
(b) Reduction by the President of tariff rates under Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines; and
(c) Exercise by the President of the power to open or close any port of entry under Section 702 of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
[42]
Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 9335 provides:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection
falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to
civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
(1) Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation,
and has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
(2) Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period
under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential
nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility
covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties
brought about by natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes as may be determined
by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the Board.
(Emphasis supplied.)
[43]
Section 9 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:
SEC. 9. Right to Appeal. An official or employee whose employment is terminated by virtue of the decision of the
Board may appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Office of the President (OP), whichever is
applicable, in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.

Moreover, Section 20 of the IRR pertinently provides:

SEC. 20. Right to Appeal. An official or employee whose employment is terminated by virtue of the decision of the
Board may appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Office of the President (OP), as the case may
be, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of the decision of the Board.
For officials who are Presidential appointees, appeal may be filed with the Office of the President. All other officials
and employees may appeal with the Civil Service Commission. Pending appeal, however, the decision of the
Board shall be immediately executory.
Provided, however, that officials and employees affected by the decision may initially file a motion for
reconsideration with the Board within [fifteen] (15) days from receipt of such decision.
Decisions of the Board shall be final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal and no motion or appeal has been filed.
[44]
Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
[45]
Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648, 659.
[46]
No. L-70484, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 613.
[47]
Id. at 625. Emphasis supplied.
[48]
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. The officials, examiners, and
employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs who violate this Act or who are guilty
of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or
taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence.
[49]
Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 450, 481.
[50]
Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. Nos. 152895 & 153151, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 136, 142, citing Lacson v. The
Executive Secretary, 361 Phil. 251, 263 (1999).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC.,
ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-

ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-
intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO
LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS
BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY,
SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON,
MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO,
CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG,
ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES,
AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO,
CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC,
GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI
LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE
VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM
MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF
PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA
LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK
COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER
BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO,
JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C.
REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON

MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO,
EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO
TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE
TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME
BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA
LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE
RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS,
ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH
LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U.
SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND
EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE
VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
SENATE, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V.
ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S.
RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN
BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES
FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF
THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.

DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M.

MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL
BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF
CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY.
MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS
G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO
FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS
HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS
SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly
irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of
government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent,
dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such
today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal
courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of
the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political
crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of
conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance,
that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure
from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or
judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by
each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated
by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect
without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to
insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by
what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override
its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of
all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
 (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of
the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not
vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two
Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. – Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. – Impeachment
Proceedings Deemed Initiated. –
In cases where a Member of the
House files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a
verified complaint that is endorsed
by a Member of the House through
a resolution of endorsement
against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated
on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution against
such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn
or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as the
case may be, is not sufficient in
substance.
 In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed,
as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.

RULE V Section 17. Bar Against

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official
more than once within the period of
one (1) year.
Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. – Within a period of
one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of
this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October
23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th
Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives
and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be
declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to
return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this
Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging
that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate;
and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President
Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens,
taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition
for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the
impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment
complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he
has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v.
PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the
second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal
profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles
of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M.
Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in
ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be
declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be
protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an
obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in
their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the
House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating
therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President
from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and
issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from
conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and
taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine
Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be
declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the
Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo
N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the
Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for
Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.
Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a
writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional
the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in
interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in
his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of
the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered
operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the
Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or
giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for
Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second
impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without
jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief
Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as
professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of
their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate
from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared
null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but
alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the
Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in
his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that
the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing
of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings
arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be
prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings
thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution
of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and
void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting
any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the
same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the
eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition
bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28,
2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on
October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292
alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the
Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a
direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put
forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not
carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected
above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse
themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court
directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003,
resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the
Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and
(d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on
petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for
and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De
Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation
asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment
cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene
(Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the
sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide
impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and
upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate
them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later
than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon,
filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and
have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable
issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment
court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the
principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution
issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress
and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the
matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No.
160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in
Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,

Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of
petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003,
to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it;
on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this
time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of

Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant
petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the
reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and
novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to
determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section
1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis
supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel
in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision
in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the

Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict,
the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility,
but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in
our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there,
has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the

nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
 then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases
and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of
powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon
the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period
of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law
of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States
generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution,
the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm
acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of

the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation
of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers
are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
 The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and
is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers
are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in
that balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any
branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in
the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at
all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it.
As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that
is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related
to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense
of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
 authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn
to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando,
declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do
not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision

under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should
bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the
history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
 accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice
Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle
of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,
in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a

provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering
that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the

Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all
the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be
so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate
the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In
still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as
to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
 adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential

application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a
political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to
try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the
scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel
rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United
States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to
try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and
difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to
show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and
American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to
try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave
abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it
necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional
questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins
to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful
words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the
U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the
U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to
initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of
filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same
official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and
may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to
exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to
the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial
willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards
in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of
the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of
the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point.
These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to
perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation
of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this
Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held
that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was
based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of
the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative
power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass
upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy
the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are
integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost
all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have
standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus
curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court
had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases
involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters
are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of
the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that,
when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in
the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing,
for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In
view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling
in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real
party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by
authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and
public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular
plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are
directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing
restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns
relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought
not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action
taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts
of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal
rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights –
as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar
and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of
the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific
requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must
be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he
can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient
that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that
any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the
Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is
composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty
to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it
with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve
the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86It,
therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by
it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening
must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to
deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable
or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be
sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before
this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing
as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental
importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive

determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1)
the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied
that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when
the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however,
mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A
party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which
courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case.
He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is
not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy
the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the
same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al.
has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join
petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that
"they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is
successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise
the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is
valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and
World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making
of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that
submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence
of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions
are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at
hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts
an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as
set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted
and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative
power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners
will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with
standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts
pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts
having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the
prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit,
as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no
urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of
constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should
first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this
Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second
impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules
provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the
Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean
maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can
raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their
signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity.
Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint
since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the
Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of
Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the
House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the
issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power
is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term
"political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned
 with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the
original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this
Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In
some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise
its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case
of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was
ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take
jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when
he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its
application on issues involving political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the
judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds
the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions
or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will
of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's
indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at
all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it.
As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well,
since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary
feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged
further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the
Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who
are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973
on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was
announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The
obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended
and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was
announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the
media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were already
incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal
threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention
had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it
had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the
proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens
of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon.
So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the
President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some
provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public
discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a
free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held
sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner
Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and
criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the
President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would
consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the
questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its
scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections,
but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays
came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers
thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given
in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a
motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be
suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of
Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new
Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the
referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of
Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed
the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution
had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void.
The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and
that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast
majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court
 were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their
respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum.
None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of
the Court felt that there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between
a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that
the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not
the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have
been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly
justiciable.

xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the
following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are
rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided
case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The
Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to
comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to
her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to
enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable or enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important
function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
 This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial
food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified
the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is
not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be
created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political
questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where
there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its
authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a
political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court
according to the new numerical need for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question
doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting

to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with
the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

 When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power.
But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being
that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political
question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1)
"truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court
has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political
following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have
normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court
declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction
to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate
that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no
means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-
justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may
be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts
to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112 (Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens
the conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is
radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our
courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4),
Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
 The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this
Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this
Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of
these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find
no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or
even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a

governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission
on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question
and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a
decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court
invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due
process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such
a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must
have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118[Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is
the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of
this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of
adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the
second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a
legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise
be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of
the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this
Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is
too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the
resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law
touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be
broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further
strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition
which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been
enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of
the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right
rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the
original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second
impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of
the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-
mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a
"Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of
Endorsement which states that:
 "We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned
Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said
second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in
the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at
least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this
requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared
and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the
Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4),
Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and
verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a
resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member
whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the
scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations
militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is
the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this
issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional
ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught
the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other
petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the
instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in
the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own.
Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the
very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting
as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again,
this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion
for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are
subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral
compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of
Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction
be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise,
this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More
than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant
petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is
a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a
dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot
inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do
so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has
acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as
always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has
laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon
the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit
to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a
moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the
case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent
Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof
from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were
interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's
membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them
to decide the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting
in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same
objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other
court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation
of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from
discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in
the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution
could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all
 Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such
possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the
last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme
or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to
the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply
place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members
of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or
biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely
saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally
function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its
Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is
nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the
fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that
judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is
the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is
equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of
judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would
leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of
judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of
limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary
proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort,
and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative
act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.
This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest
court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are
frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state
ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is
more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property
right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official
duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a
suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was
not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who
has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided
(citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial
review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

 4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility
that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the
Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or
conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating
and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of
Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging
that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of
its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor
General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as
settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the
judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify
an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way
or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-
validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not
enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing
constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law
regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the
government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches
of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and
anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v.
Veneracion, to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers],
under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond
boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then
law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers]
are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor,"
resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and
17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our
present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is
clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can,
as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1)
by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar
prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been
violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices
had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act
on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory
construction is, therefore, in order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz
Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of
"initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during
the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at
which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint,
dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to

commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice
Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the
instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts

consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of
impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to
the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of
the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco
and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee
votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but
rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but
by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the
law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive
provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think,
these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on
impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body.
This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the
First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers
several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the
Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal
referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the
approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of
record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on
the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with
the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee
resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears
that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of
the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the
Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to
the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably
the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very
technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on
the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has
already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3
(3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the
exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States
regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on
page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
impeachment proceedings"and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read:
"A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override
its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on
line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of
the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the
 substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in
the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the
Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In
his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the
phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section
3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment
proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already
initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who
was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article
XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an
action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate,"
appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in
the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must
be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-
third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
"exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium,
means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle,
and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there
is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a
private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or
uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution
must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same
complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one
third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at
this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning
of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the
House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to
that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not
its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding
but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present
Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By
his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to
initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both
ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning
into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to
the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House
of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give
the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v.
Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were
delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our
deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and
proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the
Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent
spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives
and disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only
two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice
Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for
obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by
members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and
proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment.
Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its
rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence,
these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on
its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override
its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of
all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress
to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its
members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later
Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United
States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other
than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De
Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for
this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations
that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case
of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was
even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for
courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if
we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of
judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the
issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of
its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that
day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted
by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the
members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to
do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to
the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to
for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their
own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom
or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the
question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of
the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one
has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised
by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of
any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the
Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint;
(2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship
with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically
reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts
in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and
the Legislative departments of government.155

xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power
which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution
imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality
of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.156

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated
by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent
judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
 xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from
passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the
1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what
it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that
petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our
power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the
last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if
we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the
judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former
Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly
Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should
provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third
parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that
this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus,
the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard
to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier
enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by
at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they
give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the
center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair
for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be
an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a
dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on
the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to
air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the
academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the
official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability
upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted,
this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with
respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against
the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the
doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the
arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the
Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned.
To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite
conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an
issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the
fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which
only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-
cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem
that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to
pass upon that problem head on.

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment
has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the
main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed
the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming
jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political
questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the
other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about
ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to
protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that
of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been
entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected
by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations
could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it
not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking
magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him
but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution?
Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case
in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the
Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case,
which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which
recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its
agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government
branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than
the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to
numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice
is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief
Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of
every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this
impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no
other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in
government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in
our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a
democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and
aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23,
2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.

Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 180-182; Annex "H."

2Per Special Appearance with Manifestation of House Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
(Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 325-363) the pertinent House Resolution is HR No. 260, but no
copy of the same was submitted before this Court.

3 Id. at 329. Created through PD No. 1949 (July 18, 1984), the JDF was established "to help
ensure and guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution
and public policy and required by the impartial administration of justice" by creating a special
fund to augment the allowances of the members and personnel of the Judiciary and to
finance the acquisition, maintenance and repair of office equipment and facilities."

4 Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 120-139; Annex "E."

5 The initial complaint impleaded only Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, Josue N. Bellosillo,
Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio and Renato C. Corona, and was later amended to
include Justices Jose C. Vitug, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.

6 Supra note 4 at 123-124.

7 Rollo, G.R. No. 160403 at 48-53; Annex "A."

8
http://www.congress.gov.ph/search/bills/hist_show.php?bill_no=RPT9999

9 Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 8.

10 Rollo, G.R. No. 160295 at 11.

11 Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 43-84; Annex "B."

12 Supra note 2.

13A perusal of the attachments submitted by the various petitioners reveals the following
signatories to the second impeachment complaint and the accompanying
Resolution/Endorsement. 1. Gilbert Teodoro, Jr., NPC, Tarlac (principal complainant) 2. Felix
Fuentebella, NPC, Camarines Sur (second principal complainant) 3. Julio Ledesma, IV,
NPC, Negros Occidental 4. Henry Lanot, NPC, Lone District of Pasig City 5. Kim Bernardo-
Lokin, Party List-CIBAC 6. Marcelino Libanan, NPC, Lone District of Eastern Samar,
(Chairman, House Committee on Justice) 7. Emmylou Talino-Santos, Independent, 1st
District, North Cotobato 8. Douglas RA. Cagas, NPC, 1st District, Davao del Sur 9. Sherwin
Gatchalian, NPC, 1st District, Valenzuela City 10. Luis Bersamin, Jr., PDSP-PPC, Lone
District of Abra 11. Nerissa Soon-Ruiz Alayon, 6th District, Cebu 12. Ernesto Nieva, Lakas,
1st District, Manila 13. Edgar R. Erice, Lakas, 2nd District, Kalookan City 14. Ismael Mathay
III, Independent, 2nd District, Quezon City 15. Samuel Dangwa, Reporma, Lone District of
Benguet 16. Alfredo Marañon, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, Negros Occidental 17. Cecilia Jalosjos-
Carreon, Reporma, 1st District, Zamboanga del Norte 18. Agapito A. Aquino, LDP, 2nd
District, Makati City 19. Fausto L. Seachon, Jr., NPC, 3rd District, Masbate 20. Georgilu
Yumul-Hermida, Pwersa ng Masa, 4th District, Quezon 21. Jose Carlos Lacson, Lakas, 3rd
District, Negros Occidental 22. Manuel C. Ortega, NPC, 1st District, La Union 23. Uliran
Joaquin, NPC, 1st District, Laguna 24. Soraya C. Jaafar, Lakas, Lone District of Tawi-Tawi
25. Wilhelmino Sy-Alvarado, Lakas, 1st District, Bulacan 26. Claude P. Bautista, NPC, 2nd
District, Davao Del Sur 27. Del De Guzman, Lakas, Lone District of Marikina City 28.
Zeneida Cruz-Ducut, NPC, 2nd District, Pampanga 29. Augusto Baculio, Independent-LDP,
2nd District, Misamis Oriental 30. Faustino Dy III, NPC-Lakas, 3rd District, Isabela 31.
Agusto Boboy Syjuco, Lakas, 2nd District, Iloilo 32. Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon, LDP, Lone
District of Muntinlupa City 33. Leovigildo B. Banaag, NPC-Lakas, 1st District, Agusan del
Norte 34. Eric Singson, LP, 2nd District, Ilocos Sur 35. Jacinto Paras, Lakas, 1st District,
Negros Oriental 36. Jose Solis, Independent, 2nd District, Sorsogon 37. Renato B. Magtubo,
Party List-Partido ng Manggagawa 38. Herminio G. Teves, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros
Oriental 39. Amado T. Espino, Jr., Lakas, 2nd District, Pangasinan 40. Emilio Macias, NPC,
2nd District, Negros Oriental 41. Arthur Y. Pingoy, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, South Cotobato 42.
Francis Nepomuceno, NPC, 1st District, Pampanga 43. Conrado M. Estrella III, NPC, 6th
District, Pangasinan 44. Elias Bulut, Jr., NPC, Lone District of Apayao 45. Jurdin Jesus M.
Romualdo, NPC, Lone District of Camiguin 46. Juan Pablo Bondoc, NPC, 4th District,
Pampanga 47. Generoso DC. Tulagan, NPC, 3rd District, Pangasinan 48. Perpetuo Ylagan,
Lakas, Lone District of Romblon 49. Michael Duavit, NPC, 1st District, Rizal 50. Joseph Ace
H. Durano, NPC, 5th District, Cebu 51. Jesli Lapus, NPC, 3rd District, Tarlac 52. Carlos Q.
Cojuangco, NPC, 4th District, Negros Occidental 53. Georgidi B. Aggabao, NPC, 4th District,
Santiago, Isabela 54. Francis Escudero, NPC, 1st District, Sorsogon 55. Rene M. Velarde,
Party List-Buhay 56. Celso L. Lobregat, LDP, Lone District of Zamboanga City 57. Alipio
Cirilo V. Badelles, NPC, 1st District, Lanao del Norte 58. Didagen P. Dilangalen, Pwersa ng
Masa, Lone District of Maguindanao 59. Abraham B. Mitra, LDP, 2nd District, Palawan 60.
Joseph Santiago, NPC, Lone District of Catanduanes 61. Darlene Antonino-Custodio, NPC,
1st District of South Cotobato & General Santos City 62. Aleta C. Suarez, LP, 3rd District,
Quezon 63. Rodolfo G. Plaza, NPC, Lone District of Agusan del Sur 64. JV Bautista, Party
List-Sanlakas 65. Gregorio Ipong, NPC, 2nd District, North Cotabato 66. Gilbert C. Remulla,
LDP, 2nd District, Cavite 67. Rolex T. Suplico, LDP, 5th District, Iloilo 68. Celia Layus, NPC,
Cagayan 69. Juan Miguel Zubiri, Lakas, 3rd District, Bukidnon 70. Benasing Macarambon
Jr,. NPC, 2nd District, Lanao del Sur 71. Josefina Joson, NPC, Lone District of Nueva Ecija
72. Mark Cojuangco, NPC, 5th District, Pangasinan 73. Mauricio Domogan, Lakas, Lone
District of Baguio City 74. Ronaldo B. Zamora, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of San Juan
75. Angelo O. Montilla, NPC, Lone District of Sultan Kudarat 76. Roseller L. Barinaga, NPC,
2nd District, Zamboanga del Norte 77. Jesnar R. Falcon, NPC, 2nd District, Surigao del Sur
78. Ruy Elias Lopez, NPC, 3rd District, Davao City.

14Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 5. Petitioner had previously filed two separate impeachment
complaints before the House of Representatives against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.

15299 SCRA 744 (1998). In Chavez v. PCGG, petitioner Chavez argued that as a taxpayer
and a citizen, he had the legal personality to file a petition demanding that the PCGG make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to the PCGG's task of recovering
the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner Chavez further argued that the matter of
recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to
the public. The Supreme Court, citing Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987) and Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 264
(1989) ruled that petitioner had standing. The Court, however, went on to elaborate that in
any event, the question on the standing of petitioner Chavez was rendered moot by the
intervention of the Jopsons who are among the legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth.

16384 SCRA 152 (2002). In Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,
wherein the petition sought to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts
on its then on-going negotiations with Amari Coastal Development Corporation to reclaim
portions of Manila Bay, the Supreme Court said that petitioner Chavez had the standing to
bring a taxpayer's suit because the petition sought to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties.

17 224 SCRA 792 (1993).

18Subsequent petitions were filed before this Court seeking similar relief. Other than the
petitions, this Court also received Motions for Intervention from among others, Sen. Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., and Special Appearances by House Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr., and
Senate President Franklin Drilon.

19 Supra note 2 at 10.

Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Former Constitutional Commissioners Justice Regalado E.

20

Maambong and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Former
Minister of Justice and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Deans Pacifico Agabin and
Raul C. Pangalangan, and Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga,.

21 Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 275-292.

22 Id. at 292.

23 63 Phil 139 (1936).

24 Id. at 157-159.

Vide Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924); Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051 (1957);
25

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, 665 (1987).

26 Const., art. VIII, sec. 1.

27 5 US 137 (1803).

28 Id. at 180.

29 In In re Prautch, 1 Phil 132 (1902), this Court held that a statute allowing for imprisonment
for non-payment of a debt was invalid. In Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil 125 (1907), this Court
invalidated a statute imposing a tax on mining claims on the ground that a government grant
stipulating that the payment of certain taxes by the grantee would be in lieu of other taxes
was a contractual obligation which could not be impaired by subsequent legislation.
In Concepcion v. Paredes, 42 Phil 599 (1921), Section 148 (2) of the Administrative Code, as
amended, which provided that judges of the first instance with the same salaries would, by
lot, exchange judicial districts every five years, was declared invalid for being a usurpation of
the power of appointment vested in the Governor General. In McDaniel v. Apacible, 42 Phil
749 (1922), Act No. 2932, in so far as it declares open to lease lands containing petroleum
which have been validly located and held, was declared invalid for being a depravation of
property without due process of law. In U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922), Act No. 2868,
in so far as it authorized the Governor-General to fix the price of rice by proclamation and to
make the sale of rice in violation of such a proclamation a crime, was declared an invalid
delegation of legislative power.

30 Vicente V. Mendoza, Sharing The Passion and Action of our Time 62-53 (2003).

31 Supra note 23.

32 Id. at 156-157.

Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects Of The Process
33

Of Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37 AMJJUR 17, 24 (1992).

34 Ibid.

35 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 434-436 (1986).

36 31 SCRA 413 (1970)

Id. at 422-423; Vide Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770 (1988); Luz Farms v.
37

Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990); Ordillo v.

Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).

38 194 SCRA 317 (1991).

39 Id. at 325 citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 US 581.

40 152 SCRA 284 (1987).

41Id. at 291 citing Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259 (1938), J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc v. Land Tenure Administration, supra note 36, and I Tañada and Fernando, Constitution
of the Philippines 21 ( Fourth Ed. ).

42 82 Phil 771 (1949).

43 Id. at 775.

44 Supra note 38.

45 Id. at 330-331.

46Id. at 337-338 citing 16 CJS 2.31; Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220
and Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203, SW 2d, 734, 356 Mo. 808.
47 Supra note 2.

48 Citing Section 3 (6), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

49 Supra note 21.

50 506 U.S. 224 (1993).

Supra note 2 at 349-350 citing Gerhardt, Michael J. The Federal Impeachment Process: A
51

Constitutional and Historical Analysis, 1996, p. 119.

52 227 SCRA 100 (1993).

53 Id. at 112.

54US Constititon. Section 2. x x x The House of Representatives shall have the sole Power
of Impeachment.

551987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 (1). The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

56Supra note 2 at 355 citing Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy,
1984, pp. 112-113.

57 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

58 141 SCRA 263 (1986).

59 Supra note 25.

60 298 SCRA 756 (1998).

61 272 SCRA 18 (1997).

62 201 SCRA 792 (1991).

63 187 SCRA 377 (1990).

64 180 SCRA 496 (1989).

65 Supra note 25.

66 Supra note 23.

67 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38 at 330-331.

68 Id. at 158-159.

69IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) citing Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993); House
International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA
703 (1987); Baker v. Carr, supra note 57.

70 Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130 (1995).

71 Citing Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997).

72Citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, 163 SCRA 371, 378
(1988).

73Rule 3, Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.

74 JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 143, 152 (2000).

75 246 SCRA 540 (1995).

76 Id. at 562-564.

77
Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003 citing BAYAN v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449,
562-563 (2000) and Baker v. Carr, supra note 57; Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733
(2000); TELEBAP v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998).

78 Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 15.

79Del Mar v. PAGCOR 346 SCRA 485, 501 (2000) citing Kilosbayan, Inc., et.al. v. Morato,
supra note 70; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA
333 (1976); Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966); Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, 110 Phil 331 (1960); Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Iloilo Palay &
Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).

80BAYAN v. Zamora, supra note 77 citing Bugnay v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240, 251-252
(1989); Vide Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79; Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note
77; TELEBAP v. COMELEC, supra note 77; Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70; Joya
v. PCGG, supra note 69; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC,
supra note 79; Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79; Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra note
79; Philconsa v. Gimenez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v.
Feliciano, supra note 79; Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works, supra note 79.

81Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77 citing Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad
v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972).
82Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436 (1995); Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 at
140-141 citing Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA
659 (1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA
702 (1971).

83 Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79 at 502-503 citing Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79.

84Chinese Flour Importers Association v. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil 439, 461
(1951) citing Gallego et al. vs. Kapisanan Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa, 46 Off. Gaz,
4245.

Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez, supra note 79 citing Gonzales v.

85

Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963); Pascual v. Secretary, supra note 79.

86 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).

87MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, G.R. No. 135306,
January 28, 2003, citing Industrial Generating Co. v. Jenkins 410 SW 2d 658; Los Angeles
County Winans, 109 P 640; Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62.

88Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559, 570-571 (1974), citing
Moore's Federal Practice 2d ed., Vol. III, pages 3423-3424; 4 Federal Rules Service, pages
454-455; Johnson, et al., vs. Riverland Levee Dist., et al., 117 2d 711, 715; Borlasa v.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348 (1925).

89MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, supra note 87,
dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio; Bulig-bulig Kita Kamag-Anak Assoc. v. Sulpicio
Lines, 173 SCRA 514, 514-515 (1989); Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of Doña
Paz, 159 SCRA 623, 627 (1988) citing Moore, Federal Practice, 2d ed., Vol. 3B, 23-257, 23-
258; Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (1996), citing Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of
Court; Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., supra note 88; Oposa v. Factoran,
supra note 17.

90 Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).

91Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, supra note 38; Philconsa v. Giménez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association v. Feliciano, supra note 79; Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949);
vide Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997); Santiago v.
COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); KMU v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994); Joya v.
PCGG, 225 SCRA 368 (1993); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290
(1992); Osmeña v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52
(1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Daza v. Singson, supra note
64; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79.

92Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522, 531 (1999) citing Gibson vs.
Revilla, 92 SCRA 219; Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266, 271
(1989).

93 Supra note 79.

94 Id. at 403.

95 Supra note 81.

96 Id. at 681.

97 SECTION 3. x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.

98 Supra note 25.

99 Id. at 1067.

100Vide Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905); Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882

(1952); De la Llana v. COMELEC, 80 SCRA 525 (1977).

101Vide Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949); Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1

(1961); Cunanan v. Tan, Jr.,5 SCRA 1 (1962); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774
(1967); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971); Tolentino v. COMELEC, supra note 82.

102 50 SCRA 30 (1973).

103 Record of the Constitution Commission, Vol. 1, July 10, 1986 at 434-436.

104 Id. at 439-443.

105 177 SCRA 668 (1989).

106 Id. at 695.

107 203 SCRA 767 (1991).

108 Id. at 776 citing Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, 463 (1990).

109 Supra note 64.

110 Id. at 501.

111 Supra note 57.

112 Id. at 217.

113 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 286.

114 Id. at 278, 316, 272, 283-284, 286.

115 76 Phil 516 (1946).

116 Id. at 522.

117 Supra note 37.

Id. at 58 citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of

118

Agrarian Reform,175 SCRA 343 (1989).

Vide concurring opinion of Justice Vicente Mendoza in Estrada v.Desierto, 353 SCRA
119

452, 550 (2001); Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208, 210-211 (1987) citing Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).

120As adverted to earlier, neither a copy the Resolution nor a record of the hearings
conducted by the House Committee on Justice pursuant to said Resolution was submitted to
the Court by any of the parties.

121 Rollo, G.R. No. 160310 at 38.

122 Supra note 107.

123 Id. at 777 (citations omitted).

124 Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 73.

125 Supra note 2 at 342.

126 Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil 552, 553 (1950).

127Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108, 155-156 (2001); Vide Abbas v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651 (1988); Vargas v. Rilloraza, et al., 80 Phil. 297, 315-316
(1948); Planas v. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105 (1973), concurring opinion of J. Concepcion.

128 Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 705 (1993).

129 Ibid.

130 Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462, 477 (1986).

131 Supra note 127.

132 Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 127.

133Id. at 155-156 citing Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra note 127; Vargas v.
Rilloraza, et al., supra note 127.

134 Supra note 119 at 210-211.

135 Supra note 119.

Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 103 (1996); Joya v. PCGG, supra note 69 at
136

575; Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 242 (1993); Santos III v.
Northwestern Airlines, 210 SCRA 256, 261-262 (1992), National Economic Protectionism
Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657, 665 (1989).

137 Supra note 2 at 353.

138 Supra note 33 at 32.

139 Supra note 102.

140 Supra note 33.

141 249 SCRA 244, 251 (1995).

142 Id. at 251.

143 2 Records of the Constitutional Commission at 342-416.

144 Id. at 416.

145 Commissioner Maambong's Amicus Curiae Brief at 15.

146 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 375-376, 416

147 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

148 Justice Hugo Guiterrez's Amicus Curiae Brief at 7.

149 109 Phil. 863 (1960).

150 40 SCRA 58, 68 (1971).

151 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932).

152 277 SCRA 268, 286 (1997).

153 144 U.S. 1 (1862).

154 Supra note 152 at 304-306.

155 Id. at 311.

 156 Id. at 313.

157 Supra note 152 at 314-315.

158 Supra note 50.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.

Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates Law Office for petitioner.

Efren A. Santos for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse the
decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 entitled "Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora,
Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez".

The relevant facts of the case are as follows:

On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-
Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon
City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.

Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to
"M".

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June
1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence.

A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.

A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in
evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which is the subject of the present
petition, which in part reads:

It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic reasons:

(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof
can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are
presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth
and fairness and the even handed administration of justice.

(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in

admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory;
neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be
questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special
civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be
anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not
by certiorari.Otherwise, we will have the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a
counterproductive "ping-pong" to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court
is perceived to have made an error in any of its rulings with respect to evidentiary
matters in the course of trial. This we cannot sanction.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is hereby

DISMISSED. 1

From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review, stating:

Grounds for Allowance of the Petition

10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no basis in law nor previous
decision of the Supreme Court.

10.1 In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court

of Appeals has decided a question of substance not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court as the question of admissibility in
evidence of tape recordings has not, thus far, been addressed and
decided squarely by the Supreme Court.

11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has
likewise rendered a decision in a way not in accord with law and with applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court.

11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory in nature, the

same can still be [the] subject of a petition for certiorari. 2
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.

The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a
trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment,
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress. 3

In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by
private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with
unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent
allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. 4

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,

substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.

Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions
of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both
parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the
subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2 thereof
imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for
violation of said Act. 5

We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability of
American jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are
inadmissible in evidence under Philippine law.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

* Penned by Justice Emeterio C. Cui with Justices Jainal D. Rasul and Alfredo G.
Lagamon concurring.

1 Rollo, pp. 24-25.

2 Rollo, p. 11.

3 Marcelo v. de Guzman, G. R. No. L-29077, 29 June 1982, 114 SCRA 657.

4 TSN, 9 December 1992, p. 4.

5 "Sec. 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or
cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or
who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder,
or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the
offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the
offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings."

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

CHURCHILLE V. MARI and the G.R. No. 187728

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Present:
Petitioners, VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* JJ.
HON. ROLANDO L. GONZALES,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Promulgated:
Court, Branch 39, Sogod, Southern
Leyte, and PO1 RUDYARD September 12, 2011
PALOMA y TORRES,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte
(RTC), dated January 16, 2009, dismissing the criminal case for rape against PO1
Rudyard Paloma y Torres (private respondent), and the Resolution[2] dated March
16, 2009, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be annulled and set
aside.

The records reveal the following antecedent facts.

On October 25, 2004, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, executed a

sworn statement before an Investigator of the 8th Regional Office, Philippine
National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) in
Tacloban City, where she stated that she was raped by herein private respondent on
October 10, 2004 at her boarding house at Sogod, Southern Leyte. A preliminary
investigation of the case was commenced on November 4, 2004 before the
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sogod. A warrant
of arrest was issued against private respondent, so he voluntarily surrendered to the
Chief of Police of Sogod on November 18, 2004 and was then incarcerated at the
Sogod Municipal Jail.

On November 20, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion for Bail. Hearings on
the motion commenced on December 7, 2004, but petitioner failed to appear.Only
private respondent presented evidence. Thus, on March 16, 2005, the MCTC of
Sogod issued an Order allowing private respondent to post bail set
at P200,000.00. After posting a surety bond, private respondent was released from
confinement.

Pursuant to the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26, divesting first-level courts of

authority to conduct preliminary investigation of criminal complaints cognizable
by Regional Trial Courts, records of the subject case were transmitted to the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Southern Leyte.[3] The Prosecutor's Office issued
a Resolution dated May 26, 2008, finding probable cause against private
respondent and, accordingly, an Information for Rape was filed on June 11,
2008. A warrant of arrest was immediately issued against private respondent.

On June 27, 2008, private respondent was committed to detention [4] and, on June
30, 2008, the RTC issued an Order[5] stating that accused had voluntarily
surrendered to the Office of the Clerk of Court and arraignment was set for July
31, 2008. In the meantime, on July 3, 2008, private respondent filed a Motion to
Admit Cash Bond in Lieu of Surety Bond; thus, in an Order dated July 10, 2008,
the RTC cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule for arraignment and reset the
arraignment and hearing on said motion for August 20, 2008. At said scheduled
date for arraignment and hearing on the motion, nobody appeared for the
prosecution. Hence, the RTC issued the Order[6] dated August 20, 2008 resetting
the arraignment for October 31, 2008 and stating that:

x x x this Court hereby orders the public prosecutor x x x and/or his assistant
prosecutor x x x to appear and prosecute this case on the next scheduled hearing
from arraignment up to the termination of the trial of this case otherwise this
Court will order the dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute or nolle
prosequi.[7]

On October 28, 2008, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, filed through
her private counsel, a Motion for Cancellation of Hearing,[8] manifesting that Atty.
Pedro Felicen, Jr. had been granted the authority to prosecute by the Provincial
Prosecutor and praying that the scheduled arraignment on October 31, 2008 be
cancelled due to the pendency of private complainant's petition for transfer of
venue before this Court. The authorized private prosecutor did not appear on said
hearing date. The hearing on October 31, 2008 proceeded as the RTC ruled, in its
Order[9] issued on the same day, that unless restrained by a higher court, the mere
pendency of a petition for transfer of venue is not sufficient reason to suspend the
proceedings. Moreover, counsel for accused invoked the accused's right to a
speedy trial and, thus, private respondent was arraigned in the presence of the
Provincial Prosecutor who was designated by the RTC to represent the prosecution
for the purpose of arraignment. Pre-trial was set for November 13,
2008. Nevertheless, said schedule for pre-trial was cancelled (per Order[10]dated
November 4, 2008) as the Presiding Judge of the RTC had to attend a PHILJA
Seminar, and pre-trial was reset to November 24, 2008. On November 24, 2008,
the day of the pre-trial itself, the private prosecutor again filed a Motion for
Cancellation of Hearing, again using as justification the pendency of the petition
for transfer of venue. The RTC issued an Order on even date, reading as follows:

During the scheduled pre-trial conference of this case, the public prosecutors of
Leyte, the private prosecutor and the private complainant failed to appear despite
proper notices sent [to] them. A motion for cancellation of hearing was filed by
the authorized private prosecutor, Pedro Felicen, Jr. for reasons stated therein to
which this Court finds to be not meritorious, hence, the same is denied. x x x the
public prosecutor as well as the counsel for the accused were directed to make
their oral comments on the first endorsement of the Hon. Deputy Court
Administrator, regarding the motion to transfer venue of this case to any of the
RTC, at Tacloban City, x x x.

x x x Thereafter, the pre trial proceeded by discussing matters concerning the

amicable settlement, plea bargaining agreement, stipulation of facts, pre-marking
of documentary exhibits, number of witnesses, trial dates and nature of the
defense. There being no other matters to discuss on pre-trial in order to expedite
the early disposition of this case, the pre-trial proper is now deemed
terminated.[11]

The said Order also scheduled the initial hearing for trial on the merits for
December 12, 2008. On December 12, 2008, no one appeared for the prosecution,
prompting counsel for accused private respondent to move for dismissal of the case
on the ground of failure to prosecute. Private respondent's motion to dismiss was
denied per Order[12] dated December 12, 2008, and hearing was reset to January 16,
2009.

Again, on the very day of the January 16, 2009 hearing, the private prosecutor filed
an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, stating that it
was only on January 14, 2009 that he was furnished a copy of the notice of the
January 16, 2009 hearing and he had to attend a previously scheduled hearing for
another case he was handling, set for the very same date. Thus, in the Order dated
January 16, 2009, the RTC disposed, thus:

x x x Again notably absent are the private prosecutor, the two public prosecutors
designated by the Department of Justice to prosecute this case as well as the
private complainant herself.
A last minute urgent motion to reset was filed by the private prosecutor, but the
same is denied being in violation of the three (3) day rule in filing written
postponements.After hearing the arguments coming from both the public
prosecutor assigned to this Court and counsel for the defense, the Court deems it
proper to act on the urgency of the matter prayed for by the said
counsel. Considering that the accused has been languishing in jail since June,
2008 up to the present and to allow him to stay in jail for a single minute, it is
quite unreasonable and would violate his right to speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, finding the motion of the counsel for the accused to be based on
grounds that are meritorious, this Court pursuant to x x x the rule on speedy trial
(RA 8433) [should be 8493] hereby orders this case dismissed for failure of the
prosecution to prosecute or nolle prosequi.[13]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same per
Resolution dated March 16, 2009.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari, alleging that public respondent acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rashly
and precipitately dismissing the rape case against private respondent. Respondents
counter that there was no grave abuse committed by the trial court and setting aside
the dismissal of the rape case would put private respondent in double jeopardy.

The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.

Firstly, petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. In Garcia

v. Miro,[14] the Court, quoting Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,[15] ruled thus:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to

satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter
and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task
of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
 so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before
the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court
of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either
of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be
presented. This is, and should continue, to be the policy in this regard, a
policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)

On this point alone, the petition is already dismissible. However, on several

occasions, this Court found compelling reasons to relax the rule on observance on
hierarchy of courts. In Pacoy v. Cajigal,[17] the Court opted not to strictly apply
said doctrine, since the issue involved is double jeopardy, considered to be one of
the most fundamental constitutional rights of an accused. Hence, the Court also
finds sufficient reason to relax the rule in this case as it also involves the issue of
double jeopardy, necessitating a look into the merits of the petition.

Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the criminal case against private
respondent too hurriedly, despite the provision in Section 10 of the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8493), now incorporated in Section 3, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in

computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the accused, including but not limited to the
following:

xxxx

(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating

to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

x x x x[18]

A careful reading of the above rule would show that the only delays that may be
excluded from the time limit within which trial must commence are those resulting
from proceedings concerning the accused. The time involved in the proceedings
in a petition for transfer of venue can only be excluded from said time limit if it
was the accused who instituted the same. Hence, in this case, the time during
which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private complainant is pending,
cannot be excluded from the time limit of thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-
trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by Section 1, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court had, in fact, already been breached. The private prosecutor received
the Pre-trial Order[19] dated November 24, 2008 on December 3, 2008, while the
Provincial Prosecutor received the same on December 2, 2008.[20] This means that
at the latest, trial should have commenced by January 2, 2009, or if said date was a
Sunday or holiday, then on the very next business day. Yet, because of the
prosecution's failure to appear at the December 12, 2008 hearing for the initial
presentation of the prosecution's evidence, the RTC was constrained to reset the
hearing to January 16, 2009, which is already beyond the 30-day time
limit. Nevertheless, the prosecution again failed to appear at the January 16, 2009
hearing. Indeed, as aptly observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant
behavior by obstinately refusing to comply with the RTC's directives to commence
presentation of their evidence. Petitioners did not even show proper courtesy to the
court, by filing motions for cancellation of the hearings on the very day of the
hearing and not even bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing on their
motion. As set forth in the narration of facts above, the prosecution appeared to be
intentionally delaying and trifling with court processes.

Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that mere pendency of

their petition for transfer of venue should interrupt proceedings before the trial
court.Such situation is akin to having a pending petition for certiorari with the
higher courts. In People v. Hernandez,[21] the Court held that delay resulting from
extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders must be read in harmony with
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the [p]etition [under
Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against
the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.[22] The trial court
was then correct and acting well within its discretion when it refused to grant
petitioners' motions for postponement mainly because of the pendency of their
petition for transfer of venue.
The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the
prosecution of the case. The Court's ruling in Tan v. People[23] is quite instructive,
to wit:

An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is

guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14 (2) of Article III of the Constitution.
This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent
person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the
right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice
denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes,
much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed
the right to a speedy trial.

Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act
No. 8493, otherwise known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, with
Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of
trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court
implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has
been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule
119.

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court had occasion to state -

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy

disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in
the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed
with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to
a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has
been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification.
The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient

is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely
said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to
be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends
upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not
 preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind
that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the
Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give
meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the

accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial
cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right

to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four
factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for
the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d)
prejudice to the defendant. x x x.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification

of the State for such delay. Different weights

should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by

the State. x x x.

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to speedy

trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was
deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following:
(a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or
failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.

xxxx

We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,

courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and
particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case.[24]

Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of
his liberty on two occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before the
MCTC, when he was incarcerated from November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or
a period of almost four months; then again, when an Information had already been
issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned beginning June
27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period of over 6
months. Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of
time is quite oppressive. Because of private respondent's continued incarceration,
any delay in trying the case would cause him great prejudice. Thus, it was
absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal case to
await the outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer of venue, especially in this
case where there is no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
issued by a higher court against herein public respondent from further proceeding
in the case.

Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial
court in dismissing the case against private respondent for violation of his
constitutional right to speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
 Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.
[1]
Penned by Rolando L. Gonzales, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 39, Sogod, Southern Leyte; rollo, pp. 80-81.
[2]
Id. at 88-93
[3]
MCTC records, pp. 378-379.
[4]
RTC records, p. 25.
[5]
Id. at 26.
[6]
Id. at 91-92.
[7]
Id. at 92.
[8]
Id. at 193-195.
[9]
Id. at 199-200.
[10]
Id. at 206.
[11]
Id. at 218.
[12]
Id. at 260-261.
[13]
Id. at 273-274.
[14]
G.R. No. 167409, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 127.
[15]
G.R. No. L-74766, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 753.
[16]
Garcia v. Miro, supra note 14, at 131-132.
[17]
G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 338.
[18]
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
[19]
RTC records, pp. 223-225.
[20]
See Registry Receipts, RTC records, attached to the dorsal portion of p. 225.
[21]
G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 688.
[22]
Id. at 713.
[23]
G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 139.
[24]
Id. at 151-155. (Emphasis supplied).
SECOND DIVISION

CAPT. WILFREDO G. ROQUERO, G.R. No. 181851

Petitioner,

Present:
 - versus - CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
THE CHANCELLOR OF UP-
MANILA; THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL (ADT)
OF UP-MANILA; ATTY. ZALDY B.
DOCENA; EDEN PERDIDO;
ISABELLA LARA, IN THEIR
CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN and Promulgated:
MEMBERS OF THE ADT; and
IMELDA O. ABUTAL,
Respondents. March 9, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the
Decision[1] dated 22 March 2007, and the Resolution[2] dated 1 February 2008, of
the Court of the Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87776 entitled, Capt. Wilfredo G.
Roquero v. The Chancellor of the University of the Philippine-Manila (UP
Manila), et al., a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
which sought to reverse and set aside the Orders dated 8 June 2004 [3] and 9
November 2004[4] of the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of UP-
Manila, chaired by Atty. Zaldy B. Docena with Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara as
members.

The undisputed facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Petitioner Wildredo G. Roquero is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) Security Division as Special Police
Captain. Private respondent Imelda O. Abutal is a Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan
Security Agency who was applying for a position in the security force assigned at
UP-PGH.

The instant controversy arose from a complaint by private respondent Abutal with
then Chancellor of UP-Manila Perla D. Santos-Ocampo for Grave Misconduct
against petitioner Capt. Roquero. The formal charge filed on 1 October 1998 and
docketed as ADM Case No. UPM-AC 97-007 reads as follows:

After preliminary investigation duly conducted in accordance with

the Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty and
Employees, a prima facie case has been found to exist against you
for GRAVE MISCONDUCT punishable under the University
Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty and
Employees in relation to the Civil Service Law, committed as
follows:

That you, Capt. Wilfredo Roquero of the UP Manila Police

Force, sometime in April 1996, while conducting an
interview on MS. IMELDA ABUTAL who was then
applying for the position of Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan
Security Agency to be assigned at UP-PGH, proposed to
her that if she agreed to be your mistress, you would
facilitate her application and give her a permanent position;
that despite the fact the MS. ABUTAL rejected your
proposal, you still insisted on demanding said sexual favor
from her; that you, therefore, are liable for GRAVE
MISCONDUCT under Section 22, paragraph (c) of Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O.
292 on Civil Rules.

x x x x.

On 1 October 1998, the petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for
ninety (90) days by Chancellor Santos-Ocampo, the material portion of said Order
reads:

Considering the gravity of the offense charged and pursuant to

Section 19 of Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP
Faculty Members and Employees and Section 26 and 27 Rule XIV
of Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Omnibus Rules, you
are hereby preventively suspended for ninety (90) days effective
upon receipt hereof.
 While on preventive suspension, you are hereby required to appear
before the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) whenever
your presence is necessary.

Thereafter, the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) composed of Atty.

Zaldy B. Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, was organized to hear the
instant case.Atty. Paul A. Flor, as University Prosecutor, represented the
prosecution. He was later on replaced by Atty. Asteria Felicen. Petitioner was
represented by Atty. Leo G. Lee of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) who was
then replaced by Public Attorney Philger Inovejas.

The Prosecution presented its only witness, private respondent Abutal. After the
completion of the cross-examination on the prosecutions only witness, the
prosecution agreed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence on or before 16 July
1999.

xxxx

The prosecution, however, failed to submit its formal offer of evidence within the
period agreed upon.

Thereafter, on 10 August 1999, when the case was called, only petitioner and his
counsel appeared. Atty. Flor merely called by telephone and requested Atty.
Docena to reset the case to another date. Atty. Docena then ordered the resetting
of the hearing on the following dates: 11 August and 21 August 1999. On 11
August 1999, only petitioner and his counsel came. No representative from the
prosecution appeared before the ADT. Atty. Flor again called and asked for the
postponement of the hearing.By reason thereof, Atty. Docena issued an Order,
which reads as follows:

The continuation of the hearing of this case is hereby set

to September 29, 1999 at 2:00 p.m., with the understanding that if
and when the parties fail to appear at said hearing date, this case
shall be deemed submitted for resolution based on the evidences
already obtaining in the record of the case.

SO ORDERED.

11 August 1999.

On said date, the representative from the prosecution again failed to appear.

On 22 October 1999, petitioner filed a Motion through counsel praying that

complainant (private respondent herein) be declared to have waived her
rights to formally offer her exhibits since complainant was not able to file her
Formal Offer within the given period of fifteen (15) days from 1 July 1999 or
up to 16 July 1999.

The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years. Due to
the unreasonable delay, petitioner, on 19 May 2004 filed another Motion asking
for the dismissal of the administrative case against him. The Motion to Dismiss
was anchored on the following reasons: that the prosecution had not formally
offered its evidence; that the ADT had failed to act on the motion filed on 22
October 1999; that the unfounded charges in the administrative complaint were
filed just to harass him; and that he is entitled to a just and speedy disposition of
the case.

On 26 May 2004, the prosecution, represented by Atty. Felicen in view of the

resignation of Atty. Flor in August 1999, filed its Comment/Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss. The prosecution alleged that a Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits had been filed on 24 January 2004, of which a copy
thereof was received by Atty. Lee, petitioners counsel, on 30 January 2004, per
registry return receipt. However, petitioner has not filed his comment to the said
Formal Offer.

Furthermore, the prosecution explained in its Comment/Opposition that in view of

the resignation of Atty. Flor in August 1999 but who had been on leave by mid-
July 1999, the Formal Offer could not be prepared by another counsel until all the
transcript of stenographic notes have been furnished to the counsel that replaced
Atty. Flor.Meanwhile, the stenographer, Jamie Limbaga, had been in and out of
the hospital due to a serious illness, thus the delay in the filing of the prosecutors
Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits.

On 8 June 2004, Atty. Docena issued the assailed Order denying petitioners
motion to dismiss, to wit:

Acting on respondents Motion to Dismiss, as well as the

University Prosecutors Comment and/or Opposition to said
Motion, and finding that said Motion to Dismiss to be bereft of
merit, the same is hereby DENIED.

In view of the failure of the respondent to file his comment on the

Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence, the Exhibits (A to G-1) of
the Prosecution are hereby ADMITTED for the purpose for which
the same have been offered.

The respondent is hereby directed to present his evidence on June

22, 2004 at 10:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but the same was denied in
an Order dated 9 November 2004.[5]

Petitioner Captain Wilfredo Roquero then filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87776, alleging
therein that the ADT committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
motion to dismiss the administrative case filed against him.

In a Decision dated 22 March 2007, the Honorable Court of Appeals denied the
petition with prayer for TRO of Roquero reasoning that the ADT did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders.

The Court of Appeals ruled, thus:

The main issue to be resolved is whether the ADT gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the Order denying
petitioners motion to dismiss the administrative case filed against him.

We rule in the negative.

Petitioner argues that the administrative case against him should be dismissed
because of the failure of the prosecution to file its Formal Offer of Evidence
within the agreed period.

We do not agree.

The appropriate rule in this case is Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which provides, to wit:

When the presentation of evidence has been concluded, the parties

shall formally offer their evidence either orally or in writing and
thereafter objections thereto may also be made either orally or in
writing. After which, both parties may be given time to submit
their respective memorandum which in no case shall [be] beyond
five (5) days after the termination of the investigation. Failure to
submit the same within the given period shall be considered a
waiver thereof.

The failure to file a formal offer of evidence amounts to no more than a waiver of
the right to file the same. In administrative cases, particularly, where the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service applies, the absence of a
formal offer of evidence does not bar the adverse party from presenting its
evidence.

Section 3 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service

provides:

Administrative investigations shall be conducted without

necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.

While under the Rules of Court, a formal offer may be indispensable

because the rules on evidence so require it, the same is not true in administrative
cases. There is no provision in the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service akin to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, Section 27 of the Uniform Rules states that the failure to file
a formal offer of evidence amounts to a mere waiver thereof, and not a dismissal
of the action. As such, petitioner cannot claim a vested right to a dismissal of his
case below just because a formal offer was not filed within the agreed period.

In addition thereto, the Uniform Rules give the hearing officer a leeway
when it provided that x x x the hearing officer shall accept all evidence deemed
material and relevant to the case. In case of doubt, he shall allow the admission of
evidence subject to the objection interposed against its admission.

In the case at bar, records show that in fact, a formal offer of evidence was
filed by the prosecution, a copy of which was received by petitioners counsel. The
action of the ADT in admitting the prosecutions exhibits was consistent with the
above-mentioned Rules. Thus, the tribunal acted within the bounds of its
authority.

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise

of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.

To reiterate, the admission of the exhibits for the prosecution is in

accordance with Section 3, 27, and 28 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service. In admitting the exhibits for the prosecution, petitioner
was not denied the opportunity to present his evidence. In fact, he could have
presented his evidence as early as 11 August 1999 but he did not do so.

WHEREFORE, for utter lack of merit, the instant petition with prayer for
temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED.[6]
 Roquero moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was
likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution promulgated on 1
February 2008.

Roquero is now before us seeking the reversal of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
The core issue of this case is whether the failure of the ADT to resolve
Roqueros Motion (to declare complainant Imelda Abutal to have waived her right
to submit her Formal Offer of Exhibit) which he seasonably filed on 22 October
1999 and the assailed Order of the ADT dated 8 June 2004 admitting the Formal
Offer of Exhibit of complainant Imelda Abutal despite having filed after almost
five years violated the constitutional right of Roquero to a speedy disposition of
cases.

We find merit in the petition.

The Court of Appeals faulted petitioner for his failure to present his own
evidence which he could have done as early as 11 August 1999.[7] It must be noted,
however, that petitioners 22 October 1999 motion to declare complainant to have
waived her right to submit her Formal Offer of Exhibit remained unresolved. This
is reason enough for Roquero to defer presentation of his own evidence.

Indeed, while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil

Service states that the failure to submit the formal offer of evidence within the
given period shall be considered as waiver thereof, the ADT in fact allowed the
prosecution to present its formal offer almost five (5) years later or on 24 January
2004. Starting on that date, petitioner was presented with the choice to either
present his evidence or to, as he did, file a motion to dismiss owing to the
extraordinary length of time that ADT failed to rule on his motion.
We cannot accept the finding of the Court of Appeals that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the ADT because a formal offer of evidence was
filed by the prosecution, a copy of which was received by petitioners
counsel.[8] The admission by ADT on 8 June 2004 of the formal offer of exhibits
belatedly filed did not cure the 5-year delay in the resolution of petitioners 1999
motion to deem as waived such formal offer of evidence. Indeed, the delay of
almost five (5) years cannot be justified.

The prosecution tried to explain in its Comment/Opposition dated 26 May

2004, that the resignation of Atty. Paul Flor in August 1999, who had by then
already been on leave since mid-July 1999, contributed to the delay of the filing of
the formal offer and that the formal offer could not be prepared by another counsel
until all the transcripts of stenographic notes had been given to him. Also, it was
pointed out that the stenographer, Jaime Limbaga, had been in and out of the
hospital due to a serious illness.[9]

The ADT admitted this explanation of the prosecutor hook, line and sinker without
asking why it took him almost five (5) years to make that explanation. If the
excuses were true, the prosecution could have easily manifested with the ADT of
its predicament right after Roquero filed his motion to declare the waiver of the
formal offer. It is evident too that the prosecution failed to explain why it took
them so long a time to find a replacement for the original prosecutor. And, the
stenographer who had been in and out of the hospital due to serious illness should
have been replaced sooner.

While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict

adherence to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings,[10] the same however should not violate the constitutional right of
respondents to a speedy disposition of cases.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the

accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including
civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-
judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice.[11]
 The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable
is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as
the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a
speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[12]

Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right
has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:
(1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.[13]

Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the
violation of the right to a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear
for the following reasons: (1) the delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT
in resolving the motion of petitioner, which resolution petitioner reasonably found
necessary before he could present his defense; (2) the unreasonableness of the
delay; and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early disposition
which he did through a motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was
prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety
(90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the
accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution stage.

The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of

cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the
administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.[14] The
adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord
with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better
serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the
rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations
inutile.[15]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated 22 March 2007 and Resolution dated 1 February 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87776 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of the University of the Philippines-
Manila, Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, in their capacities
as Chairman and Members of the ADT respectively, are
hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the administrative case against Capt. Wilfredo G.
Roquero for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo Zearosa, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo F.
Sundiam concurring. Rollo, pp. 17-27.
[2]
Id. at 29-30.
[3]
CA rollo, p. 18.
[4]
Id. at 21.
[5]
Id. at 18-23.
[6]
Id. at 23-26.
[7]
Rollo, p. 26.
[8]
Id. at 25.
[9]
Id. at 22.
[10]
Section 3 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service.
[11]
Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, 417 Phil. 39, 49 (2001) citing Cadalin v. POEAs Administrator, G.R. No.
104776, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 721, 765.
[12]
Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, 1 October 1999, 316 SCRA 65, 95.
[13]
Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 929 (2001) citing Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101689, 17
March 1993, 220 SCRA 55, 63.
[14]
CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 2007 Ed., p. 295.
[15]
Matias v. Plan, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1159, 3 August 1998, 293 SCRA 532, 538-539.

EN BANC

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ G.R. No. 141524

FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,
LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO Present :
CABACUNGAN,
Petitioners, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS
OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO,
namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all
surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.
ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding
Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Respondents. Promulgated :
September 14, 2005
x-----------------------------------------x
 DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio

Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo
Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles

of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary

injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development,

Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of

Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and
Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners

and respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among
these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the
respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest
Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the
respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines,
respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by

public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing
motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare respondents
Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was
granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the
respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of
summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Banks motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only
after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of
del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there
were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.[1]

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the

order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial
court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare
allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial
proper.

In an order[2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court

dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had
already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order
of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on
March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1,
1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration[3] which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal[4] and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of

appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.[5] This was received
by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998.[6]

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal
of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had

seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998
since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and
they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.[7]

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed

the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to
the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under
the Rules. It held further:

Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for

the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such
legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and
executory.[8]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned
decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6,
2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules,

petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the
appellate court:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN
AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N.
ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL IN CIVIL
CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43,
ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD
PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN

RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE
RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS
APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED
THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND
FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE
APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN

RULING THAT THE WORDS FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3, RULE 41,
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE
[FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M.
MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND
FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS
RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22,
1998.
 IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING

THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148
SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY
IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED
PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.[9]

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within

which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often
leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[10] The period to appeal is
fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129,[11] as amended,
provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15)
days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the
notice of judgment appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within

fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
the notice of judgment or final order.
 The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new
trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days

from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment
that dismisses an action.[12]

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1,

1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed
as the final order, not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed
their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their
motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of

which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the
July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the
trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly
dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he
filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion
was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his
omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed
within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was
the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed
the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case

of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.[14] where we again considered the
order denying petitioner Apuyans motion for reconsideration as the
final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view

that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the
start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in
fact file their notice of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice

of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court.
On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998),
petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a
motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only
interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.[15] It ruled that
petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the
notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.
Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules
to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the order
dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there
that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period
to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in
similar cases,[16] premised on the long-settled doctrine that the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.[17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of
occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must become
final at some definite time fixed by law.[18]

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964

Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving

upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30)
days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal
bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set
 aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be
deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last
day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the
day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the
denial of said motion.[19] (emphasis supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously

consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period
to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization[20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d etrebehind the
amendment was to shorten the period of appeal[21] and enhance the
efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict
observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we
condoned late filing of notices of appeal,[22] and only in very
exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority

v. Municipality of Libmanan,[23] however, we declared that appeal is
an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure
should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised
the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the
right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule,

periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed
unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we
condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong
considerations of fairness and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due
course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful
of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the
Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with,
our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity
of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare
cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there
always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave
injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of
procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the
full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.[25]
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all
courts.[26] It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process,
and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals
to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,[27] 43[28] and
45,[29] the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These
extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to

afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. [30]

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40

governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies[31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.[32]The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22,
1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule
41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be
taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies.[33] Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that
the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we
already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the
motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section
39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15
days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15
days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is given another
opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or
rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with
dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the

confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted
from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of
notice of final order appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of

appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final
order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed
of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided
in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or
five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was
well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.[34]

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso

(Philippines), Inc. v. IAC[35] since the Court of Appeals never even
referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the

assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WECONCUR:
 HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Acting Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

[1]
Exh. B, Records, p. 37.
[2]
Exh. E, Records, p. 47.
[3]
Exh. G, Records, pp. 56-57.
[4]
Exh. H, Records, p. 58.
[5]
Exh. I, Records, pp. 61-62. The trial court received the notice of appeal dated July 27, 1998 on July 31, 1998.
According to the court, it was eight days late, counted from July 23, 1998, which was the last day to file the
notice since petitioners had one (1) day left to file it.
[6]
Exh. K, Records, pp. 67-69.
[7]
Rollo, p. 41.
[8]
Penned by Justice Roberto A. Barrios and concurred in by Justices Godardo O. Jacinto and Eriberto U. Rosario,
Jr. of the 16th Division.
[9]
Rollo, p. 12.
[10]
M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Zenaida Villanueva, G.R. No. 136477, November 10, 2004.
[11]
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
[12]
Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. (ITC) et al. v. Philippine Tourism Authority, et al., G.R. No. 135630, 26 September
2000, 341 SCRA 90.
[13]
G.R. No. 145911, July 7, 2004.
[14]
G.R. No. 129980, September 20, 2004.
[15]
Supra.
[16]
Bank of America v. Gerochi, G.R. No. 73210, 10 February 1994, 230 SCRA 9; Dayrit v. Philippine Bank of
Communications, 435 Phil. 120 (2002); Gallego v. Spouses Galang, G.R. No. 130228, July 27, 2004.
[17]
BPI Data Systems Corp. v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 324 Phil. 267 (1996).
[18]
Borre v. Court of Appeals, No. L-57204, 14 March 1988, 158 SCRA 561.
[19]
Appeals from the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and the Social Security Commission to the Court of
Appeals.
[20]
Created by virtue of Executive Order No. 611.
[21]
MR. MILLORA: Mr. Speaker, although I am a Member of the committee I have been granted permission to ask
questions about some unresolved matters and I would like to begin with the period of appeal.
Under Section 39, Mr. Speaker, the period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments or decisions
of any court in all cases shall be fifteen days. This is very good because it will shorten the period to appeal.
Under our rules today, the period to appeal is 30 days. x x x
(February 2, 1981, Record of the Batasan, Volume IV, p. 2004.)
[22]
Ramos v. Bagasao, No. L-51552, 28 February 1980, 96 SCRA 395; Republic v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31303-
04, 31 May 1978, 83 SCRA 453; Olacao v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 81390, 29
August 1989, 177 SCRA 38.
[23]
No. L-27197, 28 April 1980, 97 SCRA 138.
[24]
345 Phil. 678 (1997).
[25]
Allied Banking Corp. and Pacita Uy v. Spouses Eserjose, G.R. No 161776, October 22, 2004.
[26]
Article VIII, Section 5 (5), 1987 Constitution.
[27]
Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals.
[28]
Appeals from (the Court of Tax Appeals and) Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals. RA 9282
elevated the Court of Tax Appeals to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction.
[29]
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
[30]
Rule 22, Section 1. How to compute time ― In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included x x x. (1997
Rules of Civil Procedure)
[31]
Before the effectivity of RA 9282 (AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS [CTA], ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH
SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP) on March 30, 2004, decisions or
rulings of the CTA were appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. With the passage of the new law, Section 19 thereof provides that a party adversely affected by
a decision or ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure.
[32]
As far as Rule 65 (Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition) is concerned, Section 3 thereof, as
amended by SC Adm. Memo. No. 00-2-03, states that no extension of time shall be granted except for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.
[33]
Katindig v. People, 74 Phil. 45 (1942) as cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition (1995).
[34]
Rules of procedure may be applied retroactively to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 289 [2001] as cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction,
1995 Edition, p. 294)
[35]
No. L-75000, 27 February 1987,148 SCRA 280.

THIRD DIVISION

EDGARDO PINGA, G.R. No. 170354

Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
THE HEIRS OF GERMAN TINGA, and
SANTIAGO represented by VELASCO, JR. JJ.,
FERNANDO SANTIAGO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
June 30, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice and

procedure[1] necessarily carries the power to overturn judicial precedents on points
of remedial law through the amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the notable
changes introduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the explicit proviso that
if a complaint is dismissed due to fault of the plaintiff, such dismissal is without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or
in a separate action.[2] The innovation was instituted in spite of previous
jurisprudence holding that the fact of the dismissal of the complaint was sufficient
to justify the dismissal as well of the compulsory counterclaim.[3]

In granting this petition, the Court recognizes that the former jurisprudential
rule can no longer stand in light of Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The relevant facts are simple enough. Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was named as one
of two defendants in a complaint for injunction[4] filed with Branch 29 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)[5] of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, by respondent
Heirs of German Santiago, represented by Fernando Santiago. The
Complaint[6] dated 28 May 1998 alleged in essence that petitioner and co-
defendant Vicente Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the
respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut
trees therein. Respondents prayed that petitioner and Saavedra be enjoined from
committing acts of depredation on their properties, and ordered to pay damages.
In their Amended Answer with Counterclaim,[7] petitioner and his co-defendant
disputed respondents ownership of the properties in question, asserting that
petitioners father, Edmundo Pinga, from whom defendants derived their interest in
the properties, had been in possession thereof since the 1930s.[8] They alleged that
as far back as 1968, respondents had already been ordered ejected from the
properties after a complaint for forcible entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo
Pinga. It was further claimed that respondents application for free patent over the
properties was rejected by the Office of the President in 1971. Defendants in turn
prayed that owing to respondents forcible re-entry in the properties and the
irresponsible and reckless filing of the case, they be awarded various types of
damages instead in amounts totaling P2,100,000 plus costs of suit.[9]

By July of 2005, the trial of the case had not yet been completed. Moreover,
respondents, as plaintiffs, had failed to present their evidence. It appears that on 25
October 2004, the RTC already ordered the dismissal of the complaint after
respondents counsel had sought the postponement of the hearing scheduled
then.[10]However, the order of dismissal was subsequently reconsidered by the RTC
in an Order dated 9 June 2005, which took into account the assurance of
respondents counsel that he would give priority to that case.[11]

At the hearing of 27 July 2005, plaintiffs counsel on record failed to appear,

sending in his stead a representative who sought the postponement of the hearing.
Counsel for defendants (who include herein petitioner) opposed the move for
postponement and moved instead for the dismissal of the case. The RTC noted that
it was obvious that respondents had failed to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable length of time, in fact not having presented their evidence yet. On
that ground, the complaint was dismissed. At the same time, the RTC allowed
defendants to present their evidence ex-parte.[12]

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[13] of the order issued in

open court on 27 July 2005, opting however not to seek that their complaint be
reinstated, but praying instead that the entire action be dismissed and petitioner be
disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte. Respondents claimed that the order
of the RTC allowing petitioner to present evidence ex-parte was not in accord with
established jurisprudence. They cited cases, particularly City of Manila v.
Ruymann[14] and Domingo v. Santos,[15] which noted those instances in which a
counterclaim could not remain pending for independent adjudication.
On 9 August 2005, the RTC promulgated an order granting respondents
Motion for Reconsideration and dismissing the counterclaim, citing as the only
ground therefor that there is no opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration of the
[respondents].[16] Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the RTC in an Order dated 10 October 2005.[17] Notably, respondents
filed an Opposition to Defendants Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, wherein
they argued that the prevailing jurisprudential rule[18] is that compulsory
counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause of action,
and a conversu, the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
compulsory counterclaims.[19]

The matter was elevated to this Court directly by way of a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 on a pure question of law, the most relevant being whether
the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaim.

We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily
carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact,
the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to
prosecute the counterclaim.
On a prefatory note, the RTC, in dismissing the counterclaim, did not
expressly adopt respondents argument that the dismissal of their complaint
extended as well to the counterclaim. Instead, the RTC justified the dismissal of
the counterclaim on the ground that there is no opposition to [plaintiffs] Motion for
Reconsideration [seeking the dismissal of the counterclaim]. [20] This explanation is
hollow, considering that there is no mandatory rule requiring that an opposition be
filed to a motion for reconsideration without need for a court order to that effect;
and, as posited by petitioner, the failure to file an opposition to the Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration is definitely not one among the established grounds for
dismissal [of the counterclaim].[21] Still, the dismissal of the counterclaim by the
RTC betrays at very least a tacit recognition of respondents argument that the
counterclaim did not survive the dismissal of the complaint. At most, the dismissal
of the counterclaim over the objection of the defendant (herein petitioner) on
grounds other than the merits of the counterclaim, despite the provisions under
Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, constitutes a debatable question of
law, presently meriting justiciability through the instant action. Indeed, in
reviewing the assailed orders of the RTC, it is inevitable that the Court consider
whether the dismissal of the complaint, upon motion of the defendant, on the
ground of the failure to prosecute on plaintiffs part precipitates or carries with it
the dismissal of the pending counterclaims.

Our core discussion begins with Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which states:

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiable cause, the

plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on
the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of defendant or upon the court's own motion, without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or
in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon
the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

The express qualification in the provision that the dismissal of the complaint due to
the plaintiffs fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or separate action.
This stands in marked contrast to the provisions under Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules
of Court which were superseded by the 1997 amendments. In the 1964 Rules,
dismissals due to failure to prosecute were governed by Section 3, Rule 17, to wit:

SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or
to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the courts own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of
an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.

Evidently, the old rule was silent on the effect of such dismissal due to failure to
prosecute on the pending counterclaims. As a result, there arose what one authority
on remedial law characterized as the nagging question of whether or not the
dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim.[22] Jurisprudence construing the previous Rules was hardly silent on
the matter.

In their arguments before the RTC on the dismissal

of the counterclaim, respondents cited in support City of Manila v.

Ruymann,[23] Domingo v. Santos,[24] Belleza v. Huntington,[25] and Froilan v. Pan

Oriental Shipping Co.,[26] all of which were decided more than five decades ago.
Notably though, none of the complaints in these four cases were dismissed either
due to the fault of the plaintiff or upon the instance of the defendant.[27]

The distinction is relevant, for under the previous and current incarnations of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, it is Section 3, Rule 17 that governs the dismissals
due to the failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the complaint, as had happened in the
case at bar. Otherwise, it is Section 2, Rule 17, which then, and still is now,
covered dismissals ordered by the trial court upon the instance of the
plaintiff.[28] Yet, as will be seen in the foregoing discussion, a discussion of Section
2 cannot be avoided as the postulate behind that provision was eventually extended
as well in cases that should have properly been governed by Section 3.

Even though the cases cited by respondents involved different factual antecedents,
there exists more appropriate precedents which they could have cited in support of
their claim that the counterclaim should have been dismissed even if the dismissal
of the complaint was upon the defendants motion and was predicated on the
plaintiffs fault. BA Finance Corp. v. Co[29] particularly stands out in that
regard, although that ruling is itself grounded on other precedents as well.
Elucidation of these cases is in order.

On the general effect of the dismissal of a complaint, regardless of cause, on the

pending counterclaims, previous jurisprudence laid emphasis on whether the
counterclaim was compulsory or permissive in character. The necessity of such
distinction was provided in the 1964 Rules itself, particularly Section 2, Rule 17,
which stated that in instances wherein the plaintiff seeks the dismissal of the
complaint, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed
against the defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court.[30] The

vaunted commentaries of Chief Justice Moran, remarking on Section 2, Rule 17,

noted that [t]here are instances in which a counterclaim cannot remain pending for
independent adjudication, as, where it arises out of, or is necessarily connected
with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing
partys claim.[31]

This view expressed in Morans Commentaries was adopted by the Court in cases
where the application of Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court was called
for, such as in Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete,[32] and Dalman v. City Court of Dipolog
City.[33] The latter case warrants brief elaboration. Therein, the plaintiff in a civil
case for damages moved for the withdrawal of her own case on the ground that the
dispute had not been referred to the barangay council as required by law. Over the
objection of the defendant, who feared that her own counterclaim would be
prejudiced by the dismissal, plaintiffs motion was granted, the complaint and the
counterclaim accordingly dismissed by the trial court. The Court refused to
reinstate the counterclaim, opining without elaboration, [i]f the civil case is
dismissed, so also is the counterclaim filed therein.[34] The
broad nature of that statement gave rise to the notion that the mandatory

dismissal of the counterclaim upon dismissal of the complaint applied regardless of

the cause of the complaints dismissal.[35]

Notably, the qualification concerning compulsory counterclaims was provided in

Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules, the provision governing dismissals by order
of the court, and not Section 3, Rule 17. As stated earlier, Section 3, which covered
dismissals for failure to prosecute upon motion of the defendant or upon motu
proprio action of the trial court, was silent on the effect on the counterclaim of
dismissals of such nature.

Spouses Sta. Maria, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[36] decided in 1972, ostensibly

supplied the gap on the effect on the counterclaim of complaints dismissed under
Section 3. The defendants therein successfully moved before the trial court for the
dismissal of the complaint without prejudice and their declaration in default on the
counterclaim after plaintiffs therein failed to attend the pre-trial. After favorable
judgment was rendered on the counterclaim, plaintiffs interposed an appeal, citing
among other grounds, that the counterclaim could no longer have been heard after
the dismissal of the complaint. While the Court noted that the adjudication of the
counterclaim in question does not depend upon the adjudication of the claims made
in the complaint since they were virtually abandoned by the non-appearance of the
plaintiffs themselves, it was also added that [t]he doctrine invoked is not available
to plaintiffs like the petitioners, who prevent or delay the hearing of their own
claims and allegations.[37] The Court, through Justice JBL Reyes, noted:

The doctrine that the complaint may not be dismissed if the

counterclaim cannot be independently adjudicated is not available to, and
was not intended for the benefit of, a plaintiff who prevents or delays the
prosecution of his own complaint. Otherwise, the trial of counterclaims would
be made to depend upon the maneuvers of the plaintiff, and the rule would offer a
premium to vexing or delaying tactics to the prejudice of the counterclaimants. It
is in the same spirit that we have ruled that a complaint may not be withdrawn
over the opposition of the defendant where the counterclaim is one that arises
from, or is necessarily connected with, the plaintiffs action and cannot remain
pending for independent adjudication.[38]

There is no doubt that under the 1964 Rules, the dismissal of a complaint
due to the failure of the plaintiff to appear during pre-trial, as what had happened
in Sta. Maria, fell within the coverage of Section 3, Rule 17. On the other hand,
Section 2 was clearly limited in scope to those dismissals sustained at the instance
of the plaintiff.[39] Nonetheless, by the early 1990s, jurisprudence was settling on a
rule that compulsory counterclaims were necessarily terminated upon the dismissal
of the complaint not only if such dismissal was upon motion of the plaintiff, but at
the instance of the defendant as well. Two decisions from that period stand out in
this regard, Metals Engineering Resources Corp. v. Court of
Appeals[40] and International Container Terminal Services v. Court of Appeals.[41]

In Metals, the complaint was expunged from the record after the defendant
had filed a motion for reconsideration of a trial court order allowing the filing of an
amended complaint that corrected a jurisdictional error in the original complaint
pertaining to the specification of the amount of damages sought. When the
defendant was nonetheless allowed to present evidence on the counterclaim, the
plaintiff assailed such allowance on the ground that the counterclaim was
compulsory and could no longer remain pending for independent adjudication. The
Court, in finding for the plaintiff, noted that the counterclaim was indeed
compulsory in nature, and as such, was auxiliary to the proceeding in the original
suit and derived its jurisdictional support therefrom.[42] It was further explained that
the doctrine was in consonance with the primary objective of a counterclaim,
which was to avoid and prevent circuitry of action by allowing the entire
controversy between the parties to be litigated and finally determined in one action,
and to discourage multiplicity of suits.[43] Also, the Court noted that since the
complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, it was as if no claim was filed
against the defendant, and there was thus no more leg for the complaint to stand
on.[44]

In International Container, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss which

was granted by the trial court. The defendants counterclaim was dismissed as well.
The Court summarized the key question as what is the effect of the dismissal of a
complaint ordered at the instance of the defendant upon a compulsory counterclaim
duly raised in its answer.[45] Then it ruled that the counterclaim did not survive
such dismissal. After classifying the counterclaim therein as compulsory, the Court
noted that [i]t is obvious from the very nature of the counterclaim that it could not
remain pending for independent adjudication, that is, without adjudication by the
court of the complaint itself on which the counterclaim was based.[46]

Then in 1993, a divided Court ruled in BA Finance that the dismissal of the
complaint for nonappearance of plaintiff at the pre-trial, upon motion of the
defendants, carried with it the dismissal of their compulsory counterclaim. [47] The
Court reiterated the rule that a compulsory counterclaim cannot remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court as it is auxiliary to the proceeding in the
original suit and merely derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. [48] Express
reliance was made on Metals, International Container, and even Dalman in
support of the majoritys thesis. BA Finance likewise advised that the proper
remedy for defendants desirous that their counterclaims not be dismissed along
with the main complaint was for them to move to declare the plaintiffs to be non-
suited on their complaint and as in default on their compulsory counterclaim,
instead of moving for the dismissal of the complaint.[49]

Justice Regalado, joined by Chief Justice Narvasa, registered a strong

objection to the theory of the majority. They agreed that the trial court could no
longer hear the counterclaim, but only on the ground that defendants motion to be
allowed to present evidence on the counterclaim was filed after the order
dismissing the complaint had already become final. They disagreed however that
the compulsory counterclaim was necessarily dismissed along with the main
complaint, pointing out that a situation wherein the dismissal of the complaint was
occasioned by plaintiffs failure to appear during pre-trial was governed under
Section 3, Rule 17, and not Section 2 of the same rule. Justice Regalado, who
ironically penned the decision in Metals cited by the majority, explained:

Turning back to Rule 17, it is readily apparent that Sections 2 and 3

thereof envisage different factual and adjective situations. The dismissal of
the complaint under Section 2 is at the instance of plaintiff, for whatever
reason he is minded to move for such dismissal, and, as a matter of
procedure, is without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the order of the
court or, for that matter, in plaintiff's motion to dismiss his own complaint.
By reason thereof, to curb any dubious or frivolous strategy of plaintiff for his
benefit or to obviate possible prejudice to defendant, the former may not dismiss
his complaint over the defendant's objection if the latter has a compulsory
counterclaim since said counterclaim would necessarily be divested of juridical
basis and defendant would be deprived of possible recovery thereon in that same
judicial proceeding.

Section 3, on the other hand, contemplates a dismissal not procured

by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him and which, in the
present case, was petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial. This situation
is also covered by Section 3, as extended by judicial interpretation, and is
ordered upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the
 issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or
compulsory, is not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint is evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his
cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter
of evidence, an adjudication on the merits. This does not, however, mean that
there is likewise such absence of evidence to prove defendant's counterclaim
although the same arises out of the subject matter of the complaint which
was merely terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise would not only
work injustice to defendant but would be reading a further provision into
Section 3 and wresting a meaning therefrom although neither exists even by
mere implication. Thus understood, the complaint can accordingly be dismissed,
but relief can nevertheless be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his
counterclaim as alleged and proved, with or without any reservation therefor on
his part, unless from his conduct, express or implied, he has virtually consented to
the concomitant dismissal of his counterclaim.[50]

Justice Regalado also adverted to Sta. Maria and noted that the objections raised
and rejected by the Court therein were the same as those now relied upon by the
plaintiff. He pointed out that Dalman and International Container, both relied
upon by the majority, involved the application of Section 2, Rule 17 and not
Section 3, which he insisted as the applicable provision in the case at bar.[51]

The partial dissent of Justice Regalado in BA Finance proved opportune, as he

happened then to be a member of the Rules of Court Revision Committee tasked
with the revision of the 1964 Rules of Court. Just a few months after BA
Finance was decided, Justice Regalado proposed before the Committee an
amendment to Section 3, Rule 17 that would explicitly provide that the dismissal
of the complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff shall be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action. The amendment, which was approved by the Committee, is reflected in the
minutes of the meeting of the Committee held on 12 October 1993:

[Justice Regalado] then proposed that after the words upon the courts own
motion in the 6th line of the draft in Sec. 3 of Rule 17, the following provision be
inserted: without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. The Committee agreed with
the proposed amendment of Justice Regalado.
 Justice Herrera observed that under Secs. 1 to 3 of Rule 17, it is not the action that
is dismissed but the complaint. He asked whether there is any distinction between
complaint and action. Justice Regalado opined that the action of the plaintiff is
initiated by his complaint.

Justice Feria then suggested that the dismissal be limited to the complaint[.]
Thus, in the 1st line of Sec. 1, the words An action will be changed to a
complaint; in the 2nd line of Sec. 2, the words an action will be changed to a
complaint and in Sec. 3, the word action on the 5th line of the draft will be
changed to complaint. The Committee agreed with Justice Ferias suggested
amendments.

CA Pao believed that there is a need to clarify the counterclaim that the
defendant will prosecute, whether it is permissive or compulsory or all kinds
of counterclaims.

Justice Regalado opined that there is no need of making a clarification

because it is already understood that it covers both counterclaims.[52]

It is apparent from these minutes that the survival of the counterclaim despite the
dismissal of the complaint under Section 3 stood irrespective of whether the
counterclaim was permissive or compulsory. Moreover, when the Court itself
approved the revisions now contained in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, not
only did Justice Regalados amendment to Section 3, Rule 17 remain intact, but the
final version likewise eliminated the qualification formerly offered under Section 2
on counterclaims that can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court.[53] At present, even Section 2, concerning dismissals on motion of the
plaintiff, now recognizes the right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim
either in the same or separate action notwithstanding the dismissal of the
complaint, and without regard as to the permissive or compulsory nature of the
counterclaim.

In his commentaries on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice Regalado

expounds on the effects of the amendments to Section 2 and 3 of Rule 17:
 2. Under this revised section [2], where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of his
complaint to which a counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal shall be
limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of
the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to have
the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the
court should render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to
prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his
counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been
dismissed, he must manifest such preference to the trial court within 15 days from
notice to him of plaintiffs motion to dismiss. These alternative remedies of the
defendant are available to him regardless of whether his counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive. A similar alternative procedure, with the same
underlying reason therefor, is adopted in Sec. 6, Rule 16 and Sec. 3 of this Rule,
wherein the complaint is dismissed on the motion of the defendant or, in the latter
instance, also by the court motu proprio.

xxxx

2. The second substantial amendment to [Section 3] is with respect to the

disposition of the defendants counterclaim in the event the plaintiffs complaint is
dismissed. As already observed, he is here granted the choice to prosecute that
counterclaim in either the same or a separate action. x x x x

3. With the aforestated amendments in Secs. 2 and 3 laying down specific

rules on the disposition of counterclaims involved in the dismissal actions, the
controversial doctrine in BA Finance Corporation vs. Co, et al., (G.R.
No. 105751, June 30, 1993) has been abandoned, together with the apparent
confusion on the proper application of said Secs. 2 and 3. Said sections were
distinguished and discussed in the authors separate opinion in that case, even
before they were clarified by the present amendments x x x.[54]

Similarly, Justice Feria notes that the present rule reaffirms the right of the
defendant to move for the dismissal of the complaint and to prosecute his
counterclaim, as stated in the separate opinion [of Justice Regalado in BA
Finance.][55] Retired Court of Appeals Justice Herrera pronounces that the
amendment to Section 3, Rule 17 settles that nagging question whether the
dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, and
opines that by reason of the amendments, the rulings
in Metals Engineering, International Container, and BA Finance may be deemed
abandoned.[56] On the effect of amendment to Section 3, Rule 17, the commentators
are in general agreement,[57] although there is less unanimity of views insofar as
Section 2, Rule 17 is concerned.[58]

To be certain, when the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
including the amended Rule 17, those previous jural doctrines that were
inconsistent with the new rules incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
were implicitly abandoned insofar as incidents arising after the effectivity of the
new procedural rules on 1 July 1997. BA Finance, or even the doctrine that a
counterclaim may be necessarily dismissed along with the complaint, clearly
conflicts with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The abandonment of BA
Finance as doctrine extends as far back as 1997, when the Court adopted the new
Rules of Civil Procedure. If, since then, such abandonment has not been affirmed
in jurisprudence, it is only because no proper case has arisen that would warrant
express confirmation of the new rule. That opportunity is here and now, and we
thus rule that the dismissal of a complaint due to fault of the plaintiff is without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute any pending counterclaims of
whatever nature in the same or separate action. We confirm that BA Finance and
all previous rulings of the Court that are inconsistent with this present holding are
now abandoned.

Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the
counterclaim, since Section 3, Rule 17 mandates that the dismissal of the
complaint is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute the
counterclaim in the same or separate action. If the RTC were to dismiss the
counterclaim, it should be on the merits of such counterclaim. Reversal of the RTC
is in order, and a remand is necessary for trial on the merits of the counterclaim.

It would be perfectly satisfactory for the Court to leave this matter at that. Still, an
explanation of the reason behind the new rule is called for, considering that the
rationale behind the previous rule was frequently elaborated upon.
 Under Act No. 190, or the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions promulgated
in 1901, it was recognized in Section 127(1) that the plaintiff had the right to seek
the dismissal of the complaint at any time before trial, provided a counterclaim has
not been made, or affirmative relief sought by the cross-complaint or answer of the
defendant.[59] Note that no qualification was made then as to the nature of the
counterclaim, whether it be compulsory or permissive. The protection of the
defendants right to prosecute the counterclaim was indeed unqualified. In City
of Manila, decided in 1918, the Court explained:
By paragraph 1 [of Section 127], it will be seen that, where the defendant
has interposed a counterclaim, or is seeking affirmative relief by a cross-
complaint, that then, and in that case, the plaintiff cannot dismiss the action so as
to affect the right of the defendant in his counterclaim or prayer for affirmative
relief. The reason for that exception is clear. When the answer sets up an
independent action against the plaintiff, it then becomes an action by the
defendant against the plaintiff, and, of course, the plaintiff has no right to ask
for a dismissal of the defendants action.[60]

Nonetheless, a new rule was introduced when Act No. 190 was replaced by the
1940 Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 30 of the 1940 Rules specified that if a
counterclaim is pleaded by a defendant prior to the service of the plaintiffs motion
to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendants objection unless
the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
This qualification remained intact when the 1964 Rules of Court was
introduced.[61] The rule referred only to compulsory counterclaims, or
counterclaims which arise out of or are necessarily connected with the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim, since the rights of
the parties arising out of the same transaction should be settled at the same
time.[62] As was evident in Metals, International Container and BA Finance, the
rule was eventually extended to instances wherein it was the defendant with the
pending counterclaim, and not the plaintiff, that moved for the dismissal of the
complaint.
We should not ignore the theoretical bases of the rule distinguishing compulsory
counterclaims from permissive counterclaims insofar as the dismissal of the action
is concerned. There is a particular school of thought that informs the broad
proposition in Dalman that if the civil case is dismissed, so also is the counterclaim
filed therein,[63] or the more nuanced discussions offered in Metals, International
Container, and BA Finance. The most potent statement of the theory may be found
in Metals,[64] which proceeds from the following fundamental premisesa
compulsory counterclaim must be set up in the same proceeding or would
otherwise be abated or barred in a separate or subsequent litigation on the ground
of auter action pendant, litis pendentia or res judicata; a compulsory counterclaim
is auxiliary to the main suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom as it
arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the complaint;[65] and that if the court dismisses the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the compulsory counterclaim must also be
dismissed as it is merely ancilliary to the main action and no jurisdiction remained
for any grant of relief under the counterclaim.

The first point is derived from Section 4, Rule 9, of the 1964 Rules of Court, while
the two latter points are sourced from American jurisprudence. There is no
disputing the theoretical viability of these three points. In fact, the requirement that
the compulsory counterclaim must be set up in the same proceeding remains extant
under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[66] At the same time, other considerations
rooted in actual practice provide a counterbalance to the above-cited rationales.

Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears the same integral characteristics
as a complaint; namely a cause (or causes) of action constituting an act or omission
by which a party violates the right of another. The main difference lies in that the
cause of action in the counterclaim is maintained by the defendant against the
plaintiff, while the converse holds true with the complaint. Yet, as with a
complaint, a counterclaim without a cause of action cannot survive.
It would then seemingly follow that if the dismissal of the complaint somehow
eliminates the cause(s) of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive.
Yet that hardly is the case, especially as a general rule. More often than not, the
allegations that form the counterclaim are rooted in an act or omission of the
plaintiff other than the plaintiffs very act of filing the complaint. Moreover,
such acts or omissions imputed to the plaintiff are often claimed to have
occurred prior to the filing of the complaint itself. The only apparent
exception to this circumstance is if it is alleged in the counterclaim that the
very act of the plaintiff in filing the complaint precisely causes the violation of
the defendants rights. Yet even in such an instance, it remains debatable
whether the dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint is sufficient to obviate
the pending cause of action maintained by the defendant against the
plaintiff.[67]

These considerations persist whether the counterclaim in question is permissive or

compulsory. A compulsory counterclaim arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing partys
claim, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties, and stands
within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount involved and the nature of
the claim.[68] The fact that the culpable acts on which the counterclaim is based are
founded within the same transaction or occurrence as the complaint, is insufficient
causation to negate the counterclaim together with the complaint. The dismissal or
withdrawal of the complaint does not traverse the boundaries of time to undo the
act or omission of the plaintiff against the defendant, or vice versa.
While such dismissal or withdrawal precludes the pursuit of litigation

by the plaintiff, either through his/her own initiative or fault, it would be iniquitous
to similarly encumber the defendant who maintained no such initiative or fault. If
the defendant similarly moves for the dismissal of the counterclaim or neglects to
timely pursue such action, let the dismissal of the counterclaim be premised on
those grounds imputable to the defendant, and not on the actuations of the plaintiff.

The other considerations supplied in Metals are anchored on the premise that the
jurisdictional foundation of the counterclaim is the complaint itself. The theory is
correct, but there are other facets to this subject that should be taken into account as
well. On the established premise that a counterclaim involves separate causes of
action than the complaint even if derived from the same transaction or series of
transactions, the counterclaim could have very well been lodged as a complaint had
the defendant filed the action ahead of the complainant.[69] The terms ancillary or
auxiliary may mislead in signifying that a complaint innately possesses more
credence than a counterclaim, yet there are many instances wherein the complaint
is trivial but the counterclaim is meritorious. In truth, the notion that a counterclaim
is, or better still, appears to be merely ancillary or auxiliary is chiefly the offshoot
of an accident of chronology, more than anything else.

The formalistic distinction between a complaint and a counterclaim does not

detract from the fact that both of them embody causes of action that have in their
end the vindication of rights. While the distinction is necessary as a means to
facilitate order and clarity in the rules of procedure, it should be remembered that
the primordial purpose of procedural rules is to provide the means for the
vindication of rights. A party with a valid cause of action against another party
cannot be denied the right to relief simply because the opposing side had the good
fortune of filing the case first. Yet this in effect was what had happened under the
previous procedural rule and correspondent doctrine, which under their final
permutation, prescribed the automatic dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim
upon the dismissal of the complaint, whether upon the initiative of the plaintiff or
of the defendant.

Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more
equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is
based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main
complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers
jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not
precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment
or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same
time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect
such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the
complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated 9 August

2005 and 10 October 2005 of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court of San Miguel,
Zamboanga del Sur in Civil Case No. 98-012 are SET ASIDE. Petitioners
counterclaim as defendant in Civil Case. No. 98-012 is REINSTATED. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to hear and decide the counterclaim with
deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice

[1]
See CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5).
[2]
See 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 17, Sec. 3.
[3]
See e.g., BA Finance v. Co, infra.
[4]
Docketed as Civil Case. No. 98-012.
[5]
Presided by Judge Edilberto Absin, who promulgated all the rulings in this case, including those now
assailed in the present Petition.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 34-36.
[7]
Id. at 39-48.
[8]
It was also alleged that Saavedra was not an heir of Edmundo Pinga but was in fact the caretaker of the
properties. Id. at 41.
[9]
Id. at 48.
[10]
Id. at 60.
[11]
Id. at 63.
[12]
Id. at 21.
[13]
Id. at 23-24.
[14]
37 Phil. 421 (1918).
[15]
55 Phil. 361 (1930).
[16]
Rollo, p. 25.
[17]
Id. at 33.
[18]
Citing in particular Belleza v. Huntington, 89 Phil. 689 (1951), and Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping
Co., 95 Phil. 905 (1954).
[19]
Rollo, p. 31.
[20]
Id. at 25.
 [21]
Rollo, p. 27.
[22]
O. HERRERA, I REMEDIAL LAW (2000 ed.), at 789.
[23]
Supra note 14.
[24]
Supra note 15.
[25]
Supra note 18.
[26]
Id.
[27]
City of Manila and Belleza both involved a complaint dismissed upon the initiative of the
plaintiffs. Domingo concerned a complaint which was dismissed after a trial on the merits wherein the plaintiff
failed to introduce any evidence in his behalf. In Froilan, a complaint-in-intervention was dismissed motu
proprio by the trial court after the court was notified of a supervening event that satisfied the obligations of the
defendant to the plaintiff-in-intervention.
[28]
Unless the plaintiff initiates the dismissal of the complaint by way of notice at any time before service of
the answer or of a motion for summary judgment, in which case it is Section 1, Rule 17 that governs, whether under
the 1964 or 1997 Rules.
[29]
G.R. No. 105751, 30 June 1993, 224 SCRA 163.
[30]
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 17, Sec. 2, which states in full:

Dismissal by order of the court. Except as provided in the preceding section, an action shall not
be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to
the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against
the defendants objection unlessthe counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication
by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be
without prejudice.
[31]
M. MORAN, I COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT WITH INTERIM RULES AND
GUIDELINES AND RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE (1979 ed.), at 515.
[32]
G.R. No. L-40098, 29 August 1975, 66 SCRA 425, 447.
[33]
219 Phil. 214, 215-216 (1985).
[34]
Id. at 216.
[35]
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera, for one, opines that the dispute as to whether the
dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim was brought about by the quoted
pronouncement in Dalman. See HERRERA, supra note 22 at 789.
[36]
150-A Phil. 988 (1972).
[37]
Id. at 994 -995.
[38]
Id.
[39]
See note 3.
[40]
G.R. No. 95631, 28 October 1991, 203 SCRA 273.
 [41]
G.R. No. 90530, 7 October 1992, 214 SCRA 456.
[42]
Metals Engineering Resources Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40 at 282.
[43]
Id. at 282-283.
[44]
Id. at 283.
[45]
International Container Terminal Services v. Court of Appeals, supra note 41 at 458.
[46]
Id. at 461.
[47]
BA Finance Corporation v. Co, supra note 29. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo, and concurred in by Associate Justices Isagani Cruz, Abdulwahid Bidin, Carolina Grio-Aquino, Flerida
Ruth Romero, Rodolfo Nocon and Jose Melo. Associate Justices Florentino Feliciano and Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
joined in the result. Justice Florenz Regalado wrote a Separate Opinion concurring in the result, infra, in which he
was joined by Chief Justice Andres Narvasa.
[48]
BA Finance Corporation v. Co, supra note 29 at 167.
[49]
Id. at 168.
[50]
Id. at 171-172, J. Regalado, Separate Opinion. Emphasis supplied.
[51]
Id. at 172-174.
[52]
Minutes of the Meeting of the Rules of Court Revision Committee dated 12 October 1993, p.
7. Emphasis supplied.
[53]
Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now reads: Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff.
Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon
the approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be
limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his
preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal
under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court.
[54]
F. REGALADO, I REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM (7th ed., 1999), 270-272. Emphasis supplied.
[55]
J. FERIA & M. C. NOCHE, I CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED (2001 ed.), at 465. Justice Feria
also notes that under the present Section 2, Rule 17, the dismissal is limited to the complaint and is without
prejudice to the prosecution by the defendant of the counterclaim in a separate action unless he manifests his
preference to prosecute it in a separate action.
[56]
O. HERRERA, supra note 22 at 789.
[57]
See also A. BAUTISTA, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003 ed.), at 78; R. FRANCISCO, I CIVIL
PROCEDURE: RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES (1st ed., 2001), at 584.
[58]
Justice Francisco and Agpalo both opine that insofar as Section 2, Rule 17 is concerned, the distinction
between permissive and compulsory counterclaims should still be maintained, insofar as it relates to the option of
the defendant to pursue the counterclaim in either a separate or the same proceeding. Justice Francisco, citing pre-
1997 jurisprudence, submits that Section 2, Rule 17 refers only to compulsory counterclaims. See FRANCISCO, id.
at 580. Agpalo , on the other hand, suggests that what may be prosecuted in a separate action refers only to
permissive counterclaim and not compulsory counterclaim, which must be prosecuted in the same action and proved
before the order dismissing the action is issued. See R. AGPALO, HANDBOOK OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2001
ed.), at 234. It should be noted though that neither view on the 1997 amendments, which run contrary to Justice
Regalados own views, supra note 54, have not been adopted by the Court.
[59]
See Act No. 190 (1901), Section 127(1) at 1 PUBLIC LAWS 308. See also City of Manila v. Ruymann,
supra note 54 at 425.

[60]
City of Manila v. Ruymann, supra note 14 at 426. Emphasis supplied, italics not ours.
[61]
Supra note 30.
[62]
V. FRANCISCO, I THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES (2nd ed., 1973), p.
987.
[63]
Supra note 34.
[64]
Supra note 40 at 281-283.
[65]
Hence giving rise to the rule, pronounced in Meliton v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101883, 11
December 1992, 216 SCRA 485, that the jurisdictional requirement of the payment of filing fees by the defendant
on the counterclaim is required only if the counterclaim is permissive, since jurisdiction over the compulsory
counterclaim is anchored on the main complaint. Id. at 498.
[66]
See 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Section 2, Rule 9 in relation to Section 7, Rule 6.
[67]
For example, if the very filing of the complaint was sufficient to have caused injury to the defendant (as
in the case wherein the filing of the complaint is enough to hamper a business transaction, consequently affecting the
value of property or the profit derived therefrom), it then could be argued that the defendant had already sustained
damage even if the complaint was subsequently withdrawn or dismissed. Of course, such damage or injury is not
present in all counterclaims which pivot their respective causes of action on the act of the filing of the
complaint. Therein precisely lies the difficulty in prescribing the mandatory dismissal of counterclaims upon the
dismissal/withdrawal of the complaint, as such a step might negate the right of the defendant to vindicate the
damage or injury sustained by reason of the filing of the complaint itself.
[68]
See 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 6, Section 7, which further qualifies that in an original
action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
[69]
Except perhaps in the circumstance discussed in note 67.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC

MINERVA GOMEZ-CASTILLO G.R. No. 187231

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
 CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
-versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.:

COMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:

and STRIKE B. REVILLA,
Respondents. June 22, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioner Minerva Gomez-Castillo (Castillo) hereby seeks to nullify the orders

dated January 30, 2009 and March 11, 2009[1] issued in EAC No. A-01-2009 by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

Antecedents

Castillo and respondent Strike P. Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of

Bacoor, Cavite during the May 14, 2007 local elections. After the Municipal Board
of Canvassers proclaimed Revilla as the elected Municipal Mayor of
Bacoor, Cavite, Castillo filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam[2] in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Bacoor, Cavite, which was eventually raffled to Branch 19.
Through his Answer, Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging
that it was filed in the wrong Branch of the RTC. He pointed out that Supreme
Court Administrative Order (SCAO) No. 54-2007 designated Branch 22 of the
RTC in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try and
decide election contests involving municipal officials in Cavite; and that contrary
to SCAO No. 54-2007, Castillo filed his protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite,
which was not the proper court.

On November 21, 2008, Branch 19 dismissed Castillos election protest for being
violative of SCAO No. 54-2007.

On December 23, 2008, Castillo presented a notice of appeal.[3] Thereupon, the

RTC ordered that the complete records of the protest be forwarded to the Election
Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC.[4]

The First Division of the COMELEC dismissed the appeal for being brought
beyond the five-day reglementary period, noting that although Castillo had
received the November 21, 2008 order of the RTC on December 15 , 2008, she
filed her notice of appeal on December 23, 2008, a day too late to appeal, to wit:

Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which

requires the appellant to file her notice of appeal within five (5) days after
promulgation of the decision of the court xxx and considering further that
jurisprudence holds that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period laid down by law is not only mandatory but JURISDICTIONAL, this
Commission, First Division, RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant appeal for
appellant's failure to file her Notice of Appeal within the five (5) day
reglementary period.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Castillo moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of her appeal, but the
COMELEC denied the motion because she did not pay the motion fees required
under Sec. 7(f), Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by
COMELEC Resolution No. 02-0130, viz:

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by protestant-appellant Minerva G. Castillo,

thru registered mail on 13 February 2009 and received by this Commission on 4
March 2009, seeking reconsideration of the Commission's (First Division) Order
dated 30 January 2009, is hereby DENIED for failure of the movant to pay the
 necessary motion fees under Sec. 7(f), Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure[6] as amended by Comelec Resolution no. 02-0130.[7]
Castillo has brought the present recourse, contending that the COMELECs
orders dismissing her appeal and denying her motion for reconsideration were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Parties Arguments

Castillo insists that her notice of appeal was seasonably filed; otherwise, the RTC
would not have given due course to his appeal; that Section 3, Rule 22 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, cited in the assailed order dated January 30, 2009,
did not apply to her case, because Section 2 of Rule I of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides that:

Sec. 2. Applicability.- These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and
proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election
contests and Quo Warranto cases cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction.

that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure applied only to actions and proceedings
brought before the COMELEC, not to actions or proceedings originating in courts
of general jurisdiction; that even assuming that the appeal was belatedly filed, the
rules on election contests should be liberally construed to the end that mere
technical objections would not defeat the will of the people in the choice of public
officers; that the Court relaxed on numerous occasions the application of the rules
in order to give due course to belated appeals upon strong and compelling reasons;
that an electoral contest like hers was imbued with public interest, because it
involved the paramount need to clarify the real choice of the electorate; that
Section 4 of Rule I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure even allows the
COMELEC to suspend its own rules of procedure in order to obtain a speedy
disposition of all matters pending before the COMELEC; and that the COMELEC
should not have dismissed her motion for reconsideration for her mere failure to
pay the corresponding filing fee, but should have considered the soundness of her
argument to the effect that SCAO No. 54-2007 continued to vest jurisdiction to try
and decide election contest involving elective municipal officials in the RTC as a
whole, rendering the designation of the RTC branches to handle election protests
akin to a designation of venue.
Castillo further insists that Section 12 of Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides that assignment of cases to the specially designated courts
should be done exclusively by raffle conducted by the executive judge or by the
judges designated by the Supreme Court; and that her protest was thus duly raffled
to the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite, considering that SCAO 54-2007 should be construed
as a permissive rule that cannot supersede the general rule that jurisdiction over
election contests is vested in the RTC.

In his comment,[8] Revilla submits that the COMELEC correctly dismissed

Castillos appeal for being filed beyond the five-day reglementary period prescribed
in Section 3 of Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, thus:

Section 3. Notice of Appeal. - Within five (5) days after promulgation of the
decision of the court, the aggrieved party may filed with said court a notice of
appeal, and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party.
that A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, otherwise known as The Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials, clearly and
categorically directed:

Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the

commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a notice
of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the
adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.

that the period for filing an appeal is not a mere technicality of law or procedure
and the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in
the manner prescribed by the law; that the notice of appeal, even on the
assumption that it was filed on time, still remained futile due to the petitioners
failure to pay the corresponding fee for the motion for reconsideration; that the
failure to pay the filing fee rendered the motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of
paper, because it prevented the COMELEC from acquiring jurisdiction over the
protest; and that the COMELEC could not be faulted for applying its procedural
rules to achieve a just and expeditious determination of every proceeding brought
before it.

Issues
Does Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC Branch that
has jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it merely designate the
proper venue for filing?

In case the RTC was incorrect, is the error enough to warrant the reversal of
its order of dismissal despite its having attained finality?

Ruling

The petition has no merit.

A
Error of Petitioner in filing the protest in
RTC in Bacoor, not jurisdictional

It is well-settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction cannot

be fixed by the will of the parties; nor be acquired through waiver nor enlarged by
the omission of the parties; nor conferred by any acquiescence of the court. The
allocation of jurisdiction is vested in Congress, and cannot be delegated to another
office or agency of the Government.

The Rules of Court does not define jurisdictional boundaries of the courts. In
promulgating the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court is circumscribed by the zone
properly denominated as the promulgation of rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts;[9] consequently, the Rules of Court can only determine
the means, ways or manner in which said jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution
and acts of Congress, shall be exercised. The Rules of Court yields to the
substantive law in determining jurisdiction.[10]

The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has
been vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code).[11] On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the
proper venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled out the
manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other
rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly
administration of justice,[12] and is permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the
exclusive and speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for quo
warranto involving elective municipal officials.[13]

Castillos filing her protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite amounted only to a wrong
choice of venue. Hence, the dismissal of the protest by Branch 19 constituted plain
error, considering that her wrong choice did not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC.
What Branch 19 should have done under the circumstances was to transfer the
protest to Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite, which was the proper venue.
Such transfer was proper, whether she as the protestant sought it or not, given that
the determination of the will of the electorate of Bacoor, Cavite according to the
process set forth by law was of the highest concern of our institutions, particularly
of the courts.

B
Castillos tardy appeal should be dismissed

Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:

Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the

Commission on Elections within five days after promulgation by filing a notice
of appeal with the court that rendered the decision with copy served on the
adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.

Although Castillo had received the November 21, 2008 order of the RTC
on December 15, 2008, she filed her notice of appeal only on December 23, 2008,
or eight days after her receipt of the decision. Her appeal was properly dismissed
for being too late under the aforequoted rule of the COMELEC.

Castillo now insists that her appeal should not be dismissed, because she
claims that the five-day reglementary period was a mere technicality, implying that
such period was but a trivial guideline to be ignored or brushed aside at will.

Castillos insistence is unacceptable. The period of appeal and the perfection

of appeal are not mere technicalities to be so lightly regarded, for
they are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion underlying the
stability of our judicial system.[14] A greater reason to adhere to this notion exists
herein, for the short period of five days as the period to appeal recognizes the
essentiality of time in election protests, in order that the will of the electorate is
ascertained as soon as possible so that the winning candidate is not deprived of the
right to assume office, and so that any doubt that can cloud the incumbency of the
truly deserving winning candidate is quickly removed.

Contrary to Castillos posture, we cannot also presume the timeliness of her

appeal from the fact that the RTC gave due course to her appeal by its elevating
the protest to the COMELEC. The presumption of timeliness would not arise if her
appeal was actually tardy.

It is not trite to observe, finally, that Castillos tardy appeal resulted in the finality
of the RTCs dismissal even before January 30, 2002. This result provides an
additional reason to warrant the assailed actions of the COMELEC in dismissing
her appeal. Accordingly, the Court finds that the COMELECs assailed actions
were appropriate and lawful, not tainted by either arbitrariness or whimsicality,

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Both issued by then Presiding Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento; Commissioner Leonardo L. Leonida; and
Commissioner Armando C. Velasco; record, pp. 23 and 37.
[2]
The protest was designated ad cautelam because it was filed during the pendency of Castillo's Petition to Declare
Failure of Elections before the COMELEC, which was dismissed by the Commission shortly after the filing of the
election protest. All these can clearly be gleaned from the third paragraph of the RTC Bacoor's Order
dated November 21, 2008, Record, p. 16.
[3]
Record, p. 1.
[4]
Id., p. 12
[5]
Id., p. 28.
[6]
xxx Legal fees. - The following legal fees shall be charged and collected:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) For filing of a motion for reconsideration on a decision, order or resolution . . . . . P[500.00]
xxx xxx xxx
[7]
Record, p. 37.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 41-49.
[9]
Section 5 (5), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
[10]
De Jesus. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-26816, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 554, 558.
[11]
Sec. 251. Election contests for municipal offices.--A sworn petition contesting the election of a municipal officer
shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
has been voted for the same office, within ten days after proclamation of the results of the election.
[12]
Esuerte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 53485, February 6, 1991, 193 SCRA 541, 544.
[13]
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, paragraph 6, Whereas clauses.
[14]
E.g., National Power Corporation v. Spouses Laohoo, G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009, where the Court states:
[T]he non-perfection of [an] appeal on time is not a mere technicality. Besides, to grant the petitioner's plea
for the relaxation of the rule on technicality would disturb a well-entrenched ruling that could make uncertain
when a judgment attains finality, leaving the same to depend upon the resourcefulness of a party in
 concocting implausible excuses to justify an unwarranted departure from the time-honored policy of the law
that the period for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

APO FRUITS CORPORATION and G.R. No. 164195

HIJO PLANTATION, INC.,
Petitioners, Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,

PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
LAND BANK OF THE MENDOZA, and
PHILIPPINES, SERENO, JJ.
Respondent. Promulgated:

October 12, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:
We resolve the petitioners motion for reconsideration addressing our Resolution of
December 4, 2009 whose dispositive portion directs:
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners second motion for
reconsideration (with respect to the denial of the award of legal interest and
attorneys fees), and reiterates the decision dated February 6, 2007 and the
resolution dated December 19, 2007 of the Third Division.

For a fuller and clearer presentation and appreciation of this Resolution, we hark
back to the roots of this case.

Factual Antecedents

Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI), together also
referred to as petitioners, were registered owners of vast tracks of land; AFC
owned 640.3483 hectares, while HPI owned 805.5308 hectares. On October 12,
1995, they voluntarily offered to sell these landholdings to the
government viaVoluntary Offer to Sell applications filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR).

On October 16, 1996, AFC and HPI received separate notices of land
acquisition and valuation of their properties from the DARs Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO). At the assessed valuation of P165,484.47 per hectare,
AFCs land was valued at P86,900,925.88, while HPIs property was valued
at P164,478,178.14. HPI and AFC rejected these valuations for being very low.

In its follow through action, the DAR requested the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) to deposit P26,409,549.86 in AFCs bank account
and P45,481,706.76 in HPIs bank account, which amounts the petitioners then
withdrew. The titles over AFC and HPIs properties were thereafter cancelled, and
new ones were issued on December 9, 1996 in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines.

On February 14, 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for determination of
just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). When the
DARAB failed to act on these petitions for more than three years, AFC and HPI
filed separate complaints for determination and payment of just compensation with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City, acting as a Special Agrarian
Court. These complaints were subsequently consolidated.

On September 25, 2001, the RTC resolved the consolidated cases, fixing the just
compensation for the petitioners 1,338.6027 hectares of
[1]
land at P1,383,179,000.00, with interest on this amount at the prevailing market
interest rates, computed from the taking of the properties on December 9, 1996
until fully paid, minus the amounts the petitioners already received under the initial
valuation. The RTC also awarded attorneys fees.

LBP moved for the reconsideration of the decision. The RTC, in its order of
December 5, 2001, modified its ruling and fixed the interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from the time the complaint was filed until finality of the
decision. The Third Division of this Court, in its Decision of February 6, 2007,
affirmed this RTC decision.
On motion for reconsideration, the Third Division issued its Resolution of
December 19, 2007, modifying its February 6, 2007 Decision by deleting the 12%
interest due on the balance of the awarded just compensation. The Third Division
justified the deletion by the finding that the LBP did not delay the payment of just
compensation as it had deposited the pertinent amounts due to AFC and HPI
within fourteen months after they filed their complaints for just compensation with
the RTC. The Court also considered that AFC had already collected
approximately P149.6 million, while HPI had already collected
approximately P262 million from the LBP. The Third Division also deleted the
award of attorneys fees.

All parties moved for the reconsideration of the modified ruling. The Court
uniformly denied all the motions in its April 30, 2008 Resolution. Entry of
Judgment followed on May 16, 2008.

Notwithstanding the Entry of Judgment, AFC and HPI filed the following motions
on May 28, 2008: (1) Motion for Leave to File and Admit Second Motion for
Reconsideration; (2) Second Motion for Reconsideration, with respect to the denial
of the award of legal interest and attorneys fees; and (3) Motion to Refer the
Second Motion for Reconsideration to the Honorable Court En Banc.
 The Third Division found the motion to admit the Second Motion for
Reconsideration and the motion to refer this second motion to the Court En
Bancmeritorious, and accordingly referred the case to the Court En Banc. On
September 8, 2009, the Court En Banc accepted the referral.

The Court En Banc Resolution

On December 4, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a majority vote, denied the

petitioners second motion for reconsideration based on two considerations.
First, the grant of the second motion for reconsideration runs counter to the
immutability of final decisions. Moreover, the Court saw no reason to recognize
the case as an exception to the immutability principle as the petitioners private
claim for the payment of interest does not qualify as either a substantial or
transcendental matter or an issue of paramount public interest.
Second, on the merits, the petitioners are not entitled to recover interest on
the just compensation and attorneys fees because they caused the delay in the
payment of the just compensation due them; they erroneously filed their
complaints with the DARAB when they should have directly filed these with the
RTC acting as an agrarian court. Furthermore, the Court found it significant that
the LBP deposited the pertinent amounts in the petitioners favor within fourteen
months after the petitions were filed with the RTC. Under these circumstances, the
Court found no unreasonable delay on the part of LBP to warrant the award of 12%
interest.

The Chico-Nazario Dissent

Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[2] the ponente of the original December 19,

2007 Resolution (deleting the 12% interest), dissented from the Court En Bancs
December 4, 2009 Resolution.

On the issue of immutability of judgment, Justice Chico-Nazario pointed out

that under extraordinary circumstances, this Court has recalled entries of judgment
on the ground of substantial justice. Given the special circumstances involved in
the present case, the Court En Banc should have taken a second hard look at the
petitioners positions in their second motion for reconsideration, and acted to
correct the clearly erroneous December 19, 2007 Resolution.
 Specifically, Justice Chico-Nazario emphasized the obligation of the State,
in the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain, to pay just compensation
to the owner of the expropriated property. To be just, the compensation must not
only be the correct amount to be paid; it must also be paid within a reasonable time
from the time the land is taken from the owner. If not, the State must pay the
landowner interest, by way of damages, from the time the property was taken until
just compensation is fully paid. This interest, deemed a part of just compensation
due, has been established by prevailing jurisprudence to be 12% per annum.

On these premises, Justice Nazario pointed out that the government deprived
the petitioners of their property on December 9, 1996, and paid the balance of the
just compensation due them only on May 9, 2008. The delay of almost twelve
years earned the petitioners interest in the total amount of P1,331,124,223.05.

Despite this finding, Justice Chico-Nazario did not see it fit to declare the
computed interest to be totally due; she found it unconscionable to apply the full
force of the law on the LBP because of the magnitude of the amount due. She thus
reduced the awarded interest to P400,000,000.00, or approximately 30% of
the computed interest.

The Present Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion to reconsider the Court En Bancs December 4, 2009 Resolution

(the present Motion for Reconsideration), the petitioners principally argue that: (a)
the principle of immutability of judgment does not apply since the Entry of
Judgment was issued even before the lapse of fifteen days from the parties receipt
of the April 30, 2008 Resolution and the petitioners timely filed their second
motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from their receipt of this resolution;
(b) the April 30, 2008 Resolution cannot be considered immutable considering the
special and compelling circumstances attendant to the present case which fall
within the exceptions to the principle of immutability of judgments; (c) the legal
interest due is at 12% per annum, reckoned from the time of the taking of the
subject properties and this rate is not subject to reduction. The power of the courts
to equitably reduce interest rates applies solely to liquidated damages under a
contract and not to interest set by the Honorable Court itself as due and owing in
just compensation cases; and (d) the Honorable Courts fears that the interest
payments due to the petitioners will produce more harm than good to the system of
agrarian reform are misplaced and are based merely on conjectures.

The Comment of the Land Bank of the Philippines

The LBP commented on the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 28,
2010. It maintained that: (a) the doctrine of immutability of the decisions of the
Supreme Court clearly applies to the present case; (b) the LBP is not guilty of
undue delay in the payment of just compensation as the petitioners were promptly
paid once the Court had determined the final value of the properties expropriated;
(c) the Supreme Court rulings invoked by the petitioners are inapplicable to the
present case; (d) since the obligation to pay just compensation is not a forbearance
of money, interest should commence only after the amount due becomes
ascertainable or liquidated, and the 12% interest per annum applies only to the
liquidated amount, from the date of finality of judgment; (e) the imposition of 12%
interest on the balance of P971,409,831.68 is unwarranted because there was no
unjustified refusal by LBP to pay just compensation, and no contractual breach is
involved; (f) the deletion of the attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the amount
finally awarded as just compensation is proper; (g) this case does not involve a
violation of substantial justice to justify the alteration of the immutable resolution
dated December 19, 2007 that deleted the award of interest and attorneys fees.

The Courts Ruling

We find the petitioners arguments meritorious and accordingly GRANT

the present motion for reconsideration.

Just compensation a Basic Limitation on

the States
Power of Eminent Domain
 At the heart of the present controversy is the Third Divisions December 19,
2007 Resolution which held that the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest on
the balance of the just compensation belatedly paid by the LBP. In the presently
assailed December 4, 2009 Resolution, we affirmed the December 19, 2007
Resolutions findings that: (a) the LBP deposited pertinent amounts in favor of the
petitioners within fourteen months after they filed their complaint for
determination of just compensation; and (b) the LBP had already paid the
petitioners P411,769,168.32. We concluded then that these circumstances refuted
the petitioners assertion of unreasonable delay on the part of the LBP.

A re-evaluation of the circumstances of this case and the parties arguments,

viewed in light of the just compensation requirement in the exercise of the States
inherent power of eminent domain, compels us to re-examine our findings and
conclusions.

Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public
[3]
use. It is an inherent power of State as it is a power necessary for the States
existence; it is a power the State cannot do without.[4] As an inherent power, it does
not need at all to be embodied in the Constitution; if it is mentioned at all, it is
solely for purposes of limiting what is otherwise an unlimited power. The
limitation is found in the Bill of Rights[5] that part of the Constitution whose
provisions all aim at the protection of individuals against the excessive exercise of
governmental powers.

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (which reads No private

property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.) provides two
essential limitations to the power of eminent domain, namely, that (1) the purpose
of taking must be for public use and (2) just compensation must be given to the
owner of the private property.

It is not accidental that Section 9 specifies that compensation should be just

as the safeguard is there to ensure a balance property is not to be taken for public
use at the expense of private interests; the public, through the State, must balance
the injury that the taking of property causes through compensation for what is
taken, value for value.
 Nor is it accidental that the Bill of Rights is interpreted liberally in favor of
the individual and strictly against the government. The protection of the individual
is the reason for the Bill of Rights being; to keep the exercise of the powers of
government within reasonable bounds is what it seeks.[6]

The concept of just compensation is not new to Philippine constitutional

[7]
law, but is not original to the Philippines; it is a transplant from the American
Constitution.[8] It found fertile application in this country particularly in the area of
agrarian reform where the taking of private property for distribution to landless
farmers has been equated to the public use that the Constitution requires. In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla,[9] a valuation case under our agrarian reform law,
this Court had occasion to state:

Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market

value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair
value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to
sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word
"just" is used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.[10][Emphasis supplied.]

In the present case, while the DAR initially valued the petitioners
landholdings at a total of P251,379,104.02,[11] the RTC, acting as a special agrarian
court, determined the actual value of the petitioners landholdings to
be P1,383,179,000.00. This valuation, a finding of fact, has subsequently been
affirmed by this Court, and is now beyond question. In eminent domain terms, this
amount is the real, substantial, full and ample compensation the government must
pay to be just to the landowners.

Significantly, this final judicial valuation is far removed from the initial
valuation made by the DAR; their values differ by P1,131,799,897.00 in itself a
very substantial sum that is roughly four times the original DAR valuation. We
mention these valuations as they indicate to us how undervalued the petitioners
lands had been at the start, particularly at the time the petitioners landholdings
were taken. This reason apparently compelled the petitioners to relentlessly pursue
their valuation claims all they way up to the level of this Court.

While the LBP deposited the total amount of P71,891,256.62 into the
petitioners accounts (P26,409,549.86 for AFC and P45,481,706.76 for HPI) at the
time the landholdings were taken, these amounts were mere partial payments that
only amounted to 5% of the P1,383,179,000.00 actual value of the expropriated
properties. We point this aspect out to show that the initial payments made by the
LBP when the petitioners landholdings were taken, although promptly withdrawn
by the petitioners, could not by any means be considered a fair exchange of values
at the time of taking; in fact, the LBPs actual deposit could not be said to be
substantial even from the original LBP valuation of P251,379,103.90.

Thus, the deposits might have been sufficient for purposes of the immediate
taking of the landholdings but cannot be claimed as amounts that would excuse the
LBP from the payment of interest on the unpaid balance of the compensation due.
As discussed at length below, they were not enough to compensate the petitioners
for the potential income the landholdings could have earned for them if no
immediate taking had taken place. Under the circumstances, the State acted
oppressively and was far from just in their position to deny the petitioners of the
potential income that the immediate taking of their properties entailed.

Just Compensation from the

Prism of the Element of Taking.

Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be
fair and reasonable, compensation, to be just, must also be made without
delay.[12] Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" if
the property is immediately taken as the property owner suffers the immediate
deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income.

This is the principle at the core of the present case where the petitioners
were made to wait for more than a decade after the taking of their property before
they actually received the full amount of the principal of the just compensation due
them.[13] What they have not received to date is the income of their
landholdings corresponding to what they would have received had no
uncompensated taking of these lands been immediately made. This income, in
terms of the interest on the unpaid principal, is the subject of the current litigation.

We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals[14] the need for prompt

payment and the necessity of the payment of interest to compensate for any delay
in the payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled in this case
that:
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the
sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the
price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by
the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation
is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from
the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid
or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and
the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a
position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the
taking occurred.[15] [Emphasis supplied.]
Aside from this ruling, Republic notably overturned the Courts previous ruling
in National Power Corporation v. Angas[16] which held that just compensation due
for expropriated properties is not a loan or forbearance of money but indemnity for
damages for the delay in payment; since the interest involved is in the nature of
damages rather than earnings from loans, then Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, which
fixes legal interest at 6%, shall apply.

In Republic, the Court recognized that the just compensation due to the
landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the Eastern Shipping
Lines ruling,[17] the Court fixed the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum,
computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just
compensation was paid, in order to eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation
and inflation of the value of the currency over time. In the Courts own words:
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interest[s]
on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner
instituted condemnation proceedings and took the property in September
1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the
property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective
 forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the
constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over
time.[18] [Emphasis supplied.]
We subsequently upheld Republics 12% per annum interest rate on the
unpaid expropriation compensation in the following cases: Reyes v. National
Housing Authority,[19] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[20] Republic v.
Court of Appeals,[21] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[22]Philippine Ports
Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc,[23] and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[24]

These were the established rulings that stood before this Court issued the
currently assailed Resolution of December 4, 2009. These would be the rulings
this Court shall reverse and de-establish if we maintain and affirm our ruling
deleting the 12% interest on the unpaid balance of compensation due for
properties already taken.

Under the circumstances of the present case, we see no compelling reason to

depart from the rule that Republic firmly established. Let it be remembered that
shorn of its eminent domain and social justice aspects, what the agrarian land
reform program involves is the purchase by the government, through the LBP, of
agricultural lands for sale and distribution to farmers. As a purchase, it involves an
exchange of values the landholdings in exchange for the LBPs payment. In
determining the just compensation for this exchange, however, the measure to
be borne in mind is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss[25] since what is
involved is the takeover of private property under the States coercive
power. As mentioned above, in the value-for-value exchange in an eminent
domain situation, the State must ensure that the individual whose property is taken
is not shortchanged and must hence carry the burden of showing that the just
compensation requirement of the Bill of Rights is satisfied.

The owners loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-
generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value
must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the
potential income lost. The just compensation is made available to the property
owner so that he may derive income from this compensation, in the same manner
that he would have derived income from his expropriated property. If full
compensation is not paid for property taken, then the State must make up for the
shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to the taking, and the
absence of replacement property from which income can be derived; interest on the
unpaid compensation becomes due as compliance with the constitutional mandate
on eminent domain and as a basic measure of fairness.

In the context of this case, when the LBP took the petitioners landholdings
without the corresponding full payment, it became liable to the petitioners for the
income the landholdings would have earned had they not immediately been taken
from the petitioners. What is interesting in this interplay, under the developments
of this case, is that the LBP, by taking landholdings without full payment while
holding on at the same time to the interest that it should have paid, effectively
used or retained funds that should go to the landowners and thereby took
advantage of these funds for its own account.

From this point of view, the December 19, 2007 Resolution deleting the
award of 12% interest is not only patently and legally wrong, but is also morally
unconscionable for being grossly unfair and unjust. If the interest on the just
compensation due in reality the equivalent of the fruits or income of the
landholdings would have yielded had these lands not been taken would be denied,
the result is effectively a confiscatory action by this Court in favor of the LBP. We
would be allowing the LBP, for twelve long years, to have free use of the interest
that should have gone to the landowners. Otherwise stated, if we continue to deny
the petitioners present motion for reconsideration, we would illogically and
without much thought to the fairness that the situation demands uphold the
interests of the LBP, not only at the expense of the landowners but also that of
substantial justice as well.

Lest this Court be a party to this monumental unfairness in a social program

aimed at fostering balance in our society, we now have to ring the bell that we have
muted in the past, and formally declare that the LBPs position is legally and
morally wrong. To do less than this is to leave the demands of the constitutional
just compensation standard (in terms of law) and of our own conscience (in terms
of morality) wanting and unsatisfied.
The Delay in Payment Issue
 Separately from the demandability of interest because of the failure to fully
pay for property already taken, a recurring issue in the case is the attribution of the
delay.

That delay in payment occurred is not and cannot at all be disputed. While
the LBP claimed that it made initial payments of P411,769,168.32 (out of the
principal sum due of P1,383,179,000.00), the undisputed fact is that the
petitioners were deprived of their lands on December 9, 1996 (when titles to
their landholdings were cancelled and transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines), and received full payment of the principal amount due them only
on May 9, 2008.

In the interim, they received no income from their landholdings because

these landholdings had been taken. Nor did they receive adequate income from
what should replace the income potential of their landholdings because the LBP
refused to pay interest while withholding the full amount of the principal of the just
compensation due by claiming a grossly low valuation. This sad state continued for
more than a decade. In any language and by any measure, a lengthy delay in
payment occurred.

An important starting point in considering attribution for the delay is that

the petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their landholdings to the
governments land reform program; they themselves submitted their Voluntary
Offer to Sell applications to the DAR, and they fully cooperated with the
governments program. The present case therefore is not one where substantial
conflict arose on the issue of whether expropriation is proper; the petitioners
voluntarily submitted to expropriation and surrendered their landholdings, although
they contested the valuation that the government made.

Presumably, had the landholdings been properly valued, the petitioners

would have accepted the payment of just compensation and there would have been
no need for them to go to the extent of filing a valuation case. But, as borne by the
records, the petitioners lands were grossly undervalued by the DAR, leaving the
petitioners with no choice but to file actions to secure what is justly due them.
 The DARs initial gross undervaluation started the cycle of court actions that
followed, where the LBP eventually claimed that it could not be faulted for seeking
judicial recourse to defend the governments and its own interests in light of the
petitioners valuation claims. This LBP claim, of course, conveniently forgets that
at the root of all these valuation claims and counterclaims was the initial gross
undervaluation by DAR that the LBP stoutly defended. At the end, this
undervaluation was proven incorrect by no less than this Court; the petitioners
were proven correct in their claim, and the correct valuation more than five-fold the
initial DAR valuation was decreed and became final.

All these developments cannot now be disregarded and reduced to

insignificance. In blunter terms, the government and the LBP cannot now be heard
to claim that they were simply protecting their interests when they stubbornly
defended their undervalued positions before the courts. The more apt and accurate
statement is that they adopted a grossly unreasonable position and the adverse
developments that followed, particularly the concomitant delay, should be directly
chargeable to them.

To be sure, the petitioners were not completely correct in the legal steps they
took in their valuation claims. They initially filed their valuation claim before the
DARAB instead of immediately seeking judicial intervention. The DARAB,
however, contributed its share to the petitioners error when it failed or refused to
act on the valuation petitions for more than three (3) years. Thus, on top of the
DAR undervaluation was the DARAB inaction after the petitioners landholdings
had been taken. This Courts Decision of February 6, 2007 duly noted this and
observed:
It is not controverted that this case started way back on 12 October 1995,
when AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. In view
of the failure of the parties to agree on the valuation of the properties, the
Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DARAB
on 14 February 1997. Despite the lapse of more than three years from the filing
of the complaint, the DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the
land. Meantime, the titles over the properties of AFC and HPI had already been
cancelled and in their place a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, even as far back as 9 December 1996. A period of
almost 10 years has lapsed. For this reason, there is no dispute that this case has
truly languished for a long period of time, the delay being mainly attributable to
both official inaction and indecision, particularly on the determination of the
 amount of just compensation, to the detriment of AFC and HPI, which to date,
have yet to be fully compensated for the properties which are already in the hands
of farmer-beneficiaries, who, due to the lapse of time, may have already
converted or sold the land awarded to them.

Verily, these two cases could have been disposed with dispatch were it
not for LBPs counsel causing unnecessary delay. At the inception of this case,
DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine
just compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC
and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. We underscore the pronouncement of the
RTC that the delay by DARAB in the determination of just compensation
could only mean the reluctance of the Department of Agrarian Reform and
the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the claim of just compensation by
corporate landowners.

To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them empty-

handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly
oppressive. [Emphasis supplied.]

These statements cannot but be true today as they were when we originally
decided the case and awarded 12% interest on the balance of the just compensation
due. While the petitioners were undisputedly mistaken in initially seeking recourse
through the DAR, this agency itself hence, the government committed a graver
transgression when it failed to act at all on the petitioners complaints for
determination of just compensation.

In sum, in a balancing of the attendant delay-related circumstances of this

case, delay should be laid at the doorsteps of the government, not at the petitioners.
We conclude, too, that the government should not be allowed to exculpate itself
from this delay and should suffer all the consequences the delay caused.

The LBPs arguments on the applicability

of cases imposing
12% interest

The LBP claims in its Comment that our rulings in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[26] Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[27] and Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Imperial,[28] cannot be applied to the present case.
 According to the LBP, Republic is inapplicable because, first, the
landowners in Republic remained unpaid, notwithstanding the fact that the award
for just compensation had already been fixed by final judgment; in the present
case, the Court already acknowledged that pertinent amounts were deposited in
favor of the landowners within 14 months from the filing of their
complaint. Second, while Republic involved an ordinary expropriation case, the
present case involves expropriation for agrarian reform. Finally, the just
compensation in Republic remained unpaid notwithstanding the finality of
judgment, while the just compensation in the present case was immediately paid in
full after LBP received a copy of the Courts resolution
We find no merit in these assertions.

As we discussed above, the pertinent amounts allegedly deposited by LBP

were mere partial payments that amounted to a measly 5% of the actual value of
the properties expropriated. They could be the basis for the immediate taking of the
expropriated property but by no stretch of the imagination can these nominal
amounts be considered pertinent enough to satisfy the full requirement of just
compensation i.e., the full and fair equivalent of the expropriated property, taking
into account its income potential and the foregone income lost because of the
immediate taking.

We likewise find no basis to support the LBPs theory that Republic and the
present case have to be treated differently because the first involves a regular
expropriation case, while the present case involves expropriation pursuant to the
countrys agrarian reform program. In both cases, the power of eminent domain was
used and private property was taken for public use. Why one should be different
from the other, so that the just compensation ruling in one should not apply to the
other, truly escapes us. If there is to be a difference, the treatment of agrarian
reform expropriations should be stricter and on a higher plane because of the
governments societal concerns and objectives. To be sure, the government cannot
attempt to remedy the ills of one sector of society by sacrificing the interests of
others within the same society.

Finally, we note that the finality of the decision (that fixed the value of just
compensation) in Republic was not a material consideration for the Court in
awarding the landowners 12% interest. The Court, in Republic, simply affirmed the
RTC ruling imposing legal interest on the amount of just compensation due. In the
process, the Court determined that the legal interest should be 12% after
recognizing that the just compensation due was effectively a forbearance on the
part of the government. Had the finality of the judgment been the critical factor,
then the 12% interest should have been imposed from the time the RTC decision
fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest was imposed
from the time that the Republic commenced condemnation proceedings and took
the property.

The LBP additionally asserts that the petitioners erroneously relied on the
ruling in Reyes v. National Housing Authority. The LBP claims that we cannot
apply Reyes because it involved just compensation that remained unpaid despite
the finality of the expropriation decision. LBPs point of distinction is that just
compensation was immediately paid in the present case upon the Courts
determination of the actual value of the expropriated properties. LBP claims, too,
that inReyes, the Court established that the refusal of the NHA to pay just
compensation was unfounded and unjustified, whereas the LBP in the present case
clearly demonstrated its willingness to pay just compensation. Lastly, in Reyes, the
records showed that there was an outstanding balance that ought to be paid, while
the element of an outstanding balance is absent in the present case.

Contrary to the LBPs opinion, the imposition of the 12% interest in Reyes did not
depend on either the finality of the decision of the expropriation court, or on the
finding that the NHAs refusal to pay just compensation was unfounded and
unjustified. Quite clearly, the Court imposed 12% interest based on the ruling
in Republic v. Court of Appeals that x x x if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the
final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from
the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual
payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good
as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.[29] This is
the same legal principle applicable to the present case, as discussed above.
While the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance on the just compensation
due to the petitioners after this Court had fixed the value of the expropriated
properties, it overlooks one essential fact from the time that the State took the
petitioners properties until the time that the petitioners were fully paid, almost 12
long years passed. This is the rationale for imposing the 12% interest in order to
compensate the petitioners for the income they would have made had they been
properly compensated for their properties at the time of the taking.

Finally, the LBP insists that the petitioners quoted our ruling in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Imperial out of context. According to the LBP, the Court imposed
legal interest of 12% per annum only after December 31, 2006, the date when the
decision on just compensation became final.

The LBP is again mistaken. The Imperial case involved land that was expropriated
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27,[30] and fell under the coverage of DAR
Administrative Order (AO) No. 13.[31] This AO provided for the payment of a 6%
annual interest if there is any delay in payment of just compensation.
However, Imperial was decided in 2007 and AO No. 13 was only effective up to
December 2006. Thus, the Court, relying on our ruling in the Republic case,
applied the prevailing 12% interest ruling to the period when the just compensation
remained unpaid after December 2006. It is for this reason that December 31, 2006
was important, not because it was the date of finality of the decision on just
compensation.

The 12% Interest Rate and

the Chico-Nazario Dissent

To fully reflect the concerns raised in this Courts deliberations on the

present case, we feel it appropriate to discuss the Justice Minita Chico-Nazarios
dissent from the Courts December 4, 2009 Resolution.

While Justice Chico-Nazario admitted that the petitioners were entitled to

the 12% interest, she saw it appropriate to equitably reduce the interest charges
from P1,331,124,223.05 to P400,000,000.00. In support of this proposal, she
enumerated various cases where the Court, pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil
Code,[32] equitably reduced interest charges.
 We differ with our esteemed colleagues views on the application of equity.

While we have equitably reduced the amount of interest awarded in

numerous cases in the past, those cases involved interest that was essentially
consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed agreements between the
contracting parties. In contrast, the interest involved in the present case runs as
a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner
to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of
taking.[33]

Furthermore, the allegedly considerable payments made by the LBP to the

petitioners cannot be a proper premise in denying the landowners the interest due
them under the law and established jurisprudence. If the just compensation for
the landholdings is considerable, this compensation is not undue because the
landholdings the owners gave up in exchange are also similarly considerable
AFC gave up an aggregate landholding of 640.3483 hectares, while HPIs gave
up 805.5308 hectares. When the petitioners surrendered these sizeable
landholdings to the government, the incomes they gave up were likewise sizeable
and cannot in any way be considered miniscule. The incomes due from these
properties, expressed as interest, are what the government should return to the
petitioners after the government took over their lands without full payment of just
compensation. In other words, the value of the landholdings themselves should be
equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due; interest is due and
should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after
taking has been completed. This is the compensation arrangement that should
prevail if such compensation is to satisfy the constitutional standard of being just.

Neither can LBPs payment of the full compensation due before the finality
of the judgment of this Court justify the reduction of the interest due them. To rule
otherwise would be to forget that the petitioners had to wait twelve years from the
time they gave up their lands before the government fully paid the principal of the
just compensation due them. These were twelve years when they had no income
from their landholdings because these landholdings have immediately been taken;
no income, or inadequate income, accrued to them from the proceeds of
compensation payment due them because full payment has been withheld by
government.

If the full payment of the principal sum of the just compensation is legally
significant at all under the circumstances of this case, the significance is only in
putting a stop to the running of the interest due because the principal of the just
compensation due has been paid. To close our eyes to these realities is to condone
what is effectively a confiscatory action in favor of the LBP.

That the legal interest due is now almost equivalent to the principal to be
paid is not per se an inequitable or unconscionable situation, considering the length
of time the interest has remained unpaid almost twelve long years. From the
perspective of interest income, twelve years would have been sufficient for the
petitioners to double the principal, even if invested conservatively, had they been
promptly paid the principal of the just compensation due them. Moreover, the
interest, however enormous it may be, cannot be inequitable and
unconscionable because it resulted directly from the application of law and
jurisprudence standards that have taken into account fairness and equity in setting
the interest rates due for the use or forebearance of money.

If the LBP sees the total interest due to be immense, it only has itself to
blame, as this interest piled up because it unreasonably acted in its valuation of the
landholdings and consequently failed to promptly pay the petitioners. To be sure,
the consequences of this failure i.e., the enormity of the total interest due and the
alleged financial hemorrhage the LBP may suffer should not be the very reason
that would excuse it from full compliance. To so rule is to use extremely flawed
logic. To so rule is to disregard the question of how the LBP, a government
financial institution that now professes difficulty in paying interest at 12% per
annum, managed the funds that it failed to pay the petitioners for twelve long
years.
It would be utterly fallacious, too, to argue that this Court should tread
lightly in imposing liabilities on the LBP because this bank represents the
government and, ultimately, the public interest. Suffice it to say that public interest
refers to what will benefit the public, not necessarily the government and its
agencies whose task is to contribute to the benefit of the public. Greater public
benefit will result if government agencies like the LBP are conscientious in
undertaking its tasks in order to avoid the situation facing it in this case. Greater
public interest would be served if it can contribute to the credibility of the
governments land reform program through the conscientious handling of its
part of this program.

As our last point, equity and equitable principles only come into full play
when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.[34] As we have shown above,
established rulings of this Court are in place for full application to the present
case. There is thus no occasion for the equitable consideration that Justice Chico-
Nazario suggested.

The Amount Due the Petitioners as Just

Compensation

As borne by the records, the 12% interest claimed is only on the difference
between the price of the expropriated lands (determined with finality to
be P1,383,179,000.00) and the amount of P411,769,168.32 already paid to the
petitioners. The difference between these figures amounts to the remaining balance
of P971,409,831.68 that was only paid on May 9, 2008.

As above discussed, this amount should bear interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from the time the petitioners properties were taken on December
9, 1996 up to the time of payment. At this rate, the LBP now owes the petitioners
the total amount of One Billion Three Hundred Thirty-One Million One Hundred
Twenty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Three and 05/100 Pesos
(P1,331,124,223.05), computed as follows:

Just Compensation P971,409,831.68

Legal Interest from 12/09/1996

To 05/09/2008 @ 12%/annum

12/09/1996 to 12/31/1996 23 days 7,345,455.17

01/01/1997 to 12/31/2007 11 years 1,282,260,977.82
01/01/2008 to 05/09/2008 130 days 41,517,790.07
 P1,331,124,223.05[35]

The Immutability of Judgment Issue

As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified,

even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court,
be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.[36] In the past, however, we have
recognized exceptions to this rule by reversing judgments and recalling their entries
in the interest of substantial justice and where special and compelling reasons
called for such actions.

Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations

Commission,[37] Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[38] Philippine Consumers Foundation v.
National Telecommunications Commission,[39] and Republic v. de los
Angeles,[40] we reversed our judgment on the second motion for reconsideration,
while in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[41] we did so on a third motion for reconsideration. In Cathay Pacific
v. Romillo[42] and Cosio v. de Rama,[43] we modified or amended our ruling on the
second motion for reconsideration. More recently, in the cases of Munoz v. Court of
Appeals,[44] Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Cosico,[45] Manotok IV v.
Barque,[46] and Barnes v. Padilla,[47] we recalled entries of judgment after finding
that doing so was in the interest of substantial justice. In Barnes, we said:
x x x Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked
by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest
court of the land.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d)
a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to

facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
 justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this
principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be
final.[48] [Emphasis supplied.]

That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not
hard to discern from these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed
under no less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can
compensation in an eminent domain be just when the payment for the
compensation for property already taken has been unreasonably delayed? To claim,
as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this case is
to forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It
forgets, too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply
to government who carries the burden of showing that these standards have been
met. Thus, to simply dismiss this case as a private interest matter is an extremely
shortsighted view that this Court should not leave uncorrected.

As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not one of first
impression in our jurisdiction; the consequences of delay in the payment of just
compensation have been settled by this Court in past rulings. Our settled
jurisprudence on the issue alone accords this case primary importance as a contrary
ruling would unsettle, on the flimsiest of grounds, all the rulings we have
established in the past.

More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of

transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter involved
agrarian reform, a societal objective that the government has unceasingly sought to
achieve in the past half century. This reform program and its objectives would
suffer a major setback if the government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly
or unwittingly, through lack of good faith in implementing the needed
reforms. Truly, agrarian reform is so important to the national agenda that the
Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked agricultural lands, its ownership and
abuse, to the idea of revolution.[49] This linkage, to our mind, remains valid even if
the landowner, not the landless farmer, is at the receiving end of the distortion of
the agrarian reform program.
 As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not
override, substantial justice.[50] As we explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:[51]
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court
reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.
xxxx
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has
consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice.[52][Emphasis supplied.]

Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[53] we had occasion to state:

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines
in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it,
for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always
been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of
Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation.[54] [Emphasis
supplied.]

We made the same recognition in Barnes,[55] on the underlying premise that

a courts primordial and most important duty is to render justice; in discharging the
duty to render substantial justice, it is permitted to re-examine even a final and
executory judgment.
Based on all these considerations, particularly the patently illegal and
erroneous conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest, we find
that we are duty-bound to re-examine and overturn the assailed Resolution. We
shall completely and inexcusably be remiss in our duty as defenders of justice if,
given the chance to make the rectification, we shall let the opportunity pass.
Attorneys Fees
We are fully aware that the RTC has awarded the petitioners attorneys fees
when it fixed the just compensation due and decreed that interest of 12% should be
paid on the balance outstanding after the taking of the petitioners landholdings
took place. The petitioners, however, have not raised the award of attorneys fees as
an issue in the present motion for reconsideration. For this reason, we shall not
touch on this issue at all in this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petitioners motion
for reconsideration. The Court En Bancs Resolution dated December 4, 2009, as
well as the Third Divisions Resolutions dated April 30, 2008 and December 19,
2007, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The respondent Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ORDERED to pay

petitioners Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. interest at the rate of
12% per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed from
the date the Government took the properties on December 9, 1996, until the
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines paid on May 9, 2008 the balance on the
principal amount.

Unless the parties agree to a shorter payment period, payment shall be in

monthly installments at the rate of P60,000,000.00 per month until the whole
amount owing, including interest on the outstanding balance, is fully paid.

Costs against the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

(on wellness leave) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(on leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(on wellness leave) MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice


On wellness leave.

On leave.

On wellness leave.
[1]
While the petitioners owned a total of 1,454.8791 hectares based on the landholdings stated in this Courts
February 6, 2007 Decision, the RTC, in its decision, fixed just compensation for 1,388.6027 hectares of land.
[2]
Retired from the Court on December 5, 2009.
[3]
See Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 391, citing Visayan Refining Co. v.
Camus, 40 Phil. 550, 558-559 (1919).
[4]
See Manapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 110478, 116176 and 116491-503, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 32.
[5]
See Heirs of Alberto Saguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 135087, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 137.
[6]
Id., citing City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919).
[7]
The authority to exercise the power of eminent domain was expressly conferred to the Philippine Government
through Section 63 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, which states:

That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, subject to the limitations and
conditions prescribed in this Act, to acquire, require, hold, maintain, and convey title to real and
personal property, and may acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right of
eminent domain. (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.)

Section 74 of the same law, which deals with the authority of the Philippine Government to grant franchises and
concessions, provides:

That the Government of the Philippine Islands may grant franchises, privileges, and concessions,
including the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain for the construction and
operation of works of public utility and service x x x: Provided, That no private property shall
be taken for any purpose under this section without just compensation paid or tendered
therefor x x x.

More specifically, Section 3 of the Jones Act (of 1916) provides that [p]rivate property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.
See Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, supra note 3.
[8]
We derived the concept of just compensation from the last clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which reads: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the government from taking its citizens' property; rather, it merely prohibits
the government from taking property without paying just compensation. (26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain 3,
citing Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. U.S., 168 F.3d 1209 [10th Cir. 1999].) It is designed to secure compensation, not
to limit governmental interference with property rights. (Id., citing Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 914,
108 L. Ed. 2d 1 [1990].) It prevents the legislature (and other government actors) from depriving private persons
of vested property rights except for a "public use" and upon payment of "just compensation." (Id., citing Landgraf
v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1522, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229 [1994].)
[9]
G.R. No. 157206, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 102, 116-117.
[10]
Id.
[11]
P86,900,925.88 for the land of AFC and P164,478,178.14 for HPI.
[12]
Land Bank v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 148892, May 6, 2010.
[13]
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla, supra note 9, at 117.
[14]
G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 611.
[15]
Id. at 622-623.
[16]
G. R. Nos. 60225-26, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 542.
[17]
In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78), we said:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan
or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing.Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on
the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of
6% per annum.No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except
when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the
 claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only
from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may
be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate
of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per
annumfrom such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
[18]
Supra note 12.
[19]
G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 494.
[20]
G.R. No. 140160, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 67.
[21]
G.R. No. 147245, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 516.
[22]
G.R. No. 157753, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 449.
[23]
G.R. No. 173392, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 198.
[24]
G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214.
[25]
Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467; J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, No. L-
21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413; Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, No. L-35861, October 18,
1979, 93 SCRA 503; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, No. L-55166, May 21, 1987, 150 SCRA 89.
[26]
Supra note 14.
[27]
Supra note 19.
[28]
Supra note 22.
[29]
Supra note 14.
[30]
Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of the
Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanisms Therefor.
[31]
Rules and Regulations Governing the Grant of Increment of Six Percent (6%) Yearly Interest Compounded
Annually on Lands Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (Effective October 21,
1994). Amended by DAR AO No. 02, series of 2004 (Issued on November 4, 2004).
[32]
Article 1229 states: The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor.
[33]
Republic v. Juan, G.R. No. L-24740, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 26; citing 30 CJS 230.
[34]
See Parent-Teachers Association of St. Mathew Christian Academy v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., G.R.
No. 176518, March 2, 2010, citing Tirazona v. Philippine EDS Techno-Service, Inc. (PET, Inc.), G.R. No.
169712, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 625, 626.
[35]
Rollo, p. 1337.
[36]
Equitable Banking Corp. v. Sadac, G.R. No. 164772, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 380, 416-417.
[37]
G.R. No. 82467, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 510.
[38]
G.R. No. L-72670, September 12, 1986, 144 SCRA 43.
[39]
G.R. No. L-63318, August 18, 1984, 131 SCRA 200.
[40]
G.R. No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.
[41]
G.R. No. L-58011, November 18, 1983, 125 SCRA 577.
[42]
G.R No. L-64276, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 396.
[43]
G.R. No. L-18452, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 207.
[44]
G.R. No. 125451, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 741.
[45]
434 Phil. 753 (2002).
[46]
G.R. No. 162335, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468.
[47]
482 Phil. 903 (2004).
[48]
Id. at 915.
[49]
Oral arguments at the Supreme Court, Hacienda Luisita case, G.R. No. 171101, August 26, 2010.
[50]
Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43511, July 28, 1976, 72 SCRA 121; Mc Entee v. Manotoc, G.R. No.
L-14968, October 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 279; Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-40098, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA
441.
[51]
G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1998, 292 SCRA 38.
[52]
Id. at 51-52.
[53]
326 Phil. 182 (1996).
[54]
Id. at 191.
[55]
Supra note 47.