[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

DALAM PERKARA MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR

BAHRU

DALAM NEGERI JOHOR, MALAYSIA

[GUAMAN SIVIL NO. : JA-21NCVC-11-04/2019]

BETWEEN

1. KAMARUL RAMLI AFIQ BIN KAMSANI

(Menyaman melalui wakil litigasi, PASIAH BINTI
SUKAMAR)
2. PASIAH BINTI SUKAMAR … PLAINTIFFS

AND

1. TEH HUAT KEE (NO K/P: 10426105073)

2. GOH YAH HOE (NO K/P: 671231-10-5342)
3. LOK SHEH LEE (NO K/P: 811005-14-5436)
4. JINTAR TRADING SDN BHD (NO SYARIKAT: 385526-P)
(Dibubarkan dibawah Seksyen 308(2) Akta Syarikat 1965 melalui
Notis Pendaftar Syarikat bertarikh 23/10/2015)
5. PENDAFTAR SURUHANJAYA SYARIKAT MALAYSIA
6. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA … DEFENDANTS

GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

The Application

[1] This is an application (“the Application”) by the Fifth

Defendant, the Registrar of the Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia,

1
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

to strike out the Plaintiffs’ Writ and Statement of Claim under

Order 18 rule 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“Rules of
Court”), which reads:

Rule 19. Striking out pleadings and endorsements

(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to

be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement,
of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in
the endorsement, on the ground that –

(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or

defence, as the case may be;

(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious:

(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial

of the action; or

(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the

Court, and may order the action to be stayed or
dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as
the case may be.

[2] I dismissed the Application and the following are my reasons:

The brief facts

[3] The First Plaintiff’s claim is for general and special damages as
a result of a motor accident (“the Accident”) on 15 September
2016, between motorcycle bearing registration number JLJ 4647
which he was riding, and a lorry bearing registration number
WCF 7617 (“the Lorry”) owned by the Fourth Defendant and
driven by the First Defendant. The Second Plaintiff (who is the

2
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

mother of the First Plaintiff), and First Defendant lodged police

reports pertaining to the accident.

[4] As a result of the accident, the First Plaintiff was paralysed and
the Second Plaintiff suffered nervous shock upon hearing of
such news.

[5] The Plaintiffs’ case was that, if not for Fifth Defendant’s
breaches of sections 308-311 of the Companies Act 1965 (“the
Companies Act”), the Fourth Defendant’s name would have been
struck off the Register as prescribed by section 308(4) of the
Companies Act (found in section 549 of the Companies Act
2016), and as such, the Lorry would have been disposed of by
the Fifth Defendant, as stipulated in section 311 of the
Companies Act (found in section 558 of the Companies Act
2016). The Lorry, therefore, would not have been driven by the
First Defendant fraudulently without insurance, and
consequently, the accident would never have happened.

The Law

[6] The law on striking out is trite and has been distilled by
Mohamed Dzaiddin SCJ (as he then was) in the Supreme Court
case of Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan
Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7, [1993] 3 MLJ 36, in
the following words:

The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its

power under any of the four limbs of O. 18 r. 19(1) Rules
of the High Court are well settled. It is only in plain and
obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary
process under this rule (per Lindley M.R. in Hubbuck v.
Wilkinson [1899] 1 QB 86, p. 91), and this summary

3
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen

that a claim or answer is on the face of it “obviously
unsustainable” (Attorney- General of Duchy of Lancaster
v. L. & N.W. Ry. Co. [1892] 3 Ch. 274, CA). It cannot be
exercised by a minute examination of the documents and
facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a
cause of action or a defence (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1
WLR 1238; [1965] 2 All ER 871, CA.). The authorities
further show that if there is a point of law which requires
serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the
pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33
r. 3 (which is in pari materia with our O. 33 r. 2 Rules of
the High Court) (Hubbuck v. Wilkinson) (supra). The Court
must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of
action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that
the defences raised are not arguable.

[Emphasis added.]

[7] Reference is also made to the Federal Court case of Seruan

Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul
Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 CLJ 1, where it was stated by Ramly
Ali FCJ:

The principles for striking out pleadings pursuant to O. 18

r. 19 of the ROC are well settled. It is only in a plain and
obvious case that recourse should be had to the summary
process under this rule; and this summary process can only
be adopted when it can clearly be seen that a claim on the
face of it is obviously unsustainable (see Bandar Builder
(supra), Hubbuck & Sons Ltd. v. Wilkinson, Heywood &
Clard Ltd [1889] 1 QB 86; Attorney General of the Duchy

4
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

of Lancester. v. London and North Western Railway

Company [1892] 3 Ch 274).

The test for striking out application under O. 18 r. 19 of

the ROC as adopted by the Supreme Court in Bandar
Builder (supra) are inter alia as follows:

a) it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse

should be had to the summary process under the rule;

b) this summary procedure can only be adopted when it

can be clearly seen that a claim or answers is on the
face of it ‘obviously unsustainable’ (emphasis
added);

c) it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the

documents and facts of the case in order to see
whether the party has a cause of action or a defence;
and

d) If there is a point of law which requires serious

discussion, an objection should be taken on the
pleadings and the point set down for argument under
O. 33 r. 3 of the ROC; and

e) The court must be satisfied that there is no

reasonable cause of action or that the claims are
frivolous or vexatious or that defenses raised are not
arguable.

[Emphasis added.]

[8] The question is what do these phrases in Order 18 Rule 19 (1)

mean? ‘Scandalous’ generally refers to matters which
improperly cause a derogatory light on someone, usually a party

5
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

to an action with respect to moral character or uses repulsive

language; ‘frivolous or vexatious’ generally refer to a
groundless action of the statement with no prospect of success,
often raised to embarrass or annoy the other party to on action;
and ‘abuse of the process of the court’ generally refer to
situations where the court’s process is used for an unlawful
object and not for the actual purpose intended to active justice:
per Ramly Ali JCA (as he then was) in See Thong & Anor v. Saw
Beng Chong [2013] 3 MLJ 235.

[9] It was further explained by Ramly Ali JCA in the same case:

Judges dealing with striking out application under O. 18 r.

19 of the RHC must always bear in mind that the power to
strike a case under the order without having to go for trial
should be exercised sparingly and only in a plain and
obvious case. The procedure is of a summary nature. The
party affected should not be deprived of his right to have
his case proceeded by a proper trial unless the claim is
obviously unsustainable. The Federal Court in the case of
CC Ng & Brothers Sdn Bhd v. Government of State of
Pahang [1985] 1 MLJ 347, had said that ‘the inherent
power to dismiss an action summarily without permitting
the plaintiff to proceed to trial is a drastic power. It should
be exercised with utmost caution’ — Per Seah FJ. It is a
power which ought to be very sparingly exercised and only
in very exceptional cases, (per Lord Herschell in Lawrence
v. Norrey — as cited in CC Ng & Brothers).

Some judges described the power to strike out the

plaintiff’s claim as ‘draconian’ — in the sense that the
plaintiff is being deprived completely from having his day
in the court of law to establish his claim by adducing

6
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

evidence and calling of witnesses. If not properly

exercised, the court in effect as closing its door for the
plaintiff to have his recourse to justice. If the application
by the defendant is dismissed, the case will still go for
trial and the defendant will still has his second bite of the
cherry during trial. On the other hand, if the application is
allowed and the case is struck out (as in the present case
before us) the plaintiff will obviously loss everything,
particularly when the plaintiff cannot refile the claim
because of limitation issue.

[Emphasis added.]

[10] It is, therefore, well established that the power of the Court to
strike out is exercised only when a claim is obviously
unsustainable, and that such power should be invoked sparingly
(see Affin Bank Bhd v. Eye Bee Sdn Bhd [2005] 1 LNS 291,
[2005] 7 MLJ 1; and Metroplex Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Commerce
International Merchant Bankers Bhd [2013] 8 CLJ 329, [2013] 4
MLJ 520).

Contentions and findings

[11] The Plaintiffs’ case is that, based on a search on the Lorry at the
Road Transport Department (“JPJ”), the Fourth Defendant was
not covered by insurance; and a further search at the Companies
Commission of Malaysia (“SSM”) revealed that a letter dated 29
April 2013 (exhibited as PBS-7 attached to the Affidavit-in-
Reply of the Plaintiffs dated 10 September 2019, deposed to by
the Second Plaintiff) was issued to the Fourth Defendant
pursuant to section 308(1) of the Companies Act. This was
followed by another letter dated 23 October 2015 (exhibited as

7
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

PBS-8 attached to the Affidavit-in-Reply of the Plaintiffs dated

10 September 2019, deposed to by the Second Plaintiff).

[12] The Plaintiffs contended that consequent to the letter dated 29

April 2013, the Fifth Defendant should have struck the Fourth
Defendant’s name off the Register as prescribed by section
308(4) of the Companies Act, and consequently, should have
disposed of the Lorry, a duty stipulated in section 311 of the
Companies Act (found in section 558 of the Companies Act
2016).

[13] The Plaintiffs’ submitted that the Fifth Defendant had breached
his statutory duty by failing to strike the Fourth Defendant’s
name off the Register as prescribed by section 308(4) of the
Companies Act. Section 308 reads:

Section 308 – Power of Registrar to strike defunct

company off register

(1) Where the Registrar has reasonable cause to believe

that a company is not carrying on business or is not
in operation, he may send to the company by post a
letter to that effect and stating that if an answer
showing cause to the contrary is not received within
one month from the date thereof a notice will be
published in the Gazette with a view to striking the
name of the company off the register.

(2) Unless the Registrar receives an answer within one

month from the date of the letter to the effect that the
company is carrying on business or is in operation,
he may publish in the Gazette and send to the
company by registered post a notice that at the
expiration of three months from the date of that

8
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

notice the name of the company mentioned therein

will, unless cause is shown to the contrary, be struck
off the register and the company will be dissolved.

(3) If in any case where a company is being wound up

the Registrar has reasonable cause to believe that-

a. no liquidator is acting;

b. the affairs of the company are fully wound up

and for a period of six months the liquidator
has been in default in lodging any return
required to be made by him; or

c. the affairs of the company have been fully

wound up under Division 2 and there are no
assets or the assets available are not sufficient
to pay the costs of obtaining an order of the
Court dissolving the company,

He may publish in the Gazette and send to the

company or the liquidator, if any, a notice to the
same effect as that referred to in subsection (2).

(4) At the expiration of the time mentioned in the notice

the Registrar may, unless cause to the contrary is
previously shown, strike the name of the company
off the register, and shall publish notice thereof in
the Gazette, and on the publication in the Gazette of
this notice the company shall be dissolved; but

a. the liability, if any, of every officer and

member of the company shall continue and may
be enforced as if the company had not been
dissolved; and

9
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

b. nothing in this subsection shall affect the power

of the Court to wind up a company, the name of
which has been struck off the register

(5) If any person feels aggrieved by the name of the

company having been struck off the register, the
Court on an application made by the person at any
time within fifteen years after the name of the
company has been so struck off may, if satisfied that
the company was, at the time of the striking off,
carrying on business or in operation or otherwise that
it is just that the name of the company to be restored
to the register, order the name of the company to be
restored to the register, and upon an office copy of
the order being lodged with the Registrar the
company shall be deemed to have continued in
existence as if its name had not been struck off, and
the Court may by the order give such directions and
make such provisions as seem just for placing the
company and all other persons in the same position
as nearly as may be as if the name of the company
had not been struck off.

(6) A notice to be sent under this section to a liquidator

may be addressed to the liquidator at his last known
place of business, and a letter or notice to be sent
under this section to a company may be addressed to
the company at its registered office or, if no office
has been registered, to the care of some officer of the
company, or if there is no officer of the company
whose name and address are known to the Registrar,
may be sent to each of the persons who subscribed to

10
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

the memorandum of the company, addressed to him

at the address mentioned in the memorandum.

[14] The Plaintiffs further claimed that since the letter dated 29 April
2013 was sent to the Fourth Defendant, the Fifth Defendant
should have, therefore, proceeded under section 308(4) of the
Companies Act to publish a notice in the Gazette when the
Fourth Defendant did not show any ‘cause to the contrary’
within 30 days from the material date, that is, 29 April 2013. By
virtue of such publication, the Fourth Defendant should have
been dissolved; and upon such dissolution, pursuant to section
310(1) of the Companies Act, the Lorry would have vested in
the Fifth Defendant, to be disposed of according to section 311
of the Companies Act.

[15] The Plaintiff contended that the Fifth Defendant’s breach of

statutory duties, therefore, extended to sections 309, 310, and
311 of the Companies Act (found in sections 556, 557 and 558
of the Companies Act 2016), and that if not for such breaches,
the Lorry would not have been driven by the First Defendant
fraudulently without insurance, and that the accident would
never have happened. The sections read:

Section 309 – Registrar to act as representative of defunct

company in certain events

1) Where after a company has been dissolved, it is

proved to the satisfaction of the Registrar-

(a) that the company if still existing would be legally or

equitably bound to carry out, complete or give effect
to some dealing, transaction or matter; and

11
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

(b) that in order to carry out, complete or give effect

thereto some purely administrative act, not
discretionary, should have been done by or on behalf
of the company, or should be done by or on behalf of
the company if still existing,

the Registrar may, as representing the company or its

liquidator under this section, do or cause to be done
any such act.

(2) The Registrar may execute or sign any relevant

instrument or document adding a memorandum
stating that he has done so in pursuance of this
section, and the execution or signature shall have the
same force, validity and effect as if the company if
existing had duly executed such instrument or
document.

************

Section 310 – Outstanding assets of defunct company to

vest in Registrar

(1) Where, after a company has been dissolved, there

remains any outstanding property, movable or
immovable, including things in action and whether
within or outside Malaysia which was vested in the
company or to which it was entitled, or over which it
had a disposing power at the time it was so
dissolved, but which was not got in, realized upon or
otherwise disposed of or dealt with by the company
or its liquidator, the property except called and
uncalled capital shall, for the purposes of the
following sections of this Subdivision and

12
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

notwithstanding any written law or rule of law to the

contrary, by the operation of this section be and
become vested in the Registrar for all the estate and
interest therein, legal or equitable, of the company or
its liquidator at the date the company was dissolved,
together with all claims, rights and remedies which
the company or its liquidator then had in respect
thereof.

(2) Where any claim, right or remedy of the liquidator

may, under this Act, be made, exercised or availed of
only with the approval or concurrence of the Court or
some other person, the Registrar may, for the
purposes of this section, make, exercise or avail
himself of that claim, right or remedy without that
approval or concurrence.

************

Section 311 – Outstanding interests in property how

disposed of

(1) Upon proof to the satisfaction of the Registrar that

there is vested in him by operation of section 310 or
by operation of any corresponding previous written
law or of a law of a designated country
corresponding with section 318 any estate or interest
in property, whether solely or together with any other
person, of a beneficial nature and not merely held in
trust, the Registrar may sell or otherwise dispose of
or deal with such estate or interest or any part thereof
as he sees fit.

13
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

(2) The Registrar may sell or otherwise dispose of or

deal with the property either solely or in concurrence
with any other person in such manner for such
consideration by public auction, public tender or
private contract upon such terms and conditions as he
thinks fit, with power to rescind any contract and
resell or otherwise dispose of or deal with such
property as he thinks expedient, and may make,
execute, sign and give such contracts, instruments
and documents as he thinks necessary.

(3) The Registrar shall be remunerated by such

commission, whether by way of percentage or
otherwise, as is prescribed in respect of the exercise
of the powers conferred upon him by subsection (1).

(4) The moneys received by the Registrar in the exercise

of any of the powers conferred on him by this
Subdivision shall be applied in defraying all costs,
expenses, commission and fees incidental thereto and
thereafter to any payment authorized by this
Subdivision and the surplus, if any, shall be dealt
with as if they were unclaimed moneys under the law
relating to unclaimed moneys.

[16] The Plaintiffs submitted, therefore, that their pleadings rendered

necessary the interpretation and application of sections 308-311
of the Companies Act.

[17] The gist of the Fifth Defendant’s submission was that he was not
liable for the damages claimed by the Plaintiffs since he was not
involved in this accident at all; that he was only responsible for
striking the Fourth Defendant’s name off the Register; and that
he was protected from liability since such responsibility was

14
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

purely an administrative one, and was done in good faith. The

Fifth Defendant further contended that any other duties and
responsibilities were beyond his scope and functions as
prescribed by the law.

[18] The Fifth Defendant also submitted that the letter dated 23
October 2015 was sent pursuant to section 308(2) of the
Companies Act, and that by virtue of such provision, the Fourth
Defendant was not dissolved as at 15 September 2016, that is,
the date of the Accident.

[19] The Plaintiff, however, submitted that the Fifth Defendant in

acting under section 308(2) had acted ultra vires as he had not
complied with the procedure as prescribed by section 308(1) and
(4) of the Companies Act.

[20] It is also pertinent to note that at this juncture, the issue for
consideration is not whether the Fifth Defendant is liable for
breach of its statutory duties, but whether the Plaintiffs have a
reasonable cause of action.

[21] The Plaintiffs have also prayed for the following declarations,
namely,

a) That the Fifth Defendant had not complied with section

308(1), or other subsections thereof, of the Companies
Act, in failing to strike the Fourth Defendant’s name off
the Register;

b) That the procedure employed by the Fifth Defendant to

strike the Fourth Defendant’s name off the Register was
wrong and that the Fifth Defendant in acting as such, was
not only negligent and lacked good faith, he had also
offended the letter and spirit of the law promulgated in

15
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

section 308(1) of the Companies Act, and other related and

applicable sections;

c) That all damages and losses suffered by the Plaintiffs due

to the Accident were also attributable to the Fifth
Defendant’s failure to strike the Fourth Defendant’s name
off the Register, pursuant to section 308(4) of the
Companies Act, and other applicable and related
provisions;

[22] The Plaintiffs sought these Declarations pursuant to section 41

of the Specific Relief Act 1950, which reads:

Section 41 – Discretion of court as to declaration of status

or right

Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right

as to any property, may institute a suit against any person
denying, or interested to deny, his title to the character or
right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a
declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not
in that suit ask for any further relief:

Provided that no court shall make any such declaration

where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a
mere declaration or title, omits to do so.

[23] ‘A declaratory judgment states the rights or legal position of the

parties as they stand without altering them in any way. By virtue
of section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 and Order 15 rule
16 of the Rules of Court 2012, the Court’s jurisdiction to make
declaratory order is unlimited, subject only to its own
discretion. The court has power to grant a declaration
irrespective of whether an application has a cause of action or

16
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

not and even if a cause of action did not exist at the time of
filing the application’: per Low Hop Bing JCA in Dato’ Raja
Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors v. Teng Chang Kim & Ors [2012] 2
CLJ 288, CA. Although the Court of Appeal was overruled by
the Federal Court in Teng Chang Kim & Ors v. Dato’ Raja
Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors [2014] 3 CLJ 173, the restatement by
the Court of Appeal on the declaratory powers of the High Court
remains good law.

[24] Based on Kuluwante (An Infant) v. Government Of Malaysia

[1978] 1 MLJ 92, the court in exercise of its inherent
supervisory jurisdiction, has the general power to award
declaratory judgments in order to ensure decisions by statutory
tribunals whether judicial or administrative, are made according
to the law. Such remedy is available in cases where a statutory
tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in
breach of natural justice. The remedy is not excluded by the fact
that any determination is by statute made final.

[25] In order to determine whether such declaration should be

granted, it is vital to first determine whether there was breach of
statutory duty. It is, therefore, necessary for the Court to hear
the evidence, and without so, it would not be possible to say
whether the Plaintiffs would succeed or fail.

[26] A perusal of the pleadings indicates that the Plaintiffs have

raised, inter alia, the following issues, which do not render their
case an obviously unsustainable one:

a) Whether the Fifth Defendant had a statutory

obligation under section 308 of the Companies Act;

b) What are the duties of the Fifth Defendant and had

they been breached;

17
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

c) What was the proper procedure to strike the Fourth

Defendant’s name off the Register;

d) Whether the Fifth Defendant had acted ultra vires

section 308(1),(2) and (4) of the Companies Act;

e) Whether sections 309, 310 and 311 of the Companies

Act applied; and

f) Whether the Plaintiffs’ claims were pursuant to

private law or public law

[27] The Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim and the Reply to the Defence
of the Fifth Defendant reveal that the pleadings contain an
allegation of facts and issues of law which are necessary to be
ventilated at trial. The Plaintiffs have established that their
cause of action against the Fifth Defendant is not “hopeless,
baseless or without foundation in law”; and is not a case that is
“obviously unsustainable”; and is neither scandalous or
frivolous and vexatious. There are triable issues of whether the
Fifth Defendant had breached his statutory duty by failing to
strike the Fourth Defendant’s name off the Register, and selling
the Lorry after the Fourth Defendant was dissolved, as provided
by the Companies Act.

[28] It must also be remembered that for the Application to succeed,

the claim on the face of it must be ‘obviously unsustainable’.
The operative word is ‘obviously’, that is, the degree of
unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without
having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail.

[29] In my view, the Plaintiffs’ case against the Fifth Defendant

requires mature and detailed consideration of the issues of law
and fact to determine the Fifth Defendant’s liability (or lack

18
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

thereof), and the proximity or remoteness of damage. This

would mean that such issues must be determined at trial and
should not be struck out summarily.

Conclusion

[30] Bearing in mind that the power of the Court to strike out has
been described as ‘drastic’ and ought to be exercised with
‘utmost caution’: per Seah J in Lee Nyan Choi v. Voon Noon
[1979] 2 MLJ 28, FC, after careful consideration of both oral
and documentary evidence, as well as submissions by Counsel
for both parties, in my view, the Plaintiffs’ case is not an
obviously unsustainable one.

[31] The Application is, therefore, dismissed with costs in the sum of
MYR2,000 (subject to allocatur fees).

Dated: 7 FEBRUARY 2020

(EVROL MARIETTE PETERS)

Judicial Commissioner
High Court, Johor Bahru

COUNSEL:

For the plaintiff – Haffirrudin Osman; M/s Haffirrudin Osman & Co

For the fifth defendant – Rizal Jafry Isa (Legal Officer); Suruhanjaya
Syarikat Malaysia

Cases referred to:

 Affin Bank Bhd v. Eye Bee Sdn Bhd [2005] 1 LNS 291, [2005] 7
MLJ 1

19
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

 Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking

Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7, [1993] 3 MLJ 36

 Dato’ Raja Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors v. Teng Chang Kim & Ors
[2012] 2 CLJ 288

 Kuluwante (An Infant) v. Government Of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ

92

 Lee Nyan Choi v. Voon Noon [1979] 2 MLJ 28

 Metroplex Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Commerce International

Merchant Bankers Bhd [2013] 8 CLJ 329, [2013] 4 MLJ 520

 See Thong & Anor v. Saw Beng Chong [2013] 3 MLJ 235

 Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Pahang

Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 CLJ 1

 Teng Chang Kim & Ors v. Dato’ Raja Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors
[2014] 3 CLJ 173

Legislation referred to:

Companies Act 1965, sections 308-311

Companies Act 2016, sections 549, 556-558

Rules of Court 2012, Order 15 rule 16, Order 18 rule 19,

Specific Relief Act 1950, section 41

Case(s) referred to:

Affin Bank Bhd v. Eye Bee Sdn Bhd [2005] 1 LNS 291, [2005] 7 MLJ
1

20
[2020] 1 LNS 212 Legal Network Series

Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking

Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7, [1993] 3 MLJ 36

Dato' Raja Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors v. Teng Chang Kim & Ors
[2012] 2 CLJ 288

Kuluwante (An Infant) v. Government Of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 92

Lee Nyan Choi v. Voon Noon [1979] 2 MLJ 28

Metroplex Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Commerce International Merchant

Bankers Bhd [2013] 8 CLJ 329, [2013] 4 MLJ 520

See Thong & Anor v. Saw Beng Chong [2013] 3 MLJ 235

Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul

Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 CLJ 1

Teng Chang Kim & Ors v. Dato' Raja Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors
[2014] 3 CLJ 173

Legislation referred to:

Companies Act 2016, ss. 308(1)(2)(4), 310, 311, 318, 549, 558

Specific Relief Act 1950, s. 41

Rules of Court 2012, O. 18 r. 19(1)

21