The evolution of international political

economy

AMANDA DICKINS *

International political economy (IPE) is a field much absorbed by theoretical

questions and, perhaps as a consequence, has become divided. There is potential
strength in the diversity this creates—but only if scholars are willing and able
to converse across the divide. I outline a folk taxonomy of the field and discuss
recent developments in IPE theory: developments that could and should facilitate
conversation between the different types of scholar. I argue that empirical work
is much enriched when the object of study is viewed from different theoretical
standpoints; focusing on human biotechnology, I show how different IPE perspec-
tives shed light on the vivid challenge of the growing global ‘bioeconomy’ and the
political economy of commerce in human tissue.

The early evolution of IPE

Critique has propelled the evolution of IPE.1 It is, of course, central to the self-
understanding of those practising critical IPE. Less well remembered is that the
field itself was conceived as a critique of the failure of International Relations
scholars to engage with the international economy.2 IPE emerged as the interna-
tional economy developed apace in the 1960s, sparking interest in the politics of the
international economy. The emerging field drew upon diverse sources, including
economics and history as well as international relations, manifesting a disciplinary
promiscuity that remains a feature to this day. A feature of early IPE that has not
survived, however, is the engagement that knit together an ‘extensive invisible
college’ of pioneering scholars.3 As this invisible college unravelled, two types of
* I would like to thank Duncan Bell, Jacqueline Best, Simon Morris, Amrita Narlikar and Chandra Sriram for
helpful comments and important insights on the subjects addressed in this article.
1
For detailed discussion see Geoffrey Underhill, ‘State, market, and global political economy: genealogy of an
(inter-?) discipline’, International Affairs 76: 4, 2000, pp. 805–24; Nicola Phillips, ‘“Globalizing” the study of
international political economy’, in Nicola Phillips, ed., Globalizing international political economy (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
2
See e.g. Susan Strange, ‘International economics and international relations: a case of mutual neglect’, Inter-
national Affairs 46: 2, 1970, pp. 304–15.
3
Susan Strange, States and markets (London: Pinter, 1988). Her remarks about the invisible college were cited
with approval by Robert Keohane in his foreword to her Festschrift, Strange power, eds, Thomas Lawton, James
Rosenau and Amy Verdun (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).

International Affairs 82, 3 (2006) 479–492 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
Amanda Dickins
IPE scholar emerged.4 Although their range overlaps, one type predominates in
the United States and the other in the United Kingdom and Canada.
The predominant type in the United States is the rationalist species, Ratiosaurus
rex. Interactions between states are its traditional dietary staple, and members of
this species have evolved sharply defined formal models and powerful quantitative
tools to help them to cut through the complexities of interstate competition and
digest the incentives for international collaboration.5 Voracious for data, problem-
solving by inclination,6 Ratiosaurus nonetheless devotes at least as much energy
to theoretical debate as to empirical work.7 Many are especially fond of theories
relating to the role of hegemony in stabilizing the international economy and in
creating or shoring up its framework of governing institutions, a preference that
may derive from the hegemonic features of their natural habitat.
By contrast, members of the diverse critical species that comprise the genus
Querimonia, dominant in the United Kingdom and Canada, expend much effort
uncovering the hidden workings of hegemony, both the international hegemony
of the United States and the intellectual hegemony of Ratiosaurus, and in exposing
the distasteful effects of both. In taxonomy, a genus is a group of species exhib-
iting similar characteristics: the genius of this genus lies in problem-posing, rather
than problem-solving. Numerous species of varied theoretical origin discovered
common purpose, if not unity, in their antipathy towards the reign of Ratiosaurus.
Many can trace their dragon-fighting lineage to Susan Strange, and the work they
produce is deliberately critical, self-consciously normative, and often focused on
the structures of (global) capitalism.
Despite their common origins, Ratiosaurus and Querimonia appear happy to
remain separate and there is very little exchange between them. Ratiosaurus remains
largely oblivious to the existence, let alone the charms, of Querimonia, while the
members of Querimonia remain bound by their shared hostility towards Ratio-
saurus. Nonetheless, the lines of recent developments in IPE may be spun into
threads with which to reknit the invisible college.

4
Textbooks often introduce three IPE ‘theories’, typically realism, liberalism and Marxism. However, this
taxonomy is unhelpful. First, the forms of realism and liberalism prevalent in contemporary IPE, namely neo-
realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, share a common analytical approach. Second, the alternatives to this
‘neo-neo’ synthesis encompass a good deal more variety than the Marxist label suggests. Cf. Craig Murphy
and Douglas Nelson, ‘A tale of two heterodoxies’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 3: 3, 2001,
pp. 393–412.
5
In the United States, IPE has become so thoroughly identified with its methodology that ‘IPE’ has become an
ambiguous term that may indicate the politics of the international economy and/or the Ratiosaurus approach to
international politics. See Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner, ‘International Organization
and the study of world politics’, in ‘International Organization at Fifty’, special issue, International Organization
52: 4, 1998, pp. 645–85.
6
See Robert Cox, ‘Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory’, Millennium
10: 2, 1981, pp. 128–9. Also published in Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its critics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986).
7
See Murphy and Nelson, ‘A tale of two heterodoxies’.

480
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
The evolution of international political economy

Recent developments in IPE

The postwar development of the international economy gave birth to IPE; the
post-Cold War development of the international economy has seeded change in
the field. The end of the Cold War smoothed the path for economic liberalization,
enlarging the sphere of international economic exchange and expanding the remit
and membership of the institutions that facilitate such exchange. In the absence of
a strong communist other, the differences within capitalism have been thrown into
relief and, as we experience greater integration within the international economy,
attention has refocused on normative questions: the triumph of neo-liberalism
has exposed its flaws and its dominance permits even adherents to indulge in
criticism.
Ratiosaurus and Querimonia have responded in their own distinctive styles, but
there are parallels in the lines of their development, even though they do not
converge. These parallels derive, in part, from the need to respond to changes in
their common environment. For example, it is difficult to analyse the impact of
transnational economic flows without drawing on an understanding of domestic
political economy. Forward-looking IPE scholars of all types are calling for the
integration of comparative and international political economy, to create global
political economy, new (international) political economy or, simply, political
economy ‘not unduly encumbered by prefixes’.8 However, the form of this integra-
tion differs. A common analytical framework and similar technical approach
enables Ratiosaurs to integrate their work with that of their close cousins in the
rationalist school of comparative political economy.9 In contrast, Querimonia frame
the engagement with comparative political economy as a reintegration and a return
to classical political economy, drawing on their strengths in political thought,
social theory and historical analysis.10
Whether framed as a merger between analytical fields or as a return to classical
political economy, the common call to integrate comparative and international
political economy is a striking parallel in the evolution of Ratiosaurus and Queri-
monia. Such parallels suggest that there may be scope to rebuild the invisible
college, to renew the exchange between them, despite their differences. Indeed,
the motivation for rebuilding lies in their differences: for it is these that create the
8
See e.g. Robert Gilpin, Global political economy: understanding the international economic order (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001); Ronen Palan, ed., Global political economy: contemporary theories (London: Routledge,
2000); also Barry Gills, ‘Re-orienting the new (international) political economy’, New Political Economy 6: 2,
2001, pp. 233–45. Those calling for, simply, ‘political economy’ include Nicola Phillips, ‘Whither IPE?’, in
Phillips, ed., Globalizing international political economy, p. 252, and Geoffrey Underhill, ‘Conceptualising the
changing global order’, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill, eds, Political economy and the changing global
order, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
9
See Helen Milner, ‘Rationalizing politics: the emerging synthesis among international, American, and
comparative politics’, International Organization 52: 4, 1998, pp. 759–86; and Katzenstein et al., ‘International
Organization and the study of world politics’. For examples of this work, see Robert Keohane and Helen
Milner, eds, Internationalization and domestic politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Mapping
the membership of organized sections in the American Political Science Association uncovers ‘a small but
united concentration of political economy research that lies between comparative politics and international
relations’. J. Tobin Grant, ‘What divides us? The image and organization of political science’, PS: Political
Science & Politics 38: 3, 2005, pp. 379–86.
10
See Underhill, ‘State, market’ and ‘Conceptualising’.

481
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
Amanda Dickins
scope for mutually beneficial exchange. There is less to learn from someone whose
work and approach precisely mirrors one’s own. In order to learn, however, one
must be willing to expend the effort required to understand what others have to
offer. Such willingness has been in short supply on both sides, but recent develop-
ments suggest that spirits, at least, may become more willing: Ratiosaurs, forced
to face normative questions, should become more open to critical approaches;
meanwhile the members of Querimonia have developed an identity independent
of their opposition to Ratiosaurus, which should enable them to deploy rationalist
tools of analysis without fear of losing their identity in the process.
The growth of the global economy creates questions of how to manage or
regulate transnational economic flows and, ever the problem-solvers, Ratiosaurs
have become much preoccupied with global governance.11 Global governance,
however, pushes Ratiosaurs to explore unfamiliar, overtly normative terri-
tory. For the neo-liberal Keohane: ‘the question of governance is one of how
the various institutions and processes of global society could be meshed more
effectively, in a way that would be regarded as legitimate’.12 From his realist perspec-
tive, Gilpin observes: ‘Governance first and last is about the exercise of power to
achieve political, social, and other objectives. Every scheme to govern the global
economy, therefore, must confront the fundamental question: Governance for
what?’13 While Ratiosaurs have advanced on the empirical instrumental questions
of governance with their formidable armoury of analytical tools, they are less
adapted to tackle these normative questions regarding the legitimacy or purposes
of global governance. The Ratiosaurs have traditionally understood their project
as one of objective social science, defined by a division of labour that allots norma-
tive debate to specialist political philosophers, but this neat division of labour is
difficult to maintain.14 Swifter-footed Ratiosaurs have sought to engage with
political philosophers who can help them unpack the normative issues.15 They
have yet to engage with the members of Querimonia, of whose work they appear
to remain largely oblivious, but their new awareness of normative questions and
exposure to the complex relationship between the empirical and the normative
should make them more open to critical approaches.

11
Ever the bellwether, Keohane predicts: ‘the subject of our study will be less individual states and their poli-
cies than governance at various levels’. Robert Keohane, ‘APSA presidents reflect on political science: from
international to world politics’, Perspectives on Politics 3: 2, June 2005, pp. 316–17.
12
Robert Keohane, ‘Introduction’, in Power and governance in a partially globalized world (London: Routledge,
2002), pp. 15–16 (emphasis added).
13
Gilpin, Global political economy, p. 400 (emphasis added).
14
The relationship between normative and empirical claims is too complex to unpack here, but a couple of
observations should suffice to make the point. For example, if a political philosopher stipulates that everyone
significantly affected by a rule should have some say in the making of the rule, the question of who is significantly
affected is not simply empirical or normative but combines elements of both. Moreover, political philosophers
often make use of empirical claims to ground claims about norms, for example in arguing that the interna-
tional economy has knit us together so tightly that justice must be defined at the level of the global rather than
the national.
15
See e.g. Helen Milner’s review essay, ‘Globalization, development, and international institutions: normative
and positive perspectives’, Perspectives on Politics 3: 4, 2005, pp. 833–54. In 2006, Milner invited both empirical
scholars and political philosophers to an interdisciplinary workshop on ‘Normative and empirical evaluation
of global governance’, organized at Princeton in collaboration with Robert Keohane and Charles Beitz.

482
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
The evolution of international political economy
Meanwhile the members of Querimonia are in their element: the complex
relationships and shifting identities of the post-Cold War international economy
create a habitat favourable to their diverse habits. Normative issues are the dietary
staple for the critical species that belong to this genus, and their self-consciously
critical approach is well adapted to tease out the complex relationships between
things as they are and as they might be. Their critical drive causes them to probe
and challenge the structures of the international economy; they are more alert
to changes and to the emergence of new formations than Ratiosaurus. However,
neither type of IPE scholar has a clear evolutionary edge: Querimonia has attained
power, but Ratiosaurus is adapting and continues to retain power, both disciplinary
and intellectual.
Despite zoological echoes, my choice of taxonomic terms is not intended
to imply that Ratiosaurus is a dinosaur, unable to survive current changes in the
climate of the global economy. As Duncan Bell suggests in his contribution to
this volume, evolution is a metaphor best suited to guide historical reconstruc-
tion, rather than attempts at prediction. Those inclined, nevertheless, to indulge
their imaginations regarding the future of IPE should remember that, despite the
dramatic appeal of the extinction story, the dinosaurs did not all disappear: some
evolved, taking wing as birds.
Querimonia is maturing as a genus, developing an independent sense of identity,
one no longer defined by opposition to Ratiosaurus.16 Historical and philosophical
inclinations, always a feature of Querimonia, have led them to reinvent their tradi-
tion, claiming an intellectual lineage that extends back to the eighteenth century,
encompassing the Physiocrats and Adam Smith as well as Marx and Gramsci.17
Following the example of these august ancestors, Querimonia has branched out to
explore the broader territory of political economy beyond the confines of IPE,
now viewed as a sub-field of this more general study. Members of Querimonia are
increasingly happy to reach across internal theoretical divisions and absorb insights
from the other species within their own genus. They also remain promiscuous
in their use of other disciplines, drawing on the work of sociologists, feminist
scholars and critical theorists.18 There are, however, limits to this accepting eclec-
ticism: it does not yet encompass Ratiosaurus, and Querimonia continues to manifest
animosity towards analyses exhibiting Ratiosaur features, such as formal theory
or anything more than the most cursory quantitative evidence, even when the
analysis is designed to further some eminently laudable emancipatory goal. This
self-denying ordinance is an unnecessary handicap. Querimonia need not struggle
16
The tenth anniversary editions of the journals Review of International Political Economy (10: 4, 2003) and New
Political Economy (10: 4, 2005) mark the developing maturity of Querimonia; their contents testify to the rich
variety and range of the genus.
17
For a rich exploration of eighteenth-century political economy, including its international aspects, see Istvan
Hont, Jealousy of trade: international competition and the nation-state in historical perspective (Cambridge, MA: Belknap,
2005).
18
Amin and Palan, aroused by the charms of ‘libidinal political economy’, suggest drawing upon ‘anthropology,
psychoanalysis, literary criticism, linguistics, architecture and history of art’. Ash Amin and Ronen Palan,
‘Towards a non-rationalist international political economy’, Review of International Political Economy 8: 4, 2001,
pp. 559–77. Gills, however, warns against losing focus on the core material issues at the heart of IPE. See Gills,
‘Re-orienting’.

483
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
Amanda Dickins
to retain a foothold in the academy: it has become as dominant in British IPE
as Ratiosaurus is in the US. (Counter-hegemonic movements are not immune to
developing hegemonic tendencies of their own, even if their hegemony is regional
rather than global.) The members of Querimonia, with their critical orientation and
historical self-image, are more than strong enough to draw on Ratiosaurus methods
without losing their own identity and sense of alterity.
These recent developments in IPE have opened up the possibility of renewing
the ‘invisible college’ of IPE: as Ratiosaurs discover the complexities of norma-
tive issues, they should be prepared to engage with the critical insights offered
by Querimonia. Moreover, the development of an independent research agenda,
no longer defined by opposition to Ratiosaurus, should allow Querimonia to use,
where appropriate, the tools developed by the Ratiosaurs. Both types of IPE can
usefully borrow from the expertise developed by the other, but the benefits of
a renewed engagement have wider potential than such borrowings. There are
(meta)theoretical issues that could be explored together: for example, it would be
instructive to compare the relative merits of the industrial-style division of labour
between Ratiosaurus and normative philosophers with the undivided labour, or
craft, approach preferred by Querimonia. The ‘industrial approach’ may overlook
important issues because it oversimplifies, or it may bring clarity; while the ‘craft
approach’ may overlook features that do not fit a given critical perspective, or it may
highlight important new features. The point is that much could be learned from an
open discussion about the merits and demerits of these different approaches.
Empirical studies also provide a promising field for constructive engagement
and collaboration. One promising example of collaboration among scholars taking
different approaches is recent work on developing countries in international
economic negotiations, work undertaken with the express aim of helping these
countries make the most of their opportunities to influence negotiations. Odell
argues persuasively from a Ratiosaur perspective that the study of negotiations
must take cognizance of bounded rationality: the preferences of negotiators vary
according to the framing of the issues, creating a dynamic intersubjective aspect
to the negotiation process that is not captured in conventional models that focus
on strategic interaction. Exploring the nature of bounded rationality, particularly
in the context of aiding developing countries, is a great opportunity for Ratio-
saurus and Querimonia to share their strengths: the work of Odell and others is
proof of what can be achieved when they do.19 A scholar’s underlying theoretical
concerns may determine which questions they choose to study, but these predilec-
tions should not bind or blind the subsequent investigation: one gains nothing by
denying oneself the full range of tools with which to investigate, and exposure to
diverse theoretical perspectives brings out different aspects of a subject. As Cooley
argues, ‘the appropriateness of any given IPE method should depend upon the
19
John Odell, ed., Negotiating trade: developing countries in the WTO and NAFTA (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2006). See in particular the chapter by John Odell and Susan Sell, ‘Reframing the issue: the coalition
on intellectual property and public health in the WTO’, which uses insights from cognitive psychology to
help understand issue framing, producing an analysis that has strong parallels with constructivist international
relations.

484
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
The evolution of international political economy
research question asked, not pre-existing assumptions about the inherent advan-
tages of either rationalist or non-rationalist approaches’.20
In this section, I have described recent developments in IPE theory, empha-
sizing the fact that scholars have been calling for the integration of comparative
and international political economy from very different perspectives. I have also
argued that both Ratiosaurus and Querimonia could benefit from collaboration,
suggesting that empirical work is a particularly promising area for collaboration.
The next section illustrates the potential benefits of renewing the invisible college
by showing how insights from both types of IPE scholarship illuminate different
aspects of the (global) political economy of human biotechnology.

The global politics of the bioeconomy

The commercial exploitation of biological material presents a vivid challenge
to the institutions that frame economic exchange, the core concern of political
economy. This ‘bioeconomy’ is a highly politicized economic arena: the fault-lines
fall between as well as within societies, creating a complex global politics exacer-
bated by institutional differences and competitive pressures. At the international
level, the most visible issue has been the transatlantic tension concerning geneti-
cally modified agricultural crops, but this is merely a foretaste of the conflicts
ahead. Human biotechnology poses much greater political problems, for it involves
the preservation, manipulation, propagation and consumption of human tissue
and, in the process, the breaking of many taboos. Few arenas of economic activity
affect so many forms of politics, connecting with so many of the issues that divide
societies—notably gender and reproductive politics, culture and religion. Yet
despite these conflicts and the inherent uncertainties of the research process, the
economic potential of human biotechnology appears immense: by promising to
maintain the health (and looks) of ageing populations in the developed world, it
taps into a vast and wealthy global market.21 In the context of a growing interna-
tional commerce in the materials, products and profits of human biotechnology,
the visceral politics of the bioeconomy take on an inescapably global aspect.
In addition to their intrinsic interest, the global politics of the bioeconomy also
provide an excellent proving ground for IPE theory. They illustrate the benefits
of drawing from the fullest possible range of IPE theories: both Ratiosaurus and
Querimonia have insights to offer on the political economy of human biotech-
nology. I begin by discussing how the critically alert Querimonia have led the way
in uncovering the politics of the bioeconomy and the insights that their theoretical
perspectives offer. One of these insights is the role played by biotechnology in
the development of the competition economy, a subject that lies at the interface
between domestic and international aspects of political economy, underscoring

20
Alexander Cooley, ‘Thinking rationally about hierarchy and global governance’, Review of International Political
Economy 10: 4, 2003, pp. 672–84.
21
As with many other areas of medical research, investment in human biotechnology has been geared towards
the ageing of the wealthy and the pathologies of prosperity, rather than the problems of the poor.

485
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
Amanda Dickins
the importance of integrating comparative and international political economy. As
I go on to discuss, the competition state is also one of a number of areas where a
Ratiosaurus approach may provide a helpful perspective. Last but not least, I discuss
how the global politics of the bioeconomy draws attention to challenges for both
perspectives, highlighting areas where the work of both Ratiosaurus and Queri-
monia would benefit from further development.
The global politics of the bioeconomy are fertile ground for Querimonia, and
its nimble-footed members have been quicker to recognize the significance of the
field as a subject for IPE than the Ratiosaurs, in part because their critical antennae
are attuned to the way in which the market relies upon governance and the politics
inherent in the construction of the market.22 (They are also more aware of work in
sociology and anthropology, the fields that have pioneered the study of the social
and political impacts of science and technology.) Critical work on the politics of
the bioeconomy has drawn attention to many important aspects, including the two
highlighted here. First, it draws attention to the way in which the commercializa-
tion of human biotechnology has transformed the institutional framework of the
market, in particular our understanding of property rights and the limits of market
exchange. Second, it highlights the role of states in developing the bioeconomy as
part of a competitive strategy in the context of global economic competition, and
the role played by global capital in creating that competitive context.
The central theme for Querimonia is the relationship between states and markets:
their critical perspective reminds us that markets are social phenomena, dependent
on institutional frameworks. Human biotechnology is an extremely disruptive
technology that tests these institutions at their very foundations, providing an
opportunity to study the political conflict generated by a market in the making.
The rules and regulations that govern markets are typically complex but, at their
most basic, they must clarify the shared expectations of market participants in
two respects. First, a market relies on clearly defined property rights: who has the
right to exchange what type of good. However, there are deep divisions regarding
the propriety of constructing property rights that cover the products of human
biotechnology, whether physical or intellectual. The creation of the bioeconomy
forces societies to confront deep questions and taboos, as they redefine property
rights to deal with biomedical knowledge or the commodification of human tissue.
Querimonia has played a crucial role in broadening the scope of IPE analysis to take
in the politics of property rights, especially intellectual property rights, and devel-
oping a body of work that is extremely helpful in unpacking this aspect of the
bioeconomy.23 Second, a market is defined by its limits, by which exchanges are
‘blocked’, i.e. excluded from the legal marketplace. Most societies place limitations
22
See e.g. Rodney Loeppky, Encoding capital: the political economy of the human genome project (New York: Routledge,
2005); also two articles by Loeppky: ‘History, technology, and the capitalist state: the comparative political
economy of biotechnology and genomics’, Review of International Political Economy 12: 2, 2005, pp. 264–86, and
‘International restructuring, health and the advanced industrial state’, New Political Economy 9: 4, 2004, pp.
493–51.
23
See e.g. Christopher May, A global political economy of intellectual property rights: the new enclosures? (London:
Routledge, 2000); Christopher May and Susan Sell, Intellectual property rights: a critical history (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 2005).

486
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
The evolution of international political economy
on transactions involving human flesh, including proscriptions or limitations on
the sale of human tissue. Transactions involving human tissue are not an entirely
new phenomenon,24 but tissue engineering, the propagation and transformation of
human tissue, has opened up the potential scope for such transactions, presenting
a severe challenge to these traditional limits on market exchange. This is another
area in which scholars with a critical perspective have led the way, uncovering the
processes by which property rights in human tissue are created and the potential
exploitation of vulnerable donor populations.25
Another useful perspective offered by Querimonia is the concept of the ‘compe-
tition state’: the state restructured and refocused as a strategic response to the
pressures of global or transnational forces in an open international economy.26 It is
worth noting that the concept draws on a combination of insights from compara-
tive and international political economy, reinforcing the argument that these fields
should be (re)integrated. This restructured competition state uses supply-side
policies designed to enhance the competitiveness of the national economy, in part
by keeping it at the forefront of innovation, hoping to reap the rewards as a high-
skill ‘knowledge economy’.27 The bioeconomy provides vivid examples of the
competition state in action, with governments using regulatory and investment
policies to create or maintain an innovative lead in the field.28 Governments can
deploy regulation to boost their prospects of developing a commercial presence in
human biotechnology (the controversial nature of the industry makes the develop-
ment of a stable regulatory framework particularly difficult, but also particularly
valuable). Strategies include deregulation and reregulation, as well as the develop-
ment of new regulatory frameworks to support new areas of economic activity.
On the investment side, governments support capital accumulation with policies
including finance-friendly measures designed to boost private investment as well as
the use of public funds to support biotechnology directly and indirectly, through
spending on basic science and science infrastructure. New health technologies are
risky investments and, since the collapse of technology stocks in 2000, little private
capital has been invested in human biotechnology. Instead, venture capitalists have
joined the campaign for increased public investment,29 a phenomenon highlighted
by critical scholars, ever vigilant regarding the role played by capitalism and by
global capital in driving the development of the bioeconomy.30
24
There is evidence of blood transfusions and the transplantation of teeth taking place as far back as the seven-
teenth century, as well as the notorious trade in corpses for the anatomy schools.
25
See e.g. Waldby and Mitchell’s discussion of the use of ‘waste’ as a category to separate donors from their flesh
and free it to circulate in the global tissue economy. Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell, Tissue economies:
blood, organs, and cell lines in late capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
26
See Susanne Soederberg, Georg Menz and Philip Cerny, eds, Internalizing globalization: the rise of neoliberalism and
the decline of national varieties of capitalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
27
See Philip Cerny, ‘Structuring the political arena: public goods, states and governance in a globalizing world’,
in Palan (ed.) Global political economy.
28
Cf. Hans Lofgren and Mats Benner, ‘The political economy of the “new biology”: biotechnology and the
competition state’, paper presented at the DRUID Summer Conference, 2005, available on-line at http://
www.druid.dk/conferencecs/summer2005/papers/ds2005-499.pdf, last accessed 7 April 2006.
29
For example, venture capitalists played a prominent role in the campaign for Proposition 71, the voter initia-
tive that established the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine.
30
For example, Melinda Cooper argues that regenerative medicine needs to be understood in the context of the

487
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
Amanda Dickins
Ratiosaurs, perhaps less alert to the radically new, have been slower to recognize
the development of the global bioeconomy and its significance for IPE.31 Nonethe-
less, the bioeconomy presents plenty of toothsome meat for their problem-solving
perspective: their rationalist approach is well adapted to trace the dynamics of
competition and collaboration as states and international organizations create and
regulate markets. Ratiosaurs have a formidable array of techniques to analyse the
competitive tension generated by different states’ trajectories in human biotech-
nology, whether they are competing for economic advantage along the lines of a
competition state or trying to prevent others from gaining the edge in a technology
they are unable or unwilling to pursue for themselves. Ratiosaurs are also well
equipped to examine the incentive structures for international collaboration: there
is pressure on states to collaborate to develop common standards and regulations
(such as common bioethical standards) in order to support international scientific
collaborations, even as they compete to capture the benefits of that collaboration.
The developing global commerce in human tissue requires international collabo-
ration to prevent exploitation and ensure reasonable safety standards: variations
in national regulations (for example, regarding payment of donors or allocation
of organs for transplant) create strong incentives to trade in human tissue, and
international cooperation is necessary for effective regulation because the tissue
economy is unusually vulnerable to smuggling.32 The economics of investment,
the impact of returns to scale, provides another motivation to collaborate to
produce consistent regulatory frameworks that allow successful products to be
sold across as many different markets as possible. Ratiosaurs are well equipped to
analyse these incentive structures and the strategic interactions they induce, as well
as contributing instrumental knowledge about how to build better-functioning
regulatory frameworks and more stable international institutions.
So Ratiosaurus perspectives offer insight into the politics of the global bioeco-
nomy: in turn, the bioeconomy illuminates some of the core issues on the Ratio-
saurus research agenda. Space here being limited, I shall focus on one: the nature
of power in the context of the bioeconomy. In terms of resources, the United
States has the biggest power base in the bioeconomy: it has tremendous intellec-
tual resources in universities and other research institutions; US actors control key
intellectual property; and a highly developed venture capital industry can provide
greater resources to invest in translational research (developing biotechnology
products for the market) than can the private sector in any other state. However,
domestic divisions over reproductive politics have prevented the United States
from developing a federal framework to regulate human embryonic stem cell
science, a key area of research.33 As a potential hegemon lacking internal cohesion
transition from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of production, where it is presented as a biomedical solution to
the limits of growth. Melinda Cooper, ‘Resuscitations: stem cells and the crisis of old age’, Body & Society 12:
1, 2006, pp. 1–23.
31
There is, however, recognition of the economic significance of human biotechnology among more policy-
oriented scholars. See e.g. Robert Paarlberg, ‘The great stem cell race’, Foreign Policy 128, 2005, pp. 44–51.
32
Would-be donors can cross borders with relative ease and, in many cases, it is similarly straightforward for
would-be patients to travel to jurisdictions where they can access controversial or cut-price treatments.
33
The popular misconception that the United States forbids this type of research stems from the restrictions
placed on federal funding: if a scientist has access to alternative sources of finance there is far less restriction on

488
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
The evolution of international political economy
and therefore direction, the US government has found it hard to shape the regula-
tion of research at the international level, let alone influence domestic regulation in
other countries.34 Meanwhile, the United Kingdom’s regulatory regime has been
highly influential, adopted in modified form in a number of other countries—a
phenomenon that could be characterized as the exercise of soft power and one
that should make it easier for the United Kingdom to benefit from international
collaboration.
However, what happens in the United States still affects institutions in the rest
of the world because of the size of its market: a large, wealthy, ageing population
with a vast appetite for new health technologies. The desire to sell into this poten-
tially lucrative market gives US law worldwide impact because, whatever regula-
tory regime they face at home, it is in the interests of producers to secure the rights
and permissions necessary to sell their products without hindrance in the United
States. The idea that market size is an important factor in economic leadership is
not new, but the Ratiosaurus debate has tended to focus on its role in motivating
and facilitating government action. The bioeconomy, by contrast, demonstrates
the impact of US market size in the absence of government action, something
which may not entirely surprise Querimonia, but which merits serious treatment
from Ratiosaurus. The opportunity to engage Ratiosaurs in this type of analysis in
the context of the bioeconomy arises because conflict over regulation is sharper
than in older, more settled, fields of economic activity: this provides the traction
necessary for the powerful but blunt tools of the Ratiosaurs, allowing them to
tackle issues of structural power, the kind of critical question that has traditionally
fallen within the domain of Querimonia.
So far, I have tried to show that both Querimonia and Ratiosaurus offer analytical
insights into the global politics of the bioeconomy, and that the dynamics of the
bioeconomy, in turn, shed light on key concerns for both types of IPE. However,
although they offer numerous insights on the bioeconomy, the bioeconomy also
draws attention to some notable lacunae in their work. Again for reasons of space,
I shall limit my discussion to a brief overview of gender and the role played by
less developed countries.35 It is an oft-heard lament that gender is neglected in
mainstream or ‘malestream’ IPE.36 Waylen argues that even the members of Queri-
monia, despite their promising critical orientation, have failed to engage with the
full import of gender in IPE.37 The bioeconomy highlights this lacuna, for gender
is an inescapable and important aspect of the bioeconomy: this is, after all, where
the productive economy collides with the reproductive economy, where the
what may be done than in, for example, the United Kingdom, where research can be conducted only under
licence from the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority.
34
Cf. Francis Fukuyama, ‘Gene regime’, Foreign Policy 129, 2002, pp. 57–63.
35
Another lacuna, in this article as well as in IPE more generally, is the role of the European Union. The EU
has played an important role in the politics of the bioeconomy, not only through its efforts to regulate human
biotechnology but also by providing a platform for the deliberation of bioethics. For discussion of these issues,
see Brian Salter and Mavis Jones, ‘Human genetic technologies’, European governance and the politics of bioethics 3:
10, 2002, pp. 808–14.
36
Cf. Contributions on feminist international relations in International Affairs 80: 1, 2004.
37
Georgina Waylen, ‘You still don’t understand: why troubled engagements continue between feminists and
(critical) IPE’, Review of International Studies 32: 1, 2006, pp. 145–64.

489
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
Amanda Dickins
formalized processes of exchange characteristic of the former penetrate the latter’s
largely informal sphere. The most vivid example of this is the growing interna-
tional trade in human eggs: egg harvesting is an unpleasant and hazardous business
and national regulations regarding egg donation vary widely, creating incentives
for an international trade that exploits this variation and raising serious concerns
about the potential impact on vulnerable donors.38 However, there are also subtler
gender challenges arising from the development of human biotechnology. The
manipulation of human eggs exposes the intimate relationship between the
productive economy and the reproductive economy: for example, the potential
for women to delay reproduction by freezing their eggs (or ovarian tissue) raises
broader issues about gender and the way in which societies accommodate, or fail
to accommodate, the reproductive labour of women. Advances in human biotech-
nology are drawing attention to the central role played by gender in structuring
the political economy, a phenomenon to which both Querimonia and Ratiosaurus
need to pay greater attention.
The development of the bioeconomy also highlights the importance and diver-
sity of roles played by less developed countries (LDCs) and the need for both types
of IPE scholarship to adapt to encompass these diverse and changing roles. In
the past, both Ratiosaurus and Querimonia have tended to frame LDCs in terms of
their alterity, as exceptions to the developed order of the international economy
to be disregarded or, alternatively, subsumed under the simplifying rubric of a
‘North–South’ clash. However, LDC governments and populations are far from
the passive or corrupt recipients of global capital and development aid suggested
by such framing.39 In the post-Cold War period, those outside the charmed circle
of the advanced industrialized economies have had little choice but to participate
in an international economy whose rules were made for the benefit of others.
They are, however, learning how to operate within (or circumvent) those rules:
IPE needs to take cognizance of the rise of these countries as ‘normal’ state actors
in the global political economy, with diverse strategies and interests.40 The global
bioeconomy underscores this point by upsetting established hierarchies and illus-
trating the similarities between the issues and strategies of developed countries
and those of LDCs. The bioeconomy upsets established hierarchies because the
entry costs are relatively low: one can participate at the cutting edge of research in
human biotechnology without investing a colossal sum. This has obvious appeal
for LDC governments hoping to boost growth by capturing the economic benefits
38
For example, concerns have been raised about Romanian clinics exporting human eggs for IVF treatment
elsewhere in the EU, particularly the United Kingdom. Egg donors risk developing ovarian hyperstimulation
syndrome, a dangerous and potentially life-threatening condition.
39
I have chosen to emphasize the powers and strategies of LDC states, as these are the areas of relative neglect
in IPE. However, this is not intended to deny the particular vulnerabilities of specific LDCs: in the context
of the bioeconomy the potential for the exploitation of vulnerable donor populations is a significant concern,
especially for countries where advanced technological capabilities exist side by side with mass poverty, such as
South Africa and India.
40
See Amrita Narlikar and Andrew Hurrell, ‘The new politics of confrontation: developing countries at Cancún
and beyond’, paper presented at conference ‘Endgame at the WTO? Reflections on the Doha development
agenda’, University of Birmingham, 2005. Also Amrita Narlikar, International trade and developing countries:
coalitions in the GATT and WTO (London: Routledge, 2003).

490
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
The evolution of international political economy
of innovation, a point that highlights the similarities between their strategies
and those of governments in developed states. It is not only the governments of
advanced industrialized states that aspire to develop the ‘knowledge economy’:
China, South Korea and Singapore have all made significant investments in human
biotechnology, and with some success (despite regulatory issues in China and South
Korea). In order to unpack the complex political economy of these investments,
the strategic calculations and regulatory issues, one would need to draw on insights
from development theory, such as work on the developmental state, the role it
plays and the problems it causes through the blurring of the distinction between
state and market actors.41 The role of LDCs in the bioeconomy thus underscores
the need for IPE to draw on interdisciplinary knowledge, integrating the political
economy of development within the broader framework of (re)integrated interna-
tional and comparative political economy.42

Conclusion
It is time to renew the extensive invisible college of IPE, to encourage exchange
between Ratiosaurus and Querimonia. Exchange does not imply the erasure of
theoretical differences. Quite the opposite: it necessitates the participation of
distinct parties. Initial exchange might be limited to a cold commerce in tools and
insights, but it is worth striving for a richer form of exchange, for a continuing
conversation. Conversation is most fruitful when there is mutual respect and
understanding, which can be hard to achieve if force of habit has hardened the
features of familiar debates. Fortunately, recent developments in IPE have created
fresh spaces and secure places that should make it easier for scholars to converse
with others from different schools. An increasing awareness of normative questions
should make rationalist scholars more receptive to critical work, while critical
scholars are discovering an independent identity as they reinvent themselves in
the tradition of classical political economy. Conversation requires, moreover,
some investment from participants: they need to be prepared to translate their
work into a common vernacular and to reduce technical language of all sorts, both
mathematical and philosophical, to a bare minimum. There will be many who are
not prepared to make this effort and no doubt some who will oppose engagement
between Ratiosaurus and Querimonia: however, the uncompromising will help to
maintain distinct identities among the conversing, maintaining the reservoirs of
difference that fuel conversation.
Those who are interested in building communication between Ratiosaurus and
Querimonia may find a rough but ready vernacular in constructivism, the collective
title given to a diverse body of work that shares an understanding of the world as,
in some sense, socially constructed. Constructivism has already provided common
ground for discussion and debate between Ratiosaurs and critical scholars in other
41
See Cheol-Sung Lee and Andrew Schrank, ‘Incubating innovation or cultivating corruption? The develop-
mental state and the life sciences in South Korea’, unpublished MS.
42
Phillips, ‘“Globalizing”’; Nicola Phillips, ‘International political economy, comparative political economy and
the study of contemporary development’, IPEG Papers in Global Political Economy 8, 2004.

491
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006
Amanda Dickins

areas of International Relations, and even grounds for collaboration as scholars

from both sides believe that their work is complementary.43 Constructivist polit-
ical economy has great promise, not least because core IPE topics revolve around
socially constructed concepts, especially those relating to finance and money.44
Strangely, it has taken longer for constructivism to permeate IPE, but it is begin-
ning to build a head of steam.45 However, while constructivism provides a vernac-
ular that communicates to Ratiosaurus as well as Querimonia, some members of
Querimonia will eschew the constructivist label precisely because of this, fearing
that talk of ‘complement’ sounds too much like ‘compliment’. I hope that some
will carve out space as critical constructivists, sharing their Querimonia perspectives
on the institutions and structures of the international economy by communicating
their constructive criticism in a vernacular that speaks to IPE scholars of all types—
not as supplements to plug gaps in a Ratiosaurus research agenda, but as equal and
self-directing members of the invisible college, free to choose the questions they
pursue and free to work with whichever analytical techniques or collaborators suit
their questions. After all, if Querimonia leans towards problem-posing, might it not
make sense to work, on occasion, with problem-solving Ratiosaurs? Querimonia
will expose new areas of study and critical issues, such as the politics of the global
bioeconomy, many of which will benefit from the application of Ratiosaurus.

43
See e.g. James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, ‘Rationalism v. constructivism: a skeptical view’, in Walter
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, eds, Handbook of international relations (London: Sage, 2002), pp.
52–72.
44
As Kirshner argues, ‘money is what you think it is’. See Jonathan Kirshner, ‘Money is politics’, Review of Inter-
national Political Economy 10: 4, 2003, pp. 645–60. See also his review essay, ‘The study of money’, World Politics
52: 3, 2000, pp. 407–36, and Jacqueline Best, The limits of transparency: ambiguity and the history of international
finance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
45
As demonstrated by the contributions in Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth and Craig Parsons, eds, ‘Constructivist
political economy’, unpublished book MS, 2006.

492
International Affairs 82: 3, 2006 © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006