Professional Documents
Culture Documents
by Wes Blomster
Theodor Adorno, on the other hand, lived well into the age of electronic
composition. Occasional remarks on the subject—disparaging, for the most
part—are found in his later writings and there were public discussions
between him and Karlheinz Stockhausen, German Wunderkind of the early
years of the movement. On a whole, however, electronic music was alien to
Adorno, a factor-ralong with his negative attitude toward all forms of
popular music and his general distaste for the music of socialist realism in the
Eastern bloc—which led the New Left of the late 1960s to reject him as a
bourgeois reactionary. "Music and Technique" (1958) is Adorno's only
publication that offers itself for consideration within socio-musicological
investigation of electronic music.
Walter Benjamin presents the concept of authenticity as follows: "Even the
most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its
presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to
b e . . . The presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of
authenticity... The whole sphere of authenticity is outside technical—and,
of course, not only technical—reproducibility.... The authenticity of a
thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging
from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has
experienced." It is at this early juncture, however, that difficulties develop in
the application of Benjamin's theses to music. His essay is concerned almost
exclusively with visual art, marked by developments from the woodcut,
engraving and etching down to lithography and photography in the 19th
century and the motion picture in the 20th. In each of these practices, a
tangible, material work of art provides concrete orientation for discussion.
But in music, does authenticity lie in the composition itself or is it rather
present in the realization of the score in performance? The essential
differences in creative media should be of particular concern to us at a time
when great emphasis is placed upon interdisciplinary efforts; serious short-
comings lie in the often superficial parallels established between the verbal
and visual arts and music. Perhaps one great need of our day is for a modern
Lessing who, in a new Laokoon, will define the boundaries of creative
expression.
A point of departure in responding to my question can be found through a
comparative glance at a painting. Regardless of the medium used by the
painter, there is and ever can be only one original possessed of authenticity.
Every reproduction, from the one executed with painful effort by an artist
working before the original with the means of the master himself to the most
sophisticated product of modern color printing, will lack the authenticity of
which Benjamin speaks. Turn then to the work of literature. Extreme as the
view might seem, I should venture the thesis that even a badly-tattered
paperback edition of Lowe-Porter's often woefully inadequate translation of
Thomas Mann's Magic Mountain retains the essentials of that authenticity
3. Illuminations, op.cit., pp. 220-221.
ELECTRONIC MUSIC / 67
with which the author and time have vested the original manuscript. An
opposing view would insist that literature since the invention of printing is
dependent upon mechanical reproduction and, consequently, manifests the
same waning of authenticity witnessed in lithography or photography.
But music? Traditionally, music depends upon performance for
realization; the original creation of the composer must be re-created—indeed
re-produced—each time it is experienced by listeners. Without such
reproduction there is no reception of music. Hardly anyone would dispute this
view. Yet, behind Adorno's "Music and Technique" lies a conception which
• calls this process into question. Adomo envisions a course of development not
immediately obvious to the uninitiated. Perhaps his thought can be
summarized best by a passage from Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus (1947), a
novel to which Adomo greatly contributed. The composer-hero has just
outlined to the narrator his scheme for strictly-ordered composition in the
manner of Schoenberg's method of composition with twelve tones; the
narrator questions whether it will be possible to "hear" all this. The hero
refers back to an early lecture given by his teacher on "Music and the Eye":
"We say of course that music 'addresses itself to the ear'; but it does so only in
a qualified way, only in so far, namely, as the hearing, like the other senses, is
the deputy, the instrument, and the receiver of the mind. Perhaps.. .it was
music's deepest wish not to be heard at all, nor even seen, nor yet felt; but
only—if that were possible—in some Beyond, the other side of sense and
sentiment, to be perceived and contemplated as pure mind, pure spirit. But
bound as she was to the world of sense, music must ever strive after the
strongest, yes, the most seductive sensuous realization.. ." 4 Adorno, in the
essay at hand, refers to Bach, "in whose case a certain arbitrariness regarding
instrumental realization in relationship to the score of a composition
prevails."5 Adorno has in mind, in most concrete terms, the monumental late
works, The Musical Offering and The Art of the Fugue, in which the
autograph offers no suggestion regarding the instrumentation for perfor-
mance. This has led some to feel that Bach had no desire that these works
4. Doctor Faustus, trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter (New York, 1965), p. 61. Mann consulted
frequently with Adorno during the writing of this novel, at which time both men resided in the
Los Angeles area. Mann had the manuscript of Adorno's Philosophy of New Music at his disposal
at this time. Adorno's total impact upon the novel is yet to be defined. I once wrote Adorno with
various questions about the novel; he replied that what he had to say about his role in its
composition would be said in his memoirs after his death. At that time, he "had no desire to get
into the position of a general who, in a film about the war, played himself." Letter of March 9,
1959.
5. All statements by Adorno not otherwise identified in this study are from "Music and
Technique," published in this issue of Telos. For the sake of the non-musician, it should be
pointed out at this early juncture that the electronic composer normally does not produce a score of
his work. The great exception here is Stockhausen; the first published score of electronic music
was his Elektronische Studie II, which appeared two years after the first realization of the piece in
1954. He now publishes scores with some regularity; these will enable a later generation to re-
realize totally one of his works. Obviously, an entirely new notation was necessary and the
innocent eye would never realize that it is looking upon music. Other composers offer at most a
spectrogram made upon completion of the composition which is of value for study and analysis.
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The link between Schoenberg and his New Viennese School and the
electronic composers of the period following 1950 is defined by Stroh when he
characterizes avant-garde music of the first half of the 20th century in terms
of "a consequent increase in control exercised by the technique of
composition over musical material" 7 —material which, through excesses of
sensuality and emotionality and emphasis upon effect, had gotten badly out
of hand in late Romanticism. Adorno also sees Schoenberg's great service in
the reintroduction of order into chaos through the control of material
established in serial composition; this was at the same time an emancipatory
act by which it becomes possible for music to transcend the dead-ended
course of development in which it found itself in the final hours of the 19th
century.
By mid-century, the new compositional technique felt sufficiently secure in
its control over material that it became possible to consider the aggrandize-
ment of musical material itself. Indeed, as Stockhausen saw it, compositional
technique and material must necessarily develop together: "The idea of new
form cannot be brought into agreement with the restrictions of old material.
Consequently, a new material must be sought." 8 This "new material" was
offered by sound produced through electronic means. Just as the manual
musical instrument—string or keyboard—had once presented the composer
with technical sophistication far surpassing the capabilities of the human
voice, so does the equipment of the electronic studio reduce the violin—or
even the grand piano —to a vehicle of sound production of comparative
primitive restrictions. Stroh can conclude, therefore, that the present-day
command of the composer over technique and material now approximates an
absolute. This "omnipotence in the techniques of composition" is, however,
sadly countered by what Stroh defines as the equally absolute "social
was to derive the claim of electronic music to universal validity from the fact that this music was
the result of an act of serial organization. Every designation of non-serial music was regarded as
terminological confusion..." Stroh, op.cit., p. 71.
7. Ibid., p. 78.
8. Quoted in ibid., p. 101. The enthusiast of electronic music finds a certain irony in the fact
that traditional music—both in terms of production and reproduction —remains today pre-
industrial, pre-technological and pre-capitalistic. The Marxist readily detects here the enchain-
ment of productive forces through the conditions of production; the possibility of their
emancipation through electronics will be indicated later. The manual instruments for which
music is written and upon which it is performed still today remain essentially what they were in
the Renaissance. As Adorno points out: "In chamber music we can accordingly speak rather of
an antagonism between productive forces and productive conditions," in Introduction to the
Sociology of Music (New York, 1976), p. 91. He has in mind the impossible problems
encountered when the string quartet moves from its native domicile in the salon into the modern
concert hall. Technology is not able to effect a satisfactory adjustment of the quartet to this
environment. Today it would be possible to say that a work such as George Crumb's Black
Angels, for Electronic String Quartet (1970) achieves such adjustment. In Crumb's composition
for the traditional four instruments of the string quartet, each instrument is electronically
amplified through the attachment of a microphone near the instrument's bridge. In contrast to
the standard use of a microphone placed on the stage to amplify the "natural" sound of
instruments, Crumb's practice results in the revelation of new sonic dimensions; sound undergoes
a processing transformation tantamount to the development of new material.
70 / TEWS
impotence" of the composer.9 This dilemma can be resolved only through a
change in the function of music —and of all art —in today's world. I shall
return later to this problem, which is also central in Benjamin's essay.
Within this framework of seemingly propitious developments, the next
significant step taken by the composer of electronic music involves the
reduction of the triadic activity seen by Adorno in "composition, notation,
and realization" into a single action. For Adorno, a highly dynamic tension
presided over the inter-relationship of these three processes: the composer
engaged in a tremendous struggle to bring the abstract image of a
composition from the inspired reaches of pure spirit onto staff paper; just as
this autograph falls short of the vision which gave rise to it, the performer, in
turn, will never realize totally everything concealed in the score. In electronic
composition, notation is by-passed; the composer in his studio works in the
manner of the painter before his canvas; the compositional intention is
realized in the very act of composition. Production and reproduction merge
into a single action.10 This, it seems to me, is the most unique aspect of
electronic music. The entire realm of interpretation is eliminated. It is as
though Beethoven —rather than committing himself to posterity through the
manuscript of his final piano sonata, opus 111, which will ever remain the
victim of the inadequacy of keyboard performance —had been in a position to
offer one single aural realization of this work which would exist for all time,
never subject to repeated interpretive performance. Thus, he might have
guaranteed the authenticity of his work. The abyss between intention and
realization is eliminated; a work is created of which there is only one
realization and all who experience the work will encounter it in this single
imprint.
It would appear that a musical work has now been achieved which is vested
with the same authenticity as the original oil painting. However, how does
Benjamin's thought on mechanical reproduction reflect upon this work? The
electronic composer, it seems, has even surpassed the painter in his creation of
a work which can be reproduced infinitely—indeed, a work designed for
mechanical reproduction and capable of reproduction only mechanically—
with no loss of authenticity through reproduction. It might be asserted that
the same claims can be made by lithograph or photograph. In these cases,
however, the single original plate or negative remains, an equivalent of which
is totally lacking in the electronic composition. Allowing all possible
optimism, electronic music might restore to art the authenticity, the loss of
which Benjamin traces through increased mechanical reproduction. Precisely
because the electronic composition experiences absolute re-realization in each
playing of the tape, this authenticity could be of highly positive consequences
for the relation of art to society in the technological age.11
9. Stroh, op.cit., p. 105. This basic dialectic runs throughout Stroh's book.
10. Konrad Bbhmer, Zwischcn Reihe und Pop, Musik und Klassengcsellschaft (Vienna and
Munich, 1970), p. 134.
11. Behind this process is sensed the visionary wisdom of Benjamin when he said: "To an ever
ELECTRONIC MUSIC / 71
A shade of sobriety is called for at this juncture in the discussion: what has
been said above is true of "pure" electronic composition. That electronic
music in which the sociologist takes the greatest interest is, however, rather a
hybrid product in which an electronically-prepared tape is combined with
"live" performers, as in the operas of Luigi Nono, Intolleranza and Lafabrica
illuminata, of which more will be said later. Why has the composer, given the
powers here defined, chosen to include in his work sounds produced in a
traditional manner, requiring traditional compositional practices? The
opponent of electronic music will immediately point to the "gimmickry" of
this endeavor and its necessarily consequent "sterility," lacking the dynamics
of. personality involved in individual interpretation. A more reserved opinion
would point to positive qualities gained through the juxtaposition of human
and technological resources. Most positively, it could be stated that the
composer, through the electronic portion of his composition, guarantees all
necessary control over performance; all danger of regression into the age of
Berlioz is overcome.
The next aspect of electronic composition which demands investigation is
Benjamin's concept of "aura" which might be viewed as the somewhat more
external imprint of authenticity. In his essay, Benjamin, having finished for
the moment his discussion of authenticity, turns to aura: "One might
subsume the eliminated element [of authenticity] in the term 'aura' and go on
to say: that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura
of the work of a r t . . . . One might generalize by saying: the technique of
reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition.
By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique
existence."12 A page later he states: "We define the aura. . .as the unique
phenomenon of distance, however close it may be." 13 Aura involves a
consciousness of history and of tradition; the moment it becomes possible to
possess a reproduction of a work of art within the proximity of one's home or
office, this distance and consciousness are lost. Mechanical reproduction
results in the reproduced work meeting "the beholder or listener in his own
particular situation. .. ,"14 within which aura is no longer of concern to the
recipient. This destruction of aura further removes the work of art from its
contextual integration which "found its expression in cult."15 Here Benjamin
cast an eye backward to the origin of art in the service of a ritual, first magical
greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility."
Opcit., p. 224. This is an advantageous point at which to inject Leonardo's comparative
evaluation of painting and music, quoted by Benjamin in a footnote to his essay: "Painting is
superior to music because, unlike unfortunate music, it does not have to die as soon as it is
born. . . Music which is consumed in the very act of its birth is inferior to painting which the use
of varnish has rendered eternal." Ibid., p. 249. This evaluation, however, can now be reversed:
the electronic composition is repeatedly reborn in a state of complete maturity; it is rendered
eternal not by varnish, but by sophisticated technology.
12. Op.cit., p. 221.
13. Ibid., p. 222.
14. Ibid., p. 221.
15. Ibid., p. 223.
72 / TELOS
and later religious. The turning point toward secular art he locates in the
Renaissance, at which time the direction of coming centuries was determined.
Benjamin summarizes: ". . .The unique value of the 'authentic' work of art
has its basis in ritual even in the most profane forms of the cult of beauty. The
secular cult of beauty.. .clearly showed that ritualistic basis in its decline and
the first deep crisis which befell it."16
Although Benjamin's basic thought is clear, assistance is needed in
developing it within this study. Help is found in a recent essay by Ferdinand
Zellwecker. Benjamin states: "With the emancipation of the various art
practices from ritual go increasing opportunities for the exhibition of their
products."17 Zellwecker elucidates this statement with the example of a work
by Bach intended originally for divine worship —a cantata or one of the
passions—which is removed from the church and performed in the more
modern age in the concert hall. He determines that "the prevailing conditions
of production prescribe a definite ritual and, in so doing, influence the
creation and, at the same time, the manner of existence of a musical work.
That is to say, the conditions of production define the scope of musical
productive forces."18 Zellwecker's conviction is that the Bach work in question
suffers—through its displacement into secular musical life—total loss of cult
value, acquiring in its stead the value of an object on exhibition: "The old
singularity is transformed into a new singularity, even if this is already
flawed."19 This new singularity—or uniqueness—is fetishized in a reactionary
manner. This is to be seen above all in the preservation of 19th century
performance practices—including the dress of musicians —down to the
present day: "The storm of new means and techniques of production which
threatens to liberate productive forces is anachronistically kept in control and
suppressed by force through the prevailing conditions of production."20 Zell-
wecker feels that electronic music at present is subject to manipulation
through this same ritualization; the eventual emancipation of productive
forces within electronic music is not, however, to be withheld permanently.
The presence of the concepts aura, cult and ritual in this discussion raises a
complex question with which I am unable to come to terms. I should like,
therefore, to sketch at this point the problem which I see here, for it involves a
sociological aspect of music, particularly crucial in purely electronic
composition —that aspect of art, namely, which Benjamin labels "the simul-
taneous collective experience."21 In my mind, this is the most significant
sociological factor in music, for the experience is more readily available in
music than in the product of any other artistic genre. A statement of Adorno's
underscores this perspective: "All music—even that which in terms of style is
16. Ibid., p. 224.
17. Ibid., p. 225.
18. "Einige Ueberlegungen tlber die Musik, ihre elektronische Reproduzierbarkeit und
Produzierbarkeit," Materialien zur Musiksoziobgie (Vienna and Munich, 1972), p. SO.
19. Ibid., p. 31.
10. Ibid.
21. Op.cit., p. 2S4.
ELECTRONIC MUSIC / 73
who has attended one. Small groups listen together to such music, largely for
study and discussion purposes. Radio is considered an excellent medium for
electronic music. A positive view would be to assert that this is a form of art
which has finally liberated itself from all markings of cult and ritual; conse-
quently, it can never be the subject of manipulation so often exercised upon
traditional music. It can never be employed for the aestheticization of politics
against which Benjamin warns in the Epilogue of his essay. But the nagging
question continues: can music which dispenses with these factors fulfill a
social role? Can the experience of music be divorced from the simultaneous
collective experience? Is the "we" heard by Adorno in all music meaningfully
audible to the isolated individual in the privacy of his personal domain?
Within the complex sketched here I am troubled not only by my own
inability to come to terms with this important sociological aspect of music,
but also by a certain absence of finite statement upon the problem by
Benjamin in his essay and in the work of those who apply his thought to
music. He states, as indicated above, that "the value of the 'authentic' work of
art has its basis in ritual," and further asserts that "this ritualistic basis,
however remote, is still recognizable as secularized ritual even in the most
profane forms of the cult of beauty."28 Perhaps Benjamin answers here the
question which I posed above regarding Brahms. It does not seem that he
views the profane cult of beauty as necessarily negative or even as a necessarily
evil component of the aesthetic experience; furthermore, in the same passage
he does speak pejoratively of Mallarme's poesie pure and of late 19th century
practices of I'art pour I'art because of their lack of social function. In the
Epilogue he locates the continuation of these tendencies in Marinetti and in
Fascism. I do not wish to suggest that Benjamin equates "autonomy" and
"authenticity" on a one-to-one basis, but it does appear that one concept is
not possible without the other. It is perhaps necessary to conclude that the
autonomous work of art, embedded in secular ritual, is not the magnificent
product as which Adorno sees it; perhaps it is precisely this autonomy which
has made it the victim of manipulation and the vehicle for false consciousness.
Benjamin's most crucial statment demands emphasis here: "But the instant
the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the
total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to
be based on another practice—politics."29 That Benjamin accepts this
reversal of function affirmatively is clear from the final paragraph of the
Epilogue; he speaks out against the aestheticization of politics in Fascism —
one wonders whether he saw Leni Riefenstahl's films on the Berlin Olympics
and the Nuremberg Party Congress—and concludes: "Communism responds
by politicizing art."3? Perhaps the final conclusion is that in the modern
world authenticity and autonomy must necessarily be replaced by
engagement and commitment.
28. Op.cit., p. 224.
29. Ibid.
SO. Ibid,, p. 242.
76 / TEWS