DM Consunji v.

Court of Appeals
 Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on
board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or
getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block
and [p]latform but without a safety lock.Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji,
Inc.
 The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from
the State Insurance Fund. The employer argued that in Floresca, the claimants may invoke either
the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence
that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation
under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy.
The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening
facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
 Petitioner, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent
cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
 ISSUE: Whether the private respondent is already barred from claiming damages under the Civil
Code pursuant to Article 3 of the Civil Code.
 HELD: No. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be
deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does
not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent
a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof
cannot be held against her.
 In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the
elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from
the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the
accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
 There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the
claim before the ECC was filed.

Cui v. Arellano University

 Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its
College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these
years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of
P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos
University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from
Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the
P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without
Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.
 On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing
all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that
“the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be
subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to
transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and
keep students in a school”.
 ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship
grant provided by Arellano University.
  HELD: The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision
set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in
question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before
graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to
undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.
 The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at
the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and
dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.

ART. 7 Repeal of Laws

Mecano v. COA
 Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on
Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that
Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No.
292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter.
 Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary
Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or
abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly
maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant
in its entirety the RAC.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
 NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.
 Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals
an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the
part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The
intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act
is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so
far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.
 It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.