University of the East

Manila
College of Law
2019 – 2020

INTERPRETIVIST THEORY

Acero, John Guiller D.

Belmonte, Joyce
Capsa, Monica
Del Rosario, Henrick
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTERPRETIVIST THEORY _______3

INTERPRETIVIST THEORY IN ITS GENERIC SENSE

HISTORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETIVISM
INTERPRETIVIST THEORY ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHERS
THE MODEL OF INTERPRETATION
TWO KINDS OF INTERPRETIVISM

INTERPRETIVIST THEORY JURISPRUDENCE 7

CASE 1
CASE 2
CASE 3

BIBLIOGRAPHY 14

2
 INTERPRETIVIST THEORY

Interpretivist Theory in its Generic Sense

Interpretivism is “associated with the philosophical position of idealism, and is used

to group together diverse approaches, including social constructivism, phenomenology and
hermeneutics; approaches that reject the objectivist view that meaning resides within the
world independently of consciousness”. According to interpretivist approach, it is important
for the researcher as a social actor to appreciate differences between people. Moreover,
interpretivism studies usually focus on meaning and may employ multiple methods in order
to reflect different aspects of the issue.

Interpretive theories, sometimes referred to as interpretivism or philosophical

interpretivism, are orientations to social reality based on the goal of understanding. Thus,
we can define interpretive theories as ontological and epistemological tools used in research
concerned with understanding how individuals and groups create meaning in their everyday
practices, communication, and lived experiences. In part, interpretivists are (a) scholars
who are interested in the ways communities, cultures, or individuals create meaning from
their own actions, rituals, interactions, and experiences; (b) scholars who wish to interpret
local meanings by locating them into a broader historical, geographical, political, linguistic,
ideological, economic, and cultural milieu; (c) researchers who look at the meanings of texts
and the codes and rules

Interpretivism about law offers a philosophical explanation of how institutional

practice—the legally significant action and practices of political institutions—modifies legal
rights and obligations. Its core claim is that the way in which institutional practice affects
the law is determined by certain principles that explain why the practice should have that
role. Interpretation of the practice purports to identify the principles in question and thereby
the normative impact of the practice on citizens' rights and responsibilities.

History of Legal Interpretivism

Interpretivism is famously associated with Ronald Dworkin, Dworkin argues that it is

precisely under those ‘hard cases’, as he calls it, that judges have to seek for legal
principles in their constructive interpretation. By contrast with rules, valid principles may
conflict and typically do. “When valid principles conflict the proper method for resolving the
conflict is to select the position that is supported by the principles that have the greatest
aggregate weight” (Shapiro, 2007). Indeed, principles possess a characteristic of weight
that permits them to be balanced with one another and be compared in a case-by-case
analysis. Another important characteristic of principles is that their application is dependent
on their substance, by opposition to their pedigree. In fact, the result of this dependence is
that “a principle does not direct action in the same way a rule does, but instead suggest a
potential outcome based on the merit of its substance” (Green, 2011). It is precisely the
‘merit of its substance’ that gives a principle its weight. Therefore, when a specific hard case
emerges, a judge has to decide by balancing the weight of different principles and although

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a decision based on a balancing process may seem controversial, it is believed that there is
a single correct way of balancing the principles for a particular case (Dworkin, 1977).

The Non - Positivist Claim combines what is known by law and how morality would
affect a state and modify it through metaphysics and theism. This takes in consideration
customs, beliefs and public traditions to verify which legal pronouncements are just. Max
Weber emphasized that social reality is viewed and interpreted by the individual
himself/herself according to the ideological positions he/she possess. There for knowledge is
personally experienced rather than acquired from or imposed from outside. The Orthodox
View believes that the law is how the institution connects its logic through the construction
of legal text. According to Dworkin, “Institutions that count as authoritative in a legal
system create, modify, or extinguish a legal right or obligation, primarily through the
production of a legal text such as a statute, decree, regulation, or judicial decision that sets
it out or logically entails it. The production of a legal text is an act of communication that
has its own logic. In producing such a text, an institution is to be understood as issuing a
directive addressed to certain subjects and meant to direct the subjects' action”.

Interpretivist Theory According to Different Philosophers

According to Michael Giudice, intrepretivism is characterized as “the theory that

claims the factors of our legal duties as interpretive facts- a propositions of law is true on
virtue of the fact that the proposition follows from the best justification of the community’s
political practice.” 1

Nicos Stavropoulos argues that the interpretivist legal theorist’s task is to

hypothesize a value that could justify legal practice requiring in fact what it is held to
require, and carrying out this task amounts to attributing a rationale or a point to law in
attempting to construct a hypothesis that can explain and justify, so far as it is possible to
do so. 2

The main claim of Interpretivism is that the way in which judicial practice affects the
law is determined by principles that explain why the practice should have its role.
Interpretation of the practice purports to identify the principles in question and thereby the
normative impact of the practice on citizens' rights and responsibilities.3

Ronald D'workin believed in the strong method to Interpretation, where judges are
vital and in the best position to interpret because they are protected from political influence
and compelling decisions interpreted through principles that have always existed will
continue eternal unlike sets of norms that depend on the opinion and reception of society. 4

1
Stavropoulos, Nicos. Objectivity in Law. p215. 1996
2
Giudice, Michael. The Methodology of Legal Theory, Volume 1. P. 144 .2010
3
Gephart, Robert. University of Alberta. Ethnostatistics: Qualitative Foundations for Quantitative Research. 1998
4
Dworkin, Ronald, 1978, Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth. Relevant sections include “The Model of
Rules I” (Ch. 2), “The Model of Rules II” (Ch. 3), “Hard Cases” (Ch. 4), “Reply to Critics” (Appendix)

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The Model of Interpretation

The start point of interpretivism is Dworkin’s claim of law as integrity, which is that
“the integrity of a community’s conception of justice demands that the moral principles
necessary to justify the substance of its legislature’s decisions be recognized by the rest of
the law” (Dworkin, 1986). Therefore, legal philosophers and judges have similar tasks:
while the task of legal philosophers is not limited to understanding how the law applies, and
the judges’ task is not limited to applying the law, both have to interpret the practice of law
and law itself. They must interpret legal claims as product of the community personified
which itself is considered, for the sake of integrity, to be committed to fairness, justice and
procedural due process (Dworkin, 1986). In fact, integrity as a principle of legal adjudication
in a particular legal system requires the interpreter to engage in what is called ‘constructive
interpretation’. Constructive interpretation “ is a matter of imposing purpose on an object or
practice in order to make it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is
taken to belong” (Dworkin, 1986). Generally put, it means that judges have to find the best
constructive interpretation of the political values and legal doctrine of the community in
order to adjudicate. The interpretation process is divided in three stages. There is a
preinterpretive stage in which the sole purpose is to identify the applicable rules and
standards to provide the “tentative content of the practice”. Afterwards, there is an
interpretive stage in which the interpreter provides some justifications for the identified
rules and standards in the preinterpretive stage. Providing such justifications “will consist of
an argument why a practice is worth pursuing, if it is”. Furthermore, such justifications must
fit the practice to a certain extent so that the interpreter is not inventing but interpreting
the practice. The last stage is postinterpretive and it is only then that the interpreter might
“adjust his sense of what the practice really requires so as better to serve the justification
he accepts in the interpretive stage” (Dworkin, 1986). In sum, when engaging in
interpretivism, one is also engaging in moral evaluation by seeking for the political
principles behind a rule of the community and trying to find whether or not the practice
serves the principle behind the rule.

Two Kinds of Interpretivism

Hybrid Interpretivism signifies another possibility along that spectrum. It begins at

the serious norm-based explanation of law but preserves an even more inclusive formation.

For Hybrid Interpretivism, the set of institutionally valid norms—the norms

determined by what the institutions said—forms the interpretive baseline. Interpretation is a
kind of moral dispensation of these norms. To interpret is to measure the norms established
by institutional communication and regulate the set in order to make it more attractive in
some way—to make it better adapt to the abstract point of legal practice in contradiction of
which it is interpreted.

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 Hybrid Interpretivism is consequently the thesis that the institutional contribution to
the interpretive process—what the institutions said—does not alone produce the final,
comprehensive set of legally valid norms.5

Pure Interpretivism is non-hybrid. It comprehends principles, official practice, and

their relation contrarily.

Interpretivism begins at the question how institutional practice stands on rights and
responsibilities. For non-hybrid interpretivism, this question is, at least in part, pre-empted
by the orthodox view on which it builds. According to the orthodox view, the practice itself
regulates how it bears on rights and obligations. This is so because the practice consists in
communication or implicit commendation of norms meant to place subjects under
obligations by virtue of communicating or sanctioning the norms. By taking all this as given,
Non-Hybrid Interpretivism therefore requests in some substantial part the important query
at which Interpretivism says one must begin.6

5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.

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Interpretivist Theory Jurisprudence

Republic of the Philippines vs. Cipriano Orbecido III

G.R. No. 154380
October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva on May 24, 1981
in Ozamis City, Philippines, which resulted to the birth of their two children. Cipriano’s wife,
along with their son, migrated to the United States in 1986, and thereafter was naturalized
as an American citizen. In 2000, Cipriano found out that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and remarried in the US.

Cipriano filed at the RTC a petition for authority to remarry, invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code.7 No opposition was filed, and thus finding merit in the
petition, the Court granted the same. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, the
Republic sought reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Orbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of marriage, were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them acquires naturalization in a foreign country and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage; otherwise, it would be absurd and unjust.

Statutes may be applied to cases that are not within the literal meaning of their
terms, so long as they come within their intent.8

Although the decision leans in favor of respondent Orbecido, he must prove his
allegations that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, and that the latter obtained

7
Art 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force of the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), and 36, 37, and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to marry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

8
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855

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a divorce decree in conformity to the foreign law that allowed it, then thereafter his plea
may prosper.

In Relation to Interpretivist Theory

Instead of limiting the interpretation of the law within the literal meaning of its texts,
and thus producing an unjust decision, the Court interpreted it according to its legislative
intent, and that which would be fair not only to the parties involved in the current case, but
also to future similar cases.

The provisions of Article 26 of the Family Code only apply to cases where the parties
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner at the time of marriage. In this case, the parties were
two Filipinos during marriage, but the wife was later on naturalized as an American citizen.
Should the Court apply the law according to the meaning of its texts, the pronouncement
would be unjust to the respondent, as he would not be allowed to remarry, whereas his wife
had obtained a divorce decree under a foreign law and subsequently remarried. In order
that the decision remains just and based on reason, the Court interpreted the law beyond
the textual meaning while still maintaining its spirit and intent.

However, though the law was applied with proper reason, mere allegations are not
considered facts, and must therefore be supported by substantial evidence.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo

G.R. No. 221029

April 24, 2018

FACTS:

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was previously married to a Japanese national named

Yoshino Minoro. On January 10, 2012, Manalo filed a Petition for cancellation of her
marriage to Minoro. Said Petition stemmed from a divorce decree instituted by the latter
from a Japanese Court in order for their marriage to be null and ineffective. In view that
that Manalo and Minoro were indeed separated, Manalo, thus, was seeking to cancel their
entry of marriage before the Civil Registry of San Juan in order for her to be allowed to use
her maiden surname. However, the CA, contrary to the decision initially rendered by the
RTC, ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines must prevail even if it was
Manalo who filed the divorce against Minoro. Consequently, Manalo cannot claim the nullity
of her marriage with Minoro.

ISSUES:

(i) Whether the CA erroneously applied Article 26 of the Family Code as regards the
determination of nullity of marriages in the Philippines; and

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 (ii) Whether the divorce decree promulgated by the Japanese court is a valid ground
to invalidate the marriage of Manalo and Minoro in the Philippines.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court noted that indeed, where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore, be extended
to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue, paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
the Philippines does not allow divorce. Thus, the SC ruled in favor of Manalo however, the
burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.

In Relation to Interpretivist Theory

In accordance to Ronald Dworkin, it may be noted that the interpretivist or

constructivist theory acclaims, among others, that laws are more than the explicit of
meanings of its text. It has merits or principles that can be interpreted or constructed by
the courts to contribute to the growth of law. It is right-based, and pro-active construction
of law. In view hereof, laws are therefore gleaned as subjective in nature insofar as its
proper application and interpretation is concerned. Moreso, the question of who has the
authority to render the rightful application and interpretation is derived. This is where the
interpretivist theory comes in, which provides that courts, by virtue of judges’ decisions and
jurisprudence, have the knowledge over the matter.

The abovecited case mirrors a circumstance where the proper interpretation and
application of certain statute is being questioned; otherwise, there is no query at all.
Specifically, the dilemma lies between the contentions of the Court of Appeals with regard to
the scope and limitations of the abovementioned provision of the Civil Code in contrary to
the Respondent’s argument that decisions from foreign courts shall prevail in the instant
case. The Court therefore, is obliged to rule on the matter by providing just and obligatory
decisions free from personal bias but is rather constituted by fundamental principles of
justice, morals and public policies.

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People vs. Basher Tomawis y Ali
G.R. No. 228890
April 18, 2018

FACTS:

On August 21, 2008 at around 6:30 P.M. at Alabang, Tomawis sold, traded and
delivered to a PDEA agent a methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu,"
a dangerous drug, with a net weight of 12.74 grams, a walk-in confidential informant
appeared in their office and reported that a certain alias Salim was engaged in illegal drug
activities and operated in Muntinlupa, Alabang. She called her team leader and an anti-buy
(sic) bust operation was coordinated. On August 21, 2008, their team leader conducted a
briefing on the buy-bust operation. Alejandro was assigned as the poseur buyer and was
given two genuine five hundred peso bills which she marked with her initials MCA as buy
bust money. The two five hundred peso bills were placed on top of boodle money, folded
and tied together and placed in a white envelope.

Thereafter, they went to Metropolis [Starmall], Alabang to meet with alias Salim. The
confidential informant introduced Alejandro to alias Salim and she told him that she wanted
to buy shabu. Alias Salim, who was later identified as Tomawis, said that he wanted to see
the money first so she showed him the money. He told her that he will get the shabu
somewhere and will meet her in the food court. After ten to fifteen minutes, Tomawis
returned and they simultaneously exchanged the money for the shabu. After getting the
shabu, Alejandro removed her jacket which was their pre-arranged signal. Immediate back
up came to arrest Tomawis. A commotion occurred during the arrest because bystanders
inside the food court wanted to help Tomawis who shouted "Tulungan niyo ako papatayin
nila ako." They were not able to put markings on the evidence in the vicinity because of the
commotion.

After Tomawis was arrested, he was read of (sic) his constitutional rights and
brought together with the evidence to Brgy. Pinyahan, Quezon City. Upon reaching Brgy.
Pinyahan, they immediately conducted the inventory which was done before the barangay
officials of the said barangay. Alejandro handed the seized item to Alfonso Romano who was
the inventory officer, but she was present during the inventory process. Lacap corroborated
the testimony of Alejandro. [Burce] testified that he was a kagawad of Brgy. Pinyahan,
Quezon City and that he was called to be present during the inventory of evidence acquired
from a buy bust operation.

When he reached the office, the confiscated items were placed on top of the table.
They asked Tomawis if the items were recovered from him, to which he assented to. The
same was corroborated by Gaffud. Tomawis testified that he was with his mother in
Starmall-Alabang when they were accosted by two men. One of them wrung his neck and
he could not breathe. His mother tried to help him but was unable to do so. When he was
trying to get away from the man holding him, the other man punched his stomach and
grabbed his cellular phone. A seller in Starmall-Alabang, who knew him, tried to help him
but was unable to do so because the two men brought out their guns. He was brought out

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to the parking lot and into a vehicle where his hands were handcuffed and his wallet
containing P13,500.00 was taken. There were six men in the vehicle, none of which he
knew. The van stopped in front of the mall, and a man peeped inside and said, "Bro, hindi
’yan iyong subject." One of them inside the van laughed and replied, "Pare-parehas lang
ang mga muslim." They stopped by a toll gate where two policemen carrying guns arrived.
One of them said, "Pare, ibaba mo na muna ’yan kausapin mo." The men got out and talked
for a few minutes and when they returned, said, "Pare, panindigan na lang natin na ’yan
iyong subject."

Tomawis was told that in exchange of his money, he will be released. When he asked
what his violation was, they answered that it was because he resisted. He later found out
that he was brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Office where he was
again punched in the stomach. He was told to call his relatives so he called his mother. He
was brought to Brgy. Pinyahan where he was ordered to point to the money and something
wrapped in plastic. He did not complain about the illegal arrest and taking of his wallet to
the barangay officials because he was afraid. He was photographed and then brought back
to the PDEA Office. In the PDEA Office, his wife and mother told him that he will be charged
with an illegal drug-related case. He denied the allegations and said that he was being
falsely charged because the PDEA officers knew he was selling cellular phones inside the
mall. He cannot think of any other motive why the PDEA officers would file a case against
him. His urine was tested and yielded a negative result. Tomawis' mother corroborated his
testimony. RTC convicted Tomawis, and held that the prosecution was able to preserve the
integrity of the seized drugs. The RTC further ruled that the conduct of the inventory and
photographing was justifiably done in a different place because of the commotion that
ensued in the place of arrest. The CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 21 of RA 9165 was properly conducted by the buy bust team
HELD:

In this case, the buy-bust team committed several and patent procedural lapses in
the conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug - which thus
created reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs and, consequently,
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. The buy-bust team failed to comply with
the three-witness rule.

Section 21 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of

the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and
confiscation. In addition, the inventory must be done in the presence of the accused, his
counsel, or representative, a representative of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public
official, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical
inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately

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after, or at the place of apprehension. If this is not practicable, the IRR allows that the
inventory and photographing could be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the
nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer or team. By the same
token, however, this also means that the three required witnesses should already be
physically present at the time of apprehension--a requirement that can easily be complied
with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a
planned activity. Simply put, the buy-bust team has enough time and opportunity to bring
with them said witnesses. The buy-bust team in this case utterly failed to comply with these
requirements.

In Relation to Interpretivist Theory

To start, the conduct of the inventory in this case was not conducted immediately at
the place of arrest but at the barangay hall of Pinyahan, Quezon City. As explained by the
buy-bust team of the PDEA, IO1 Alejandro and IO1 Lacap, they could not conduct the
inventory at Starmall, Alabang, because a commotion ensued as bystanders in the food
court tried to assist Tomawis who shouted for help. Evidently, this happened because the
buy-bust operation was conducted in a shopping mall. While the IRR allows alternative
places for the conduct of the inventory and photographing of the seized drugs, the
requirement of having the three required witnesses to be physically present at the time or
near the place of apprehension, is not dispensed with. The reason is simple, it is at the time
of arrest - or at the time of the drugs' "seizure and confiscation" - that the presence of the
three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and
confiscation that would insulate against the police practice of planting evidence. There are
police stations closer to Starmall, Alabang, in Muntinlupa City and the office of the PDEA is
also in Pinyahan, Quezon City. And yet, the inventory was conducted in the barangay hall of
Pinyahan, Quezon City - which is not one of the allowed alternative places provided under
Section 21 of the IRR.

The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a

constitutionally protected right. The burden lies with the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt by establishing each and every element of the crime charged. On
the other hand, public officers generally enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. This is a disputable presumption provided under Section
3(m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
duties can be overturned only if evidence is presented to prove that the public officers were
not properly performing their duty or they were inspired by improper motive.

In this case, both the RTC and CA used the presumption of regularity in giving full
faith and credence to the testimonies of the buy-bust team and to justify the deviation from
the procedure. However, in drugs cases, more stringent standards must be used for the
presumption of regularity to apply. The presumption should arise only when there is a
showing that the apprehending officer/buy-bust team followed the requirements of Section
21, or when the saving clause may be properly applied. Gaps in the chain of custody cannot
be filled in by the mere invocation of the presumption of regularity.

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 Judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law is fundamentally
unsound because the lapses themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity. This means
that even in the event that the presumption of regularity may stand, it will not be stronger
than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of
evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. Trial
courts have been directed by the Court to apply this differentiation.

In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot be applied due to the glaring
disregard of the established procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR, committed
by the buy-bust team. All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti9 of the
offense of sale of illegal drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure
committed by the buy-bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug.
Thus, the prosecution was not able to overcome the presumption of innocence of Tomawis.

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“body of the crime,” the proof that a crime has been committed

13
Bibliography

Books

Dworkin, R. (1978) Taking Rights Seriously. Harvard University Press

Gephart, R. (1998) Ethnostatistics: Qualitative Foundations for Quantitative Research.

University of Alberta

Giudice, M., Waluchow, W., Del Mar, M. (2010) The Methodology of Legal Theory. Taylor &
Francis Ltd

Stavropoulos, N. (1996) Objectivity in Law, Oxford University Press

Websites

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-interpretivist/

https://research-methodology.net/research-philosophy/interpretivism/

https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/interpretive-theory/51454

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