JANUARY 2016 – MARCH

2018
REMEDIAL LAW
EVIDENCE
JURISPRUDENCE
EVIDENCE

RULE 129

BANK OF COMMERCE V. HEIRS OF DELA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 211519 AUGUST 14, 2017

In Latip v. Chua, the Court laid down the instances when judicial notice could be
properly taken of facts that would normally take the place of evidence, to wit:

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of
judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial

notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice
 of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Note: Courts are not authorised to take judicial notice of the

contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection and with
the knowledge of the opposing party ( Landbank of the Phils., v.
Spouses Banal, July 20, 2004)Example: The Judge took judi
Under Section 3 of Rule 129, the Court may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of a matter and allow the parties
to be heard thereon.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of
saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can
be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious
that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are commonly known.

Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be

matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as
true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person.

We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the
recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which cited State
Prosecutors:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable
dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be

matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as
true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a
wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent
on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge."

Contrary to the findings and conclusions of the RTC, the merger of the petitioner
and Panasia was not of common knowledge. It was overly presumptuous for the RTC to
thereby assume the merger because the element of notoriety as basis for taking judicial
notice of the merger was loudly lacking.

TAN VS. PEOPE

G.R. NO. 218902. OCTOBER 17, 2016

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 4. Judicial Admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party

in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial,
either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the
judicial proceeding. It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by
the admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who makes the same, and
absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, as in this case, no amount
of rationalization can offset it. Also, in Republic of the Philippines v. De Guzman citing
Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court held that "a party who judicially admits a fact cannot later
challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is
dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy."
RULE 130 RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

SPOUSES TAPAYAN V. MARTINEZ

G.R. NO. 207786 JANUARY 30, 2017

The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever
its contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section
3 of Rule 130. However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is
necessary. The Court's ruling in Lorenzana v. Lelina is instructive:

The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic) the
contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself
except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
As such, mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence
rule. Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in
evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was
formally offered.

In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be

made at the proper time, and the grounds specified. Objection to evidence must be made
at the time it is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all
the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for
which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that
objection to the documentary evidence may be made. And when a party failed to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such
objection shall be considered as waived. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is
inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper
time. Moreover, grounds for objection must be specified in any case. Grounds for
objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived, even if the evidence
was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may not
consider any other ground of objection, except those that were raised at the proper time.

The Court notes that Petitioners failed to object to the admission of the plain copy
of the Deed of Undertaking at the time it was formally offered in evidence before the
RTC. In fact, in their Reply, Petitioners admit that they only raised this objection for the
first time before the CA. XXXXX Having failed to timely raise their objection when the
Formal Offer of Evidence was filed in the RTC, Petitioners are deemed to have waived
the same. Hence, they are precluded from assailing the probative value of the plain copy
of the Deed of Undertaking.

LORENZANA V. LELINA
G.R. NO. 187850 AUGUST 17, 2016

The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in
the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such,
mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule.
Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered
by the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a
mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was formally
offered.

In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be

made at the proper time, and the grounds specified. Objection to evidence must be made
at the time it is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all
the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for
which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that
objection to the documentary evidence may be made. And when a party failed to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such
objection shall be considered as waived. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is
inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper
time. Moreover, grounds for objection must be specified in any case. Grounds for
objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived, even if the evidence
was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may not
consider any other ground of objection, except those that were raised at the proper time.

PAROL EVIDENCE

FERNANDO MANCOL, JR. VS. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 204289. NOVEMBER 22, 2017

The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a
written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms
were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. This,
however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any
of the exceptions in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
agreement. Moreover, as with all possible objections to the admission of evidence, a
party's failure to timely object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then be
entertained. In the case of Maunlad Savings & Loan Assoc., Inc. v. CA, the Court held
that:
The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as the grounds
therefor become reasonably apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection
must be made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer, otherwise the
objection is waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as
competent and complete evidence and all parties are thus amenable to any favorable or
unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.

We stress that the admissibility of the testimonial evidence as an exception to the

parol evidence rule does not necessarily mean that it has weight. Admissibility of
evidence should not be confounded with its probative value. "The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains
to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade." The
admissibility of a particular item of evidence has to do with whether it meets various tests
by which its reliability is to be determined, so as to be considered with other evidence
admitted in the case in arriving at a decision as to the truth. The weight of evidence is not
determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a
given fact, but depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge
trying the case. "Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of
evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of
whether the admitted evidence proves an issue." "Thus, a particular item of evidence may
be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence." It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness
can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., those
which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify on what he merely
learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may
not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. Hearsay
evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard
from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to
written statements.

The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting

testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of
personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because
his testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to him as a witness presently
testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of his
information.

REPUBLIC V. ROQUE, JR.

G.R. NO. 203610 OCTOBER 10, 2016

The core issue in this case is whether an exception to the parol evidence rule
applies. In resolving this issue, we examine whether the parol evidence presented,
particularly Gonzalo and Viloria's testimonies, are admissible to establish the alleged oral
conditions in the sale contract.
We rule in the negative.

Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a written contract is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon by the parties and no evidence of these terms
is admissible other than the contents of the contract. The parol evidence rule forbids any
addition to the terms of a written agreement by testimony showing that the parties orally
agreed on other terms before the signing of the document. However, a party may present
evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a written agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleadings either: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written
agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the parties' true intent and
agreement; (c) the validity of the written agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms
agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written
agreement. The issue must be squarely presented.

We note the basic rule that he who alleges must prove his case. In this case, the
respondents have the burden to prove that the sale was subject to two conditions: (a) their
remaining properties will benefit from the increase in land value after the construction of
the NGC Project and (b) the government will return the sold properties to them should
the NGC Project not materialize. However, they failed to discharge this burden.

Notably, they failed to present copies of the deeds of sale to show that the sale
was attended by the alleged conditions. Pursuant to the parol evidence rule, no evidence
of contractual terms is admissible other than the contract itself. On this level alone, the
respondents failed to discharge their burden.

Furthermore, the respondents failed to put in issue in their pleadings the sale
contract's failure to express the parties' agreement. In Ortañez v. Court of Appeals, the
respondents alleged the existence of oral conditions which were not reflected in the deeds
of sale. A witness testified in court that the sale was subject to the oral conditions. The
Court held that the parol evidence was inadmissible because, among others, the
respondents failed to expressly plead that the deeds of sale did not reflect the parties'
intentions. Instead, they merely alleged that the sale was subject to four conditions which
they tried to prove during trial. The Court emphasized that this cannot be done because
they failed to put in issue in their pleadings any exception to the parol evidence rule.

Similar to Ortañez, a review of the complaint reveals that the respondents failed to
put in issue in their complaint that the deeds of sale do not express the parties' true intent.
Hence, the failure of the deeds of sale to reflect the parties' agreement was not squarely
presented as an issue for the court to hear evidence on it. Therefore, the exceptions to the
parol evidence rule cannot apply.

Even assuming that the respondents put in issue in the complaint the deed of sales'
failure to express the parties' true agreement, the parol evidence will still not apply
because they failed to justify the applicability of the second exception to the parol
evidence in this case.

The second exception to the parol evidence rule applies only when the written
contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the parties' contractual intention cannot
be understood from a mere reading of the agreement. Hence, the court may receive
extrinsic evidence to enable the court to address the ambiguity.

Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the contract's meaning, it cannot

serve to incorporate into the contract additional conditions which are not mentioned at all
in the contract unless there is fraud or mistake. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous
verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict, or defeat the operation of
a valid contract. Hence, parol evidence is inadmissible to modify the terms of the
agreement if the complaint fails to allege any mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement.

RCBC V. BERNARDINO
G.R. NO. 183947 SEPTEMBER 21, 2016

The parol evidence rule, in general, restricts the evidence to the surety agreements
between MMC and RCBC. The first paragraph of Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.
xxx xxx xxx

Under this rule, when the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, they
are deemed to have intended the written agreement to be the sole repository and
memorial of everything that they have agreed upon. All their prior and contemporaneous
agreements are deemed to be merged in the written document so that, as between them
and their successors-in-interest, such writing becomes exclusive evidence of its terms and
any verbal agreement which tends to vary, alter or modify it is not admissible. Whatever
is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. This must
be so because an oral testimony on an alleged prior or contemporaneous agreement, such
as the subrogation agreement subject of Bernardino's testimony in this case, comes from
a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case and depends exclusively on human
memory. Thus, it is not as reliable as written documentary evidence. Spoken words could
be notoriously undesirable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language.

Be that as it may, the rule prohibiting the presentation of parol evidence is not
absolute. A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading any of the following:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after
the execution of the written agreement.

CREDIBILTY

PEOPLE V. AMARELA,
G.R. NOS. 225642-43, JANUARY 17, 2018

More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual
depredation, rape cases are solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the
private complainant. In doing so, we have hinged on the impression that no young
Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually abused, unless
that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. However, this
misconception, particularly in this day and age, not only puts the accused at an unfair
disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice.

The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In

the case of People v. Taño, the Court affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers
who took turns raping a person named Herminigilda Domingo. The Court, speaking
through Justice Alejo Labrador, said:

It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that
they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their
natural instinct to protect their honor. We cannot believe that the offended party would
have positively stated that intercourse took place unless it did actually take place.

This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting
back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in
disclosing a sexual assault; today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara
stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We, should stay away from such
mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today; she who has
over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person,
willing to fight for her rights.

In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape

without gender bias or cultural misconception. It is important to weed out these
unnecessary notions because an accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the
victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. 14 Thus, in order for us to
affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe beyond reasonable doubt the version of
events narrated by the victim.

In an appeal from a judgment of conviction in rape cases, the issue boils down,
almost invariably, to the credibility and story of the victim and eyewitnesses. The Court is
oftentimes constrained to rely on the observations of the trial court who had the unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grilling and at times unfriendly, examination. It has since become
imperative that the evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial court be accorded great
respect by this Court; for it can be expected that said determination is based on
reasonable discretion as to which testimony is acceptable and which witness is worthy of
belief. Although we put a premium on the factual findings of the trial court, especially
when they are affirmed by the appellate court, this rule is not absolute and admits
exceptions, such as when some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended, and misinterpreted.

We follow certain guidelines when the issue of credibility of witnesses is

presented before us, to wit:

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness
on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's
findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome
of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.

PEOPLE V. SALAHUDDIN
G.R. NO. 206291, JANUARY 18, 2016

It is well settled that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is
entitled to great respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the
manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge, therefore, can better
determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh
conflicting testimonies. Further, factual findings of the trial court as regards its
assessment of the witnesses’ credibility are entitled to great weight and respect by the
Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms the said findings, and will not be
disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and
circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case.

IDANAN V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 193313, MARCH 16, 2016

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. Petitioners' statements that
they did not complain or put up any resistance when they were arrested despite their
innocence is contrary to human nature and experience. Petitioners should have at least
protested if they believed that they were not committing any crime. Moreover, the
allegation of "planted evidence" is unsubstantiated. There is no proof that that the police
had the ill-motive to falsely accuse and testify against petitioners, aside from the
unsubstantiated and far-fetched allegation that the police wanted to impress their
superiors. The presumption of regularity accorded to police officers is unrebutted.

PEOPLE V. CRUZ
G.R. NO. 214503, JUNE 22, 2016

Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's plain

denial of the offenses charged and defense of frame-up, unsubstantiated by any credible
and convincing evidence fail. These twin defenses of denial and frame-up have been
viewed with disfavor due to the ease of their concoction and the fact that they have
become common and standard defense ploys in prosecutions for illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RUSGIE GARRUCHO Y SERRANO

G.R. NO. 220449. JULY 4, 2016

The burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests on the prosecution which
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
When moral certainty as to the culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable
doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right irrespective of the reputation of the accused,
who enjoys the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

CALIMAG V. HEIRS OF MACAPAZ

G.R. NO. 191936 JUNE 1, 2016

The documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela,
viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of
marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running
afoul with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of
the Rules on Evidence provides that: "When the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, x x x."
Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original document can still be admitted as secondary
evidence subject to certain requirements specified by law. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., it
was held that:

A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section
5, which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to
satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3)
the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/
offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would
constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence, x x x.

On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As

early as in the case of United States v. Evangelista, it has been settled that church
registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor
are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their
authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with
the rules of evidence. Accordingly, since there is no showing that the authenticity and due
execution of the canonical certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly
proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.

Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the
fact of a solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's
birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parent.

RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE

BUENAFLOR CAR SERVICES, INC. V. DAVID, JR.,

G.R. NO. 222730, NOVEMBER 7, 2016

In any case, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply
in this illegal dismissal case, the treatment of the extrajudicial confession as hearsay is
bound by the exception on independently relevant statements. Under the doctrine of
independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such
statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the
statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.

TAN SIOK KUAN V. HO

G.R. NO. 175085, JUNE 1, 2016

Moreover, there is merit in respondents' invocation of the principle of res inter

alios acta or that principle which states that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided, among which
are: (1) admission by third party, (2) admission by co-partner or agent, (3) admission by
conspirator, and (4) admission by privies.

In the case of Tamargo v. Awingan, the Court expounded on the rationale behind
the principle of res inter alios acta. Citing People v. vda. De Ramos, the Court held that:

(O)n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the
acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

HEARSAY EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V. CALINAWAN
G.R. NO. 226145 FEBRUARY 13, 2017
 The courts a quo considered the said statement as an admissible dying declaration.
For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following
conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant was conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a
witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or
Parricide where the declarant is the victim.

In this case, the Court notes that in her affidavit, Janice said that she thought she
could survive the attack. She never thought that she was dying. In fact, she was optimistic
of her recovery. In view of this, there seems to be a doubt whether she was aware of her
impending death.

Granting there is such doubt, Janice's statement, nevertheless, is admissible as an

exception to the hearsay rule for being part of res gestae. In order for a statement to be
considered part of res gestae, the following elements must concur: (a) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statement was made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statement concerns the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances. All the foregoing elements are present in
the case at bench.

First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling occurrence. Second, Janice never had
the opportunity to fabricate a statement implicating Calinawan because she immediately
identified him as her attacker when Jonathan saw her shortly after the assault took place.
Lastly, the statement of Janice concerned the circumstances surrounding her stabbing.

CHING V. QUEZON CITY SPORTS CLUB, INC.,

G.R. NO. 200150, NOVEMBER 7, 2016

Worthy of reiterating herein is the following disquisition of the Court in Patula v.

People on hearsay evidence:

To elucidate why the Prosecution's hearsay evidence was unreliable and

untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of
Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts
that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge
of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that
establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the
disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its
value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the
veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information. caITAC

In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and
cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the
witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness
without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in
court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.

It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into
any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any
contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she
entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden
entirely upon the dead or absent author. Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests
mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The
testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is
offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is
hearsay just the same.

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is
offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the
basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when
made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an
extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but
without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For
example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say
that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the
complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words.
This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is,
therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule
does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the
hearsay rule applies.

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule
that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration.
Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine
the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or
occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is
not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party's
witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies,
is essential to the administration of justice.

To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to

establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a party's right to cross-examine
her adversary's witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to
require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under
oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,
viz.:

Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses

presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation.
Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of
answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-
examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures this
solution thusly:

Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. — Upon the termination of the
direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any
matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness
and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the
reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
 Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept
relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which
guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . enjoy the right . . . to
meet the witnesses face to face . . . ," the rule requiring the cross-examination by the
adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.

We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being
given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-
examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of
the out-of-court statement depends.

LIM V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 211977 OCTOBER 12, 2016

Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that witnesses can testify only
with regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge; otherwise, their testimonies
would be inadmissible for being hearsay. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force
depends on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three
reasons: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3)
absence of oath.

Consequently, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative

value unless it is shown that the evidence falls within any of the exceptions to the hearsay
rule as provided in the Rules of Court. However, none of the exceptions applies to the
present case.

DST MOVERS CORP. V. PHIL. GEN. INSURANCE CORP.

G.R. 198627, JANUARY 13, 2016

Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Hearsay
Rule. It renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court statements made by persons who
are not presented as witnesses but are offered as proof of the matters stated. This rule
proceeds from the basic rationale of fairness, as the party against whom it is presented is
unable to cross-examine the person making the statement:

SECTION 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. —

A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

The Hearsay Rule, however, is not absolute. Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence enumerate the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. Of these,
Section 44—regarding entries in official records—is particularly relevant to this case:

SECTION 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
 therein stated.

Precisely as an exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 130, Section 44 does away
with the need for presenting as witness the public officer or person performing a duty
specially enjoined by law who made the entry. This, however, is only true, for as long the
following requisites have been satisfied:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so;

(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

Respondent, the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court
of Appeals are all of the position that the Report prepared by PO2 Tomas satisfies these
requisites. Thus, they maintain that it is admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts it
states. This despite the admitted fact that neither PO2 Tomas, nor the person who
supposedly reported the events of February 28, 2002 to PO2 Tomas – the person
identified as "G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX" – gave a testimony in support of the Report.

They are in serious error.

XXXX
Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited above.
As correctly noted by the courts below, while the Traffic Accident Investigation Report
was exhibited as evidence, the investigating officer who prepared the same was not
presented in court to testify that he had sufficient knowledge of the facts therein stated,
and that he acquired them personally or through official information. Neither was there
any explanation as to why such officer was not presented. We cannot simply assume, in
the absence of proof, that the account of the incident stated in the report was based on the
personal knowledge of the investigating officer who prepared it.

AMBRAY VS. TSOUROUS

G.R. NO. 209264. JULY 5, 2016

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence or the "rule on former testimony" which
provides:

Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition

of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

Case law holds that for the said rule to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in
the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the
witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. The
reasons for the admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial or proceeding are the
necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony
can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor,
i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of testimony in the realm of
admissible evidence.

CHAIN OF CUSTODY UNDER RA 9165 AND RELATED CASES

PEOPLE V. DE GUZMAN Y DELOS REYES,

G.R. NO. 219955, FEBRUARY 5, 2018

It appears, based on the prosecution's evidence no less, that for reasons unknown,
the PNP Crime Laboratory agreed to turn over custody of the seized items to an unnamed
receiving person at the City Prosecutor's Office before they were submitted as evidence
to the trial court. It should be emphasized that the City Prosecutor's Office is not, nor has
it ever been, a part of the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs. It has absolutely no
business in taking custody of dangerous drugs before they are brought before the court.

Given the flagrant procedural lapses committed by the police in handling the
seized marijuana and the serious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, the lower
courts clearly misapplied the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties in the prosecution's favor. After all, it is settled that a presumption of regularity
cannot arise where the questioned official acts are patently irregular, as in this case.

PEOPLE V. DELA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 205414, APRIL 4, 2016

In view of the preceding, the Court has, time and again, ruled that non-compliance
with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 shall not necessarily render the arrest of an accused as
illegal or the items seized as inadmissible if the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved in compliance with the chain of custody rule. The
Court explained the rule on the chain of custody to be as follows:

The rule on chain of custody expressly demands the identification of the persons
who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized
movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are seized
from the accused until the time they are presented in court. Moreover, as a method of
authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in
such manner that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

PEOPLE V. BULAWAN
G.R. NO. 204441 JUNE 8, 2016

In the case at bar, as the seized substance was not sealed, the prosecution should
have presented all the officers who handled said evidence from the time it left the person
of the accused to the time it was presented in open court. The prosecution did not.

Time and again, this Court has held that "the failure to establish, through
convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized items has been adequately preserved
through an unbroken chain of custody is enough to engender reasonable doubt on the
guilt of an accused, x x x A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt
on the identity of the drug.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARITESS CAYAS Y CALITIS

G.R. NO. 206888 JULY 4, 2016

While recent jurisprudence has subscribed to the provision in the Implementing

Rules and Regulations of (IRR) R.A. 9165 providing that non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure is not fatal to the prosecution's case, we find it proper to define and
set the parameters on when strict compliance can be excused.

As a rule, strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of

the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable,
and easily open to tampering, alteration, or substitution either by accident or otherwise.

The exception found in the IRR of R.A. 9165 comes into play when strict
compliance with the proscribed procedures is not observed. This saving clause, however,
applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter
explained the cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution established that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved. The
prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of invoking the presumption of regularity and bears
the burden of proving - with moral certainty - that the illegal drug presented in court is
the same drug that was confiscated from the accused during his arrest.

Not to be forgotten in considering the exception is the legal reality that the
required corpus delicti heavily relies on whether the identity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated drug itself were shown to have been preserved.
 In Malillin v. People, we explained the importance of the chain of custody of the
confiscated drugs, as follows:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or
when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to
observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In
other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering -
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

In People v. Kamad, we recognized the following links that must be established to

ensure the preservation of the identity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug
should there be no strict compliance with the procedure provided in Section 21, Article II
of R.A. 9165: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
from the forensic chemist to the court.

RULE 132 PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

REPUBLIC V. GALENO
G.R. NO. 215009 JANUARY 29, 2017

Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence are not sufficient to warrant

the correction prayed for. The Court cannot accord probative weight upon them in view
of the fact that the public officers who issued the same did not testify in court to prove
the facts stated therein.

In Republic v. Medida, the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical
Director, DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein,
holding that:

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence as follows:
 (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to
be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section
19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy x x x.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

"Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries

in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against
a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do] not fall
within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of
Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in
the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are
not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the
legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public
documents. x x

As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers
who issued respondent's documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the
same are bereft of probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
stated therein. At best, they may be considered only as prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.

In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent's sole
witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the
veracity of their contents, as she did not prepare any of the certifications nor was she a
public officer of the concerned government agencies. Notably, while it is true that the
public prosecutor who represented petitioner interposed no objection to the admission of
the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the court below, 32 it should be borne in
mind that "hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless
the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay
evidence rule," 33 which do not, however, obtain in this case. Verily, while respondent's
documentary evidence may have been admitted due to the opposing party's lack of
objection, it does not, however, mean that they should be accorded any probative weight.
The Court has explained that:

The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of
objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one
should not be misled into thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with
probative value. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
 evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for it
has no probative value.

Besides, case law states that the "absence of opposition from government
agencies is of no controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Neither is the Republic barred from
assailing the decision granting the petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in
this case] if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no
merit." Moreover, "in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's."

SPS. REYES V. HEIRS OF MALANCE

G.R. NO. 219071 AUGUST 24, 2016

Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it

with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public
have in their favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence. However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can
be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A
defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a
private document. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document,
the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized
document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is
preponderance of evidence.

AMBRAY VS. TSOUROUS

G.R. NO. 209264. JULY 5, 2016

Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting
may be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to
the satisfaction of the judge. Corollary thereto, jurisprudence states that the presumption
of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct
evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the
signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an
expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.

REPUBLIC V, SPOUSES GIMENEZ

G.R. 174673 JANUARY 11, 2016

Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence.
Testimonial evidence is offered at the time [a] witness is called to testify. Documentary
and object evidence, on the other hand, are offered after the presentation of a party’s
testimonial evidence. Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally
unless permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence.

More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally
offered to be considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the
determination of the case. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of
time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it.

Rule 132, Section 34 provides:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional

guarantee of due process. Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence
submitted against them and take the necessary actions to secure their case. Hence, any
document or object that was marked for identification is not evidence unless it was
“formally offered and the opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or
cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it.”

This court explained further the reason for the rule:

The Rules of Court provides that “the court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered.” A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to
rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or
purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this
allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover,
it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not
previously scrutinized by the trial court.

To consider a party’s evidence which was not formally offered during trial would
deprive the other party of due process. Evidence not formally offered has no probative
value and must be excluded by the court.

ZALDIVAR V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 197056, MARCH 2, 2016

The CA, likewise, correctly found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court when it nullified the proceedings previously conducted and ordered anew a pre-trial
of the case. Note that one of the main reasons presented by Judge Catilo in nullifying the
pre-trial proceedings was that the proceedings conducted after the pre-trial conference did
not comply with the prescribed procedure in the presentation of witnesses. But as
propounded by the CA, and even the OSG who appeared for Judge Catilo, what the trial
court should have done to correct any "perceived" procedural lapses committed during
the presentation of the prosecution's evidence was to recall the prosecution's witnesses
and have them identify the exhibits mentioned in their respective affidavits. This is
explicitly allowed by the rules, specifically Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

Sec. 9. Recalling witnesses - After the examination of a witness by both sides has been
concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of court. The court will grant or
withhold leave in its discretion as the interest of justice may require.

The trial court may even grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue in question, for strict observance of the order of
trial or trial procedure under the rules depends upon the circumstance obtaining in each
case at the discretion of the trial judge.

RULE 133 WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

BACERRA Y TABONES V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 204544 JULY 3, 2017

Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence with

legal consequences.

The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves the
relationship of the fact inferred to the facts that constitute the offense. Their difference
does not relate to the probative value of the evidence.

Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any inference.

Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, "indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that
the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence."

The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor
superior to circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court do not distinguish between
"direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact
may be inferred." The same quantum of evidence is still required. Courts must be
convinced that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from

which it may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and
that the accused is its perpetrator. There is no requirement in our jurisdiction that only
direct evidence may convict. After all, evidence is always a matter of reasonable
inference from any fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference is
logical and beyond reasonable doubt.

Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that
should be established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:
 Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt
may all be established by circumstantial evidence. The circumstances must be considered
as a whole and should create an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the
accused authored the crime.

The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a

finding of guilt is a qualitative test not a quantitative one. The proven circumstances must
be "consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."

PEOPLE V. VARGAS
G.R. NO. 208446 APRIL 6, 2016

Generally, whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the

testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that
affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and
sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness
may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate
recollection of the subject.
Xxxx
We held in People v. Flores that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies are
present between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness and her testimonial
declarations with respect to one's participation in a serious imputation such as murder,
there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the witness' account. There is no other
evidence in this case aside from the testimony of the lone eyewitness which directly
implicates appellants to the crime. The inconsistent statements could not be dismissed as
inconsequential because the inconsistency goes into the very identification of the
assailants, which is a crucial aspect in sustaining a conviction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GIL RAMIREZ Y SUYU

G.R. NO. 218701. FEBRUARY 14, 2018

Indeed “direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from
which a court may draw its finding of guilt.” [R]esort to circumstantial evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 133, Section [4] of the [Rules of Court]. “Circumstantial evidence is
defined as that which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the
fact-finder draws from the evidence established.” The requisites for circumstantial
evidence to sustain a conviction are:

(a) There than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and,
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

As extensively discussed in People v. Modesto -

the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person. From all the circumstances, there should be a combination of
evidence which in the ordinary and natural course of things, leaves no room for reasonable
doubt as to his guilt. Stated in another way, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and
the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to convict the accused.

PEOPLE V. TAYO
G.R. NO. 215750 AUGUST 17, 2016

To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of

circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal
liability of the accused. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
conditions when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, to wit:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient

for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.