NATURAL LAW - INTRODUCTION TO LAW
41
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 2
LAW CUSTOM, USAGE. AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES p. 5
The Sources of International Law
HOW TO STUDY LAW p. 7
How to Study Law
WHAT ARE THE PARTS OF A CASE
RATIO DECIDENDI p.9
Mercado v. People, [GR No. 149375, 11/26/02]
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, [GR No. 132524, 12/29/98]
Phillips v. Irons, [ Il No. 1-03-2992, 2/22/2005]
OBITER DICTUM p.14
People v. Macadaeg [GR No. L-4316, 05/28/52]
DISPOSITIVE PORTION p.15
Manalang v. Rickards [GR No. L-11986, 07/31/58]
People’s Homesite & Housing v. Hon. Ericta [GR No. L-40675,
08/17/83]
Brother Mike Velarde v. Social Justice Society [GR No.
159357, 04/28/04]
SEPARATE OPINION p.18
Barnes v. Glenn Theater [115 L. Ed. 2d 504]
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah [508 US 520]
DISSENTING OPINION p.20
Ruiz v. Ucol [G.R. No. L-45404, August 7, 1987]
Nolasco v. Paño [G.R. No. L-69803, January 30, l987]
Tolentino v. Ongsiako [G.R. No. L-17938, April 30, 1963]
People v. Malmstedt [198 SCRA 401, 06/19/91]
LANDMARK CASE p.24
Recuerdo v. People [GR No. 133036, 01/22/03]
Villaber v. COMELEC [GR No. 148326, 11/15/01]
LEADING CASE p.27
Asufrin v. San Miguel [GR No. 156658, 03/10/04]
Philippine Export v. Philippine Infrastructures [GR No.
120384, 01/13/04]
Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC [GR No. 162759, 08/04/06
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 3
Language Mastery NA
El Poder NA
COURTS, LAWYERS AND JUDGES p. 29
JUDGES
Argel v. Pascua [RTJ-94-1131, 08/20/01]]
LAWYERS
Fernandez v. Grecia [ A.C. No. 3694, 06/17/93]
Regala v. Sandiganbayan [GR No. 105938, 09/20/96]
SEPARATION OF POWERS p. 33
Senate v. Ermita [GR No. 169777, 04/20/06]
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo [GR No. 171396, 05/05/06]
Presidential Proclamation 1017
Francisco v. HRET [GR No. 160261, 11/10/03]
Undue Delegation: Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan [293 US 388
(1935)]
JUDICIAL REVIEW p.39
PP 1017
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo [GR No. 171396, 05/05/06]
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
Estrada v. Escritor (2003) [AM No. P-02-1651, 08/04/03]
Silverio v. Republic [GR No. 174689, 10/22/07
CHECKING THE OTHER BRANCHES p.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Estrada v. Desierto [GR No. 156160, 12/09/04]
United States v. Nixon [418 US 683 (1974)] – special
prosecutor
David v. Macapagal –Arroyo [GR No. 171396, 05/05/06]
Neri v. Blue Ribbon Committee [GR No. 180643, 03/25/08]
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Senate v. Ermita [GR No. 169777, 04/20/06]
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee [GR No. 89914,
11/20/91]
Blue Ribbon Committee v. Judge Majuducon [GR No.
136760, 07/29/03]
Standard Chartered Bank Phils. v. Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies [GR
No. 167173, 12/27/07]
Francisco v. House of Representatives [GR No. 160261,
11/10/03]
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 4
JURISDICTION p. 53
Herrera v. Barretto [25 Phil. 245, 09/10/13]
People v. Mariano [GR No. L-40527, 06/30/76]
STARE DECISIS p.55
El Pueblo Filipinas v. Marcaida [GR No. L-953, 09/18/47]
Tala Realty v. Banco Pilipinas [GR No. 137980, 06/20/00]
Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor [79 Phil. 249 (1947)]
MUTATIS MUTANDIS p.59
Ebranilag v. Division Superintendent of Schools [219 SCRA
256] –Jehovah students
ABANDONMENT V. REVERSAL p. 60
Astraquillo v. Javier [13 SCRA 125 (1965)]
People v. Mapa [20 SCRA 1164 (1967)]
Relampagos v. Cumba [G.R. No. 118861, 04/27/95]
Serrano v. NLRC [GR No. 117040, 05/04/00]
Vitarich v. NLRC [GR No. 121905, 05/20/99]
Helvering v. Hallock [309 US 106 (1940)]
RES JUDICATA p. 66
Agilent Technologies v. Integrated Silicon Technology [GR
No. 154618, 04/14/04]
Cayana v. CA [GR No. 125607, 03/18/04]
Urbana Velasco v. People’s Homesite [GR No. L-39674,
01/31/78]
LAW OF THE CASE p.70
Argel v. Pascua [A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131, 08/20/01]
Buaya v. Stronghold [GR No. 139020, 10/11/00]
Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading [GR No. 90596,
04/08/91]
JM Tuason v. Mariano [GR No. L-33140, 10/23/78]
Uy Lee v. CA [68 SCRA 196, 11/28/75]
Mercury Group of Companies v. Home Development Mutual
Fund [GR No. 171438, 12/19/07]
MIESCOR v. NLRC [GR No. 145402, 03/14/08]
FINALITY OF DECISION see related digests
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice [301 SCRA 96, 01/19/99]
Buaya v. Stronghold [GR No. 139020, 10/11/00]
Estrada v. Escritor (2006) [AM No. P-02-1651, 06/20/06]
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 5
OPERATIVE FACT AND PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS p.80
20th Century Fox v. CA [164 SCRA 655 (1988)]
Columbia Pictures v. CA [261 SCRA 144 (1996)]
Que v. People [154 SCRA 160 (1987)]
People v. Co [227 SCRA 444]
COURTS AS ARBITERS OF RIGHTS AND POWERS p.84
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd v. Ignacio M. Capulong [GR No.
82398, 04/29/88]
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA [GR. No. 97336, 02/19/93]
Lawrence et al. v. Texas [US Supreme Court, No. 02-102,
06/26/03]
People v. Cayat [68 Phil. 12]
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Association v.
Philippine Blooming Mills [51 SCRA 189]
Employment Division v. Smith [494 US 872 (1990)]
R.A. v. City of St. Paul [505 US 377 (1992)]
Einstadt v. Baird [405 US 438 (1972)]
Hernandez v. Robles[7 NY. 3d 338]
Sparkman v. Stump [435 US 349 (1978)]
Roe v. Wade [410 US 113 (1973)]
Gonzales v. Carhart [Nos 05-380, 413 F. 3d 791 and No. 05-
1382, 435 F. 3d 1163, reversed (2007)]
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE p.98
People v. Cayat [68 Phil. 12]
Goesart v. Cleary [335 U.S. 464 (1948)]
Ichong v. Hernandez [GR No. L-7995, 05/31/57]
Tiu v. CA [GR No. 127410, 01/20/99]
RIGHT TO LIFE p. 101
Cruzan v. Director [497 US 261 (1990)]
The Schiavo Case (2005)
ADDITIONAL REFERENCE TERMS p. 103
PP 1017 p. 106
E.O. 464 p. 107
Art. VI, Sec. 21-22 p. 109
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 6
Language, Custom, and General Principles
THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Domestic laws are found in statute books and in collections
of court decisions. It is an altogether different
matter with international law. In the absence of a
centralized legislative, executive and judicial structure,
there
is no single body able to legislate and there is no system of
courts with compulsive power to decide what the
law is nor is there a centralized repository of international
law. Nevertheless international law exists and there
are “sources” where, with some effort, the law can be
found.
Formal sources- can refer to the various processes by which
rules come into existence. Thus, for instance, legislation is a
formal source of law. So are treaty making and judicial
decision making as well as the practice of states.
Material sources- on the other hand, are not concerned with
how rules come into existence but rather with the substance
and content of the obligation. They identify what the
obligations are. In this sense, state practice, UN Resolutions,
treaties,
judicial decisions and the writings of jurists are material
sources in so far as they identify what the obligations are.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
enumerate the “sources” of international law as: (1) custom,
(2) treaties and other international agreements, (3)
generally recognized principles of law, (4) judicial decisions
and (5)
teachings of highly qualified and recognized publicists.
(1) Custom or customary international law- means “a
general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation [opiniojuris].”
(Restatement) This statement contains the two basic
elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how states
behave, and the psychological or subjective factor,
that is, why they behave the way they do.
The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is
the actual behavior of states. This includes
several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of
the practice of states. More important than the
duration though, is the consistency and the generality of the
practice; the basic rule on consistency is, continuity
and repetition.
Opiniojuris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is
obligatory, is what makes practice an international rule.
Without it, practice is not law. . Even humanitarian
consideration by itself does not constitute opiniojuris.
Would dissenting states be bound by custom? Yes, unless
they had consistently objected to it while the custom
was merely in the process of formation. Moreover, a state
joining the international law system for the first time after a
practice has become law is bound by such practice.
“Instant custom”
-It comes about as a spontaneous activity of a great number
of states supporting a specific line of action. In
the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack, a coalition
of forces arose supporting the action taken by the
United States. This united action may have given birth to
instant customary law classifying the attack as an
armed attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter justifying
collective self-defense. What was peculiar about this
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collective action was that the object of defense was not an
attack from a state but from a non-state
organization.
(2) Treaties- Determine the rights and duties of states just as
individual rights are determined by contracts.
Their binding force comes from the voluntary decision of
sovereign states to obligate themselves to a mode of
behavior.
(3) General principles of law recognized by civilized nations-
This is also referred to by the Restatement as “general
principles of law recognized by or common to the world’s
major legal systems.” This has reference not to principles of
international law but to principles of municipal law common
to the legal systems of the world.
(4) International Court of Justice Decisions- decisions of the
ICJ are not only regarded as highly persuasive in
international law circles; they have also contributed to the
formulation of principles that have become international
law.
(5) Publicists-These are institutions which write on
international law. The more significant ones are: The
International Law Commission, an organ of the U.N.; the
Institut de Droit International, the International Law
Association, a multinational body; the (Revised)
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States;
andthe annual publication of the Hague Academy of
International Law. It should be noted, however, that these
institutions are generally government sponsored; hence
they bear within themselves a potential for national
bias.
Other sources of International Law:
Equity- This is an instrument whereby conventional or
customary law may be supplemented or modified in
order to achieve justice. It has both a procedural and
substantive aspect. Procedurally, it means a mandate
given to a judge to exercise discretion in order to achieve a
determination that is more equitable and fair.
UN Resolutions- Declarations of legal principles and
Resolutions by the United Nations are generally considered
merely
recommendatory. But if they are supported by all the states,
they are an expression of opiniojuriscommunis.
Soft Law or Non-Treaty Agreements- They are international
agreements not concluded as treaties and
therefore not covered by the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.
HOW TO STUDY LAW
How To Study Law (Kinyon, Stanley)
A. How To Study Law
1. Tools Of the Profession
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Block A Class 2013 8
The primary tools that a student need to endure law school
are books, may it be textbooks and casebooks.
Certainly, students also need to have their own writing
materials for listing and jutting down important notes.
Lastly, the most important tool that students must not
forget to have is a dictionary of Law. As what the author
mentioned in the book law students usually have difficulty
in comprehending legal terms that is why a law
dictionary is a must have.
2. Object of Law Study
“Law “ a term used in a much broader sense to indicate the
whole process by which organized society, through
government bodies and personal attempts to apply these
rules and regulations and thereby establish and maintain
peaceful and orderly relations between the people in that
society.
The study of law should be viewed only within the context
of the legal system as a whole. Students must learn how
to deal a particular problem or controversy and precisely
sort it in a manner possible for everyone, not only to the
other students of law but also to those who are non-
students of law, to understand and comprehend the
problems that they face everyday in the legal way.
3. “Case Method” or “Case System”
‘Case System” is based on the idea that the best way to
study law is to study the actual court decision in various
types of cases.
‘Cases” are published reports of controversies, which have
come before the court, including the courts decision
and its reasons for it’s decision.
“Casebooks” are made up principally of selected cases taken
from these reports and arranged according to the
type of controversy or subject matter in the case.
4. Briefing Cases
This is a way to make a concise summary or abstract of the
case in the student’s own words.. The importance of
briefing cases is that the students have the opportunity to
read the case thoroughly and carefully, they also will
have a condensed written record of each case.
5. Taking Notes
In this way the students will have the overview of what they
had taken on their class. Do not write everything that
the professor had said, only jut down important details and
codes that you can remember when a certain case is
brought out.
6. Review
a. Day to Day review
This is a way for the student to have full grasp of what will
be discussed and what was already discussed.
b. Periodic Review
Its objective is to get a broad mental picture of the main
divisions in each course.
7. Outline
This compels the student to do the reviewing more
thoroughly, carefully and systematically.
What Are the Parts of the Case?
1. A brief Statement of the kind of controversy involved.
2. A statement of the facts of the controversy
a. Who were the parties
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b. What was the case about
c. Who brought the action and what they prayed for
3. A statement of the question(s) the court is called upon to
decide
4. The arguments on the issue
5. The general conclusion
6. The courts decision may it be affirming or dismissing or
modifying the lower court’s decision.
RATIO DECIDENDI
MERCADO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR 149375, NOVEMBER 26, 2002
*RATIO DECIDENDI- THE PRINCIPLE WHICH THE CASE
ESTABLISHES; THE REASON FOR THE DECISION
Facts
Petition for review of accused Marvin Mercado in the
Supreme Court pursuant to the last par. Of Sec 13, Rule 124
of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Petitioner: Marvin Mercado
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Date: November 26, 2002
Supreme Court Second Division
Ponente: Justice Bellosillo (Supreme Court)
Resolution of the Court of Appeals: Justice Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr.
• Marvin Mercado with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins,
Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen—carnapping (RA 6538-
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972)
• The petitioner along with the other accused was charged
with Carnapping of the Isuzu Trooper, whom they claim
they had no intention of stealing but just borrowed the car
for joyride. The said car was abandoned in Baguio City
by the people accused.
• In order to gain access to the vehicle, the car’s quarter
window was broken. Thereby proving that force was used
upon the property to gain access to it.
• In the Lower court, the petitioner was sentenced to 12
years and 1 day minimum to 17 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal maximum. When the petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, the sentence increased to
17
years and 4 months to 30 years.
• Court of Appeals relying on People vs. Omotoy (charged
with arson, sentenced to reclusion perpetua as
maximumcase
taken directly to Supreme Court)
• Carnapping is a special law (Anti-carnapping Act of 1972).
Thus, corresponding penalties are not provided under
Revised Penal Code.
• The petitioner in his appeal to the Court of Appeals also
raised the issue of whether or not there was indeed
carnapping. However, upon review, the Appellate court
affirmed the conviction.
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Issue
• Whether the maximum sentence of 30 years given by the
Court of Appeals is considered to be within the range of
reclusion perpetua which will enable the case to be certified
in the Supreme Court for a reevaluation of the facts
and evidence.
• Whether the increase in the sentence term of the penalty
is correct as given by the Court of Appeals
• Whether the sentence of 17 years and 4 months to 30
years rule of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure is applicable to the case at bar
Ratio
• The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals is in
accordance to Sec. 14 of RA 6538. Article 27 of The Revised
Penal Code states that the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty
(40) years. The penalty given by the appellate court falls
within this range.
• It should be stressed however, that the penalty to be
imposed on the petitioner is under RA 6538 or The Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972 which is a special law and not under
The Revised Penal Code. With this said, it is incorrect
to penalize the petitioner based on the terms provided for
by the Revised Penal Code. RA 6538 provides for its
own penalties.
• Under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972,
carnapping without violence is penalized with seventeen
(17)
years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years. On the other
hand, if force or violence was used, the penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death.
• With this, the trial court was wrong to sentence the
petitioner with 12 years minimum when based on RA 6538,
the minimum should be 14 years and 8 months.
Ruling
• The Supreme Court affirms the conviction of the petitioner
but disagrees with the penalty imposed. Although the
Isuzu Trooper’s window was broken in order to gain access
to it and based on RA 6538, if violence/ force was used
to gain access to the property, the penalty should be by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, this does not merit
the full penalty.
• The petition of Marvin Mercado for review in the Supreme
Court is denied. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed with a modification that the penalty to
be imposed is reduced to indeterminate prison term
of 17 years and 4 months to 22 years, no costs.
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY VS. ISABEL AGUINALDO COJUANGCO-
SUNTAY, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 132524 DECEMBER 29, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner: Federico Suntay
Respondents: Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco-Suntay and Hon.
Gregorio Sampaga
Date: December 29, 1998
Supreme Court Second Division
Ponente: Justice Martinez
• The parents of the respondent, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, were married in Macao but
after 4 years, filed for annullment. The marriage between
the two was declared null and void by the Court of First
Instance on the basis of the mental disorder of Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay who has schizophrenia. Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay predeceased his mother, Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
In 1990, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died without a will.
Main Case
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• Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco-Suntay filed a petition for
issuance of Letter of Administration of grandmother’s estate
(5 years after death) stating that she is one of the legitimate
grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be
appointed as administratrix of the estate.
• However, petitioner, Federico Suntay, filed an opposition
saying that he has been managing the properties even
before death of wife and prayed that he be appointed
administratrix instead.
• Federico Suntay moved to dismiss the case alleging that
Isabel is an illegitimate child (almost 2 years after filing of
Isabel’s case) saying that declaration by the then CFI of Rizal
that the marriage of respondent Isabel’s parents is
“null and void,” the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no
right nor interest in the estate of her paternal
grandmother.
• Trial court denied motion to dismiss Case at hand
• Federico filed this petition
Issue:
• Whether or not the court committed grave abuse of
discretion
Held:
• Petition dismissed
Ratio:
• Under Section 1 Rule 16, the time limit for petition to
dismiss is long overdue
• The decision of the CFI declared the marriage between
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco Suntay is null
and void. But according to Article 89 of the New Civil Code, a
voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces
all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a
competent court in an action for annulment. Children
conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate
• Respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay is a
legitimate child which is clear under the third paragraph of
Article 85 of the New Civil Code.
Ruling
• Legitimate grandchildren, including respondent Isabel,
may invoke their successional right of representation the
estate of their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay
• No grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is
DISMISSED.
Phillips vs. Irons
Facts
On Jan 1999, plaintiff, Richard Phillips and the defendant,
Sharon Irons began dating. At the time, the defendant
informed
Phillips that she was married a year ago and claimed that
she has been divorced from her husband, Dr. Adebowale
Adeleye.
Time passed and Phillips and Irons were engaged to be
married. The couple talked about the possibility of having
children
after getting married. Plaintiff informed the defendant that
he did not wish to have children, at least not until they are
married, and intended that he would use a condom
whenever they engage in sex. The defendant understood
and agreed.
During the course of their relationship, the couples engaged
in oral sex 3 times, with 2 of those instances having occurred
on the same date. They never engaged in vaginal
intercourse because of the defendant’s menses.
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Around Feb 19 and/or March 19 of 1999, Irons engaged in
oral sex with Phillips. She used the semen that hadn’t been
discarded to artificially inseminate herself without the
plaintiff’s knowledge.
On May 1999, the defendant confessed to Phillips that she is
still married to her former husband,. She told him that she
planned to get a divorce, and showed him a “petition for
dissolution of marriage” which was filed on May 20, 1999. In
the
petition, the defendant swore that she was not pregnant.
The couple ended their relationship when Phillips learned
that his fiancée was still married to her husband on May
1999.
In November 21, 2000, Irons filed a “Petition to Establish
Paternity and Other Relief” against plaintiff, claiming she
and
plaintiff had a sexual relationship which gave birth to Serena
on December 1, 1999, where DNA tests have confirmed that
Phillips is the biological father of Iron’s daughter.
Phillips asserted that he had no knowledge of Iron’s
pregnancy nor the birth of the child until receiving the
defendant’s
petition to establish paternity. He also claimed that Iron’s
continued to live with his Adeleye during her pregnancy.
Adeleye and the public were led to believe that Serena is
Adeleye’s daughter because of the presence of Adeleye’s
name on
Serena’s birth certificate. Even Serena, doesn’t know that
Phillips is her biological father.
Phillips filed a complaint before the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois against defendant seeking damages for:
intentional
infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and conversion. At the initial filing of the
complaint, the
plaintiff’s paternity hasn’t been established.
FTA: FN1. At the time this case was before the circuit court,
and as of the filing of plaintiff’s original brief, plaintiff’s
paternity had not
been established. Although the parties agree that plaintiff is
Serena’s biological father, no documentation is provided in
the record on
appeal.
*2 Following the filing of plaintiff’s initial complaint,
defendant successfully moved to dismiss under section 2-
615. Plaintiff ultimately
filed a third amended complaint, which was dismissed with
prejudice, the circuit court finding each count “continues to
lack sufficient
facts” necessary to state a cause of action. Plaintiff timely
appeals.
Issues:
Whether or not the circuit court erred in dismissing
plaintiff’s complaint for intentional infliction of emotional
distress;
Whether or not the circuit court erred in dismissing
plaintiff’s complaint for fraudulent misrepresentation;
Whether or not the circuit court erred in dismissing
plaintiff’s complaint for conversion.
Held:
Yes. the circuit court erred in dismissing count plaintiff’s
complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
No. The circuit court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s
claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.
No. The circuit court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s
claim for conversion.
Ratio for issue 1:
Three elements are needed to state a cause of action for
IIED: (1) the conduct involved must be truly extreme and
outrageous (2) the actor must either intend that his or her
conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there
is at
least a high probability that it will cause severe emotional
distress and (3) the conduct must, in fact, cause severe
emotional
distress.
An action can be considered “outrageous and extreme” if
the nature of the conduct goes beyond the possible bounds
of
decency and is considered intolerable in a civilized
community. In the case at bar, defendant’s actions can be
considered
“extreme and outrageous” when she deliberately misled the
plaintiff that she didn’t want to bear children until after
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marriage, but deceitfully engaged in sexual acts which no
one would would expect could result in pregnancy, and
using the
plaintiff’s sperm in unorthodox, and unexpected manner
yielding extreme consequences.
It must also be established that actor must intend that
his/her actions inflict severe emotional distress, or at least
know that
there is a high probability that it will cause severe emotional
distress. FTA: According to plaintiff, defendant was aware of
his desire to have children only after marriage. Further,
plaintiff believed defendant could not become pregnant, not
only
due to the nature of the sexual acts, but because he
believed she was infertile at the time as a result of her
menstrual cycle.
Months later, however, defendant informed plaintiff he
fathered her child. From these facts, if proved, it may be
inferred
reasonably that defendant knew manipulating plaintiff into
unwittingly conceiving a child out of wedlock would inflict
severe emotional distress
Lastly, it must be determined whether the consequence of
the actor’s conduct on the acted upon, can be considered
severe. The degree of emotional distress depends on its
intensity and duration. FTA: In this case, plaintiff claims he
“often
finds himself nauseated and unable to eat, especially when-
as a family practitioner-he treats small children who are the
same age as the child he allegedly fathered.” As plaintiff’s
claim involves a physically and psychologically manipulated
nonconsensual
pregnancy, it is cognizable that the intensity of his
emotional distress is great and its duration long-lasting.
Ratio for issue 2:
The tort of fraudulent misrepresentation cannot be applied
in the case at bar since historically, it has been limited to
cases
involving financial transactions where plaintiff suffered
monetary harm. It is an economic tort under which one may
recover
only monetary damages. Therefore, plaintiff may not
recover on allegations of physical and emotional distress.
Elements of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation:
• a false statement of material fact;
• known or believed to be false by the party making it;
• intent to induce plaintiff to act
• action by plaintiff in justifiable reliance on the truth of the
statement
• damage to plaintiff resulting from such reliance.
Ratio for issue 3:
Conversion is an unauthorized act that deprives a person of
his property permanently or for an indefinite time. It must
be
shown that the money claimed, or its equivalent, at all
times belonged to plaintiff and that defendant converted it
to his
own use. The elements of a claim for conversion are: (1)
plaintiff’s right in the property; (2) plaintiff’s right to
immediate,
absolute, and unconditional possession of the property; (3)
defendant’s unauthorized and wrongful assumption of
control,
dominion, or ownership over the property; and (4) plaintiff’s
demand for possession.
The plaintiff cannot show “right to immediate, absolute, and
unconditional possession” of his sperm. Plaintiff presumably
intended, and he does not claim otherwise, that defendant
discard his semen, not return it to him. FTA: “The essence of
conversion is the wrongful deprivation of one who has a
right to the immediate possession of the object unlawfully
held.”
note: FTA means “from the article”. The statement following
it has been explicitly copied verbatim from the original
document
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 14
OBITER DICTUM
Obiter Dictum- passing or incidental statements; statements
made or decisions reached in a court opinion which were
not
necessary to the disposition of the case; uttered by way, not
upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside from
the main topic of the case to collateral subjects; opinion of
the court upon any point or principle which it is not required
to
decide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. Hon, Higinio
Macadaeg, Antonio Guillermo, et al,
respondents
GR L-4316, MAY 28, 1952
Facts:
Petition to prevent and restrain Seventh Guerilla Amnesty
Commission from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a
petition
for amnesty filed by respondent Antonio Guillermo a.k.a
Silver
• Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission- Hons. Macadaeg,
Potenciano Pecson, Ramon R. San Jose
• Antonio Guillermo- convicted and sentenced for murder
• July 15, 1947- case filed in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte—Mar. 29, 1948- judgment.
• Appeal to the Supreme Court- judgment on May 19,
1950— expressly ruled in the judgment of conviction that
Guillermo
is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty because the
murders which he was convicted were committed “not in
furtherance
of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal
strife between two rival guerilla units.”
• Motion for reconsideration- June 5, 1950- denied July 13,
1950
• June 20, 1950- filed for suspension of the proceedings and
reference of the case to the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty
Commission- denied July 13, 1950
• Petition for amnesty- July 8, 1950
Issue:
Whether the pronouncement of the Court regarding the
amnesty of Antonio Guillermo is obiter dictum and if the
Commission has jurisdiction over the petition for amnesty of
the convicted?
Ruling:
The petition for prohibition was granted and the preliminary
injunction issued by the Supreme Court on Nov. 24, 1950
made absolute with costs against Guillermo. He may not
raise again the issue in any tribunal, judicial or
administrative and
is now estopped from contesting the judgment, of the
jurisdiction of the court that rendered the adverse ruling.
Seventh
Guerilla Amnesty Commission can take cognizance only of
cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court on October 2,
1946,
at that time, during which date the Guillermo criminal case
was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte.
Guillermo’s case was assigned to the Second GAC. Seventh
GAC’s claim of jurisdiction of the application was merely
based
on administrative Order no. 217 which expressly states “in
view of the appointments of new Judges of First Instances”
and
not for the purpose of setting forth cases cognizable by each
of the different commissions. The courts are not excluded in
deciding any claim for amnesty, thus the Court has
jurisdiction over the amnesty petition of Guillermo. It was
also found
that the petition was an ill-advised attempt to delay
execution of the judgment of conviction which no court of
justice will
countenance. The finding of the Court that Guillermo is not
entitled to the benefits of amnesty is final and conclusive,
not
an obiter dictum, under the principle of res judicata.
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 15
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petitioner-Appellants: BERNARDO MANALANG, VICENTE DE
LEON, AND SALVADOR DE LEON
VS. Respondent-Appellees: ELVIRA TUASON DE RICKARDS
G.R. No. L-11986
July 31, 1958
FACTS:
• 01 January 1954: City of Manila increased assessment of a
44,561.80-square-meter-lot being used as a private
subdivision in Sampaloc, Manila and rented out by
Manalang, et al. Rickards, who owned the lot, increased
rent
tenants insisted on paying former rent
• 27 April 1954: Rickards filed for ejectment in the Municipal
Court of Manila
• Tenants filed for motions to dismiss RA 1162:
expropriation of land estates in Manila, division of such lots
and
their lease on reasonable terms
• 14 July 1954: Municipal Judge of Manila denied motions to
dismiss and suspended proceedings for 2 years
• 13 April 1955: Municipal Judge ordered the setting of
cases for hearing tenants asked for reconsideration
denied tenants filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of First Instance of Manila against
Rickards and the Judges of the Municipal Court of Manila
that their previous judgment and order be declared
null and void
• Rickards argued that the July 1954 order for the case to be
suspended for 2 years is interlocutory cannot be
reviewed by petition for certiorari
• 06 February 1956: Court of First Instance dismissed
petition for certiorari cannot be reviewed by petition for
certiorari and case was heard
• Court of First Instance: actions for ejectment were filed
before the enactment of RA 1162 laws can only be
enforced prospectively
• Tenants took it to the Court of Appeals who then passed it
on to the Supreme Court
ISSUE/S, HELD AND RATIO:
1) Whether or not the July 1954 order of the inferior court is
interlocutory
o Yes, the order is interlocutory.
o Dispositive portion of the order did not contain a definite
resolution but instead suspended the hearing of
the case.
2) Whether or not the lower court made a mistake in
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition
o No, the lower court did not make a mistake.
o Since the order is interlocutory and not final, it is not open
for certiorari.
o Lower court is given the power to reopen the trial and
resolve the case.
TERMS:
• Certiorari to be shown an order by a higher court
directing a lower court to send the record of a case for
review
• Interlocutory order given during the intermediate stage
between the beginning and end of a cause of action
not final
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 16
Petitioner: PEOPLE’S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION
(PHHC)
VS. Respondents: HON. VICENTE ERCITA, Judge of Court of
First Instance of Quezon City; ACTING
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT; REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY; JAIME O. RIVERA
G.R. No. L-40675
August 17, 1983
FACTS:
• 1971: Court ordered PHHC to execute a deed of sale in
favor to Rivera, a registered tenant of the land and who
was awarded the purchase of the property in its original
cost past rentals considered as partial payment
• 1975: PHHC filed for a motion of reconsideration claim:
dispositive portion of the Court order did not include
the purchase price of the property
ISSUE/S, HELD & RATIO:
• Whether or not the reconsideration filed by PHHC should
be allowed
o No, the reconsideration isn’t allowed.
o Lack of legal basis for motion.
o Case resolution isn’t always found in the dispositive
portion.
Petitioner/Plaintiff: MARIANO “BROTHER MIKE” Z. VELARDE
VS. Defendant/Respondent: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)
G.R. No. 159357
April 28, 2004
FACTS:
• (Previous Case) 28 June 2003 – SJS filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief against Velarde and other significant
religious leaders (Jaime Cardinal Sin, Eraño Manalo, Eddie
Villanueva, Eliaso Soriano) before RTC-Manila (Branch
49)
o Declaratory Relief
- Section 1, Rule 64, Rules of Court: A special civil action
brought by a person interested under a deed,
will, contract or written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance, before breach or violation thereof,
to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or
statute and for a declaration of his rights or
duties
- Requisites:
1) Justiciable controversy involves an active antagonistic
assertion of legal right on one side and
denial thereof on the other concerns a real (and not
theoretical) question or issue
2) Controversy between persons with adverse interests
material interest
3) Must have legal interest in controversy to seek for
declaratory relief
4) Issue must be ripe for justiciable determination
- Relief specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a
violation of the right of the plaintiff
SJS’s objectives:
1) Interpretation of the constitutional provision on
separation of church and state
2) Declaratory judgment: whether or not the act of a
religious leader like any of herein respondents, in
endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or
in urging or requiring the members of his
flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the
letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 17
whether or not Velarde and the other religious leaders in
question violated the constitution by
endorsing candidates or requiring members to vote for
specific candidates for elective office
Filed motions by respondents:
1) Villanueva, Manalo and Velarde Motion to Dismiss
(within original filing period)
2) Cardinal Sin Comment (within extended period)
3) Soriano Answer (within extended period)
o Dismissal of petition no cause of action and no justiciable
controversy
o Court denied Motion to Dismiss and ordered to submit a
pleading by way of advisement
Decision: endorsement of specific candidates is a clear
violation of the separation clause
o However, the decision did not include a dispositive
portion order or judgment of the court
irrespective of the contrary statements therein
o Motion for Reconsideration denied by lower court
• (Case at hand) Petition for Review
o 02 September 2003: Court Resolution SJS and Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), as well as
respondents to submit comments
ISSUE/S , HELD AND RATIO:
• Procedural Issues
1) Whether or not Petition For Declaratory Relief contains
justiciable controversy
o No, the petition does not contain justiciable controversy.
o Petition is based on speculations and theoretical issues
that had not yet ripened into actual
controversy sheer speculation does not give rise to actual
right
2) Whether or not Petition for Declaratory Relief states a
cause of action
o No, the petition does not state a cause of action.
o Cause of action act or omission of one party in violation of
the legal rights of another, causing injury
Essential requirements:
1) Right in favor of the plaintiff
2) Obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such
right
3) Defendants act or omission in violation of that right
breach of obligation
In a case of declaratory
relief, it is presupposed that a breach or violation is
impending, imminent
or at least threatened, even if it has not actually happened
o Petition filed by SJS before the RTC has no explicit
allegation that SJS had any legal right it ought to
protect
o Assumption: Velarde and the other religious leaders in
question might participate in partisan politics
3) Whether or not SJS had any legal standing to file for
Petition for Declaratory Relief
o No , SJS has no legal standing.
o No adverse legal interest between Velarde and SJS no
legal right of SJS was threatened by Velarde
o Petition did not sufficiently state what specific right was
being violated, or what acts were in breach
of the law or Constitution
• Substantive Issues
1) Whether or not the RTC Decision conformed to the form
and substance required by the Constitution, the law
and the Rules of Court
o No, the RTC’s decision did not conform.
o Essential parts of a good decision:
1. Statement of case
2. Statement of facts
3. Issue or assignment of errors
4. Court ruling
5. Disposition or dispositive portion Court order or
judgment irrespective of contrary statements
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 18
2) Whether or not religious leaders, like Velarde, can
endorse candidates for public office
o Unclear
o SJS failed to convince the Court
• Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court
1) Dismissal of complaint complaint should contain clear
facts for claim and specify relief sought for
2) Complaint filed, legal fees paid, issued summons to
defendant or respondents by clerk of court 15 days for
defendant to answer, unless different period fixed by court
3) If not answered relief granted.
4) If answered and counter-claimed must be answered
within 10 days from service. Reply may again be filed
10 days from service of the pleading responded to.
5) Failure to answer Court directs judgment on pleading
TERMS:
• A quo earliest limiting point; starting point; beginning
• Locus standi legal standing personal or substantial
interest party sustained or will sustain a direct injury as
a result of the act
• Moto proprio of one’s own accord upon motion of the
defendant
SEPARATE OPINION
Michael Barnes for St. Joseph County, Indiana vs. Glen
Theater, Inc.
Facts
• Respondents are 2 establishments in South Bend, Indiana,
that wish to provide totally nude dancing as
entertainment, and individual dancers who are employed at
these establishments. Namely:
o Kitty Kat Lounge sells alcoholic beverages and provides
“go-go dancing” desires to present totally
nude dancing
o Glen Theatre, Inc who’s primary business is in supplying
adult entertainment in the form of written
and printed materials, movie showings, and live
entertainment at an enclosed “bookstore” that
features nude and seminude performances through glass
panels.
• Indiana public indecency statute asserts prohibition
against complete nudity in public places which violates
first amendment
Issues
• Whether or not the nude dancing involved here was
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment
• Respondents argue their freedom for ‘expressive
conduct’—in this case to convey an erotic message—in the
form of dancing nude.
o Respondents contend that even though prohibiting nudity
in public generally may not be related to
suppressing expression, prohibiting the performance of
nude dancing is related to expression
because the state seeks to prevent its erotic message.
Held
• Decision of Court of Appeals is Reversed
• Court of Appeals Decision was: “non-obscene nude
dancing performed for entertainment is expression
protected by the First Amendment, and that the public
indecency statute was an improper infringement of
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 19
that expressive activity because its purpose was to prevent
the message of eroticism and sexuality conveyed
by the dancers”
Ratio
• the requirement that the dancers don pasties and a G-
string does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic
message it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly
less graphic. The perceived evil that Indiana seeks to
address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity
• while the dancing to which it was applied had a
communicative element, it was not the dancing that was
prohibited, but simply its being done in the nude
CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. V. CITY OF HIALEAH
(508 U.S. 520)
FACTS:
• Petitioner Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. (Church)
and Ernesto Picardo its president filed an action against the
city
if Hialeah and its city council named as defendants alleging
violation of the their rights under the Free Exercise Clause.
• In April 1987, the church announced plans to establish a
house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum with
the
goal to bring the practice of the Santeria faith, including its
ritual of animal sacrifice, into the open.
• On June 9, 1987 and other subsequent days the Hialeah
city council held an emergency public session where several
ordinances and resolutions where passed in response to the
distress of members of the community regarding practices
of
the Santeria religion specifically animal sacrifice.
(1) On June 9, Resolution 87-66, noted the “concern”
expressed by residents of the city “that certain religions may
propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with
public morals, peace or safety,” and declared that the City
reiterates its commitment to a prohibition against any and
all
acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent
with public morals, peace or safety.
(2) On June 9, Ordinance 87-40, incorporated in full, except
as to penalty, Florida’s animal cruelty laws which
punishes unnecessarily or cruelly killing of any animal. With
the consent of the attorney general of Florida the city
attorney
assured that the prohibition of sacrificing of animals in a
religious practice or ritual is not inconsistent with the state
law
therefore the city council can make ordinances against it.
(3) On August 11, Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual sacrifices
of animals within the City of Hialeah was passed. (4) On
Sept.
8, Ordinance 87-52 prohibiting public ritualistic animal
sacrifice, other than for the primary purpose of food
consumption
was passed.
(5) On Sept. 22, Ordinance 87-71 stating that It shall be
unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or
associations to
sacrifice any animal within the corporate limits of the City of
Hialeah, Florida where the word sacrifice shall mean: to
unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in
apublic or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary
purpose of food consumption was passed.
(6) On Sept. 22, Ordinance 87-72 stating that it is unlawful
for any person, persons, corporations or associations to
slaughter any animal on any premises in the City of Hialeah,
Florida, except those properly zoned as a slaughter house,
and
meeting all the health, safety and sanitation codes
prescribed by the City for the operation of a slaughter house
was passed.
• After a 9-day bench trial the District Courts favored the
defendants finding absolute immunity for their legislative
acts and
that no violation of the petitioners’ rights were made
finding four compelling reasons: (1) that animal sacrifices
present a
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 20
substantial health risk, both to participants and the general
public, (2) that the children who witness the sacrifice of
animals
suffer from emotional
injury, (3) that the city’s interest in protecting animals from
cruel and unnecessary killing and (4) that the city’s interest
in
restricting the slaughter or sacrifice of animals to areas
zoned for slaughterhouse use.
• The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
judgment in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion stating
that
the ordinances were consistent with the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Hialeah city council is in violation of the
First Amendment in enacting Ordinances 87-14, 87-52, 87-71
and 87-72.
HELD:
The Supreme Court decided in favor of the petitioner and
reversed the previous decisions concluding that that each of
Hialeah’s ordinances pursues the city’s governmental
interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief.
RATIONALE:
The US Constitution provides that the Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the
free exercise thereof through the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment which was applied to the States through
the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Given that the Santeria is a religion, its beliefs such as
animal sacrifice “need not be acceptable, logical, consistent
or
comprehensible to others in order to be protected by the
First Amendment.
To support the constitutional protection for free exercise of
religion, (a) neutrality and (b) general applicability in the law
needs to be established. A law failing to satisfy these
requirements must be justified by a compelling
governmental
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to advance that
interest even if it has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular
religious practice. Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. The ordinances of the
Hialeah city council fail to satisfy these Smith requirements.
(a)
Neutrality need not only be facial (evident at the text used
in the law) but can also be supported by the equal
protection
mode of analysis in the formulation of the law. The
ordinances were found to be inconsistent with these
requirements and
led to the conclusion that the ordinances had as their object
the suppression of religion.
(b) General applicability needs to be establish with laws
burdening religious practice. The Free Exercise Clause
“protect[s]
religious observers against unequal treatment and
inequality results when a legislature decides that the
governmental
interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued
only against conduct with a religious motivation. The
ordinances
fall well below the minimum standard necessary to protect
First Amendments rights. The Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and
87-
71 were claimed to advance two interests: protecting the
public health and preventing cruelty to animals but this may
be
done not by prohibiting Santeria sacrifice alone and there
are far more greater ways to do this that would not
discriminate
the practice of the Santeria religion. Also a law burdening
religious practice that is not neutral or not of general
application
must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny it must satisfy
‘interests of the highest order,’ and must be narrowly
tailored in
pursuit of those interests. In this case the ordinances fail to
satisfy these requirements as well. Lastly, the Free Exercise
Clause commits government to religious tolerance, and
upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state
intervention
stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices,
all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to
the
Constitution and to the rights it secures.
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 21
DISSENTING OPINION
RUIZ VS. UCOL
GR L-45404, AUGUST 7, 1987
FACTS
Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty.
Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against
defendantappellee
Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt
Ilocos Norte. In her answer to the charges, Ucol alleged
that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who
wanted to get back at the Ucol’s because of a case filed by
Encarnacion Ucol’s husband against Ruiz. She was also
alleged to have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz instigated the
complaint and fabricated the charges.
The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file
his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol based on
the
alleged libelous portion of Ucol’s answer.
Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty. During
the proceedings in the libel case, complainant Atty. Ruiz
entered his appearance and participated as private
prosecutor. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment
acquitting
Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement was made by
the trial
court as to the civil liability of the accused
Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a
separate complaint for damages based on the same facts
upon
which the libel case was founded.
Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had
prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the
decision
in the criminal case for libel.
ISSUE
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground
of res judicata. As earlier stated, on appeal, the Court of
Appeals certified the case to us, the only issue being
whether or not the civil action for damages was already
barred by the
criminal case of libel.
HELD
No. What comprises a decision which can be subject of
appeal or special civil action is the majority opinion of the
court
and not the dissenting opinion. Never has it happen that the
dissenting opinion
has been the one appealed of. Doing such is contrary to
logic and reason.
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petition filed by petitioner
Encarnacion Ucol is likewise DISMISSED for patent lack of
merit.
BASIS
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration
in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist.
The plaintiff-appellant’s contentions have no merit. The
right of the plaintiff-appellant under the above provisions to
file the
civil action for damages based on the same facts upon which
he instituted the libel case is not without limitation
The findings in the criminal case, therefore, show a pattern
of harassment. First, petitioner Ruiz had something to do
with
the administrative complaint. The complaint was dismissed.
Second, he filed a criminal case for libel based on portions of
Mrs. Ucol’s answer in the administrative case. Third, he
acted as private prosecutor in the criminal case actively
handling as
a lawyer the very case where he was the complainant. And
fourth, after the accused was acquitted on the basis of the
facts
stated above, Atty. Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols with
implacability by filing a civil action for damages. As stated
by
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 22
the trial judge, “court actions are not established for parties
to give bent to their prejudice.” This is doubly true when the
party incessantly filing cases is a member of the bar. He
should set an example in sobriety and in trying to prevent
false and
groundless suits
Guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. A
review of the court’s findings, however, indicates that the
disputed
Answer of Mrs. Ucol in the administrative case contains no
libel. As stated by the trial court, “As will be shown later, it
appears that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but
authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the
respondent’s
answer.” (Emphasis supplied). The court found the charges
against Ucol, if not malicious, at least reckless in the face of
proven facts and circumstances.
NOLASCO VS. PAÑO
GR L-69803 JANUARY 30, 1987
FACTS:
The case at bar is for the motion for partial reconsideration
of both petitioners and respondents of the SC’s
decision that the questioned search warrant by petitioners
is null and void, that respondents are enjoined from
introducing
evidence using such search warrant, but such personalities
obtained would still be retained, without prejudice to
petitioner
Aguilar-Roque.
Respondents contend that the search warrant is valid and
that it should be considered in the context of the crime
of rebellion, where the warrant was based.
Petitioners on the other hand, on the part of petitioner
Aguilar- Roque, contend that a lawful search would be
justified only by a lawful arrest. And since there was illegal
arrest of Aguilar-Roque, the search was unlawful and that
the
personalities seized during the illegal search should be
returned to the petitioner.
The respondents, in defense, concede that the search
warrants were null and void but the arrests were not.
The court decides to use the dissenting opinion of
Teehankee regarding this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the personalities seized using an illegal
search warrant be returned?
HELD:
Yes, it should be. Following the dissenting opinion of
Teehankee stated as follows:
… The questioned search warrant has correctly been
declared null and void in the Court’s decision as a general
warrant
issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that
‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses,
papers and effects aqainst unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not
be
violated’ (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights rders the
absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: “Any
evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding” (Sec. 4[2]).
This
constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary
rule has proved by historical experience to be the only
practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures by utlawing all evidence
illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the
part of state and police officers to
disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the
Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to
change or modify. All the articles thus seized fag under the
exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be
used
against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority
in the recent case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-
09,
August 30, 1985). …
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 23
TOLENTINO VS. ONGSIAKO
GR L-17938 APRIL 30, 1963
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant claims to be the successor-in-interest of
the late Severino Domingo, who was involved in a case
against Ongsiako. Plaintiff-appellant said that Domingo died
without ever receiving the decision of the case, and he has
just
found out of the decision, over 20 years since its
promulgation. This prompted him to file a complaint for the
enforcement
of the dissenting opinion. This was dismissed by the trial
court for lack of cause of action.
ISSUES:
o Whether or not appellant’s claim that decision was
erroneous and unjust is tenable?
o Whether or not one can move for the enforcement of the
dissenting opinion?
HELD:
On the first issue, it is untenable. Appellant is barred by res
judicata, the decision of the case being final and
executory for a long time already.
On the second issue, the enforcement of the dissenting
opinion is ridiculous as the dissenting opinion enforces no
right, claim, or whatsoever. It is just a dissent from the
conclusion of the case.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MIKAEL MALMSTEDT
“THE SWEDISH NATIONAL WITH HASHISH CASE”
198 SCRA 401 JUNE 19, 1991
FACTS:
Accused Michael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, took a
Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC
902
from Sagada province to Baguio City on May 11, 1989.
On the same day, Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding
Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed
at
Camp Dangwa, received persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had in
his possession prohibited drugs. Cpt. Vasco thus ordered his
men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14,
Acop,
Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
During the inspection of the aforementioned vehicle, CIC
Galutan noticed a bulge on accused’s waist. Suspecting the
bulge
on accused’s waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
accused’s passport and other identification papers. When
accused
failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out
whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging
object
turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the
same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4)
suspiciouslooking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the
officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped
objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused
stopped to
get two (2) traveling bags from the luggage carrier.The
officers confiscated the bags and opened them. A teddy
bear was
found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer
noticed that there were bulges inside the same, which did
not feel
like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened
the bags that accused finally presented his passport. The
officers consequently opened the teddy bears, and they
were found to also contain hashish.
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 24
ISSUE:
WON the search of the plaintiff’s person and possessions
were illegal, because it was made without a search warrant
and,
therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered
during the illegal search could not have been made
admissible as
evidence against him.
HELD:
The RTC decision was affirmed by the SC.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Ponente: Padilla, J.
The constitution states that a peace officer or a private
person may arrest a person without a warrant when in his
presence
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The
offense was
recognized with the warrantless search conducted by
NARCOM prompted by probable
cause:
(1) the receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession
and
(2) failure of the accused to immediately present his
passport.
Note: Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and The petitioner files a petition for review, stating that she has
prudent man to believe that an offense has been been convicted of an unconstitutional law and that the trial
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with court erred in not upholding her innocence as well as
the offense are upholding the evidence of prosecution
in the place sought to be searched.
Dissenting Opinion: Narvasa& Cruz
“Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I
believe that the appellant should be absolved on reasonable
doubt.
There was in this case no confidential report from, or
positive identification by an informer; no attempt to flee; no
bag or
package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably
persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the time in
process of
perpetrating the offense for which he was subsequently
prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched Malmstedt’s
pouch
and the bags in his possession, they were simply “fishing”
for evidence.”
-Narvasa
LANDMARK CASE
Joy Lee Recuerdo (petitioner) vs. People of the Philippines
and the Court of Appeals (respondents)
Landmark Case. The case is a review of an appeal petitioned
by Joy Lee Recuerdo on the decision made by the Court of
Appeals on July 16, 1997 affirming the decision rendered by
the Regional Trial Court Branch 150, which in turn affirmed
the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati
City, Branch 67. The petitioner was convicted for violation of
Batas Pambansa 22 or The Bouncing Checks Law.
Yolanda Floro sold to Joy Recuerdo a 3-karat loose diamond
stone valued at P420,000. Recuerdo gave a downpayment of
P40,000 and issued 9 postdated checks, 8 of which paid in
the amount of 40,000 and 1 in the amount of 20,000. All
checks
were drawn from the petitioner’s Prudential Bank account.
Yolanda deposited 8 of the 10 checks to Liberty Savings and
Loan Association and only 3, dated December 25, 1993,
January
25, 1994 and February 25, 1994 were cleared. The other
checks were dishonored due to the closure of the
petitioner’s
Intro to Law Case Digests
Block A Class 2013 25
account. Yolanda went to Recuerdo’s dental clinic and
advised her to change the dishonored checks which she
failed to do.
A demand letter was then sent to Recuerdo, but to no avail,
leading Yolanda to file 5 counts of violations of BP 22 at the
Makati MeTC. The Makati MeTC found the Recuerdo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of the BP 22 on all 5
counts and sentenced the accused to suffer 30 days of
imprisonment for each count and to pay Yolanda Floro
P200,000
which is the total amount of the checks issued and another
P20,000 as damages to compensate attorney’s fees. On
appeal,
the RTC affirmed this decision. The CA also affirmed the
decision.