THE HOBGOBLIN OF LITTLE MINDS:

HOW THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONTRADICTION EXPLAINS THE

CYCLIC NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

BRIAN MICHAEL MCKEON SR

BS, SUNY College at Cortland, 1996

MS, Duquesne University, 1998

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy, Interpretation, and Culture
in the Graduate School of
Binghamton University
State University of New York
2006
 UMI Number: 3243492

Copyright 2006 by
McKeon, Brian Michael, Sr.

All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 3243492

Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company

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P.O. Box 1346
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© Copyright by Brian Michael McKeon Sr 2006

All Rights Reserved

 Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy, Interpretation, and Culture
in the Graduate School of
Binghamton University
State University of New York
2006

Friday, September 8, 2006

Eric Dietrich, Department of Philosophy and CPIC, Binghamton University

Stephen Ross, Program in Philosophy, Interpretation, and Culture, Binghamton

University

Donald Weiss, Department of Philosophy, Binghamton University

iii
ABSTRACT
Paradoxes appear to represent inconsistencies in our logic, and many philosophers

have tried to solve or dissolve them. Graham Priest claims that paradoxes arising at the

limits of our thought are actually true contradictions, or “dialetheia,” in his book, Beyond

the Limits of Thought. My goal is to see if his claims can be validated. To that end, I

analyze Priest’s dialetheia with an indexing system that I invented to keep track of

changing perspectives. Utilizing this indexing system, epsilon calculus and modern

logic, I am able to demonstrate that we are capable of seeing the dialetheic nature of

paradoxes when we take into account different points of view. Ultimately I claim that

dialetheism itself is a point of view.

In addition to claiming that dialetheism is a viewpoint in my philosophical

system, I argue that realism is also a point of view. I further claim that we can’t have

direct knowledge of anything in and of itself except for the content of our experiences. In

other words, once we introduce points of view, we can’t know whether or not we are

actually in the Matrix.

Even though my epistemic relativism is not new, I arrived at these conclusions via

a new route. I am not claiming that reality does not exist or that life is all relative.

Instead, I claim that points of view make it impossible to be soundly justified (at the level

required in philosophy) in holding our beliefs. Now, philosophy has spent millennia

discussing various points of view from various points of view. But instead of providing

truth and wisdom, I argue that philosophy is better suited for asking questions and

organizing information. My hope is that we can reconceive philosophy and its role in

society.

iv
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to you, the reader. If you

were not in my head, I wouldn’t have anyone to write to.

v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Professor Richard Mester for introducing me to philosophy

while I was teaching biology at Penn State Erie. After numerous afternoon discussions in

the summer of 2001, he noted that I innately thought like a philosopher. I therefore

decided to attend BU’s graduate school in January 2002 after moving to Binghamton to

teach microbiology at Broome Community College. Being a biologist, I thought that a

degree primarily focused on medical ethics made the most sense.

As a nascent medical ethicist, I was extremely surprised to find myself interested

in Professor Eric Dietrich’s Philosophical Psychology class (I only signed up for the class

because it fit my tight schedule). At the end of the semester, he graciously agreed to take

me on as a grad student, despite my relatively weak background in philosophy. We had

hopes of focusing on concepts until we studied Graham Priest’s book entitled Beyond the

Limits of Thought. I distinctly remember meeting at Eric’s house for our weekly study

and commenting that paradoxes seem to arise due to different points of view. And we

were off! It has been a long, curvy road, but I am excited by where we have been and

where we are going. I definitely would not be here without the help and support of my

advisor and friend. Thank you, Eric.

I would like to thank Professors Stephen Ross, Donald Weiss, and Charles

Goodman for agreeing to be on my committee, and for providing numerous comments

and enlightening conversations regarding my dissertation and philosophy in general.

Finally, I would like to thank Carolyn, Brian, Josiah, Gabriel, and Kaleb for their

love and support throughout this entire endeavor. You have truly made life in “the desert

of the real” worth it.

vi
A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen

and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to

do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you

think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard

words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day. — 'Ah, so you shall

be sure to be misunderstood.' — Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood?

Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and

Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever

took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.

- Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self Reliance

vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FROM THE BEGINNING........................................................................................... 1
1.1. CONTRADICTIONS, PARADOXES, AND PSYCHOLOGY ..................................... 1
PARADOXICAL MUSINGS........................................................................................... 4
2. FAMOUS PARADOXES ............................................................................................. 5
2.1. ZENO’S PARADOXES ..................................................................................... 5
2.1.1. Achilles and the Turtle .......................................................................... 5
2.1.2. The Dichotomy ...................................................................................... 6
2.1.3. The Arrow ............................................................................................. 8
2.1.4. The Stadium .......................................................................................... 8
2.1.5. “Solution’s” to Zeno’s Paradoxes of Motion ....................................... 9
2.1.6. A Non-Sequitur.................................................................................... 12
2.2. PROVABLE PARADOXES .............................................................................. 13
2.2.1. Burali-Forti’s Paradox ....................................................................... 13
2.3. SELF-REFERENTIAL PARADOXES ................................................................ 17
2.3.1. Liar’s Paradox .................................................................................... 17
2.3.2. Russell’s Paradox ............................................................................... 19
2.3.3. Cantor’s Theorem ............................................................................... 21
2.3.4. Konig’s Paradox ................................................................................. 21
2.3.5. Berry’s Paradox.................................................................................. 22
2.4. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2 ........................................................................... 22
3. ARE PARADOXES SIMPLY DIALETHEIA? ....................................................... 24
3.1. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO PARACONSISTENT LOGIC AND DIALETHEISM .. 24
3.2. PARADOXES AT THE LIMIT OF ITERATION ................................................... 26
3.2.1. Dialetheic Nature of Burali-Forti’s Provable Paradox...................... 27
3.2.2. Dialetheic Nature of Russell’s Self-Referential Paradox ................... 27
3.2.3. Dialetheic Nature of Cantor’s Paradox.............................................. 28
3.2.4. Dialetheic Nature of Konig’s SR Paradox.......................................... 28
3.2.5. Dialetheic Nature of Berry’s SR Paradox .......................................... 29
3.2.6. Priest and Kant ................................................................................... 29
3.3. PARADOXES AT THE LIMIT OF COGNITION .................................................. 32
3.3.1. Dialetheic Nature of the Self-Referential Liar Paradox ..................... 32
3.4. PARADOXES AT THE LIMIT OF CONCEPTION ................................................ 35
3.4.1. Priest and Bishop Berkeley................................................................. 35
3.5. NĀGĀRJUNA’S PARADOXES ........................................................................ 40
3.5.1. Dialetheic Nature of Nāgārjuna’s Self-Referential Limit of Expression
Paradox..................................................................................................................... 40
3.5.2. Dialetheic Nature of Nāgārjuna’s Self-Referential Ontological
Paradox..................................................................................................................... 43
3.6. THE INCLOSURE SCHEMA FOR DIALETHEIC PARADOXES ............................ 45
3.7. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 3 ........................................................................... 46

viii
FROM A CERTAIN POINT OF VIEW....................................................................... 47
4. POINTS OF VIEW ..................................................................................................... 48
4.1. AN INTRODUCTION TO POINTS OF VIEW ...................................................... 48
4.1.1. What ARE Points of View? ................................................................. 48
4.1.2. Subjective and Objective Points of View ............................................ 49
4.1.3. Necessary Syntax ................................................................................ 52
4.2. APPLYING POV INDEXING .......................................................................... 53
4.3. POV INDEXING AND THE MARCH OF THE TRANSFINITE ORDINALS............. 57
4.4. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4 ........................................................................... 60
5. THE DIALETHEIC POINT OF VIEW ................................................................... 61
5.1. THE PSYCHOLOGIZED INCLOSURE SCHEMA ................................................ 61
5.2. PSYCHOLOGIZING DIALETHEIC PARADOXES IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND
THEM ............................................................................................................................. 67
5.2.1. Russell’s Paradox ............................................................................... 68
5.2.2. Kant’s Fifth Antinomy......................................................................... 70
5.2.3. Cantor’s Paradox................................................................................ 71
5.2.4. Burali-Forti’s Paradox ....................................................................... 73
5.2.5. Nāgārjuna’s Paradoxes ...................................................................... 74
5.2.6. The Liar’s Paradox ............................................................................. 77
5.3. PSYCHOLOGIZING SOME OTHER DIALETHEIA ............................................. 81
5.3.1. Konig’s Paradox ................................................................................. 82
5.3.2. Berry’s Paradox.................................................................................. 83
5.3.3. Berkeley’s Paradox............................................................................. 84
5.4. ZENO’S STADIUM PARADOX ....................................................................... 88
5.5. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 5 ........................................................................... 90
FREE YOUR MIND ....................................................................................................... 91
6. EPISTEMOLOGY AT THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT .......................................... 92
6.1. TRISCUIT BISHOP, THE DIALETHEIC ANT .................................................... 93
6.2. THE UNATTAINABLE VIEWPOINT ................................................................ 95
6.3. EPISTEMOLOGY AT THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT .............................................. 97
6.4. THE REALISTIC POINT OF VIEW ................................................................ 101
6.5. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 6 ......................................................................... 103
7. YOU JUST DON’T GET IT, DO YOU? ................................................................ 104
7.1. THE PERCEIVED NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY ................................................ 104
7.2. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?.............................................................. 107
7.3. “LET ME EXPLAIN… NO, THERE IS TOO MUCH… LET ME SUM UP”....... 110
7.4. UNTIL WE MEET AGAIN ........................................................................... 112
8. REFERENCES.......................................................................................................... 113

ix
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1........................................................................................................................... 10
TABLE 2........................................................................................................................... 14
TABLE 3........................................................................................................................... 15
TABLE 4........................................................................................................................... 31
TABLE 5........................................................................................................................... 32
TABLE 6........................................................................................................................... 59
TABLE 7........................................................................................................................... 69
TABLE 8........................................................................................................................... 70
TABLE 9........................................................................................................................... 72
TABLE 10......................................................................................................................... 73
TABLE 11......................................................................................................................... 75
TABLE 12......................................................................................................................... 76
TABLE 13......................................................................................................................... 79
TABLE 14......................................................................................................................... 82
TABLE 15......................................................................................................................... 83
TABLE 16......................................................................................................................... 88

x
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1 .......................................................................................................................... 6
FIGURE 2 .......................................................................................................................... 7
FIGURE 3 .......................................................................................................................... 7
FIGURE 4 .......................................................................................................................... 9
FIGURE 5 ........................................................................................................................ 30
FIGURE 6 ........................................................................................................................ 53
FIGURE 7 ........................................................................................................................ 54
FIGURE 8 ........................................................................................................................ 54
FIGURE 9 ........................................................................................................................ 55
FIGURE 10 ...................................................................................................................... 56
FIGURE 11 ...................................................................................................................... 62
FIGURE 12 ...................................................................................................................... 64
FIGURE 13 ...................................................................................................................... 65
FIGURE 14 ...................................................................................................................... 66
FIGURE 15 ...................................................................................................................... 66
FIGURE 16 ...................................................................................................................... 89
FIGURE 17 ...................................................................................................................... 92

xi
 1. FROM THE BEGINNING

1.1. Contradictions, Paradoxes, and Psychology

Inconsistencies routinely occur in our everyday lives without causing a big stir

(e.g. having a love-hate relationship with your computer). While these seeming

contradictions are generally accepted, most people do not sanction strong contradictions.

Either the sun is a ball of flaming hydrogen gas, or it’s not. Strong contradictions have

always been a concern for philosophy. Committing such a contradiction in the heart of

one’s analytical philosophical theory is regarded as a fatal mistake, and in the outskirts of

one’s theory it is an embarrassing blunder. Committed intentionally, contradictions’

chief role in philosophy is to block certain argumentative directions, as in reductios. But

strong contradictions are not universally reviled and avoided. Many philosophers have

embraced them and even used them in a positive fashion to express their positions: from

Heraclitus to Hegel, from Nāgārjuna to Alan Watts and Paul Reps. Yet those that do

traffic in contradictions are almost always regarded either as lost in some deep spiritual or

religious struggle, or as excessively cryptic by most philosophers in the western analytic

tradition.

Nevertheless, contradictions play a central role in the history of all philosophy

and in its continuingly perplexing nature. What sort of discipline is philosophy? What is

its role in our lives? I contend that we must look to the contradiction in order to truly

understand philosophy. I plan to canvass many of the well-known contradictions in the

western analytic tradition as well as a few in other philosophical traditions, to analyze

their structure, and then to invoke an aspect of human psychology to explain their

simultaneously destructive and creative force. I intentionally place my work in the larger

1
context of a sea-change in modern logic: the development of Dialetheism – the non-

standard logic that holds that contradictions can be true, for it is the true contradiction

that is the source of philosophy’s creative power.

I begin by recounting Zeno's paradoxes, which are arguably the most famous

paradoxes in western civilization. Though famous, Zeno's paradoxes are actually faux

paradoxes in that they are not regarded as paradoxes at all. I discuss this, too. I then

discuss paradoxes from two other large classes: provable paradoxes and self-referential

paradoxes. Provable paradoxes are those that emerge from a sound argument (valid with

true premises). Mathematics is full of these contradictions, and I discuss a couple of

classic paradoxes arising from Cantor’s work as examples. Self-referential paradoxes, on

the other hand, are contradictions that occur because they can be logically applied to

themselves. This category includes both mathematical examples, such as Russell's

paradox from set theory, as well as linguistic dilemmas such as those seen in the Liar's

paradox or Nāgārjuna’s paradoxes. 1

Having considered a variety of logical paradoxes, I will then consider various

analytic solutions and explanations for these contradictions, as given by Nāgārjuna, Kant,

Hegel, Russell, Quine, Priest, and others from various philosophical traditions. In

particular, I will spend a significant amount of time analyzing Priest’s solution: that these

paradoxes arise at the limits of our thought and are, in fact, dialetheia. Part one will

conclude with an analysis of Priest’s Inclosure Schema – his model for all dialetheic

paradoxes.

1
Quine (1966) refers to these categories as falsidical, veridical, and antinomies. I call falsidical
paradoxes “faux” paradoxes, since they are not real paradoxes at all. The veridical paradoxes I call
“provable” paradoxes and the antinomies I refer to as “self-referential” paradoxes. I find this distinction
important because some antinomies are also veridical, thus blurring the line. Here, however, provable
paradoxes are distinct from the paradoxes of self-reference.

2
 In part two of my dissertation, I will turn my attention to human psychology and

introduce the crucial notion of points of view. All perception and conception are from a

point of view – even our conception of the view from nowhere. I use this insight by

applying points of view to all the paradoxes I reviewed in part one. I will show that

paradoxes are not, in fact, something to be solved or avoided. Instead, I think paradoxes

show us that contradictions are the essential tension of perceptual acts. One conclusion

from this insight might be that Hegel is right and that everything is in fact dialectical. On

the other hand, perhaps all we have are points of view, thus leaving us with Berkeley’s

idealism. Or perhaps you will discover other conclusions as you progress through the

dissertation.

Finally, I present a positive program for western analytical philosophers. I show

that point of view psychology changes how we interpret the western analytic tradition. I

think this new viewpoint provides the discipline with an opportunity to reconceive itself,

while simultaneously pointing to future directions.

3
PART I

PARADOXICAL MUSINGS

4
 2. FAMOUS PARADOXES
Though we share the same earth with millions of kinds of living creatures, we
also…inhabit a world full of abstractions, impossibilities, and paradoxes.
-Terrence Deacon, The Symbolic Species

2.1. Zeno’s Paradoxes

Zeno of Elea 2 identified some of the most famous paradoxes in western

philosophy. He was a student of the Eleatic philosopher, Parmenides, who developed a

philosophy based on unchanging oneness. In fact, Parmenides held that the universe was

unchangeable, which forced him to conclude that appearances to the contrary, e.g. the

motion of the clouds or water, were merely deceptions. These beliefs, of course, caused

him and his views to be ridiculed, so Zeno developed four paradoxes of motion in order

to defend his mentor by showing that motion is simply an illusion. 3

2.1.1. Achilles and the Turtle

Imagine the Greek hero Achilles pitted against a turtle in a footrace (depicted in

Figure 1). An excellent sprinter, Achilles decides to give the turtle a head start. Now,

given that each participant runs at a constant speed (one slow and one fast), Achilles will

reach the turtle’s starting point after a finite time interval one, t-i(1). However, during

that same time, the turtle will have “run” to a new position ahead of Achilles. In order

for the Greek hero to reach the turtle’s second position, he will again have to run for a

finite amount of time, t-i2, which is less than it took to run the first distance. However,

2
490BC-425BC
3
Our knowledge of these paradoxes comes from paraphrases written by Aristotle, since Zeno’s
original works have been lost. See Courant and Robbins (1941). My summary of these paradoxes is based
upon Salmon (1980).

5
even during this new space of time, the turtle will have again advanced its position.

Every time Achilles reaches a position where the turtle was, he still has farther to run in

order to catch the turtle.

A @ t0 T @ t0 T @ t1 T @ t2
A @ t1 A @ t2 A @ t3

A’s
t-i(1)
FIGURE 1

By applying this functional operator ad infinitum, Zeno concludes that one moving object

cannot catch another moving object, so long as their speeds remain constant. The

paradox arises, of course, each time that one moving object catches up to and passes

another, even at constant speeds.

2.1.2. The Dichotomy

The Dichotomy comes in two forms: progressive and regressive. In the

progressive Dichotomy, Achilles cannot reach the end of any racecourse, whether he is

racing the turtle or not. Before Achilles can cover the entire course, he must first travel

over the first half of it. Next, he must cover half of the remaining distance, after which

he must cover half of the remaining distance again, and so on. Thus, Achilles cannot

6
arrive at any destination, even if it is stationary, because he must cover an infinite number

of halfway points (depicted in Figure 2).

1/2 3/4 7/8…

FIGURE 2

Thus, according to Zeno, motion is an illusion. Of course, the paradox arises each time

that you actually move from one point to another.

Alternately, the regressive Dichotomy suggests that Achilles cannot even get

started. In order to run the whole distance, Achilles must first run halfway to the end.

However, before running halfway to the finish line, he must first run halfway to the

halfway point (as seen in Figure 3).

…1/8 1/4 1/2

FIGURE 3

Again, given an infinite number of halfway points, we have an infinite regression in

which Achilles cannot even take a single step towards the finish line. Paradoxically, we

can not only take that “first step,” but we routinely reach our destinations in our daily

lives.

7
2.1.3. The Arrow

In another paradox of motion, Zeno claims that an arrow in flight is always at rest.

When examining a flying arrow at any given instant (a minimal and indivisible unit of

time for Zeno), the arrow is occupying a portion of space equal to itself. In order to move

during that instant, it would have to occupy two different locations during the different

parts of the instant. However, in order to do this, it must be in a space larger than itself

during that instant, or else it would have no room to move. Thus, since the entire flight

of the arrow contains only distinct instants of time during which the arrow is “at rest” (i.e.

not changing its position in space), the arrow must not be moving at all. Having seen an

arrow, and many other objects, move through the air from one location to another, this

conclusion seems paradoxical.

2.1.4. The Stadium

For this paradox, imagine that three rows of soldiers, with three members in each

row, align themselves in a stadium as seen in the first position of Figure 4. Next, with the

A row of soldiers remaining stationary, imagine that the B soldiers and C soldiers move

in opposite directions at the same rate of speed until all three rows are lined up (second

position in Figure 4).

8
 First Position Second Position

A1 A2 A3 A1 A2 A3

B1 B2 B3 B1 B2 B3

C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3

FIGURE 4

Notice that C1 passed twice as many B’s as A’s. Thus, Zeno concludes that “double the

time is equal to its half.” Now, if we assume (as some ancient Greeks did) that space and

time are atomistic in nature, meaning that they are composed of atoms of non-zero size,

motion must consist of taking up discrete locations at discrete instants (again, an

indivisible unit). Given that the A’s are stationary, the B’s are moving to the right at a

rate of one discrete position per instant, while the C’s are moving to the left at the same

rate. The problem is, this leaves no time for C1 to pass B2, so it never happens according

to Zeno.

2.1.5. “Solution’s” to Zeno’s Paradoxes of Motion

Zeno’s attempt to show that the appearance of motion is simply a deception was

not particularly popular. Aristotle 4 rejects Zeno’s argument that motion is merely an

allusion. To begin with, he divides quantity into continuous and discrete, which he bases

upon the interaction of their parts. While he considers language and numbers discrete, he

4
Aristotle’s The Categories, Section 6

9
defines time, lines, surfaces, place, and bodies as continuous. He then claims that only

discrete quantities are infinitely divisible, 5 while continuous items are only potentially

infinitely divisible. Aristotle goes on to say 6 that Achilles, for example, does not

actualize an infinity of points as he tries to catch the turtle. He reasons that in order to

actualize a point, one must stop at it. However, Achilles does not stop at points along the

way, but instead follows a continuous path to both catch and pass the turtle. Thus, the

potential infinity of points is never actualized and the paradox does not occur. 7

Unfortunately for Aristotle, actual infinities of continuous quantities do exist.

This fact does not save Zeno’s paradoxes, however. In the early 1800’s, Cauchy

provided foundations for modern calculus based on the concept of a limit, which

Weierstrauss subsequently fixed in the 1850’s. 8 A limit allows us to see that an infinite

summation can give a finite sum. Consider the following partial sums in Table 1:

Original Version Read As:

S1 = 1/2 S1 = 1/2

S2 = 1/2 + 1/4 = 3/4 S2 = 1/2 + 1/4 = 3/4

S3 = (1/2 + 1/4) + 1/8 = 7/8 S3 = 3/4 + 1/8 = 7/8

S4 = ((1/2 + 1/4) + 1/8) + 1/16 = 15/16 S4 = 7/8 + 1/16 = 15/16

TABLE 1

5
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book XIII, section 2.
6
Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption, Book I, section 2.
7
Aristotle uses this basic argument to refute all of Zeno’s paradoxes.
8
See Purcell (1965).

10
Notice that all of these partial sums are finite sums and only involve two pieces 9 of input.

Next, a sequence of these partial sums can be formed where each member of this

sequence is determined by the function f(n) = (2n - 1) / 2n. Now we are ready to define

the infinite sum S∞ as the limit of the sequence Sn of its partial sums. This can be done as

follows:

A. Definition of the limit of a sequence. The sequence Sn generated by the

function f(n) has a limit L if there is a boundary number B in the natural numbers N

after which the elements of Sn (i.e. f(n) ) stay within ε of L for any ε no matter how

small. In other words, for all ε, there exists a B such that the absolute value of the

subtraction of L from some function f(n) will be less than ε for all n that are greater

than or equal to B. Symbolically

∀ε ∃B s.t. |f(n) - L| < ε, for all n ≥ B

From this we get the following:

B. Infinite sums. The infinite sum is the limit of the sequence of its partial sums,

if such a limit exists. In general,

∑
n =1
f(n) = L

9
Note that the numbers within the parentheses represent one piece of input, as indicated in the
second column of Table 1.

11
Therefore, according to modern calculus, some infinite summations are finite if a finite

limit exists. 10 When applied to Zeno’s Dichotomy, proponents of this mathematical

solution claim that Achilles can easily reach his goal (or take that first step) by first

adding up an infinite sequence of halfway points. Imagine that Achilles has one

kilometer to run. By applying the limit, we get:

⎛ 1 ⎞
Lim⎜1 − n ⎟ = 1 (where 1 = the 1 km distance to be run)
n→∞ ⎜ 2 ⎟⎠
⎝

Thus, modern calculus shows that the sum of an infinite number of non-zero terms can be

finite.

2.1.6. A Non-Sequitur

As we saw in the previous section, we have spent nearly 200 years thinking that

Zeno’s paradoxes of motion had been successfully explained away. But how? Zeno uses

his paradoxes to suggest that it is impossible for us to complete an infinite number of

tasks. The modern calculus response, that an infinite number of non-zero terms can be

finite, is a non sequitur. 11 It is like saying, “Bram says that you can’t make a square into

a red circle, but you can clearly make a square red.” The response is absurd. In other

words, if we ask how an infinite number of steps can take only a finite amount of time to

complete, then calculus has the answer. But, if we want to know how a system can do all

10
See Purcell (1965).
11
I would like to thank Eric Dietrich and Bram van Heuveln for pointing this out to me.

12
of those infinite steps, then the answer is that it can’t, by definition, since there’s an

infinite number of them. So, Zeno’s paradoxes are alive and well.

2.2. Provable Paradoxes

Though Zeno’s paradoxes are the most famous, there are other categories of

paradoxes to consider. The provable paradoxes 12 include cases where a purportedly true,

though seemingly illogical conclusion results from sound arguments. Mathematically-

based paradoxes frequently fall into this category when they arise from following

conflicting but valid rules. In this section, I will present a paradox resulting from the

work of Georg Cantor.

2.2.1. Burali-Forti’s Paradox

Georg Cantor was the mathematician who proved that infinite sets could have

different sizes. In the late 1800’s he identified a provable paradox, which Cesare Burali-

Forti later formalized, involving the set of ordinal numbers. 13 Working in formal set

theory, Cantor identified the ordinal numbers as an extension of the whole numbers. An

ordinal number is defined as the order type of (or category for) a well-ordered set. A

totally ordered set (S) is well-ordered if and only if every nonempty subset of S has a

least element. A set is totally ordered if it has reflexivity, weak antisymmetry, transitivity,

and comparability. The relation “≥” totally orders set S if the following definitions are

true: 14

1. Reflexivity: x ≥ x for all x ∈ S.

12
Quine (1966), chapter 1. Note that Quine refers to these as veridical paradoxes.
13
Quine (1966), chapter 1; Priest (2002).
14
Weisstein (2004b).

13
 2. Weak antisymmetry: x ≥ y and y ≥ x implies that x = y.

3. Transitivity: x ≥ y and y ≥ z implies that x ≥ z.

4. Comparability: for any x, y ∈ S, either x ≥ y or y ≥ x.

Every finite totally ordered set is well-ordered. While finite ordinal numbers are denoted

using Arabic numerals, transfinite ordinals are represented by lower case Greek letters.

For example, the ordinal symbol “0” is called the “empty set” and has no elements, or {}.

The ordinal number “1” is the “set of one element” and contains the empty set {0}.

Notice that each ordinal number is simultaneously the set of all preceding ordinal

numbers and the next successive ordinal number in the sequence. Thus, we can generate

the list of finite ordinals as follows: 15

Sets Represented by Ordinal Number

Description the Ordinal Number (Symbol / Name)
Empty set {} 0
Set of one set {0} 1
Set of two sets {0,1} 2
Set of three sets {0,1,2} 3
Set of four sets {0,1,2,3} 4
… … …

TABLE 2

From this we can see that the smallest infinite sequence of finite ordinal numbers is:

0,1,2,3,4,…

15
See Weisstein (2004a).

14
Cantor dubbed the least ordinal greater than all the finite ones “ω.” Since ω is both the

set of all previous ordinals and an ordinal number itself, Cantor realized that ω must be a

member of ω + 1. Thus, the transfinite ordinals are formed as follows:

Sets Represented by Ordinal Number

Description the Ordinal Number (Symbol)
Empty set {} 0
Set of one set {0} 1
Set of two sets {0,1} 2
Set of three sets {0,1,2} 3
Set of four sets {0,1,2,3} 4
… … …
Set of all finite ordinals {0,1,2,3,4,…} ω
Set of all finite ordinals and ω {0,1,2,3,4,… ω} ω+1
Set of all finite ordinals, ω, ω + 1 {0,1,2,3,4,… ω, ω + 1} ω+2
… … …

TABLE 3

Of course, by following this pattern, Cantor realized that ω + ω, or 2ω, must exist. Thus,

we have:

0,1,2,3… ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, ω + 3…2ω, 2ω + 1, 2ω + 2, 2ω + 3…

And this function could be repeated as follows:

0…ω...2ω...3ω...4ω…

15
After which would be a number greater than all of these:

0…ω...2ω...3ω...4ω…ω2

Of course, the next greatest number would be:

0…ω...2ω...3ω...4ω…ω2, ω2 + 1, ω2 + 2…

Cantor noted that this could go on indefinitely and then formalized the rules by which all

ordinal numbers are generated: 16

1. if x is an ordinal number then there is a next number, x + 1, which is the

immediate successor of x.

2. if a definite succession of defined ordinal numbers exists, for which there is

no largest number, then a new ordinal number is created that is simultaneously

the limit of those numbers and also the next larger number of them all.

Given the above rules for ordinal generation, Burali-Forti (and even Cantor

himself) considered the totality of all the ordinals, which he defined as “the set of all

ordinal numbers” or Ω. While this appears to be a limit for all of the ordinals, Cantor’s

second rule states that the limit to any definite succession of defined ordinals is actually

the next largest ordinal number. Therefore, Ω is itself the next largest ordinal for the set

of all ordinal numbers. By applying Cantor’s first rule, we find that the successor to Ω is

16
Cantor’s rules, as quoted by Dauben (1979).

16
Ω+1. However, since Ω+1 is itself an ordinal according to rule two, it must be included

in Ω by definition of Ω. Formalizing the resulting paradox gives us:

Ω< Ω+1≤ Ω

Here, the paradox produces the apparently absurd but seemingly true result that Ω is both

a member, and the limit of, the set of all ordinals. 17

2.3. Self-Referential Paradoxes

The last category of paradoxes that I will consider is the self-referential 18 (SR)

paradoxes. These paradoxes produce self-contradictory conclusions. Simply stated, a SR

paradox is true of itself only if it is false of itself. For this section, I have selected both

classic and slightly less well-known SR paradoxes to analyze.

2.3.1. Liar’s Paradox

Consider the paradox of Epimenides the Cretan who said that all Cretans are liars.

If Epimenides told the truth, then he must be lying. However, if he was lying, then he

was speaking a true statement. Thus, it appears we have a classic antinomy.

Unfortunately, Epimenides’ paradox has some problems. Maybe Epimenides was a liar

who told the truth on rare occasions. On the other hand, perhaps he only knew Cretans

who were liars and, therefore, did not realize that some Cretans told the truth. The point

is, several alternative explanations could be used to dissolve this apparent paradox. Most

17
Quine (1966), chapter 1.
18
Quine (1966), chapter 1.

17
philosophers save this antinomy by simply altering it to say, “This sentence is false.”

Quine, however, thinks that “This sentence is false” is too vague to be self-referential. 19

In other words, does it refer to the prior sentence in the paragraph as being false, or to

itself? In order to remove this vagueness, we might alter the structure to read, “’This

sentence is false’ is false.” Nevertheless, Quine still thinks that the outside sentence does

not attribute a truth-value of false to itself, but to the internal sentence in the quote. He

therefore remodels the paradox around the phrase, “Yields a falsehood when appended to

its own quotation.” When we consider this phrase with regard to itself, we get, “’Yields a

falsehood when appended to its own quotation’ yields a falsehood when appended to its

own quotation.” It is this formulation, Quine asserts, that produces the desired SR

contradiction where the phrase is true of itself if and only if it is false of itself.

2.3.1.1. A Brief Tangent

We should pause here briefly to consider Quine’s fetish over this particular

paradox. Even though he goes to great lengths to fix what he perceives to be a weakness

in the wording of this paradox, he merely succeeds in pointing out how vital points of

view are. 20 Firstly, Quine argues that “This sentence is false” does not produce an

antinomy because the sentence is vague. Imagine typing this phrase on a clean sheet of

paper and showing it to a friend. It is certainly possible that your friend will ask, “Which

sentence?” At which point you would say, “This one, right here” while pointing to the

phrase on the paper. It is this “pointing” that leads Quine to conclude that “This sentence

is false” is not in fact SR, since self-referential things should not need help in pointing to

19
Quine (1966), chapter 1.
20
A hint of things to come.

18
themselves. 21 Thus, Quine develops the phrase, “Yields a falsehood when appended to

its own quotation.” However, if you were to type Quine’s phrase on a piece of paper and

show it to a friend, the same question might arise! 22 Why? Because this phrase can be

just as ambiguous as Quine claims “This sentence is false” is. Therefore, it seems as

though Quine has gone to great lengths to fix a perceived problem, yet has failed to fix it

according to his own standards. Does this mean that a liar paradox really does not exist?

Of course not! “This sentence is false” really does produce an antinomy. It just requires

the right point of view to see it. This will become important later on. For now, please

note that I will continue to use “This sentence is false” or TSIF for all future dealings

with the Liar paradox.

2.3.2. Russell’s Paradox

Having analyzed Cantor’s naïve set theory 23 and Frege’s logical theorems, 24

Bertrand Russell began to consider sets that do not contain themselves as members. For

example, the set of all dogs is not itself a dog and so is not in the set of dogs, nor is the

21
This is my best guess as to what Quine is thinking and why he felt the need to remodel the
phrase so extensively. Quine was a behaviorist and did not want minds in the world. Alas, his “fix” of the
liar paradox ensconces them in the world.
22
Quine might respond that “its quotation” refers to which “it.” However, if Quine needs to
respond at all, he has not fixed the problem!
23
In Cantor’s naïve set theory, a set is described as a well-defined collection of objects (called
elements or members of the set). Objects can be numbers, people, other sets, and so on (basically, anything
at all). For example, humans are members of the set of all mammals, 6 is a member of the set of even
numbers, etc. Furthermore, sets can have an infinite number of members. At first blush, it may appear that
we can form any sets that we want to. However, this is precisely how Russell was able to generate his
paradox (see below). For more on Cantor’s naïve set theory, see Halmos (1960).
24
Frege, the first major proponent of logicism (the theory that all mathematics can be reduced to
logic), applied the formal devices of his Begriffsschrift (“Concept-script”; 1879) to the logicist programme
that he had set forth in his Grundlagen (Groundwork of Arithmetic; 1884) in his third work, entitled
Grundgesetze (Basic Laws of Arithmetic; 1893). Russell’s first account of logicism was his Principles of
Mathematics (1903). While finishing his manuscript, Russell realized that apparently true assumptions led
to a contradiction regarding classes. He then wrote to Frege and showed him that the Grundgesetze’s
logical system permitted a proof of the contradiction (now known as Russell’s paradox). The blow is
thought to have led Frege to give up on his defense of logicism. See Bunnin and Tsui-James (2003) for
more on Frege and Russell.

19
set of all cars itself a car and hence is not in the set of cars. Conversely, the set of all

mathematical objects is itself a mathematical object and therefore contains itself as a

member. Similarly, the set of all ordinal numbers is itself an ordinal number (as seen

earlier), and so contains itself as a member. Now, given that some sets contain

themselves as members and others do not, 25 Russell identifies a set, S, which is “The set

of all sets that do not contain themselves as members.” As we just noted, the set of all

dogs belongs to this set, as does the set of all cars, and so on. Once we have properly

cataloged all of the appropriate sets, however, we might ask ourselves if set S contains

itself (i.e., is S in the set of all sets that do not contain themselves, called S). If not, then

S is a set that does not contain itself. As such, it fits the description for membership in

set S and hence is in S. However, if S contains itself, then it cannot be a member of S by

definition. In other words, S is a member of S, iff S is not a member of S.

Now, consider this paradox from another angle. Imagine that there exists a town

with a barber who shaves all and only men who do not shave themselves. A question

then arises: does the barber shave himself? If the barber shaves himself, then he cannot

shave himself by definition because he shaves only those who do not shave themselves.

However, if the barber does not shave himself, then he must shave himself, because he

shaves all men who do not shave themselves, by definition. Regardless of which version

you consider, a compelling SR paradox results.

25
Note that most sets do not contain themselves as members. However, we only need one such set
to exist in order to lead us to Russell’s paradox.

20
2.3.3. Cantor’s Theorem

Cantor’s Theorem produces a paradox similar to Russell’s. 26 Given any set S, the

Power Set of S is the set of all the subsets of S. Every member counts as a subset of S,

along with every combination of the various members. Consider the set A = {a, b, c}.

The Power Set of A, P(A) = {(a), (b), (c), (a,b), (a,c), (b,c), (empty set)}. Clearly, P(A) >

A. 27 Now, consider the set of all sets, U. Since P(U) contains sets as members, all the

members of P(U) are contained in U. 28 In other words, U is its own Power Set.

However, by definition, the Power Set is larger than the original set. Hence, P(U) > U

and P(U) = U. This is called Cantor’s Paradox.

2.3.4. Konig’s Paradox

Paradoxes of definability also fall into the category of SR. Konig 29 was the first

to identify this type of paradox. First, let something be “definable” if there is a

nonindexical noun-phrase in English that refers to it. Next, let dΩ represent the

collection of definable ordinal numbers. Now, English has a finite vocabulary, so the

number of noun-phrases it contains is countably infinite. Therefore, the number of

definable objects, including dΩ, must be countably infinite as well. However, Ω is not

countable. Therefore, ordinal numbers must exist that are not definable. In fact, there

must exist a least ordinal not in dΩ that, by definition, cannot be defined. However, we

just defined that ordinal as the “least ordinal not in dΩ.” Thus, a SR paradox of

definability arises known as Konig’s paradox.

26
See Mendelson (1997). Note that Mendelson refers to the universal set as V.
27
Mathematically, the cardinality of P(A) > cardinality of A.
28
Mathematically, the cardinality of P(U) = cardinality of U.
29
Konig (1905) as reprinted by van Heijenoort (1967).

21
2.3.5. Berry’s Paradox

In a letter to Bertrand Russell, G.G. Berry suggested that another SR paradox

existed. 30 Given the definition for “definable” that we used in Konig’s paradox, imagine

a set of natural numbers, Ni, definable by an English noun-phrase of less than i words.

For example, the number 9,342 is definable by a noun-phrase of i=6 words: “nine

thousand three hundred forty two.” This number is a member of any set larger than N6,

including N7, N8, and so on. Conversely, 93,421 is defined by the noun-phrase “ninety

three thousand four hundred twenty one.” Therefore, 93,421 is not in N7. Now, if i=99

then there must exist a least natural number not in N99. However, we just defined that

number as “least natural number not in N99,” which is only i=6 words. Therefore, Berry’s

paradox of definability arises.

2.4. Summary of Chapter 2

In this chapter I presented three different types of paradoxes. Zeno’s paradoxes,

the most famous and well known of all paradoxes in Western culture, are commonly

considered faux paradoxes due to modern calculus. However, this is a non sequitur

argument. In other words, these paradoxes only feel “solved.” We also considered

provable paradoxes, which produce a valid result from true premises. Even though the

result appears illogical, it is mathematically valid that Ω< Ω+1≤ Ω. Finally, we briefly

analyzed the antinomies, which are paradoxes of self-reference. I think these paradoxes,

30
See Russell (1906).

22
particularly the Liar and the Barber, are the most frustrating for us as humans since they

can be easily presented and understood without a detailed knowledge of mathematics.

Regardless of which paradox we are confronted with, we must decide how to deal

with the inconsistency it highlights in our reasoning. One alternative is to ignore the

contradiction. Our innate system of reasoning is relatively well behaved during normal

business hours, and the paradoxes that we have discussed typically arise on the fringes of

our everyday world. Since we do not encounter them in our daily activities, most of us

“forget” about their existence on a regular basis anyway. A second, and related,

alternative is to accept that our reasoning has some shortcomings. Again, since reason

works well in our daily lives, we can “forgive” it for being rough around the edges and

simply ignore the inconsistencies. Finally, we might choose to reject the Law of

Noncontradiction itself, or at least set it aside on some occasions, since doing so would

allow us to happily accept the apparent contradictions as a normal part of life. I explore

this last option in the next chapter.

23
 3. ARE PARADOXES SIMPLY DIALETHEIA?
One can conceive of an object that is not conceived … in the appropriate sense; I do, and
so can you.
-Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought

3.1. A Brief Introduction to Paraconsistent Logic and Dialetheism

Careful consideration of the preceding paradoxes reveals that human reason balks

at an object that both has and does not have a particular property simultaneously. For

example, a bacterial cell cannot be both a prokaryote and not a prokaryote. Either it is or

it isn’t. Aristotle referred to this as the Law of Noncontradiction 31 , or LNC, written

symbolically as ¬(p ∧ ¬p). In this example, p equals the proposition “a bacterial cell is a

prokaryote” and ¬p equals the proposition “a bacterial cell is not a prokaryote.” Both

Aristotle 32 and the majority of subsequent philosophers have concluded that this rule of

reason is without exception. One reason for this conclusion is that a true contradiction of

the form p ∧ ¬p is explosive, which means that it implies everything. In other words,

with a contradiction as a premise, we can prove any proposition A as follows:

(1) Assume p ∧ ¬p

(2) By (1) and conjunction elimination p

31
Aristotle tried to prove the LNC in Metaphysics, Book Gamma, ch. 4.
32
In the introduction to his book, Beyond the Limits of Thought, Priest (2002, p. 5) notes that the
existence of true contradictions was highly contested before the time of Aristotle. Aristotle presented an
argument for the LNC in Metaphysics Book 4, which became solidified and uncontested in the Middle
Ages. In fact, substantial challenges to the LNC have only occurred recently. Most philosophers, apart
from Hegel, agreed with Aristotle (probably due most people’s innate use of the LNC in their daily lives).
The problem is, Aristotle’s argument for the LNC, like most of his logic and scientific arguments, does not
work at all (according to Priest). In other words, strict allegiance to the LNC appears to be sociological
rather than logical.

24
 (3) By (2) and disjunction introduction p ∨ A (where A = any proposition)

(4) By (1) and conjunction elimination ¬p

(5) By (3), (4), and disjunctive syllogism A

Hence, any proposition is provable when p ∧ ¬p is true. This proof, along with the

commonplace, rational, and innately preferred (!) human experience of ¬(p ∧ ¬p),

explains why the LNC has prevailed for millennia. However, a branch of logic known as

paraconsistent logic has countered the above proof by rejecting disjunctive syllogism (5).

The paradoxes discussed in the first chapter (along with the hundreds of others

that were not covered) provide one motivation for dialetheic logic, which maintains that

some contradictions are true. The claim is that strict allegiance to the LNC is responsible

for these contradictions, which have been unsolvable thus far. Furthermore, the

paradoxes cannot simply disappear, as is evidenced by their longevity. Thus, a logician

must either accept that the paradoxes are inexplicable, or that the logic is wrong. Graham

Priest and other dialetheic logicians suggest that the explosion principle and at least one

of the laws of disjunction is wrong in the above proof. Instead, he claims that some true

contradictions do exist and that the LNC must be set aside. 33

In the following review of Priest’s Beyond the Limits of Thought, 34 I will recount

the dialetheic nature of the paradoxes I presented in Chapter 2. Priest notes that

33
Priest (1998).
34
Priest (2002).

25
paradoxes that arise at the limits of thought involve a totality (of all things describable,

expressible, etc.) and an appropriate operation that produces an object (x) with both

transcendence beyond and closure in that totality (Y). Transcendence means that the

object produced is outside of the totality, while closure means that the object is within the

totality. In other words: 35

Closure: x∈Y

Transcendence: x∉Y

Given the LNC in classical logic, we cannot have (x ∈ Y and x ∉ Y). In dialetheic logic,

however, it is possible for closure and transcendence (p ∧ ¬p) to both obtain. Priest

refers to these contradictions as “dialetheia” instead of paradoxes and deals with them as

they arise at the limits of our expression, iteration, cognition, and conception. My review

will focus on the last three of these categories. 36

3.2. Paradoxes at the Limit of Iteration

Iterations are sequences generated by repeatedly applying a functional operator to

a given set. If an operator is applied as many times as possible, an infinite sequence is

generated, resulting in the limit of iteration. While Zeno’s paradoxes are arguably the

most famous examples occurring at this limit, they are faux paradoxes and, as a result,

35
In this and subsequent definitions and proofs, I have modified Priest’s symbols and notations.
36
Since Priest does not identify any true dialetheia in his chapter on the Limit of Expression, I
chose to ignore this category for the most part, though Nārgārjuna does present a dialetheia at the limit of
expression. See section 3.5.1 for more details.

26
not considered by Priest to be dialetheic. Therefore, let us return to a paradigm model for

the generated infinity known as the “march of the transfinite ordinals” and, with it,

Burali-Forti’s provable paradox.

3.2.1. Dialetheic Nature of Burali-Forti’s Provable Paradox

Recall that if we use Cantor’s rules for generating the transfinite ordinals, we can

identify Ω as the set of all ordinal numbers by stating that there must be a limit to this

iteration. Now, this means that the limit, Ω, is itself an ordinal (rule 2), and that Ω + 1 is

the least ordinal greater than Ω (transcendence). However, since Ω + 1 is also an ordinal,

it belongs in the set of all ordinals, Ω, by definition (closure). Thus, Burali-Forti’s

paradox is actually a dialetheism or “true contradiction” since Ω+1 is both within and

beyond the set Ω, i.e. Ω < Ω+1 < Ω.

3.2.2. Dialetheic Nature of Russell’s Self-Referential Paradox

Priest deals similarly with Russell’s paradox, which is another SR paradox that

arises at the limit of iteration. Again, Russell identified the set, S, as “The set of all sets

that do not contain themselves as members.” Now, if S does not contain itself (S ∉ S),

then S must contain itself by the very definition of S (closure). However, if S contains

itself (S ∈ S), then S cannot contain itself by its very definition (transcendence).

Russell’s paradox is commonly considered self contradictory and unsolvable. However,

without the LNC, both S ∉ S and S ∈ S are true, giving us another dialetheism at the

limit of iteration.

27
3.2.3. Dialetheic Nature of Cantor’s Paradox

Recall from Cantor’s Theorem 37 that any set, S, has a Power Set that includes all

subsets of S. Since every member of S counts as a subset of S, P(S) > S. Now, when we

consider the set of all sets, U, we find that U is its own Power Set. In other words, P(U)

= U (closure). However, by definition, the Power Set is larger than the original set

(transcendence). Hence, Cantor’s Paradox states that P(U) > U and P(U) = U. According

to Priest, this paradox is actually true once we disregard the LNC.

3.2.4. Dialetheic Nature of Konig’s SR Paradox

Recall Konig’s 38 paradox. First, let something be “definable” if there is a

nonindexical noun-phrase in English that refers to it. Next, let dΩ represent the

collection of definable ordinal numbers. Since the English vocabulary is finite, the

number of noun-phrases it contains is countably infinite. Thus, the number of definable

objects, including dΩ, must be countably infinite as well. However, Ω is not countable.

Therefore, there exist ordinal numbers that are not definable. In fact, there must exist a

least ordinal not in dΩ that, by definition, cannot be defined (transcendence). However,

we just defined that ordinal as the “least ordinal not in dΩ” (closure). The result is a true

contradiction in dialetheism.

37
Priest (2002), p. 128.
38
Priest (2002), p.131-132.

28
3.2.5. Dialetheic Nature of Berry’s SR Paradox

For Berry’s paradox, 39 recall that we used Konig’s definition for “definable.”

Now, imagine a set of natural numbers, Ni, definable by an English noun-phrase of less

than n words. For example, the number 9,342 is definable by a noun-phrase of i=6

words: “nine thousand three hundred forty two.” Now, if i=99, then there must exist a

least natural number not in N99 (transcendence). However, we just defined that number

as “least natural number not in N99,” which is only i=6 words (closure). In dialetheic

logic, where the LNC does not always hold, this is a true contradiction.

3.2.6. Priest and Kant

3.2.6.1. Brief Background

There are also hints of dialetheism in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 40 In the

Critique, Kant deals with Transcendental Ideas, which are ways of totalizing according

to the three kinds of syllogism (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive). Kant identifies

these Transcendental Ideas as the Soul, the Cosmos, and God. Furthermore, each Idea

brings with it a family of arguments (the Paralogisms, the Antinomies, and the Ideal,

respectively), which are intended to establish profound metaphysical truths, yet are

fallacious. Kant therefore refers to them as “dialectical” arguments. Interestingly, Kant

notes that we still fall into these fallacies as a “natural and unavoidable illusion,” 41

despite our knowledge of their fallaciousness. This is similar to falling into visual

39
Priest (2002), p. 132.
40
Kant (1787) as translated by N. K. Smith (1933) and interpreted by Priest (2002). My extremely
brief summary of various points from Kant’s Critique are actually summary points of Priest’s (2002;
chapter 6) interpretation of Kant’s Critique. As such, they are not intended to be the “final word” on
interpreting Kant, but merely an introduction to how Priest views Kant, since Priest’s point of view is
actually the topic of this chapter. Furthermore, I am not personally interpreting Kant’s work in any way, as
I am not qualified to do so.
41
Kant (1787), A422=B450.

29
illusions, which are an inherent feature of our correctly functioning sensory apparatus.

For example, if you measure the two lines found in Figure 5 you will find that they are

exactly the same length, despite appearances to the contrary. However, even though you

know they are the same length, they still seem different.

FIGURE 5

In the same way, we still suffer from the Transcendental Illusion 42 (i.e. these illusions

still feel correct) based upon our correctly functioning conceptual apparatus, even though

we know that the dialectical arguments are indeed fallacious.

Of the three types of dialectical arguments, only the Antinomies will be

considered here. The arguments found in each of the four Antinomies center around

using a condition (or “generator,” in Priest’s lingo) that can be iterated to produce a

series. By using an arbitrary starting point and reapplying the generator as many times as

possible, we obtain the limit of the series. Note that these are generated infinities. Now,

the arguments found in the Antinomies are presented in pairs, known as the Thesis and

the Antithesis, which indicates that the generated limits have particular contradictory

42
Kant’s term for the illusion concerning the dialectical arguments.

30
properties. Priest analyzes all four of these Antinomies in detail, 43 which I summarized

in Table 4.

Antinomy Generator Limit [Anti]Thesis

First event prior to totality of past states has [not] a beginning

Second part of the simple objects are [not] composed of

Third cause of chain of causes has [not] a first member

Fourth ground of first member of chain if it exists, is [not] necessary

else the whole chain

TABLE 4

In the end, Priest concludes that none of the arguments succeed. However, he does find

that the Fourth Antinomy, though flawed, is capable of repair as follows.

3.2.6.2. Priest Repairs Kant’s 4th Antinomy

Using the fourth antinomy as a foundation, Priest culls out a “fifth antinomy”

(self-referential paradox) from Kant’s writing.44 To begin with, Priest identified an

infinity generator that he calls the thought of x. 45 This generator might be applied as

follows: the White House; the thought of the White House; the thought of the thought of

43
Priest (2002), p. 88-101. Table 4 is adopted from p. 97.
44
Priest (2002) p. 100-101.
45
Here Priest means the content of the thought, not the act of thinking itself.

31
the White House, and so on. Performing this procedure as many times as possible

produces a transfinite sequence of objects, since the contents of every new thought can be

contained in a successively larger thought. 46 If T represents the totality of the thoughts

generated in this manner, we find that T has no last member since the thought of x is

applicable to every member of T. Furthermore, if T represents the limit or boundary, the

generator is not applicable to T by definition (transcendence). In other words, “There

exists a limit, T, that cannot be thought of.” However, we just thought of T when we read

that last sentence (closure). The result is a dialetheia that Priest calls “Kant’s 5th

Antinomy.” 47

Antinomy Generator Limit [Anti]Thesis

Fifth thought of T can [not] be thought of

TABLE 5

3.3. Paradoxes at the Limit of Cognition

3.3.1. Dialetheic Nature of the Self-Referential Liar Paradox

The next limit of thought that Priest discusses occurs in cognition, which deals

with the relationships that exist between agents and the world they cognize; between our

representations of objects in the “real world” and the objects themselves (regardless of

whether they actually exist or not). For example, recall the self-referential Liar paradox

46
We saw this in the march of the transfinite ordinals.
47
Priest (2002), p. 101, 130. Table 5 is adapted from p. 101. Priest presents Kant’s 5th Antinomy
in chapter 6 of BTLOT, but does not describe the general form of this and other dialetheia until chapter 9.

32
that results from “This sentence is false.” If we assume that what this proposition says is

true, then TSIF is false. But, if TSIF is false, then it must be true. This conclusion, of

course, leads us back to where we started.

Priest notes that this and similar paradoxes arising at the limit of cognition are

generated by beginning with a thesis of the following form, which he calls the Cognition

Schema:

∀x(x ∈ ∑ → Cx)

In this schema, C is a cognitive predicate (e.g. “is [un]true”), and the quantifiers are

intended to range over statements. Now, let us consider how the Liar paradox fits into

this schema. First, let Π be the set of all propositions that are true. Next, let Σ be any set

that contains ϕ. Thus, writing the Liar symbolically, we would get the following version

of the Cognition Schema:

∀x(x ∈ ∑ → x ∉ Π) 48

Finally, let ϕ be any instance of the above schema. 49 Now, transcendence can be

demonstrated as follows: 50

48
This proposition states that “every proposition is false.” No wonder Priest is able to generate a
dialetheia from this proof!
49
Notice that it is Priest’s definitions of ϕ and ∑ that allow him to derive self-reference in this
proof.
50
Adapted from Priest (2002), p. 54

33
 (1) ϕ = ∀x(x ∈ ∑ → x ∉ Π) by definition

(2) ∀x(x ∈ ∑ → x ∉ Π) ∈ ∑ by definition

(3) Therefore, ϕ ∈ ∑

(4) Suppose ϕ∈Π i.e. ϕ is true

(6) Therefore, ϕ

(7) Therefore, ∀x(x ∈ ∑ → x ∉ Π)

(8) ϕ∈∑→ϕ∉Π applying ϕ to itself (place ϕ in for x)

(9) ϕ∈∑ from (3)

(10) Thus, ϕ∉Π Transcendence by Modus ponens

From this deduction, we have demonstrated that assuming TSIF is true leads us to

conclude that the statement is indeed false (transcendence). In order to demonstrate

closure from here, Priest stipulates that ∑ is a set whose only member is ϕ in step #8.

Thus, closure can be demonstrated as follows:

34
 (10) ϕ∉Π

(11) Then ∀x(x = ϕ → x ∉ Π) from (5) and (6)

(12) But ∀x(x ∈ ∑ ↔ x = ϕ) (i.e. ϕ is the only member of ∑)

(13) So ∀x(x ∈ ∑ → x ∉ Π) by transitivity between (11) and (12)

(14) i.e. ϕ is true from (1)

(15) Thus, ϕ∈Π Closure

We arrive at the conclusion that ϕ ∈ Π because Π includes all true statements. At

this point, we must conclude that the entire proposition is therefore true (closure). Thus,

we have a dialetheic antinomy where ϕ ∈ Π → ϕ ∉ Π → ϕ ∈ Π, and so on.

3.4. Paradoxes at the Limit of Conception

3.4.1. Priest and Bishop Berkeley

Paradoxes also arise at the limit of conception. Consider Bishop Berkeley’s work

on idealism. Berkeley held a strong version of idealism in which nothing exists apart

from a mind that conceives it. Using Philonous as his mouthpiece, Berkeley presents his

master argument for idealism as follows: 51

51
Berkeley (1734), First Dialogue. I added paragraph numbers for future reference.

35
1. Phil. I am content to put the whole upon this Issue. If you can conceive it possible for any

Mixture or Combination of Qualities, or any sensible Object whatever, to exist without the

Mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.

2. Hyl. If it comes to that, the Point will soon be decided. What is more easy than to conceive a

Tree or House existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by any Mind whatsoever? I

do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.

3. Phil. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?

4. Hyl. No, that were a Contradiction.

5. Phil. Is it not as great a Contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived?

6. Hyl. It is.

7. Phil. The Tree or House therefore which you think of, is conceived by you.

8. Hyl. How should it be otherwise?

9. Phil. And what is conceived, is surely in the Mind.

10. Hyl. Without question, that which is conceived is in the Mind.

11. Phil. How then came you to say, you conceived a House or Tree existing independent and out

of all Minds whatsoever?

36
 12. Hyl. That was I own an Oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me to it.——It is a

pleasant Mistake enough. As I was thinking of a Tree in a solitary Place, where no one was

present to see it, methought that was to conceive a Tree as existing unperceived or unthought

of, not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see, that all I can

do is to frame Ideas in my own Mind. I may indeed conceive in my own Thoughts the Idea of

a Tree, or a House, or a Mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving, that I can

conceive them existing out of the Minds of all Spirits.

13. Phil. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive, how any one corporeal

sensible Thing should exist otherwise than in a Mind.

14. Hyl. I do.

Here’s the argument: “Berkeley Thesis” 52 is the idealistic claim that everything is

conceived or thought of. Hylas, on the other hand, claims that he can conceive of

something that is not conceived (Hylas, #2). This is the negation of BT, and it carries

weight because BT seems false based upon our everyday experiences. Now, if any

objects exist that are not conceived, then let c represent an arbitrary one of those

unconceived things. Furthermore, if it is conceived that there exists an object that is not

conceived, then it is conceived that c is not conceived. Since you and I just conceived

that there exists an object that is not conceived, we conceived that c is not conceived.

However, as Philonous points out in the above transcript, if it is conceived that the object

c is not conceived, then we have just conceived of c. Thus, c is conceived.

52
Henceforth, BT.

37
 Here is the argument in logical form. Following Priest 53 (with modifications), let

τ = “is conceived” and T = “it is conceived that.” Also, c will continue to represent an

arbitrary unconceived object, if one exists (c = εx ¬τx). Hylas’ claim (#2), then, is τc.

Finally, Priest notes that to conceive of the object c as having a property means that, ipso

facto, c is conceived. Hence, he defines the Conception Schema as follows: 54

Tϕ(c) → τc where c has some property, ϕ

This move seems reasonable, since thinking about the redness of my car is to be thinking

about my car, just like thinking about my wife’s beauty is to be thinking about my wife.

Now to the proof. We will begin by assuming the negation of BT, since this also

seems plausible based upon our everyday experiences.

(1) Suppose ∃x¬τx the negation of BT

(2) Then ∃x¬τx → ¬τc where c = εx ¬τx, as defined earlier

(3) T∃x¬τx → T¬τc Prefixing principle 55

(4) T∃x¬τx we did this in (1)

53
Priest (2002), p. 61-62.
54
Priest (2002), p. 62.
55
The Prefixing Principle is standard in logic using epistemic operators such as T, according to
Priest (2002), p. 64.

38
 (5) So T¬τc by Modus ponens

(6) Now, T¬τc → τc by the Conception Schema 56

(7) Thus, τc Closure by Modus ponens

Therefore, c is conceived, i.e. is a member of the set of all things conceived, which is

closure. Next, the argument for transcendence is made as follows:

(8) But, ∃x¬τx denying BT seems plausible, reasonable

(9) ∃x¬τx → ¬τc

(10) Thus, ¬τc Closure by Modus ponens

(11) Finally, τc ∧ ¬τc from (7) and (10) by Conjunction

Therefore, Berkeley’s self-referential paradox, 57 according to Priest, is τc ∧ ¬τc.

In other words, it is conceivable that there exists an object, c, that is not conceived

56
The Conception Schema is extremely powerful. Firstly, it allows us to get directly at the object
being conceived. Secondly, it removes the negation sign. This schema is doing all of the work! However,
I think the Conception Schema is wrong. Again, Priest claims Tϕ(x) → τx. This means that we can grab
hold of the object, x, itself without any properties! But this is impossible. Instead, the Conception Schema
should read, Tϕ(ψ) → τψ, where we can grasp a property, but never a thing itself. Furthermore, when we
apply the Conception Schema to c (as defined in the paper), we don’t get T¬τc → τc as Priest claims, but
T¬τc → τ_. Why does c disappear? Because ¬τ is the epistemic essence of c, without which we cannot
grasp c! The idea of epistemic essences deserves further consideration, which I will save for a future paper.

39
(transcendence). However, we just conceived of it (closure). As a result, we have a

dialetheic paradox at the limit of conception.

3.5. Nāgārjuna’s Paradoxes

I have presented some western philosophers and their experiences with paradoxes,

but it would be a mistake to infer that eastern philosophers had not dealt with similar

issues. In fact, while most of the western philosophers are uncomfortable with the

paradoxes they generated and worked to remove them, 58 eastern philosophers such as

Nāgārjuna embraced these contradictions. Nāgārjuna 59 was a Buddhist philosopher

whose writings are considered by many to be cryptic and terse. 60 Nonetheless, he

dramatically influenced the Mahayana Buddhist tradition.

3.5.1. Dialetheic Nature of Nāgārjuna’s Self-Referential Limit of Expression Paradox

Let us begin with a paradox arising at the limit of expression. Nāgārjuna’s

doctrine rests upon the existence of two realities: conventional reality and ultimate

reality. Similarly, there are two truths to explain these realities, simply annotated as

conventional and ultimate truth. Conventional truths refer to the ordinary world and are

typically relative to ones circumstances, conceptual scheme, etc. On the other hand,

57
Berkeley never identifies this as a paradox. For Berkeley, once c is conceived as having a
property, c is conceived. I.e., once T¬τc occurs, you are left with τc and you can’t go back. C.f. Winkler
(1989).
58
For example, removing the contradiction seems to be the obvious motivation behind Russell’s
theory of logical types (1908).
59
c. second to third century
60
My extremely brief summary of various points from Nāgārjuna’s MMK are actually summary
points of Priest (2002; chapter 16) and Garfield’s (1995) interpretation of Nārgārjuna. As such, they are
not intended to be the “final word” on interpreting Nārgārjuna, but merely an introduction to how Priest
and Garfield view Nārgārjuna, since Priest’s point of view is actually the topic of this chapter.
Furthermore, I am not personally interpreting Nāgārjuna’s work in any way, as I am not qualified to do so.

40
Nāgārjuna’s understanding of ultimate truth is not relative, but does rely upon his notion

of “emptiness.” Here, emptiness does not mean “non-existence,” but rather

“interdependent existence.” 61 An object’s essence is what the object is intrinsically, what

it possesses independently of all other things. As he notes in his Mulamadhyamakakarika

(MMK) or “The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way,” 62

Essence itself is not artificial

And does not depend on another.

(MMK xv: 2cd)

“Emptiness,” on the other hand, is to have no essence. According to Nāgārjuna, the most

important ultimate truth is that everything is empty, i.e. everything is dependent on other

things for existence.

… all entities are empty,

(MMK xxvii: 29a)

61
Interdependent existence is the idea that everything is intrinsically essenceless - that objects
exist only in relation to other objects. Consider a universe where the only object inside of it is a cup.
Given that only the cup exists in this universe, is it actually a cup? Without liquids, there is nothing to fill
it and, hence, it has no function in this universe. Yet, it seems as though a cup is defined as a cup by its
function. So, without a function, the cup does not exists as a cup. I.e. it requires a relationship with other
objects in order to exist. If you still think that a cup can exist by itself in a universe, you are either not
removing yourself from the universe in question, or you believe that everything has an intrinsic essence.
To solve the first case, simply remove yourself from the universe. In the second case, try to define what the
essence of a cup is. I.e. what is it to be a cup, apart from all else?
62
All Nāgārjuna quotes were taken from Garfield’s translation (1995) of the MMK unless
otherwise noted.

41
In fact, a majority of the MMK contains extended arguments defending the emptiness of

everything that one might mistake for having essence.

Of course, this leads Nāgārjuna to conclude that emptiness itself is empty (MMK

vii). Furthermore, the emptiness of emptiness means that ultimate reality is just as empty

as conventional reality. In other words, ultimate reality is only conventionally real.

Thus, the two realities are, in fact, identical. Notice that this is quite different from

Kant’s philosophy where his conventional reality (the phenomenal realm) is distinct and

separate from his ultimate reality (the noumenal realm). 63

Why does Nāgārjuna assert that emptiness is so important? Because it is the only

way things can exist. 64 In other words, emptiness is not simply a feature that an object

might have or lack, nor is it a distinct phenomenon to which another phenomenon is

compared. Therefore, one must abandon views about the ultimate nature of reality since

there is no such thing as the ultimate nature of reality. Now, if ultimate reality does not

exist, then there is no ultimate truth. However, the MMK is full of ultimate truths! For

example,

Therefore, space is not an entity.

It is not a nonentity.

Not characterized, not without character.

The same is true of the other five elements.

(MMK v: 7)

or

63
Murti (1955) actually proposes interpreting Nāgārjuna from a Kantian viewpoint.
64
Garfield (1995) points this out in his commentary to the MMK.

42
 Difference is not in a different thing.

Nor is it in a nondifferent thing.

If difference does not exist,

Neither different nor identical things exist.

(MMK xiv: 7)

And the list continues. In fact, even the claim that there is no ultimate reality is itself a

truth about ultimate reality and, hence, an ultimate truth! Thus, we can rephrase

Nāgārjuna’s self-referential paradox at the limit of expression this way: “There are no

ultimate truths” (transcendence). However, we just stated an ultimate truth (closure),

resulting in a dialetheia.

3.5.2. Dialetheic Nature of Nāgārjuna’s Self-Referential Ontological Paradox

Nāgārjuna is not merely interested in defining terms such as “empty” and

“nonempty” to describe what can and cannot be said. Rather, he is particularly concerned

with establishing a fundamental ontology:

Whatever is dependently co-arisen

That is explained to be emptiness.

That, being a dependent designation,

Is itself the middle way.

Something that is not dependently arisen,

43
 Such a thing does not exist.

Therefore a nonempty thing

Does not exist.

(MMK xxiv: 18-19)

In verse 18, Nāgārjuna tries to tie dependent origination, emptiness, and verbal

convention together by means of the middle way. Again, he is defining emptiness as the

dependently arisen. However, he is not arguing that the phenomenal world and

emptiness are distinct things. Rather, he thinks they are two different characterizations of

the same thing. To say that something is empty is to say that it is dependently co-arisen,

i.e. lacks independent existence. Furthermore, any time we identify something as

dependently co-arisen, we must do so by verbal conventions. However, since the thing

itself is empty, it has no identity apart from these verbal conventions. Finally, to say that

an object’s identity is merely a verbal fact is to point directly to that object’s emptiness.

In other words, everything must have the coextensive properties of conventional (verbal)

identity, dependent-origination, and emptiness. Thus, we have the middle way, which

lies at the center of these three characterizations of the same thing. In other words,

everything, including emptiness itself, lacks inherent existence. 65

Given that everything is empty, everything must lack an ultimate nature when

viewed from the ultimate perspective or viewpoint. However, in order to lack ultimate

nature or essence includes lacking emptiness by definition. Stated another way, since

everything is ultimately empty, everything must be empty of emptiness. Therefore, we

can conclude that there is no way that things are ultimately (transcendence). However,
65
I.e. is essenceless

44
we just showed the way things ultimately are when we concluded that there is no way

that things are (closure).

3.6. The Inclosure Schema for Dialetheic Paradoxes

The paradoxes that I presented above represent just a few examples from a family

of paradoxes that all conform to the same formula, i.e. have the same basic structure. In

fact, Russell himself recognized this general formula shortly after identifying his famous

paradox: 66

Given a property ϕ and a function δ, such that, if ϕ belongs to all members of u, δ(u) always

exists, has the property ϕ, and is not a member of u; then the supposition that there is a class Ω of

all terms having property ϕ and that δ(Ω) exists leads to the conclusion that δ(Ω) both has and has

not the property ϕ.

Using Russell’s formula, Priest formalizes the Inclosure Schema 67 for dialetheic

paradoxes as follows:

(1) Ω = {y; ϕ(y)} exists and ψ(Ω) Existence

(2) if x ⊆ Ω and ψ(x) (a) δ(x) ∉ x Transcendence

(b) δ(x) ∈ Ω Closure

66
Russell (1905) as quoted in Priest (2002), p. 129.
67
In the fields of mathematics and logic, demonstrating the success of a formula to generate a
model is vitally important for legitimizing the system. Therefore, I recommend that you read the Technical
Appendix of Priest’s Beyond the Limits of Thought (2002; p. 170-175) to see how he generates this model.

45
In this schema, Ω is the set of all ϕ things, and x is any subset of Ω that satisfies ψ. Now,

if we apply the function δ to the set Ω, we get δ(Ω) ∉ Ω from (2a), and δ(Ω) ∈ Ω from

(2b). Hence, any paradox fitting the Inclosure Schema reaches a dialetheic conclusion in

the absence of the law of non-contradiction. Based on their structure, paradoxes of

absolute infinity, which occur at the limit of iteration, fit the inclosure schema and are

therefore dialetheic. Furthermore, if ψ is chosen appropriately, the Inclosure Schema will

also encompass Berkeley’s paradox, along with Konig’s and Berry’s paradoxes of

definability. 68

3.7. Summary of Chapter 3

The goal of this chapter was to introduce you to dialetheism and show how this

paraconsistent logic can explain the existence and validity of some key paradoxes.

Perhaps you are among the majority of people who do not find dialetheism convincing,

however, particularly because of your attachment to, and daily use of, the LNC. Are you

then stuck with paradoxes if you reject dialetheism? If so, is this a bad thing? Could

there actually be a better explanation to these contradictions that does not involve

paraconsistent logic? Furthermore, can these paradoxes actually play a larger role than

simply confounding our everyday logic? I will address this and much more in Part II.

68
Priest (2002), p. 134.

46
PART II

FROM A CERTAIN POINT OF VIEW

47
 4. POINTS OF VIEW
Luke: Obi-Wan, why didn’t you tell me? You told me Vader betrayed and
murdered my father.
Obi-Wan: Your father was seduced by the dark side of the force. He ceased to be
Anakin Skywalker and became Darth Vader. When that happened, the
good man who was your father was destroyed. So what I told you was
true, from a certain point of view.
Luke: A certain point of view?
Obi-Wan: Luke, you’re going to find that many of the truths we cling to depend
greatly on our own point of view.
- George Lucas, Star Wars: Episode VI - Return of the Jedi

4.1. An Introduction to Points of View

As we saw in the last chapter, Priest wants to set-aside the law of non-

contradiction on some occasions and allow that, for some things, p ∧ ¬p is true. Given

that our intuitions agree with the law of non-contradiction, one might argue that Priest’s

inclination to reject this law is based solely upon his point of view. In fact, I am perfectly

willing to grant that some cases of p ∧ ¬p are true from Priest’s point of view. But,

before we go any further, we must first understand what viewpoints actually are and how

they affect our conclusions.

4.1.1. What ARE Points of View?

For this dissertation I will define a point of view as a phenomenal experience

from a particular location in phenomenal space. Now, the conclusions that can be drawn

from these phenomenal experiences are not immediately apparent. For example, perhaps

I am merely words on a page, in which a reader is conceiving of me having the

48
experience of writing this dissertation. 69 Or, perhaps I am in the Matrix, a dream-like

state where I experience dissertation writing but these “experiences” are merely images

implanted in my brain by a computer. In either case, all I can really know is that I

experience. And in this case, I am experiencing writing my dissertation. Obviously, this

is my subjective point of view and, as such, is not objectively held by everyone since I

am the only one currently having my experiences. But, how do objective and subjective

points of view relate to each other? Is it necessary to distinguish between subjective and

objective experience?

4.1.2. Subjective and Objective Points of View

Thomas Nagel 70 has written extensively on points of view and has concluded that

they are subjective or objective relative to one another. In other words, variations in

points of view occur along a spectrum, with subjectivity and objectivity being at opposite

ends. According to Nagel, a point of view is more objective when it becomes more

accessible to a variety of conscious agents. For example, you are currently having the

experience of staring at a white page with black markings. The subjective viewpoint is

not concerned with how it is possible for you to have this experience, but simply with the

fact that you are having the experience. Once reference is made to causation of your

experience, the point of view becomes more objective because it is describing something

that is accessible to other conscious agents. Hence, for Nagel, the subjective point of

view is simply the phenomenological experience, and that viewpoint becomes more

objective as you begin to consider the details of why you are having that experience.

69
C.f. Sophie’s World, by Gaarder (1994).
70
Nagel (1979), (1986).

49
Science, which is driven to find the objective reality of the world we live in, provides us

with great opportunities to observe this spectrum. Imagine that you are having a green,

jagged shaped experience. 71 The experience itself is your subjective point of view. Now,

your viewpoint begins to move towards objectivity once you realize that this green,

jagged experience is occurring while you are looking at a leaf. You are being even more

objective when you realize that the green leaf is not actually causing your green, jagged

experience, but that the leaf is merely reflecting green wavelengths of light and absorbing

all the rest. Furthermore, you might consider that measuring wavelengths of light in

nanometers is a human measurement, and that other perceivers of green wavelengths of

light might measure green light differently.

Dietrich and Hardcastle 72 disagree with Nagel regarding the subjective / objective

spectrum. Instead, they argue that points of view are actually binary, i.e. {0,1}, with no

gradations in between. In other words, we have subjective points of view (the actual

experience itself) and objective points of view that merely get “wider” as we include

more information accessible by an increasing number of conscious individuals.

Therefore, the green leaf view, the nanometer view, and the generalized measurement

view are equally objective, but they are increasingly wider in their scope. Under this

conception of viewpoints, the subjective point of view is the first-person perspective,

while the objective point of view is the third-person perspective. Note that even this

terminology suggests that gradations do not exist between the two points of view. For

example, no one considers their viewpoint to be half first-person and half third-person in

71
It is interesting to note that we do not typically have “green, jagged shaped” experiences. This
is a philosophical viewpoint that is not usually adopted in our daily lives. Instead, we have “leaf”
experiences. So, we live our lives at a low-level objective point of view. My thanks to Eric Dietrich for
pointing this out to me.
72
Dietrich and Hardcastle (2004).

50
nature. On the contrary, we can quickly switch between the two points of view, and even

from narrower to wider third-person viewpoints. However, we cannot have a first-person

and a third-person perspective simultaneously. True, it often feels like we can adopt both

points of view at the same time, but we are simply retaining all of these viewpoints in our

working memory, which is what enables us to switch so quickly between them.

We are now left with a dilemma: a third-person viewpoint cannot be held by a

conscious individual who is actually experiencing a first-person viewpoint. In other

words, the objective point of view is always filtered through a subjective perspective

when a conscious individual holds it. Even Kant 73 noted that the nature of reality as we

know it is inseparable from our subjective perspective. In other words, none of our

knowledge is subjective-point-of-view free. 74 This is because all knowledge derives

from experience that is filtered through our first-person, subjective perspective.

Nagel 75 claims that the most objective point of view is the view from nowhere in

particular. However, “wherever you go, there you are.” Therefore, since the view from

nowhere in particular is filtered through a subjective point of view (because the

individual does not lose consciousness during this time, but is experiencing the view from

nowhere), I argue that it is not truly objective. Instead, when a conscious individual

holds a third-person point of view, she actually has a “subjective objectivity” that I refer

to as objective recursivity. Many philosophers may disagree with me on this point,

claiming that objective points of view clearly exist and that we can hold them. 76

73
Kant (1787) as translated by N.K. Smith (1933).
74
But what about 2+2=4? Isn’t this POV free? I argue that our experience of “2+2=4” is filtered
through our subjective perspective. Hence our knowledge of “2+2=4” is not purely objective. It is
interesting to note that in mathematics (barring the paradoxes), however, our subjective experience does not
affect the outcome (see section 4.3).
75
Nagel (1986).
76
Dietrich and Hardcastle (2004) have argued just this, as indicated above.

51
Therefore, I should clarify that objective viewpoints may exist, e.g. the view from

nowhere in particular. However, I claim that it is impossible for a conscious individual to

actually hold a completely objective point of view since all experience is filtered through

a subjective perspective.

4.1.3. Necessary Syntax

Even though we all have objective recursivity, a gradation exists between our

most subjectively subjective viewpoints and our most subjectively objective. Therefore, I

find it imperative to define an indexing system for keeping track of which level in the

gradation we are discussing or dealing with. From here on, I will refer to “point of view”

as POV. Now, imagine that you are having that green, jagged shaped experience we

discussed earlier. Let POV1 signify the level at which you recognize that this jagged

green experience is due to the leaf you are viewing. Thus, LPOV1 is the leaf viewed from

the first point of view. Next, I will use a decimal system to represent specific but

different angles of the same object. For example, if you start by viewing the front of the

leaf, this is represented by LPOV1.1. If you rotate the leaf so that you see its side, you have

LPOV1.2, and so on. In other words, all of your physical experiences that translate into

“my point of view” are on POV level 1. Now, if you “step back” mentally and “see”

yourself looking at the leaf in your mind’s eye, you do so from the second level, POV2.

Of course, you might imagine that you can see yourself looking at yourself looking at the

leaf, but this occurs from POV3, with each angle within that POV represented by the

decimal system. Since we are finite we cannot adopt an infinite number of POV levels.

However, we can skip to the end and adopt Nagel’s view from nowhere in particular,

52
which is represented as POVn. Clearly, this is the most objectively recursive POV that

we can hold. Finally, it should be obvious that your point of view of the front of the leaf

is different from mine. Therefore, whenever it is necessary I will add a prefix to the POV

that will refer to the person holding that point of view. For example, Brian’s experience

of the front of the leaf is LBPOV1.1.

4.2. Applying POV Indexing

Now that I have extensively defined and indexed points of view, I will

demonstrate how to apply the POV indexing system to eliminate confusion in

philosophical problems. In order to do this, I would like you to consider a die, such as

the one in Figure 6. Recall that a die is a cube that has six sides with a collection of dots

on each side. For the purposes of the demonstration, I will refer to the sides by the

number of dots they contain. To begin with, imagine that you are looking at side 1 of a

giant die (say, 10 feet high) and that it is the only thing in your field of view.

FIGURE 6

53
Let us call this view of the die DPOV1.1. Given that the giant die is so large, imagine that

you must walk around the die to see its different sides. Start by walking to the right. As

you continue to pass side 1, you will begin to see side 2. At first it will start off as a tall,

thin rectangle, but eventually it will get wider as you get closer to the corner of the die.

During this move you are walking through an infinite number of viewpoints on the die,

which can all be represented by the real numbers. Your mind, however, only processes a

few of them consciously. Eventually, you reach DPOV1.15.

FIGURE 7

Continuing to the right, you will pass through another infinite set of POV’s until you

reach DPOV1.2. In this way, you could continue to view all four of the vertical sides.

FIGURE 8

54
Now, notice that all of these POV changes occur at level 1. This is true of all of your

experiences, since POV1 represents the “my point of view” that we all go through life

with. Furthermore, POV1 includes everything that is within your field of view. As you

read this dissertation, you are experiencing it at POV1. However, since the paper that the

dissertation is printed on is not taking up your entire field of view, all of the background

objects that you can see simultaneously are also part of your normal POV1. Thus, we can

either talk about your POV of a single object, such as DPOV1.2, or we can talk about all of

the objects in your POV1 field of view. However, this is not the only POV level that we

can adopt. For example, imagine stepping back and seeing yourself standing in front of

side 2 such that it takes up your entire field of view, as diagramed in Figure 9.

FIGURE 9

As you imagine what you look like while viewing side 2, you are at POV level 2. You

are mentally adopting the viewpoint of another person who might see you looking at the

die. The view in Figure 9 might be indexed as DPOV2.123 (the actual decimal number does

not matter here), indicating that you are at level 2. Of course, you could also step back to

POV level 3 and imagine yourself looking at yourself looking at the die. There are an

55
infinite number of such level changes that you could adopt though, being finite, you can’t

possibly adopt them all.

Finally, this indexing has some interesting ramifications. Normally, when we

experience a viewpoint, regardless of which level we are on, our objective recursivity

makes us feel like it is all a single, unified point of view. However, POV indexing has

shown us that once we start to change POV levels, we are no longer looking at the same

thing. To see this, reconsider the last figure, where you can see yourself looking at the

giant die. Clearly, the die does not look the same from up here, nor do you. In fact,

changing POV levels can sometimes produce unexpected outcomes. However, the

strangeness of the outcome quickly disappears when we recognize which POV level we

are on. This is an extremely important point, since confusing POV levels only leads to

more confusion. To see this, imagine now that you are looking at a large tree and it is

taking up your entire field of view, as shown below:

FIGURE 10

56
Oops, my mistake. I forgot to tell you that the image was from my POV, where I am

looking at you looking at the tree. Did you notice that initial confusion? If you followed

the text carefully, you probably expected a picture of just the tree itself, like when I

showed you the die for the first time. Or, if your eyes jumped ahead to the figure, you

probably expected the text to say something different. Worse, perhaps you did not notice

anything unusual at all. Most readers will probably have the latter experience. Why?

Because we switch between POV levels effortlessly, seamlessly. We do it all day long

without even noticing. And this is the key point. Not noticing POV level changes leads

to confusion and contradiction. I will return to this point in the next chapter.

4.3. POV Indexing and the March of the Transfinite Ordinals

The mental exercise with a 10 foot high die notwithstanding, you might be

wondering if any of the POV indexing actually matters in the real world. For example, it

seems reasonable to expect that adding two objects together with three other objects

results in five total objects, regardless of your POV. I would argue that this intuition is

valid. Math done properly should produce consistent results, regardless of the viewpoint

at which it is performed. But I also claim that when the results are consistently

unexpected we should worry about POV’s. If my son is consistently adding two balls

with three balls and getting four as the total, I might become interested in his point of

view: i.e. why is it that he only sees four when he should see five? Is it the angle at

which he is sitting? Is he accidentally seeing two balls as one because they are so close

together that he cannot properly distinguish between them? Or is there some other reason

why he is getting an unexpected result? Similarly, it is intuitive to me that we should

57
look at the unexpected results obtained by the paradoxes and see if they are actually

being caused by differences in viewpoints. In order to accomplish this, I will analyze the

dialetheia in the next chapter. First, however, I want to demonstrate the POV indexing

system will not adversely affect mathematics done properly. Let us therefore apply this

technique to the march of the transfinite ordinals.

First, recall from chapter 2 that an ordinal number is actually a set of the

preceding ordinal numbers. Additionally, Cantor defined two rules for establishing

ordinal numbers, as follows:

1. if x is an ordinal number then there is a next number, x + 1, which is the

immediate successor of x.

2. if a definite succession of defined ordinal numbers exists, for which there is

no largest number, then a new number is created that is simultaneously the

limit of those numbers and also the next larger number of them all.

Now, according to rule 2, the next greatest ordinal number is simultaneously the limit

(read “set”) of all of the previous ordinal numbers. I argue that this rule actually denotes

a change in POV’s for every ordinal number. Moving from our initial POV on the empty

set, { }, we see that it is represented by the ordinal number, 0. And we must alter our

POV again to see that 0 is actually a member of the set represented by the ordinal number

1. Now, even though POV shifts occur at each step of the march, no contradictions are

being generated. In other words, the perspective shifts are not causing any logical errors

58
 to occur. Given this backdrop, we are now ready to index the march of the transfinite

ordinals.

Sets Represented by the Ordinal Ordinal Number

Description Number (Symbol)
Empty set {}POV1 0POV2
Set of one set {0}POV1 1POV2
Set of two sets {0,1}POV1 2POV2
Set of three sets {0,1,2}POV1 3POV2
Set of four sets {0,1,2,3}POV1 4POV2
… … …
Set of all finite ordinals {0,1,2,3,4,…}POV1 ωPOV2
Set of all finite ordinals and ω {0,1,2,3,4,… ω}POV1 (ω + 1)POV2
Set of all finite ordinals, ω, ω + 1 {0,1,2,3,4,… ω, ω + 1}POV1 (ω + 2)POV2
… … …
Set of set ω plus set ω {ω + ω}POV1 2ω+1POV2
… … …
2
Set of set ω times set ω {ω * ω}POV1 (ω + 1)POV2
… … …

TABLE 6

So, indexing the transfinite ordinals indicates that their march requires POV shifting in

order to occur smoothly. However, I expected this to occur since I think that Cantor’s

second actually forces a POV shift to occur. Now, since indexing does not affect or

interfere with the march, I think it is safe to use on other operations without the fear of

introducing extraneous variables.

59
4.4. Summary of Chapter 4

This chapter provided us with a foundation for understanding points of view and

how we adopt and change them. Furthermore, I argued that all conscious beings have

objective recursivity, which prevents us from actually holding a purely objective

viewpoint on anything. Given this important feature of our consciousness, I created a

POV indexing system that was intended to show us where we change our points of view

and how those changes affect our understanding of the world around us. Now we can

return to Priest’s dialetheic paradoxes.

60
 5. THE DIALETHEIC POINT OF VIEW
One can conceive of an object that is not conceived … in the appropriate sense; I do, and
so can you.
-Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought

Vizzini: He didn’t fall?!? Inconceivable!

Inigo: You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it
means.
- William Goldman, The Princess Bride

5.1. The Psychologized Inclosure Schema

Having defined and illustrated POV indexing, I will now return to analyzing the

dialetheic nature of some paradoxes. As we saw in chapter 3, Priest defines the

paradoxes that arise at the limits of thought as Inclosure contradictions if they fit into the

Inclosure Schema as follows:

(1) Ω = {y; ϕ(y)} exists and ψ(Ω) Existence

(2) if x ⊆ Ω and ψ(x) (a) δ(x) ∉ x Transcendence

(b) δ(x) ∈ Ω Closure

If we apply the above Inclosure Schema to the limit, Ω, we get (a) δ(Ω) ∉ Ω and

(b) δ(Ω) ∈ Ω, which is dialetheic. Now, while this symbolic representation of the

Inclosure Schema is helpful for understanding how paradoxes at the limits of thought can

result in dialetheic conclusions, it does not specifically explain how our minds follow this

pattern of reasoning. More specifically, ignoring the psychology behind the Inclosure

61
schema results in the omission of an important variable - POVs. Points of view must be

factored into the Inclosure Schema in order to determine if Priest’s theory is valid. In

other words, we need a Psychologized Inclosure Schema.

Initially, Priest’s entire Inclosure Schema occurs from POV1. Thus, for almost

any x, δ(x) is not a member of x but is still a member of Ω. The problem with Priest’s

Inclosure arises when we substitute Ω for x. The reason is that Ω is at POV1. It is the

initial boundary, the limit, the viewpoint. This can be easily seen from the following

figure adopted from Priest. 77

δ(Ω)

ψ(Ω) Ω

δ(x)
ψ(x) x

ϕ(y)

FIGURE 11

Ω, which is the set of all ϕ things, is represented by the large oval. Any subset of Ω

satisfying ψ is represented by x, while the function δ applied to x takes us out of x but

still within Ω. When applying the function δ to Ω, Priest lands on a point that is both in

and not in Ω.

77
Priest (2002), p. 156.

62
 When we consider a dialetheic paradox, I think that we adopt a new point of view

level, POV2, in order to “see” Ω and substitute it for x. From POV2 we can identify Ω

and apply it to itself to generate the paradox. Furthermore, we can adopt another

viewpoint from which to see ourselves (or someone else) generating the paradox. In

general cases, Dietrich 78 refers to this as the “reader’s point of view.” For example, let O

be any object. Next, let O+P1 be the POV where O has the property P1, and ¬(O+P1) be

the POV where O does not have the property P1. Now, there must always exist a third

POV where O+P1 and ¬O+P1 both obtain. This is the reader’s POV, where O both has

and does not have P1.

In the case of the dialetheic paradoxes, I call the broader POV where p ∧ ¬p

occur the Psychologized Inclosure Schema. Let ΩPOV1 signify that Ω is the boundary for

POV1. Therefore, we begin with the following modified schema:

(1) ΩPOV1 = {y; ϕ(y)} exists and ψ(ΩPOV1) Existence

(2) if x ⊆ ΩPOV1 and ψ(x) (a) δ(x) ∉ x Transcendence

(b) δ(x) ∈ ΩPOV1 Closure

Again, for almost any x, this is not a problem for most people. However, in order to

substitute ΩPOV1 for x, we must first step back and change our POV level. Thus, viewing

Ω from back here at POV2, we are actually at ΩPOV2. This is our new boundary and it is

“wider” or more objective than ΩPOV1. Now when we substitute ΩPOV1 for x in the

remodeled Inclosure Schema, we get:

78
Dietrich (2005).

63
 (1) ΩPOV2 = {y; ϕ(y)} exists and ψ(ΩPOV2) Existence

(2) if ΩPOV1 ⊆ ΩPOV2 and ψ(ΩPOV1) (a) δ(ΩPOV1) ∉ ΩPOV1 Transcendence

(b) δ(ΩPOV1) ∈ ΩPOV2 Closure

As you can see, δ(ΩPOV1) ∉ ΩPOV1 and δ(ΩPOV1) ∈ ΩPOV2 logically occur simultaneously

when we accurately account for the shift in POV levels. In other words, POV2 is the

dialetheic point of view from which transcendence and closure both obtain. I have

redrawn Priest’s original figure to represent our understanding of the changing

perspectives. 79

ΩPOV2 δ(ΩPOV1)
The
ψ(ΩPOV2) ΩPOV1 Dialetheic
POV!

δ(x)
ψ(x) x

ϕ(y)

FIGURE 12

79
Note that while POV2 is the dialetheic point of view, you are at the reader’s POV, which is even
wider.

64
 Now, you might be concerned by my claim that we can only see ΩPOV1 from the

objectively wider ΩPOV2. However, recall that Kant noted that reality is inseparable from

our subjective perspective. In his preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure

Reason, he wrote: 80

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects.

But all attempts [for instance, to account for the possibility of objective knowledge] have,

on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not

have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects conform to our

knowledge.

In other words, different points of view determine, in part, which subject is actually being

viewed. Consider the following example. Imagine that I am interested in drawing your

attention to three X’s, such as those arranged below:

XXX

FIGURE 13

One strategy that I could use might be to put a circle around the three X’s. 81 That way I

could say, “Turn your attention to the three X’s that I have circled.” From this point of

80
Kant (1787), B xvi as translated by N.K. Smith (1933).
81
Or I could have simply relied on the words “drawing your attention to three X’s, such as those
arranged below.”

65
view, XXXPOV1, the figure might look like this, where the circle is the boundary around

the three X’s, but it is not part of the three X’s that I want you to focus on:

XXX

FIGURE 14

However, suppose a third person arrives and views the figure above. From her point of

view, XXXPOV2, it might appear that the circle not only represents a boundary, but is also

part of the picture. I have drawn her viewpoint as a box around the image under

consideration:

XXX

FIGURE 15

In the same way, it is possible for us to shift from ΩPOV1 to ΩPOV2, because we are

capable of adopting progressively wider points of view in our mind’s eye. Furthermore,

since we are capable of juggling these different POV levels effortlessly, we routinely

combine these different points of view into a single, unified viewpoint. Therefore,

shifting between different POV levels without realizing it is what allows us to see the

66
dialetheic paradoxes for what they really are. In other words, what Priest has done is to

adopt a different POV level from which he can see both transcendence (of ΩPOV1) and

closure (within ΩPOV2) at the same time. This wider point of view is called dialetheism.

Before continuing, I would like to address one more concern. Perhaps you inhabit

the point of view that I once inhabited, where it appears that POV shifting actually

dissolves dialetheia. You might think that there are no paradoxes, only perspective shifts.

For example, you argue, consider the dialetheic house that is pink on one side and green

on another. From one perspective, I would claim that the house I am looking at is pink.

My son might argue that it is, in fact, green. But you, from your broader, more objective

point of view, can clearly show us that we are simply looking at two sides of the same

house that have been painted with different colors. However, this line of reasoning is

mistaken, because the house we have described is not actually dialetheic. Instead, the

dialetheic house is pink all over from POV1 and green all over from POV2. The

Psychologized Inclosure Schema allows us to adopt the wider perspective from which to

see that the house is both pink and green. Now, I realize that the dialetheic house seems

impossible in the physical world. But, 1) that does not preclude its existence in some

other logically possible world, and 2) there are plenty of actual contradictions that appear

to exist in the physical world (consider the fact that light is both a wave and a particle, or

any other fact from quantum mechanics).

5.2. Psychologizing Dialetheic Paradoxes in Order to Understand Them

Given our system for indexing POV’s, I will now analyze the dialetheia that I

discussed in chapter 3. The basic pattern for what I call “Type A” dialetheia all involve

67
establishing a limit or boundary, then shifting to a wider POV in order to apply the limit

to itself. The exact move that occurs will be highlighted for each of the paradoxes

considered.

5.2.1. Russell’s Paradox

Reconsider Russell’s paradox 82 at the limit of iteration. Imagine that there is a set

S, which is the set of all sets that do not contain themselves as members. Applying the

definition for S to itself, we find that S is a member of itself if and only if it is not a

member of itself (S ∈ S ↔ S ∉ S). In order to deal with the paradox he discovered,

Russell 83 devised the Theory of Logical Types, which states that a class is of a logical

type that has a higher ordinality than its members do and, therefore, we must not mingle

different logical types by applying classes to themselves. The reason for this rule

becomes apparent in the following example. Consider the law of the excluded middle,

which states that propositions can be either true or false. Since this law is itself a

proposition, we might ask if the law of the excluded middle can be either true or false. In

order to be a law, it must always be true, but this contradicts itself. Therefore, Russell

argues, the law of the excluded middle is a proposition about propositions, or meta-

proposition, and should not be confused with the propositions to which it refers. Russell

therefore concludes that SR statements are meaningless of themselves (cannot be applied

to themselves) rather than true or false of themselves. While I am not convinced that

different logical types actually exist, I do think that POVs can help to explain Russell’s

intuition. Further, this feature of our psyche has remained relative hidden since the POV

82
Priest (2002), p. 130.
83
Russell (1908).

68
shift occurs subconsciously, often without ever being identified by our conscious

intellect. As we saw in the previous section, when the limit, Ω, is established, the only

way to apply Ω to itself is to adopt an objectively wider POV.

In order to apply the Psychologized Inclosure Schema Russell’s paradox, let SPOV1

be the initial boundary, ΩPOV1. The identity function (i) used to determine membership in

set S can be written as follows: i(x) = {x ∈ S; x ∉ x}. 84 Thus, δ(x) = i(x). Finally, let

ϕ(y) = y ∈ S. Thus:

Paradox Ω x ψ(Ω) ϕ(y) δ(x)

Russell S x ψ(S) y∈S i(x), where

i(x) = {x ∈ S; x ∉ x}

TABLE 7

(1) SPOV1 = {y; y ∈ S} exists and ψ(SPOV1) Existence

(2) if x ⊆ SPOV1 and ψ(x) (a) i(x) ∉ x Transcendence

(b) i(x) ∈ SPOV1 Closure

However, in order to apply S to itself, which happens when we ask if S is a member of

itself, we must first step back to SPOV2. This occurs because we can only “see” S from the

new POV level. As a result, we obtain transcendence beyond the first limit, SPOV1, but

have closure within the second limit, SPOV2.

84
See Priest (2002), p. 129.

69
 (1) SPOV2 = {y; y ∈ S} exists and ψ(SPOV2) Existence

(2) if SPOV1 ⊆ SPOV2 and ψ(SPOV1) (a) i(SPOV1) ∉ SPOV1 Transcendence

(b) i(SPOV1) ∈ SPOV2 Closure

Clearly, (2a) and (2b) of our Psychologized Inclosure Schema occur within the dialetheic

point of view because we altered our perspective on the limit S. Thus, Russell’s paradox

produces a genuine dialetheium.

5.2.2. Kant’s Fifth Antinomy

Recall Kant’s fifth antinomy as Priest presented it: 85 if t(z) = the thought of z, and

if we apply this generator an infinite number of times, there is a limit, T, that contains all

of these generated objects. Furthermore, as the limit or boundary of all such thoughts, T

itself cannot be thought of by definition. However, we just thought of it. Thus, we have

the “thought of an unthinkable T.” Now, let us account for the POV variable. TPOV1

represents the set of all things that are thought of. As such, TPOV1 is the initial limit,

ΩPOV1. Finally, let ϕ(y) = y ∈ T and δ(x) = t(z), as summarized below.

Paradox Ω x ψ(Ω) ϕ(y) δ(x)

Kant’s 5th T z ψ(T) y∈T t(z)

TABLE 8

85
Priest (2002) p. 100-101. Note that in this example I altered t(x) to t(z) in order to avoid
confusion with the x used in the PINS.

70
From this we get the following Psychologized Inclosure Schema:

(1) TPOV1 = {y; y ∈ T} exists and ψ(TPOV1) Existence

(2) if z ⊆ TPOV1 and ψ(z) (a) t(z) ∉ z Transcendence

(b) t(z) ∈ TPOV1 Closure

However, in order to apply T to itself, which happens when I say, “we just thought of it,”

we must first step back to TPOV2. Changing POV levels is necessary in order to “see”

TPOV1. As a result, we have transcendence beyond the first limit, TPOV1, but obtain

closure within the second limit, TPOV2.

(1) TPOV2 = {y; y ∈ T} exists and ψ(TPOV2) Existence

(2) if TPOV1 ⊆ TPOV2 and ψ(TPOV1) (a) t(TPOV1) ∉ TPOV1 Transcendence

(b) t(TPOV1) ∈ TPOV2 Closure

Once again, a POV shift allows us to see the contradiction arise.

5.2.3. Cantor’s Paradox

Recall from Cantor’s paradox 86 that every set has a power set that contains all of

the subsets of the original set and is therefore bigger than the original set. Let the set of

86
Priest (2002), p. 128.

71
all sets, UPOV1 = ΩPOV1. Let the Power set of x, P(x) = δ(x) and ϕ(y) = y ∈ U. Therefore,

we can write the Inclosure for this paradox as follows:

Paradox Ω x ψ(Ω) ϕ(y) δ(x)

Cantor U x ψ(U) y∈U P(x)

TABLE 9

(1) UPOV1 = {y; y ∈ U} exists and ψ(UPOV1) Existence

(2) if x ⊆ UPOV1 and ψ(x) (a) P(x) ∉ x Transcendence

(b) P(x) ∈ UPOV1 Closure

However, in order to substitute the set of all sets, U, for x, we must first step back to the

dialetheic point of view, UPOV2. Thus,

(1) UPOV2 = {y; y ∈ U} exists and ψ(UPOV2) Existence

(2) if UPOV1 ⊆ UPOV2 and ψ(UPOV1)

(a) P(UPOV1) ∉ UPOV1 Transcendence

(b) P(UPOV1) ∈ UPOV2 Closure

Notice that a POV shift on the limit, U, is responsible for enabling us to see this genuine

dialetheium.

72
5.2.4. Burali-Forti’s Paradox

Next, I would like to reconsider Burali-Forti’s paradox. 87 Again, using Cantor’s

rules for generating the transfinite ordinals, we can identify Ω as the set of all ordinal

numbers by stating that there must be a limit to this iteration. Since Ω is itself an ordinal

by rule 2, Ω + 1 must be the least ordinal greater than Ω. However, since Ω + 1 is also an

ordinal, it belongs in the set of all ordinals, Ω, by definition. As a result, we get

Ω< Ω+1≤ Ω. Applying this to the Psychologized Inclosure Schema, let the collection of

all the ordinals, Ω, be the Inclosure Schema ΩPOV1. Also, let ϕ(y) = “y is an ordinal,” and

let δ(x) = log(x). 88

Paradox Ω x ψ(Ω) ϕ(y) δ(x)

Burali-Forti Ω x ψ(Ω) y ∈ ordinals log(x)

TABLE 10

(1) ΩPOV1 = {y; y is an ordinal} exists and ψ(ΩPOV1) Existence

(2) if x ⊆ ΩPOV1 and ψ(x) (a) log(x) ∉ x Transcendence

(b) log(x) ∈ ΩPOV1 Closure

87
Priest (2002), p. 130.
88
Where log(x) = least ordinal greater than x.

73
In order to substitute Ω in for x, however, we must first step back and adopt a broader

POV to see the limit Ω. We then have the resulting version of the Psychologized

Inclosure Schema:

(1) ΩPOV2 = {y; y is an ordinal} exists and ψ(ΩPOV2) Existence

(2) if ΩPOV1 ⊆ ΩPOV2 and ψ(ΩPOV1) (a) log(ΩPOV1) ∉ ΩPOV1 Transcendence

(b) log(ΩPOV1) ∈ ΩPOV2 Closure

As I mentioned in chapter 4, Cantor’s two rules actually hide the POV changes that occur

in the march of the transfinite ordinals. But, if a POV shift occurs for each ordinal, why

isn’t a dialetheium generated in the march before we reach Ω? The reason is that, while

each ordinal is the boundary for all of the preceding ordinals, it is also the last member of

the set represented by the next largest ordinal by definition. Ω, on the other hand, is

defined as the complete collection of all ordinals that have or ever will exist, and not

merely just the previous ordinals. It is this distinction that moves Ω to the limit of

thought. Even though Ω’s dialetheic nature may initially appear to be unusual, POV

indexing helps to explain the true nature of the Burali-Forti paradox.

5.2.5. Nāgārjuna’s Paradoxes

Recall that Nāgārjuna’s MMK leads the reader to conclude that ultimate reality

does not exist, which means that there are no ultimate truths (transcendence). However,

the expression “there are no ultimate truths” is itself an ultimate truth about ultimate

74
truths (closure). To form the Psychologized Inclosure, 89 let ϕ(y) = “y is an ultimate

truth,” let ψ(x) = “x is definable,” and let δ(x) = the sentence “there is nothing which is in

d,” where “d” refers to x. 90 Finally, let ΩPOV1 = “ultimate truth,” or UT.

Paradox Ω x ψ(Ω) ϕ(y) δ(x)

Nāgārjuna’s UT x ψ(UT) y is an “there is nothing

Paradox of ultimate truth in d”, where d
Expression refers to x

TABLE 11

(1) UTPOV1 = {y; y is an ultimate truth} exists and ψ(UTPOV1) Existence

(2) if x ⊆ UT POV1 and ψ(x) (a) d(x) ∉ x Transcendence

(b) d(x) ∈ UTPOV1 Closure

Now if we want to apply ultimate truth to itself, we must step back to POV2 in order to

see UTPOV1. Thus:

(1) UTPOV2 = {y; y is an ultimate truth} exists and ψ(UTPOV2) Existence

(2) if UTPOV1 ⊆ UTPOV2 and ψ(UTPOV1) (a) d(UTPOV1) ∉ UTPOV1 Transcendence

(b) d(UTPOV1) ∈ UTPOV2 Closure

89
Priest (2002), p. 268.
90
According to Priest (2002), p. 268, if x is definable, such a d exists.

75
Once again, a POV shift is responsible for illuminating the dialetheium. But don’t forget

that Nāgārjuna also had an ontological paradox. Recall that everything is completely

empty, even of emptiness itself. Therefore, there is no way that things are ultimately

(transcendence). However, this claim is about the way things are (closure). 91 In order to

clarify this paradox, let ϕ(y) = “y is empty,” let ψ(x) = “x is a set of things with some

common nature,” and let δ(x) = “the nature of things in x” or n(x). Finally, let ΩPOV1 =

“the set of all things with the nature of being empty,” or E.

Paradox Ω x ψ(Ω) ϕ(y) δ(x)

Nāgārjuna’s E x ψ(E) y is empty n(x) = “The

Ontological nature of things
Paradox in x”

TABLE 12

(1) EPOV1 = {y; y is empty} exists and ψ(EPOV1) Existence

(2) if x ⊆ EPOV1 and ψ(x) (a) n(x) ∉ x Transcendence

(b) n(x) ∈ EPOV1 Closure

However, in order to substitute the set of all things with the nature of being empty (E) for

x, then we must modify the schema using the same methods we have used for the other

paradoxes:

91
Priest (2002), p. 268-269.

76
 (1) EPOV2 = {y; y is empty} exists and ψ(EPOV2) Existence

(2) if EPOV1 ⊆ EPOV2 and ψ(EPOV1) (a) n(EPOV1) ∉ EPOV1 Transcendence

(b) n(EPOV1) ∈ EPOV2 Closure

So we can see that even the ontological paradox of Nāgārjuna occurs as a result of a POV

shift. Thus, both of his paradoxes are genuine dialetheia.

5.2.6. The Liar’s Paradox

I shall now return to the Liar paradox. As I noted earlier, Russell tries to dissolve

paradoxes of self-reference in general using his theory of logical types. 92 However, in

order to apply this theory to the Liar paradox, he has to manipulate its general form by

parsing the sentence. Rewritten, Russell’s Liar paradox reads, “There is a proposition

that I am affirming and that is false.” 93

∃p(I assert p and p is false)

Russell claims that if the above proposition’s quantifier has order o, then the proposition

itself has an order o+1 and, thus, does not fall under the scope of the quantifier. Priest 94

points out, however, that this artificial parsing does not actually work to solve the

paradox. Firstly, the Liar paradox causes a contradiction to occur even without being

asserted. Even more significantly, the self-reference can be obtained without

92
Russell (1908).
93
Whitehead and Russell (1910), p.65, as cited in Priest (2002), p. 143.
94
Priest (2002), p.143.

77
quantification. For example, a demonstrative could be used, such as “this proposition is

false,” to generate the self-reference. In either case, Russell’s attempt to solve the

paradox fails.

As I noted in chapter 2, Quine 95 worked hard to generate a strong Liar’s paradox

by using the phrase, “Yields a falsehood when appended to its own quotation.” Having

satisfied himself with the generation of a strong Liar, Quine then imitates Russell’s

theory of logical types and suggests that there is, in fact, a hierarchy of truth locutions. In

order to keep track of this hierarchy, he attaches numerical subscripts, beginning with

“0,” to expressions such as “true,” “true of,” “false,” and other related phrases. Thus, he

might index “true0,” “true1,” “true2,” and so on, depending on the situation. Next, Quine

specifies that whenever a truth locution T is applied to expression E, a subscript must be

appended to T that is higher than any subscript in E, 96 otherwise the phrases in question

will be meaningless or ungrammatical, rather than false or true. For example, if we want

to know the truth-value of “this proposition is false,” Quine would ask, “Is ‘this

proposition is false0’ false1?” With this method, Quine believed that the Liar could be

dissolved. Returning to his strong version of the Liar paradox, he writes, “’Yields a

falsehood0 when appended to its own quotation’ yields a falsehood1 when appended to its

own quotation.” In this way, Quine claimed to prove that the initial phrase in quotes is

meaningless of itself rather than true or false of itself.

Priest is not convinced by this indexing of truth-values to show so-called

differences in logical types. Instead, he claims that he can “legitimately” manipulate the

95
Quine (1966), p. 7-8.
96
This is obviously the same move Russell made, and it indicates that the truth locution is of a
different logical type than the expression it is applied to.

78
form of the Liar paradox in order to show that it is, in fact, an Inclosure. 97 To see how,

let us assume with Priest that it is sentences, instead of propositions, which are true or

false. Next, let Ω be the set of true sentences (TS), where ϕ(y) = “y is true,” and let ψ(x)

= “x is definable.” Finally, let δ be the function σ, such that σ(a) = α, where α = 〈α ∉

a〉. 98 If a, which is definable, is a subset of TS, Priest concludes the following with the

aid of the T-schema: 99

Paradox Ω x ψ(a) ϕ(y) δ(x) = σ(a)

Liar TS a a is definable y is true α, where

α = 〈α ∉ a〉

TABLE 13

1. Recall σ(a) = α = 〈α ∉ a〉 as defined above

2. Assume σ(a) ∈ a i.e. σ(a) is a definable, true sentence

3. Then σ(a) ∈ a → 〈α ∉ a〉 ∈ TS from 1 and 2

4. So α∉a from 3 by the T-schema

97
Priest (2002), p. 144.
98
Note that 〈 〉 around the term α ∉ a indicates that this is a sentence that says α is not in a. One
example of α might be “This sentence is not a true sentence.” Finally, “a” must be definable or there is no
guarantee that such a sentence exists.
99
The T-schema = T〈A〉 ↔ A, which says that “A” is true iff A. See Tarski (1933).

79
 5. Therefore, σ(a) ∉ a from 1 and 4

So, the Liar sentence, σ(a), is not a true sentence, which is transcendence. But we are not

done yet.

6. Thus α∉a from 1 and 5 (or simply 4)

7. So 〈α ∉ a〉 ∈ TS from 6 and the T-schema

8. Therefore, σ(a) ∈ TS from 1 and 7

Hence, Priest has demonstrated closure. Based on his manipulation, then, Priest

concludes that the Liar is the sentence σ(TS) 100 and the paradox is that σ(TS) ∉ TS

and σ(TS) ∈ TS. 101

Using Priest’s definitions and derivation of the dialetheic Inclosure, let us modify

his schema according to the POV methods I have applied to the other paradoxes.

(1) TSPOV1 = {y; y is true} exists and ψ(TSPOV1) Existence

(2) if a ⊆ TSPOV1 and ψ(a) (a) α(a) ∉ a Transcendence

(b) α(a) ∈ TSPOV1 Closure

100
Basically, where the Liar sentence is applied to itself.
101
Priest (2002), p.145.

80
This is fundamentally the same as Priest’s Inclosure, though I am making note of the

POV for the boundary, TS. The real work is done, however, when Priest substitutes TS

in for a. 102 In order to perform this substitution in his Inclosure Schema, Priest first had

to step back and see the boundary, TSPOV1, from POV level 2. Therefore, the appropriate

Psychologized Inclosure Schema for the Liar paradox should look like this:

(1) TSPOV2 = {y; y is true} exists and ψ(TSPOV2) Existence

(2) if TSPOV1 ⊆ TSPOV2 and ψ(TSPOV1) (a) α(TSPOV1) ∉ TSPOV1 Transcendence

(b) α(TSPOV1) ∈ TSPOV2 Closure

So, after Priest’s hard work demonstrating that the Liar paradox was actually a

dialetheium, we can see through POV indexing that the paradox relies on a subconscious

POV shift to apply the limit to itself.

5.3. Psychologizing Some Other Dialetheia

Having seen how an objectively wider perspective explains the inner workings of

dialetheia with a particular form, I now want to turn to some other paradoxes that Priest

considered, but which have a slightly different structure. In the following examples of

what I call “Type B” dialetheia, a limit is established, but the POV shift that occurs does

not revolve around the limit itself. Instead, it involves a comment about the limit. These

paradoxes must therefore be dealt with differently, as we shall see.

102
This occurs in steps 6 - 8.

81
5.3.1. Konig’s Paradox

Consider Konig’s 103 paradox again, that there must exist a least ordinal not in dΩ that, by

definition, cannot be defined. However, we just defined that ordinal as the “least ordinal

not in dΩ.” Unfortunately, the original PINS does not accurately represent Konig’s

paradox. Konig did not ask if the set of definable ordinals was a member of itself the

way Russell did. Instead, he noted that there must exist a least greatest ordinal not in the

set of definable ordinals. Now, what is actually going on here? First, we are defining a

limit, i.e. the set of all definable ordinals. Next, we are commenting on this set from

POV1 when we note that there must exist a least ordinal not in the set of definable

ordinals. Finally, we shift to POV2 in order to see that the comment we made regarding

membership within the defined boundary is actually contradictory. 104 So, this paradox

fits into what I call the PINS, second edition, where the POV around δ is noted. Let δ(x)

be the function μy such that y ∉ x, written as μyy ∉ x, where ψ(x) = x is definable. In

this paradox, δx can be viewed from either POV1 or POV2. Let ϕ(y) = y ∈ DOn (y is a

member of the definable ordinals). Finally, let Ω = DOn.

Paradox Ω x ψ(Ω) ϕ(y) δ(x)

Konig DOn x ψ(DOn) y ∈ DOn μyy ∉ x

TABLE 14

103
Priest (2002), p. 133-134.
104
Of course, from the reader’s point of view, both occur simultaneously.

82
Konig’s paradox therefore fits into the PINS 2nd ed. as follows:

(1) DOn = {y; y ∈ DOn} exists and ψ(DOn) Existence

(2) if x ⊆ DOn and ψ(x) (a) (μyy ∉ DOn)POV1 ∉ DOn Transcendence

(b) (μyy ∉ DOn)POV2 ∈ DOn Closure

As we can see in the modified Inclosure, the POV shift around the function δ allows us to

see Konig’s paradox as a genuine dialetheium.

5.3.2. Berry’s Paradox.

Berry’s paradox 105 can be dealt with similarly to Konig’s. In this case the limit,

Ω = DN99 and ψ(x) = x ∈ DN90 (since DN99 is clearly definable in less than 90 words). If

x is definable in less than 90 words, then μyy ∉ x = δ(x) and is not in x, though it is a

member of DN99. Finally, ϕ(y) = y ∈ DN99. Thus, the Psychologized Inclosure, 2nd ed.

looks like this:

Paradox Ω x ψ(Ω) ϕ(y) δ(x)

Berry DN99 x ψ(DN90) y ∈ DN99 μyy ∉ x

TABLE 15

105
Priest (2002), p. 134.

83
 (1) DN99 = {y; y ∈ DN99} exists and ψ(DN90) Existence

(2) if x ⊆ DN99 and ψ(x) (a) (μyy ∉ DN99)POV1 ∉ DN99 Transcendence

(b) (μyy ∉ DN99)POV2 ∈ DN99 Closure

Again, the POV shift that occurs in the PINS 2nd ed. illuminates the actual nature of yet

another dialetheium.

5.3.3. Berkeley’s Paradox

In order to reexamine Berkeley’s paradox, let us return to Priest’s interpretation of

Berkeley’s writings, particularly his proof for transcendence and closure that he derived

from Berkeley’s dialogue between Philonous and Hylas. 106 Recall that τ = “is

conceived” and T = “it is conceived that.” 107

∃x¬τx the antithesis of Berkeley’s Thesis

¬∃x¬τx Berkeley’s Thesis

T∃x¬τx Hylas’ claim

106
Berkeley (1734), First Dialogue.
107
Priest (2002), 61-62.

84
Given the Conception Schema (Tϕ(c) → τc, where c has some property, ϕ), 108 Priest

derives Berkeley’s paradox, 109 which I have summarized below. Firstly, the case for

transcendence can be made as follows:

1. Suppose ∃x¬τx the antithesis of Berkeley’s Thesis

2. So, ∃x¬τx → ¬τc where c is an instance of x

3. Hence, ¬τc transcendence by modus ponens

Next, the argument for closure can be made from Hylas’ claim and a modified version of

the Conception Schema:

4. Given T∃x¬τx Hylas’ claim

5. But Tϕ(c) → τc Conception Schema

6. So T∃c¬τc → τc by substitution, where c is an instance of x

7. Hence, τc closure

108
Priest (2002), p. 62.
109
Priest (2002), p. 62-70.

85
Thus, Priest claims that Berkeley’s paradox is τc ∧ ¬τc. In other words, it is conceivable

that there exists an object, c, that is not conceived (transcendence). However, we just

conceived of it (closure).

Now, Berkeley seems to claim that the moment that c is conceived, it is no longer

“unconceived”! In other words, once τc occurs, ¬τc no longer exists for that c. This

certainly seems to be the whole point of Berkeley’s argument in the dialogue between

Philonous and Hylas. 110

Phil. How then came you to say, you conceived a House or Tree existing independent and out of

all Minds whatsoever?

Hyl. That was I own an Oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me to it.——It is a pleasant

Mistake enough. As I was thinking of a Tree in a solitary Place, where no one was present to see

it, methought that was to conceive a Tree as existing unperceived or unthought of, not considering

that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see, that all I can do is to frame Ideas in

my own Mind. I may indeed conceive in my own Thoughts the Idea of a Tree, or a House, or a

Mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving, that I can conceive them existing out of the

Minds of all Spirits.

Hylas clearly admits that the unconceived tree he was thinking of was conceived the

moment he thought of it as unconceived. Priest’s conception schema even indicates this

feature regarding conceived objects. Thus, when Priest asserts that he can conceive of an

110
Berkeley (1734), First Dialogue.

86
unconceived object, 111 you might think he is mistaken in claiming that it remains

unconceived. Consider Berkeley’s master argument, as paraphrased below: 112

1. The only way to conceive of a tree or house (or any object) as existing

independently of all minds is to conceive of that object as being unconceived.

2. However, it is an illogical contradiction to conceive of a thing as being

unconceived. Conceived objects cannot be unconceived any more than seen

objects can be unseen.

3. Therefore, it is impossible to conceive of any object as existing independently

of all minds.

Thus, the argument goes, the only way for Priest’s argument to work then is for him to

continue to represent c as unconceived, even after he has conceived it. This is not a

contradiction, but merely a labeling problem. He is refusing to “change the label” on the

unconceived object, c, once he has conceived it.

The problem with this argument is that ignores the fact that a POV shift is

occurring. Thus, from POV1 c really is unconceived, yet from POV2 we see that POV1

was a conception of it as being unconceived. This can be seen in the PINS 2nd ed. as

follows. Let ψ(x) = “x is conceivable,” and let δ(x) = εyy ∉ x, which means that εy is a

variable such that y ∉ x. Now, if we let ϕ(y) = τy and Ω = C, which is the set of

conceivable things, we get:

111
Priest (2002), p. 70.
112
See K. Winkler (1989), p.183-184. Summarized from G. Berkeley (1734), p. 200.

87
 Paradox Ω x ψ(Ω) ϕ(y) δ(x)

Berkeley C x ψ(C) τy εyy ∉ x

TABLE 16

(1) C = {y; τy} exists and ψ(C) Existence

(2) if x ⊆ C and ψ(x) (a) (εyy ∉ C)POV1 ∉ C Transcendence

(b) (εyy ∉ C)POV2 ∈ C Closure

Therefore, we conceive of c in step (2a) as unconceived from POV1, but must step to

POV2 to realize that we have a conception of this unconceived c in (2b). The object, c,

really does have those properties, but they can only be seen together from the dialetheic

POV. 113

5.4. Zeno’s Stadium Paradox

As I noted in section 2.1.5, modern calculus has been used in an attempt to

explain three of Zeno’s famous paradoxes. Unfortunately, we now know that this move

is a non sequitur. The stadium paradox, however, can be dealt with differently than the

other three. Recall that this paradox begins with three rows of soldiers, each with three

members per row, aligned in a stadium as seen in the first position of Figure 16. Next,

with the A row of soldiers remaining stationary, the B soldiers and C soldiers move in

113
And from any wider perspective that encompasses the dialetheic POV.

88
opposite directions at the same rate of speed until all three rows are lined up (second

position in Figure 16).

First Position Second Position

A1 A2 A3 A1 A2 A3

B1 B2 B3 B1 B2 B3

C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3

FIGURE 16

Notice that C1 passed twice as many B’s as A’s. From this Zeno claims that “double the

time is equal to its half.” Since there is no time for C1 to pass B2, Zeno concludes that it

never happens.

Given our new understanding of points of view, we are now in a position to see

how Zeno is reaching this mistaken conclusion. To begin with, imagine that I am C1 and

you are B2. Furthermore, imagine that it takes two seconds for rows B and C to move

from the first position to the second position. Now, from my point of view as C1, it took

two seconds to move one position to the left. Let us call this viewpoint CPOV1. On the

other hand, from your point of view as B2, it took two seconds to move one position to

the right. Let this viewpoint be represented by BPOV1. Finally, Zeno is watching these

movements from a third, broader perspective, ZPOV2. (The reason that Zeno is at POV2

is that he is observing both B and C as they move – he has a perspective that

encompasses both of them simultaneously.) For him, two seconds involves the motion

89
of both C1 and B2. It should now be obvious what is happening. You and I each

experience two seconds of time, for a total of four experienced seconds. Zeno is also

experiencing two seconds of time. However, since he is stationary at a third, broader,

perspective, he is capable of watching you and I experience our two seconds at the same

time. Thus, it is true that “double the time is equal to its half” from Zeno’s wider point of

view. But this broader perspective does not erase the paradox. Instead, it demonstrates

how POV shifts can actually illuminate the inner workings of the paradoxes that would

otherwise trouble us.

5.5. Summary of Chapter 5

Graham Priest has argued strongly for the existence of dialetheia, supporting his

claims by demonstrating how dialetheic paradoxes fit into his Inclosure Schema. Using

POV indexing and the Psychologized Inclosure Schema, I think that I have both verified

his claims and explained how it is possible for us to see true contradictions. In other

words, genuine dialetheia exist. However, my POV analysis has opened Pandora’s Box,

for now we must deal with all of the questions that adopting multiple perspectives brings

up. For example, I claim that we can see dialetheia from a broader point of view. But

what, exactly, is this broader perspective? Is it broad enough to explain other

conundrums in life, or only dialetheic ones? In a multitude of perspectives, how do we

know which POV should be privileged? Which one is true? It is these and other deeper

philosophical questions that will occupy the remainder of this dissertation.

90
PART III

FREE YOUR MIND

91
6. EPISTEMOLOGY AT THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT
Neo: I know what you are trying to do.
Morpheus: I am trying to free your mind, Neo. But I can only show you the door.
You’re the one that has to walk through it.
***
Morpheus: You have to let it all go, Neo. Fear, doubt, and disbelief. Free your
mind.
***
Neo: I thought it wasn’t real.
Morpheus: Your mind makes it real.
Neo: If you’re killed in the Matrix, you die here?
Morpheus: The body cannot live without the mind.
- Wachowski Brothers, The Matrix

FIGURE 17

MÖBIUS II by MC Escher

Woodcut printed from 3 blocks. 1963.

92
6.1. Triscuit Bishop, the Dialetheic Ant

One fine summer morning, Triscuit Bishop, the dialetheic ant, was

walking along a rather large piece of paper. In fact, the paper was so

wide that it would have been impossible for Triscuit to walk to either side

in his lifetime. But, as fate would have it, Triscuit was walking along the

length of the paper, instead of the width. Now, as he was walking on the

top of the paper, he came across a small stain. “Molasses,” Triscuit said

to himself as he licked the stain. “One of my favorite treats. It is a pity

that molasses stains are so rare.” Having satisfied himself with the

nourishment of the molasses stain, he began walking again. He came next

to an oil mark on the bottom surface of the paper. “Virgin olive oil,” he

noted. “What a strange place to find such a mark.” Continuing on,

Triscuit reached a rather small ink blotch on the inside curve of the paper.

“Why, that looks like a butterfly,” commented Triscuit. “How lovely.”

Since it was now midday, Triscuit decided to rest while admiring the

butterfly ink blotch he had discovered. Being a lover of fine art, he gazed

deeply at its figure, memorizing its every twist and curve. When he had

committed this beautiful image to memory, he started walking again.

After a while he came across what looked like another molasses stain,

though “curiously like the first one,” he remarked to himself. A short

while after that, he found a virgin olive oil mark, again on the bottom of

the paper. “This day is getting stranger,” Triscuit muttered. But he was

most surprised when he encountered another ink blotch. “Why,” he

93
gasped with surprise, “that is the butterfly I was gazing at earlier!”

Triscuit was deeply puzzled. “How did I manage to go both on the top

and bottom of the paper without ever going over its edge?” he wondered.

Something strange had happened to him, but he was at a loss to explain it.

Determined to solve this mystery, he began walking again in the same

direction of his previous journey. In time, he found the molasses stain, the

virgin olive oil mark, and the beautiful butterfly blotch, exactly in the

positions he had seen them previously. And again, he had not crossed a

single edge of paper. “Though the paper I am walking on is continuous, I

am somehow managing to walk on both the top and bottom of the paper,”

he noted. “But the only paper I have ever encountered in the past has an

edge between the top and the bottom. How deeply puzzling this is.”

Triscuit puzzled until his puzzler hurt. But then, a new idea began to grow

in his mind. Perhaps, just perhaps, he was not walking along an ordinary

piece of paper. “What if the paper were somehow twisted (though I have

never heard of such paper before)? That might explain why I can walk on

both the top and the bottom of the paper without crossing an edge.” In

order to confirm this suspicion, Triscuit decided to walk along the width of

the paper. Eventually, he concluded, he would find the edge and verify

that the paper was indeed twisted as he hypothesized. Triscuit spent the

rest of his life in pursuit of the edge, convinced that he had discovered a

wonderful and strange thing, even though he was never able to prove it.

94
6.2. The Unattainable Viewpoint

There are limits to our thought, placed on us by the finiteness of our very being.

From one viewpoint, I cannot conceive of the inconceivable. From a second point of

view, I just did. But how do we know which viewpoint is right? Which one is true? Is it

even possible for a finite being to know the truth? Triscuit Bishop, the dialetheic ant,

speculated that he was on a curved piece of paper with no discernable edge between the

top and bottom. However, being short-lived on a piece of paper too wide for him to

cross, he could not prove his hypothesis. He could not know the truth. Does that mean

he shouldn’t believe in his hypothesis? Not necessarily. It only means that he could not

know. The limits of our thought present similar barriers as highlighted by the paradoxes.

But in addition to seeing true contradictions within the dialetheic viewpoint, we can also

analyze the paradoxes to see what they say about our own conscious psychology.

In all of the dialetheic paradoxes that we have considered here, we noted that a

POV shift was responsible for highlighting the genuine contradiction. It therefore seems

plausible that a sufficiently wide POV would provide the necessary vantage point for

seeing the inner workings of any paradox. Consider Triscuit Bishop again. Imagine that

you are watching him as he walks along the “curved paper,” trying to discover its true

nature. As you are looking at him and the paper, which is entirely within your view even

though it is too big for him to traverse, you notice that he is actually standing on a giant

Möbius strip. In other words, you have the objectively wider POV that could dispel his

confusion.

Now, if objectively wider perspectives can explain what is happening in the

dialetheic POV, you might wonder if there is a perspective objective enough to explain

95
problems in other areas as well? Some might call this perspective the “Gods-eye-view,”

while Nagel refers to it as the view from nowhere in particular 114 (VFNIP). In the case

of Triscuit, any POV wide enough to include the entire Möbius strip would have helped

our dialetheic ant understand his apparent contradiction. Since the VFNIP is the most

objective perspective you can get by definition, it certainly seems suited for just such

dilemmas. But there is a problem with conscious beings like us actually holding the

VFNIP: we have objective recursivity. As a result, we are not capable of attaining the

VFNIP, but can only have our personal experience of the VFNIP. 115 Ultimately, this

makes the point of view distinctly ours, which is contrary to the viewpoint we are trying

to obtain.

To see why we can’t hold the VFNIP, consider the following. I have defined a

point of view as a phenomenal experience from a specific point in phenomenal space.

So, by definition, a POV must be experienced. The VFNIP is defined as a point of view

from no particular location in phenomenal space. 116 This implies that it is held by no one

in particular. But herein lies the rub. (A) The VFNIP is a POV and, therefore, must be

experienced from a specific point in phenomenal space. However, (B) it is not from a

particular point in phenomenal space, by definition. From the reader’s perspective, we

can see that the VFNIP must both occur and not occur from a particular place in

phenomenal space. Hence, this viewpoint is actually dialetheic. Now, being dialetheic

does not, by definition, preclude us from holding the VFNIP. However, all of our POV’s

114
C.f. Nagel (1979, 1986).
115
Note that the PINS takes advantage of this overall pattern for resolving inconsistencies that
arise at the limits of our thought. However, the PINS is not representative of the VFNIP. Instead, it is
merely wide enough to encompass one particular POV – dialetheism. Now, the PINS certainly points us in
the right direction for finding the VFNIP, but we can never reach this vantage point since we can only
experience it subjectively.
116
I am using my terminology here.

96
that we adopt must occur from a particular point in phenomenal space. Thus, whenever

we try to hold the VFNIP, we are filtering that viewpoint through our subjective

perspective of phenomenal experience, which is from a particular point in phenomenal

space. In other words, experiencing the VFNIP makes it mine, and not the POV I was

trying to obtain. Hence, I cannot actually inhabit this dialetheic POV.

Simply stated then, understanding the dialetheic paradoxes requires that we

understand the POV shifts that are occurring. This suggests the need for an ultimately

broad point of view from which to see things – the VFNIP (which happens to be

dialetheic). However, we cannot obtain or hold this viewpoint directly, since our

subjective experience of the VFNIP pollutes the very viewpoint we are trying to obtain.

Therefore, while the paradoxes help us recognize the shortcomings of our very

consciousness and point to a solution for overcoming these and other problems, they

present an unattainable aspiration.

6.3. Epistemology at the Limits of Thought

Again, objective recursivity prevents us from accurately obtaining the VFNIP.

Now, if I cannot objectively hold the VFNIP, then it stands to reason that I cannot know

what it is really like. I can speculate, I can imagine, but I cannot know its true nature. If

I cannot know its nature, then I cannot possess actual knowledge of the VFNIP in and of

itself. Thus, we have listed our first item that we can’t truly know due to our objective

recursivity. But is there anything else that I cannot intimately know? Does my tainted

vision cloud any of my other knowledge?

97
 It certainly seems reasonable that I cannot actually know how you feel at this

moment. Even if you described in detail how you feel, I would only have my subjective

experience of you telling me how you feel, accompanied by my interpretation of what

you told me. In other words, I would only know the content of my experience of you

telling me how you feel. But, I could not actually know the content of your experiences

given objective recursivity. Notice that this line of reasoning quickly leads us down a

skeptical path. If I carry this thought to its logical conclusion, all I can really know is the

content of my subjective experience. All of my other knowledge must be simply

descriptive.

Descartes is famous for having doubted all of his knowledge and eventually

settling on one important fact: Cogito ergo sum. 117 Descartes then went on to rebuild his

knowledge upon the foundation of this fact. Unfortunately, he went too far. Given our

objective recursivity, all we can really know for sure is that we have phenomenal

experiences. Our subjective experience molds and shapes our knowledge of the things

and events with which we are interacting, providing us with mere appearances. The only

thing that we can know for sure is that we experience those appearances.

If our only actual knowledge is that we experience appearances, what justification

do we have for believing that any of our knowledge is accurate? We could choose to be

foundationalists, 118 where underlying beliefs support other beliefs. However, this system

of justification leads to an infinite regress unless we can show that at least one belief is in

some way independently secure. In this case, the only secure, actual knowledge that we

possess is that we experience appearances. However, we have no idea if these

117
Descartes (1637).
118
Bunnin (2003).

98
appearances are accurate representations of things in a “real world,” or if they are

completely fictitious, or somewhere in between. In other words, a disconnect exists

between our one piece of foundational knowledge and everything else we know. So,

perhaps foundationalism is not the way to go.

An alternate method of justification is coherentism, 119 where beliefs are justified

when they cohere with beliefs in an already accepted set. Strong coherentism requires

that my beliefs stand in mutual relations of interdependence and consistency. In this

case, the knowledge that I experience appearances is certainly coherent with all of my

other beliefs. Unfortunately, it is also capable of supporting two contradictory beliefs

equally, without providing the means for deciding which of the competing beliefs is

correct. For example, I am currently experiencing “typing on the keyboard.” This direct

knowledge of the content my experience certainly supports the belief that I actually am

typing on the keyboard in reality. However, this experiential knowledge also supports

the belief that I am actually in the Matrix, merely typing on the keyboard in my mind

while I am actually laying in a vat of fluid in the real world. Worse yet, this direct

knowledge of my experience is not sufficient for choosing between the two contradictory

beliefs. Hence, I do not have enough concrete knowledge to be a strong coherentist. But,

if strong coherentism doesn’t work, perhaps I could adopt a weaker version (I think this is

more commonly used in everyday life). For example, I might hold beliefs that basically

cohere together. This is not to say that I do not have any incoherent or contradictory

beliefs, or that I have thoroughly investigated the independence or interdependence of all

of my beliefs. Rather, beliefs in my daily life may hang loosely together, suspended in

mid-air. Unfortunately, this weaker version endorses any and all beliefs that do not
119
Bunnin (2003).

99
contradict the knowledge that I experience appearances. Clearly, this is not an

improvement.

While I have certainly not exhausted the list of methods for justifying belief, I

think that I have outlined an objection that can be applied to any system of justification:

namely, that there is a disconnect between the content of my experiences and the objects

those experiences represent. This is not to suggest that the objects I interact with are not

actually represented accurately by the content of my experiences. Rather, I am claiming

that I cannot know whether or not the content of my experiences accurately represent

anything at all. If I only have direct access to the content of my experienced appearances,

what reason do I have for believing that those experiences accurately correspond to

reality? The knowledge that I have these experiences is not enough to justify the belief

that they are accurate in any way. Worse, if I cannot trust the content of these

experiences, how can I know if a reality exists at all?

The epistemic relativism that I present is not new. 120 However, I have arrived at

this perspective by following my understanding of points of view to their logical

conclusion. Simply stated, if all of our knowledge depends on our point of view, then all

we really have is our point of view. I am not claiming that reality does not exist. I do

think that I exist in some form, simply because, as Descartes pointed out, I am thinking.

However, I am claiming that I cannot know the true nature of reality. Having reached this

conclusion, realism (as commonly inhabited by the people I think I interact with every

day) simply becomes another point of view.

120
Cf. Russell (1912), Berkeley (1734), Descartes (1641), Kant (1787), Locke (1690), and Plato
(1961) for a classical background to skepticism.

100
6.4. The Realistic Point of View

Realism is a popular point of view, particularly in everyday life. Perhaps this is

because realism is so irresistible. 121 Consider breathing. If I decide to hold my breath, I

first notice a slight pressure in my lungs. The longer I hold my breath, the more

noticeable the pressure becomes. Soon, I start to feel pain in my chest and lungs.

Eventually, I feel compelled to release the air and breathe in again. Why? Because

somehow I know I will die if I do not start breathing again. I do not know this from first-

hand experience, i.e. I have not stopped breathing altogether and subsequently died.

Instead, I am convinced by the way my body reacts to the lack of oxygen over time, and

to the warning in my mind that says “Danger, Danger.” Now, if I really was in the

Matrix, or was simply a mind floating around in emptiness, it seems odd that breathing

would be so important. In fact, it is because my body acts like breathing is so important

that I am compelled to think that I am actually breathing. It is this and countless other

experiences that make realism so irresistible. So in everyday life, realism wins by

default.

On the other hand, it is logically possible (perhaps even reasonable) for the

appearance of the necessity of breathing to exist within the Matrix as well, which leads

us back to the point of not knowing realism is true. But if Realism isn’t the only logical

explanation, and if Antirealism can just as easily explain our experiences, what makes

Realism so irresistibly compelling? I claim 122 that the mind makes Realism seem real

through Psychological Essentialism (PE). 123 According to PE, people categorize items

more by their internal structure or some other hidden property than by external features.

121
I would like to thank Eric Dietrich for pointing this out to me.
122
I would like to thank Eric Dietrich for pointing this out to me.
123
Cf. Medin and Ortony (1989).

101
For example, it seems like there are essential features to being a mouse. But what are

those features? Is it having a tail? Not really, since some mice lack tails and are still

mice. Is it having beady eyes or big ears? Not necessarily. But if it isn’t these features,

what is the essential nature of a mouse? We might claim that a mouse is a mouse based

on its DNA. But humans have DNA. Are we mice? Of course not. We could argue that

it is the actual genes coded for by the DNA. Interestingly, humans and mice share 99%

of the same genes. 124 Does that mean that the 1% difference is what makes a mouse a

mouse? Actually, that 1% of the genes is not capable of creating a complete mouse.

Instead it is a combination of all the genes together. If we continue this discussion even

further down the molecular scale, we find that we cannot point out exactly what it is to be

a mouse as distinct from other things, such as humans. And yet, we still feel as though

there is something essential to being a mouse. PE is the part of our psychology that gives

us this conviction that things have essences, even when we cannot point to those essences

specifically. Likewise, I think PE is what makes the Realism POV so compelling. When

we experience appearances of things that “exist in the real world,” PE gives us the

irresistible feeling that what we are interacting with has an essence, that it is real.

Furthermore, PE makes realism feel real! From the Antirealist POV, however, we are

told that the essences we believe in so strongly about don’t exist. Given our PE and our

subjective experiences with objects in the “real world,” the Realistic POV is extremely

attractive. Our minds make Realism real, and that convinces most of us to live our daily

lives in reality.

124
Cf. Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium (2002).

102
6.5. Summary of Chapter 6

Psychological Essentialism notwithstanding, Realism, i.e. how the world appears

to us, is merely a point of view (albeit a compelling one). But, so is Antirealism,

Relativism, Dialetheism, and a whole host of other “–isms.” And in all cases, the only

concrete knowledge that we have is that we are experiencing appearances. If we require

strong justification for our other beliefs, we aren’t going to find any thanks to our

objective recursivity. In the end, all we have are points of view. And, while the

paradoxes show us that the VFNIP could help explain many of life’s mysteries by giving

us the best vantage point from which to view them, it is a false hope that can never be

realized. Our finite minds present a limit to our thoughts that cannot be breached.

103
 7. YOU JUST DON’T GET IT, DO YOU?
The [Point of View] gun was created by Deep Thought prior to its long pondering of the
Answer to Life, the Universe, and Everything. When it is fired at someone, it will cause
him/her to see things from the firer's point of view. According to the Guide, the gun was
commissioned by the Intergalactic Council of Angry Housewives, who were tired of
ending every argument with their husbands with the phrase: "You just don't get it, do
you?"
-Douglas Adams, The Hitchiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (2005 Movie Version)

7.1. The Perceived Nature of Philosophy

Philosophy, which is Greek for “the love of wisdom,” has long been thought to

provide wisdom and knowledge to practitioners of the art. 125 Unfortunately, all

philosophers are in the same boat we are: mired down by objective recursivity,

possessing only concrete knowledge of their experienced appearances. It follows, then,

that philosophy is really just an interminable dialogue about different points of view from

different points of view. This suggests that philosophy is both the easiest and the hardest

profession. If you have a point of view, you can play. However, if you have a point of

view, you cannot know if you have accomplished anything. No doubt this claim is

disturbing to philosophers who think that philosophy ultimately leads to truth, wisdom, or

knowledge.

Consider Aristotle. He was a philosopher and a scientist. He wrote extensively

on biology, physics, ethics, and philosophy. He is still widely read and quoted today in

philosophy departments across the globe. In fact, he is required reading for almost all

Introduction to Philosophy courses in the western world. But in biology, he is rarely

125
Cf. Soccio (1998).

104
mentioned. I discuss Aristotle briefly in Microbiology in order to thank him for

promoting the theory of Spontaneous Generation. Thanks to his considerable influence,

much of the general populace believed in a scientific fallacy, to their detriment, for over

2000 years. Similar negative comments can be made regarding his other scientific

endeavors. But in philosophy, he is our colleague. His ethical and philosophical writings

are as apropos today as they were when he wrote them. Many philosophers believe it is

beneficial to read Aristotle and to discuss his ideas. Biologists do not make the same

claim.

One might argue that science makes progress because it deals with the “real”

world. Make no mistake – that is not my claim. Rather, I think science appears to make

progress because scientists try to study the world around them from a universal or

objective perspective. Now, I do not think scientists can be any more objective than you

or I. In fact, every human (and any conscious being like us) has objective recursivity.

But scientists innately compensate for the relativity of the viewpoints from which data

are obtained. While the system is not perfect, scientists are capable of learning which

appearances are called “yellow,” which appearances are called “bacteria,” and so on,

even if they are not actually experiencing yellow or bacteria in the exact same way as

anyone else. Somehow, this ability to correlate their potentially unique experiences to

the commonly accepted concepts inherent in the language of science helps them to

overcome this POV relativity (at least in a general sense). As a result, scientists are able

to refer collectively to objects in the world, even if their references are completely

inaccurate as to the actual nature of the things they refer to.

105
 But scientists aren’t the only ones who agree to basic rules for dealing with

variation in points of view. In fact, humans in general seem to posses this ability. For

example, the concept of time is dependent on our point of view, yet we as a society (I

will let you define that word as narrowly or as broadly as you like) can synchronize our

viewpoints. For example, we might actually disagree about which second of the day we

are on (my watch may say 11:01:43 am when yours says 11:01:56 am, for example), but

we still share a general agreement that it is approximately 1 hour until noon.

Furthermore, if a class that is scheduled for 11 am actually starts at 11:02 by my watch,

I accept this as falling within the standard error for modern timepieces or human

fallibility. However, I would be extremely upset with an 11 am class that randomly

began at 10:45 am one week, 11:20 am the next, and so on. So, we are in general

agreement about time (i.e. we have certain expectations of each other regarding our

common use of the idea of time), even if we do not have the ability to calculate the

exact time in every instance. Furthermore, we acknowledge that time is relative, since

11 am on the east coast is 8 am on the west coast. Time is a relative point of view.

However, I think that we are hardwired 126 to deal with POV relativity and get

approximations that are "close enough."

In philosophy, the rules of logic are designed to provide a unified, objective

viewpoint. However, these rules cannot entirely overcome the problem of POV

relativity. Consider Frege, 127 who wanted to reduce math to logic. Russell, 128 as we

126
I do not have specific scientific evidence for the claim that we are hardwired in this way. It is
merely an intuition. However, until my intuition is disproven, I think that it is a useful concept for trying to
understand how we deal with this unique feature of our psychology.
127
See Frege, Begriffsschrift (“Concept-script”; 1879), Grundlagen (Groundwork of Arithmetic;
1884), Grundgesetze (Basic Laws of Arithmetic; 1893).

106
know, pointed out his failure. Most notably, this failure resulted from a POV shift. 129

Perhaps the true insight from Russell’s destruction of Frege's logic is the

following: with a few exceptions, humans are hardwired to deal with POV relativity,

which helps us interact with each other and the world around us. Since POV relativity

infuses every aspect of our communal lives, we try to learn which personal experiences

relate to the "generally accepted labels" for those experiences. However, while this

innate ability works reasonably well for everyday life, it is not capable of providing an

overarching, coherent logical system for philosophers. Our ability to deal with POV

relativity on a low level, daily basis ultimately proves to be inadequate for sustaining

intense philosophical inquiry. Furthermore, since philosophers deal with ideas upon

which human beings can’t come to complete agreement regarding appearances and their

intended representations, we are still dealing with the same philosophical dilemmas as

Socrates, St. Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Russell, Nāgārjuna, and the rest. We are not

progressing the way that scientists appear to “progress.” Instead, we only succeed in

adding more and more diverse viewpoints to an already complicated discussion.

7.2. Where Do We Go From Here?

It may seem odd that scientists, mathematicians, construction workers, doctors,

lawyers, and everyone else can deal with POV relativity in their fields while

philosophers cannot. But I would argue that Philosophy is really the profession that

discovers how the other professions play the game. Unfortunately, philosophers often

128
Russell realized that apparently true assumptions led to a contradiction regarding classes while
finishing his Principles of Mathematics (1903). He then wrote to Frege and showed him that the
Grundgesetze’s logical system permitted a proof of the contradiction (now known as Russell’s paradox).
129
See section 5.2.1 of this dissertation.

107
get tangled up in trying to decide which rules to agree upon in order to understand this

feature of our psychology. By way of analogy, imagine that we can only build a new

building from the top down. So, for example, we must build the first floor while

standing on the second floor. However, in order to stand on the second floor, it must

first be built while standing on the third floor. In order to build from the third floor,

however, we must work from the fourth floor. This, of course, leads to an infinite

regress. This is how philosophers build philosophies. One of our jobs is to determine

the rules by which to deal with POV relativity. But viewpoint relativity is ubiquitous,

so we need to select rules by which to determine the rules for dealing with POV

relativity, and so on, ad infinitum. Where does this leave us? In desperate need of

Douglas Adam’s Point of View Gun, which is theoretically capable of imparting the

POV of the shooter to anyone she shoots.

Barring technological advances in POV weaponry, the preceding discussion

suggests that Philosophy cannot give us wisdom or knowledge of the truth. However,

dealing with deep issues from multiple points of view is ideal for asking interesting

questions. As Russell 130 notes:

Philosophy, if it cannot answer so many questions as we could wish, has at least

the power of asking questions which increase the interest of the world, and show the

strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of

daily life.

130
Russell (1912).

108
In addition to asking the tough questions, Russell 131 points out that philosophy is

important for organizing our beliefs.

This function [of organizing our beliefs], at least, philosophy can perform. Most

philosophers, rightly or wrongly, believe that philosophy can do much more than this --

that it can give us knowledge, not otherwise attainable, concerning the universe as a

whole, and concerning the nature of ultimate reality. Whether this be the case or not, the

more modest function we have spoken of can certainly be performed by philosophy, and

certainly suffices, for those who have once begun to doubt the adequacy of common

sense, to justify the arduous and difficult labours that philosophical problems involve.

Given our objective recursivity, I think it is unreasonable to expect philosophy to advance

our concrete knowledge of the world. The only concrete knowledge that I am capable of

possessing is that I experience appearances. On the other hand, I am awash in apparent

or descriptive knowledge, and philosophy is an excellent tool for organizing that

information. By way of analogy, my computer is an extremely useful tool for organizing

the information in my dissertation, but it is unreasonable for me to expect this tool to

write (i.e. create) my dissertation for me. In the same way, philosophy is useful for

organizing my knowledge, but not for providing me with knowledge. Philosophers have

confused “organizing” knowledge with “imparting” knowledge for far too long. Worse,

they have expected knowledge “produced” from philosophical endeavors to lead them to

the truth. Unfortunately, we can’t possess concrete knowledge of what the truth actually

looks like.

131
Russell (1912).

109
 In addition to asking questions and organizing information, I think there is one

other extremely important venue in philosophy that requires attention: metaphilosophy.

By “metaphilosophy” I mean the pursuit of determining the rules to which philosophers

should agree in order to overcome POV relativity. To begin with, we could try to find

the underlying formula or function for the generally accepted rules in our everyday lives

and in other professions. For example, does “time” possess particular properties that

allow us to overcome POV relativity, or do we simply employ a unique feature of our

psyche, or both? Perhaps understanding the foundation of these rules will allow us to

generate similar rules for dealing with the relativity of philosophical viewpoints. On the

other hand, it is entirely possible that the rules used in our everyday lives are of no use to

us in philosophy. Philosophers routinely reject commonplace jargon and thought

processes in their quest for “truth,” so it is perfectly reasonable to think that the same

thing might happen here. Ultimately, I think that understanding the psychology behind

dealing with POV relativity in daily circumstances will provide a useful foundation for

dealing with it in philosophy.

7.3. “Let Me Explain… No, There is Too Much… Let Me Sum Up” 132

In this dissertation I employed the methods of analytic philosophy and epsilon

calculus to demonstrate that point of view shifts are responsible for enabling us to see the

paradoxes that occur at the limits of our thought. I then went on to show that paradoxes

highlight important boundaries in our psychology, in addition to identifying a point of

view from which to better understand these boundaries (the VFNIP). Unfortunately, this

point of view is unattainable for us (and all conscious beings like us) since our subjective
132
- William Goldman, The Princess Bride

110
experience prohibits us from actually holding this purely objective vantage point.

Furthermore, our subjective experience pollutes all of our knowledge, leaving us with

concrete knowledge of our experienced appearances but only apparent knowledge of

everything else. Ultimately, we cannot be justified, in the strongest sense of the term, in

holding most of our beliefs. Worse, philosophy is incapable of giving us knowledge of

the truth (or, if you prefer, what the truth looks like), or of providing wisdom for deciding

between these contradictory beliefs. Now at this point, it may seem like the skeptic is

right, leaving us afloat in a sea of relativism and indecision. I don’t think this is actually

the case.

Firstly, we have come to realize that philosophy is best suited to a) asking the

difficult questions and then b) organizing our apparent knowledge around those

questions. Additionally, c) there is still much work to be done in metaphilosophy for the

purpose of identifying the necessary rules for dealing with philosophical POV relativity.

Now, while philosophy may not be the fountain of knowledge and wisdom we once

thought it to be, its actual role is nonetheless vitally important and rewarding. I can only

hope that the necessary move to reconceive philosophy will take place in my lifetime.

Secondly, it seems obvious that we do not live our daily lives based on strong

justification. Instead, I think that most of us have belief systems that loosely cohere, with

several small inconsistencies along the way. Most of us probably even have a couple

major contradictory beliefs that we are torn between. 133 And yet life, as we experience it,

continues. There is no point in looking for strong justification in our daily lives – we

cannot hope to find it. Objective recursivity has sealed our fate. We are fated to live

133
I know several people, including myself, who are torn between Realism and Antirealism.
Realism is compelling in our daily lives, yet Antirealism makes a strong showing late at night while doing
philosophy in one’s study.

111
with beliefs that are disconnected from, though consistent with, our experienced

appearances. Yet despite this fact, life goes on.

7.4. Until We Meet Again

I have not offered an analysis of every known paradox that occurs at the limit of

thought, nor have I offered an analysis for every known interpretation of the paradoxes I

did deal with. Furthermore, I certainly have not even begun to make a dent in the sum

total of known paradoxes. I must save these and other analyses for future publications.

However, I predict that all paradoxes occurring at the limits of thought will fall into one

of two categories: either a POV shift will center on the limit itself (fitting into PINS 1st

ed.), or it will center on a comment regarding the limit (fitting into PINS 2nd ed.). In

either case, genuine dialetheia can best be understood when POV shifting is accounted

for. I look forward to defending and substantiating these claims throughout my career.

However, given the pervasiveness of POV relativity, I also expect to revise them.

Finally, it should be perfectly obvious that this dissertation is all from BPOV1,

which is itself subject to revision (and technically not even expressible). 134 As such, it

adds yet another chapter to the old philosophical tradition of the wisdom seekers. And,

like my contemporaries, I harbor the hope that I have pointed to a (re)new(ed) way of

viewing the world in general and philosophy in specific. For now, however, I must

content myself with living in this Matrix until such time as I can remake it as I see fit…

134
If you find that I have contradicted myself throughout the dissertation, Don’t Panic.

112
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