“Further development by the Courts may merely be awaiting the first post-Human Rights

Act case where neither the law of confidence nor any other domestic law protects an
individual who deserves protection. Lindsay J. in Douglas No. 2

With the UK creeping closer to a right to privacy, does this assert the need for a full-blown
image right?

“Celebrities replaced the monarchy as the new symbols of recognition and belonging, and as
the belief in God waned, celebrities became immortal.”1

The above statement sets out an apt description of the magnitude of celebrity worship and
obsession rooted in our society at present. Over the years, the onus of entertainment has
shifted remarkably on celebrities who provide a valuable commodity that has a less than
significant market. Celebrities dominate almost all forms of mass media and are major
driving factors of sales. The appetite for celebrity gossip is insatiable and there is no doubt
that this is only going to continue to escalate. There remains a colossally lucrative market
for celebrity merchandise as celebrities help amplify the sales of a wide range of
complementary goods and services. However, despite the magnitude of their impact on the
social and economic spheres, there remains a substandard level of protection for their right
to personality and privacy. The jurisprudence in this area of law is inconsistent and sporadic
as judges resort to varied alternatives to find a solution to each case. This makes the law
unpredictable and unsatisfactory.

It is opined that, “ Celebrities should have exclusive control of the commercial use of their
identities.”2 This discussion will consider this position in the current social and legal
atmosphere. In order to do so it will first examine the rationales for the creation and
subsistence of personality rights. It will then go on to analyse the current operating
alternatives to personality protection in the UK and assess whether they are satisfactory. It
will also look at the approaches adopted by other jurisdictions in lieu of personality rights.
Finally, it will discuss any potential downsides of image protection. Although there are
contrary perspectives, it will be argued that personality rights are imperative and elemental.

Personality rights and privacy rights are essentially two sides of the same coin. The right to
privacy entails the right to be left alone and non interference from the state in matters of
private and family life. On the other hand, the right to publicity pertains to the right to
protect one’s image from unauthorized use or exploitation. Though it is important to keep
them separate, for the sake of this discussion we will focus on the position of personality
rights in their entirety as opposed to its two elements individually.

The impact that celebrities have on everyday life is colossal. From our T.V. sets and
newspapers , they have penetrated our surroundings almost entirely. Celebrities have been
successful in becoming, the chief agents of moral change as they have come to embody

1 Chris Rojek, Celebrity (Routledge 2010). p.14.

2 McCarthy, J. Thomas. , 'Rights of Publicity and Privacy', (2nd [Release 2017] edn, Thomson Reuters, 2017).
abstract issues or points of view, and are shorthand forms for ideals or expertise. Celebrities
also play the role of a sort of social glue, allowing people from different points of society to
converse, to share feelings and essentially to carry on informal relations.3 In recent decades,
the obsession with celebrities has transcended beyond the desire to be entertained and
permeated into our need to forge a personal identity and stand out in an anonymous
society. Gabler asserts that the identity of modern populace is not only shaped by their
intimate relationships but also by their only superficially intimate ones with well known
personalities.4 Therefore, there is a dire need for recognition of personality rights directly,
and not vicariously. 5

Considering the level of permeation of the celebrity culture in our society, the emergence of
personality rights is somewhat inevitable. Professor McCarthy, the author of the standard
treatise on the subject, characterizes the right of publicity as "a self-evident legal right,
needing little intellectual rationalization to justify its existence."6

Before we delve into a discussion of the rationales for the creation of personality rights, it is
imperative to address the two most common questions raised in their opposition.

Firstly, why should the law confer more income on individuals who are already
handsomely paid for their work?

The above question is easier to answer once it has been established that the appropriation
of an individual’s image for another person’s commercial benefit is intrinsically immoral and
unfair. When celebrities assert their right of publicity they are protecting their own image
and in turn in preventing unjust enrichment and deceptive trade practice. Enforcement of
this negative right also protects the public from being misled. The view that publicity rights
should be denied to celebrities since it would make them richer by controlling how they
want to share their image is somewhat archaic and tenuous. The creation of image rights
does not by default fill the coffers of celebrities, it gives them more control over their own
image. This control can be executed by preventing or allowing use of their personas. The
principal point here is that consent must be required, even if there is no benefit attached to
the use of the appropriated image, the act of use without the consent is fraudulent,
unethical, illegal. Such ownership is further justified by Locke and Hegel’s theories.

Further, ‘Allocative efficiency management’ can also be used to answer the above question.
Originating from competition law, it pertains to Economic efficiency, whereby “none of the
players, sellers or buyers, could be made better off without someone being made worse off.
This is achieved from the interaction of the forces of allocative and productive efficiency.
Allocative efficiency, with which we are concerned, occurs when, “goods are produced in
the quantities valued by society”.

3 Vincent M. de Gradpre, 'Understanding The Market For Celebrity: An Economic Analysis Of The Right Of
Publicity' (2001) 12 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal.
4 Vincent M. de Gradpre, 'Understanding The Market For Celebrity: An Economic Analysis Of The Right Of

Publicity' (2001) 12 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal.
4 McCarthy, J. Thomas. , 'Rights of Publicity and Privacy', (2nd [Release 2017] edn, Thomson Reuters, 2017).
5 not through alternate measures such as passing off etc
6 McCarthy, J. Thomas. , 'Rights of Publicity and Privacy', (2nd [Release 2017] edn, Thomson Reuters, 2017).
Applied to personality rights, it entails that that in order to maintain a situation of allocative
efficiency, the celebrity must have exclusive control over their personality features to
ensure that their personality is being distributed at a point where market price equals
marginal cost , so that everyone “who values the product at its cost of production will be
able to purchase it, “and the product itself will not depreciate in value.7

The rationale for protection of image rights transcends beyond pecuniary motives, it is
based on the concept of dignity of life. It is contended that not every celebrity should
necessarily be regarded as a public figure, nor should their personal lives be considered
“matters of public concern.” Celebrities are not public servants. The European Convention
contains specific provisions that identify human dignity as a paramount value.”8Invasion of
privacy, false endorsement and unauthorised merchandising can have detrimental effect on
an individuals private and family life, which in turn is worthy of protection by the law. This
protection must be extended irrespective of the fulfilment of the element consumer
confusion. 9

And secondly, is the censorship of popular culture or a common asset of society

justifiable?

It is argued that celebrity persona is a public asset as it is a public creation, and should
therefore rest in the public domain. Grady asserts that viewing personality rights as ‘public
assets’ is ludicrous. He bases his reasoning on the argument that a personality can under no
circumstances be classified as a “pure public good.” He propounds that, public goods are
characterised as “non-excludable” and “non-rivalrous.” The first implies that “it is
impossible to exclude people who have not paid to use the resource” and the second, that
“one person's consumption of the good does not interfere with another person's
consumption”10

He goes on to assert that the characteristics stated above do not apply to apply to
personality rights, since they are both excludable and rivalrous, for example third parties try
to consume them at price below the cost to the owner, thereby having a negative effect on
him. He compares the notion of ownership of personality to the ownership of something as
quotidian as air. “Air” is an abundant good, freely available for use by all without losing its
value and carries no profit-maximising potential for third parties with it; whereas one's
personality is very different, as it adds value to products, allowing free-riders to indulge in
abnormal profits, at the expense of the owner. This is why Demsetz argues that to counter
this dilemma: “society will tend to privatize goods--create private property rights--when the
benefits from the increased efficiency outweigh the costs of enforcement.”11

Further, the public interest claim, in turn is outweighed by the interests of fairness and
justice. Over the years, the ubiquitous popularity of stars has garnered many producers

7 Bains, Savan. 'Personality Rights: Should the United Kingdom Grant Celebrities a Proprietary Right in their
Personality?', Entertainment Law Review, vol. 18/no. 7, (2007), pp. 237.
8 https://today.uconn.edu/2010/10/the-price-of-fame-celebrities-and-the-right-to-privacy/
9 as in passing off
10 Mark F. Grady, “A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity” (1994) 1 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 97 at p.100.
11 Bains, Savan. 'Personality Rights: Should the United Kingdom Grant Celebrities a Proprietary Right in their

Personality?', Entertainment Law Review, vol. 18/no. 7, (2007), pp. 237.

from various realms to ‘jump on the celebrity bandwagon’ and capitalize on the celebrities’
personality features including their likeness. Appropriation of these aspects to promote
their own goods is highly profitable and led to a multimillion industry built thus based on
the reaping the profits of another’s work and personality. This free riding is not only
unjustified but also risks polluting the moral fabric of society. 12 Moreover, owing to social
media and the intensification of celebrity obsession along with advent of citizen journalism,
the exploitation of celebrity image is only going to swell. This has been recognized by many
other legal systems including the US where personality rights have been given legal
credence for over 50 years.

The rationale for the protection of image rights are numerous, for the purpose of this
discussion they will be broadly classified into moral, economic and dignitary. The moral
arguments comprise the basic structural arguments put forth by legal theorists while the
dignitary justifications relate to the personal interests a celebrity may have in recognition of
his image rights.

The lack of a theoretical justification has been a major excuse for jurists to abandon the
creation of personality rights. Unlike tangible property which forms the subject matter for
other rights, these aren’t tangible and so their ownership is harder to justify. Another
contributing factor for the absence of personality rights is the somewhat ambiguous nature
of the rights themselves. As stated, there remains a “A deep-seated scepticism” about the
very practice of publicity has resulted in a slow and diffident response from the English
courts – and no response at all from the legislature.”13

With no coherent rights in place, claimants have had to resort to mould their claims to the
the nearest available legal remedy. this in turn has led to the twisting of the existing laws to
fill the gaping void of the law. All in all, the UK response to publicity practice has so far been
ad hoc and somewhat opportunistic14

MORAL JUSTIFICATIONS

JOHN LOCKE

Locke’s labor theory of property sets out the primary rationale for the protection of
personality rights. He justifies the private ownership of goods and land on the basis of the
effort or labor which individuals expend to produce goods or to cause the land to produce
goods of value to human beings.15 Locke defines ‘labor’ as effort, no matter how trivial it
may be. His theory rests on the premise that as long any amount of effort is expounded by
an individual, the result is rewarded by ownership of the object itself.

12 Ibid 11
13 Black, Gillian. 'Exploiting Image: Making a Case for the Legal Regulation of Publicity Rights in the United
Kingdom', European Intellectual Property Review, vol. 33/no. 7, (2011), pp. 413.
14 Ibid 13
15 John Locke, Two Treatise of Government, edited by Peter Laslett, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1988) in John Christman, The Myth of Property: Toward an Egalitarian Theory of Ownership (Oxford
University Press, 1994), p.193.
Thus on a rudimentary level, Locke’s labor theory can be used to justify the ownership of
personality rights. Labor, when invested to give meaning to objects is rewarded by
ownership, likewise, labor invested in personality must also be rewarded by ownership.
Under natural rights, anything that flows from the mind or body of an individual would be
owned by the source.Radin supports this by further asserting that, because “one owns one's
limbs he therefore owns their product”.16Therefore, fairness implies that an individual who
invests valuable time and effort to develop a persona must be allowed to reap the benefits
that derive from it. This is reiterated by Nimmer who states that, “… every person is entitled
to the fruit of his labours …” if he has “long and laboriously nurtured the fruit of publicity
values,” and invested “time, effort, skill and even money” in their creation.17 Additionally,
Margaret Radin also asserts that if an individual can be attached to physical property and”
its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object's replacement. Therefore, it can be
argued that the appropriation of one’s personality would result even greater distress since it
is an even more intimate part of the persona.

Professor McCarthy also agrees that personality should be protected as property, for: “while
one person may build a home, and another knit a sweater so also may a third create a
valuable personality, and all three should be recognised by the law as ‘property’ protected
against trespass and theft.”18 Functional/simplistic as it may seem, Locke’s labor theory has
been subject to emphatic criticism by many commentators who argue that while it helps
establish a foundational rationale behind the protection of persona it doesn’t go on to
justify it completely. Personality rights cannot be justified under the labor theory as
‘celebrity image’ is in most cases the work of numerous people including PR agencies,
photographers, mass media etc. Henceforth, the labor thus exerted is not the celebrities’
alone, rather a result of the labor of multiple people. What must be noted though is that
this labor does not on itself create the celebrity image per se. Ultimately, is still to some
extent the individuals own creation and who uses these tools and applies personal
discretion. Furthermore, even though the celebrity image may not be created from the
manifestation of an original idea, the requirement of the original idea has now ceased to
exist. We are in a culture where “the star draws on ‘our culture's image bank,” hence
making “the autonomous inventor a rarity”19Therefore, the presumption that labor by the
celebrity is a precursor for personality rights is incorrect. Locke’s labor theory can be used to
justify personality rights in the sense that the celebrity invests labor in the execution of the
idea rather than the idea itself; therefore the celebrity's labour in their personality should be
guaranteed protection against third-party exploitation.20

The labor theory further proposes that if the person who expends labor for reasons other
than moral then he deserves benefit for it. It extends recognition to the derivation of social
value from products that have labor expended on them. This theory recognises that labour
creates “social value and it is this production of social value that ‘deserves’ reward, not the

16 Margaret Jane Radin, 'Property And Personhood' (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review.
17 Melville B. Nimmer, 'The Right Of Publicity' (1954) 19 Law and Contemporary Problems.
18 McCarthy, J. Thomas. , 'Rights of Publicity and Privacy', Anonymous Translator (2nd [Release 2017] edn,

Thomson Reuters, 2017).

19 Hazel Carty, “Advertising, Publicity Rights and English Law” [2004] I.P.Q. 209 at p.249.
20 Bains, Savan. 'Personality Rights: Should the United Kingdom Grant Celebrities a Proprietary Right in their

Personality?', Entertainment Law Review, vol. 18/no. 7, (2007), pp. 237.

labor that produced it”21It can be argued that the creation of the celebrity persona,
although it may not contain sufficient labour, may nevertheless create a social value and
merit reward, to ensure that celebrities continue to invest in their images. The social value
of the celebrity persona arises in the sense that it aids the development of culture by
allowing people to use these images, in a non-commercial way, to add value to their own
lives and also to move forwards by expending their labour in the execution of the ideas
already in the common, to create their own new personalities.
Locke’s theory is rebuttable on two grounds. One of the flaws with this theory is that he does
not elaborate on the amount/level of labour required to claim ownership of the product and
whether this product is itself identifiable as the individual’s property. It has also been argued
that Locke's theory is incompatible with the universal notion of natural rights being absolute.
This is because Locke suggests that rights are private properties, which are inalienable.
Andrew22 argues: “if rights are properties, they are alienable or subject to bargains or trade-
offs … Or if rights are inalienable, they are not private property, or freely disposable at the will
of the right-holder.” They cannot be mixed.
Locke’s labour theory is strong at a foundational level but cannot be used to justify image
rights fully. Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion we will go on to discuss the
theories asserted by others.

HEGEL

Hegel in his work, The Philosophy of Right23 sets out the personality justification which in
turn defines property as ‘an expression of self.’

Stillman suggests that as “the person takes possession of his self-his mind and body, his
willing, his thinking, and acting-he gains as his property those substantive characteristics of
himself that are not "external by nature" but that are internal to himself and "constitute" his
"own private personality and the universal essence of [his] self-consciousness. Hegel's
arguments about persons, things, and property leads him to assert essentially the freedoms
of bodily and personal integrity. At the same time that Hegel asserts the person's inalienable
rights to life and liberty, he argues that human beings can create new "things" that are
property by externalizing some portion of them- selves into the objective world. 24

Lockean theory fails to answer the question of how much of a person’s will is required to be
invested before the individual acquires rights. Hegel’s theory does in fact help in answering
this question. It is explicit in stating that “it must be recognisable by other people.” thus
entailing an external part of image which is further substantiated by Stillman. Hegel’s theory
also affirms that even though talents are not external per se, the expression of them makes
them alienable and external. Thus they can be categorised as ‘things’. So even though they

21John Locke, Two Treatise of Government, edited by Peter Laslett, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988) in John Christman, The Myth of Property: Toward an Egalitarian Theory of Ownership (Oxford
University Press, 1994), p.193.
22
23 (Marxists.org, 2018) <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/philosophy-of-right.pdf>
accessed 31 March 2018.
24 Stillman, Peter G. 'Hegel's Analysis of Property in the Philosophy of Right', Cardozo Law Review, vol. 10/no. 5-

6, (1989), pp. 1031.

may not be external from their conception, they attain externality through action. 25

Essentially asserting that a celebrity’s image is separable from their true identity. Their
images are not reflections but distorted extensions of their actual personality. Thus Hegel’s
justification of image rights can be applied with ease when the image of a celebrity is
considered as distinct and external and a result of their expension of will. Therefore,
celebrities expend a valuable part of their self when creating a ‘commodity’. The
remuneration they receive through their work is an outcome of the effort they make for
their job. However, this must be separated from their personality itself, the image that they
create and own is a separate commodity worthy of protection independently. What must be
considered is that the artist and their work is separate and independent from their
personality. This personality which in most cases may be a result of their work itself is a
commodity that stands in the economy with its own value. Thus, it is imperative to separate
the art from the artist.

The point of contention with this theory is whether it can apply to celebrities when they
often might not expend any/much labor in the formation of their image?

To answer these questions, Madow26 brings to the front the fact that it is only because
celebrities/ stars carry meaning that they are able to sell products in the first place. Their
economic value) derives from their semiotic power-their power to carry and provoke
meanings. Madow goes on to evaluate the merits of labor theory of publicity rights by
drawing a comparison between the fame achieved by Albert Einstein with Bohr and
Heisenberg. He asserts that A person can, within the limits of his natural talents, make
himself strong or swift or learned. But he cannot, in this same sense, make himself famous,
any more than he can make himself loved. Therefore, the fact that Einstein became a
celebrity had more to do with the needs and preoccupations of the society than his merit.
He uses Missners account to suggest that "Superstar" athletes, musicians, and screen actors
command huge incomes, while performers of only slightly less talent may barely make a
living. Further, he asserts that the disparity of fame stems from the media hunger to use
celebrities and famous people to satiate their own monetary greed. The media intentionally
choses people ‘who best serve its own need to present the world in compellingly dramatic
terms’. Over the recent decade, this process has been exaggerated to an extent where the
celebrity/star is a complex product of specialists like publicists, stylists, photographers etc.
considerable resources are invested in building, controlling and maintaining a specific
persona that appeals to the masses.

ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS

The most typical justification entails the incentive theory. Judges and academics argue that

25 Bains, Savan. 'Personality Rights: Should the United Kingdom Grant Celebrities a Proprietary Right in their
Personality?', Entertainment Law Review, vol. 18/no. 7, (2007), pp. 237.
26 Michael Madow, 'Private Ownership Of Public Image: Popular Culture And Publicity Rights' (1993) 81

California Law Review.

the right of publicity offers additional incentives for potential celebrities to invest in skills
that could make them famous and increase the value of their person. 27 Applied to
celebrities themselves, the argument goes that too few skills will be developed unless the
law internalizes into all potential celebrities private decision-making, a private benefit equal
to the benefit that they convey on all of us.

However, the incentive theory has faced criticism in that the right to publicity is not
restricted to those who display exemplary achievement. Skills and talent are not the only
factors that might lead to fame. It is a complex interplay of diverse factors which at times
many not involve any skill or talent at all. Further, the assumption that incentives of fame
would lead to refinement of skill is not accurate. Vincent states that the elusive character of
fame makes it hard to assess how much additional preparation is required. He balances this
on two reasons, the first being that in fields such as the show business, success depends on
public taste, making it impossible to gauge how much additional preparation would be
required to attain success/fame. Secondly, in fields like sports, where the criteria for success
is objective, it is impossible to assess how much extra effort in terms of practice is required
for fame.

A stronger argument for the right to publicity stems from the incentive theory but pertains
to incentives for celebrities and their promoters to prevent the over exploitation of certain
personae. Vincent points out that the identity of celebrities may be over exploited. He uses
the American case of Frito Lay v Waits28 where it was set out that “individual consumption
of celebrity goods and services often creates negative externalities.” Thus, creating a
property right in human identity internalizes in a single persons decision-making process all
relevant costs and benefits, and allows her to choose the optimal level and mix of uses for
her identity. Therefore as per him, the right of publicity is more necessary than ever
because the ubiquity of images in our society has only accentuated the problem of negative
externalities that arise in the consumption of celebrity goods and services.29

DIGNITARY JUSTIFICATIONS

Dignitary interests have no fixed definition in legal terms. However, might be regarded as
interests other than financial interests that one might have in the protection of one’s image.
These can be broadly categorised into interests in reputation, personal privacy and mental
wellbeing. The consequences of appropriation of personality can be multifarious, they can
affect an individual both economically and dignitarily. This is supported by McCarthy who
asserts that ‘control of identity’ is the heart of the notion of publicity rights and is inherent
in the rights of autonomy and dignity. 30

1. Interests in reputation

Having invested a considerable amount of time and energy in building an image it is

27 Mathews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d (1994)

28 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. and Tracy-Locke, Inc. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992)
29 Vincent M. de Gradpre, 'Understanding The Market For Celebrity: An Economic Analysis Of The

Right Of Publicity' (2001) 12 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal.
30 McCarthy, J. Thomas. , 'Rights of Publicity and Privacy', Anonymous Translator (2nd [Release

2017] edn, Thomson Reuters, 2017).

inevitable that celebrities would have an interest in protecting and maintaining this image.
Reputation plays an integral role in preserving the general interest of the public in the
celebrity and most importantly his/her work. Tarnishment of reputation can have a
deteriorating effect on not only future work but also on how the existing work is received by
the audiences. It is not uncommon for celebrities’ careers to come an abrupt halt owing to a
particularly defamatory news. One such example is the Eddie Irvine case31 where at the time
of the acts complained of, the claimant had a significant reputation that was worthy of
protection and owing to the advertisement was at considerable risk of damage.

2. Interests in personal privacy

As previously mentioned, publicity and privacy together form the right of personality and
play an integral albeit equal role in protecting one’s image rights. This interest stems from
the notion of personal dignity and is considered important to protect the unauthorised
commercial exploitation of a person’s valuable attributes in name and likeness. It is against
this uncertain conceptual background that the development of an essentially dignitary
interest in privacy into an essentially economic interest in publicity is traced.

It is argued that, celebrities who commercialize their image do not have a right to privacy
per se. However, it is unfair that because an individual has to publicize and commercialize
themselves in lieu of their work, they must be denied privacy in its entirety. They maintain a
life outside this realm of fame which is intertwined with the lives of their families and
friends. It may also be the case that some people do not actively seek fame but find
themselves amidst the public eye which strips them of their privacy. In some cases, the
matters that demand privacy may go beyond the realm of daily life into more fragile matters
of mental health, sexual abuse, or drug/ alcohol abuse. The threshold for privacy in case of a
celebrity gets even higher. In the controversial case of Naomi Campbell,32 Lady Hale ruled
that the need for treatment for drug addicts was more important than the right of the
public to know about it. She added that “blundering in when matters are acknowledged to
be at a fragile stage may do great harm."

Further, in the ECtHR case concerning the Princess of Monaco, it was held that “the present
case does not concern the dissemination of 'ideas', but of images containing very personal or
even intimate 'information' about an individual. Furthermore, photos appearing in the
tabloid press are often taken in a climate of continual harassment which induces in the
person concerned a very strong sense of intrusion into their private life or even of
persecution. “The Court reiterated the fundamental importance of protecting private life
"from the point of view of the development of every human being's personality" and said
that everyone, including people known to the public, had to have a "legitimate expectation"
that his or her private life would be protected.

3. Interests in Mental Wellbeing/Freedom from Mental Distress

This interest pertains to the interest an individual may have in protecting themselves from
mental distress and harm. In some cases, as a result of exploitation of personality

31 Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 423;

32 Campbell v MGN Ltd (HL) [2004] UKHL 22;
individuals can experience injured feelings or mental distress. Just like an individual is
protected against mental distress in his workplace33, there is no reason to not extend this
right to celebrities who suffer distress and harm in the course of their work. Since celebrities
are subject to constant scrutiny and censure they are prone to mental health disorders, and
so defilement of reputation or in extreme cases of false merchandising are legitimate
grounds for them to experience stress, anxiety and PTSD. A mechanism to control how
one’s image is projected can be substantial reassurance and security against exploitation.

4. Interests in Autonomy

Herein lies the one of the primary tenets of justification of image rights, the interest of
autonomy. It refers to an individual’s freedom to make choices for themselves without
external interference. The ECHR34 has recognized this as a right that allows one to refuse
publication of his or her image and object to recording, conservation and reproduction of
the image by another person. The court added that “A person's image constitutes one of the
chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals the person's unique characteristics and
distinguishes the person from his peers. The right to the protection of one's image is thus
one of the essential components of personal development and presupposes the right to
control the use of that image.” It asserted that the control of identity entails control not
only at the time of publication but also at the moment the picture is taken without consent.

33 employment law
34 Reklos v Greece