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JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 17, 309-339 ( 1981)
An Examination of the Fishbein-Ajzen Behavioral-

Intentions Model’s Concepts and Measures
PAUL W. MINIARD AND JOEL B. COHEN
University of Florida
Received April 5. 1979
The Fishbein-Ajzen behavioral-intentions model is designed to represent the

effect of attitudes and subjective norms on behavioral intentions. The model has
been used in a variety of contexts, and evidence for its validity flows largely from
its generally good performance in predicting behavioral intentions. However. the
manner in which these concepts are defined and operationalized appears to make
it inappropriate for those seeking to distinguish between personal and normative
reasons for engaging in a behavior. Additional problems were found in the
hypothesized relationship between the more global normative construct and its
underlying components.
In recent years, the Fishbein-Ajzen behavioral-intentions model has

been widely applied in areas as diverse as adolescent alcohol use
(Schlegel, Crawford, & Sanborn, 1977), family-planning behavior (Jac-
card & Davidson, 1975), and product choice behavior (Wilson, Mathews,
& Harvey, 1975). Issues that some thought might affect the application of
the model to behavioral prediction (e.g., the relationship between be-
havior and behavioral intentions, the stability of the regression weights) in
these and other settings have been raised (Songer-Necks, 1976a, 1976b)
and clarified (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 1976a, 1976b). Not so easily re-
solved are information integration (Anderson, 1968; Bettman, Capon, &
Lutz. 1975a, 1975b; Lynch, 1979, Wyer, 1974, pp. 141-150.291-294) and
Paul W. Miniard is now a member of the Faculty of Marketing, Ohio State University.
Parts of this research are based upon the first author’s masters thesis prepared for the
Department of Marketing, University of Florida, Gainesville. Appreciation is expressed to
Olli T. Ahtola, Stephen A. LaTour, and Barry R. Schlenker who served as committee
members, to James L. Ginter for his analysis of multicollinearity issues, and to Deborah
Miniard for her assistance on the project. We also wish to acknowledge the support provided
by the Center for Consumer Research at the University of Florida.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Joel B. Cohen. Center for Consumer Research,
University of Florida. Gainesville, FL 3261 I.
309
0022-1031/81/030309-31$0200/O
Copyright @ 1981 by Academic Press. Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
310 MINIARDANDCOHEN
scaling (Schmidt. 1973) concerns that go directly to the adequacy of the

model’s representation of information-processing activities.
For those interested in using the model for both predictive and diagnos-
tic purposes (e.g., to identify the cognitions most associated with dysfunc-
tional behavior), a major concern should be the adequacy and validity of
the measures used to represent the principle constructs of the model.
Without confidence in such measures, our understanding of the factors
that contribute to one’s intentions and behavior is problematic, and we
should be extremely cautious in advocating policy alternatives. Despite
this. there has been a surprising lack of attention to anything other than a
predictive criterion for model evaluation. Among the few exceptions are
several investigations that have found expected differences in the relative
importance of the attitudinal and normative component regression
weights (Ajzen. 1971: Ajzen bi Fishbein, 1970; Fishbein, Note 1) depend-
ing upon which source of influence was heightened. More recently. Lutz
(1975) has provided limited support for predictions based on the attitudi-
nal component of the model using an attitude change paradigm. Evidence
supporting both the operationalization of the normative component of the
model and the validity of the model’s joint representation (and separation)
of the attitudinal and normative components is. however, virtually
nonexistent. despite the fact that a major change has been made in the
measurement of the normative component (Fishbein & Ajzen. 1975. pp.
301-30X).
This paper addresses three major issues central to the model and its
application: (I ) the conceptual and operational separation of the attitudi-
nal and normative components. (2) the role of a motivation-to-comply
construct in the model and its “proper“ level of specificity. and (3) the
equivalence of the more global subjective-norm construct and its
hypothesized determinants. The first of these issues is perhaps the most
important. It is our position that the present form of the model will often
be inadequate in separating attitudinal and normative influences. Such a
separation appears essential before the model can be confidently em-
ployed for evaluating the contribution of personal and socially mediated
consequences upon behavioral intentions.
The Fislzhrin-Aj:en Beha\~iorul Intetztiom Model
“According to the theory, there are two major factors that determine
behavioral intentions: a personal or ‘attitudinal’ factor and a social or
‘normative’ factor” (Fishbein & A.jzen. 1975. p. 301). Symbolically.
B- Bl = M’,A,~ + MI* SN. (1)
where B is the behavior; Bl is the behavioral intention to perform be-
havior B; A, is the attitude toward performing behavior B; SN is the
subjective norm; and rrl and n$Zare empirically determined weights.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE FISHBEIN-AJZEN MODEL 311
The first component, A,, is the actor’s attitude toward performing the
behavior in question under a given set of circumstances. In accordance
with an expectancy-value formulation, a person’s attitude toward a spe-
cific behavior is proposed to be a function of the salient beliefs about the
relevant attributes and perceived consequences of performing the
behavior and of the person’s evaluation of these attributes and conse-
quences:
A, = pbiei, (2)
i=l
where b is the belief that performing behavior B leads to consequence or

outcome i; e the person’s evaluation of outcome i; and n is the number of
salient beliefs the person holds about performing behavior B.
The second component, SN, consists of an actor’s perception of what
specific referent individuals or groups who are important to him think he
should do, and of his motivation to comply with these referents:
SN = 2 NBiMCi, (3)
i=l
where NB stands for normative belief (i.e., the person’s belief that refer-
ence group or individual i thinks he should or should not perform the
behavior); MC is the person’s general motivation to comply with referent
i: and n is the number of relevant referents.
The relative importance of these two components in determining inten-
tions is expected to vary with the behavior, with the situation, and with
individual differences among actors. Component weights (i.e., u’, and ~1~)
for As and SN are traditionally estimated by multiple-regression proce-
dures and are interpreted as being “proportional to their relative impor-
tance in the prediction of behavioral intentions” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975.
pp. 302, 303).
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975, pp. 368-372). the relationship
between behavior and behavioral intentions depends upon (1) the degree
to which the measure of intention corresponds directly to the observed
behavior, (2) the time interval between measurement of intention and the
behavior’s occurrence, and (3) the degree to which the actor is able to act
in accordance with his or her own intentions or without the assistance of
others. A stronger relationship between intention and behavior should
occur when the intention measure is specific to the behavior of interest,
performance of the behavior is temporally close to the measurement of
intention, and the behavior is under volitional control.
Separating Attitudinal and Normative Influences
In modifying Dulany’s (1961. 1968) theory of propositional control
dealing largely with verbal conditioning, the model’s components were
312 MINIARD AND COHEN
specifically developed to “reveal their relations to more familiar social

psychological concepts” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975. p. 301). A significant
portion of the social psychological literature emphasizes at least prag-
matic differences between personal (attitudinal) and social (normative) in-
stigators of behavior in terms of conditions affecting the relative impor-
tance of each (e.g.. the presence of others. visibility of the behavior.
availability of sanctions) as well as the persistence of the behavior. Before
this model can claim to represent the relative importance of one’s attitude
(through A,) and the social environment (through SN), however, it is
necessary to establish the degree to which the attitudinal and normative
measures tap the particular constructs they are intended to reflect. permit
accurate separation of those two sources of influence. and avoid serious
“double-counting” errors.
In the absence of both an adequate conceptual basis for and operational
separation of attitudinal and normative influences, multicollinearity be-
tween the two predictor variables would make the estimation and in-
terpretation of the p coefficients difficult (Green. 197X. pp. 227-230:
Johnston, 1963. pp. X-207). Tests used to assess the significance of p
coefficients at-e sensitive to the degree of multicollinearity among the
predictors: higher degrees of multicollinearity lower the likelihood of
rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e.. that 6 equals zero). This can be a
particularly serious problem when attempting to infer “causation” since a
potentially important predictor variable may appear to be insignificant.’
Suppose, for example, that both attitudinal and normative factors are in
fact important for a given behavior. To the extent that the model does not
adequately separate these two sources of influence. an insignificant p
weight might result for, say. the normative component, and one might
erroneously conclude that normative factors were unimportant in generat-
ing the behavior. Research using this model is replete with interpretations
of component importance based upon statistical significance (or lack of it)
of the two p coefficients, and statements concerning the relative impor-
tance of attitudinal and normative influences require testing the null
hypothesis that theps are equal (Draper & Smith, 1966, pp. 72-77). But the
likelihood of rejecting this hypothesis decreases as multicollinearity in-
creases, and under such conditions the result would be an unduly conser-
vative test. Therefore, to the extent that there is a lack of a clear concep-
tual separation between attitudinal and normative influences and that this
is cauied through to the operational level, our ability to assess their relative
importance will be greatly impaired.
At this point. we should acknowledge that Fishbein has never explicitly
’ ConverseI). predictors that are not related to the criterion may appear important as
reflected by a significant beta coefficient. Such occurrences have been discussed under the
label of “suppressor” variables (cf. Cohen & Cohen, 197.5).
claimed that the components were independent, and informally at least

has questioned both the practicality and necessity of such a separation.
Both the mathematical expression of the model and interpretations given
to the regression coefficients, however, do imply such a separation. For
example:
Thus it appears that attitudinal considerations of engaging in premarital sexual

behavior were more important than normative considerations for female students.
Subjective norms, however, were the primary determinants of behavioral inten-
tions for males (Fishbein & Ajzen. 1975. p. 312).
Statements of this kind suggest that the model’s components are intended
to provide a distinct representation of these two sources of influence.
Fishbein and Ajzen’s basis for distinguishing attitudinal and normative
influences on behavioral intentions is explicit though largely operational:
“The theory suggests that it is useful to maintain the distinction between
beliefs about the consequences of perj&wzing a behavior and beliefs about
expectations of relevant rejkrents.” Thus, using an example from Fish-
bein and Ajzen (p. 304). a belief that “My child thinks I should buy Sugar
Puffs” is regarded as normative on the basis that it refers specifically to a
referent’s expectation regarding the behavior in question. On the other
hand, a belief that “Buying Sugar Puffs will please my child” would not
be regarded as normative since this belief, as stated, does not contain an
explicit referent expectation.
Fishbein and Ajzen have offered no evidence that people, in fact,
maintain such a distinction in their thinking. So, once we move beyond a
surface level (both NB and SN measures have been designed to separate
out the “X thinks I should” type of belief), we are still faced with the
problem of establishing that these are distinct in any important psy-
chological sense. Thus, the belief, “Buying Sugar Puffs will please my
child” and the belief “My child thinks I should buy Sugar Puffs.” while
structurally different, may reflect a similar underlying concern with the
child’s reactions. The second belief might result from a direct statement
by the child, and the first might very well be a direct implication of that
statement. For this reason it is not clear why so much should be made of
this surface distinction. What may be much more significant, however, is
whether or not these two beliefs reflect a common underlying concern
with pleasing the childfijr normati~~e reasons (e.g.. to avoid a temper
tantrum or have the child respond with praise).
It is our contention that the conceptual basis underlying Fishbein and
Ajzen’s separation of attitudinal from normative influences is also in-
adequate if these are to be interpreted as separate sources of influence on
behavioral intentions. To illustrate this, let’s assume that the true state of
the world is as follows. You essentially have no attitude toward buying
stock in Company A until a colleague, who you consider to be particularly

knowledgeable about such things, tells you and several others that this
would be a fine investment for people in your circumstances. You believe
this information and develop a favorable attitude toward buying this
stock. You also consider it extremely unlikely that your colleague per-
sonally cares whether or not you buy the stock or that he would ever
know whether or not you followed his advice. You are now asked to
respond to the attitudinal and normative measures. Your responses to the
attitude measure would correctly reflect your favorable evaluation of the
consequences you now associate with buying the stock. Your response to
the normative belief question (essentially whether or not this referent
thinks you should engage in the behavior) would also be positive merely
because you know he advocates the behavior. Since you are favorably
disposed, by definition you “want to do what the referent thinks you
should do” (therefore, motivation to “comply” is positive). Thus the
model will also record the process as an instance of normative influence.
though your behavior stems entirely from your favorable attitude toward
buying the stock (i.e., there is no pressure to comply with the referent).
Substituting the overall SN measure for iVB and MC is of little help. It
simply replaces “a colleague” with “most people who are important to
me” (i.e., do they think you should or should not engage in the behavior?)
and assumes that motivation to comply is somehow incorporated in YOUI
response. One might be expected to infer that important others probably
believe you should engage in behaviors you find personally desirable.
The Fishbein-Ajzen formulation thus implies that the influence result-
ing from the demonstrated expertise of another person, who is valued
solely for his/her knowledge on the particular topic, should be reflected in
the normative component. But the potential for confounding and double
counting exists since these are precisely the factors that should have led
to a greater likelihood of information acceptance and hence impact on the
attitudinal component. Fishbein and Ajzen do not dispute the fact that
information or advice from others may also be incorporated into one’s
attitude (i.e., the formation and/or change of beliefs and values that are
produced by the information provided), assuming of course the informa-
tion is believed. This is what is expected to happen for information
gleaned from newspapers. tv, this journal, or any other source, so there is
no reason why information from people we know should be different.
Data from Ajzen and Fishbein (1972) suggest that the informational influ-
ence of others was reflected in both components. In their study, state-
ments about other’s expectations of the potential risk involved in a variety
of behaviors were manipulated in a role-playing setting. These variations
were found to alter not only one’s normative beliefs significantly, but
one’s attitude toward the behavior as well. A similar finding was reported
by Ajzen and Fishbein (1974). where a measure of a referent’s perceived
expertise correlated significantly with both attitudinal and normative

measures.
As it now stands, then, the normative component does not discriminate
between informatiomally-based social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955)
and influences that are truly normative in nature. In point of fact, any
belief that links a behavior to an outcome, regardless of whether the
outcome reflects a personal goal or is under the control of others, must be
treated as a “behavioral belief’ within the Fishbein and Ajzen system and
should be represented in the attitudinal component. The normative com-
ponent is reserved exclusively for beliefs about referent expectations.
Despite this, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975, p. 306) maintain that motivation to
comply with a referent should reflect all of the bases of social power,
including expertise, discussed by French and Raven (1959). The rationale
is simply that anything that increases a referent’s social power will in-
crease the likelihood of “complying” with that individual.
Let us further illustrate the potential for confounding. Under the
Fishbein-Ajzen formulation, all salient behavioral beliefs such as “voting
in the election will please my father” (or “voting in the election will help
to elect my candidate”) are to be represented in the attitudinal compo-
nent. The incentive value of each outcome (e.g., helping to elect my
candidate, pleasing my father) is then captured by the evaluative scales
(i.e., good-bad, rewarding-punishing) used to assess the value of each of
the outcomes in the attitudinal component. The desire to “do what your
father thinks you should do” is, however, also reflected in the
motivation-to-comply measure within the normative component. Thus,
despite the fact that the value of “pleasing my father” should already be
represented in the attitudinal component, its ability to motivate behavior
is given special status through the measurement of motivation to comply
with him. For these reasons, it appears likely that this method of separat-
ing the impact of attitudes and social norms may well lead to “double
counting” of a person’s desire to achieve outcomes mediated by impor-
tant others.
Furthermore, we do not believe Fishbein and Ajzen’s basis for distin-
guishing attitudinal and normative influences is consistent with the jus-
tification they offer for representing these two components in their model:
Moreover, this distinction emphasizes the importance of two basic social psy-
chological concepts that have traditionally been treated independently. Psycholo-
gists and sociologists interested in individual behavior have frequently made use of
the attitude concept whereas theorists dealing with groups and societies have often
relied on the concept of social norms. By including an attitudinal and a normative
component. the present theory emphasizes the importance of both concepts and
provides a bridge between the two approaches to the study of human behavior”
(Fishbein & Ajzen. 1975, p, 304, 305).
316 MINIARDANDCOHEN
If, in fact. a major goal of the model is to represent and separate “these
basic social psychological concepts.” this approach seems conceptually
flawed. The traditional distinction between complying with others for
normative reasons and engaging in a behavior because it is consistent with
one‘s attitudes and values is not only lost, it is made trivial. Thus. to take
a further example from Ajzen and Fishbein (l%O), the belief “my hus-
band thinks I should have an abortion” is regarded as normative whereas
the belief “my having an abortion would please my husband” would be
attitudinal (p. 73).
The lack of a clear separation can be seen in the measures. In measuring
normative beliefs (NB). the respondent is asked to indicate whether
“Referent X thinks I should/should not perform behavior Y.” Thus. I
may believe that my attorney thinks I should sign a contract. but such
expert information should also lead to the creation or change of beliefs
(e.g.. that the contract is to my advantage, protects my rights) that
determine my personal attitude toward the behavior.
Similar problems appear inherent in the measurement of motivation to
comply (MC) which asks the respondent how much “I want to do/I want
to do the opposite of what referent X thinks I should do.” Since this
operationalization does not restrict itself to compliance but extends to any
reason for wanting to engage in a behavior you believe the referent
endorses for you. it should incorporate aspects of personal as well as
normative reasons for engaging in a behavior.
In the most recent approach to measuring the normative component.
subjective norm (SN) is operationalized as “Most people who are impor-
tant to me think 1 should/should not perform behavior Y.” The measure
does not distinguish between others who are important for informational
as opposed to normative reasons. In addition, as elaborated in a sub-
sequent section. this me;;sure simply assesses one’s perception of what
important others think the person should do. Yet. SN is thought to
incorporate both specific normative beliefs and motivation to comply with
them. There is a further ambiguity inherent in an SN-type measure since
respondents may define the “behavior” so as to include complying (01
not) with influence pressures in the immediate situation (e.g.. voting
“yes” is coded as voting “yes” to comply with a manipulator). Since
people probably feel that others would not want them to comply with a
manipulator. such a recoding of the behavior should make the SN mea-
sure ambiguous.
Turning to the attitudinal component, measures of AN have typically
asked subjects to simply evaluate their “performing behavior X.” Since
subjects are not asked for their independent evaluation (i.e., how they feel
about the behavior unmindful of normative outcomes). it is likely that
subjects will. to some extent. include normative considerations in their
responses.
In summary, neither the conceptual nor operational distinctions offered

by Fishbein and Ajzen provide a satisfactory separation between norma-
tive and personal influences on behavioral intentions. Since Ajzen and
Fishbein (1980) describe their work as a “theory . . . designed to explain
virtually any human behavior” (p. 4) in which “a person’s intention is a
function of two basic determinants, one personal in nature and the other
reflecting social influence” (p. 6), valid representation and separation of
these two factors would appear to be essential. This is a particularly
crucial consideration for those interested in using their model as a diag-
nostic tool and for policy recommendations.
If a major goal of the Fishbein-Ajzen model were also to account more
adequately for the formation of behavioral intentions, its limitations are
even more severe. They would need to demonstrate that attitudinal and
normative factors deserve separation on information processing grounds
(i.e., that these cognitive elements are somehow distinct and combine in
this fashion). At present the justification for separating these seems more
pragmatic and diagnostic. The logic of the component combinatorial rule
is not self-evident: What is the necessity for or meaning of component
regression weights? What psychological role are these assumed to play in
this information integration process?
A distinction between personal and normative reasons for engaging in a
behavior does not require that they be treated as separate model compo-
II~‘IZIS, each having its own regression weight. It is possible to think of
“normative” outcomes or consequences as but one of the many subsets
of outcomes the individual both evaluates (ei) and judges in terms of
likelihood of occurrence (b,). So, while the particular construction of the
normative component was initially modeled after Dulany’s (1961, 1968)
theory of propositional control, it could be restated in the expectancy-
value format of the attitude component.
Furthermore, each inquiry presumably spawns its own set of salient
consequences, and these may be assessed and then grouped as befits the
investigation, including a grouping into personal and normative subsets.
Of course, if one believed it was useful to create a taxonomy of particular
types of outcomes associated with the behavior (e.g., personal versus
socially mediated), that might provide a pragmatic rationale for separate
components. The precise justification of the Fishbein and Ajzen distinc-
tion is not fully spelled out, but it is clear that it cannot involve personal
versus normative outcomes since these are grouped together as “be-
havioral beliefs” within the attitudinal component.
We chose not to assume that the goals of the Fishbein-Ajzen model
included the more stringent information-processing objectives. We con-
centrated instead on the degree of overlap between the model’s compo-
nents, since demonstrating an adequate separation between personal and
social influence determinants of behavior would be required for either an
information-processing or pragmatic rationale. To explore the degree of

“overlap” between the model’s components, we examined the attitudinal
and normative measures’ sensitivity to systematic manipulations in “per-
sonal” and “social” influences. Support for the independence of the
component measures would be obtained if (1) MC and SN were affected
by variations in a referent’s influence potential, whereas A, was not, and
(2)AB was sensitive to variations in attitudinal influence, whereas MC and
SN were not.
Within a separate normative component. the need for a motivation-to-

comply (or value of complying) term is based on the premise that the
expectations of particular referents will be more important than those of
others. Further, although the influence potential of referents will often be
positive (i.e., we want to comply with their expectations), others’ influ-
ence potential can be negative (e.g., a negative reference group). It is the
role of MC to reflect these variations in referent influence potential.
Despite its conceptual appeal, evidence supporting MC’s predictive
utility has been limited. Ajzen and Fishbein (1969) reported a decrement
in the prediction of behavioral intentions (BI) when NB was weighted by
MC, and Ajzen and Fishbein (1970) stated that
Research to date has indicated relatively little variance in this measure. and thus
the results obtained with normative beliefs alone were as good or better than those
obtained when NB was multiplied by MC (p. 469).
Fishbein (1976) has stated that scoring his previous unipolar MC mea-
sure (i.e., the scale ranged from “I want to do” to “I want not to do”) as a
bipolar scale was “probably inappropriate” and that “as a next step we
should measure motivation to comply on a true bipolar scale” (p. 494).
Such bipolar concepts would be necessary to represent social “influ-
ence” that one would not simply disregard but instead would lead one to
behave in an opposite manner (e.g., reactance theory predictions, rebel-
lion against authority). Therefore. if the psychologically relevant end-
points are “1 want to do” and “I want to do the opposite of,” these
should be assessed using a bipolar scale. This alteration in scale format
may not by itself lead to findings supporting the predictive utility of MC.
Research (see, for example, Bass & Wilkie, 1973; Cohen & Ahtola. 1971;
Wilkie & Pessemier. 1973) addressing this issue with respect to the at-
titudinal component (i.e.. the utility of weighting beliefs by values) has
cautioned researchers not to expect increased power where there is low
variability in the evaluative measures (i.e.. when values assigned to at-
tributes are relatively equal). Similarly. MC should contribute little to the
prediction of BI, regardless of how the scale is coded. when positive
referents are of roughly equal importance (i.e., when MC varies little
between referents) since MC would simply add a constant amount. One of

the purposes of the study, therefore, was to test a bipolar MC measure
under situations where one’s motivation to comply varies substantially.
This should indicate whether there is a need to include a motivational/
value term in the normative component.
The equivalence of SN and CNBMC. One of the questionable aspects of
Fishbein’s model has been the asserted relationship between SN and
CNBMC (cf. Ahtola, 1976; Lutz, 1976). Although SN has been concep-
tualized (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 302) and operationalized as a percep-
tual construct (“most people who are important to me think I should/
should not perform behavior X”). its role in the model is to mediate the
effects of not only an underlying perceptual (i.e., NB) component, but a
motivational component (i.e., MC) as well. It would seem that the two
approaches to operationalizing the normative component should yield
similar results only when MC is positive for each referent. When MC is
either zero or negative (e.g., an irrelevant or negative referent, say a
parent whose “advice” sometimes produces the opposite effect), the two
approaches should yield inconsistent results since SN implicitly assumes
one is motivated to comply with important others.
In our opinion, both the internal logic and empirical evidence underly-
ing the adequacy of the advocated SN measure is weak. Fishbein and
Ajzen (1975) cite studies by King and Jaccard (Note 2) and Glassman and
Birchmore (Note 3). where’ correlations from .625 to .910 were obtained
between the two approaches as support for the SN measure. However,
relying solely on the overall correlation between SN and CNBMC can be
misleading. Strong correlations between SN and CNBMC would have
occurred if SN and ZVB were highly associated and if one’s motivation to
comply with each referent used in the exercise approached a positive
constant. This is because the relationship between two sets of scores is
unaffected when one set is weighted by a constant factor. Testing the
relationship under such conditions would provide little insight into its
validity. Therefore, without knowing the prediction achieved by CNB
alone. it is impossible to determine what if any impact MC had on the
results reported by these authors.
Two approaches (alternative approaches are discussed by Wyer, 1974,
pp. 55-59) were employed to address this issue. One compared the
differential predictions achieved when NB is and is not weighted by MC.
If the omission of MC leads to a stronger prediction of SN, then either the
reliability of the particular MC measure used or the model’s validity
would have to be questioned. The second approach evaluated the degree
to which I;NBMC contributes to predictions of behavioral intentions over
and above the contribution of SN. This approach has been used previ-
ously to evaluate the structure of the attitude component (Dickson &
Miniard. 1978).
Levels oj’specijicity for motivation to comply. Fishbein and Ajzen have

traditionally conceptualized and operationalized MC as one’s general
tendency or willingness to comply with a particular referent. This orienta-
tion appears inconsistent with their views regarding the need for corre-
spondence between predictors and criteria (Ajzen & Fishbein. 1977:
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Indeed, the conceptualization of MC as a gen-
eral willingness to comply with a referent seems in conflict with their
stated position that
Accurate prediction of a given intention. however. can be expected only when the
attitudinal and normative components of the model are measured at the same level
of specificity as is the intention (Fishbein & Ajzen. 1975, p. 333).
Treating MC as a situation-specific construct may also be more concep-

tually sound if one believes that people typically evaluate the benefits (and
possibly the costs) of going along with the specific position of a referent
before deciding whether or not to comply. It should be difficult to respond
accurately to an MC measure if there is no information as to what
behavior the referent is advocating and why the referent may take that
position (e.g.. for personal gain).
Despite such conceptual limitations, there appear to be several opera-
tional advantages to measuring MC at a global level. First, Ahtola (1976)
has suggested that a general measure is statistically appealing since it
allows MC to be independent of NB. Further, a general measure of MC
should prevent the possible tapping of the attitudinal component which
may occur at a more situation-specific level. At such a level. an individu-
al’s stated motivation to comply may represent the degree of consistency
between what the person wants to do and the behavior the referent
prefers. Given the existing format, a general measure of MC should be
less susceptible to this potential contamination.
While threatening the construct validity and diagnosticity of a
situation-specific measure of MC, such attitudinal contamination could
enhance its predictive validity. To the extent that subjects’ attitudes are
highly correlated with intentions, this confounding between attitudes and
a specific MC measure should increase predictability relative to that ob-
tained by operationalizing MC at a more general level.
Fishbein ( 1976) has recently advocated measurement of MC at a “mod-
erate” level of specificity. Such a level would be illustrated by a mea-
surement of MC with respect to a particular behavioral domain, such as
how much a person wants to comply with a referent in regard to “shop-
ping behaviors.” Unfortunately. a moderate level may not be specific
enough to be optimal as a predictor of specific behaviors. There is the
further problem arising from the subjectivity involved in deciding what
constitutes a moderate (i.e., general) enough level to avoid tapping the
attitudinal component. The study will examine this issue by measuring

MC at three different levels of specificity.
In summary, the goals of this study are to investigate:
(1) the model’s ability to provide separate estimates of personal and
normative influences,
(2) the incremental value of an MC-type construct,
(3) the relationship between SN and %VBMC, and
(4) the relative merits of measuring MC at various levels of spec-
ificity.
METHOD
A total of 193 male and female students. enrolled in various undergraduate marketing
courses at the University of Florida, participated in the experiment. After reading a scenario
in which a hypothetical woman was considering the purchase of a dress, subjects were asked
to play the role of this woman in responding to a questionnaire containing the measures
necessary for operationalizing the model. Subjects were randomly assigned to the cells of a
2 x 2 x 3 factorial design. The first factor (attitude toward object) was designed to
manipulate the attitudinal component by varying the woman’s attitude toward the dress, the
second (referent inguence potential) the normative component through the presence or
absence of information that the woman’s friend was exerting influence for self-serving
reasons, and the third (MC spec$cit~) involved the measurement of MC at three alternative
levels of specificity. These separate manipulations of attitudinal and normative influence
allow an examination of the degree to which each component captures a separate set of
influences on behavioral intentions.
Procedure and Independent Variables

Subjects received a booklet explaining that they would read several paragraphs in which a
person was considering some action. and that they should play the role of this person in
answering some ensuing questions. Second, scale instructions were provided describing
how the scales were to be used in answering such question. including the meaning of the
categories comprising the 7-point scales (e.g., the concept of a “neutral” evaluation was
anchored to the scale midpoint).
This was followed by a description of a hypothetical person, Debbie, whose role the
subjects were to assume. It is explained that she and her family have moved to a new town
where she meets her next-door neighbor. the referent. Sue. Sue is described by a series of
personality traits selected from Anderson ( 1968) on the basis of her extreme favorability and
low rating variability. The importance of their “social relationship” was stressed by such
statements as “Debbie is very happy to have met Sue since their relationship would make
her adjustment in the new town much easier” and “Debbie likes Sue very much and wants
to show her that they do have a lot in common so that Sue will like her.” Following this
background material, the two are described as on a shopping trip when “Sue spots a dress
and tells Debbie how beautiful it would look on her.”
At this point the manipulation of attitude was introduced by describing Debbie as per-
sonally liking the dress or disliking it. Underposirive r&rent influence potential conditions,
this attitudinal manipulation completed the scenario description. Under negatirae referent
influencepotentialconditions, however, subjects were told that Debbie, while in the dress-
ing room, overheard Sue telling a salesclerk: “Don’t worry about this sale. I’ll get her to buy
the dress whether she likes it or not so that I can borrow it for the social this weekend.” This
manipulation was also intended to create a situation in which one is not motivated to comply
with a generally influential referent, thus permitting a test of the adequacy of measuring MC
at a general level.
Before proceeding to the questionnaire, subjects were asked to return to the scenario and
circle those aspects of the situation which they considered important. Then. after being
reminded to assume the role of Debbie. they responded to one of three questionnaires (the
third between-subjects factor in the design) which differed only in the level of specificity at
which MC was assessed (i.e., general. moderate. and situation specific). This factor was
included to examine the implications of measuring MC at different levels of specificity.
Deprrldrr~r Vuriahles
Since prior research varying item order showed no significant differences (Ajzen &
Fishbein. 1969). we employed the order suggested by the schematic representation of the
model as presented by Fishbein and Ajzen ( 1975, p, 334). Therefore. subjects first responded
to one of three alternative measures of MC via 7-point scales ranging from “I want to do”
(+3) to “I want to do the opposite of” (-3). Depending upon whether level of specificity
was general, moderate, or situation specific, the scale was prefaced by either “In general.”
“In the area of clothes shopping behavior,” or “In this situation.” respectively. Next. NB
was assessed on 7-point scales with the endpoints *‘I should” (+3) and “I should not” (-3).
NB and MC were obtained for three referents: the hypothetical person’s neighbor (Sue).
husband. and parents.’
Subjects then indicated their attitude toward the behavior (AR). They received Fishbein‘s
standard (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1969, 1970. 1972) lead-in (“Buying the dress is:“) and then four
7-point bipolar evaluative semantic differential scales (good-bad. foolish-wise.
rewarding-punishing. harmful-beneficial). Subjects next responded to theSN measure via a
7-point scale ranging from “I should” (+3) to “I should not” (-3). This was followed by an
alternative attitudinal measure (PA,), not employed by Fishbein. This measure (“Forgetting
what others think you should do and their reaction. youpersonally feel that buying the dress
is:“) was designed to minimize normative influences by instructing subjects that the influ-
ence of others was to be ignored. The major difference. then. between PA, and A, was that
the latter does not suggest that the influence of others is to be ignored.
BI was next measured on three 7-point bipolar semantic differential scales (likely-
unlikely, probable-improbable. possible-impossible). Perceptions that the referent was
trying to help or manipulate the person were also separately assessed on these same three
semantic differential scales and combined into an index so as to provide a check on the
referent injhencc~ potential manipulation.
2 Three referents were used because NB for Sue was held constant across the scenarios
(i.e.. the state of disagreement was manipulated by changes in attitude and not by variations
in the referent’s expectations). The lack of variance in NB would constrain correlations with
SN. so that even a “weak” measure of MC could improve this fit. To avoid this statistical
problem in evaluating SN = I; NBMC predictions, additional variance was built in by using
the husband and parents as additional referents across all scenarios. The choice of these two
referents was based on the fact that the hypothetical person’s husband was mentioned in
each of the scenarios. and both husbands and parents might well be relevant referents when
the “wisdom” of complying with a new acquaintance would be an issue. In analyses looking
instead at the sensitivity of a particular measure to alternative sources of influences that do
not involve correlation methods. only the one referent specifically used to create variance in
normative influence was employed. Unless specified in the text. NB and MC scores for all
three referents (i.e.. a NBMC score is computed for each referent, summed across the three
referents, and the resultant score correlated with the criterion ofinterest) will only be used in
testing correlational hypothesis (i.e., model predictions).
Subjects were next asked how difficult it was to play the role on a S-point scale ranging
from ‘not at all difficult” (I) to “extremely difficult” (5) and how confident or certain they
were that their responses would be similar to the hypothetical person’s responses on a
6-point scale ranging from “extremely certain” (I) to “extremely uncertain” (6). These were
included to provide a check both on any particular problems subjects had playing the role in
these scenarios and for potential differences between male and female abilities to capture the
role.
Supplementary Measures
Measures addressing the validity of the scenario manipulations were collected from two
groups of subjects who did not take part in the main experiment. Each subject randomly
received one of the scenarios. After reading the scenario, the first set of subjects (II = 67)
were asked to evaluate nine social outcomes (as assessed by scales measuring the value of
being liked and disliked by, pleasing and displeasing, gaining the approval and disapproval
of, being similar and dissimilar to, and obtaining a favorable reaction from the referent)
potentially mediated by Sue (the referent) on 7-point scales ranging from “extremely good”
(+3) to “extremely bad” (-3) in order to show that the referent’s influence potential was in
fact reduced by displaying her manipulative intent. The referent’s influence potential should
be reduced by the inclusion of information describing the referent’s manipulative intent. but
not by the attitudinal manipulation.
The second group (n = 57) was given a “referent influence” scale and was asked to
estimate the amount and direction of social influence existing in the situation via an I l-point
scale with the endpoints “more likely to buy the dress” (1 I) and “less likely to buy the
dress” (I). The scale midpoint was to be marked if the referent’s influence was unimportant.
The goal of this check was to evaluate the impact of the refcwnf influence porentiul
manipulation on perceptions of referent influence.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Three separate manipulation checks were used to evaluate the ade-
quacy of the referent influence potential treatment. The first examined the
overall impact of this particular manipulative behavior on others’ evalua-
tion of outcomes mediated by that referent. The second assessed that
subjects did in fact perceive the referent as behaving in a manipulative
fashion, and the third examined the perceived influence of this manipula-
tive behavior on the likelihood of subjects’ buying the dress.
Social outcome measures. Each of the nine ‘-social outcome” mea-
sures was tested individually using a 2 (attitude toward object) x 2
(referent infkence potential) analysis of variance.3 The latter factor was
significant @ < .OOl) in each case and accounted for, on average, 29% of
:% Cell sizes ranged from I3 to 18. As a result of the unequal and disproportional cell sizes,
unless particular procedures are undertaken, an orthogonal partitioning of the explained
variability is not achieved, and the resulting tests of significance are biased (Applebaum &
Cramer. 1974). Therefore, for this and subsequent ANOVAs, an analytical procedure known
as experimental design analysis (Overall & Speigel. 1969) was employed. Basically, this
analysis involves the estimation of a main effect by adjusting for the remaining main effects
but ignoring interactions. and then estimation of interactions through adjusting for both main
effects and interactions of the same and lower order.
the measures’ variability using the & statistic (Hays, 1967). thus provid-
ing support for this manipulation’s impact on factors assumed to affect
one’s motivation to comply with a referent. There were no significant (p >
.05) effects of the attitudinal manipulation on any of the nine measures.
The latter analysis was carried out to determine if disagreement between
the person and the referent as to whether or not the person should buy the
dress would lower perceived referent attractiveness and hence the refer-
ent’s influence potential. If such an effect occurred. the “confounded”
attitudinal manipulation would make an unambiguous assessment of the
normative measures’ attitudinal contamination impossible.
Prrcei\-cd rmnipulcrti~~e intent. To verify that the referent was per-
ceived to be manipulative, the 193 experimental subjects’ perceptions of
the referent’s manipulative intent were analyzed as a function of attitude
tmwrd object, reJ&~tzt infirrencr pote~rticrl, and the level of specificity of
the motivation to comply measure (i.e., the questionnaire manipulation).
As expected, only referent injrrrnw potential was significant [ F( 1, IX I ) =:
949.31, p < .OOl] and accounted for 83% of the variation.
Ryfcrerlt injlucnce s~ult~. Finally. both r&rent irljhrencr potentiul con-
ditions pushed subjects’ responses away from the scale midpoint (i.e., 6).
Cell means for the positi\-c and nrgrrtil,e referent i@uence potential
scenarios were 8.31 and 4.14. respectively. and both were significantly
different from the scale midpoint. The ctttitctdc> to\cm-d ohjrct treatment
means were also tested against this criterion. Neither of the means sig-
nificantly (P > .05) departed from the scale midpoint. again supporting
this factor‘s lack of impact on the referent’s influence potential.
Behavioral Intrntions
Before examining the measures’ sensitivity to the experimental manipu-
lations. we tested whether our manipulations significantly altered be-
havioral intentions (Bl). If intentions were not affected by such manipula-
tions. it might indicate that only a minimal impact on the determinants of
intentions was achieved by these manipulations. Using a 7 x 2 v 3
ANOVA. both the crttitudr tmard object [F( I. 181) = 116.72, p < .OOl]
and the reJ>rrnt inj2nenc.epotential [F( 1. 181) = 61.03, p < .OOl] factors
were highly significant and explained 31% and 16%’of the variability in BI.
respectively. A significant [F( I. 181) = 4.75. p < .03 I, A2 = ,011 interac-
tion was also detected, indicating that the difference in BI between the
attitude conditions was greater when the referent was not seen as a
manipulator than when she was.
The reasonableness of employing these data to evaluate the measures
was further supported since the model provided an acceptable prediction
of Bf. The results of pooled (i.e., collapsing across experimental cells
after adjusting for mean differences between cells) multiple regression
analyses for models containing the various attitudinal and normative
measures are summarized in Table 1.4 These data give an early indication
of the weaknesses of the more general MC measure as the normative
component’s partial regression coefficient failed to achieve significance
when MC was operationalized at this global level.”
Finally, to the extent students, especially males, were unable to “cap-

ture the role” created in the scenarios, the generalizability of the findings
would become questionable. Subjects, however, perceived little difficulty
in assuming the role (X = 2.0) and were fairly confident regarding their
ability to duplicate the hypothetical person’s responses (2 = 2.4). Male
and female responses to these measures were not significantly different @
> . I ). Separate tests of all research hypotheses were conducted on males
versus females and no significant differences impacting on study hypoth-
eses were found.
Independence of the Measures”
Subjects’ responses to the MC, NB, SN, A,, and PA, measures were
submitted to separate 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVAs, where referent injhence
potential, attitude tmrurd object, and MC specificity represent the three
’ There are two major approaches to computing correlations among measures affected by
experimenter-manipulated treatments. One approach is to collapse across the experimental
cells and compute correlations without adjusting for the shared variation between measures
deriving solely from their similar sensitivity to the experimental treatments. An alternative
procedure is to calculate pooled correlations which eliminate the influence of the experimen-
tal manipulations by adjusting for mean differences between experimental conditions. Be-
cause of the suspected overlap between attitudinal and normative measures. it was believed
that a manipulation (e.g.. A,) would affect the second component (e.g.. SN) as well as Bf. If
an unadjusted correlation was computed between SN and BI, for example, their joint
sensitivity to the A, manipulation would overstate the direct relationship between SN and
BI. More generally, since the inclusion of shared treatment variation can thus overstate the
actual relationship among variables (i.e.. independent of their unique sensitivity to the
experimental treatments). a more conservative approach was adopted and adjustments for
mean differences between cells were made prior to computing correlations. It should be
noted. however. that this approach eliminates some of the measures’ variance and hence
may suggest a lower degree of relationship than might actually exist in other settings. As an
illustration of the extent to which restrictions occurred as a result of the pooling procedures.
the standard deviations before (i.e.. the variation without adjusting for mean differences)
and after the pooling procedure were calculated for XNBMC. The before/after standard
deviations for ZNBMCg. ZNBMCm, and ZNBMCs were 9.89/9.05. 7.3616.68. and 9.1417.60.
Reductions for BI were somewhat larger and were 6.3 114.14. 6.2614.42, and 6.4614.99 for the
MC‘,q. MCm. and MCs questionnaires. although for none of the variables could it be said that
the reduction in variance was drastic.
i As indicated in footnote 2. all three referents were included in this analysis. These
analyses were repeated using only the single referent resulting in model fit being essentially
the same and only marginal differences in p weights.
6 Data and issues pertinent to the component overlap treated in this section are presented
in Miniard and Cohen (1979). These data are reported here for the sake of completeness.
326 MINIAKD AND COHEN
TABI,E I
Poo~m MULJIPLE KEGRESSI~N ANALYSES POR SHE. PREDICTION OF
BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS
Model II B;’ B$ R R’ P’
A,+SN lY3 .55** .0x .5y+- .3s .43**

A,q + Z;NBMCg 57 .S4”” -- .06 ..53’-V .?X .15
A, + ZNBMCttr 6X .53”’ .72* .64** .41 .3x**
A, + TNBMCs 68 ._54** .19* .63** .40 .7’4
- *
PA,{ f SN 193 .49** .lY”” .56** .31 .?I**
PA, + LNBMC,v 51 .70** - .07 .6Y** .48 .I3
PA, f CNBMC~W 6X .3Y”‘, .3x*” .57+* .33 .I0
t’A, + ZNBMC.r 68 .4x** .23** ..5y** .35 .27”
NOIP. The symbols MCg, MCnz. and MCs refer to whether motivation to comply was
measured at a general. moderate. or situation-specific level, respectively.
‘I Standardized partial regression coefficient for attitudinal component.
b Standardized partial regression coefficient for normative component.
c Pooled simple correlation (i.e., multicollinearity) between attitudinal and normative
components.
* p i .os.
** p < .Ol.
factors.i The cell means for these measures as a function of the normative
and attitudinal manipulations and the F ratios for these two main effects
and their interaction are presented in Table 2. The MC specijicity factor
was excluded from the table since it failed to achieve significance as either
a main effect or interaction in any of these analyses.
If MC taps distinguishable normative influence-based responses (i.e., if
it is not also sensitive to attitudinal influence), subjects’ responses to the
measure should be affected only by the r&rent ir~Jiurncr potentid ma-
nipulation. While this factor reached significance (& = .17), the attitudinal
manipulation had a smaller but significant (& = .07) impact on the measure.
As suggested earlier, therefore, MC does not appear to isolate compliance-
based reasons for wanting to engage in a behavior from attitudinal ones.
Differences in the attitudinal manipulation’s impact upon MC as a
function of the measure’s level of specificity were not found as the
interaction between the questionnaire and attitudinal factors failed to
approach significance @ > . I). Similarly, the notion that a situation-
specific measure would be superior to more general measures of MC in
capturing social influence was not supported, as the interaction between
the questionnaire and normative manipulations was also insignificant.
Possible explanations for these nonsignificant interactions are presented
in the Discussion.
i There were no significant effects of the manipulations beyond those specihcally consid-
ered in the discussion of study goals.
TABLE 2
MEANS AND F RATIOS FOR NORMATIVE AND A~rrmumNAL MEASURES RY SCENARIO MANIPULATIONS
F Ratios
Referent influence potential
Referent influence Attitude toward
Measure/attitude toward object Positive Negative potential object Interaction
Motivation to comply (MC)

(1) Favorable attitude 2.14 -0.17 45.go** 19.go** I.61
(2) Unfavorable attitude 0.50 -1.u7
Normative belief (NB)
(I) Favorable attitude 2.76 2.17 0.66 0.10 5.91”
(2) Unfavorable attitude 2.28 2.59
Subjective norm (SN)
(I) Favorable attitude 1.59 0.20 34.41”” I‘6 l6** 0.27
(2) Unfavorable attitude 0.36 -0.80
Attitude (A,)
( I) Favorable attitude 6.51 I.52 53.47** 173.24** 0.03
(2) Unfavorable attitude -2.38 -7.11
Personal attitude (PA,)
(I) Favorable attitude 7.12 2.50 27.56** x2.86** 2. IO
(2) Unfavorable attitude -5.48 -8.09
Nore. The normative measures had a scale range of +3 to -3 whereas the attitudinal measures ranged from + I2 to - 12.
* p < .05.
** p < .OOl.
Limited support for NB’s independence of attitudinal influence was

found. as the main effect of attitude tmwrd object was not significant.
There was, however, a small but significant (& = .03) interaction between
attitude to~rwrd object and rejkrent injfuencc~ potential. Subjects reported
that the referent (Sue) was more likely to hold the belief that the person
should buy the dress when the person’s attitude was favorable and the
referent was evaluated positively or when the person’s attitude was un-
favorable and the referent was evaluated negatively. This unexpected
interaction is consistent with balance theory notions of evaluative infer-
ence. It may be that people who are perceived to be “positive” (non-
manipulative, attractive) are assumed to be more likely to think you
should engage in behaviors thatgorl regard as desirable, while people who
are “negative” (manipulative. unattractive) are assumed to be more likely
to think you should eggage in behaviors that you find undesirable.
Support for SN’s ability to represent normative influence was provided
by the significant (& = .I I) impact the r&rent irlflrrence potential factor
had upon the measure.x Since this factor affected the perceived manipula-
tive intent of the referent and through this subjects’ motilwtion to go along
with the referent (as opposed to the perceptual. NB, aspect of the norma-
tive component). the causal mechanism underlying SN’s sensitivity to this
manipulation is not clear. SN did not escape the impact of attitudinal
influences: The attitudinal manipulation significantly (j2 = .08) altered
subjects’ SN responses. Thus, each of the normative measures was found
to be affected in one form or another by the attitudinal manipulation.
These results cast doubt on the model’s ability to separate attitudinal and
normative influences.
Support for Fishbein’s attitudinal measure’s (A,) ability to assess at-
titudinal influence was found. as the uttitrrdr tm-urd object factor was
highly significant (& = .42). If An does not also incorporate normative
influences, then the rejbent irlfluencr potential manipulation should not
impact upon subjects’ responses to the measure. This factor, however.
achieved significance (0” = .13). thus leading us to question A,‘s ability
to separate attitudinal from normative reasons for engaging in a behavior.
In a parallel test of the PA, measure. it was found to be superior to A),
both in sensitivity to the uttitrtde torzard object manipulation (& = .57)
and in its lack of responsiveness to the normative influences reflected in
the reftrent injluence potentiuf manipulation (& = .05). If this holds more
” As the manipulation of social influence was achieved by varying the referent’s influence
potential and not through changes in perceived referent expectations. it was not possible to
test NB’s responsiveness to normative factors. Despite the conceptual similarity ofNB and
SN. SN’s sensitivity to the normative influence manipulation was tested since Fishbein
(1976. p. 496; Fishbein & Ajzen. 1975. Chap. 7) seems to be recommending the use of SN as
a replacement for ZNBMC. It would appear that SN is expected to reflect any changes in
normative influences. regardless of their perceptual or motivational basis.
generally, replacement ofA, with a more restrictive type of measure such

as PA, may well decrease the amount of overlap among the model’s
components. The correlation between A, and PA, was .72, indicating that
roughly half the variance in one was common to the other.
Model Predictions
Evidence bearing upon the relationship of MC and BI is presented in
Table 3. Justification for including MC requires that the correlation be-
tween BZ and IZNBMC be significantly greater than the correlation be-
tween BZ and ZNB. Employing a ; test for the difference between two
correlations from the same sample (Roscoe, 1975). weighting ZNB by MC
(collapsing across all experimental factors) produced a significant [Z =
2.83. p < .005] improvement in the prediction of BI. This finding supports
the inclusion of a motivation-to-comply-type measure.
Data in Table 3, however, suggest that support for MC’s predictive
utility should be qualified by its level of specificity. Using a z test for the
difference between two correlations from independent samples (Roscoe.
1975), the most general measure of MC yielded significantly (p < .05)
inferior predictions of BI than those achieved by the more situation
specific MCnz and MCs measures. Indeed, only when MC was
operationalized at a general level did the CNBMC formulation fail to
correlate significantly with BI. The SVBMCh and SNBMCs measures
did not significantly (p > .i) differ in their predictive power. One should
not conclude from Table 3 that CNB is of little value in predicting BI.
Recall that by design the referent (Sue) advocated the behavior in each
condition. thus constraining XNB.
Results pertinent to the asserted equivalence of SN and ZNBMC are
summarized in Table 4. If this hypothesized relationship is valid, then the
correlation between SN and ZNBMC should not be less than the correla-
tion between SN and IZNB. Collapsing across MC’s level of specificity.
this prediction is not supported, as the correlation between SN and CNB
was significantly (p < .02) lower when NB was weighted by MC (although
TABLE 3
POOLED SIMPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS AND
NORMATIVE MEASURES
Questionnaire n SN XNB TMC ZNBMC
MCg 57 .51** .I7 .I4 .07

MCm 68 .28* .06 .29* 42**
MCs 68 23 -.05 .39** :36**
All” 193 .32** .04 .27** .18**
n Row correlations are pooled across all experimental factors.

* p < .05.
** p < .Ol.
TABLE 4
POOLED SIMPLE CORRELAIXON BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE NORM AND
ITS HYPOTHESIZED DETERMINANTS
Questionnaire ,1 XNB Z;NBMC I”’
MCR 51 .JY”* .23 .Oh

MCm 6X .34- .39*- II.,.
MCS 68 ..5(““ .2Y4 .03
All” 193 .37*= ,z’)** .07
(’ Column values represent the level of significance for the predictive difference between
CNB and XNBMC.
* Row correlations are pooled across all experimental factors.
* ,> < .05.
** ,’ < .Ol.
there is no difference when MC is measured at a “moderate” level).

These results call into question the assumption that SN captures the
motivational aspect of its hypothesized determinants.
Further evidence regarding this aspect of the mode1 was attained
through an examination of the causal flow underlying Fishbein’s norma-
tive component. If SN does in fact mediate XNBMC’s influence upon
intentions, then the incremental prediction of BI achieved by including
CNBMC in a regression mode1 containing SN as a predictor variable
should not be significant. Contrary to the model, this addition [F( 1. 190) =
8.60, p < .Oll increased the prediction of Bi. This suggests that CNBMC
contains some component that is orthogonal to SN but is related to BI.
One obvious candidate is the MC component. To examine this possibility.
the preceding analysis was replicated with the one modification of remov-
ing the MC component (i.e.. CNB was not weighted by MC). In this
situation, the inclusion of CNB failed to enhance the explanation of BI.
These findings fail to support the postulated causal flow and suggest that
SN does not adequately capture the effect of an MC-type construct shown
to be of value in the prediction of BI.
DISCUSSION
The major findings of the study were:
(1) The existing operationalizations of the Fishbein-Ajzen model make
it doubtful that this model will be useful in separating personal and
normative reasons for engaging in a behavior. Manipulations of a ref-
erent’s influence potential were found to affect subjects’ responses to the
attitudinal as well as the normative measures. Similarly, manipulations of
attitude impacted upon both sets of measures.
(3) Predictions of BI were improved when motivation to comply was
included in the normative component.
(3) Moderate and situation-specific levels of MC were found to provide
a superior prediction of BZ than the more general measure. None of the

levels, however, avoided the problem of attitudinal contamination.
(4) The hypothesized equivalence of SN and ZNBMC was not sup-
ported: SN did not successfully incorporate MC. and adding ZNBMC to
SN improved predictions of BI.
This study evaluated the model and measures in a single behavioral
domain utilizing a particular set of conditions presented as a role-playing
task, so an appropriate caution regarding generalizability is in order.
Further, explicit information was presented to respondents on only one
referent. This may have encouraged inference processes, based partially
on attitude, regarding what “important others” believed the subject
should do. Thus. a further evaluation of SN’s sensitivity to attitudinal
influences is recommended. Conversely, SN’s responsiveness to the
normative influence manipulation may be overstated, since under the
negatir~r referent irzJIuence potential treatment subjects might reasonably
assume that “important others” would not expect them to go along with a
manipulator. In this event. SN might well track the presence or absence of
perceived manipulative intent. Also, the failure to find differential sen-
sitivity to normative influences among the three levels of MC specificity
suggests that it may be necessary to establish a strong preexisting readi-
ness to comply in general, such that one negative instance does not exert a
decisive impact on both MCs and MCg. For differences in sensitivity to
attitudinal influence to emerge, it may be necessary to obtain a measure of
one’s general motivation to comply with a referent before the behavioral
context is disclosed.
Though we have shown that the components of the Fishbein-Ajzen
model seem to be interrelated in ways that would render it inadequate for
separating personal and socially mediated consequences. we have no
evidence to suggest that the model would fail to distinguish between
behavioral beliefs and referent expectations (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980. p.
7). The significance of this distinction is, however. questionable.
The bottom line seems to be that Fishbein and Ajzen believe that the
attitudinal component should represent all consequences associated with
an act of behavior. The only thing left for the normative component would
appear to be referent expectations not tied to any overt or psychological
consequences. However, even assuming one is engaging in behaviors
thought to be endorsed by a role model or important others or possibly
fulfilling a “moral obligation” to those far removed. Fishbein and Ajzen
have yet to demonstrate that these are not thought of as other personal
reasons for engaging in the behavior. Their origin (e.g., information from
or about others) should be irrelevant. It is not appropriate to rely on
statistically significant regression coefficients for each component as jus-
tification for the psychological reality of a dual-component model
(Birnbaum & Mellers, 1979). Existing evidence does not appear to be
adequate to support the separate existence of a normative component as a

psychologically meaningful set of beliefs exerting a unique influence on
behavior.
For those interested in distinguishing between personal and normative
reasons for engaging in a given behavior. the development of an alterna-
tive model seems appropriate. One approach consistent with the
expectancy-value form of the attitudinal component might be to view
normative influence as the summary value attached to eliciting particular
responses from referents (e.g., having the referents make desired attribu-
tions about me ]Calder & Burnkrant. 1977; Schlenker. 19801 or behave in
particular ways toward me). This would lead to viewing behavioral inten-
tions as being determined by: (I) personal beliefs (i.e.. beliefs about
outcomes of the behavior that are unrelated to referents’ responses) and
the values of such outcomes. regardless of the original source of such
beliefs and values, and (2) beliefs about the responses of important ref-
erents and the value associated with such responses.
POSTSCRIPT
We were disappointed in Fishbein and Ajzen’s lack of attention in their
accompanying paper to the major conceptual issues we have raised. To
prevent the focus from being deflected away from these issues, we will
summarize our major theoretical and operational concerns and then indi-
cate the weaknesses we see in Fishbein and Ajzen’s remarks. They also
raised certain technical issues dealing with scale coding and analysis, but
these are not central to the discussion.!’
!’ Fishbein and Ajzen question our conclusions concernmg the inadequacy of assessing
MC at a general level and SN’s inability to mediate the MC-B1 relationship. They argue that
(/ we coded our bipolar ‘WC measure in a unipolar fashion and if we had computed
unadjusted correlations. we would have reached different conclusions. They note in their
paper that they had originally coded their unipolar motivation to comply scale (“want
to-want not to.‘) in a bipolar fashion: however, when they subsequently restored this scale
in keeping with its unipolar format. the correlations involving MC increased. Concerning the
first point, Fishbein t 1976) earlier argued for the use of a true bipolar MC scale. This is the
scale we used and, of course. scored in keeping with the responses subjects thought they
were supplying (i.e.. bipolar scoring). Fishbein and Ajzen now argue that we should score
motivation to comply in a unipolar fashion.
But assigning a negative referent a positive motivational score seems to us both atheoreti-
cal and counterintuitive. Moreover. the improvement in correlations may merely reflect a
scale transformation artifact that results when a positive constant is used to eliminate
negative scale values and there is a preponderance of positive referents in the data base.
Given a majority of negative referents in the data base. the opposite scale transformation
(i.e., from unipolar to bipolar) could artifically increase correlations. Given characteristics of
the data base, improvement in correlations can always be achieved through a specified scale
transformation. We simply believe that transforming our bipolar scale to a unipolar scale
and then using these data in correlational analyses is unsound.
As discussed in footnote 4, the appropriateness of pooled versus unadjusted correlations
Fishbein and Ajzen assert that their theory of behavioral intentions

views intentions as a function of “two basic determinants, one personal in
nature and the other reflecting social influences” (1980, p. 6). They state
that “this distinction emphasizes the importance of two basic social
psychological concepts that have traditionally been treated indepen-
dently” (1975, p. 304). However, their model requires that all beliefs
about the consequences of performing a behavior be included in the
attitude component even if a consequence is entirely normative (e.g.,
expulsion from a desired group). The normative component is designed to
include only beliefs about expectations of relevant referents. The
psychological distinction between these two beliefs seems to us to be a far
cry from the fundamental distinction drawn above. A major point of our
paper, then, is that their model is not appropriate for those seeking to
distinguish between personal and normative reasons for engaging in a
behavior. In their accompanying paper Fishbein and Ajzen do not address
this issue directly. Though they explicitly defend the construct validity of
their measures they choose not to discuss the role of their constructs
themselves in the larger nomological network. While the precision of
one’s measures is undeniably important, it is our position that this is
secondary to the theoretical justification or pragmatic rationale behind the
determination of the constructs themselves.
Now. it may be argued that the attitude construct has traditionally been
interpreted to reflect all beliefs that combine to produce affect for or
against the attitude object or behavior (including beliefs about others’
reactions). Seemingly, then, this supports Fishbein and Ajzen’s decision
to place all behavioral beliefs in the attitude component. It is important to
recall, however, that the explicit objective of the Fishbein and Ajzen
model is to assess two particular determinants of a person’s intention to
engage in a behavior that the authors chose to regard as important and
conceptually separable: attitudes and social influence/norms. We are es-
sentially examining the nature of this separation both logically and empir-
ically. Our arguments do not imply that, in general, we think the definition
of an attitude should be changed to exclude beliefs about normative
consequences. However, given their explicit goal of separating the two
sources of influence on behavioral intentions, we are hard pressed to
grasp the logic of placing normative reasons for engaging in a behavior in
the attitude component and trying to handle the intended conceptual
separation by hypothesizing what amounts to a new construct, referent
expectations. It would appear simpler to place personal (i.e., nonnorma-
is not an easily resolved issue. We therefore reanalyzed our data without adjusting for mean
differences and found that the major conclusions bearing on MC‘s predictive value and the
SN = ZNBMC relationship are unaffected when the motivation to comply scale is scored in
its original bipolar fashion.
tive) reasons for engaging in a behavior in one component and normative

reasons in the second, given at least a pragmatic rationale for separating
attitudinal and social/normative influences in the first place.
Note that we are not suggesting to Fishbein and Ajzen that this is what
rhry should do. They may have other reasons for dividing beliefs up as
they have. It may be, for example. that their model is intended to repre-
sent the process through which behavioral intentions are formed, though
we are unaware of convincing empirical evidence that the model reflects
information processing operations. The conclusion reached in our paper is
that those persons who are interested in distinguishing between personal
and normative reasons for engaging in a given behavior are likely to find
the Fishbein and Ajzen model inadequate.
In concept, an alternative model would only assess beliefs regarding
evaluative aspects of the behavior under consideration. that is. (a) out-
comes that are unrelated to referents‘ responses and (b) outcomes that are
associated with anticipated referent responses. Therefore, researchers
who prefer this conceptualization to Fishbein and Ajzen’s criteria for
distinguishing between personal and social influences would not need to
grapple with the uncertainty of where to place a belief as “My doctor
thinks I should lose weight” (to use an example from the Fishbein and
Ajzen comment paper). Any model or set of measures developed toward
this objective would obviously need to be subjected to appropriate empir-
ical scrutiny to determine, among other things. the adequacy of its separa-
tion of these two sources of influence. The purpose of our paper was to
examine the Fishbein and Ajzen behavioral-intentions model rather than
to demonstrate the advantages of any other model.
A second concern raised in our paper dealt with the difficulty of main-
taining the Fishbein and Ajzen attitude/normative separation empirically.
We concluded that both model components may capture the same source
of influence. The resulting multicollinearity renders Fishbein and Ajzen’s
reliance on regression weight estimates of component importance (for
theory/measure validation as well as prediction) unsound. Substantial
evidence of such multicollinearity exists in their own studies (e.g.. Ajzen
and Fishbein, 1970, 1972). (A common tinding indicative of multicollinear-
ity in these studies is that a model component will often correlate sig-
nificantly with intentions and yet receive an insignificant regression
weight.) The overlap among the measures is also clearly illustrated in our
own data. Multicollinearity makes it difficult to establish whether a two-
factor model (i.e., one that postulates separate attitudinal and normative
components) is superior to a one-factor model (Birnbaum and Mellcrs.
1979).
In their paper, Fishbein and Ajzen devote considerable attention to
both general and specific issues involved in empirically assessing the
degree of overlap among their measures. They state, “it is impossible to
tell, in advance, the exact extent to which a given manipulation or a given

item of information will influence a person’s attitude or subjective norm.”
We do not regard this inability as a strength of their model since the
hypothesized existence of two separate constructs makes it theoretically
desirable, if not necessary, to have an a priori and testable determination
of factors expected to lead to attitudinal and normative effects. So. if a
particular manipulation impacts on both components, it is always possible
after the fact to discover attitudinal or normative implications of that
manipulation and thereby find support for such a theory. To overcome
this problem, two approaches to designing manipulations may be taken.
The first is simply to match each manipulation to the designated measure
as closely as possible though this does not go far in establishing the value
of the construct. The approach we took was to develop manipulations
having quite different personal and normative consequences and then to
run a set of manipulation checks to assess any contamination between the
attitudinal and normative treatments. The manipulation of attitude toward
the object in our experiment, for example, might have impacted upon the
referent’s influence potential since the person and the referent are in
agreement over the behavior in the positive attitude condition but dis-
agreed in the negative attitude condition. These variations in agreement
could conceivably alter the perceived similarity and potential attractive-
ness of the referent and thereby possibly the referent’s power between the
conditions. The paper reports the results of these manipulation checks
which, in this case, revealed no such contamination. Obviously more
manipulation checks could be run. However, we believe that we have
been generally successful in manipulating attitudinal and normative
reasons for engaging in the behavior. Fishbein and Ajzen may be correct
in believing that creating a favorable attitude can lead subjects to believe
that important others expect the person to engage in the behavior. They
take the position that it is not unlikely for a manipulation to affect both A,
and SN. However, we believe that this illustrates the difficulty of keeping
the Fishbein and Ajzen concepts separate and distinct empirically. In-
deed, our paper argues that the empirical overlap is in part a result of
placing all behavioral beliefs in the attitude component and referent ex-
pectations in the normative component, since one by inference often
suggests the other.
In their paper, Fishbein and Ajzen cite the Ajzen and Fishbein (1972)
study to show that it is possible to design manipulations “that may
reasonably be expected to have predictably different effects on the two
components.” They indicate that a given manipulation influenced the
attitude measure without affecting the normative measure. This paper was
written before the concept of subjective norm was introduced, and only
NB was measured. We therefore find this study to be less than compel-
ling. As indicated in our discussion of the various normative measures and
by the results of our experiment, the MC and SN measures are more likely
to be influenced by manipulations of one’s attitude than is NB. Since these
measures were not included in their study, the question of whether a
manipulation can be developed that impacts upon only the A, measure
and not the MC and SN measures is not resolved by this study.“’
In defense of their distinction between the attitudinal and normative
components, Fishbein and Ajzen present several examples which they
feel demonstrate the lack of redundancy among behavioral and normative
beliefs and that this is more than a surface distinction. One of these
examples deals with a situation in which a person believes that buying his
wife a diamond ring would make her happy (in their system this would
lead to a positive attitude). At the same time the husband believes that his
wife thinks he should not buy the ring (this would lead to a negative
subjective norm). This example is obviously incomplete: his wife’s overall
negativity toward his buying the ring stands in marked contrast to his
belief that such behavior would make her happy. Fishbein and Ajzen
parenthetically suggest that possibly the wife feels they cannot afford the
ring. It seems more parsimonious to say that the wife’s summary judg-
ment is negative and that, assuming one wanted to understand this
further, this judgment is based on her more heavily weighted belief that
they can’t afford the ring and the less heavily weighted belief that she
would enjoy wearing it. Assuming that one wanted to understand the
factors impacting on the husband’s behavioral intention, we feel it would
be better to differentiate clearly between the husband’s desire to make his
wife happy out of a sense of gratitude or love (a personal reason) as
opposed to wanting to evoke favorable reactions from her (a normative
reason). Our approach would suggest. then, that the key distinction is not
between a behavioral belief and a referent expectation but between per-
sonal and normative reasons for engaging in a behavior.
In their paper, Fishbein and Ajzen note that the original presentation of
our study design explicitly questioned the construct validity of their
‘” Fishbein and Ajzen contend that the motivational components of their model (i.e.. MC
and e,) should be assessed “independent of the behavior in question.” In part they justify
this by adding that “Neither evaluation nor motivation to comply are used as direct
predictors of intention: they merely modify the behavioral or normative beliefs which are
measured in correspondence with the intention and the behavior.” We do not feel this is a
very persuasive argument: motivation to comply with one’s employer, clergyman. or piano
teacher is likely to be restricted to particular sets of behavior. By the same token. “sweet-
ness” may be perceived as a good thing in certain desserts but may be evaluated negatively
when it comes to wine. In a number of examples in their recent book (e.g.. Ajzen 6i
Fishbein, 1980. p. 269). the authors do in fact ask people to evaluate behaviorally specifc
outcomes (e.g.. “making new nuclear power plants safer than present ones”) rather than
general ones (e.g.. “safety”). Furthermore. they suggest in their paper that perhaps they
should shift their emphasis “from a general to a behavioral domain level of analysis” with
respect to motivation to comply. Whether it will be possible to develop a useful measure of
MC that is not so specific as to tap behavioral intentions is still an open question.
measures. We originally proceeded on the assumption that their measures

should be evaluated in relation to constructs implied by a theory whose
stated goal was to identify and distinguish between personal and social
influences on behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein. 1980, p. 6). We did not see how
Fishbein and Ajzen’s proposed measures could maintain this theoretical
distinction. After we made an earlier version of our paper available to
Fishbein, he argued that while his model distinguished between “a per-
sonal or ‘attitudinal’ factor and a social or ‘normative’ factor“ (Fishbein
& Ajzen, 1975, p. 3011, it did not attempt to separate the effects of
personal and social outcomes or consequences of engaging in a behavior.
It is clear that the authors of a theory have the right to define their
constructs as they see fit. Therefore it is inappropriate to assess the
validity of Fishbein and Ajzen’s measures relative to a more commonly
accepted use of the terms “personal and social influence” rather than
their more limited definition of these terms. By the same token, however.
questions regarding the theoretical significance and usefulness of the
model are given added importance. Whereas we had originally thought
that the underlying theoretical framework was adequate and that most of
the problems were at a measurement level, the clarification provided by
Fishbein forces us to conclude that the conceptualization itself does not
address the needs of those wanting to separate the effects of personal and
social influences on behavioral intention.
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AN EXAMINATION OF THE FISHBEIN-AJZEN MODE12 339
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JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 17, 309-339 ( 1981)

An Examination of the Fishbein-Ajzen Behavioral-

PAUL W. MINIARD AND JOEL B. COHEN

Received April 5. 1979

The Fishbein-Ajzen behavioral-intentions model is designed to represent the

In recent years, the Fishbein-Ajzen behavioral-intentions model has

scaling (Schmidt. 1973) concerns that go directly to the adequacy of the

where b is the belief that performing behavior B leads to consequence or

specifically developed to “reveal their relations to more familiar social

claimed that the components were independent, and informally at least

Thus it appears that attitudinal considerations of engaging in premarital sexual

stock in Company A until a colleague, who you consider to be particularly

expertise correlated significantly with both attitudinal and normative

In summary, neither the conceptual nor operational distinctions offered

information-processing or pragmatic rationale. To explore the degree of

Within a separate normative component. the need for a motivation-to-

between referents) since MC would simply add a constant amount. One of

Levels oj’specijicity for motivation to comply. Fishbein and Ajzen have

Treating MC as a situation-specific construct may also be more concep-

attitudinal component. The study will examine this issue by measuring

Procedure and Independent Variables

Finally, to the extent students, especially males, were unable to “cap-

A,+SN lY3 .55** .0x .5y+- .3s .43**

Motivation to comply (MC)

Limited support for NB’s independence of attitudinal influence was

generally, replacement ofA, with a more restrictive type of measure such

Questionnaire n SN XNB TMC ZNBMC

MCg 57 .51** .I7 .I4 .07

n Row correlations are pooled across all experimental factors.

Questionnaire ,1 XNB Z;NBMC I”’

MCR 51 .JY”* .23 .Oh

there is no difference when MC is measured at a “moderate” level).

a superior prediction of BZ than the more general measure. None of the

adequate to support the separate existence of a normative component as a

Fishbein and Ajzen assert that their theory of behavioral intentions

tive) reasons for engaging in a behavior in one component and normative

tell, in advance, the exact extent to which a given manipulation or a given

measures. We originally proceeded on the assumption that their measures

Schlegel, R. P.. Crawford. C. A., & Sanborn, M. D. Correspondence and mediational

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A,+SN lY3 .55 .0x .5y+- .3s .43