Kinita
CrimRev
4th set
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. BENJAMIN CASAS y
VINTULAN, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 212565 February, 2015
Facts:
Benjamin Casas was charged with
the crime of Murder and Attempted
Homicide under Articles 248 and 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court
convicted him of the crimes charged. The
record shows that Casas went to a certain
TAHO factory looking for a certain Jesus.
Failing to find Jesus, he brandished a knife
and stuck it into a pail used in making TAHO.
As a result, Eligio, an employee of the factory
confronted Casas and told him to get rid of
the knife. Thereafter , Eligio and Casas had a
fist fight. Consequently, Casas was able to
regain and stabbed Eligio twice while the
latter was fleeing. While Casas was in pursuit
of Eligio, he ran into Joel who tried to help
Eligio with the use of bamboo pole. However,
Joel slipped and lay prostrate on the floor.
There and then, Casas stabbed him twice
who eventually died. Casas interpose self-
defense to justify his action of stabbing both
Joel and Eligio alleging that Joel challenged
him into a fight that he stabbed Eligio to
protect himself.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of
Casas for the crimes of Murder and
Attempted Homicide proper.
Held:
No for the crime of Murder and Yes for
the crime of Homicide. The court affirmed
the conviction of Casas of Attempted
Homicide but found the charge of Murder
improper. Casas should only be guilty of the
crime Homicide on killing Joel.
The court first rule on the existence of
criminal liability. There can be no self-defense
unless the victim committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted
self-defense. It was Casas who was actually
the aggressor, as he was the one who
wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio,
then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and again
on Eligio as he was fleeing. The initial fistfight
between Eligio and Casas does not indicate
the unlawful aggression was employed by
the former against the latter considering that
Eligio had already yielded from the brawl
and in fact proceeded to flee. The moment
the fist aggressor runs away, unlawful
aggression on the part of the first aggressor
ceases to exist. The core element of unlawful
aggression was not proven, thus Casas claim
on self-defense falters and his criminal liability
stands.
The court however disagrees that
Casas should be convicted of the crime
Murder with respect to the death of Joel due
to the prosecutions failure to prove the
existence of treachery. The essence of
treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and
unforeseen attack on the victim, without the
slightest provocation on the latter’s part. The
victim must not have known the peril he was
exposed to at the moment of the attack.
Should it appear however, that the victim
was forewarned of the danger he was in and
instead of fleeing from it he met it and was
killed as a result, then the qualifying
circumstance of treachery cannot be
appreciated. He knew that Casas was
armed with a knife and had just used the
same on Eligio. Joel chose to intervene and
even armed himself with a bamboo pole. It is
rather obvious that Joel was aware of the
danger he is about to face. Hence, there
can no treachery. As such, Casas is only
guilty of the crime of Homicide and
Attempted Homicide.
PEOPLE vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, G.R. No.
135981, January 15 2004.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from the killing of Ben
Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa,
appellant herein. During their first year of
marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but
apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the
couple would always quarrel and sometimes
their quarrels became violent. Appellant
testified that every time her husband came
home drunk, he would provoke her and
sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by
her husband, she consulted medical doctors
who testified during the trial. On the night of
the killing, appellant and the victim were
quarreled and the victim beat the appellant.
However, appellant was able to run to
another room. Appellant admitted having
killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant,
however, alleged that the cause of death of
the victim was by beating through the use of
a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense
and defense of her unborn child. After trial,
the Regional Trial Court found appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of parricide with an aggravating
circumstance of treachery and imposed the
penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme
Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court
allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and
the re-examination of the cause of his death;
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(2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, (3) the
inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the
automatic review or, in the alternative, a
partial re-opening of the case a quo to take
the testimony of said psychologists and
psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly
granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of
the appellant. It remanded the case to the
trial court for reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on
the “battered woman syndrome” plea.
Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the
“battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan
and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and
admitted by the trial court and subsequently
submitted to the Supreme Court as part of
the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can
validly invoke the “battered woman
syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the
killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the negative as
appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the “battered woman
syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as
a woman “who is repeatedly subjected
to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce
her to do something he wants her to do
without concern for her rights. Battered
women include wives or women in any
form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as
a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least
twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If
it occurs a second time, and she remains
in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman
syndrome is characterized by the so-
called “cycle of violence,” which has
three phases: (1) the tension-building
phase; (2) the acute battering incident;
and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting
the possibility of self-defense arising from
the battered woman syndrome. First,
each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and
her intimate partner. Second, the final
acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind
an actual fear of an imminent harm from
her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save
her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed probable --
not necessarily immediate and actual --
grave harm to the accused, based on
the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Under the existing facts of the present
case, however, not all of these elements
were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three
phases of the “cycle of violence”
supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa.
No doubt there were acute battering
incidents but appellant failed to prove
that in at least another battering
episode in the past, she had gone
through a similar pattern. Neither did
appellant proffer sufficient evidence in
regard to the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the
syndrome in a relationship does not in
itself establish the legal right of the
woman to kill her abusive partner.
Evidence must still be considered in the
context of self-defense. Settled in our
jurisprudence, is the rule that the one
who resorts to self-defense must face a
real threat on one’s life; and the peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent
and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus,
the Revised Penal Code provides that
the following requisites of self-defense
must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2)
Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3)
Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential
element of self-defense. It presupposes
actual, sudden and unexpected attack
-- or an imminent danger thereof -- on
the life or safety of a person. In the
present case, however, according to
the testimony of Marivic herself, there
was a sufficient time interval between
the unlawful aggression of Ben and her
fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent
behavior and escape to their children’s
bedroom. During that time, he
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apparently ceased his attack and went
to bed. The reality or even the
imminence of the danger he posed had
ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat
on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological
paralysis and passion and obfuscation
were, however, taken in favor of
appellant. It should be clarified that
these two circumstances --
psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise
from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the
cyclical nature and the severity of the
battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse
upon appellant. That is, the repeated
beatings over a period of time resulted
in her psychological paralysis, which was
analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her
acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation, it has been
held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of
an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts
or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as
to overcome reason. To appreciate this
circumstance, the following requisites
should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such
a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not
far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might recover
her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the
resulting offense, treachery must be
proved as conclusively as the killing itself.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that
when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot
be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased
may be said to have been forewarned
and to have anticipated aggression
from the assailant. Moreover, in order to
appreciate alevosia, the method of
assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately
chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without
risk from any defense that might be put
up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced
passion or obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in
the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite
of the fact that she was eight (8) months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed
her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which
overcame her reason and impelled her
to vindicate her life and that of her
unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction of appellant for parricide.
However, considering the presence of
two (2) mitigating circumstances and
without any aggravating circumstance,
the penalty is reduced to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been
detained for more than the minimum
penalty hereby imposed upon her, the
director of the Bureau of Corrections
may immediately RELEASE her from
custody upon due determination that
she is eligible for parole, unless she is
being held for some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by
the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise
known as Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004 was
enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides
that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found
by the courts to be suffering from
battered women syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability
nothwithstanding the absence of any of
the elements for justifying circumstances
of self-defense under the Revised Penal
Code.xxx"
Ty vs People
G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004
Facts:
This case stemmed from the filing of
7 Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against
Ty before the RTC of Manila. The said
accused drew and issue to Manila Doctors’
Hospital to apply on account or for value to
Editha L. Vecino several post-dated checks.
The said accused well knowing that at the
time of issue she did not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such checks in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented
for payment within ninety (90) days from the
date hereof, was subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for “Account Closed”
and despite receipt of notice of such
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dishonor, said accused failed to pay said
Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the
checks or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking
days after receiving said notice.
Ty claimed that she issued the checks
because of “an uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury.” She claims that she was
forced to issue the checks to obtain release
of her mother whom the hospital inhumanely
and harshly treated, and would not
discharge unless the hospital bills are paid.
The trial court rendered judgment against Ty.
Ty interposed an appeal with the CA and
reiterated her defense that she issued the
checks “under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in
avoidance of a greater evil or injury.” The
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court with modification. It set aside the
penalty of imprisonment and instead
sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand
pesos P 60,000.00 equivalent to double the
amount of the check, in each case.
Issue: Whether or not the defense of
uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her
exemption from criminal liability?
Held: No.
Uncontrollable fear - For this exempting
circumstance to be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur: (1)
existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the
fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the
fear of an injury is greater than or at least
equal to that committed.
In the instant case, the evil sought to be
avoided is merely expected or
anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided
is merely expected or anticipated or may
happen in the future, this defense is not
applicable
It must appear that the threat that caused
the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and
imminence that the ordinary man would
have succumbed to it. It should be based on
a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s
life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is
not enough. It should not be speculative,
fanciful, or remote. A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show therefore that
the compulsion was such that it reduced him
to a mere instrument acting not only without
will but against his will as well. It must be of
such character as to leave no opportunity to
the accused for escape.
Speculative fear
The fear harbored by Ty was not real and
imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled
to issue the checks, a condition the hospital
allegedly demanded of her before her
mother could be discharged, for fear that
her mother’s health might deteriorate further
due to the inhumane treatment of the
hospital or worse, her mother might commit
suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Medina
G.R No. 113691
Facts:
June – October 1982, Medina was
confined in the National Mental Hospital for
schizophreniform disorder, where he was
subsequently released. Relatives say that his
condition did not seem to improve. He was
referred to Dr. Adigue for further
examinations. May 20, 1991, 11 pm, a party
was attended by both Dalisay and Medina,
as well as Larry Andal, where the both Dalisay
and Medina danced the chacha together.
Afterwards, Dalisay invited Andal to go
home, with Dalisay walking in front of Larry.
They were waylaid by Medina who stabbed
Dalisay. Dalisay fell down and the two
grappled on the ground. Dalisay was able to
run away but he was chased and once more
stabbed repeatedly by Medina. Andal was
so stunned that he wasn’t able to help
Dalisay, who was brought DOA to the
hospital.
The Trial Court convicted Medina of
murder & said that his defense of insanity is
not meritorious since Dr. Adigue was not
qualified as an expert witness, that his sister’s
testimony didn’t constitute sufficient proof of
insanity, and that he was actually mentally
agile during trial.
Issues:
1. Whether or not medina was insane
therefore exempt from criminal liability.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred
in not appreciating Medina’s voluntary
surrender
Rulings:
1. No. The decision was not based
on the qualifications of Dr. Adigue as a
doctor but as a witness. What mattered was
the failure of Dr. Adigue’s testimony to
establish the legal insanity of Medina as
shown in the results of the tests she
conducted which merely says that Medina
has a mild depression and emotional
disturbances. The testimony also did not
establish the complete deprivation of reason
on Medina’s part. Art. 12, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, requires a complete
deprivation of rationality in committing the
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act; i.e., that the accused be deprived of absence of such document, age may be
reason, that there be no consciousness of based from the information of the child,
responsibility for his acts, or that there be testimonies of other persons, physical
complete absence of the power to discern. appearance and other relevant evidence.
The presumption of law, per Art. 800 of the Also in case of doubt, minority should be in
Civil Code, always lies in favor of sanity, and, favour of the child. In the case at bar,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, every minority was established by the testimonies of
person is presumed to be of sound mind. The the petitioner and his mother. This was not
defense of insanity or imbecility must be objected by the prosecution and did not
clearly proved. Hence, in the absence of even presented contrary evidence. Thus,
positive evidence that the accused had minority is established.
previously lost his reason or was demented The law should be given retroactive
moments prior to or during the perpetration application since this favors the accused as
of the crime, the courts will always presume provided for in the Revised Penal Code –
that he was in a normal state of mind. Care penal laws favouring the accused should be
must be taken to distinguish between insanity given retroactive effect. Hence the
or lack of reason and failure to use reason or accused is considered a minor with an age
good judgment due to extreme anger or of not above 15 years old. The case is
passion. Moral insanity or mere mental dismissed and the petitioner is referred to
depravity – results not from the disease of the the appropriate local social welfare.
mind but from a perverted condition of the
moral system; person is sane and is not
exempted from the criminal liability.
2. The mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should have been
credited in favor of the appellant. The
solicitor general concurs and notes that
appellant, after having earlier given himself
up to a certain Col. Faltado, surrendered at
midnight on May 20, 1992, or about an hour
after the stabbing incident, to Wilfredo
Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batangas
City Police Station. Hence, the evidence
sufficiently established the elements of
voluntary surrender, namely: (1) the offender
has not been actually arrested; (2) he
surrendered himself to a person in authority
or an agent of a person in authority; and (3)
his surrender was voluntary.

Robert Sierra vs People of the Philippines GR

182941 (July 3, 2009)
Facts
Petitioner was 15 years old when he
raped a minor. He was convicted of rape
and was imposed a penalty of imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua and a fine. He
elevated the case to CA and during the
pendence of the case, RA 9344 took effect.
CA affirmed the conviction and denied the
defense of minority since the age was not
established by presenting the birth certificate
but only alleged in the testimonial of the
petitioner and his mother. According to them
the burden of proof of age is upon the
prosecution.
ISSUES
Who has the burden of proof in
establishing the age of the accused?
Whether the law be given retroactive
application.
HELD:
The duty to establish the age of the
accused is not on the prosecution but on the
accused. Age can be established by birth
certificate. Sec. 7 provides that in the

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