G.R. No.

L-56013 October 3, 1987

LIWANAG AGUIRRE, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION), respondents.

CORTES, J:

Petitioner Liwanag Aguirre seeks a review of a Sandiganbayan decision finding him guilty of the
crime of direct bribery which is punishable under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Information filed against him reads:

THAT on or about November 24, 1978, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then an Acting Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and obtain
from one Hermogenes Hanginon, an employee of the business firm Guardsman
Security Agency, the sum of FIFTY (P50.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, as a
consideration for the said accused refraining, as he did refrain, from immediately
implementing a Writ of Execution of a final judgment of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Branch XI against said security agency
in NLRC Case No. 905-MC-XI-78 that the accused, in the performance of his
office as such Deputy Sheriff, should have immediately implemented the said writ
of execution by then and there immediately seizing personal property of the
judgment-debtor Guardsman Security Agency, to satisfy the judgment. (Rollo, pp.
33-34)

After petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the charge, the case proceeded to trial. Thereafter, on
the basis of the aforequoted Information and the evidence adduced during the trial the
Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner as principal of the crime charged. The lower court
appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any
aggravating circumstance, in favor of the petitioner and sentenced him to:

. . .Two (2) Months and One (1) Day of Arresto mayor; with the accessories
provided by law: to suffer special temporary disqualification for Six (6) Years and
One (1) Day; to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00), with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 5465; to indemnify Hermogenes Hanginon in the
same amount of Fifty Pesos (P50.00); and, to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 50)

Petitioner in this case assails the judgment of conviction upon the ground that the evidence
presented failed to prove his guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. The main
thrust of the Petition is that the Sandiganbayan erred in giving weight to the uncorroborated
testimony of the lone prosecution witness.

In certiorari proceedings under Rule 45, the findings of fact of the lower court as well as its
conclusions on credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed, the question before the Court
being limited to questions of law (Rule 45, Sec. 2). Specifically, the conclusions of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses are given considerable weight, since said court is in the best
position to observe the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial [People v.
Refuerzo, 82 Phil. 576 (1949); People v. Gumahin 128 Phil. 728 (1967), 21 SCRA 729; People v.
Mercado, L-39511, April 28, 1980, 97 SCRA 2321]. However, this court may choose to pass
upon the credibility of a witness if it appears from the decision under review that the trial court
has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the
result of the case [People v. Alban, L-15203, March 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 931; People v. Espejo, L-
27708, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400, People v. Garcia, L-44364, April 27, 1979; People vs.
Mercado, supra People v. Dagangon, G.R. No. 62654-58, November 13,1986,145 SCRA 464].

In the instant case, the conviction is anchored upon the uncorroborated testimony of a single
prosecution witness. The Sandiganbayan justifies its reliance upon said testimony, thus:

. . . (E)ven as witness Hanginon's version stands sans corroboration, the same is

sufficiently impeccable and carries the ring of truth. He could not have been
mistaken as to the time and circumstances of the visit of the accused to the office
of the Agency and nothing in his demeanor and reactions during his sojourn on
the witness stand tends to suggest that the story he threshed exit in open Court
was a fabrication . . . The forthright and spontaneous manner with which the
version of the prosecution witness, as advanced by Hanginon, was diclosed and
recorded speaks well of the veracity thereof. More importantly, no sufficient and
compelling motive had been pointed to which could have impelled witness
Hanginon to deliberately perjure himself and consciously impute the commission
of a nefarious offense to an innocent man and thus railroad him to a stretch in jail
. . . (Rollo, pp. 40-41).

The constitutional presumption of innocence imposes upon this Court the duty to ascertain in
every case that no person is made to answer for a crime without proof of his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt [Constitution, Article III, Sec. 14 (2)]. To overcome this constitutional
presumption and to justify a criminal conviction, there must exist in the record, "that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" [Rule 133, Sec. 2; Rule 131, Sec. 2].

That the prosecution evidence consists of the testimony of a single witness does not necessarily
indicate insufficiency of evidence to convict. It is settled that the testimony of only one witness
may be sufficient to support a conviction if it convinces the court beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused committed the crime charged [U.S. v. Dacotan 1 Phil. 669 (1903); U.S. v. Olais, 36
Phil. 828 (1917); People v. Argana 119 Phil. 573 (1964), 10 SCRA 311; People v. Salazar, G.R.
No. L-32858, Aug. 19, 1974, 58 SCRA 467; People v. Tan, Jr., G.R. No. 53834, November 24,
1986, 145 SCRA 614].

However, there are aspects of the testimony of the sole witness in this case that do not inspire
belief. It appears unnatural for the petitioner to have demanded a bribe from him, a mere
employee of the security agency, without authority to accept any writ or legal paper and without
money. It is also doubtful if said employee could have voluntarily parted with his personal funds
without any expectation of refund. Furthermore, no entrapment was employed in this situation
where it could have been quite easy to catch the petitioner red-handed with the bribe money. As
testified to by Hanginon, petitioner allegedly told him that the balance of the P200 Pesos bribe
money was to be delivered at the Davao Famous Restaurant upon the arrival of the owner of the
agency (Rollo, pp. 206-207). If, according to this witness the owner had decided to press charges
and had gone to his legal counsel the day after his (the owner's) arrival (Rollo, p. 207), why was
the police not called in to entrap the petitioner at the place indicated by him? That would have
been a more logical and usual procedure in preparing for the prosecution of a bribery case which
almost always suffers from a dearth of witnesses.

The petitioner, in his defense, asserts that there is serious dispute as to the fact of the
commission of the offense; that the uncorroborated testimony of Hermogenes Hanginon fails to
prove its commission and the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and that notice of
garnishment had been served upon the bank for satisfaction of the NLRC's judgment against the
Guardsman Security Agency before the alleged bribery took place
After careful examination of the decision under review, the pleadings filed and the evidence
relied on, the nagging doubt remains as to whether the testimony of Hanginon, the sole witness
for the prosecution, proves the petitioner's guilt. As aptly observed in People v. Opida, "The
scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact should be tipped in favor of the accused because
of the constitutional presumption of innocence." [G. R. No. L-46272, June 13, 1986, 142 SCRA
295, 303].

This Court finds that in the absence of evidence establishing the guilt of the petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt, the judgment of conviction under review must yield to the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) is

REVERSED. Liwanag Aguirre is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 163656 : April 27, 2007]

MARINA B. SCHROEDER, Petitioner, v. ATTYS. MARIO A.

SALDEVAR and ERWIN C. MACALINO, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated October 30, 2003
and the Resolution2 dated May 6, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 63418, entitled "Attys. Mario A. Saldevar and
Erwin C. Macalino v. Hon. Lydia Querubin-Layosa, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge, Branch 217, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, The Ombudsman, The Department of Justice, National
Bureau of Investigation, and Marina B. Schroeder," that partly set
aside the Order3 dated October 30, 2000 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-0-00-1090 [I.S. No. 98-394].

The pertinent facts are as follows.

Petitioner Marina B. Schroeder owns a liquor store in Robinson's

Galleria, Pasig City. Respondents Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C.
Macalino are the Legal Division Chief and Attorney II,
respectively, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Revenue District
Office No. 7 in Quezon City.
Sometime in 1998, respondents were arrested by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment
operation conducted upon petitioner's complaint.

After inquest, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed in the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, an information
for direct bribery against respondents. The case was remanded to
the DOJ for preliminary investigation.

The DOJ issued a Resolution4 finding probable cause to indict

respondents for direct bribery. Aggrieved, respondents filed in the
DOJ a Petition for Review of the said Resolution. The DOJ,
however, endorsed the petition to the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman treated the Petition for Review as a motion for

reconsideration of the aforesaid DOJ Resolution. It denied the
Petition for Review for lack of merit, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding no merit to the

Petition for Review of public respondents Mario A. Saldevar and
Erwin C. Macalino, treated herein as a motion for reconsideration
of the Resolution of the Department of Justice, Manila, dated 07
June 1999, in I.S. No. 98-394 [Crim. Case No. Q-98-76453],
finding probable cause to continue with the prosecution in court
of said respondents for Direct Bribery, the same [Petition for
Review a.k.a. Motion for Reconsideration] is hereby DENIED, with
finality.

SO ORDERED.5

Respondents filed in the Court of Appeals a petition

for certiorari and mandamus . The appellate court found no
probable cause against respondent Saldevar, but upheld the
finding of probable cause against respondent Macalino. The
dispositive portion of its assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED insofar as

petitioner Mario A. Saldevar is concerned. Accordingly, the order
of the Ombudsman dated October 30, 2000 finding probable
cause to prosecute said petitioner for direct bribery
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The subject order
is AFFIRMED in all other aspects.
SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted

Decision, but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant
petition raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING

THAT THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST RESPONDENT
SALDEVAR; and

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT

SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN FINDINGS FOR THE FINDINGS OF
PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE PROSECUTORIAL ARMS OF THE
GOVERNMENT.7

Petitioner contends that the determination of probable cause is an

executive function lodged with the prosecutorial arm of the
government, not with the judiciary. Petitioner argues the
evidence on record clearly establish probable cause to indict
Saldevar with Macalino. Petitioner stresses Saldevar need not
actually demand and receive the marked money in order for him
to be indicted for direct bribery. Petitioner adds that since
respondents never ascribed any ill motive to the NBI agents who
conducted the entrapment operation, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties applies.

Respondents, however, insist that the DOJ erred in endorsing the

Petition for Review to the Ombudsman. They aver that the
Ombudsman cannot deny the Petition for Review filed in the DOJ.
Respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals can determine
probable cause because the DOJ erred in not resolving the
Petition for Review . They also point out that the Ombudsman
glossed over the issue of illegal arrest. Respondents posit that the
operation conducted by the NBI was an instigation, not an
entrapment.

We find the petition meritorious.

In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises
wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case
should be filed in court. Courts must respect the exercise of such
discretion when the information filed against the person charged
is valid on its face, and no manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.8 As a rule,
courts cannot interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion in the
conduct of preliminary investigations. In the determination of
probable cause, the Ombudsman's discretion prevails over judicial
discretion.9

In this case, there being no clear showing of manifest error or

grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman in
finding probable cause against Saldevar for direct bribery, the
Court of Appeals erred in supplanting the Ombudsman's
discretion with its own.

Probable cause is simply the existence of such facts and

circumstances as would excite a belief that a crime has been
committed and that the person charged is probably guilty of the
said crime.10 In this case, sufficient evidence on record clearly
shows the existence of probable cause against Saldevar. Contrary
to the appellate court's theory, Saldevar need not actually
demand and receive the bribe money in order for him to be
indicted for direct bribery. Mere belief, after weighing the relevant
facts and circumstances, that Saldevar probably committed direct
bribery suffices for the establishment of probable cause. Whether
he is indeed guilty of direct bribery is a different matter, which
can properly be determined at a full blown trial on the merits of
the case.

Furthermore, note that the Ombudsman's findings are essentially

factual in nature. Hence, when respondents assailed the said
findings before the Court of Appeals on the contention that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, respondents
clearly raised questions of fact. Respondents' arguments zeroed
in on the Ombudsman's appreciation of facts. It bears stress that
a petition for certiorari admits only of questions of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Therefore,
the Court of Appeals should have, in the first place, dismissed
respondents' petition for certiorari on the ground that it raised
questions of fact.
Lastly, we are not prepared to indulge respondents' insistence
that the DOJ cannot endorse to the Ombudsman the Petition for
Review of the abovementioned DOJ Resolution. The
Ombudsman's power to investigate and to prosecute is plenary
and unqualified.11 It pertains to any act or omission of any public
officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, or improper.12 In this case, respondents are public
officers charged with the commission of a crime. The DOJ
Resolution, subject of the Petition for Review, found probable
cause against respondents for the crime of direct bribery. The
Ombudsman thus acted within its authority in taking over the
said Petition for Review .

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated October 30, 2003 and Resolution dated May 6, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63418 are SET ASIDE. The
October 30, 2000 Order13 of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-00-1090
[I.S. No. 98-394], finding no merit and denying the Petition for
Review of herein respondents and finding probable cause to indict
respondents Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino for direct
bribery, is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1 Rollo, pp. 38-50.

2 Id. at 52.

3 CA rollo, pp. 23-36.

4 Id. at 102-111.

5
Id. at 35.

6 Rollo, p. 50.

7 Id. at 353.

8
People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 475, 493.

9 Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 443, 466.

10 Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NOS. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 533, 550.
11 Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, G.R. NOS. 145957-68, January 25, 2002, 374 SCRA 691, 694.

12 Id.

13
CA rollo, pp. 23-26.